

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Dressing for the Party: Clothing, Citizenship, and Gender-formation in Mao's China[1]

Tina Mai Chen

The prevailing vision of the sartorial landscape of China under the leadership of Mao Zedong is one of masses of peasants and workers dressed in Mao suits of navy blue, khaki green, or grey. The uniformity of the clothes and the subdued colors represent an imagined homogeneity across the time and space of the Chinese nation from 1949 to 1976. Scholars of the period join Chinese citizens and Chinese Communist Party propagandists in perpetuating the image of Chinese communist fashion as differentiated by ethnicity but largely undifferentiated by class, gender, or age.[2] Clothing of the Maoist period often elicits remarks about the "sexless" and "shapeless" appearance of society, while those concerned with dress in twentieth-century China generally prefer to focus their

analytical gaze on pre-1949 cosmopolitan urban culture or the post-1976 "re-emergence" of Chinese fashion.[3] Examination of the sartorial ideals promulgated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from 1949 to 1966, however, reveals a more dynamic discourse than that which has come to dominate CCP and Western characterizations of the period.

Despite the ways in which Maoist fashion is remembered, a lack of conformity to this idealized homogeneity figured prominently as an integral component of the historical period in question. Diversity in clothing represented more than an instance of political and social liberalization in the mid-1950s or an expression of subversive individuality against newly emerging norms. Both vestimentary uniformity and carefully explicated difference informed CCP-sanctioned clothing options. As a nodal point in the interplay between citizenship, the politics of nation-building, and gender-formation, clothing participated in the creation of socialist citizens to populate the new nation. Premised on the dual goals of eliding and reinforcing difference, the project of creating a national citizenry thus challenges and reinforces the ideal of a uniformly clad



Figure 1
"Sexless" and "Shapeless" female comrades. *China Reconstructs*, March–April 1952, p. 23.

populace. The following analysis of communist fashion in the early Maoist period (1949–66) thus provides a twofold critique of the perceived homogeneity of the sartorial landscape by (a) exploring the socio-political meanings of discontinuous clothing options and (b) examining the politics of uniformity in the sartorial landscape of Mao's China.

An examination of state-sponsored clothing options promoted by the CCP uncovers diversity across the time and space of post-1949 China. Undoubtedly, the clothing choices made by individuals on a daily basis are also significant in understanding the sartorial practices of this period. A primary focus on contestation between official discourse and everyday practice as the main location of diversity in communist-era fashion, however, risks reinforcing an oppositional relationship between official sartorial discourse and everyday practice. This dichotomy effectively supports rather than questions the notion of an official uniformity that dominates post-1976 understandings of clothing in Mao's China.

My study, by contrast, interrogates the socio-political meanings of official uniformity and difference. It focuses on ideal(ized) dress as presented by the CCP from 1949 to 1966 in sources such as newspapers, photographs, posters, and film costumes. Attention to the clothing worn by representatives of the new nation in propaganda materials reveals that the CCP desired "the people" to dress for the Party in varied ways. This variety in attire compels analysis of the complex relationship within official sartorial discourse between the CCP as the vanguard, Party members as universalized models, and "the people" as the constituents of the new socialist society. We need to ask how the clothing of the socialist model simultaneously covered and uncovered hierarchies within the national body politic.

An answer to this question highlights the centrality of fashion in the constructive process of citizenship as a gendered, raced, and classed concept. In addition to displaying one's inclusion in, or exclusion from, the national community of socialist China, clothing choices placed one in particular locations within the national community. Through the propaganda materials produced for national emulation campaigns that promoted models of the new society, the CCP provided normative standards of dress and appearance that explicitly linked clothing to location in the citizenry. Institutionalized categories such as peasant, worker, soldier tended to assume specific standardized appearances in photographs, posters, film representations, or drawings: the female peasant dressed in cotton floral top, the male industrial worker in blue coveralls, and the male People's Liberation Army soldier in army green uniform.

Propaganda materials—as a socialist form of advertising—showcased not only communist clothing but also a comprehensive image consonant with the politics and aesthetics of the period. The materials literally fashioned the multiple subjects of the Chinese national narrative. The CCP understood clothing and those who wore it in relation to the national

revolutionary project. The materialization of the human experience as reflected in the clothed body reinforced the proposition that body and material dress could not be separated. Rather, clothing and sartorial discourse were forces in the unstable process of making order in the new society.[4] In this respect, a focus on fashion benefits from Ban Wang's superb analysis of the aesthetic-political framework in communist China. Ban Wang argues that in communist China "politics does not borrow the garb of aesthetics to dress itself up but is itself fleshed out as a form of art and symbolic activity" (Wang 1997). The "fleshing out" of politics as the symbolic activity of nation-building thus also requires analysis of the clothed body in the aestheticization of politics. To become a subject of history, a maker of the socialist future, entailed learning how to dress appropriately for one's interpellation into the revolutionary picture.

Class and the Aesthetics of the National Body

Dressing for the Party entailed living the image of the future socialist nation. The CCP represented this socialist nation, in part, as redress for various forms of oppression and contamination, including feudalism, imperialism, patriarchy, capitalism, and "revisionism." This characterization stressed the new class character of socialist China that differentiated it from the class inequalities of other social orders. Bin Zhao, a recent scholar of consumerism and communism in China, reiterates the dominant assessment of the effect of the new class character on fashion in Mao's China. "Fashion, regarded as bourgeois in origin and surplus to authentic human needs, was for many years more or less abolished, which turned China into a country of people dressed in grey, black, white, army green, and navy blue—the color scheme of Chinese puritan communism" (Zhao 1997). Bin Zhao reproduces conventional associations and oppositions: the muted colors of a self-sacrificing socialist society versus the colorful bourgeois self-indulgent individual. He draws with broad strokes a homogenized picture of the Chinese populace.

As Bin Zhao also remarks, however, socialism shares with capitalism roots in the Enlightenment and a commitment to material progress. Albeit in a different guise than capitalist modernization, socialism embraces modernization and developmental theories as a component of the transformation of nation and individual. As a result, notions of progress infused sartorial discourse and enlivened the drabness associated with Chinese puritan communism. Class and clothing were intimately linked, but they were also tied to understandings of historical progress. In the immediate post-1949 period, the CCP lauded the return of textile factories to Chinese ownership as illustrative of a new economic era, an era in which the Party delivered to the Chinese people national autonomy and modernization. Nationalization and subsequent development of textile

industries in the 1950s seemed to provide an answer to the difficult question of how to produce clothing for socialist China. The CCP claimed to have created for the people the material preconditions for a new aesthetic (Fang 1954).

Success in overturning the economic base of the bourgeoisie through class struggle constituted a key component of CCP discussions of fashion choices. Regardless of the veracity of CCP pronouncements that legitimated particular styles as redress for past oppression, these elements of the sartorial discourse, in Antonia Finnane's words, "were necessary to the creation of an ideological space for the reception of a new clothing ethic."[5] Notably, apparel designated as *passé* because bourgeois or feudal fell from favor not because of seasonal fashion time but according to campaign time.[6] Items such as the Mao suit, *qipao*, or brightly colored tops acquired meaning through class categories that were being reinforced and rethought in relation to past and present clothing as well as specific campaign needs. Even though the cycles differed from those marking time in the international fashion industry, in keeping with the time sense of fashion cycles, one always sought to shed the accouterments of the past in favor of those of the present and, better yet, the future. Determining how to style the new fabrics and dress the nation's people therefore was concomitant with class struggle, nation building, and a historical teleology leading to the socialist future.

One element of dress, color, acquired a particularly clear resonance with historical progress and the category of class. It also vividly displayed the intimate relationship between class and gender. During the "Aid Korea, Resist America" campaign of 1950–1953, male village leaders encouraged women to participate in patriotic efforts of selling cotton to the nation with the following appeal: "Do you want to wear flower-print dresses? . . . Then we must sell our cotton to the government, which will send to it the mills to have fine cloth woven and printed for you" (*China Reconstructs* 1952). Official rhetoric linked female consumer desire for colorful dresses to patriotism. The CCP asserted that contributions to the nation would also benefit the individual by improving her wardrobe. The individual as consumer therefore held a legitimate position in society, even if the nation could not fully meet the needs of the consumer during the periods of economic reconstruction (1949–1952) and the Korean War (1950–1953).

The consumer goods movement, initiated in 1956 on a national level to increase the quality and variety of consumer goods, then further established intimate links, for women, between patriotic expression and consumption. *Fulian* (the All China Women's Federation) and the Youth League sponsored a national style movement; *New Observer*, a Beijing fortnightly, featured a fashion advice column; and *China's Youth* showcased new styles in a Saturday section entitled "*The Weekend*." Moreover, the *New Observer* forum conveyed approval from the Party for these forays into the world of fashion. In response to the reader query

whether or not to dress nicely was bourgeois, party officials assured the readership that "bourgeois people wear handsome clothes to show they have plenty of money. But why should they be the only ones to dress nicely? In a socialist society, people can dress well too. . . . It's poor-spirited to dress carelessly."[7] To dress with care, however, entailed advertisement and implementation of malleable standards of dress.

The *New Observer* forum and subsequent materials that emphasized color and prints as signifiers of national prosperity and patriotism contrasted sharply with that which was considered appropriate patriotic appearance during the Cultural Revolution. A true patriot in the late 1960s immersed herself in national projects to the exclusion of individual desires, specifically those encouraged by the consumer goods movement. Anchee Min, in her autobiographical novel *Red Azalea*, recalled the beauty and daring of Little Green. "She was daring. Dared to decorate her beauty. She tied her braids with colorful strings while the rest of us tied our braids with brown rubber bands. Her femininity mocked us."[8] Little Green not only deviated from norms of dress through colorful adornment, she also shunned utilitarian notions of clothing by carefully embroidering pretty underwear made from remnants of fabric, tapering her shirt at the waist, and remaking her trousers so that her legs would appear longer. Her concern for her body, clothes, and sexuality challenged the dominant idea of the late 1960s that a "communist should never care about the way she looked. The beauty of the soul was that which should be cared about."[9] Her actions, however, might very well have been perceived in the mid-1950s as a patriotic celebration of a vibrant new China.

Brightly colored shirts can be seen in the 1950s and the Cultural Revolution period on both men and women in official photographs, posters, and pictures. The Party, however, directed its exhortations to don a variety of hues first and foremost toward women. Harriet Evans reads this association of women and color as a discounting of women as serious revolutionary contenders. She argues that the "visual imbrication between the female, color, and clothing could also be seen as a means of reinforcing familiar hierarchical associations."[10] I agree that the fascination with female dress points to a tension within official rhetoric between state-sponsored feminism and the (ab)use of "conventional femininity." The meaning of color, however, is more unstable than Evans suggests in her reading of propaganda posters. Color held various simultaneously circulating class-based associations that legitimated, delegitimated, and ordered subject positions through gender and class norms. At some times, color marked national progress, while at others it indicated bourgeois and revisionist thinking on the part of an individual. Like clothing more generally, the color and print of the cloth sat at the nexus of citizenship, national identity, and gender-formation. All of these interacted with specific understandings of the progressive potential of class struggle and the attendant relationship between the Party and the citizen.

Dressing Female Socialist Citizens

An examination of the female model proves to be an instructive way to understand the relationship between clothing, color, and citizenship. Women attained an institutionalized position beside men in the new China: the triumvirate of worker, peasant, and soldier did not deviate from the norm of female peasant, male worker, and male soldier. But the clothing worn by the three representatives did vary as norms of dress for the three constituents of "the people" changed. In a poster published on 1 January 1952 extending wishes for longevity to the People's Republic of China, the peasant woman donned a cotton flower-printed top in cross-over style with toggled closures on the right side (*Zhongguo Qingnian bao* 1952). The top, cut in a boxy shape, fell just below her hips and was worn over dark trousers and cotton shoes. Her hair was cut in a shoulder-length bob.[11] The male worker, at the apex of the formation, wore a white cotton shirt with buttons down the center and sleeves rolled up past his elbow, dark trousers, and black leather shoes.[12] The male soldier was dressed in military uniform with a structured cap, a belted jacket with center buttons, dark trousers, and black leather boots. Only the clothing of the woman incorporated bright color and print.

Generally, model women's clothing in the immediate post-Liberation years included cotton-printed tops with toggled closures on the right, white cotton shirts with center buttons and waist darts, and the stereotypical Mao jacket. In the official press, references to floral-printed cotton fabrics revealed an early ambiguity around such fabrics and their place in a new national imaginary. Printed, embroidered, and colorful blouses, often hand-made, had been associated with rural areas, the peasantry, minority groups, and traditional clothing. While the Party celebrated these groups as constituents of socialist society, it simultaneously perpetrated notions of the backwardness of rural and minority life prior to liberation by the CCP.[13] Modernization, therefore, required that these fabrics and those who wore them be transported across the divide between the old and the new China if they were to retain a place in the new society. But by 1952, printed cloth had acquired the requisite new social meaning for continued circulation, as it became tied to economic self-sufficiency through the industrialization of the Chinese nation.

The Chinese Communist Party represented mass consumption of factory-made printed cloth as indicative of the new age ushered in by the Party (Hsu 1954). The Party told a story in which, during the pre-liberation years, foreign imperialists primarily concerned with exploiting cheap Chinese labor dominated the textile industry. As a result, even cotton-growers often lacked clothing. Very few Chinese could afford a new set of clothes more than once in several years, and rarely could they purchase material produced by fellow Chinese workers in the modern factories. The CCP claimed to have effected a radical break in this cycle of production by building factories owned by "the people" in

cotton-growing areas throughout the country (as opposed to coastal port cities alone). Women working in factories, particularly the textile industry, when photographed or otherwise depicted by the local and national newspapers, now tended to wear cotton tops with geometric patterns or plain white shirts under a cotton smock. The white shirts denoted a modern, urban location with their crisp lines, while the new prints set the women's smocks off from those derived from traditional embroidery patterns and worn by their rural counterparts.[14] Clothing made from factory-produced printed cloth marked the women who wore it as progressive; they were models of socialist modernity.

This narrative within which the consumption of cloth was located reflected concern not only with what was produced and consumed but how it was produced and for whom. State-owned mills brought modern equipment, standards, and lifestyles to China's people as wages increased, prices of Chinese-produced consumer goods decreased, and the buying power of all workers, urban and rural, expanded.[15] The ability of the CCP to meet consumer demands signified the successful transformation of China into an autonomous modern nation. Consumption occurred within a socialist framework and, at least in CCP rhetoric, demonstrated the superiority of egalitarian policies over exploitative capitalist consumerism.

As socialist modernization progressed, the CCP continued to legitimate these desires by portraying the Party's ability to meet them as yet one more instance in which the Party served the people. In 1954, one article reported to the international community:

> The people want textiles of many weaves and colours. To meet the demand, a number of dyeing and cloth-printing mills have been built. Cotton prints of over a thousand different patterns are now on sale. One dyeing plant in Sian specializes in the bright colours—scarlet, green, purple and sky-blue—favoured by the minority peoples. Another, which will soon begin work this year in Chungking, can do six-colour printing and handle 6,000 bolts of cloth a day.
>
> The output of old and new mills in 1954 will be enough to provide each one of China's more than 500 million people with about 29 feet of cotton material. This is twice the peak pre-war per capita production, reached in 1936.[16]

To be clothed in the new factory-made cloth signified participation in the new economy. It indicated support of the new regime and promoted close relations between citizen-as-consumer, Party, and nation. The above passage does not divorce patriotism from a consuming subject, because it foregrounds redress for economic imperialism as the precondition of consumption. At this particular historical moment, the link between colorful clothing and consumer desires did not acquire a negative class label. Official policies produced the citizen-as-consumer (discursively and

materialistically) as a legitimate subject of national history. Moreover, the vibrant picture painted for the international audience of the new China reinforced the positive value assigned to colorful dress as a signifier of historical progress and prosperity. What we must note at this juncture is that bright colors and consumer culture did not have a fixed socio-political meaning nor an *a priori* class categorization.

The type and color of cloth out of which one's clothes were made acquired further social significance for the domestic and international communities as it was modeled by the nation's exemplars. Selection of model workers assumed a prominent position in CCP campaigns for progress and therefore their appearance and behavior came under the close scrutiny of the Party.[17] National and international presentation of models of socialist modernization entailed that these citizens in particular display appropriate dress for various audiences. The role of colorful and diverse clothing in their wardrobes, however, differed from that discussed above in relation to the new textile industry and the dress-reform campaign of the mid-1950s. Photographs of China's first female tractor driver and national model worker, Liang Jun, depicted her predictably wearing cloth cap, loose light-colored trousers, dark padded jacket, and kerchief.[18] Or else the alternative head shots accompanying her story showed a fresh but serious young face with hair either bobbed or in two plaits, depending on her age.[19] Likewise, in photographs and pictorial depictions from the early 1950s, Tian Guiying, China's first female train conductor, clearly modeled the clothing of the industrial patriot. She wore a soft cloth cap, a casually belted Mao jacket (decorated with chrysanthemums in one instance), and baggy trousers.[20] In each instance, the clothing of China's new women replicated that of the male industrial workers pictured in the vicinity.[21] The rise to national fame of Liang Jun and Tian Guiying stressed the equality of men and women, as the CCP linked women's emancipation to work and, in its most "advanced" form, industrial development. This can then be read as the erasure of gender difference and the equalization of class, as women such as Liang Jun and Tian Guiying embodied through dress and actions the dictum that "whatever men can do, women can do too."

The intimate link between claims to successful economic modernization and the dress of the female population, which encouraged color and neutral uniformity at the same time, attained yet another dimension as model women traveled outside China. As a frequent delegate to the All-China Federation of Women and international meetings, Liang Jun recalled the preparation that preceded her departure for a model workers' conference she was to attend in the Soviet Union in 1951.[22] The Party instructed Liang Jun to purchase new clothes for the meeting and provided funds for this task. Liang Jun, having never bought new clothes before, failed in her first attempt when she returned with a new set of work clothes in the characteristic blue cotton. She was directed, among other things, to have a *qipao* made for the occasion.



Figure 2
Tian Guiying, China's first female locomotive driver. "Xin Zhongguo de Nu Huoche (New China's Female Train Conductor), *Xin Zhongguo Funu* (New China's Women), February 1956, p.1.

Although Liang Jun told this story as an amusing anecdote, the concern by the Party for her personal appearance indicates an important link between personal and public appearance in the production of the national subject. CCP practice, in the case of Liang Jun, suggested that a diverse wardrobe could reflect success according to socialist norms set by the CCP rather than a bourgeois proclivity for self-indulgence. Furthermore, to be a "modern model" dressing for the Party required the economic means and fashion savvy to select the appropriate clothing for particular audiences and functions. To be a model entailed more than dressing in cotton work clothes or Mao suit on all occasions regardless of age, gender, or occupation. For women workers clothing choices required knowing for whom one needed to be a *woman* worker and for whom one was simply a worker. In this realm of gendered sartorial decisions, as in all others, the Party promised to guide the people. The Party provided Liang Jun with the monetary and cultural capital to determine what clothing

was appropriate to her various responsibilities. Photographs of a fashionable Liang Jun then reiterated the lesson for the people more generally.

Clothing options modeled by Liang Jun, on the individual and national level, stemmed from confidence in the existence of a strong proletarian consciousness. Liang Jun first proved herself to be an ideal "new woman" of China in her commitment to socialist development and in the ways in which her body was physically re-shaped to meet any associated challenges.[23] As a result, fashions with ambiguous credentials, such as the *qipao*, when draped over this re-formed body found new meaning as the formal attire of women whose proletarian credentials were beyond reproach.[24] Similarly, for the nation, brightly colored printed fabrics rose to prominence as a result of socialist construction and the transformation of China's economy. The Party presented these fabrics as the luxuries earned by a disciplined productive national body. The Party further suggested that a nationally autonomous textile industry rendered luxuries of an earlier age the goods of the masses in the new socialist age. Fashion options thereby shared in the optimism occasioned by early economic success and the rapid and seemingly effective overthrow of old orders, inequalities, and scarcities. Socialist modernization did not run counter to diverse wardrobes as long as diversity was understood in terms of the sartorial discourse of the period.

In this optimistic mood, fashion columns, in conjunction with the national drive to improve consumer goods and the "beautification" campaign of the mid-1950s, began to suggest new styles for the female population. It is important to note, however, that these fashions did not seek to replace or offer a fundamental challenge to the utilitarian work outfit of trousers and blouse or Mao jacket. Rather, new women's fashions usually appeared as alternatives to be enjoyed during times of leisure such as the weekend. These articles suggested a complementary relationship between the gender-differentiated clothing of international and leisure spaces and the more androgynous clothing reserved for revolutionary work and national construction. Moreover, this notion of complementarity between gendered components of one's own wardrobe and lifestyle also extended to reassertion of gendered roles in the family, as has been noted by Harriet Evans.[25]

Young women modeling the new hairstyles, dress fashions, and leather shoes in the pages of newspapers tended to be photographed in urban settings and were rarely at work.[26] While this background suggests a privileged position in society, the written texts accompanying the introduction of the new fashions sutured the particular setting to a universalized body by asserting that these garments held a place among the masses. Patriotic consumption did not explicitly underline these texts, as in the earlier-quoted references from the early 1950s. Rather, the descriptions coded them as practical and economical and reinforced the notion that these were the fashions of a disciplined and rational citizen. The attractiveness of the garments was an added feature. A retreat from the potential

bourgeois implications of the articulation of attractiveness to a sexualized femininity marked the sartorial discourse. The official rhetoric strove to inscribe the new styles into a narrative of national development that spoke of desire in terms of service by the Party to the people and vice versa rather than individual and sexualized desire for objects and others.

Despite efforts to code the new styles as available to all citizens, the ability to wear the new dresses to work depended upon one's occupation. It was not an option for those engaged in labor associated with heavy industry or farming—the very industries privileged as the foundation of the nation. Cotton-factory workers were occasionally pictured wearing a printed cotton dress under their white smocks, whereas female model workers who had pushed forward socialist modernization in heavy industry proudly wore padded Mao jackets and cloth caps.[27] The presence of pretty new fashions in the workplace as sanctioned by the Party in the mid-1950s thus reinforced a gendered division between types of work and an attendant hierarchy that placed lesser value on feminized industries and work. Unlike the ordinary cotton-mill worker of the 1950s, women such as Liang Jun contributed to modernization through participation in heavy industry and as a model worker acquired a larger wardrobe. She, however, did not disrupt entirely the norms of peasant and proletarian dress in everyday life because of her specific occupation and the supplementary role of her non-uniform clothing. Color, printed patterns, and new dresses showcased and expressed nationalistic attitudes; but they remained only one component through which the citizen of the socialist nation was produced.

National Uniformity: Dressing the Revolutionary

Alternative sets of clothes for moments of leisure, work, or official business demonstrated a movement in socialist modernization toward increased diversity in the female wardrobe. A parallel, but reverse, process in which women exchanged one set of clothes for another more uniform set also occurred in the 1950s. A fuller wardrobe connoted success; but so did the ownership of particular styles of clothing, namely the Communist Party or PLA uniform (or, for youth, the red scarf (*honglingjin*) of the Young Pioneers).

Hao Jianxiu, a young woman spinner, attained national status as a model worker by developing new scientific methods for use in the nation's spinning industry. Hao Jianxiu, as a result, acquired a new uniform when formal recognition was bestowed upon her for her exemplary work. In a pictorial representation of the story of Hao Jianxiu she changed from her work clothes (a geometrically patterned cotton blouse under a white smock) into a belted Mao suit for attendance at a national model workers' convention (*Xin Zhongguo Funu* 1951). The storyline reached its climax at the moment Hao Jianxiu exchanged her smock, trousers, and blouse

Figure 3
"Study Hao Jianxiu." Illustrations accompanying her story, published in *Xin Zhongguo Funu* (New China's Women), 1 December 1951.

for a Mao suit; the text praised her role as a model of new China and her success in overturning attitudes of condescension to workers and women. Transformation of self and co-workers entailed promotion of Hao Jianxiu from feminine clothing and the particularized space of light industry to the purportedly universal realm of uniformity. Her new clothes dramatically symbolized entrance into the Party and her elevated status as model worker whom all should strive to emulate. The attendant sartorial discourse promoted the uniform as desirable fashion for all, regardless of location in the national citizenry, even as the illustrated and written text shored up the distance between the desired fashion of the Party uniform and the everyday clothing of most citizens.

The Mao suit as Party uniform encouraged new forms of social behavior because of the way in which it fused symbolism and utility. Those who wore the uniform simultaneously demonstrated their membership in the proletariat and their status as vanguard elements of the revolutionary proletarian struggle. It is at this level that interest in diverse colorful fashion appeared, quite literally, to fade as one style acquired particularly acute social meaning. In conjunction with the plethora of propaganda materials presenting "honorable and glorious" entrance into the Party as reward for serving the people, the ideal to be approximated in dress and deed was clearly articulated for the masses, even though the great majority had only a faint hope of attaining this status. Hao Jianxiu's new clothes illustrated how full citizenship required sanctioned access to the uniform and an idealized uniformity. Moreover, promotion of the uniform as the ideal located clothing choices within a network of power relations that gave authority to the Party as bestower of the privilege of wearing the desired fashion.[28]

Vestiary coding of occupation and service also privileged particular gender and class subject positions, as was reflected in the varying styles of Mao suits. The Mao suit varied by color—blue, grey, or army green—and by accessories, such as a brown leather belt and rifle. A green khaki belted jacket invoked the military tradition of the PLA more strongly than the blue Mao jacket worn loose. Moreover, the manner in which the Mao

jacket was worn suggested in what type of activity the model would be engaged and her consequent status. Open Mao jackets flowed freely and often revealed colorful cotton tops, worn underneath by both male and female workers.[29] The casualness of form and fabric indicated ease of movement on the part of the working body of the peasantry and proletariat. Here attention to dress appeared far from the mind of the wearer. A belted Mao jacket, by contrast, and perhaps ironically given the altruistic community-oriented values it symbolized, demanded discipline of the garment and body and suggested a carefully cultivated sartorial image. The green khaki belted jacket denoted authority in a manner that separated its wearer from the masses of workers and peasants sporting unbelted blue variants. For Hao Jianxiu and others whose entrance into the Communist Party was related in illustrated propaganda, a belted Mao jacket and soft cloth cap with red star insignia (*hongxing maohui*) marked the transition from worker to model worker, from member of the masses to member of the Youth League or Communist Party.

Recognizing the Mao suit as a popular uniform, therefore, entails appreciating the dual purpose of the uniform: to produce coherence through sameness and establish hierarchy through detail.[30] The Mao suit, because it represented the clothing of the proletariat and the People's Liberation Army, fused the civilian and military traditions of the new modern China. Even before the Cultural Revolution proper, however, the militarized body began to gain ascendancy over earlier moments of greater diversity in models of the nation. The plethora of national model workers and heroes put forward by the Party for emulation in the 1950s gradually gave way, beginning in 1963, to select "supermodels" such as Lei Feng, Wang Jie, and Li Wenzhong. These new models proved themselves devout socialist subjects by performing with extraordinary zeal ordinary duties. Each was firmly located within the military tradition, and their clothing reminded the people of the positioning of these models in society. They consistently wore the army green jacket with red tabbed collar, brown leather belt, and soft cloth cap with red star insignia. They generally accessorized their dress with an edition of Mao's selected writings (the "little red book") and a gun or bayonet.[31]

Antonia Finnane traces the relationship between military culture and Chinese civilian dress to the first decades of the twentieth century and struggles over national sovereignty and Chinese manhood (Finnane 1999). She links the rise of militarism in vestimentary codes to increased social prestige and political importance (at the expense of the scholar-official). During the Maoist period, sartorial discourse increasingly placed value on the uniformity of militaristic fashion and promoted this form of clothing and its concomitant behavior as that towards which all citizens should work. This increased presence of militaristic uniformity did not destroy other clothing conventions; but it did necessitate that alternatives to the uniform be measured against the uniform. The convergence of all



Figure 4
Lei Feng, Mao's good soldier.

emulation campaigns on the military tradition as opposed to other alternatives thereby established hierarchical gradations between the various manifestations of the Mao suit as well as between the Mao suit and clothing made from colored fabrics.

Approximation in dress to the uniform of the People's Liberation Army soldier differentiated the individual from others whose blue Mao suits linked them more closely to the proletarian tradition. Subtle yet unmistakable sartorial signs distanced the proletarian and peasant heritage from the military, and suggested that the former acquired refinement through participation in the latter. Without the vigilant arm of the army the proletariat could be co-opted or led astray. Counter-revolutionaries might even use the Mao jacket, a 1955 poster reminded the people, to cloak their true identity. The "USA" undershirt worn beneath a Mao jacket revealed the impurity of the thoughts and actions perpetrated by thin, wily men with sketchy eyes.[32] The PLA uniform, we are to assume, did not grace the bodies of such dishonorable types. This poster exemplifies the mobilization of sartorial practice in explicitly political campaigns such as the anti-Rightist campaigns to distinguish correct from incorrect ideological consciousness, patriot from traitor, revolutionary from counter-revolutionary.



Figure 5
"Sharpen one's vigilance, uncover hidden counterrevolutionaries," *China's Youth*, 3 September 1955, p.1.

The PLA uniform participated in the production and governance of social order in various ways. It subtly displayed rank within military and civilian settings; for example, additional pockets below the belt adorned the uniforms of senior Party.[33] At the same time, the location of the PLA uniform at the apex of the sartorial ideal served to categorize citizens through their ability to approximate this uniform. The ideal of the PLA uniform perhaps attained its greatest influence, particularly for youth, during the Cultural Revolution. Red Guard members (young people who responded to Mao's call to criticize bureaucratization of the Party and counter-revolutionary trends) sought out old PLA uniforms, which were worn with a red armband to proclaim their socialist spirit. Through their clothing, these young people recalled an earlier revolutionary tradition and insisted upon the recognition of this tradition as the true spirit of modern China. Mao extolled the youth to confront the softening of the national body during the peaceful post-Liberation era, and he promoted permanent revolution as the means through which to reform national bodies. The desire to wear the old PLA uniforms expressed an explicit move to create visual ties to those aspects of the revolutionary past linked to struggle and vigilance.[34]

In this way the politics of the uniform gained yet another dimension, as those young people whose family members had been members of the PLA could acquire more easily a "genuine" uniform. One interviewee remembered the way in which he and his friends scoured closets and queried relatives in hopes of obtaining a "real" PLA uniform.[35] In this sense, a superficial uniformity of clothing was, in fact, marked by difference according to whether or not one wore an original uniform, a replica, the partial elements of one, or simply imitated the style. As a result, the ideals of self-sacrifice and socialist consciousness signified by the uniform reached beyond the CCP and the PLA, while clothing served as a constant reminder of one's distance from the ideal.

During the Cultural Revolution period (1966–1969), the red armband worn by Mao and the Red Guards figured prominently as a critical accessory, alongside a book of Mao's quotations. This accessory played a democratizing role, rendering political fashion accessible to all regardless of occupation or Party membership.[36] The masses generally continued to dress in a variety of colored tops and trousers, blue Mao jackets, and cotton overalls—all of which could be appropriately accessorized. The back cover of the April 1961 edition of *Dazhong Dianying* (Popular Cinema) nicely illustrated the role of accessories in altering the socio-political meaning of stereotypical peasant clothing.[37] A young woman with bobbed hair, relaxed (but not smiling) mouth, and eyes focused in the distance stood proudly amidst a cotton field with right arm extended as if in greeting. She wore navy blue trousers with a grey-blue top complemented by green piping along the small upright collar and toggled closures. The standard female peasant clothing acquired an entirely different look in this photograph, however. The woman also cinched her top at the waist with a thick brown leather belt, while a brown leather holster crossed over her chest on the left in more dramatic fashion than the green piping on the right. Finally, on her left arm she wore a red armband. Accessories transformed the typical peasant garb and rendered it closer to the ideal of the militaristic uniform. In a limited sense, then, diversity retained a place in the sartorial landscape even in the 1960s.

Even when appropriately accessorized, however, the masses did not stand at the apex of the pyramid of desirable clothing. In a Cultural Revolution poster entitled "Take Speech as a Weapon to Destroy Completely Reactionary and Revisionist Artists and Writers" three uniformed youths (two male, one female) stood aggressively at the forefront. The masses, rallying in support in the background, constituted a colorful group, with white, yellow, pink, and blue tops worn by those in the front row.[38] The color and variation so favorably extolled as signifiers of socialist construction and patriotism in the 1950s were still visible but demoted. By the late 1960s, at best, color adorned the bodies of the less well-disciplined socialist subjects and, at worst, denoted corruption of the disciplined national body by bourgeois desires.



Figure 6
A new look improvised by means of well-placed accessories.

Socialist citizenship took on an increasingly uniform ideal appearance from the 1950s to the 1960s. In the 1950s, the PLA uniform was only one of several sets of clothing worn by national models exemplifying the new China. Material progress, as discussed above, held an important position in the early selection of models and early formulations of the relationship between the citizen, her clothing, the Party, and the nation. Following the disastrous economic results of the Great Leap Forward,

however, CCP discourse tended to disarticulate model workers from national material progress and focused more sharply on the proletarian consciousness of the individual. This shifting understanding of the relationship between citizen, Party, and nation predicated a more hierarchical notion of service than the (theoretically) reciprocal one that underwrote promotion of consumer goods in the mid-1950s. Accessibility of the uniform ideal depended upon correct individual performance by the new socialist subject. The uniform de-emphasized the performance of the Party and nation in re-building the textile industry and a modern economy more generally. Instead, the uniform recognized disciplined bodies and loyal individuals; it signaled service to the Party and, through the Party, the nation. Hierarchy therefore existed within vestimentary representations and reflected an unequal relationship in the dialectic of service that was based on the people serving the Party and the Party serving the people. Official sartorial discourse elucidated consumerism and color as service by the Party to the people, whereas the Party uniform demonstrated service by the people to the Party. Uniformity privileged the latter form of service.

Gender Implications of a Uniformed Nation

By the onset of the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong charged that counter-revolutionary forces threatened the Party and nation from within. His policies at this time further integrated militarism into civilian life. In this context, alterations and cultivated beauty signified weakness of character. Female and male national bodies thus re-dressed themselves in old styles for the new tasks put to them. The uniform once again reigned supreme, as the emphasis shifted from displaying modernity by meeting the needs of women as consumers to insisting on reforming the national body as the basis of an alternative vision of modernity. A masculinization of the uniform(ed) national body, the body that lies at "the heart of the encounter between appearances and social discipline,"[39] accompanied the feminization of fashion. Ironically, then, dressing for the Party entailed the gendered devaluing of the concern for clothes precisely when the masculinized Party increasingly policed the public through standards of appearance and adornment in order to proclaim the realization of a radical new society that eschewed gender-based discrimination and inequality.

Elision of gender oppression through militaristic uniformity proved problematic on several levels. It entailed feminizing the undesirable, by conflating woman, bourgeoisie, and color while also insisting on a type of gender equality that the belted Mao jacket belied. Despite Mao's assertion in 1919, a man's waist and a woman's waist were not the same.[40] It is necessary, therefore, to reflect on the effect of the promotion of military clothing and its accessories as the ideal for all citizens and the

effect on the gendered subject that was produced through these fashions. Lacking the democratic potential of the red armband, the gun as an accessory reinforced gendered and occupational ranking. The ubiquitous presence of the gun as a component of the model's uniform, even in civilian settings, provided a clichéd symbol of manhood that even the most casual observer could recognize. Mao Zedong in his 1961 "Inscription on a Photograph of Women Militia" bolstered this notion that fulfillment of national duty entailed precisely such an exhibition:

> These well-groomed heroines carry five-foot rifles,
> On this parade ground in the first rays of the sun,
> Daughters of China have uncommon aspirations,
> Preferring battle-tunics to red dresses.[41]

Reflection upon what it means to replace red dresses with battle tunics and five-foot rifles during a period when China was not at war in the conventional sense requires that we return to the thematic juxtapositions of bright colors versus militaristic uniformity, attractiveness versus utility, femininity versus masculinity, and the common masses versus the hero(ine). I have described some of the ways in which these oppositions were regarded as less threatening in the 1950s, as the first term in each pairing acquired patriotic meaning through a discourse of the Party's serving the needs of the people. Instances of similar vestimentary diversity witnessed during the 1960s acquired a different meaning. Materials of this period emphasized contradictions within society, service to the Party, and individual proletarian consciousness. The sartorial discourse of the 1960s assigned a presumably fixed class category to colorful fashions and consumer desires. At the same time, the designation of color and consumer desire as bourgeois reinforced rather than redressed gendered hierarchies. The continued use of charges of effeminacy to delegitimate bourgeois society combined with the association of women and new fashions cultivated during the dress reform campaign. Female or feminized bodies, in this context, were susceptible to the lures of bourgeois fashion.

Within the relationship between citizen, Party, and nation, the female clothed body stood on particularly unstable terrain because of the these articulations of class to gender. The ideal of the hypermasculine uniform of the PLA soldier further complicated the relationship of citizenship and gender formation through the conflation of this sartorial standard and the championing of women's emancipation. Women's emancipation constituted one of the central legitimating discourses of the CCP from its inception (Wang 1999), and uniformed women signified success in this realm. Because the official rhetoric linked women's emancipation and uniformity, we must reflect upon the following questions: When women wore this uniform, did they extend the parameters of female fashion, undermine male dominance of the uniform, subject women to

masculinization, or a combination of these? An answer must consider that the CCP praised the PLA uniform for its participation in the dual process of displaying and cultivating disciplined desexualized subjects. Male or female, the wearer eschewed individual desires (including sexual desires) and focused all energy on revolutionary praxis. Individual desires could be written back into this discourse by the Party, as was done in the 1950s, if the conditions seemed appropriate. The individual, however, could not author such an alternative herself because she occupied a carefully governed (if always shifting) position within modern Chinese socialist society. What occurred, therefore, was a hierarchical valuation of spaces and lines of service (people to Party, Party to "the people") that acquired a gendered dimension with respect to clothing.

Clothing and fashion did not reflect inherent and stable class or gender categories. Each acquired meaning in relation to the others. Sartorial discourse during specific campaigns such as the anti-Rightist campaign and the Cultural Revolution sutured undesirable class categories—bourgeois and feudal—to feminized bodies. We cannot conclude, however, that sartorial discourse facilely reproduced the opposite effect, a masculinization of the female clothed body. Nor can we conclude that the CCP viewed fashion as the purview of a feminized sphere, so the Party therefore did not concern itself with fashion. Rather, a tension existed in the 1960s between four elements that informed the relationship between clothing, citizenship, and gender formation in China: (1) constant recognition of dress and appearance as imbued with social meaning; (2) insistence that a true communist does not concern herself with clothing but rather revolutionary struggle; (3) privileging of the militarism-masculinity strand of the national narrative; and (4) depiction of women as full citizens.

By the 1960s, dressing for the Party entailed easing the tension by downplaying precedents that highlighted fault lines in the vision of a homogeneously clad populace. The ideal shifted the gaze of citizens and scholars away from both the vestimentary diversity present from 1949 to 1966 in official representations of "the people" and the dress-reform campaign of the mid-1950s. Examination of the sartorial discourse during the Maoist period in China underscores the importance that definitions of revolutionary struggle had for determining what the ideal citizen would wear, on what occasions, and to convey what meaning. The permutations reveal conditions of social flux within which the material of dress held an important role.

Analysis of the materialization of discourse through a study of sartorial ideals in Mao's China demonstrates that clothing was a critical component in producing the subject of the new regime. The clothed body was subject to alteration depending upon the socio-political dynamics of the moment. While certain general styles retained popularity throughout the Maoist period, changes in their relative importance and social meanings indicate difference across time and within uniformity. It is worth reiterating that awareness of the movement in the 1950s to link color and fashion to



Figure 7
The use of fabric, fashion, and space reinforces the spatial hierarchy within this poster, as it also demonstrates that the Mao suit did not necessarily dominate even in the realm of propaganda. "Mao Visits an Experimental Farm (*Mao Zhuxi canguan shiyan tian*)," reproduced in *Zhongguo Qingnianbao*, 16 January 1965, p.4.

socialist modernity casts a new light on the emphasis on masculinized uniformity in the late 1960s. The CCP conceived the disciplined loyal citizen as a necessary subject (albeit mediated through the Party as representative of "the people") for the national narrative. Without this subject the socialist nation ceased to exist. This, however, was not the only citizen-subject imagined by the CCP. The optimism of the 1950s and the concomitant emphasis on redress for economic exploitation occasioned a sanctioned role within socialist China for the patriotic

consumer. This relaxation of discipline over the national body proved short-lived; and subsequent socio-political conditions encouraged Mao Zedong and the CCP to insist upon a uniformity over time that previously did not exist in the manner suggested by Cultural Revolution sartorial discourse.

Changes in appropriate clothing fashions during the Maoist period participated in the politics and aesthetics of socialism as well the interplay between citizenship, nation-building, and gender-formation. The ways in which the female body was deployed as a central component in these struggles and re-dressed to meet various requirements points to the vexed relationship in CCP discourse between clothing as an important mode of governance and the relegation of particular fashions and colors to feminine spaces. Propaganda materials in Mao's China may have assigned an apparently fixed class and gender category to fashion during the Cultural Revolution; but, as I have argued, neither particular fashions nor particular colors had fixed meanings. For the CCP, as Marx suggested, re-dressing history converged with the history of dress in a continuous process of re-presenting fashions in order to present new scenes in world history.[42] In Maoist China, this history became part of the process of defining a desirable relationship between gendered citizen, Party, and nation as the foundation for the future of China. This point is particularly important to remember as Chinese and Western reports about fashion in the post-Mao period often assert that the "Four Modernizations" and capitalist impulses in industry promoted by Deng Xiaoping resulted in a better, brighter, and more fashionably clad China. While these reports share with those of the 1950s an equation of color with progress, they ignore the historical precedent in which a better and more colorfully dressed population was attributed to socialist modernization and not the reversal of such policies (Zhang 1992; Li 1998). In the interest of providing a foil against which to extol the fashion benefits of neo-liberal global capitalism, color is erased from the dominant sartorial landscape of Mao's China. This erasure of color results in analyses that fail to engage meaningfully with the important relationship between clothing, color, and gendered citizenship. The above analysis cautions us against unquestioning acceptance of an undifferentiated vision of the fashion landscape of Mao's China, a vision that rests upon selective viewing of a diverse history of dress across both the time and space of communist China.

Notes

General Note: All English names in the text appear according to the Western convention of personal name followed by family name. Names of Chinese scholars and authors are recorded according to the order used in publication. All other Chinese names appear according to the Chinese convention of family name followed by given name. Pinyin has been used

to romanize Chinese names except where another system has been used by the author in publication.

1. I would like to thank Peter Bailey, Tani Barlow, Peter Carroll, Valerie Steele, and an anonymous reviewer for their insightful comments on earlier versions of this paper. I would also like to thank Robert Chen and Steven Howes for their help with the illustrations.
2. Clothing and ethnicity is a well-developed area of scholarship. See Harrison (n.d.); Gladney (1994).
3. On pre-1949 urban culture, see Lee (1999); Steele and Major (1999). On post-1976 clothing, see Li (1998); Honig and Hershatter (1988).
4. I am grateful to Tani Barlow for aiding in the formulation of this theoretical relationship.
5. Antonia Finnane discusses the relationship between the cloth shortage in the 1950s, the dress-reform campaign, and dubious claims that particular styles were more economical: Finnane (2001).
6. The concept of campaign time is drawn from Hershatter (2000).
7. Yu Feng, quoted in *China Reconstructs* (1955). Excerpts from the *New Observer* forum were frequently translated and reprinted in *China Reconstructs* for an English-speaking audience.
8. Min (1994): 56–7.
9. Incidents of violence perpetrated by student Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution against those who violated acceptable norms of dress are well documented in Cultural Revolution memoirs. Moreover, Elizabeth Perry and Li Xun have shown that subcultures existed in Shanghai and that demands on the population were not always matched by the actions of persons in power. Huang Jinhai, a standing committee member of the first Workers' General Headquarters, was labeled a "dandy" (*afei fenzi*) for his conspicuously fashionable dress: Perry and Li (1997: 54).
10. Evans (1999).
11. On the sexualization of the bob by Lu Xun and other May Fourth male intellectuals see Sun (1997).
12. The blue overalls and white shirt of the urban (male) factory-worker also deserve analysis but are not discussed here. Occasionally women in light industry wore similar apparel, although the white smock overdress or cotton blouse and trousers are more characteristic. This article, however, focuses on the extremes of colorful (feminized) leisurewear and uniform (masculinized) heavy industry and military service wear.
13. CCP representations of non-Han people emphasize a static and timeless society divorced from the modern world. Pre-modern space and time, then, tends to be peopled with brightly clad women in ethnic costumes.
14. Many pictures of Mao Zedong depicted him in the fields talking to young people, wearing dark trousers and a factory-made white cotton

shirt with center buttons. Although physically located in rural space, he retained authority by virtue of his sartorial distance: cf. "Mao Visits an Experimental Farm (*Mao Zhuxi canguan shiyan tian*)," reproduced in *Zhongguo Qingnianbao*, 16 January 1965, 4. The stark contrast of clothing and location is also evident in a series of photographs celebrating young people's contributions to the nation. Only the young scientists peering at a microscope wear white cotton button-down shirts and belted pleated trousers: *Zhongguo Qingnianbao,* 1 January 1960: 4.

15. Numerous photographs of peasants examining printed cloth in stores appeared in newspaper stories reporting the benefits of socialist modernization. Often the caption reinforced the new purchasing power of peasants, workers and minorities that enabled them to buy "city goods." See, for example, *Zhongguo Qingnianbao*, 19 September 1952: 4.
16. Fang (1954: 24). The importance of color lay in the contrast to the mass-produced blue cloth dyed with indigo dyes (*lan cao*). Indigo was grown on most hill farms and provided the basic dye for cotton cloth in the early Liberation days. The uniform of the People's Liberation Army, on the other hand, was made of yellow-green cotton, almost khaki in color, that originated from the dyeing facilities available at Yan'an.
17. Successful model workers received rewards for their extraordinary commitments to socialist modernization as they performed for the masses the future of the nation. Notably, bolts of new cloth figured prominently among the awards. See, for example, *China Reconstructs* (1953: 22).
18. For instance, see the photographs accompanying the article by Liang Jun (Jun 1953). The specific colors of her clothing cannot be discerned from the black and white photographs.
19. In addition to the above, see also "Nu Tuolajishou Liang Jun" (1950).
20. A photograph of Tian Guiying appeared on the cover of *Xin Zhongguo Funu*, 1950:9. Illustrations also accompanied her story (Ba 1951).
21. An interesting comparison exists between the similarity of male and female clothing for Chinese industrial models and the male and female clothing used for the Soviet industrial models that often were said to provide the inspiration for China's new woman. Film stills from Soviet films such as *Xinfu zhi tu* featured a young woman with bobbed hair in various settings: when meeting her superior in his office she wore a fitted jacket and long skirt; on a social occasion she donned long fitted dark dress with collar and cuffs; and next to the tractor, the reader saw her depicted from the waist up, in a loose jacket worn open with a colored shirt underneath. Only in one still where she stood next to a male co-worker did she wear a cotton jacket approximating workers' clothing and akin to the Mao jacket: Liang (1950).

22. Interview with Liang Jun, 28 May 1997, Harbin, Heilongjiang province, PRC.
23. Descriptions of strong, muscular bodies forged through physical labor and struggles with natural elements were a common component of female model worker stories: cf. Chen (n.d.).
24. By the 1950s the hemline of the *qipao* had risen to mid-calf, shoulder seams had been introduced for a sloping shoulder effect, and the collar had been rounded for a softer effect. By the end of the 1950s, the *qipao* had become very fitted, with waist and bust darts and set-in sleeves. Women wore the *qipao* as late as the official celebration of the sixteenth anniversary of the founding of the PRC before it was banned as decadent and bourgeois: Garrett (1994: 106).
25. The dress-reform movement coincided with other campaigns such as the "Five Goods Movement," which sought to establish the good housewife as a socially useful role. In this transitional phase, opportunities for paid employment proved insufficient for all women to heed the call of the Party to enter new economic and social roles. This campaign underscores the gendered valuation of types of clothing and their locations. Cf. Croll (1978: 256–8); Evans (1997).
26. New hair-styling options included arranging the characteristic long plaits of young people in various ways and tying them with colorful bows, as well as cutting hair short or having a permanent wave: *Zhongguo Qingnian bao* (1955); Liu (1956). The dress designs characteristically had hemlines at the mid-calf and a scoop neck, incorporated the new fabrics, and meshed traditional and modern styles. A *qipao* fashioned in factory-made printed cotton fabric almost always appeared among the new styles, but most dresses followed the "new style" *Zhongguo Qingnian bao* (1956). Dresses were worn with black leather oxfords, "mary-janes," or pumps. On the historical meanings of the leather pump in twentieth-century China, see Ko (1999).
27. For photographs of female model textile workers in colorful printed jackets, see Fang (1956).
28. Joseph refers to the uniform as certificate of legitimacy. Its very existence implies at least a two-tiered organizational hierarchy consisting of, one, the wearers and, two, the superiors who have granted them the right to wear the group uniform and who supervise conformity to group regulations: Joseph (1986: 67).
29. See *Zhongguo Qingnian bao* (1965). These posters include examples of the various manifestations of the Mao suit and jacket. See also "Countryside medical station (Shancun yiliao zhan), Liaoning 1974," reproduced in Evans and Donald (1999).
30. Roche (1996 [1994]: 221–56).
31. Lei Feng appeared in all forms of media. Early monographs include *Lei Feng Riji, 1959–1962* (1963) and *Mao Zedong de Hao Zhanshi—Lei Feng* (1963).

32. Poster reproduced in *Zhongguo Qingnian bao*, 3 September 1955, p. 1.
33. Garrett (1994: 128–9). In the 1980s, stars along the red-tabbed collars indicated rank within the army.
34. Efforts to establish strong associations between the revolutionary zeal needed in the 1960s and that which had brought the PRC into being dominated political culture. Closely related to emulation campaigns and sartorial discourse was the emphasis in the cultural sphere on the production of films, plays, and dramas about the anti-Japanese war of resistance (1939–1945).
35. Interview with Niu Dayong, 25 February 1997, Beijing, PRC.
36. Elizabeth Perry and Li Xun discuss the difficulty some groups had in attaining sufficient red fabric if they lacked the patronage of high-placed cadres: Perry and Li (1997: 33).
37. *Dazhong Dianying*, 1961: 4, back cover.
38. Poster number 16, "Mao's Graphic Voice," Elvehjem Museum of Art, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 31 August–27 October 1996.
39. Roche (1996 [1994]: 222).
40. Mao Zedong first addressed the politics of clothing during the May Fourth period (1919–1924). He demanded: "If a women's head and a man's head are actually the same, and there is no real difference between a women's waist and a man's, why must women have their hair piled up in those ostentatious and awkward buns? Why must they wear those messy skirts cinched at the waist? . . .": Mao Zedong, "Tiyi zhi yanjiu," partially translated in Schram (1969: 152–60).
41. Mao Zedong (translated by Jerome Ch'en), "Inscription on a Photograph of Women Militia," in Ch'en (1965: 352).
42. Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon," in Tucker (1978 [1972]: 592).

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