TÉCNICO LISBOA

TLS and SSH overview

Segurança Informática em Redes e Sistemas
2022/23

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Secure communication channel



Roadmap

- TLS – Transport Layer Security
- SSH – Secure Shell
- Key management

Roadmap

- TLS – Transport Layer Security
  - **HTTPS**
- SSH – Secure Shell
- Key management

HTTPS

- **HTTPS** = **HTTP** over **S**SL (now TL**S**)
  - In fact, SSL was originally designed to be used with HTTP
    - Netscape Navigator (1994)
      - Forefather of Mozilla Firefox
  - Version history
    - SSL 1.0 1994
    - SSL 2.0 1995
    - SSL 3.0 1996
    - TLS 1.0 1999
    - TLS 1.1 2006
    - TLS 1.2 2008
    - TLS 1.3 2018

Netscape Navigator



- A few months later, in July 1995, a computer programmer ordered the first book ever sold by an online bookstore named after a river in South America…

TLS goals

- Secure communication channels over TCP/IP
  - Current version: **TLS 1.3** – august 2018
    - Standard based on the deprecated **SSL (Secure Sockets Layer)**
    - Sometimes called **SSL** for that reason
  - Manages secure sessions over **TCP/IP** per application
    - Initially designed for the HTTP protocol (HTTPS)
    - Currently used by other protocols, e.g., SMTP, IMAP, POP3
- Security mechanisms
  - **Authentication** of the communicating parties
  - **Confidentiality** and **integrity** of the communication
  - **Key distribution**

TLS utilization

- TLS is just a protocol; not a standard API
- Common APIs:
  - Reference API for SSL: SSLref (Netscape)
  - Public implementations: OpenSSL, GnuTLS, SSLeay, Mbed TLS, Java Secure Socket Extension (JSSE)
- Remote interfaces:
  - Conventional: protocol/port
    - e.g., TCP/443 for HTTPS
  - STARTTLS: allows upgrading text connection to TLS
    - Defined for SMTP, IMAP, POP, SMTP, FTP, IRC,...

TLS operation management

- Client-Server model as in TCP
- The applications (e.g., web, mail) define the strategy
- Authentication
  - If it is needed and how it is performed
- Cryptographic algorithms
  - The client presents the **cipher suites** it supports
  - The server selects one
- Session key management
  - Lifetime of the **master secret** = lifetime of the **TLS session**
    - Used whenever the client and the server decide to communicate
    - Maximum of 24 hours recommended
  - Lifetime of the **session keys**: at most lifetime of the TCP connection

TLS Cipher Suites

- **Cipher suite**
  - Public-key algorithm
  - Symmetric encryption algo.
  - MAC algorithm
- TLS supports several

- **Negotiation**:
  - Client offers choice
  - Server picks 1
    - e.g., the most secure

- **Common algorithms**
- Public-key encryption
  - RSA, ECDSA
- Symmetric ciphers
  - AES: block
  - ChaCha20: stream
- Hash functions
  - SHA-2
  - SHA-3

TLS protocols

- **Handshake Protocol**
  - Exchange of identity and supported cipher suites
  - Authentication of the communicating parties
    - Client challenges the server, that proves its identity with certificate(s) *[Optional, but mandatory if the next exists]*
    - Server challenges the client, that proves its identity with certificates *[Optional]*
  - Key distribution
- **Record Protocol**
  - Creation and verification of secure messages
    - ~~Compression~~, cipher, integrity control

Removed in TLS 1.3

TLS handshake (1)

Purpose

1. Server authentication
2. Negotiation: agree on crypto algorithms
3. Establish keys
4. Client authentication (optional)

TLS handshake (2)

1. **Client** sends list of algorithms it supports, along with client nonce
2. **Server** chooses algorithms from list; sends back: choice + certificate + server nonce
3. **Client** verifies certificate, extracts server's public key, generates pre_master_secret, encrypts with server's public key, sends to server
4. **Client and server** independently compute encryption and MAC keys from pre_master_secret and nonces
5. **Client** sends a MAC of all the handshake messages
6. **Server** sends a MAC of all the handshake messages

TLS handshake (3)

- Last two steps protect handshake from tampering:
  - Client typically offers range of algorithms, some strong, some weak
  - Man-in-the-middle could delete best algorithms from list
  - Last two message MACs allows detecting such an attack
- Why not simply sign or add MACs to the handshake messages?
  - Not possible: it is the handshake that sets up the keys!

TLS record protocol



Record header: content type; TLS version; length

MAC: is function of the sequence number and the MAC key M_x

Fragment: each data fragment has up to 2^{14} bytes (~16 Kbytes)

TLS record format



TLS performance

- First implementations were slow
- Currently, when properly configured, can be fast

- “On our production frontend machines,
  TLS accounts for
  less than 1% of the CPU load,
  less than 10 KB of memory per connection and
  less than 2% of network overhead.”
  - Adam Langley, Google "Overclocking SSL“
  - https://istlsfastyet.com/

TLS tool: SSLTest

https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/

SSLTest output for Técnico



https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=tecnico.ulisboa.pt&s=193.136.128.169

Roadmap

- TLS – Transport Layer Security
- **SSH – Secure Shell**
- Key management

SSH



Figure 7.1 Remote login is a lot like astral projection.

SSH goals

- Secure communication application and protocol over TCP
  - Allows **secure remote sessions (~telnet)** and **file transfer (~ftp)**
  - Allows **tunneling** of TCP/IP traffic
- Security mechanisms
  - **Confidentiality** and **integrity** of the communication
  - **Distribution of keys**
  - Communicating parties' **authentication**
    - The server (or, usually, the server machine)
    - The user

SSH protocols (1/2)

- Transport Layer Protocol
  - Server authentication
    - Signature of the exchanged DH ephemeral values
    - Server public key can be transferred at this time, if not already held by the client
      - ➔ **TOFU (Trust on First Use) model**
        - Vulnerable to man-in-the-middle
        - No certificates or CA
  - Distribution of keys
    - Diffie-Hellman key exchange
    - The session keys are computed with ephemeral DH values
  - Creation and analysis of secure messages
    - Compression, encryption, integrity control

SSH protocols (2/2)

- User authentication towards the remote machine:
  - Password or
  - Signature with private key of client
    - Server knows the public key of client
- Connection Protocol
  - Information/data flow **multiplexing** over a secure session

Tunneling with SSH

- In the client machine, a **mapping** is created between a **local TCP port** and a **port in the remote machine**
  - e.g., *localhost:IMAP → mail.myorg.pt:IMAP*
- **SSH session / tunnel** is created to mail.myorg.pt
- Client application is configured to use the **local port**
  - When using the port, it will securely interact via SSH with the remote server *mail.myorg.pt*
  - Client SSH and server SSHd operate as a secure relay mechanism

Configuration example of SSH tunnel for IMAP (port 220)





Output tunnel

- TCP connections started at the client, so **outbound**
  - **SSH client** opens **port X** and waits for connections from client application
  - Similar situation to remote login



Input tunnel

- TCP connection started at the server, so **inbound**
  - **SSH client** connects to port in local server
  - Often used to get graphical interface in the remote host



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- **Key management**

Keys

- TLS and SSH use **public-key cryptography**
  - (We will study this cryptography later, in more detail)
- **Pair of keys**
  - One is **private**, personal, non-transmissible
  - One is **public**, can/should be widely known
- Allow for
  - **Confidentiality** with the exchange of secret keys
  - **Authentication and Integrity** with digital signatures

Private key

- The private key represents its owner so:
  - The probability of it being compromised must be minimized
  - Backup copies must be physically secure
- Private key must be protected
  - The access path to the private key must be restricted
  - Password protected, e.g., JKS, PGP
  - Security of applications using the private key must be guaranteed

Public key certificate

- **Certificates** are documents signed by a certification entity
  - **Certification Authority (CA)**, public organization or company
  - Certificates are public documents
  - Certificates have a digital signature to assure authenticity
- Can distribute public key through unsecure channel
  - Receiver can validate the certificate signature using the CA public key
  - If it trusts the CA and the signature is valid, then it can trust the public key
- Certificate standard format: X.509 (RFC 3280)

Certificate signing steps 1/4



Certificate signing steps 2/4



Certificate signing steps 3/4



Certificate signing steps 4/4



Summary

- TLS – Transport Layer Security
- SSH – Secure Shell
- Key management