Politicizing Trade: How Economic Discontent and Identity Politics Shape Anti-Trade Campaign Appeals

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Abstract

An unexpected rise in protectionist sentiments in advanced economies is threatening the future of the liberal international order. Yet, the role of political elites in framing free trade's distributional consequences and thus cueing this backlash is not fully understood. Current research debates the importance of material or socio-cultural factors in determining protectionist attitudes but fails to address how politicians shape the information environment which voters rely on to form economic preferences. My paper demonstrates that politicians manipulate trade issues as an electoral strategy. Using data on televised political advertising, I examine what factors drive anti-trade elite priming. I find politicians choose to run anti-trade ads in regions that suffer from long-term manufacturing decline. Politicians also consider the racial composition of their constituencies to increase message receptivity. The effect of sustained de-industrialization on anti-trade ads is higher in regions with higher shares of white voters who identify as losers of globalization. My findings reveal how opportunistic politicians manufacture pockets of resistance to globalization for their political incentives.

Keywords: campaign advertising, de-industrialization, public opinion on trade

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What role do political elites play in generating the backlash against international trade? Many voters don't possess information on foreign affairs, especially on international economic issues (Almond, 1950). Studies have shown that when asked about trade policy, voters don't pay attention (Rankin, 2001), don't know the answers to basic knowledge questions like who is the US's biggest trading partner (Guisinger, 2009, 2017), and can't understand the complex economic consequences the policy has on their lives (Rho & Tomz, 2017). It is fair to say that trade is a low-salience issue among voters.

Yet, trade policy is increasingly politicized in advanced economies. Recent years have seen the proliferation of events that pointed at a brewing globalization backlash. In the US, political candidates in both presidential and congressional elections denounced trade liberalization for its negative labor market consequences. A few of these examples include Barack Obama and Mitt Romney's rejection of free trade agreements in 2012, Senator Sherrod Brown's anti-trade campaign messages in 2014, and Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders' criticisms of the North American Free Trade Agreement and Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2016. Since voters don't stress about actual tariff levels and punish their representatives on trade policy (Guisinger, 2009), why do we see political attempts to make trade a salient issue?

I argue that strategic politicians manipulate trade issues for their domestic electoral purposes. Trade's low-salient and multidimensional nature offers opportunities for politicians to make anti-globalization sentiments salient to win votes. Rho & Tomz (2017) showed that voters' attitudes on trade are activated when given "distributional cues" on trade's economic consequences. Politicians may use negative messages on trade to trigger anti-trade sentiments among voters to galvanize support for their protectionist promises.[1] Indeed, messages on how hard-working Americans lose jobs to free trade, how American companies shift production overseas due to trade agreements, and how trade competition with ethnically

[1] Guisinger (2017) demonstrated that politicians don't have any incentives to disseminate support for trade issues because positive messages on trade don't help their electoral aims.

different countries like China is a threat to the American economy are designed to activate fear of trade and support for protectionism.

By arguing that politicians cue voters on trade's distributional consequences, I contribute to the burgeoning literature on information environment on trade policy.[2] Existing research on trade attitudes derives voters' preferences from economic theory or argues for the importance of socio-cultural beliefs such as other-regarding, community-oriented concerns, and out-group prejudices (Mayda & Rodrik, 2005; O'Rourke & Sinnott, 2001; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001; Mansfield & Mutz, 2009, 2013; Sabet, 2014). These models assume that voters learn about how shifts in tariffs affect their well-being but black box the sources of such information. The evidence these studies provide from survey experiments that can't incorporate elite cues due to their one-shot nature is the major reason for this inadequacy (Fordham & Kleinberg, 2012; Naoi, 2020). Other studies examine the impact of trade exposure on political behavior. Extant research has shown that trade shocks stimulate anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim, and authoritarian attitudes (Cerrato *et al.*, 2018; Ballard-Rosa *et al.*, 2021), and generate anti-incumbent, polarized and conservative voting behavior (Margalit, 2011; Colantone & Stanig, 2018b,a; Jensen *et al.*, 2017; Autor *et al.*, 2020). Yet, these studies are silent on the mechanisms that connect trade shocks to identity-oriented political behavior.

What is left out of these political economy studies is how elites shape mass opinion on trade.[3] Yet, we know from the American politics literature that elite cues shape opinion (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Miller & Krosnick, 2000). Politicians that attack China may heighten the risk perceptions of voters regarding trade liberalization(Bisbee & Peter Rosendorff, 2021). Like immigration cues, trade cues containing nativist elements, such as messages that blame offshoring for American job losses, can evoke anxiety and trigger out-group prejudice (Valentino *et al.*, 2013).

I focus on one cueing mechanism - political advertising. Many voters learn about

[2]See Guisinger (2017) for a thorough description on trade information environment.
[3]Except see Guisinger & Saunders (2017); Guisinger (2017).

issues that politicians choose to emphasize during the campaign period. Candidates convey their ideas and policy preferences directly to voters via televised campaign advertising (Sides, 2006; Guisinger, 2017). Despite the advancements in technology, televised political advertising still makes up 95% of the Congressional electoral communication budget (Fowler *et al.*, 2019). Political ads are good sources of cues and heuristics, given that they contain short, concise messages and include catchphrases given the politicians' time and budgetary constraints (Popkin, 1994). They also receive considerable local and national attention (Margalit, 2011). Even though trade constituted a small portion of campaign ads at the presidential level, voters in some districts were exposed to an overwhelming amount of negative trade messaging in congressional elections

Given the importance of advertising as elite message carriers, I address the following question: Where do elites target anti-trade messages? Candidates craft their messages carefully because ads are costly. They choose messages that resonate with voters to win elections (Downs, 1957). I assert that candidates target anti-trade messages to places that have suffered from long-term manufacturing decline. The sustained unemployment and poverty over a long period left workers in these areas, such as the Rust Belt, disenchanted from politics. Since geographic location determines self-interest (Fordham & Kleinberg, 2012), candidates find it profitable to air anti-trade ads in regions where voters suffer from deindustrialization. Candidates create a narrative scapegoating trade, blaming it for the lack of economic recovery in the region.

I test this prediction using data on televised political advertising in congressional elections between 2008 and 2016.[4] Televised political advertising allows me to directly measure the salience of trade in political communications, unlike previous studies that have used indirect proxies (Gabel & Scheve, 2007; Jones & Martin, 2017). Data come from Wisconsin Advertising Project (WAP) and Wesleyan Media Project (WMP) and contain rich information on the ads' timing, geography, sponsorship, partisanship, and contents at the ad

[4]This constitutes the universe of televised political advertising in 210 US media markets.

level. These datasets are ideal for me because of the systematic and consistent collection of negative trade ads with detailed information on geography. My sample starts right after the Great Recession and excludes post-2016 elections to keep the party positions on trade constant.[5] Given that congressional candidates are more responsive to local conditions due to narrower districts, ads aired in these elections provide a cleaner test to my predictions.

I find that candidates aired more anti-trade ads in counties that suffered from a manufacturing decline since the 1970s. The results are robust to controlling for electoral incentives and constituency characteristics that could drive anti-trade advertising, such as the competitiveness of the election, the initial share of manufacturing workers, and voter education levels. The long-term manufacturing decline regions experienced was complex, including both automation and increased trade competition. To show that candidates target general economic decline and not legitimate trade concerns of their constituencies, I leverage the sudden increase in Chinese imports between 2000-2007 (Autor *et al.*, 2013). Recent trade shocks don't affect anti-trade ads.

As aforementioned, one puzzle from the regional trade competition literature is the changes in social identification that leads to right-wing political behavior after exposure to trade shocks (Grossman & Helpman, 2018; Gennaioli & Tabellini, 2019; Autor *et al.*, 2020). I provide an answer for this puzzle by showing that candidate targeting of anti-trade ads varies depending on the region's racial composition. I argue that candidates target regions that suffer from long-term economic decline where white voters make up the majority. I advance three possible explanations for this phenomenon. First, white voters are likely targets for anti-trade messages given their manufacturing job history. White voters have lost manufacturing jobs more than non-white voters in absolute terms (Baccini & Weymouth, 2021), which make them more responsive to protectionist policy promises. Second, white voters are more likely to equate their social standing with their nation, perceiving a threat

[5]Even though Trump campaigned heavily on trade in the 2016 elections, trade realignment at the congressional level didn't happen until the 2018 midterm elections.

to the American economy as a threat to their status. Third, trade policy is racialized, inherently providing protection to white voters who have lost manufacturing jobs (Guisinger, 2017; Jardina, 2019). Thus, white voters are likely targets of protectionist messages, given that candidates can exploit economic and status anxiety for electoral purposes. Interacting manufacturing decline with racial diversity, I find that politicians advertise on trade more in racially homogeneous, white counties. A further investigation into the effect of partisanship on trade ad airing demonstrates that Republicans choose rural, economically backward, and whiter areas as their targets for these ads.

My paper contributes to the debate of economic and non-economic origins of protectionist preferences. To the extent that candidates tap into economic anxieties with their protectionist messages, and these messages inform voters' perceptions of globalization, my article suggests that ethnocentric and sociotropic determinants of trade attitudes may have materialistic concerns lying underneath. I suggest that ethnocentrism, sociotropic attitudes, and prejudices are not exogenous; they are created due to the dynamics of the political and economic system that surrounds the individual. Local politics and economics are critical in this process because citizens' perceptions are formed regarding their community and the nation (Mansfield & Mutz, 2009). My paper shows that globalization forces that restructure the economic dynamics might determine social identities and racial attitudes used to explain protectionist sentiments (Rodrik, 2020). I offer one mechanism - manipulating the cost of globalization by political entrepreneurs - through which economic conditions can operate to determine social identities endogenously.

The results also contribute to our understanding of the role of trade as an electoral issue (Kim & Margalit, 2021; Autor *et al.*, 2020; Colantone & Stanig, 2018b,a). Trade has political repercussions not only on voter but also on candidate behavior (Rogowski, 1989). Instead of looking at how trade shapes voter behavior, this paper examines the manipulation of economic integration as a candidate campaign strategy. An important implication of my findings is that trade's salience varies between geographies and over time since voters are

exposed to different information about trade depending on where they reside. This idea that there are pockets of economic protectionism across the U.S. is in line with Broz *et al.* (2021)'s argument that protectionism follows geography. The dynamics of trade politicization I advance in this paper are also in line with Walter (2021)'s claim that the backlash against globalization is engineered by political entrepreneurs who politicized the issue during elections (De Vries *et al.*, 2021). My results point to the importance of understanding trade attitudes through a top-down process. Political candidates with domestic electoral concerns engineer cleavages around globalization, exploiting the public's economic anxiety. Opportunistic political entrepreneurs spot cultural and social divisions and actively play into them to garner votes and shape public opinion (Converse, 1964).

Finally, my findings contribute to the burgeoning literature on politicians' responsiveness to their constituencies. A growing body of literature acknowledges that district economic conditions shape legislators' policy positions. However, we still know little about how economic conditions shape elite communication strategies to voters. My findings suggest that, in line with Feigenbaum & Hall (2015)'s predictions, candidates serve narratives to voters that allow them to shift the blame from their poor economic performances. In this regard, they demonstrate that the populist strategies Donald Trump coined in the 2016 Presidential elections predate him and are a part of American political history.

Background: Anti-Trade Advertising in the United States

Trade has been a hotly debated issue in the Presidential elections since 2000. In 2004, John Kerry made offshoring one of his central issues in the Democratic primaries (Margalit, 2011). The subsequent Democratic primary had two candidates, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, blaming the North American Free Trade Agreement for the "devastating" job losses to get the nomination.[6] Obama, who was successful in his 2008 presidential bid, went on to

[6]Golshan, Tara and Dylan Scott. 2019. "The big divide among 2020 Democrats on trade - and why it matters."Link

support free trade issues during his first term, up until the consecutive Presidential election. In 2012, the Democratic candidate Obama and the free trade supporter Republican candidate Romney both took protectionist positions and promised voters to curb trade liberalization.[7] Trade protectionism was at the center of the 2016 presidential election agenda as Donald Trump, Bernie Sanders, and Hillary Clinton all argued that free trade destroys and ships US jobs overseas.[8]

Trade policy also led to heated discussions in state and local elections. For example, between 2002 and 2016, voters in a total of 178 distinct districts and approximately 310 races were exposed to trade-related ads in the House elections.[9] Figure 1 plots the percentage of congressional anti-trade ads in total ads sponsored by Democratic and Republican candidates/party and interest groups.[10] What is striking about the figure is the fluctuations of trade salience in campaign rhetoric for all sponsoring groups. Two things stand out in the chart. First, the share of anti-trade ads in the Democratic campaign agenda peaked in the 2010 midterm elections, right after the Great Recession. Anti-trade ads constituted 17 % of all ads aired by the Democrats, making it the third most mentioned Democratic issue in 2010. Until the 2010 election, Democratic anti-trade advertising showed a consistently increasing trend, followed by a dip in 2014 and a rise in 2016. One reason for the surge in Democratic anti-trade ads could be to divert attention from the slow economic recovery voters attributed to their party without hurting their own Administration (Jacobson, 2011).

The second interesting thing is the relative dearth of anti-trade ads aired by congressional Republicans. Contrary to the 2016 Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump who made a central issue in his campaign agenda, congressional Republicans resort to the strategy less than their Democratic counterparts. One of the main reasons behind this may

[7] https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2012/09/17/161294756/obama-romney-in-tug-of-war-over-china-trade.

[8] https://www.cnbc.com/2016/08/11/trump-and-clinton-now-sound-similar-on-one-key-issue.html. https://www.forbes.com/sites/daviddavenport/2016/04/01/trump-and-sanders-in-agreement-the-strange-politics-of-free-trade/?sh=480012736eef.

[9] Primary and general elections included.

[10] The figure includes anti-trade ads aired by both Senate and House candidates.

be the traditional supportive free trade beliefs of congressional Republicans. Nevertheless, the chart shows that trade policy has been strategically used by candidates from the both sides of the isle. Both Republicans and Democrats have utilized trade issues to attack their opponents in elections.

A major driving force for the anti-trade ads voters watch might be outside interest groups. Between 2000 and 2016, interest groups, for example unions like AFL-CIO, have aired ads, urging the voters to strongly consider candidates that run on protectionist platforms. However, Figure 1 shows that these outside groups are unlikely forces that drive candidates' trade agendas, mainly because of the relative lack of advertising on these issues. Protectionist interest groups mostly advertised in elections against free-trade in the second half of the 2000-2016 period. In the early 2000s, liberal interest groups were active in pushing for the liberal trade agenda.

The heightened interest in trade policy as a campaign issue in my sample period could be traced back to the structural changes in the American economy in the 2000s. Following China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, the US trade deficit has sharply increased until the Great Recession.[11] The penetration of cheap Chinese imports into the domestic market has attracted the attention of local and national news, which portrayed the consequences of the trade relations in a negative light. Events such as the ratification of CAFTA in 2005, the start of negotiations of the contentious Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2014, the rise of China as the US' main trading partner, and the Great Recession in 2008 have increased trade's salience in the American political arena.[12] These changes in the global economy rendered the US trade policy a lucrative campaign topic in the late 2000s. Indeed, candidates in interviews mentioned that they promised their voters' protectionist policies because their voters demanded action on trade policy in campaign trails.[13]

[11] The US trade deficit decreased for a short period of time around the Great Recession, mainly due to the decline in Americans' consumption patterns. It has continued to decrease following 2009. Source: US Census

[12] But trade lost its importance as a campaign strategy again in the 2014 midterm elections.

[13] "Election 2006: No to Staying the Course on Trade", *Public Citizen*, accessed through

Yet, it is an empirical question as to whether concerns about the recent surge in Chinese imports motivated candidates to target anti-trade advertising in such regions. Figure 2 plots the geographical variation in the share of anti-trade ads purchased across the designated media markets (dmas). Dmas are created by Nielsen media company to track local TV viewership. Candidates buy spots to air their ads to convey their campaign messages to constituencies via broadcast television. The figure shows a concentration of anti-trade ads

https://www.citizen.org/node/6555

Figure 1: Congressional Anti-Trade Ads Between 2000-2016 by Sponsorship



This figure plots the proportion of trade ads to total ads over election periods, broken down by ad sponsors. Trade ads are ads coded by WMP and WAP to include issues regarding trade and globalization. The blue line indicates the ads sponsored by Democratic party candidates. The red line plots ads sponsored by Republican party candidates. The black line plots ads sponsored by third-party interest groups. The vertical lines indicate the Great Recession. Data Source: Wisconsin Advertising Project and Wesleyan Media Project

in the old manufacturing hubs in the Rust Belt. Yet, there is still considerable amount of unexplained variation both inside the Rust Belt region and across the US.

Figure 2: Geographic Variation in the Congressional Anti-Trade Ads Between 2008-2016



This figure plots the proportion of trade ads to total ads over election periods in dmas. Trade ads are ads coded by WMP and WAP to include issues regarding trade and globalization. Darker shades of red represent a higher share of trade in dma advertising. Data Source: WAP and WMP

The content of anti-trade ads is surprisingly similar across races and parties. Guisinger (2017)'s examination of political advertising by congressional, presidential candidates, and interest groups throughout 2000 to 2012[14] demonstrates that coverage of trade in these ads have been overwhelmingly negative. This is in line with the overall negativity of effective televised political advertising, given that individuals react stronger to negative information

[14]Guisinger (2017)'s dataset excludes the 2010 midterm elections ads.

(Tversky & Kahneman, 1991; Jacobson, 2015). Since most ads highlight the negative consequences of trade, candidates use import competition and offshoring as the main themes almost exclusively. This is not surprising given the considerable distaste of Americans for companies relocating American jobs elsewhere, even though the American public seems to support free trade on average. [15] Candidates embellish these issues by emphasizing the adverse effects of trade, specifically on the labor market. What's notable is that mentions of job losses are coupled with an emphasis on foreign competition. The specific framing of trade issues by emphasizing the loss of jobs to foreign competitors, specifically China, has produced a lop-sided discussion where very few voters are exposed to the benefits of free trade during the campaign period. In line with Mutz (2018)'s definition of the American public's perceptions on trade, anti-trade ads enforced an understanding of trade relations as a zero-sum game, where America loses when foreign trading partners win. This begs the question whether candidates are offering protectionist policies to appease their voter base who wants tariff to go down, or whether some other strategy is at play.

To summarize, the salience of trade varies over time and across geographies. Between 2000 and 2016, but especially after the Great Recession, candidates have aired their distaste toward free trade and offered protectionist policies to their voters with promises to end the free trade agreements and cut ties with China if elected. The emphasis on the negative consequences of trade, considerable variation in the Rust Belt and strategic choice of timing by candidates in anti-trade airing necessitate an investigation on the specific reasons why politicians use trade as a scapegoat.

Elite Responsiveness to Local De-industrialization

The retrospective economic voting literature provides the theoretical underpinnings of why candidates are responsive to local economic conditions in their campaigns. Economic

[15] A 2007 Gallup poll shows that 77% of respondents thought outsourcing was bad. https://news.gallup.com/businessjournal/28309/beware-your-customers-oppose-outsourcing.aspx

indicators such as the unemployment rate (Kramer, 1971) or gross domestic product (Fair, 1978) factor into the voters' decisions on the incumbent administration. As a result, even voters disinterested in politics may remove politicians with a poor economic performance from office (Ferejohn, 1986; Key, 1966), or punish the administration party candidates for local job losses (de Benedictis-Kessner & Warshaw, 2020). Studies have shown that despite the nationalization of politics in the US in recent years constituency economic concerns shape candidates' campaign agendas. Looking at televised campaign advertisements, Marble (2020) found that candidates emphasize jobs in areas with higher unemployment, especially if they don't belong to the President's party. Thus, candidates strategically emphasize the economy in their campaign messages, emphasizing job losses or defecting attention from the economy depending on partisanship (Vavreck, 2009).

Although political economists have demonstrated the negative effects of increased economic integration on the US labor market, few studies have investigated how political elites have responded to trade-induced economic deterioration. Feigenbaum & Hall (2015) showed that incumbents evaded the political costs of trade shocks by adopting a protectionist stance in roll-call trade votes. By contrast, Pomirchy & Schonfeld (2020) found that legislator voting behavior wasn't in line with constituency opinion on trade bills. Regarding campaign messages on trade, the literature is scarcer. Guisinger (2017, p. 196)'s exploration of trade ads from 2000 to 2012 demonstrated that candidates emphasized the adverse effects of trade in "old industrial centers", such as Utica, NY, and Detriot, MI. However, the literature has not examined in detail the elite responsiveness to globalization by measuring the association between regional trade shocks, constituency characteristics, and campaign messages of U.S. Congressional candidates.

Given the interest in studies on globalization and voting outcomes, it is surprising that elite responsiveness to globalization is understudied. Candidate framing of trade issues constitutes the basis of attitudes that translate into voting behavior. Yet, studies thus far have focused almost exclusively on the demand-side explanations, exploring how global-

ization shocks altered the demand for right-wing politics. Even though these studies have mentioned the potential role of political entrepreneurs in creating this demand, the role of elites has largely been ignored. However, the weak empirical evidence on the correlation between the backlash and negative public opinion on trade motivated recent calls to pay closer attention to the politicization of anti-globalization attitudes by the elites (Walter, 2021).

In the following section, I contribute to the literature on the supply side of the backlash against globalization by advancing a theory on responsiveness to trade-induced economic changes in the labor markets. I bring together two unconnected literature, candidate campaign behavior and the political economy of trade, to explain how candidates respond to international macroeconomic shocks.

A Theory of Anti-Trade Advertising

I argue that candidates respond to the detrimental effects of international economic integration. Trade-induced changes in the local labor market and trade's complexity as an issue render trade a lucrative campaign appeal for candidates who hope to tap into voters' economic anxiety and activate protectionist attitudes in trade-hit places. This argument provides a starting point to how we can understand the impact of globalization in domestic politics.

To understand how trade issues enter the campaign agendas, I rely on (Riker, 1983)'s campaign strategy theory of heresthetics. Riker broadly defines heresthetics as "manipulation of tastes."(Riker, 1983, p. 57) Based on rational choice, his theory sheds light on the phenomenon where political actors introduce, manipulate and increase the salience of certain issues to reach their aims. Its application on campaign strategies reveals that rather than assuming its position or persuading the median voter on policy, candidates aim to control the agenda by manipulating what issue dimensions are emphasized during elections (Sides, 2006; Hammond & Humes, 1993). It is derived from the theory of heresthetics that candidates

are strategic in their campaign messages. As they aim to win elections by maximizing their vote share, candidates carefully craft their agenda, including issue positions that appeal to and mobilize voters (Vavreck, 2009; Arbour, 2014). These issue positions may deviate from their personal beliefs, as long as they adapt their policy positions to match their audience's. Likewise, when candidates create their agenda to react to local economic conditions, they set priorities and messages strategically around the economy (Vavreck, 2009). Given the budgetary and time constraints on televised advertising, candidates can't respond to every voter's concern. The considerable time and resources candidates spend on crafting the most effective messages reveal the importance they assign to campaign agendas (Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000). Thus, we can expect observed campaign ads to inform us about candidates' underlying calculated strategy of which issues they think will mobilize the voters.

Voters turn to politicians when they try to fathom the changes observed in their local economy. Politicians may use this interest as an opportunity to control the electoral agenda when they communicate to the electorate what's behind the economic changes. Since the causes of local economic decline are complex, politicians craft messages that highlight their own priorities and interpretations of the economic conditions to capture votes (Zaller, 1992; Gelman & King, 1993; Stevenson & Vavreck, 2000; Arceneaux, 2006). For example, Republican candidates may benefit from attributing job losses to diminished corporate activity, allowing them to attract votes by proposing lower corporate tax policies. In the same vein, Democratic candidates may trace the same problem to skill differences, suggesting governmental-run job training programs as a solution. The incomplete information voters possess about the economy initiate politicians' efforts to raise their issue priorities and frame issues in a specific way to control the electoral agenda.

What makes candidates respond to trade shocks with anti-trade ad appeals? The complexity of trade issues makes trade the perfect issue for agenda control. The decline of manufacturing in the 1970s, recent changes in the local industrial composition due to China's WTO accession, and the influx of cheap imports in the 2000s rendered it difficult for voters

to comprehend the distributive consequences of trade (Guisinger, 2017). This reality is only exacerbated by the technological advancements in the manufacturing process that destroyed even more US manufacturing jobs. Surveys show that Americans don't have a solid understanding of the US trade relations - Americans cannot name the main US trading partners and cite their congressmen's trade voting record correctly (Guisinger, 2009). All these developments rendered citizens' opinion malleable and vulnerable to framing because uncertainty about trade has increased (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2006).[16] The inability of voters to comprehend the complex reasoning of economic decline in their regions encourages candidates to take a populist stance and scapegoat trade. Obama's US trade representatives' quote on trade explains this phenomenon - "Since you don't get a chance to vote on technology or even globalization, trade agreements have become the scapegoat for other quite legitimate concerns about jobs and wages."[17]

A discussion of how trade is perceived in the US and frequent themes in the anti-trade ads further reveal candidates' incentives to target these ads. Effective political campaigns are short and simple, designed with one clear message on the issue voters judge the candidates. Explaining to voters how multiple factors interact with trade to cause manufacturing job losses isn't a lucrative campaign strategy (Acemoglu *et al.*, 2016). Moreover, given the profitability of negative campaign ads, anti-trade ads are preferred to positive trade ads (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995). Indeed, only a handful of candidates support trade liberalization in their campaign ads between 2000 and 2016.[19] Common themes found in anti-trade ads are "jobs lost overseas", "corporate tax breaks that shipped jobs to China", and "job-killing trade agreements."[20] Candidates expect that these ads resonate with the electorate. According to Mutz (2018), trade is perceived as a zero-sum game where Americans lose as foreign countries like China and India gain. Therefore, declaring support for protectionist

[16] Candidates made international trade a salient issue in the aftermath of the big changes in US integration to the world economy, such as following the events of the rise of Japan in the 1980s, start of NAFTA negotiations in the 1990s, and surge in cheap Chinese imports after the 2000s.

[17] [18]

[19] Guisinger (2017) arrives at the same conclusion in her exploration of trade ads between 2000 and 2012.

[20] Ad Source: WMP

policies allow candidates to offer an alternative to current policies that cause unemployment (Fiorina, 1981). By blaming trade for poor economic performance, candidates aim to tap into the dormant protectionist attitudes of voters who experience job losses in their communities.

Airing anti-trade ads is also a good strategy for candidates to evoke economic anxiety where trade is more salient to increase their chances of receiving more votes. The issue salience theory of campaign agendas states that candidates talk about issues that voters care about during the election period (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1994). Since candidates who fail to engage with high priority constituency issues are punished by voters, they pay specific attention to center their campaigns around these issues (Sides, 2006; Sulkin & Evans, 2006). Fenno (1977) asserts that congressional candidates often deviate from the national party priorities to address district priorities to form a bond with the electorate. Trade's negative effects on the local economy make it a salient issue for the community. Trade-related job losses link to a myriad of social and economic problems such as lower public goods provision (Feler & Senses, 2017), higher crime (Che *et al.*, 2018), mortality (Sullivan & von Wachter, 2009) and opioid addiction (Pierce & Schott, 2016) rates in the region. The median voter is more likely to be protectionist compared to other communities (Downs, 1957). Even if voters do not suffer personal economic decline, they are more likely to know someone in their community who has (Mansfield & Mutz, 2009). This provides an opportunity for the candidate to exploit trade's salience and tap into voters' economic anxiety.

The decline of the manufacturing sector is not a new phenomenon in the US. Figure 3 taken from Broz *et al.* (2021)'s paper illustrates that while the average manufacturing employment share in the 1970 was around 30%, this share declined to 10% in the 2010s, a trend also seen in other advanced economies. They emphasize in their paper that even though the sudden, recent surge in Chinese imports were a major shock, old manufacturing hubs in the US like Dayton, Ohio or Detroit, Michigan borne the higher cost, especially after the financial crisis. Thus, candidates might have found these places to be more attractive targets for their populist messages on trade. My hypothesis states that:

The malleability and complexity of trade issues, ability to appeal to emotions and salience of trade make anti-trade ad airing a profitable strategy for candidates running in trade-hit areas. Since candidates craft their campaign agenda to mobilize the electorate and earn votes, these advantages should incentivize candidates to target protectionist ads where they get the biggest bang for their buck. The impact of the recent Chinese import shock on US local labor markets are thus likely to ignite a reaction from voters. Candidates would like to capitalize on these grievances by targeting their protectionist messages in these communities. Therefore, my first hypothesis states that:

H1: Candidates air more anti-trade ads in regions that sustained a long manufacturing decline.

De-industrialization after the 1970s was multi causal. The integration of low income countries such as Vietnam and South Korea has led to intense trade competition in regions that contained industries that produced such goods. At the same time, manufacturing industries have undergone automation at a fast-paced. I argue that candidates should target anti-trade ads to places in economic decline, regardless of the source. One implication for this statement is that controlling for long-term de-industrialization, regions that come under trade shocks should not be targets of anti-trade ads. Thus, my second hypothesis states that:

*H2: Candidates **do not** air more anti-trade ads in regions with higher levels of recent local import competition.*

In the next section, I present the data sources for all the variables I include in the regression. I also provide a detailed explanation on how I measure my two independent variables.

Research Methodology

In this section, I describe the research methodology and various data sources I use in my analysis. First, I describe the campaign ad data, explaining why it is a good measure for campaign rhetoric as my dependent variable. Second, I specify how I identify the long-term and recent negative effects of trade on the labor market. I conclude this section with a discussion of the model and controls I use.

Figure 3: The Manufacturing Decline in the US Starting from the 1970s



Note: The data are from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, International Labor Comparisons Program.

Graph taken from (Broz *et al.*, 2021)

Campaign Ad Data

My paper explores the effect of trade shocks on candidates' campaign agendas. Ideally, this entails issues candidates communicate to voters through all communication channels, including press releases, campaign speeches, and websites. However, collecting such data is a challenge given the size of the potential data and time-taking task of coding issues across different types. I, therefore, rely on televised political advertising data collected by WAP and WMP (Goldstein *et al.*, 2002; Fowler *et al.*, 2016).[21] This data is representative of candidate issue priorities since televised political advertising still makes up 95% of the Congressional communication budgets (Fowler *et al.*, 2019) and candidates emphasize more or less the same issues across different channels. The data includes ad-level information, including ad airing date, time, length, sponsor, program, and location (district and media market).

Televised political advertising is well-suited for examining the campaign appeals. Campaign ads are one of the few channels where voters directly hear about a candidate's unfiltered position on issues. They are also ideal for assessing strategic campaign appeals since candidates face tight time and budgetary constraints airing the ads. Thus, candidates raise issues only if they are winning issues of high priority (Sulkin, 2015; Sides, 2006). The data on political ads also allows me to rely on cross-checked issue codings of a large group of research assistants that worked for the project.

I examine televised political ads aired by House and Senate candidates in the Congressional elections between 2008 and 2016.[22] Looking at congressional elections permits for a thorough investigation of how constituency characteristics match with candidate issue emphasis. Unlike presidential candidates, congressional candidates are more likely to respond to constituency demands since they have narrower electoral districts (Marble, 2020). Congressional elections give me enough geographical variation to investigate trade's electoral

[21] Data on televised ads aired in 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2008 come from WAP. Data on ads aired in 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016 come from WMP. Before 2008, only ads aired in the top 100 media markets are recorded. After 2008, the dataset includes ads from all 210 Nielsen media markets.

[22] I focus on the time period after the Great Recession but results don't differ if I include the whole sample.

role at a time period when trade was locally, but not nationally, salient. In my main specifications, I restrict my sample to include ads aired post-Recession. This period coincides with the end of the height of Chinese import competition and excludes the 2016 elections during which President Trump shifted trade priorities across the party lines. As I show in my analysis, party priorities are kept constant during this period, allowing me to examine partisan heterogeneity in responses to trade shocks. I only look at ad targeting during the Labor Day - Election Day period because I expect candidates to be more responsive when voters' interest in the campaign increases. This restriction also allows me to ignore primary ads, as strategies candidates pursue for in-party competition differ significantly from the out-party competition.

My dependent variable measures trade issue emphasis as the number of anti-trade ads to total ads in a county. As mentioned before, ad contents are coded by a group of research assistants. There are, in total, around 53 issue categories.[23] Researche assistants have watched the video files of each ad and coded issues as indicator variables - if an issue is mentioned in the ad, it gets coded as 1, 0 otherwise. For example, if a candidate talked about outsourcing, "trade" column gets coded as 1. Anti-trade ads are negative ads that are coded as 1 under the "Trade/Globalization" category.[24] Most ads last 30 seconds (although there are a few that lasts 60 seconds). I count every airing of an ad as one observation, even if the ad's content stays the same. Let's say a candidate purchased air time to show an ad during the commercial breaks of a show. If he showed the ad at each commercial break and the show has three commercial breaks, each ad showing counts as an observation. Ad issue categories are not mutually exclusive; many ad observations include multiple issues. For instance, a candidate arguing for tax decreases in an ad may also discuss her views on abortion, social security, and veterans. While there are many ways to count these ads, the measure I construct captures the motivation behind the time and resources a candidate

[23]The number of issues coded may change from one dataset to another. Luckily, researchers have coded trade issues in all datasets.

[24]I have watched anti-trade ad videos and weeded out pro-trade ads.

invests in running an ad. Since advertising time is limited and expensive, a mention of trade issues by a candidate in an ad is a costly signal that the candidate wants to inform voters about trade policy.

I stack all years in my sample and aggregate the instances of anti-trade ads and total ads in a dma. My cumulative measure at the media market level also allows me to circumvent a large number of zeros that cause problems while analyzing at disaggregated geographical levels. Then, I calculate the proportion of anti-trade ads to total ads in each media market. Finally, I match a list of all counties in the US with their respective media market to observe the share of anti-trade ads to total ads voters were exposed to during the 2008-2016 period. I use a crosswalk to do the matching.[25] Using counties as the unit of analysis allows me to include both House and Senate ads in my sample and ensures consistency in geographical units during the sample period.[26] Ads are geocoded at the media market level in WMP and WAP datasets.

The Economic Decline of Manufacturing

I have two variables to proxy for a county's vulnerability to the long-term and shorter-term changes in US' global economic integration. The first one measures the impact of the sudden surge in Chinese import in a county depending on how much its commuting zone's employment were in the manufacturing import-competing industries. The second one measures the long term manufacturing decline effect by calculating the share of manufacturing employment in a county in the 1970s when the American economy came under a lot of pressure because of imports from low-income manufacturing exporters, such as South Korea and Vietnam.

[25]Media markets are larger geographical units made up of multiple counties. Counties match with exactly one media market because county borders don't intersect media market borders. Candidates make their ad-buying decisions at the media market level.

[26]County borders, unlike congressional districts', don't change during this time period.

Long-Term Manufacturing Decline

I use data from Broz *et al.* (2021) to indicate which counties were old manufacturing hubs. They gathered data on US county manufacturing employment in the 1970s from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Higher shares of manufacturing in the 70s would indicate a steeper economic decline in the following years, designating a county to be a former manufacturing hub. As (Guisinger, 2017) acknowledges, there are almost no regions left where import-competing manufacturing dominates the local economy like it did in the 70s. Figure A4 in the Appendix shows that the severity of the decline of manufacturing employment in the 2000s is highly correlated (cor=0.83) with a county's manufacturing employment share in 1970. Figure A5 demonstrates that even though the China import competition and old manufacturing hubs measures are positively correlated(cor=0.3), the correlation is not as strong as expected.[27]

Exogenous Local Trade Shocks

To empirically assess the effect of local trade competition on the emphasis of trade issues, I rely on Autor *et al.* (2013)'s measure of regional market exposure to trade and identification strategy. Autor *et al.* (2013) develops a model capturing the effect of a shock to China's supply of exports into the US on product demand to examine the US labor market changes due to further integration with China. They conclude that in the absence of labor mobility,[28] trade shocks decreased employment in regional markets.[29]

In my analysis, I aim to measure the recent economic impact of increased imports on regional labor markets. Autor *et al.* (2013)'s labor market exposure measure fits well with my aim. They define local labor markets as "commuting zones," a larger geographical unit made up of multiple counties that estimate worker travel between home and work (Tolbert & Sizer, 1996). In the commuting zone, they quantify the average change in Chinese import

[27] Summary statistics are reported in Table A1.
[28] Autor *et al.* (2013) demonstrated in their papers that migration between regions was low in the 2000s.
[29] Acemoglu *et al.* (2016) provides further evidence to Autor *et al.* (2013)'s conclusions.

penetration at each industry, weighted by the industry's initial employment share in the commuting zone. Then, to measure commuting zone exposure, they sum up each industry exposure across all industries in the community zone.

Formally, let j index commuting zones, k industries and T period of exposure of interest. The following formula displays commuting zone j's exposure to trade in period T:

$$\Delta IP_{jT}^{cu} = \sum_k \frac{L_{jkt}}{L_{jt}} \Delta IP_{kt}^{cu}$$

where ΔIP_{kt}^{cu} is $\Delta M_{kt}^{cu}/(Y_{k0} + M_{k0} - X_{k0})$, the growth of US imports from China in industry k over period T (M_{kt}^{cu}), divided by US industry shipments (Y_{k0}) plus net imports ($M_{k0} - X_{k0}$) in 1991.[30] This part of the equation only varies from industry to industry (and thus not indexed by j), as the share of Chinese imports in the industry's trade absorption is the same within each industry. To obtain regional variation, the change in Chinese imports in industry k is multiplied by that industry's employment share in the local labor market at the start of period T. This share is calculated by dividing L_{jkt}, workers in industry k in commuting zone j at time t(start-of-period), by L_{jt}, total employment in all industries in commuting zone j at time t. The final measure consists of the sum of the weighted industry import exposure across all manufacturing industries. The import shock measure is the highest in commuting zones whose initial employment consisted of industries that saw imports from China increase the most in the given time period. Autor *et al.* (2013) put together this measure using various data sources. Data for international trade come from UN Comtrade Database. Data for values of US shipments are from NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database. County Business Patterns provide data for employment.

I set my time period, T, as 2000-2007. I calculate the changes in US imports from China from the beginning of the decade until the start of my ad sample period (2008) and the Great Recession. This period coincides with the height of Chinese import growth in the US right after China's accession to World Trade Organization. Excluding the Great Recession

[30] O indexes 1991; it is a ten-year lag in US trade activity which is appropriate for measuring trade exposure in the 2000s.

period allows me to avoid the crisis period in which Chinese trade performance would be complicated by the crisis's effect on trade.

The main threat to inference in my analysis arises from unobservable omitted variables that correlate with both local trade shocks and the incentive for a candidate to air an anti-trade ad. Reverse causality is not likely a problem because there is a low probability that Congressional candidates impact trade between China and the US. However, an increase in the demand for a tradeable product in the US could increase imports from China and employment, which could disincentivize candidates to talk about trade in the region. This would lead to an underestimation of the size of the trade shock's true impact.

To strip the local trade exposure measure from the endogenous US demand part, I construct an instrument that measures changes in Chinese imports only due to China's economic considerations. Following Autor *et al.* (2013), I replace changes in US imports from China ($DeltaIP_{kt}^{cu}$) with changes in other high-income countries from China (ΔIP_{kt}^{co}). The instrument's equation is stated below:

$$\Delta IP_{jT}^{co} = \sum_k \frac{L_{jkt-1}}{L_{jt-1}} \Delta IP_{kt-1}^{co}$$

The instrument is constructed by using changes in Chinese imports into eight other developed countries.[31] Given the high correlation between Chinese imports into the US and other developed countries, the instrument is relevant. Moreover, the instrument satisfies the exclusion restriction because an increase in imports in the instrument can be attributed only to changes in China's economy (for example, Chinese manufacturing productivity) and not to demand conditions in the US.[32]

To summarize, I obtain a measure of a county's local labor market vulnerability toward the sudden surge of Chinese imports between 2000 and 2007. I assign counties their local trade exposure measure and instrument after matching counties with their commuting

[31] These countries are: Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland.

[32] Autor *et al.* (2013) discusses how the exclusion restriction is satisfied despite other potential threats of inference.

zones. Data for both come from Autor *et al.* (2013)'s replication material. These measures correspond to their second-decade measures (t2=1, year=2000).

The Model

To assess whether exogenous trade shocks or the share of manufacturing in the labor market in the 70s drive anti-trade advertising in counties, I estimate a cross-sectional 2SLS regression, using the instrument explained above. The regression equation is:

First-stage model:

$$1(a)\ \Delta IP_{jT}^{cu} = \gamma + \lambda \mathbf{\Delta IP_{jT}^{co}} + \zeta ManuHub_{zt-30} + \mathrm{X}_{zt0} + \psi_j,$$

$$1(b)\ Y_{zT} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \Delta IP_{jT}^{cu} + \beta_2 ManuHub_{zt-30} + \mathrm{X}_{zt0} + \mu + \epsilon_z$$

where Y_{zT} is the share of cumulative anti-trade ads in county z during period T (2008-2016), ΔIP_{jt}^{cu} is county z's commuting zone j's trade exposure in period t (2000-2007), $ManuHub_z$ is county z's share of workers in manufacturing, and X_{zt0} is a vector of start-of-period county-level controls. In the base regressions, these controls are start-of-period manufacturing employment and race competitiveness.[33] Initial share of manufacturing controls for the differences in shares of manufacturing and non-manufacturing employment across counties. This way, variation in trade exposure among counties is driven by the weight of import-competing industry employment Autor *et al.* (2013).[34] I include competitiveness as a control because competitiveness increases the number of ads and issues mentioned in an election. I use the Partisan Voting Index (PVI) at the media market level and match it with counties to measure competitiveness. I refrain from using previous election year's results for competitiveness. A number of studies found that doing this could generate bias (Dropp & Peskowitz, 2012) as competitiveness may reflect both race competitiveness and candidates'

[33] I collect data on the share of manufacturing employment and competitiveness in 2000 as trade competition could affect both.

[34] The share of manufacturing employment is computed using Census' County Business Patterns. Since a county's trade exposure is measured at the commuting zone level, I use the initial share of manufacturing employment at the commuting zone level.

own effort to win. For example, a safe district may turn competitive depending on the number of ads aired. Also, since I'm using ads aired by House and Senate candidates, determining competitiveness at the county level is problematic for multiple election years. PVI is constructed based on voting behavior in presidential elections; it reflects the performance of Democratic and Republican presidential candidates in a region relative to other regions. Thus, PVI is unlikely to be influenced by congressional candidates' communication efforts.[35] I code a county as falling into a competitive media market if the PVI score is between 5 and -5. PVI scores higher than 5 indicate a Democratic-leaning, whereas PVI scores less than -5 indicate a Republican-leaning. For my base models, I code this variable as an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the PVI score categorizes the county as competitive, and 0 otherwise. I cluster the standard errors around commuting zones as my independent variable is measured at the commuting zone level. To account for unobserved confounding variables that could influence both anti-trade advertising and the economic decline, I include region-fixed effects in my regressions.

The coefficients of interest are β_1, the coefficient in front of the trade exposure measure, and β_2, the coefficient in front of the old manufacturing hub measure. I expect both β_1 and $beta_2$ to be positive and significant. Increases in trade exposure measured by import competition after China's accession to WTO and before the Great Recession should increase the amount of anti-trade ads aired in a county. Long term economic decline due to the loss of manufacturing jobs should also trigger politicians to address these regions with protectionist policies. In both cases, the median voter in the county is likely to be protectionist given that trade is a salience issue in communities that suffered from job losses.

[35]PVI measures are taken from this website: https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2018/8/12/1786221/-

Results

Anti-Trade Ad Predictors

Table 1 presents the first-stage regression results. The table demonstrates a positive and significant correlation between ΔIP_{jT}^{cu}, the trade shock variable and its instrument, ΔIP_{zt}^{co}. Coefficients in both columns show that this correlation is strong, even after adding county and commuting zone-level controls. F-statistics for both specifications are bigger than 10, which allows me to reject the hypothesis that the instrument is weak.

Table 1: First-Stage Regression Results

	(1) Chinese Import Shock	(2) Chinese Import Shock
Chinese Import Shock_IV	0.754***	0.518***
	(0.106)	(0.142)
% Manufacturing Employment		0.086***
		(0.021)
Competitive		0.156
		(0.184)
% Manufacturing 1970		0.000
		(0.005)
Observations	3111	2898
Weak-F Statistics	50.85	37.45
County-level Controls	no	yes
Region-fixed Effects	no	yes

The table above presents the results for the first-stage 2SLS regression. The first column presents the association between Chinese import shocks and their instrument. The second column shows that the positive and significant correlation holds after including county-level controls and region-fixed effects. Chinese import shock instrument is concurrent Chinese imports into eight other developed countries.Robust standard errors are clustered around commuting zones; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The second stage estimates presented in Table 2 reveals some interesting results. Column 1 shows the bivariate relationship between instrumented ΔIP_{jT}^{cu} and the share of anti-trade ads seen by county citizens. This relationship is positive and significant. Column

2 shows that inclusion of the competitiveness of the county and the share of manufacturing employment decreases the significance, but the coefficient is still significant and positive. The model in column 3 adds other county characteristics that are relevant, as well as a county's manufacturing employment share in the 1970s. Controlling for the long manufacturing decline trends, the coefficient before ΔIP_{jT}^{cu} becomes insignificant. Substantially, one standard deviation increase in the share of manufacturing in county employment in 1970 increases the share of anti-trade ads by one percentage-point. This is an economically and statistically significant effect, given that mean county trade ad exposure is %8. This effect holds even after adding region-fixed effects to account for the unobservable variation that might be driving anti-trade advertising across regions.[36]

Table 2: 2SLS: Trade Shock Exposure and Anti-Trade Ads

	(1) % Trade Ads	(2) % Trade Ads	(3) % Trade Ads	(4) % Trade Ads
Chinese Import Shock	0.884***	0.512*	0.264	0.033
	(0.174)	(0.265)	(0.221)	(0.206)
Competitive		2.568***	2.395***	1.799***
		(0.607)	(0.566)	(0.498)
% Manufacturing Employment		0.114**	0.049	0.060
		(0.051)	(0.043)	(0.038)
% Manufacturing 1970			0.199***	0.090***
			(0.022)	(0.018)
Observations	2792	2792	2792	2792
County-level Controls	no	yes	yes	yes
Region-Fixed Effects	no	no	no	yes

The first model presents the correlation between Chinese import shock and anti-trade ads. The second model includes county characteristics measured in the 2000 Census. The third model controls for the county share of manufacturing in 1970. The fourth model adds region-fixed effects. Chinese import shock is instrumented by concurrent Chinese imports into eight other developed countries. Robust standard errors are clustered around commuting zones; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

All in all, two-stage least square regression estimates refuted my first hypothesis,

[36] Appendix Table A1 presents the estimated coefficients of other county controls.

while supporting the second one. Taken together, these results may mean that candidates believe their protectionist messages might be the most effective in regions that suffered a sustained economic decline.[37]

What Does Trade Stand For?

Results in Table 2 reveal that candidates are responsive to trade shocks in their districts. This means that the long-term impact of manufacturing decline motivated candidates running in the subsequent elections to adapt their communication strategies by offering more protectionist policies. Congressional candidates targeted these policies to places that borne the severe cost of the loss of manufacturing employment in the 70s. The fact that politicians considered these places as receptive to anti-trade messages after the Great Recession is an indication that economic grievances caused by manufacturing decline last a long time. This makes sense, as studies show that the Great Recession created a larger dent in the labor market of these old manufacturing hubs (Broz *et al.*, 2021). Manufacturing plants were big and employed thousands of workers at once. A plant shutdown has had a detrimental effect on both the workers and their families and communities. Amid the rapid technological change and shifting of the US economy from manufacturing to service sector, lost jobs didn't come back to these communities.

While politicians' strategy of targeting anti-trade ads in old manufacturing hubs means such ads are motivated by the economic decline international economic engagement has brought, it does not tell us the strategy behind why trade messages are selected into the campaign agenda. Trade policy is a multidimensional issue. On one hand, there is the economic dimension: increasing economic integration kills low-skilled jobs in advanced economies. On the other hand, there is the social dimension: the fear of a foreign competitor, mostly China, challenging the American superpower status. Historically, these two concerns have created interesting alliances for trade policy-making. Even nowadays, we can observe

[37] Table A2 in the Appendix reports the coefficients of all controls.

that left-wing progressives in the Democratic party find themselves rooting for the same protectionist position with conservatives in the Republican party.

To understand the ad strategies, I capitalize on other issues coded by WMP research assistants. I look at three other issue areas: jobs, china and immigration.[38] My aim is to acquire suggestive evidence on which frames candidates choose when advertising on trade issues. If candidates are targeting job-related ads to the same communities as trade ads, then anti-trade ads might be picking up purely employment concerns. In this case, trade acts as one of the many economic issues candidates can choose from to address regional economic decline. However, if candidates target China and immigration ads in the same places as trade, they might be trying to invoke status anxiety. China is mentioned fairly frequently and negatively in televised political advertising, despite its emergence only in recent years. If the factors that motivate candidates to advertise on trade also incentivize them to air anti-China ads, we could suspect socio-cultural aspirations. Indeed, the New York Times published an article reporting on this phenomenon in the 2010 midterm elections. The article states that candidates used China as a "scapegoat" in their ads to distract from the real reasons of economic decline in their regions. China's challenger status and American's increasing anxiety that China will surpass America as the leading economy in the near future renders China the perfect "villain."[39] Finally, I substitute trade ads with immigration ads in my models. Most populist candidates assumed an anti-immigration stance alongside protectionism since trade and immigration flows are the most visible embodiment of economic globalization. Like trade, candidates can tap into voters' status anxiety and increase out-group prejudice by emphasizing how migrants are a threat to the American dominance in

[38] In the dataset, job-related ads are ones that mention employment and the labor market. Ads are coded as China-related if the ad mentions China. Finally, immigration ads are ones where candidates talk about the immigration policy. Similar to trade, most of these issue ads are negative attack ads. Immigration ads are not coded in the 2008 and 2010 data releases. For these years, I code the immigration ads myself. The dataset contains an open-ended text column asking research assistants any other topics mentioned in the ad not found in the original coding scheme. I searched for "immig" and "border" in this column to flag the ads that mention immigration. I validated my coding by watching the videos of the ads. Despite my best efforts, immigration ads are most likely under-counted compared to other issues.

[39] Chen, David M. 2010. "China Emerges as a Scapegoat in Campaign Ads, *New York Times*, Link

the global order. Observing a significant increase in anti-trade and immigration ads in old manufacturing hubs would suggest that the economic decline in these regions created a receptive spot for populist messages.

Table 3 presents the results. Column 2 shows that counties that had higher share of manufacturing employment in the 70s are more likely to be targeted by anti-China ads. Even though this effect is statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval, it is a rather small one. The China shock variable doesn't seem to be driving any of the ads.[40]

Table 3: Jobs, China and Immigration Ads

	(1) % Jobs Ads	(2) % China Ads	(3) % Immigration Ads
Chinese Import Shock	0.406	0.038	-0.024
	(0.354)	(0.140)	(0.095)
% Manufacturing 1970	0.051*	0.028**	0.016*
	(0.028)	(0.012)	(0.009)
Competitive	2.487***	0.485	-0.854***
	(0.824)	(0.334)	(0.211)
% Manufacturing Employment	-0.007	0.018	0.002
	(0.067)	(0.026)	(0.020)
Observations	2898	2898	2898
County-level Controls	yes	yes	yes
Region-Fixed Effects	yes	yes	yes

Two-stage least square results. The first dependent variable is ads that mention employment, the second is ads that mention China, and third is ads that mention immigration. Robust standard errors are clustered around commuting zones; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

White Voter Status Anxiety

So far, I have argued that the long-term economic decline in regions where counties belong drive anti-trade advertising. Recent books on white identity politics categorize trade with other policies that have become racialized in the American politics Jardina (2019).

[40]Table A3 in the Appendix presents the coefficients of all controls.

These authors argue that policy preferences are influenced by voters' social identity groupings (Converse, 1964). Converse's group-centric theory has certainly influences the recent way of thinking about trade attitudes in the political economy literature. (Mansfield & Mutz, 2009) found that the perceived economic benefits of trade to the national economy and out-group prejudice have more predictive power in estimating trade opinion compared to material self-interest explanations. Other studies have provided empirical evidence to support this claim (Guisinger, 2017). In fact, the recent dominant view in trade attitudes literature argues that groups rely on heuristics - mental shortcuts and information on their identified in-group's well-being to make judgements about complex trade policy ().

To test whether anti-trade ads are targeting a specific social grouping, I turn to interacting a county's demographic variables with the severity of its economic decline. Unfortunately, it is difficult to detect which groups politicians specifically target with their anti-trade messages in observational data since buying ad spots happen at the larger media market geographic level. Thus, this section provides suggestive evidence on what I believe politicians aim to activate with their anti-trade messages - white voter status anxiety.

Which group is more likely to be mobilized by anti-trade ads? I contend that protectionist policies are more likely to serve the interest of those who regard themselves as the losers of trade liberalization. According to the economic theorems of international trade (Rogowski, 1989; Stolper & Samuelson, 1941), the winners of the labor market in developed countries are high-skilled labor whereas the losers are low-skilled given that scarce factors of production lose from trade liberalization. Studies show that these low-skilled workers are white workers from the manufacturing industries. Baccini & Weymouth (2021) demonstrated that white manufacturing layoffs exceeded the number of non-white manufacturing layoffs between 2004 and 2015 by using Quarterly Workforce Indicators statistics.[41] Rural areas where import-competing sectors made up the majority of the local economy suffered

[41] A they indicate, it is impossible to determine whether manufacturing job losses are caused by trade or technology. But even though the job losses' real culprit is technology, workers may still believe they lost their jobs to trade.

from trade's adverse effects more than urban areas that had industrial diversity. For example, when the General Electric (GE) plant shut down in Janesville following the financial crisis, a large share of the population lost jobs, including GE factory workers as well as workers from other companies whose future relied on GE. As American rural manufacturing hubs' populations tend to be whiter, white workers were victims of trade shocks more than non-white workers.

Recent work that studied the behavioral reactions to globalization has found that political responses indeed vary by racial groups. These studies derive from Tajfel (1974)'s social identity theory that voter behavior is dependent on how globalization affects the destiny of one's in-group. Gennaioli & Tabellini (2019) argued that trade shocks strengthen the group identification of and social cohesion between the anti-trade class, which, in turn, structures conflict along identity lines. Theoretical predictions Grossman & Helpman (2018) derive from their model of trade policy after introducing identity in Hecksher-Ohlin's model demonstrated that when voters identify "narrowly" in social groups (in this case, as a result of a trade shock), protectionist sentiments can be activated. As demonstrated above, activation of group identification is likely to be among white voters in the US. As the majority group, they are the most likely to connect their fortunes with the US and feel a loss of status as a result of economic anxiety (Baccini & Weymouth, 2021). Indeed, Baccini & Weymouth (2021) found that white voters reacted differently than voters of color to manufacturing job losses. Exposure to high de-industrialization decreased support for the Democratic presidential candidate only among white voters in the 2016 elections.

Thus, I argue that political opportunists should air anti-trade ads in regions with greater manufacturing decline to target white voters. Guisinger (2017, p. 145)'s examination of race in anti-trade ads demonstrates that "the face of trade protection in such ads has been overwhelmingly white, working-class and male." She argues that this depiction endorses the view that trade is a redistribution policy that promises protection to white workers. This conceptualization of trade policy also aligns with populist leaders' fondness for higher tariffs

and autarky (Dornbusch & Edwards, 2007) as they prefer redistributive policies. Trade issues serve as a tool for politicians to tailor their discourse to get the support of white voters as voters consider in-group members' interests that are similar to their positions in society when they form attitudes on redistributive policy (Shayo, 2009).

Trade issues are beneficial for tapping into white voter economic anxiety and status threat because of their content. Given that the most successful appeals are emotional because most voters can recall and remember them (Jerit, 2004), messages that imply to white voters that the US is losing power to enemies, they are losing their dominant status in society, and the only way to prevent this catastrophe is to support the candidate that offers protectionist policies are powerful for mobilization (Johnston *et al.*, 1992). This strategy works when voters feel that the signs of economic decline in their communities because of manufacturing losses. Studies that found that trade shocks had activated status loss among white voters also acknowledge the possible role of political entrepreneurs (Autor *et al.*, 2020; Cerrato *et al.*, 2018; Gennaioli & Tabellini, 2019; Rodrik, 2020).

I start by collecting information on the share of white-voters in counties before the 2000-2007 Chinese import competition. A larger white population share indicates that a county is non-diverse, in other words, homogeneous. To make the interaction simpler, I create a dummy variable that takes the value 0, indicating that the non-white population in the county is less than 30%, and 0 otherwise.[42]

I derive two possible hypotheses based on the existing right-wing attitudes literature. On one hand, politicians may find whiter counties with sharper economic decline more lucrative targets as their message has a higher probability of reaching the voter base of interest, as voters in such counties may be more receptive to populist messages (Broz *et al.*, 2021). On the other hand, some studies found that racial diversity increases white voters' support for protectionism, thus increasing anti-trade ad strategy's profitability through two potential mechanisms. The first mechanism concerns the effect of economic deprivation on

[42]I count white Hispanics in the non-white population category.

white voters' sentiments toward their in and out-groups. Ballard-Rosa *et al.* (2021) found that globalization shocks increase authoritarian values among the dominant group of white voters in regions with large minority groups. They argue that the reason for diversity's moderated effect is the heightened animus toward out-groups (non-white voters) as a result of experiencing economic misfortune among the in-group (thus, tighter in-group identification) white voters identify with. Therefore, a larger minority population increases the possibility of white voters interacting with their out-group and cultivates further prejudice. The second mechanism is about white workers being the protected in-group from tariffs and quotas. (Guisinger, 2017)'s empirical investigation on white voters' preferences as a function of racial diversity reported a positive correlation between racial diversity and trade protectionism. She argued in contrast to white voters' diminished support for welfare policies when diversity increases, support for trade protection increases because trade policy benefits other white workers. Finally, (Balcázar, 2021)'s ongoing research found that politicians' incentives to use identity appeal to target the majority group positively correlate with the size of the minority population.

I test these contradicting hypotheses by interacting the county diversity variable I created with manufacturing economic decline. Figure 4 presents the marginal effect of the interaction between racial diversity and long-term manufacturing decline. The figure shows that for counties that were not highly affected by the manufacturing decline in the 70s, candidates air anti-trade messages more in homogeneous, white districts. This finding is in line with protectionist speeches candidates give in the Rust Belt that tends to be more rural and white during the presidential election period. The marginal effect difference of one standard deviation increases in the share of manufacturing employment in the 70s on anti-trade advertising is approximately one percentage-points. This difference is significant at the 95% confidence level.

The interaction between the Chinese import competition variable and racial diversity reveals an interesting pattern. Controlling for the long-term economic decline, Figure 5

demonstrates that heterogeneous counties that recently came under pressure due to the sudden surge in Chinese imports were exposed to more anti-trade advertising compared to more homogeneous counties. The difference in marginal effect of one standard deviation increase in the China trade shock measure is -0.80 percentage points, even though the difference fails to reach significance at the 95% confidence interval. This result is contrary to what drives anti-trade advertising in old manufacturing hubs.

One possible explanation for this surprising finding is that political parties might have developed different strategies in trade-related campaign advertising. (Sides, 2006) examined the origins of campaign agendas and found that, contrary to the expectations of the issue ownership theory on campaign agendas (Petrocik, 1996; Vavreck, 2009), Democrats and Re-

Figure 4: The Marginal Effect of the Manufacturing Employment Share in 1970 on Anti-Trade Ads by Racial Diversity



Diverse counties are ones that have a non-white population larger than 30%. Non-diverse counties are ones that have a non-white population less than 30%.

Figure 5: The Marginal Effect of Chinese Import Competition on Ads by Racial Diversity



Diverse counties are ones that have a non-white population larger than 30%. Non-diverse counties are ones that have a non-white population less than 30%.

publicans talked about the same issues but framed them differently. As I mentioned before, trade policy made strange bedfellows. Both progressive Democrats and libertarian, conservative Republicans like the Tea Party members call for protectionist policies, even though their motivation behind it are different. In the next section, I'll look at Democratic and Republican-sponsored ads separately to see if candidate partisanship affected the motivation of a candidate to advertise on trade.[43]

I subject my results to a series of robustness checks. First, to prevent the criticism that the share of manufacturing employment in 1970 may not capture the real effect of economic decline, I substitute my measure with the change in the share of manufacturing employment between 2000 and 2015. Second, I use commuting zone-level demographic controls instead of county-level controls to make sure it doesn't make a difference. Third, I conduct a subsample analysis to ensure the interaction between old manufacturing hubs and racial diversity stays negative and significant in homogeneous counties. Finally, to ensure the results are not driven by several outlier counties that experiences the highest manufacturing job losses, I exclude them from the analysis. Results change little.[44]

Partisan Differences in Airing Anti-Trade Ads

Democrats and Republicans may be speaking about the same issue, but may use different frames talking about it. Trade is inherently an economic issue. Economic issues are "performance, leased" issues that are available for both Democratic and Republican candidate rhetoric, depending on the electoral context (Petrocik, 1996). Changes in the local economic performance are likely to trigger reactions from candidates because of their importance in candidate selection. Given that candidates don't have an incentive to air positive trade messages due to the inherent negativity among the public (Guisinger, 2017), I expect both parties to resort to protectionist ads as a response to local economic conditions.

[43]The coefficients of the interactions and other controls can be found in the Appendix Table A4.
[44]Results can be found in Appendix tables A9-12.

The difference between the two parties should arise in the frequency and frames of the trade messages. Entman (2004, p. 417) defines frames as tools to "select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient." Using frames, political candidates attempt to convince the electorate to understand the issues through a certain view that benefits the candidate. The most effective frames are often repeated ones, candidates and co-partisans alike. The complex and multifaceted nature of trade renders the issue malleable to multiple frames (Hiscox, 2006). For example, the identity politics part of trade issues - out-group prejudice due to economic anxiety and threat of loss of status for the dominant group - can be manipulated by the Republican party members to mobilize their voters base. They would especially benefit from the foreign policy aspect to act tough toward the economic competitors of the US. On the other hand, Democrats could use protectionist appeals to appeal to the blue-collar, white manufacturing workers in the Rust Belt they have historically represented before 2016. Democratic protectionist voting records on trade bills also demonstrate that Democrats have an advantage in past trade policy performance.

It is thus crucial to understand how candidates approach international trade issues depending on their partisanship. The following examples demonstrate different frames Democrats and Republicans have used to talk about trade issues throughout the years. Democrats have generally attacked Republicans on their party's past enthusiastic support for free trade agreements and blamed their pro-trade voting record for further job losses. In contrast, Republicans ran anti-trade ads to denounce Obama's 2009 stimulus package and criticize Nancy Pelosi's policies. In the 2010 midterm elections, Indiana's 2nd district Republican candidate Jackie Walorski blamed the incumbent Joe Donnelly for "vot(ing) to send our (American) jobs to China," right before she criticized him for "vot(ing) for the $1,000,000,000,000 Obama/Pelosi stimulus bill." In the same midterm election, another Republican candidate competing in Ohio's 15th district, Steve Stivers, accused the Democratic incumbent, Mary Jo Kilroy, of sending jobs overseas with a picture of Kilroy and Pelosi together. In the 2012 House elections, Illinois' 11th district Democratic candidate defeated

the long-term Republican incumbent Judy Biggert by indicting her for supporting "trade deals costing 113,700 jobs." Snapshots of these ads can be found in the Appendix.[45]

The differences in framing may motivate candidates from the two parties to consider different socio-demographic factors in deciding where to target. Conservative Republicans may choose rural, conservative places with a higher share of white voters to increase their chances of firing up their voting base with nativist appeals. For Democrats, it may not be the best strategy since they don't have a stronghold in these areas. Thus, they might choose to target white voters in racially heterogeneous areas to get just enough votes from the white voters to make them win.

To empirically test partisan motivations in trade advertising, I break down my dependent variable measure by candidate partisanship. Then, I run the same model presented in Equation 1 and 2. As seen in Table 4 column 1, the share of manufacturing employment in the 1970s is a significantly driving factor for Republican candidates. In column 2, the coefficient in front of the same variable is not statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. This shows that there may indeed be strategically differences in where candidates air anti-trade ads, depending on their partisan affiliations.

To further investigate their differences in targeting white voters, I take two steps. First, I look at which demographic factors drive job, China and immigration-related ads aired by Democrats and Republicans. Table A5 in the Appendix demonstrates that Republicans target their anti-immigration ads also in old manufacturing hubs. The use of trade and immigration-related ethnocentric appeals by Republicans in these places suggest that they are using a nativist frame to reach white voters with economic grievances. Second, I interact my manufacturing variables with county racial diversity to observe partisan differences in trade advertising. Table A6 reveals that, in line with my expectations, Republicans choose more homogeneous places that came under the stress of long-term manufacturing decline to air anti-trade ads. Moreover, they coupled their anti-trade ads with ads that blame

[45] Appendix Figures A1, A2, and A3. Anti-trade ads' data source is Wesleyan Media Project.

Table 4: Candidate Partisanship and Anti-Trade Advertising

	(1) Democrats	(2) Republicans
Chinese Import Shock	0.244	-0.268
	(0.323)	(0.164)
% Manufacturing 1970	0.113***	0.035**
	(0.027)	(0.014)
Competitive	3.533***	-0.168
	(0.802)	(0.342)
% Manufacturing Employment	0.060	0.062**
	(0.064)	(0.031)
Observations	2792.000	2792.000
Region-fixed Effects	yes	yes
County Controls	yes	yes

Two-stage least square results. The first dependent variable is anti-trade ads aired by Democrats, The second dependent variable is ads aired by Republican candidates. Robust standard errors are clustered around commuting zones; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

China for the economic problems (Appendix Table A7). Interestingly, Democrats choose to target diverse counties that suffered a more recent manufacturing decline due to intense Chinese import competition (Appendix Table A8). Further research is needed to unpack the mechanisms behind these interesting partisan differences.

Conclusion

Trade was one of the most contentious campaign issues in the 2016 elections. Donald Trump's promises to renegotiate NAFTA, pull out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, and a crackdown on unfair trade practices with China have garnered attention from domestic and international audiences. However, the 2016 elections are not the first time when trade emerged as a heated campaign issue. Historically, candidates from both Democratic and Republican parties resorted to protectionist appeals. Even though trade might not have been a nationally salient issue that received attention in the State of the Union

Table 5: Candidate Partisanship and Anti-Trade Advertising

	(1) Democrats	(2) Republicans
Chinese Import Shock	0.202	-0.276*
	(0.320)	(0.164)
% Manufacturing 1970	0.123***	0.029**
	(0.026)	(0.013)
Competitive	3.425***	-0.086
	(0.813)	(0.344)
% Manufacturing Employment	0.063	0.066**
	(0.063)	(0.031)
Observations	2898	2898
Region-fixed Effects	yes	yes
County Controls	yes	yes

Two-stage least square results. The first dependent variable is ads that mention employment, the second is ads that mention China, and third is ads that mention immigration. Robust standard errors are clustered around commuting zones; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

speeches, voters in some localities were exposed to large amounts of anti-trade messaging. As campaigns are important sources that inform perceptions of how trade impacts the national and local economies, it is vital to understand the strategic decision to bring trade to the forefront as part of an electoral agenda.

Using the universe of anti-trade advertising between 2008-2016, I find that the sustained economic decline in manufacturing hubs was an important factor in candidates' anti-trade ad airing decisions. Somewhat surprisingly, recent manufacturing decline due to the sudden surge in cheap Chinese imports following the Chinese accession to WTO didn't drive anti-trade ads, after controlling for the sustained economic decline. These findings reveal important differences in anti-trade rhetoric depending on the timing of economic suffering from manufacturing job losses. Going forward, papers should consider whether the political outcomes observed as a result of the China shock are concentrated in these old manufacturing hubs.

My second set of findings show that the effect of long and short-term manufacturing decline on anti-trade ads might be conditioned by the racial diversity of the region. I advance an explanation for this interesting finding by unpacking anti-trade ads by partisan sponsorship. I find that Democrats and Republicans lead different campaign strategies to target white voters with different motivations. Republicans air anti-trade ads in rural, homogeneous counties, coupled with nativist anti-immigration and anti-China appeals. Democrats prefer to reach white voters in racially diverse regions that recently came under the Chinese manufacturing import shock. Although my findings suggest that there are important differences in partisan trade messaging, further research is needed to confirm the root causes of these differences.

These findings are the first steps at demystifying the politicization of trade issues in the electoral context, a topic which surprisingly received scant attention from the political economy literature. They suggest that to understand how the backlash against globalization is created by a top-down approach, one has to study the motivations behind candidates' decisions to appeal to voters with protectionist messages. Recognizing that electoral incentives galvanize candidates to offer protectionist policies can help us understand when and where to expect a backlash against globalization.

These findings also reveal that President Trump's protectionist appeals were not new in American politics. Congressional candidates aimed their anti-trade ads to regions where Trump campaigned relentlessly with nativist appeals, even though they constituted a minority in the Republican party. Realizing the electoral appeals of anti-trade ads, President Trump borrowed from the anti-trade advertising playbook and turned the tide in his favor by appealing to white voters' grievances.

Campaign advertising is only one source of information voters receive from their representatives. Future research should look into alternative channels of elite communication and investigate how trade is portrayed in those channels. It would be revealing to see how

the results generalize beyond the 2000s context. Luckily, US politics have ideal periods to investigate these issues, like the rhetoric around the rise of Japan in the 1980s and NAFTA in the 1990s. Future studies can collect data on elite communication in the legislature to establish generalizability in the US context. Another interesting extension could engage with the research question on whether candidates follow up with their protectionist promises when they assume office. Wichowsky & Weiss (2020) found that China-bashing incumbents were not more likely to vote for anti-China bills in the legislature. Pomirchy & Schonfeld (2020) fail to find evidence on candidate responsiveness in trade bills to constituency preferences. These findings reveal that candidate responsiveness to international economic issues may stop at the campaign stage.

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Appendix

Snapshots of Anti-Trade Televised Political Advertising

(a) (b)

Figure A1: Indiana's 2nd district Republican candidate Jackie Walorski's anti-trade ad in the 2010 midterm elections

Figure A2: Ohio's 15th district Republican candidate Steve Stivers' anti-trade ad in the 2010 midterm elections

Figure A3: Illinois's 11th district Democratic candidate Bill Foster's anti-trade ad in the 2012 elections

Figures

Figure A4: The correlation between the share of manufacturing employment in 1970 and changes in this share between 1970 and 2015



Data Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, taken from Broz *et al.* (2021)

Figure A5: The correlation between the share of manufacturing employment in 1970 and Chinese import shock 2000-2007



Data Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, taken from Broz *et al.* (2021)

Tables

Table A1: Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
% Trade Asd	8.007	7.774	0.000	100.000
Chinese Import Competition	2.807	2.751	-0.629	43.085
% Employment in Manufacturing in 1970	17.322	12.618	0.196	65.947
Competitiveness	0.275	0.446	0.000	1.000
% Manufacturing Employment_2000	19.580	10.090	0.108	55.242
% College-educated	16.482	7.735	4.883	63.746
% Male	49.544	1.958	42.564	67.253
% White	84.325	16.501	4.508	99.739
% Foreign-Born	3.421	4.826	0.000	50.936

Table A2: 2SLS: Trade Shock Exposure and Anti-Trade Ads - Full Controls

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	% Trade Ads	% Trade Ads	% Trade Ads	% Trade Ads
Chinese Import Shock	0.884***	0.512*	0.264	0.033
	(0.174)	(0.265)	(0.221)	(0.206)
Competitive		2.568***	2.395***	1.799***
		(0.607)	(0.566)	(0.498)
% Manufacturing Employment		0.114**	0.049	0.060
		(0.051)	(0.043)	(0.038)
% County College-Educated		0.024	0.010	-0.015
		(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.023)
% County Foreign-Born		0.009	0.004	-0.060
		(0.063)	(0.065)	(0.056)
% County Male		-0.153	-0.041	-0.138
		(0.096)	(0.097)	(0.085)
% County White		0.018	0.026**	-0.012
		(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)
% Manufacturing 1970			0.199***	0.090***
			(0.022)	(0.018)
Observations	2792	2792	2792	2792
Region-Fixed Effects	no	no	no	yes

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010

Table A3: Jobs, China and Immigration Ads

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	% Jobs Ads	% China Ads	% Immigration Ads
Chinese Import Shock	0.406	0.038	-0.024
	(0.354)	(0.140)	(0.095)
% Manufacturing 1970	0.051*	0.028**	0.016*
	(0.028)	(0.012)	(0.009)
Competitive	2.487***	0.485	-0.854***
	(0.824)	(0.334)	(0.211)
% Manufacturing Employment	-0.007	0.018	0.002
	(0.067)	(0.026)	(0.020)
% County College-Educated	-0.042	-0.039**	-0.015
	(0.033)	(0.017)	(0.010)
% County Foreign-Born	-0.025	0.025	-0.017
	(0.073)	(0.050)	(0.030)
% County Male	-0.314**	-0.070	-0.017
	(0.143)	(0.070)	(0.041)
% County White	-0.058***	0.006	-0.032***
	(0.022)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Observations	2898	2898	2898
County-level Controls	yes	yes	yes
Region-Fixed Effects	yes	yes	yes

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010

Table A4: Manufacturing Decline Interacted with Racial Diversity

	(1) % Trade Ads	(2) % Trade Ads
Chinese Import Shock	0.007	-0.055
	(0.204)	(0.215)
% Manufacturing 1970	0.105***	0.095***
	(0.018)	(0.017)
Diverse County=1	1.895***	-0.206
	(0.694)	(0.752)
Diverse County=1 × % Manufacturing 1970	-0.069**	
	(0.033)	
Competitive	1.728***	1.730***
	(0.503)	(0.501)
% Manufacturing Employment	0.063	0.065*
	(0.038)	(0.038)
Diverse County=1 × Chinese Import Shock		0.286
		(0.201)
Observations	2898	2898
County-level Controls	yes	yes
Region-Fixed Effects	yes	yes

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010

Table A5: Partisan Jobs, China and Immigration Ads

	(1) % Dem Jobs Ads	(2) % Rep Jobs Ads	(3) % Dem China Ads	(4) % Rep China Ads	(5) % Dem Immigration Ads	(6) % Rep Immigration A
Chinese Import Shock	0.415	0.186	-0.085	-0.012	-0.009	-0.047
	(0.455)	(0.515)	(0.213)	(0.114)	(0.078)	(0.129)
% Manufacturing 1970	0.057	0.009	0.028	0.008	0.002	0.033***
	(0.035)	(0.041)	(0.017)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.012)
Competitive	2.235**	3.623***	0.288	0.603*	-0.694***	-0.586*
	(1.052)	(1.170)	(0.517)	(0.313)	(0.190)	(0.315)
% Manufacturing Employment	0.018	0.006	0.031	0.028	0.009	-0.005
	(0.084)	(0.097)	(0.043)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.029)
% County College-Educated	-0.018	-0.030	-0.057**	-0.017	-0.014	-0.017
	(0.045)	(0.055)	(0.023)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.013)
% County Foreign-Born	-0.015	-0.037	0.076	-0.065***	0.042	-0.084*
	(0.106)	(0.089)	(0.068)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.044)
% County Male	-0.475***	-0.157	-0.115	-0.073	0.009	-0.022
	(0.174)	(0.177)	(0.087)	(0.052)	(0.038)	(0.071)
Observations	2898	2898	2898	2898	2898	2898
County-level Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region-Fixed Effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010

Table A6: Diversity Interacted with Old Manufacturing Hubs - Trade Ads

	(1) % Dem Trade Ads	(2) % Dem Trade Ads	(3) % Rep Trade Ads	(4) % Rep Trade Ads
Chinese Import Shock	0.197	0.056	-0.273*	-0.261
	(0.320)	(0.316)	(0.163)	(0.177)
% Manufacturing 1970	0.136***	0.125***	0.037***	0.029**
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Diverse County=1	2.905***	-0.438	1.078**	0.287
	(1.078)	(1.189)	(0.483)	(0.564)
Diverse County=1 × % Manufacturing 1970	-0.076		-0.054**	
	(0.049)		(0.023)	
Competitive	3.404***	3.396***	-0.116	-0.107
	(0.810)	(0.806)	(0.345)	(0.345)
% Manufacturing Employment	0.062	0.066	0.066**	0.065**
	(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.031)	(0.031)
% County College-Educated	-0.016	-0.017	-0.026*	-0.025*
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.013)	(0.013)
% County Foreign-Born	-0.118	-0.104	-0.062***	-0.060**
	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.023)	(0.024)
% County Male	-0.381***	-0.364***	0.041	0.047
	(0.113)	(0.114)	(0.059)	(0.059)
Diverse County=1 × Chinese Import Shock		0.673*		-0.067
		(0.350)		(0.158)
Observations	2898	2898	2898	2898
County-level Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region-Fixed Effects	yes	yes	yes	yes

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010

Table A7: Diversity Interacted with Manufacturing Hubs - Other Ads

	(1) % Dem Jobs Ads	(2) % Rep Jobs Ads	(3) % Dem China Ads	(4) % Rep China Ads	(5) % Dem Immigration Ads	(6) % Rep Immigration Ads
Chinese Import Shock	0.406	0.169	-0.079	-0.012	-0.011	-0.052
	(0.456)	(0.516)	(0.213)	(0.113)	(0.078)	(0.129)
% Manufacturing 1970	0.057	0.020	0.032*	0.015	0.003	0.039***
	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.018)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.013)
Diverse County=0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Diverse County=1	1.247	3.608**	0.020	0.965**	0.412	1.968*
	(1.500)	(1.603)	(0.629)	(0.412)	(0.333)	(1.151)
Diverse County=1 × % Manufacturing 1970	0.005	-0.067	-0.031	-0.046***	0.002	-0.033
	(0.070)	(0.073)	(0.026)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.028)
Competitive	2.258**	3.697***	0.257	0.605*	-0.698***	-0.604*
	(1.049)	(1.177)	(0.514)	(0.314)	(0.188)	(0.316)
% Manufacturing Employment	0.017	0.004	0.032	0.028	0.008	-0.007
	(0.084)	(0.097)	(0.043)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.029)
% County College-Educated	-0.015	-0.026	-0.058**	-0.017	-0.013	-0.012
	(0.045)	(0.055)	(0.023)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.013)
% County Foreign-Born	-0.002	-0.008	0.065	-0.064***	0.044*	-0.082*
	(0.103)	(0.088)	(0.066)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.043)
% County Male	-0.473***	-0.173	-0.116	-0.080	0.011	-0.019
	(0.173)	(0.175)	(0.086)	(0.051)	(0.038)	(0.072)
% County White						-0.026
						(0.016)
Observations	2898	2898	2898	2898	2898	2898
County-level Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region-Fixed Effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010

Table A8: China Shock Interacted with Diversity- Other Ads by Party

	(1) % Dem Jobs Ads	(2) % Rep Jobs Ads	(3) % Dem China Ads	(4) % Rep China Ads	(5) % Dem Immigration Ads	(6) % Rep Immigration Ads
Chinese Import Shock	0.345	0.214	-0.119	0.035	-0.015	0.046
	(0.480)	(0.508)	(0.231)	(0.121)	(0.072)	(0.127)
Diverse County=1 × Chinese Import Shock	0.299	-0.228	0.188	-0.236*	0.023	-0.511***
	(0.431)	(0.689)	(0.213)	(0.129)	(0.103)	(0.192)
% Manufacturing 1970	0.058*	0.011	0.027	0.008	0.003	0.035***
	(0.035)	(0.041)	(0.017)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.012)
Diverse County=1	0.466	3.036	-1.089	0.815*	0.381	3.666***
	(1.585)	(1.973)	(0.743)	(0.453)	(0.357)	(1.027)
Competitive	2.249**	3.713***	0.257	0.618**	-0.699***	-0.560*
	(1.050)	(1.178)	(0.514)	(0.315)	(0.188)	(0.310)
% Manufacturing Employment	0.018	0.003	0.033	0.027	0.009	-0.010
	(0.084)	(0.098)	(0.044)	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.029)
% County College-Educated	-0.016	-0.025	-0.058**	-0.016	-0.013	-0.009
	(0.045)	(0.055)	(0.023)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.013)
% County Foreign-Born	0.002	-0.007	0.070	-0.065***	0.044*	-0.078*
	(0.103)	(0.087)	(0.065)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.044)
% County Male	-0.471***	-0.167	-0.110	-0.076	0.011	-0.022
	(0.173)	(0.176)	(0.086)	(0.052)	(0.038)	(0.072)
Observations	2898	2898	2898	2898	2898	2898
County-level Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region-Fixed Effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010

Robustness Checks

Table A9: Robustness Check: Looking at Manufacturing Employment Change since 1970

	(1) % Trade Ads	(2) % Trade Ads
Chinese Import Shock	-0.037	-0.081
	(0.202)	(0.215)
Change in Manufacturing Employment	0.125***	0.106***
	(0.021)	(0.020)
Diverse County=1	1.843***	-0.046
	(0.573)	(0.822)
Diverse County=1 × Change in Manufacturing Employment	-0.124***	
	(0.038)	
Competitive	1.573***	1.602***
	(0.514)	(0.515)
% Manufacturing Employment	0.099**	0.100***
	(0.038)	(0.039)
Diverse County=1 × Chinese Import Shock		0.207
		(0.207)
Observations	2679	2679
County-level Controls	yes	yes
Region-Fixed Effects	yes	yes

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010

Table A10: Robustness Check: Trade-Hit Places Interacted with Racial Diversity - Commuting Zone Controls

	(1) % Trade Ads	(2) % Trade Ads
Chinese Import Shock	0.016	-0.037
	(0.207)	(0.217)
% Manufacturing 1970	0.112***	0.102***
	(0.018)	(0.017)
Diverse County=1	1.411**	-0.493
	(0.679)	(0.753)
Diverse County=1 × % Manufacturing 1970	-0.065*	
	(0.033)	
Competitive	1.811***	1.810***
	(0.492)	(0.491)
% Manufacturing Employment	0.067	0.066
	(0.043)	(0.043)
Diverse County=1 × Chinese Import Shock		0.250
		(0.204)
Observations	2898	2898
County-level Controls	yes	yes
Region-Fixed Effects	yes	yes

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010

Table A11: Robustness Check - Subsample Analysis

	(1) % Trade Ads Diverse	(2) % Trade Ads Not Diverse
Chinese Import Shock	0.353	-0.117
	(0.230)	(0.235)
% Manufacturing 1970	0.047	0.106***
	(0.038)	(0.018)
Competitive	-0.134	2.080***
	(0.922)	(0.532)
% Manufacturing Employment	0.114**	0.059
	(0.050)	(0.045)
Observations	498	2400
County-level Controls	yes	yes
Region-Fixed Effects	yes	yes

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010

Table A12: Robustness Check - Excluding Outliers

	(1) % Trade Ads	(2) % Trade Ads
Chinese Import Shock	0.263	0.231
	(0.222)	(0.233)
% Manufacturing 1970	0.219***	0.196***
	(0.023)	(0.022)
Diverse County=1	2.436***	-0.649
	(0.755)	(0.843)
Diverse County=1 × % Manufacturing 1970	-0.151***	
	(0.037)	
Competitive	2.333***	2.334***
	(0.568)	(0.570)
% Manufacturing Employment	0.053	0.053
	(0.043)	(0.043)
Diverse County=1 × Chinese Import Shock		0.148
		(0.229)
Observations	2792.000	2792.000
County-level Controls	yes	yes
Region-Fixed Effects	yes	yes

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010