A Specification for Rijndael, the AES Algorithm

1. Notation and Conventions

1.1 Rijndael Inputs and Outputs

The input, output and cipher key for Rijndael are sequences containing 128, 160, 192, 224 or 256 bits with the input and output sequences having the same length, the cipher block size. Here a bit is a binary digit (0 or 1) and 'length' refers to the number of elements in a sequence – in this case bits. In general the block size and the key length can be any of the five allowed values but for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) the block size is fixed at 128 bits and the key length can only be 128, 192 or 256 bits.

The elements within sequences and sub-sequences will be enumerated from zero to one less than the number of elements in the sequence. The number associated with a sequence element is called its index and sequences will be presented with their lower numbered elements to the left. Unless otherwise specified, the enumeration order of sub-sequences matches that of the sequence from which they are derived. For the input, output and key sequences for Rijndael, the number i associated with a bit will hence be in one of the five ranges $0 \le i < 128$, $0 \le i < 160$, $0 \le i < 192$, $0 \le i < 224$ or $0 \le i < 256$.

In general implementors are responsible for mapping these bit sequences onto physical or logical resources. But for sofware the preferred mapping (one used later in pseudo code) is onto arrays of 8-bit bytes with consecutive bytes formed from consecutive 8-bit subsequences in which bits with lower sequence indexes have higher numeric significance.

1.2 Bytes

Internally bit sequences are interpreted as one-dimensional arrays of 8-bit bytes where byte n consists of the sub-sequence 8n to 8n+7. In such an array, denoted by a, the n'th byte will be referred to as either a_n or a[n], where n is in one of the ranges $0 \le n < 16$, $0 \le n < 20$, $0 \le n < 24$, $0 \le n < 28$ or $0 \le n < 32$. The order i of a bit within a byte has a value 7 - k, where k is the bit's index, and the bit with order i in a byte b will be denoted by b_i . Internally bytes represent finite field elements using a polynomial representation:

$$b_7 x^7 + b_6 x^6 + b_5 x^5 + b_4 x^4 + b_3 x^3 + b_2 x^2 + b_1 x^1 + b_0 = \sum_{i=0}^{7} b_i x^i$$
 (1.2.1)

The values of bytes will be presented as a concatenation of their bits between braces with higher order (lower index) bits to the left. Hence {011000011} identifies a specific finite field element. It is also convenient to denote byte values using hexadecimal notation, with each of two groups of four bits being denoted by a character as follows.

bit pattern	character
0000	0
0001	1
0010	2
0011	3

bit pattern	character
0100	4
0101	5
0110	6
0111	7

bit pattern	character
1000	8
1001	9
1010	a
1011	b

bit pattern	character
1100	С
1101	d
1110	е
1111	£

Hence the value $\{011000011\}$ can also be written as $\{63\}$, where the character denoting the 4-bit group containing the higher order bits is again to the left. Some finite field operations an extra bit (b_8) to the left of an 8-bit byte; if present, this will appear to the left of the left brace as in $1\{1b\}$. Note that the external integer byte value 0x01 is mapped through the interface (i.e. without translation) to the internal finite field value $\{01\}$.

1.3 The Rijndael State

Internally Rijndael operates on a two dimensional array of bytes called the **state** that contains 4 rows and Nc columns, where Nc is the input sequence length divided by 32. In

this state array, denoted by the symbol s, each individual byte has two indexes: its row number r, in the range $0 \le r < 4$, and its column number c, in the range $0 \le c < Nc$, hence allowing it to be referred to either as $s_{r,c}$ or s[r, c]. For AES the range for c is $0 \le c < 4$ since Nc has a fixed value of 4.

At the start (end) of an encryption or decryption operation the bytes of the cipher input (output) are copied to (from) this state array in the order shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1 – Input to, and output from, the cipher state array

Hence at the start (end) of encryption or decryption the input (output) array in (out) is copied to (from) the state array according to the schemes:

$$s[r, c] = in[r + 4c]$$
 for $0 \le r < 4$ and $0 \le c < Nc$ (1.3.1)

$$out[r + 4c] = s[r, c]$$
 for $0 \le r < 4$ and $0 \le c < Nc$ (1.3.2)

1.4 Arrays of 32-bit Words

The four bytes in each column of the state can be thought of as an array of four bytes indexed by the row number r or as a single 32-bit **word** (bytes within all 32-bit words will always be enumerated using the index r). The state can hence be considered as a one-dimensional array of words for which the column number c provides the array index.

The key schedule for Rijndael, described fully in Section 4, is an array of 32-bit words, denoted by the symbol k, with the lower elements initialised from the cipher key input so that byte 4i+r of the key is copied into byte r of key schedule word k[i]. The cipher iterates through a number of cycles, called **rounds**, each of which uses Nc words from this key schedule. Hence the key schedule can also be viewed as an array of **round keys**, each of which consists of an Nc word sub-array. Hence word c of round key n - k[Nc * n + c] - will also be referred to using two dimensional array notation as either k[n,c] or $k_{n,c}$. Here the round key for round n as a whole, an Nc word sub-array, will sometimes be referred to by replacing the second index with '-' as in k[n,-] and $k_{n,-}$.

2. Finite Field Operations

2.1 Finite Field Addition

The addition of two finite field elements is achieved by adding the coefficients for corresponding powers in their polynomial representations, this addition being performed in GF(2), that is, modulo 2, so that 1 + 1 = 0. Consequently, addition and subtraction are both equivalent to an exclusive-or operation on the bytes that represent field elements. Addition operations for finite field elements will be denoted by the symbol \oplus . For example, the following expressions are equivalent:

$$x^{6} + x^{4} + x^{2} + x^{1} + 1 + x^{7} + x^{1} + 1 \equiv x^{7} + x^{6} + x^{4} + x^{2}$$
 (polynomial notation)
 $\{01010111\} \oplus \{10000011\} \equiv \{11010100\}$ (binary notation)
 $\{57\} \oplus \{83\} \equiv \{d4\}$ (hexadecimal notation)

2.2 Finite Field Multiplication

Finite field multiplication is more difficult than addition and is achieved by multiplying the polynomials for the two elements concerned and collecting like powers of x in the result. Since each polynomial can have powers of x up to 7, the result can have powers of x up to 14 and will no longer fit within a single byte.

This situation is handled by replacing the result with the remainder polynomial after division by a special eighth order irreducible polynomial, which, for Rijndael, is:

$$m(x) = x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1 (2.2.1)$$

Since this polynomial has powers of x up to 8 it cannot be represented by a single byte and will be written as either 1{00011011} or 1{1b} as indicated earlier. This process is illustrated in the following example of the product $\{57\} \bullet \{83\} \equiv \{c1\}$ (where \bullet is used to represent finite field multiplication):

$$(x^{6} + x^{4} + x^{2} + x + 1) \bullet (x^{7} + x + 1) \Rightarrow$$

$$\bullet x^{7} = x^{13} + x^{11} + x^{9} + x^{8} + x^{7} + x^{6} + x^{5} + x^{3} + x^{2} + x$$

$$(x^{6} + x^{4} + x^{2} + x + 1) \bullet 1 = x^{6} + x^{4} + x^{2} + x + 1$$

This intermediate result is now divided by m(x) above:

Multiplication is associative, and there is a neutral element {01}; for any binary polynomial b(x) of degree less than 8, the extended Euclidean algorithm can be used to compute polynomials a(x) and c(x), such that:

$$b(x) \bullet a(x) \oplus m(x) \bullet c(x) = 1 \tag{2.2.2}$$

$$a(x) \bullet b(x) \operatorname{mod} m(x) = 1 \tag{2.2.3}$$

which shows that the polynomials a(x) and b(x) are mutual inverses. Furthermore:

$$a(x) \bullet (b(x) \oplus c(x)) = a(x) \bullet b(x) \oplus a(x) \bullet c(x) \tag{2.2.4}$$

It hence follows that the set of 256 byte values, with the XOR as addition and multiplication as defined above has the structure of the finite field GF(256).

2.3 Multiplication by Repeated Shifts

The finite field element $\{00000010\}$ is the polynomial x, which means that multiplying another element by this value increases all it's powers of x by 1. This is equivalent to shifting its byte representation up by one bit so that the bit at position i moves to postion i+1. If the top bit is set prior to this move it will overflow to create an x^8 term, in which case the modular polynomial is added to cancel this additional bit, leaving a result that fits within a single byte.

For example, multiplying $\{11001000\}$ by x, that is $\{00000010\}$, the initial result is 1 {10010000}. The 'overflow' bit is then removed by adding 1{00011011}, the modular polynomial, using an exclusive-or operation to give a final result of {10001011}.

By repeating this process, a finite field element can be multiplied by all powers of x from 0 to 7. Multiplication of this element by any other field element can then be achieved by adding the results for the appropriate powers of x. For example, Table 1 carries out this calculation for the product of the field elements $\{57\}$ and $\{83\}$ to give $\{c1\}$.

р	{57} • x ^p	xor m(x)	$\{57\} \bullet x^p$	bit p {83}	xor value	result
	{01010111}		{01010111}	1	{01010111}	{01010111}
1	{10101110}		{10101110}	1	{10101110}	{11111001}
2	1{01011100}	1{00011011}	{01000111}	0	{00000000}	{11111001}
3	{10001110}		{10001110}	0	{00000000}	{11111001}
4	1{00011100}	1{00011011}	{00000111}	0	{00000000}	{11111001}
5	{00001110}		{00001110}	0	{00000000}	{11111001}
6	{00011100}		{00011100}	0	{00000000}	{11111001}
7	{00111000}		{00111000}	1	{00111000}	{11000001}

Table 1 – Finite field multiply \{57\} \bullet \{83\}

2.4 Finite Field Multiplication Using Tables

When certain finite field elements (known as generators) are repeatedly multiplied to produce a list of their powers, g^p , they progressively generate all 255 non-zero elements in the field. When p reaches 256 the original field element recurs, indicating that g^{255} is equal to $\{01\}$. The p values for each field element can be thought of as logarithms and these provide a way of converting multiplication into addition. Hence the two elements $a = g^{\alpha}$ and $b = g^{\beta}$ have the product $a \bullet b = g^{\alpha + \beta}$. With a 'logarithm' table listing the power of the generator for each finite field element we can hence find the powers α and β corresponding to the elements a and b and add these values to find the power of b for the result. A reverse table can then be used to look up the product element.

Since the two initial power values can each be as high as 255, their sum may be greater than 255 but if this occurs, 255 can be subtracted from the value to bring it into the range of the tables because $g^{255} = \{01\}$. Although decimal exponents have been used in this explanation, all exponents in what follows are in hexadecimal notation.

L(2	23.2.)								3	Į.							
ш (2	∠у)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	С	d	е	f
	0		00	19	01	32	02	1a	С6	4b	с7	1b	68	33	ee	df	03
	1	64	04	e0	0e	34	8d	81	ef	4c	71	08	с8	f8	69	1c	с1
	2	7d	с2	1d	b5	f9	b9	27	ба	4d	e4	аб	72	9a	с9	09	78
	3	65	2f	8a	05	21	0f	e1	24	12	f0	82	45	35	93	da	8e
	4	96	8f	db	bd	36	d0	се	94	13	5c	d2	f1	40	46	83	38
	5	66	dd	fd	30	bf	06	8b	62	b3	25	e2	98	22	88	91	10
	6	7e	6е	48	с3	a3	b6	1e	42	3a	6b	28	54	fa	85	3d	ba
x	7	2b	79	0a	15	9b	9f	5e	са	4e	d4	ac	e5	f3	73	a7	57
^	8	af	58	a8	50	f4	ea	d6	74	4f	ae	е9	d5	e7	е6	ad	e8
	9	2c	d7	75	7a	eb	16	0b	£5	59	cb	5f	b0	9c	a9	51	a0
	а	7f	0c	f6	6f	17	с4	49	ec	d8	43	1f	2d	a4	76	7b	b7
	b	CC	bb	3e	5a	fb	60	b1	86	3b	52	a1	бс	aa	55	29	9d
	С	97	b2	87	90	61	be	dc	fc	bc	95	cf	cd	37	3f	5b	d1
	d	53	39	84	3с	41	a2	6d	47	14	2a	9e	5d	56	f2	d3	ab
	е	44	11	92	d9	23	20	2e	89	b4	7c	b8	26	77	99	e3	a5
	f	67	4a	ed	de	с5	31	fe	18	0d	63	8c	80	с0	f7	70	07

Table 2 – 'Logs' – L values such that $\{xy\} = \{03\}^L$ for a given a finite field element $\{xy\}$

- /										Y							
E(2	(y)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	С	d	е	f
	0	01	03	05	0f	11	33	55	ff	1a	2e	72	96	a1	f8	13	35
	1	5f	e1	38	48	d8	73	95	a4	f7	02	06	0a	1e	22	66	aa
	2	e5	34	5с	e4	37	59	eb	26	6a	be	d9	70	90	ab	е6	31
	3	53	f5	04	0c	14	3с	44	CC	4f	d1	68	b8	d3	6e	b2	cd
	4	4c	d4	67	a9	e0	3b	4d	d7	62	a6	f1	80	18	28	78	88
	5	83	9e	b9	d0	6b	bd	dc	7f	81	98	b3	се	49	db	76	9a
	6	b5	с4	57	f9	10	30	50	f0	0b	1d	27	69	bb	d6	61	a3
1	7	fe	19	2b	7d	87	92	ad	ес	2f	71	93	ae	е9	20	60	a0
Х	8	fb	16	3a	4e	d2	6d	b7	c2	5d	e7	32	56	fa	15	3f	41
	9	с3	5e	e2	3d	47	с9	40	c0	5b	ed	2c	74	9c	bf	da	75
	a	9f	ba	d5	64	ac	ef	2a	7e	82	9d	bc	df	7a	8e	89	80
	b	9b	b6	с1	58	e8	23	65	af	ea	25	6f	b1	с8	43	с5	54
	С	fc	1f	21	63	a5	f4	07	09	1b	2d	77	99	b0	cb	46	ca
	d	45	cf	4a	de	79	8b	86	91	a8	e3	3e	42	сб	51	f3	0e
	е	12	36	5a	ee	29	7b	8d	8c	8f	8a	85	94	a7	f2	0d	17
	f	39	4b	dd	7c	84	97	a2	fd	1c	24	6с	b4	с7	52	f6	01

Table 3 – 'Antilogs' – field elements $\{E\}$ such that $\{E\} = \{03\}^{(xy)}$ given the power (xy)

For the Rijndael field {03} is a generator that yields Table 2 and Table 3. Using the previous example, Table 2 shows that $\{57\} = \{03\}^{(62)}$ and $\{83\} = \{03\}^{(50)}$ (where the brackets on the exponents identify them as hexadecimal numbers). This gives the product as $\{57\} \bullet \{83\} = \{03\}^{(62)+(50)}$ and since (62)+(50)=(b2) in hexadecimal, Table 3 gives the result $\{c1\}$, as before. These tables can also be used to find the inverses of field elements since $g^{(x)}$ has the inverse $g^{(ff)-(x)}$. Hence the element $\{af\} = \{03\}^{(b7)}$ has the inverse $g^{(ff)-(b7)} = g^{(48)} = \{62\}$. All elements except $\{00\}$ have inverses.

2.5 Polynomials with Coefficients in GF(256)

Four term polynomials can be defined with coefficients that are finite field elements as:

$$a(x) = a_3 x^3 + a_2 x^2 + a_1 x + a_0 (2.5.1)$$

where the four coefficients, each represented by a byte, will be denoted as a 32-bit word in the form $[a_3, a_2, a_1, a_0]$. With a second polynomial:

$$b(x) = b_3 x^3 + b_2 x^2 + b_1 x + b_0 (2.5.2)$$

addition can be performed by adding the finite field coefficients of like powers of x, which corresponds to an XOR operation between the corresponding bytes in each of the words or an XOR of the complete 32-bit word values (note that the variable x here is different to that used in the definition of individual finite field elements).

Multiplication is achieved by algebraically expanding the polynomial product and collecting like powers of x to give:

$$c(x) = c_6 x^6 + c_5 x^5 + c_4 x^4 + c_3 x^3 + c_2 x^2 + c_1 x + c_0$$
 (2.5.3)

where:

$$c_{0} = a_{0} \bullet b_{0}$$

$$c_{1} = a_{1} \bullet b_{0} \oplus a_{0} \bullet b_{1}$$

$$c_{2} = a_{2} \bullet b_{0} \oplus a_{1} \bullet b_{1} \oplus a_{0} \bullet b_{2}$$

$$c_{3} = a_{3} \bullet b_{0} \oplus a_{2} \bullet b_{1} \oplus a_{1} \bullet b_{2} \oplus a_{0} \bullet b_{3}$$

$$c_{4} = a_{3} \bullet b_{1} \oplus a_{2} \bullet b_{2} \oplus a_{1} \bullet b_{3}$$

$$c_{5} = a_{3} \bullet b_{2} \oplus a_{2} \bullet b_{3}$$

$$c_{5} = a_{3} \bullet b_{3}$$

$$c_{5} = a_{3} \bullet b_{3}$$

$$c_{5} = a_{3} \bullet b_{3}$$

$$c_{6} = a_{1} \bullet b_{3}$$

$$c_{7} = a_{1} \bullet b_{2} \oplus a_{1} \bullet b_{3}$$

$$c_{8} = a_{1} \bullet b_{3}$$

$$c_{9} = a_{2} \bullet b_{3}$$

$$c_{9} = a_{1} \bullet b_{3}$$

$$c_{9} = a_{2} \bullet b_{3}$$

$$c_{9} = a_{1} \bullet b_{3}$$

$$c_{9} = a_{2} \bullet b_{3}$$

$$c_{9} = a_{1} \bullet b_{3}$$

$$c_{9} = a_{2} \bullet b_{3}$$

with \bullet and \oplus representing finite field multiplication and addition (XOR) respectively. This result requires six bytes to represent its coefficients but it can be reduced modulo a degree 4 polynomial to produce a result that is of degree less than 4.

In Rijndael the polynomial used is $x^4 + 1$ and reduction produces the following polynomial coefficients:

$$d_{3} = a_{3} \bullet b_{0} \oplus a_{2} \bullet b_{1} \oplus a_{1} \bullet b_{2} \oplus a_{0} \bullet b_{3}$$

$$d_{2} = a_{2} \bullet b_{0} \oplus a_{1} \bullet b_{1} \oplus a_{0} \bullet b_{2} \oplus a_{3} \bullet b_{3}$$

$$d_{1} = a_{1} \bullet b_{0} \oplus a_{0} \bullet b_{1} \oplus a_{3} \bullet b_{2} \oplus a_{2} \bullet b_{3}$$

$$d_{0} = a_{0} \bullet b_{0} \oplus a_{3} \bullet b_{1} \oplus a_{2} \bullet b_{2} \oplus a_{1} \bullet b_{3}$$

$$(2.5.5)$$

If one of the polynomials is fixed, this can conveniently be written in matrix form as:

$$\begin{bmatrix} d_3 \\ d_2 \\ d_1 \\ d_0 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} a_0 & a_1 & a_2 & a_3 \\ a_3 & a_0 & a_1 & a_2 \\ a_2 & a_3 & a_0 & a_1 \\ a_1 & a_2 & a_3 & a_0 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} b_3 \\ b_2 \\ b_1 \\ b_0 \end{bmatrix}$$
(2.5.6)

Because $x^4 + 1$ is not an irreducible polynomial, not all polynomial multiplications are invertible. For Rijndael, however, a polynomial that has an inverse has been chosen:

$$a(x) = \{03\} x^3 + \{01\} x^2 + \{01\} x + \{02\}$$
 (2.5.7)

$$a^{-1}(x) = \{0b\} x^{3} + \{0d\} x^{2} + \{09\} x + \{0e\}$$
(2.5.8)

Another polynomial that Rijndael uses has $a_0 = a_2 = a_3 = \{00\}$ and $a_1 = \{01\}$, which is the polynomial x. Inspection of (2.5.6) above will show that its effect is to form the output word by rotating the bytes in the input word so that $[b_3, b_2, b_1, b_0]$ is transformed into $[b_2, b_1, b_0, b_3]$, with bytes moving to higher index positions and the top byte wrapping round to the lowest position. Higher powers of x correspond to the other cyclic permutations of the four bytes within a 32-bit word. The RotWord function that is used in the key schedule corresponds to x^3 .

3. The Cipher

At the start of the cipher the cipher input is copied into the internal state using the conventions described in Section 1.4. An initial round key is then added and the state is then transformed by iterating a **round function** in a number of cycles. The number of cycles Nn varies with the key length and block size. On completion the final state is copied into the cipher output using the same conventions.

The round function is parameterised using a round key which consists of an Nc word sub-array from the key schedule. The latter is considered either as a one-dimensional array of 32-bit words or an array of round keys with a structure and initialisation as decribed in section 1.5. In general the length of the cipher input, the cipher output and the cipher state, Nc, measured in multiples of 32 bits, is 4, 5, 6, 7 or 8 but the AES standard only allows a length of 4. The length of the cipher key, Nk, has the same values but only lengths of 4, 6 or 8 are allowed in the AES standard.

The cipher is described in the following pseudo code with the individual transformations and the key schedule described subsequently. Here the key schedule is treated as an array of Nn + 1 individual round keys, each of which is itself an array of Nc words.

```
Cipher(byte in[4*Nc], byte out[4*Nc], word k[Nn+1,Nc], Nc, Nn)
Begin
                          // The notation k[Nn+1,Nc] above indicates that
  byte state[4,Nc]
                          // the array k contains Nn + 1 individual round
                          // keys that are each arrays of Nc words
  state = in
  XorRoundKey(state, k[0,-], Nc)
                                              // k[0,-] = k[0..Nc-1]
  for round = 1 step 1 to Nn - 1
     SubBytes(state, Nc)
     ShiftRows(state, Nc)
     MixColumns(state, Nc)
     XorRoundKey(state, k[round,-], Nc) // k[round*Nc..(round+1)*Nc-1]
  end for
  SubBytes(state, Nc)
  ShiftRows(state, Nc)
  \label{eq:cond_key} \texttt{XorRoundKey(state, k[Nn,-], Nc)} \qquad // \ k[Nn*Nc..(Nn+1)*Nc-1]
  out = state
end
```

The number of rounds for the cipher (Nn) varies with the block length and the key length as shown in the following table. Remember that for AES the block size, Nc, is fixed at 4 and the key, Nk, can only have the lengths 4, 6 or 8.

		The larger of Nc or Nk												
	4	5	6	7	8									
Nn	10	11	12	13	14									

Table 4 – The number of rounds as a function of block and key size

3.1 The SubBytes Transformation

The SubBytes transformation is a non-linear byte substitution that acts on every byte of the state in isolation to produce a new byte value using an S-box substitution table. The action of this transformation is illustrated in Figure 2 for a block size of 6.




Figure 2 – SubBytes acts on every byte in the state in isolation

This substitution, which is invertible, is constructed by composing **two** transformations:

- 1. First the multiplicative inverse in the finite field described earlier (with element {00} mapped to itself).
- 2. Second the affine transformation over GF(2) defined by:

$$b_{i} = b_{i} \oplus b_{(i+4) \bmod 8} \oplus b_{(i+5) \bmod 8} \oplus b_{(i+6) \bmod 8} \oplus b_{(i+7) \bmod 8} \oplus c_{i}$$
(3.1.1)

for $0 \le i < 8$ where b_i is bit i of the byte and c_i is bit i of a byte c with the value {63} or {01100011}. Here and elsewhere a prime on a variable on the left of an equation indicates that its value is to be updated with the value on the right.

In matrix form the latter component of the S-box transformation can be expressed as:

$$\begin{bmatrix} b_{7} \\ b_{6} \\ b_{5} \\ b_{4} \\ b_{3} \\ b_{2} \\ b_{1} \\ b_{0} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} b_{7} \\ b_{6} \\ b_{5} \\ b_{4} \\ b_{3} \\ b_{2} \\ b_{1} \\ b_{0} \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$(3.1.2)$$

The final result of this two stage transformation is given in the following table.

h	ex								7	Į.							
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	С	d	е	f
	0	63	7с	77	7b	f2	6b	6f	с5	30	01	67	2b	fe	d7	ab	76
	1	са	82	с9	7d	fa	59	47	f0	ad	d4	a2	af	9c	a4	72	с0
	2	b7	fd	93	26	36	3f	f7	CC	34	a5	e5	f1	71	d8	31	15
	3	04	с7	23	с3	18	96	05	9a	07	12	80	e2	eb	27	b2	75
	4	09	83	2c	1a	1b	бе	5a	a0	52	3b	d6	b3	29	e3	2f	84
	5	53	d1	00	ed	20	fc	b1	5b	ба	cb	be	39	4a	4c	58	cf
	6	d0	ef	aa	fb	43	4d	33	85	45	f9	02	7f	50	3с	9f	a8
x	7	51	a3	40	8f	92	9d	38	f5	bc	b6	da	21	10	ff	f3	d2
^	8	cd	0c	13	ec	5f	97	44	17	с4	a7	7e	3d	64	5d	19	73
	9	60	81	4f	dc	22	2a	90	88	46	ee	b8	14	de	5e	0b	db
	а	e0	32	3a	0a	49	06	24	5c	с2	d3	ac	62	91	95	e4	79
	b	e7	с8	37	6d	8d	d5	4e	a9	6с	56	f4	ea	65	7a	ae	08
	С	ba	78	25	2e	1c	a6	b4	С6	e8	dd	74	1f	4b	bd	8b	8a
	d	70	3e	b5	66	48	03	f6	0e	61	35	57	b9	86	с1	1d	9e
	е	e1	f8	98	11	69	d9	8e	94	9b	1e	87	е9	се	55	28	df
	f	8c	a1	89	0d	bf	е6	42	68	41	99	2d	0f	b0	54	bb	16

Table 5 – The Substitution Table – Sbox[xy] (in hexadecimal)

The pseudo code for this transformation is as follows.

```
SubBytes(byte state[4,Nc], Nc)
begin
  for r = 0 step 1 to 3
    for c = 0 step 1 to Nc - 1
       state[r,c] = Sbox[state[r,c]]
  end for
  end for
end
```

3.2 The ShiftRows Transformation

The ShiftRows transformation operates individually on each of the last three rows of the state by cyclically shifting the bytes in the row such that:

$$s'_{r,c} = s_{r,[c+h(r,Nc)] \mod Nc} \text{ for } 0 \le c < Nc \text{ and } 0 < r < 4$$
 (3.2.1)

where the shift amount h(r, Nc) depends on row number r and block length as follows:

b	(r. No)		row (r)						
//((r, Nc)	1	2	3					
	4, 5, 6	1	2	3					
Nc	7	1	2	4					
	8	1	3	4					

Note that the AES block size, Nc, is fixed at 4

Table 6 – Shift offsets for different rows and block lengths

This has the effect of moving bytes to lower positions in the row except that the lowest bytes wrap around into the top of the row (note that a prime on a variable indicates an updated value). The action of this transformation is illustrated in Figure 3 for a cipher block size of 6.




Figure 3 – ShiftRows acts independently on rows in the state

The pseudo code for this transformation is as follows.

```
ShiftRows(byte state[4,Nc], Nc)
begin
  byte t[Nc]
  for r = 1 step 1 to 3
     for c = 0 step 1 to Nc - 1
        t[c] = state[r, (c + h(r,Nc)) mod Nc]
     end for
     for c = 0 step 1 to Nc - 1
        state[r,c] = t[c]
     end for
  end for
end for
end
```

3.3 The MixColumns Transformation

The MixColumns transformation acts independently on every column of the state and treats each column as a four-term polynomial as described in Section 2.6.

In matrix form the transformation used given in equation (3.3.1), where all the values are finite field elements as discussed in Section 2.

$$\begin{bmatrix} \dot{s}_{3,c} \\ \dot{s}_{2,c} \\ \dot{s}_{1,c} \\ \dot{s}_{0,c} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 02 & 01 & 01 & 03 \\ 03 & 02 & 01 & 01 \\ 01 & 03 & 02 & 01 \\ 01 & 01 & 03 & 02 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} s_{3,c} \\ s_{2,c} \\ s_{1,c} \\ s_{0,c} \end{bmatrix}$$
 for $0 \le c < Nc$ (3.3.1)

The action of this transformation is illustrated in Figure 4 for a cipher block size of 6.




Figure 4 - MixColumns acts independently on each column in the state

The pseudo code for this transformation is as follows, where the function FFmul(x, y) returns the product of two finite field elements x and y.

3.4 The XorRoundKey Transformation

In the XorRoundKey transformation Nc words from the key schedule (the round key described later) are each added (XOR'd) into the columns of the state so that:

$$[b'_{3c}, b'_{2c}, b'_{1c}, b'_{0c}] = [b_{3c}, b_{2c}, b_{1c}, b_{0c}] \oplus [k_{round,c}] \text{ for } 0 \le c < Nc$$
(3.4.1)

where the round key words $k_{round,c}$ (shortened to k_c^r in the diagram below) will be described later. The round number, round, is in the range $0 \le round \le Nn$, with the value of 0 being used to denote the initial round key that is applied before the round function.




Figure 5 – Words from the key schedule are XOR'd into columns in the state

The action of this transformation is illustrated in Figure 5 for a cipher block size of 6. The byte address within each word of the key schedule is that described in Section 1.

The pseudo code for this transformation is as follows, where xbyte(r, w) extracts byte r from word w.

4. The Key Schedule

The round keys are derived from the cipher key by means of a key schedule with each round requiring Nc words of key data which, with an additional initial set, makes a total of Nc(Nn + 1) words, where Nn is the number of cipher rounds. This key schedule is considered either as a one dimensional array k of Nc(Nn + 1) 32-bit words with an index i in the range $0 \le i < Nc(Nn + 1)$ or as a two dimensional array k[n,c] of Nn + 1 round keys, each or which individually consists of a sub-array of Nc words.

The expansion of the input key into the key schedule proceeds according to the following pseudo code. The function SubWord(x) gives an output word for which the S-box substitution has been individually applied to each of the four bytes of its input x. The

function RotWord(x) converts an input word $[b_3, b_2, b_1, b_0]$ to an output $[b_0, b_3, b_2, b_1]$. The word array Roon[i] contains the values $[0, 0, 0, x^{i-1}]$ with x^{i-1} being the powers of x in the field GF(256) discussed in section 2.3 (note that the index i starts at 1).

```
KeyExpansion(byte key[4*Nk], word k[Nn+1,Nc], Nc, Nk, Nn)
  i = 0
  while (i < Nk)
    k[i] = word [ key[4*i+3], key[4*i+2], key[4*i+1], key[4*i] ]
    i = i + 1
  end while
  i = Nk
  while (i < Nc * (Nn + 1))
    word temp = k[i - 1]
    if (i \mod Nk = 0)
       temp = SubWord(RotWord(temp)) xor Rcon[i / Nk]
    else if ((Nk > 6)) and (i \mod Nk = 4)
       temp = SubWord(temp)
    end if
    k[i] = k[i - Nk] xor temp
    i = i + 1
  end while
end
```

Note that this key schedule, which is illustrated in Figure 6 for Nk = 4 and Nc = 6, can be generated 'on-the fly' if necessary using a buffer of max(Nc, Nk) words. It can also be split into separate, somewhat simpler, key schedules for $Nk \le 6$ and Nk > 6 respectively.




Figure 6 – The key schedule and round key selection for Nk = 4 and Nc = 6

5. The Inverse Cipher

The inversion of the cipher code presented in section 3 is straightforward and provides the following pseudo code for the inverse cipher.

```
InvCipher(byte in[4*Nc], byte out[4*Nc], word k[Nn+1,Nc], Nc, Nn)
begin
  byte state[4,Nc]
  state = in
  XorRoundKey(state, k[Nn,-], Nc)
                                    // k[Nn*Nc..(Nn+1)*Nc-1]
  for round = Nn - 1 step -1 to 1
    InvShiftRows(state, Nc)
    InvSubBytes(state, Nc)
    XorRoundKey(state, k[round,-], Nc) // k[round*Nc..(round+1)*Nc-1]
    InvMixColumns(state, Nc)
  end for
  InvShiftRows(state, Nc)
  InvSubBytes(state, Nc)
                                          // k[0..Nc-1]
  XorRoundKey(state, k[0,-], Nc)
  out = state
end
```

5.1 The Inverse ShiftRows Transformation

The InvShiftRows transformation operates individually on each of the last three rows of the state cyclically shifting the bytes in the row such that:

$$s'_{r,[c+h(r,Nc)] \mod Nc} = s_{r,c} \text{ for } 0 \le c < Nc \text{ and } 0 < r < 4$$
 (5.1.1)

where the cyclic shift values h(r, Nc) are given in Table 6. The pseudo code for this transformation is as follows.

```
InvShiftRows(byte state[4,Nc], Nc)
begin
  byte t[Nc]
  for r = 1 step 1 to 3
    for c = 0 step 1 to Nc - 1
        t[(c + h(r,Nc)) mod Nc] = state[r,c]
    end for
    for c = 0 step 1 to Nc - 1
        state[r,c] = t[c]
    end for
  end for
end for
end
```

5.2 The Inverse SubBytes Transformation

The inverse S-box table needed for the inverse InvSubBytes transformation is given in Section 3.1. The pseudo code for this transformation is as follows:

```
InvSubBytes(byte state[4,Nc], Nc)
begin
  for r = 0 step 1 to 3
    for c = 0 step 1 to Nc - 1
        state[r,c] = InvSbox[state[r,c]]
    end for
  end for
```

Table 7 gives the full inverse S-box, the inverse of the affine tranformation (3.1.1) being:

$b_i' = b_{(i+2) \bmod 8}$	$_{3} \oplus b_{(i+5) \mod 3}$	$_{8} \oplus b_{(i+7) \mod 8}$	$\oplus d_i$, where byte $d = \{$	05}	(5.2.1)
----------------------------	--------------------------------	--------------------------------	--------------	-----------------------	-----	---------

										7							
he	ex		1		1			1		Y	1		1		1		1
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	С	d	е	f
	0	52	09	ба	d5	30	36	a5	38	bf	40	a3	9e	81	f3	d7	fb
	1	7c	e3	39	82	9b	2f	ff	87	34	8e	43	44	с4	de	е9	cb
	2	54	7b	94	32	аб	с2	23	3d	ee	4c	95	0b	42	fa	с3	4e
	3	08	2e	a1	66	28	d9	24	b2	76	5b	a2	49	6d	8b	d1	25
	4	72	f8	f6	64	86	68	98	16	d4	a4	5с	CC	5d	65	b6	92
	5	бс	70	48	50	fd	ed	b9	da	5e	15	46	57	a7	8d	9d	84
	6	90	d8	ab	00	8c	bc	d3	0a	£7	e4	58	05	b8	b3	45	06
x	7	d0	2c	1e	8f	са	3f	0f	02	с1	af	bd	03	01	13	8a	6b
^	8	3a	91	11	41	4f	67	dc	ea	97	f2	cf	се	f0	b4	е6	73
	9	96	ac	74	22	e7	ad	35	85	e2	f9	37	e8	1c	75	df	6e
	а	47	f1	1a	71	1d	29	с5	89	6f	b7	62	0e	aa	18	be	1b
	b	fc	56	3e	4b	С6	d2	79	20	9a	db	с0	fe	78	cd	5a	f4
	С	1f	dd	a8	33	88	07	с7	31	b1	12	10	59	27	80	ec	5f
	d	60	51	7f	a9	19	b5	4a	0d	2d	e5	7a	9f	93	с9	9c	ef
	е	a0	e0	3b	4d	ae	2a	f5	b0	с8	eb	bb	3с	83	53	99	61
	f	17	2b	04	7e	ba	77	d6	26	e1	69	14	63	55	21	0c	7d

Table 7 – The Inverse Substitution Table – InvSbox[xy] (in hexadecimal)

5.3 The Inverse XorRoundKey Transformation

The XorRoundKey transformation is its own inverse.

5.4 The Inverse MixColumns Transformation

The InvMixColumns transformation acts independently on every column of the state and treats each column as a four-term polynomial as described in Section 2.6. In matrix form the transformation used given in equation (5.4.1), where all the values are finite field elements as discussed in Section 2.

$$\begin{bmatrix} \dot{s}_{3,c} \\ \dot{s}_{2,c} \\ \dot{s}_{1,c} \\ \dot{s}_{0,c} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 0e & 09 & 0d & 0b \\ 0b & 0e & 09 & 0d \\ 0d & 0b & 0e & 09 \\ 09 & 0d & 0b & 0e \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} s_{3,c} \\ s_{1,c} \\ s_{1,c} \\ s_{0,c} \end{bmatrix}$$
for $0 \le c < Nc$ (5.4.1)

The pseudo code for this transformation is as follows, where the function FFmul(x, y) returns the product of two finite field elements x and y.

```
InvMixColumns(byte block[4,Nc], Nc)
begin
   byte t[4]
  for c = 0 step 1 to Nc - 1
     for r = 0 step 1 to 3
        t[r] = block[r,c]
   end for
   for r = 0 step 1 to 3
        block[r,c] =
        FFmul(0x0e, t[r]) xor
        FFmul(0x0b, t[(r + 1) mod 4]) xor
        FFmul(0x0d, t[(r + 2) mod 4]) xor
        FFmul(0x09, t[(r + 3) mod 4])
   end for
   end for
end
```

5.5 The Equivalent Inverse Cipher

The inverse cipher uses the same key schedule as the forward cipher (in reverse) but its form is different. However a series of transformations can be applied to transform the inverse cipher to match the form of the forward cipher. This is possible because the order of some operations in the inverse cipher can be changed without changing the final result.

For example the order of the SubBytes and Shiftrows transformations does not matter because SubBytes changes the value of bytes without changing their positions whereas Shiftrows does the exact opposite. Moreover, the order of the xorRoundKey and InvMixColumns operations can be inverted to put the forward and inverse ciphers in the same form provided that an adjustment is made to the key schedule. The order of round key addition and column mixing can be changed because the column mixing operation is linear with respect to the column input so that:

```
InvMixColumns(state xor k)=InvMixColumns(state) xor InvMixColumns(k)
```

where k represents a round key in the form of a state array. Hence, provided that an inverse column mixing operation is performed on appropriate words (columns) of the decryption key schedule, the order of these transformations can be reversed during decryption. Note, however, that this operation is not be performed on the first and last round keys (the first and last Nc words of the key schedule) since these do not operate in association with the column-mixing step.

The importance of this transformation is that the structure of the forward cipher allows the round function to be expressed in an efficient form for implementation. By transforming the inverse cipher into the same sequence of operations as the cipher itself, it can be implemented in the same way, thereby achieving this efficiency.

In this modified form the inverse cipher is as follows (with the modified decryption key schedule in the word array dk[Nn+1,Nc]).

```
EqInvCipher(byte in[4*Nc], byte out[4*Nc], word dk[Nn+1,Nc], Nc, Nn)
begin
  byte state[4,Nc]
  state = in
  XorRoundKey(state, dk[Nn,-], Nc) // dk[Nn*Nc..(Nn+1)*Nc-1]
  for round = Nn - 1 step -1 to 1
    InvSubBytes(state, Nc)
    InvShiftRows(state, Nc)
    InvMixColumns(state, Nc)
    XorRoundKey(state, dk[round,-], Nc) // dk[round*Nc..(round+1)*Nc-1]
  end for
  InvSubBytes(state, Nc)
  InvShiftRows(state, Nc)
  XorRoundKey(state, dk[0,-], Nc) // dk[0..Nc-1]
  out = state
end
```

where the following pseudo code is added to the end of the key expansion step (this can be made more efficient if encryption and decryption are not required simultaneously).

Note that, since InvMixColumns operates on a two-dimensional array of bytes while the round keys are held in an array of words, the call to InvMixColumns in this pseudo code sequence involves a change of type. This requires care with byte order conventions.

6. Implementation Issues

6.1 Implicit Assumptions

While hardware implementations of Rijndael can treat the input, output and cipher key inputs as bit sequences, software implementations will almost always to treat these entities as arrays of 8-bit bytes. Equally, while a hardware implementation will have to include a description of how Rijndael inputs and outputs are interfaced, a software implementation will often operate in an environment where Rijndael's two key enumerations – the enumeration of bits within 8-bit bytes and the enumeration of bytes within arrays – are already defined.

Where the environment in which Rijndael is implemented provides both for 8-bit bytes as addressable entities and for the enumeration of bits within bytes, it is reasonable to assume that Rijndael inputs and outputs will comply with these conventions.

In consequence Rijndael implementations in software should either indicate that this assumption is correct or alternatively undertake one of the following:

- (a) convert inputs and outputs to (or from) these standard formats to those being used internally;
- (b) document the interface to ensure that users of the implementation know that the inputs and outputs are in non-standard formats.

6.2 Bit Enumerations

In processing bytes to undertake finite field multiplication it is useful to define a function to multiply by x, an operation that involves shifting the value of a byte by one and then performing a conditional XOR operation. If by convention bit 0 is the 'lowest' bit in a byte (i.e. it represents a numeric value of 1) then multiplying by x will correspond to a left shift. This is the most likely situation but it is not unknown for bit 0 to be designated as the 'highest' bit in a byte, the bit that represents a numeric value of 128 in decimal, in which case multiplication by x will correspond to a right shift. When this applies, all byte values will also have their bits reversed so that $\{01100011\}$ or $\{63\}$, which in former convention would be associated with a numeric value of 0x63 in hexadecimal, will instead be associated with a numeric value of 0x63 in hexadecimal, will instead be associated with a numeric value of 0x63 in hexadecimal, will 'right' when referring to shifts have been avoided in this specification by using the terms 'up' and 'down' to refer to operations in which bytes at an index position move to higher or lower index positions respectively.

6.3 Bytes Within Words

A number of Rijndael operations involve the manipulation of the four 8-bit bytes within a 32-bit word, one such operation being the cyclic shift (rotation) of these four bytes into new positions. Whether the operation of moving bytes to higher array index positions correponds to a cyclic left or a cyclic right shift for a 32-bit word will depend on how the bytes are organised within words.

On some ('little-endian') processors bytes are numbered upwards from the 'low' end of 32-bits words and this means that a cyclic shift of bytes to higher array index positions will correspond to a cyclic left shift. But on other ('big-endian') processors bytes are numbered upwards starting at the 'high' end of a word so that a cyclic shift to higher index positions corresponds to a cyclic right shift.

In consequence care is needed in implementing Rijndael to ensure that the right directions of shifts and rotates are employed for the processor or processors for which an implementation is being designed.

In general these issues can be tackled either by the conversion of input and output values before use or by ensuring that the conventions employed for implementation are those of the architecture on which the cipher will operate.

7. Implementation Techniques

In the pseudo code in this section the following symbols will be used:

- δ bits in result are the AND of the corresponding bits in the two operands
- bits in result are the OR of the corresponding bits in the two operands
- ^ bits in result are the XOR of the corresponding bits in the two operands
- >> right shift of left operand by amount given by right operand
- left shift of left operand by amount given by right operand
- <> not equal
- 0x.. hexadecimal value

7.1 Finite Field Multiplication

The basic technique for finite field multiplication is explained in Section 2.4 and is implemented as follows:

```
byte FFmul(const byte a, const byte b)
  byte aa = a, bb = b, r = 0, t
  while (aa <> 0)
    if ((aa & 1) <> 0)
      r = r ^b
    endif
    t = bb \& 0x80
    bb = bb << 1
    if (t <> 0)
      bb = bb ^ 0x1b
                      // the bit of field polynomial (0x11b) is not
    endif
                       // not needed here since bb is an 8 bit value
    aa = aa >> 1
  endwhile
  return r
```

But this approach can be quite slow compared with table lookup using the techniques described in Section 2.5. With a 256-byte arrays from tables 2 and 3 we obtain:

```
byte FFlog[256]
                  // array from table 2
byte FFpow[256]
                  // array from table 3
byte FFmul(const byte a, const byte b)
begin
  if ((a <> 0) and (b <> 0))
    word t = FFlog[a] + FFlog[b]
     if(t >= 255)
      t = t - 255
     endif
    return FFpow[t]
  else
    return 0
  endif
end
```

This can be speeded up by doubling the length of the FFpow[] array and setting the values for elements 255 to 509 to the same values as elements 0 to 254 respectively so that FFmul() can be coded as:

```
byte FFmul(const byte a, const byte b)
begin
  if ((a <> 0) and (b <> 0))
    return FFpow[FFlog[a] + FFlog[b]]
  else
    return 0
  endif
end
```

In practice many compilers will allow these functions to be specified as inline code and this makes finite field multiplication very efficient.

7.2 Column Mixing

Provided that the state array is arranged appropriately in memory, each of the columns will be a single 32-bit word. If the bytes in such a word are c[3] to c[0] then the mixing operation is:

where the bytes are updated with the values on the left at the end of this sequence. But since $\{03\} \bullet c[0] = \{02\} \bullet c[0] \oplus c[0]$, this can also be written as:

```
c[3]' = v \oplus c[3] \oplus \{02\} \bullet (c[0] \oplus c[3])
c[2]' = v \oplus c[2] \oplus \{02\} \bullet (c[3] \oplus c[2])
c[1]' = v \oplus c[1] \oplus \{02\} \bullet (c[2] \oplus c[1])
c[0]' = v \oplus c[0] \oplus \{02\} \bullet (c[1] \oplus c[0])
(7.2.2)
```

where $v = c[3] \oplus c[2] \oplus c[1] \oplus c[0]$. When the need for temporary storage is taken into account, this code sequence becomes (with temporary variables t, u and v):

Morover, multiplication by the element {02} is just a shift followed by a conditional exclusive-or operation.

Although this formulation is quite efficient on 8-bit processors, the operations can be speeded up considerably on processors with 32 bit words provided that there are operations that can cyclicly rotate the bytes within such words. The functions required are as follows:

- moves the bytes in positions 0, 1 and 2 in the word w to positions 1, 2 and 3 respectively and moves the byte in position 3 to position 0.
- moves the bytes in positions 0, 1, 2 and 3 in w to positions 2, 3, 0 and 1 respectively (or exchanges byte 0 with byte 2 and byte 1 with byte 3).
- rot3(w) moves the bytes in positions 1, 2 and 3 in w to positions 0, 1 and 2 respectively and moves the byte in position 0 to position 3.

Using these operations on each word w of the state allows the above code sequence on individual bytes to be rewritten as one operation on each word (column) as a whole:

```
w = rot3(w) ^ rot2(w) ^ rot1(w) ^ FFmulX(w ^ rot3(w))
```

where the function FFmulx(w) performs a finite field multiplication of each of the four bytes in the word w by $\{02\}$. This itself can be coded to operate in parallel on the four bytes in the word as follows:

```
word FFmulX(const word w)
begin
  word t = w & 0x80808080
  return ((w ^ t) << 1) ^ ((t >> 3) | (t >> 4) | (t >> 6) | (t >> 7))
end
```

Here the word t extracts the highest bits from each byte within w, while the term w^t extracts the lower 7 bits. The four individual bytes within the latter can then be multiplied by $\{02\}$ in parallel using a single 32-bit left shift without creating overflows from one byte to the next. The $((t >> 3) \mid (t >> 4) \mid (t >> 6) \mid (t >> 7))$ construction leaves zero bytes within t unchanged but changes the bytes whose top bits are set to $0 \times 1b$. There are several alternative ways of performing this step including, for example $((u - (u >> 7)) & 0 \times 1b \times 1b \times 1b)$ or $((u >> 7)) & 0 \times 0 \times 1b \times 1b \times 1b)$, the most efficient depending on the characteristics of the processor instruction set available for its implementation. Finally, when this value is XOR'ed into the result the effect is that

required – namely, the modular polynomial is added to all bytes in which the top bits were originally set.

7.3 Inverse Column Mixing

As with forward column mixing, the inverse operation can be expressed as operations on the four bytes within a column contained within a single 32-bit word.

Provided that the state array is arranged appropriately in memory, each of the columns will be a single 32-bit word. If the bytes in such a word are c[3] to c[0] then the mixing operation is:

At first sight this looks very different to the forward transformation matrix but if we look at the first row, we can rewrite this as:

```
c[3]' = (\{02\} \oplus \{0c\}) \bullet c[3] \oplus (\{03\} \oplus \{08\}) \bullet c[0] \oplus (\{01\} \oplus \{0c\}) \bullet c[1] \oplus (\{01\} \oplus \{08\}) \bullet c[2]
= \{02\} \bullet c[3] \oplus \{0c\} \bullet c[3] \oplus \{03\} \bullet c[0] \oplus \{08\} \bullet c[0]
\oplus c[1] \oplus \{0c\} \bullet c[1] \oplus c[2] \oplus \{08\} \bullet c[2] 
= \{08\} \bullet (c[3] \oplus c[2] \oplus c[1] \oplus c[0]) \oplus \{04\} \bullet (c[3] \oplus c[1])
\oplus [\{02\} \bullet c[3] \oplus \{03\} \bullet c[0] \oplus c[1] \oplus c[2]]
= c[3] \oplus \{09\} \bullet v \oplus \{04\} \bullet (c[3] \oplus c[1]) \oplus \{02\} \bullet (c[0] \oplus c[3])
```

where $v = \{09\} \bullet (c[3] \oplus c[2] \oplus c[1] \oplus c[0])$. The inverse transformation is hence:

```
c[3]' = (\{04\} \bullet (c[3] \oplus c[1])) \oplus [v \oplus c[3] \oplus \{02\} \bullet (c[0] \oplus c[3])]
c[2]' = (\{04\} \bullet (c[2] \oplus c[0])) \oplus [v \oplus c[2] \oplus \{02\} \bullet (c[3] \oplus c[2])]
c[1]' = (\{04\} \bullet (c[3] \oplus c[1])) \oplus [v \oplus c[1] \oplus \{02\} \bullet (c[2] \oplus c[1])]
c[0]' = (\{04\} \bullet (c[2] \oplus c[0])) \oplus [v \oplus c[0] \oplus \{02\} \bullet (c[1] \oplus c[0])]
(7.3.3)
```

which is now similar in form to the forward calculation. The code sequence to implement this with temporary variables t, u, v and w is then:

```
t = c[3] ^ c[2]
u = c[1] ^ c[0]
v = t ^ u
v = v ^ FFmul(0x08, v)
w = v ^ FFmul(0x04, c[2] ^ c[0])
v = v ^ FFmul(0x04, c[3] ^ c[1])
c[3] = c[3] ^ v ^ FFmul(0x02, c[0] ^ c[3])
c[2] = c[2] ^ w ^ FFmul(0x02, t)
c[1] = c[1] ^ v ^ FFmul(0x02, c[2] ^ c[1])
c[0] = c[0] ^ w ^ FFmul(0x02, u)
```

As for forward mixing, this calculation can be optimised in situations where 32-bit operations that include rotate instructions are available.

7.4 Implementation Using Tables

Rijndael can be implemented very efficiently on processors with 32-bit words by transforming it in the following way.

Considering a single column (word) of the state and applying the SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns and XorRoundKey transformations in turn gives:

after SubBytes:
$$\begin{bmatrix} s_{3,c} \\ s_{2,c} \\ s_{1,c} \\ s_{0,c} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} S[s_{3,c}] \\ S[s_{2,c}] \\ S[s_{1,c}] \\ S[s_{0,c}] \end{bmatrix}$$
 (7.4.1)

after shiftRows:
$$\begin{bmatrix} s_{3,c} \\ s_{2,c} \\ s_{1,c} \\ s_{0,c} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} S[s_{3,[c+h(3,Nc)] \mod Nc}] \\ S[s_{2,[c+h(2,Nc)] \mod Nc}] \\ S[s_{1,[c+h(1,Nc)] \mod Nc}] \\ S[s_{0,c}] \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} S[s_{3,c(3)}] \\ S[s_{2,c(2)}] \\ S[s_{1,c(1)}] \\ S[s_{0,c(0)}] \end{bmatrix}$$
(7.4.2)

after MixColumns:
$$\begin{bmatrix} s_{3,c}^{"} \\ s_{2,c}^{"} \\ s_{0,c}^{"} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 02 & 01 & 01 & 03 \\ 03 & 02 & 01 & 01 \\ 01 & 03 & 02 & 01 \\ 01 & 01 & 03 & 02 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} S[s_{3,c(3)}] \\ S[s_{2,c(2)}] \\ S[s_{1,c(1)}] \\ S[s_{0,c(0)}] \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} s_{3,c}^{"} \\ s_{0,c}^{"} \\ s_{1,c}^{"} \\ s_{0,c}^{"} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 02 & 01 & 01 & 03 \\ 03 & 02 & 01 & 01 \\ 01 & 03 & 02 & 01 \\ 01 & 03 & 02 & 01 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} S[s_{3,c(3)}] \\ S[s_{2,c(2)}] \\ S[s_{2,c(2)}] \\ S[s_{1,c(1)}] \\ S[s_{1,c(1)}] \\ S[s_{2,c(2)}] \\ S[s_{1,c(1)}] \\ S[s_{$$

after XorRoundKey:
$$\begin{bmatrix} s_{3,c}^{m} \\ s_{2,c}^{m} \\ s_{0,c}^{m} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 02 & 01 & 01 & 03 \\ 03 & 02 & 01 & 01 \\ 01 & 03 & 02 & 01 \\ 01 & 01 & 03 & 02 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} S[s_{3,c(3)}] \\ S[s_{2,c(2)}] \\ S[s_{1,c(1)}] \\ S[s_{0,c(0)}] \end{bmatrix} \oplus \begin{bmatrix} k_{3,c} \\ k_{2,c} \\ k_{1,c} \\ k_{0,c} \end{bmatrix}$$
(7.4.4)

where the shorthand notation $c(r) = [c + h(r, Nc)] \mod Nc$, with c(0) = c, has been used in the column index c.

Treating this as one complex transformation (i.e. with a single prime), it can be written in column vector form as:

$$\begin{bmatrix} s_{3,c} \\ s_{2,c} \\ s_{1,c} \\ s_{0,c} \end{bmatrix} = S[s_{3,c(3)}] \bullet \begin{bmatrix} 02 \\ 03 \\ 01 \\ 01 \end{bmatrix} \oplus S[s_{2,c(2)}] \bullet \begin{bmatrix} 01 \\ 02 \\ 03 \\ 01 \end{bmatrix} \oplus S[s_{1,c(1)}] \bullet \begin{bmatrix} 01 \\ 01 \\ 02 \\ 03 \end{bmatrix} \oplus S[s_{0,c(0)}] \bullet \begin{bmatrix} 03 \\ 01 \\ 01 \\ 02 \end{bmatrix} \oplus \begin{bmatrix} k_{3,c} \\ k_{2,c} \\ k_{1,c} \\ k_{0,c} \end{bmatrix}$$

$$(7.4.5)$$

And if four tables each of 256 32-bit words are defined (for $0 \le x < 256$) as follows:

$$T_{3}[x] = \begin{bmatrix} 02 \bullet S[x] \\ 03 \bullet S[x] \\ S[x] \\ S[x] \end{bmatrix} T_{2}[x] = \begin{bmatrix} S[x] \\ 02 \bullet S[x] \\ 03 \bullet S[x] \\ S[x] \end{bmatrix} T_{1}[x] = \begin{bmatrix} S[x] \\ S[x] \\ 02 \bullet S[x] \\ 03 \bullet S[x] \end{bmatrix} T_{0}[x] = \begin{bmatrix} 03 \bullet S[x] \\ S[x] \\ S[x] \\ 02 \bullet S[x] \end{bmatrix} (7.4.6)$$

equation (7.4.5) can then be expressed in the form:

$$\begin{bmatrix} s_{3,c} \\ s_{2,c} \\ s_{1,c} \\ s_{0,c} \end{bmatrix} = T_3[s_{3,c(3)}] \oplus T_2[s_{2,c(2)}] \oplus T_1[s_{1,c(1)}] \oplus T_0[s_{0,c(0)}] \oplus k_{round,c}$$

$$(7.4.7)$$

where $c(r) = [c + h(r, Nc)] \mod Nc$, c(0) = c and $k_{round,c}$ is word c of round key round.

This shows that each column in the output state can be computed using four XOR instructions involving a word from the key schedule and four words from tables that are indexed using four bytes from the input state.

Equation (7.4.7) applies to all but the last round because the latter is different in that the MixColumns step is not present. This means that different tables are required for the last round as follows:

$$U_{3}[x] = \begin{bmatrix} S[x] \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} U_{2}[x] = \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ S[x] \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} U_{1}[x] = \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ S[x] \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} U_{0}[x] = \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ S[x] \end{bmatrix}$$
 (7.4.8)

These tables can be implemented directly or can be computed from the S-Box table or by masking the appropriate tables for normal rounds. 4096 bytes (4 x 256 x 4) of table space are needed for the main rounds and this doubles if last round tables are also used. However, the four tables are closely related to each other since $T_i(x) = \text{rot1}(T_{i-1}(x))$, so the space needed can be reduced by a factor of four at the expense of three additional rotations in the calculation of each column of the state.

The implementation approach described in this section can also be used for the equivalent inverse cipher since this has the same high level structure as the forward cipher. But a different set of tables is needed because the inverse S-Boxes and the inverse column mixing operation have to be used in this case. The byte indexing for the table values is also different for the inverse cipher, namely, $c(r) = [c - h(r, Nc) + Nc] \mod Nc$. For the inverse cipher the normal round tables are hence:

$$V_{3}[x] = \begin{bmatrix} 0e \bullet S^{-1}[x] \\ 0b \bullet S^{-1}[x] \\ 0d \bullet S^{-1}[x] \\ 09 \bullet S^{-1}[x] \end{bmatrix} V_{2}[x] = \begin{bmatrix} 09 \bullet S^{-1}[x] \\ 0e \bullet S^{-1}[x] \\ 0b \bullet S^{-1}[x] \\ 0d \bullet S^{-1}[x] \end{bmatrix} V_{1}[x] = \begin{bmatrix} 0d \bullet S^{-1}[x] \\ 09 \bullet S^{-1}[x] \\ 0e \bullet S^{-1}[x] \\ 0b \bullet S^{-1}[x] \end{bmatrix} V_{0}[x] = \begin{bmatrix} 0b \bullet S^{-1}[x] \\ 0d \bullet S^{-1}[x] \\ 09 \bullet S^{-1}[x] \\ 0e \bullet S^{-1}[x] \end{bmatrix} (7.4.9)$$

so that the equivalent inverse cipher round transformation can be expressed as:

$$\begin{bmatrix} s_{3,c}' \\ s_{2,c}' \\ s_{1,c}' \\ s_{0,c}' \end{bmatrix} = V_3[s_{3,c(3)}] \oplus V_2[s_{2,c(2)}] \oplus V_1[s_{1,c(1)}] \oplus V_0[s_{0,c(0)}] \oplus k_{round,c}$$

$$(7.4.10)$$

where $c(r) = [c - h(r, Nc)] \mod Nc$, c(0) = c and $k_{round,c}$ is word c of round key round for the equivalent inverse cipher. The inverse last round tables (W) match equation (7.4.8) with $S^{-1}[x]$ replacing S[x].

8. Acknowledgements

This specification was originally written as an input to the AES FIPS development process but it has been developed further since then. I would like to acknowledge the contributions of Joan Daemen, Vincent Rijmen, Jim Foti, Elaine Barker, Morris Dworkin, Lawrence Bassham, Paulo Barreto, Bryan Olson, David Hopwood and Doug Gwynn.

9. References

J. Daemen and V. Rijmen, *AES Proposal: Rijndael*, AES Algorithm Submission, September 3, 1999, available from the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) AES web site at http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/

10. Errors

This specification has been produced from the base document referenced in section 9. It has no formal status but the author would be grateful for reports of any errors in it to brg@gladman.plus.com. C implementations of Rijndael by the author are available at:

http://fp.gladman.plus.com/cryptography_technology/index.htm

11. An Example of Cipher Operation

The following diagram shows the hexadecimal values in the state array as the cipher progresses for a cipher input length (Nc) of 4 and a cipher key length (Nk) of 4. The notation for the following inputs is given at the start of Section 12.

olllowing	inputs is given	at the start of S	ection 12.		
Input Key			13198a2e037 of7158809cf		(pi * 2^124) (e * 2^124)
round number	start of round	after subbytes	after shiftrows	after mixcolumns	round key value
input	32 88 31 e0 43 5a 31 37 f6 30 98 07 a8 8d a2 34				2b 28 ab 09 7e ae f7 cf 15 d2 15 4f 16 a6 88 3c =
1	19 a0 9a e9 3d f4 c6 f8 e3 e2 8d 48 be 2b 2a 08	d4 e0 b8 le 27 bf b4 41 11 98 5d 52 ae f1 e5 30	d4 e0 b8 le bf b4 41 27 5d 52 11 98 30 ae f1 e5	04 e0 48 28 66 cb f8 06 81 19 d3 26 e5 9a 7a 4c	a0 88 23 2a fa 54 a3 6c fe 2c 39 76 17 b1 39 05 =
2	a4 68 6b 02 9c 9f 5b 6a 7f 35 ea 50 f2 2b 43 49	49 45 7f 77 de db 39 02 d2 96 87 53 89 f1 1a 3b	49 45 7f 77 db 39 02 de 87 53 d2 96 3b 89 f1 1a	58 1b db 1b 4d 4b e7 6b ca 5a ca b0 f1 ac a8 e5	$ \bigoplus_{\substack{c2 \ 96 \ 35 \ 59 \\ 95 \ b9 \ 80 \ f6 \\ f2 \ 43 \ 7a \ 7f}} = $
3	aa 61 82 68 8f dd d2 32 5f e3 4a 46 03 ef d2 9a	ac ef 13 45 73 c1 b5 23 cf 11 d6 5a 7b df b5 b8	ac ef 13 45 c1 b5 23 73 d6 5a cf 11 b8 7b df b5	75 20 53 bb ec 0b c0 25 09 63 cf d0 93 33 7c dc	⊕ 3d 47 1e 6d 80 16 23 7a 47 fe 7e 88 7d 3e 44 3b =
4	48 67 4d d6 6c 1d e3 5f 4e 9d b1 58 ee 0d 38 e7	52 85 e3 f6 50 a4 11 cf 2f 5e c8 6a 28 d7 07 94	52 85 e3 f6 a4 11 cf 50 c8 6a 2f 5e 94 28 d7 07	0f 60 6f 5e d6 31 c0 b3 da 38 10 13 a9 bf 6b 01	⊕ a8 b6 db 44 52 71 0b a5 5b 25 ad 41 7f 3b 00
5	e0 c8 d9 85 92 63 b1 b8 7f 63 35 be e8 c0 50 01	e1 e8 35 97 4f fb c8 6c d2 fb 96 ae 9b ba 53 7c	e1 e8 35 97 fb c8 6c 4f 96 ae d2 fb 7c 9b ba 53	25 bd b6 4c d1 11 3a 4c a9 d1 33 c0 ad 68 8e b0	$ \bigoplus \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$
6	f1 c1 7c 5d 00 92 c8 b5 6f 4c 8b d5 55 ef 32 0c	a1 78 10 4c 63 4f e8 d5 a8 29 3d 03 fc df 23 fe	a1 78 10 4c 4f e8 d5 63 3d 03 a8 29 fe fc df 23	4b 2c 33 37 86 4a 9d d2 8d 89 f4 18 6d 80 e8 d8	⊕
7	26 3d e8 fd 0e 41 64 d2 2e b7 72 8b 17 7d a9 25	f7 27 9b 54 ab 83 43 b5 31 a9 40 3d f0 ff d3 3f	f7 27 9b 54 83 43 b5 ab 40 3d 31 a9 3f f0 ff d3	14 46 27 34 15 16 46 2a b5 15 56 d8 bf ec d7 43	$ \bigoplus_{\substack{54 \ 5f \ a6 \ a6 \ f7f \ c9 \ 4f \ dc}} 4e $
8	5a 19 a3 7a 41 49 e0 8c 42 dc 19 04 b1 1f 65 0c	be d4 0a da 83 3b e1 64 2c 86 d4 f2 c8 c0 4d fe	be d4 0a da 3b e1 64 83 d4 f2 2c 86 fe c8 c0 4d	00 b1 54 fa 51 c8 76 1b 2f 89 6d 99 d1 ff cd ea	$ \bigoplus_{\substack{\text{da b5 } 31 7f \\ \text{d2 8d 2b 8d} \\ 73 \text{ba f5 29} \\ 21 \text{d2 60 2f}}} = $
9	ea 04 65 85 83 45 5d 96 5c 33 98 b0 f0 2d ad c5	87 f2 4d 97 ec 6e 4c 90 4a c3 46 e7 8c d8 95 a6	87 f2 4d 97 6e 4c 90 ec 46 e7 4a c3 a6 8c d8 95	47 40 a3 4c 37 d4 70 9f 94 e4 3a 42 ed a5 a6 bc	$ \bigoplus \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$
10	eb 59 8b 1b 40 2e a1 c3 f2 38 13 42 1e 84 e7 d2	e9 cb 3d af 09 31 32 2e 89 07 7d 2c 72 5f 94 b5	e9 cb 3d af 31 32 2e 09 7d 2c 89 07 b5 72 5f 94		### Boundary Control ### Boundary Control
output	39 02 dc 19 25 dc 11 6a 84 09 85 0b 1d fb 97 32				

12. Rijndael Reference Implementation in C++

12.1 The Header File

```
// Copyright in this code is held by Dr B. R. Gladman but free direct or
// derivative use is permitted subject to acknowledgement of its origin.
// There are no guarantees of correctness or fitness for purpose.
// Dr B. R. Gladman <br/> <br/> brg@gladman.me.uk>
#ifndef AES H
#define AES_H
                                            // the number or rows in the state
const int n_row = 4;
const int n_{col} = 4;
                                             // the number or columns in the
state
const int n_maxr = 14;
                                             // the maximum number of cipher
rounds
aes_state[n_col];// an array of columns for the state
typedef aes col
class aes
    aes state key sch[n maxr + 1]; // the key schedule
                 key_len;
    int
public:
    aes(void) : key_len(0) {};
    bool key(const void *key, int keylen);
    bool encrypt(const void* pt, void* ct) const;
    bool decrypt(const void* ct, void* pt) const;
};
#endif
12.2 The C++ Implementation
// Copyright in this code is held by Dr B. R. Gladman but free direct or
// derivative use is permitted subject to acknowledgement of its origin.
// There are no guarantees of correctness or fitness for purpose.
// Dr B. R. Gladman <br/> <br/> brg@gladman.me.uk>
#include "aes.h"
namespace
{
    aes\_elem s\_box[256] = // the S box
         0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5,
         0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76, 0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0, 0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0, 0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc,
         0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15,
         0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a,
         0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75,
         0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0,
         0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84, 0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b, 0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf, 0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85,
         0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8,
```

0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5, 0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2, 0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17, 0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73, 0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88,

```
0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb,
     0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c,
     0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79,
     0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9, 0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08, 0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6,
     0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a,
     0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e,
     0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e,
     0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94,
     0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf, 0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68, 0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16
};
aes_elem is_box[256] = // the inverse S box
     0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38,
     0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb,
     0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87, 0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb, 0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d, 0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e,
     0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2,
     0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25,
     0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16,
     0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92,
     0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda, 0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84, 0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a, 0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06,
     0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02,
     0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b,
     0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea,
     0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73,
     0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85,
     0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e, 0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89, 0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b,
     0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20,
     0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4,
     0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31,
     0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f,
     0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d,
     0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef, 0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0, 0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61, 0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26,
     0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d
};
aes elem ff tab[8] =
     0x00, 0x1b, 0x36, 0x2d, 0x6c, 0x77, 0x5a, 0x41
// multiply a GF(256) element by {02}
aes_elem gf_mul2(aes_elem s)
     return (s << 1) ^ ff_tab[s >> 7];
// multiply a GF(256) element by \{04\}
aes_elem gf_mul4(aes_elem s)
```

```
return (s << 2) ^ ff_tab[s >> 6];
// multiply a GF(256) element by {08}
aes_elem gf_mul8(aes_elem s)
    return (s << 3) ^ ff_tab[s >> 5];
  // rotate bytes within a column
void rot_column(aes_col in)
{ aes_elem
                t;
    t = in[0];
    in[0] = in[1];
    in[1] = in[2];
    in[2] = in[3];
    in[3] = t;
// forward byte substitution for a column
void sub_column(aes_col in)
    in[0] = s_box[in[0]];
    in[1] = s_box[in[1]];
    in[2] = s_box[in[2]];
    in[3] = s_box[in[3]];
}
// inverse byte substitution for a column
void inv_sub_column(aes_col in)
    in[0] = is\_box[in[0]];
    in[1] = is_box[in[1]];
in[2] = is_box[in[2]];
    in[3] = is\_box[in[3]];
}
// forward byte substitution transformation
void sub_bytes(aes_state s)
    for(int row = 0; row < n_row; ++row)</pre>
        sub_column(s[row]);
// inverse byte substitution transformation
void inv_sub_bytes(aes_state s)
    for(int row = 0; row < n_row; ++row)</pre>
        inv_sub_column(s[row]);
// forward shift row transformation
void shift_rows(aes_state s)
    for(int row = 1; row < n_row; ++row)</pre>
        aes_elem t[n_row];
        t[0] = s[(row + 0) % n_col][row];
        t[1] = s[(row + 1) % n_col][row];
```

```
t[2] = s[(row + 2) % n_col][row];
                      t[3] = s[(row + 3) % n_col][row];
                      s[0][row] = t[0];
                      s[1][row] = t[1];
                      s[2][row] = t[2];
                      s[3][row] = t[3];
           }
}
// inverse shift row transformation
void inv shift rows(aes state s)
           for(int row = 1; row < n_row; ++row)</pre>
                  aes_elem t[n_row];
                      t[(row + 0) % n_{col}] = s[0][row];
                      t[(row + 1) % n_{col}] = s[1][row];
                      t[(row + 2) % n_{col}] = s[2][row];
                      t[(row + 3) % n_col] = s[3][row];
                      s[0][row] = t[0];
                      s[1][row] = t[1];
                      s[2][row] = t[2];
                      s[3][row] = t[3];
           }
}
// forward mix column transformation
            \{02\}a ^{03}b ^{01}c ^{01}d = a ^{01}d = a ^{01}d ^{02}a ^{01}d = a ^{01}d ^{02}a ^{01}d = a ^{01}d ^{01}d ^{01}d = a ^{01}d ^{01}d ^{01}d ^{01}d ^{01}d ^{01}d ^{01}d ^{01}d = a ^{01}d ^{
            \{01\}a \{02\}b \{03\}c \{01\}d = b \{a \ b \ c \ d\} \{02\}{b \{02\}
//
            {01}a ^ {01}b ^ {02}c ^ {03}d = c ^ {a ^ b ^ c ^ d} ^ {02}{c ^ d}
{03}a ^ {01}b ^ {01}c ^ {02}d = d ^ {a ^ b ^ c ^ d} ^ {02}{d ^ a}
void mix_columns(aes_state s)
           for(int col = 0; col < n_{col}; ++col)
                 aes_elem ad, bc, abcd;
                      ad = s[col][0] ^ s[col][3];
                      bc = s[col][1] ^ s[col][2];
                      abcd = ad ^ bc;
                      s[col][0] ^= abcd ^ gf_mul2(s[col][0] ^ s[col][1]);
s[col][1] ^= abcd ^ gf_mul2(bc);
s[col][2] ^= abcd ^ gf_mul2(s[col][2] ^ s[col][3]);
s[col][3] ^= abcd ^ gf_mul2(ad);
           }
}
// inverse mix column transformation
            {0e}a ^ {0b}b ^ {0d}c ^ {09}d
            (09)a ^ (0e)b ^ (0b)c ^ (0d)d
            (0d)a ^ (09)b ^ (0e)c ^ (0b)d
//
            (0b)a ^ (0d)b ^ (09)c ^ (0e)d
//
// =
                                                                                [forward transformation matrix]
        {0c}{a^c} ^ {08}{b^d} ^ [{02}a ^ {03}b ^ {01}c ^ {01}d]

{08}{a^c} ^ {0c}{b^d} ^ [{01}a ^ {02}b ^ {03}c ^ {01}d]

{0c}{a^c} ^ {08}{b^d} ^ [{01}a ^ {01}b ^ {02}c ^ {03}d]

{08}{a^c} ^ {00}{b^d} ^ [{01}a ^ {01}b ^ {02}c ^ {03}d]
//
//
// =
           //
//
            \{0c\}\{a^c\} ^ \{08\}\{b^d\} ^ d ^ a ^ b ^ \{02\}\{c ^ d\}
```

```
// {08}{a^c} ^ {0c}{b^d} ^ a ^ b ^ c ^ {02}{d ^ a}
    // a ^ {09}{a^b^c^d} ^ {04}{a^c} ^ {02}{a ^ b}
// b ^ {09}{a^b^c^d} ^ {04}{b^d} ^ {02}{b ^ c}
// c ^ {09}{a^b^c^d} ^ {04}{a^c} ^ {02}{c ^ d}
// d ^ {09}{a^b^c^d} ^ {04}{b^d} ^ {02}{d ^ a}
    void inv_mix_columns(aes_state s)
         for(int col = 0; col < n_col; ++col)
             aes_elem ad, bc, p, q;
              ad = s[col][0] ^ s[col][3];
              bc = s[col][1] ^ s[col][2];
              q = ad ^bc;
              q ^= gf_mul8(q);
              p = q ^ gf_{mul4}(s[col][0] ^ s[col][2]);
              q = q ^ gf_{mul4}(s[col][1] ^ s[col][3]);
              s[col][0] \ ^{=} p \ ^{gf_mul2(s[col][0] \ ^{s[col][1])};}
              s[col][1] ^= q ^ gf_mul2(bc);
s[col][2] ^= p ^ gf_mul2(s[col][2] ^ s[col][3]);
              s[col][3] ^= q ^ gf_mul2(ad);
         }
    }
    // add key transformation (same in both directions)
    void add_round_key(aes_state s, const aes_state k)
         for(int col = 0; col < n_{col}; ++col)
              for(int row = 0; row < n_row; ++row)</pre>
                  s[col][row] ^= k[col][row];
    // trabsfer the input to the state array
    void state_in(aes_state s, const void* in)
         for(int col = 0, i = 0; col < n_{col}; ++col)
              for(int row = 0; row < n_row; ++row)</pre>
                  s[col][row] = static cast<const unsigned char*>(in)[i++];
    }
    // trabsfer the state array to the output
    void state_out(aes_state s, void* out)
         for(int col = 0, i = 0; col < n_{col}; ++col)
              for(int row = 0; row < n row; ++row)</pre>
                  static cast<unsigned char*>(out)[i++] = s[col][row];
}
// set the cipher key
bool aes::key(const void* key, int keylen)
    if(keylen == 128 | keylen == 192 | keylen == 256)
         key_len = keylen / 32;
    else if(keylen == 16 \mid \mid keylen == 24 \mid \mid keylen == 32)
         key_len = key_len / 4;
    else
         return false;
    aes_col *kp = (aes_col*)key_sch;
    int hi = n_{col} * (key_len + 7);
```

```
int i = -1, k = 0;
    while(++i < key_len)</pre>
        kp[i][0] = static_cast<const unsigned char*>(key)[k++];
        kp[i][1] = static_cast<const unsigned char*>(key)[k++];
        kp[i][2] = static_cast<const unsigned char*>(key)[k++];
        kp[i][3] = static_cast<const unsigned char*>(key)[k++];
    }
    --i;
    aes_elem rc = 1;
    while(++i < hi)
        aes\_col temp = { kp[i - 1][0], kp[i - 1][1], }
                           kp[i - 1][2], kp[i - 1][3];
         if(i % key_len == 0)
             rot_column(temp);
             sub_column(temp);
             temp[0] ^= rc;
             rc = gf_mul2(rc);
        else if (key_len > 6 && (i % key_len == 4))
             sub_column(temp);
        kp[i][0] = kp[i - key_len][0] ^ temp[0];
        kp[i][1] = kp[i - key_len][1] ^ temp[1];
kp[i][2] = kp[i - key_len][2] ^ temp[2];
kp[i][3] = kp[i - key_len][3] ^ temp[3];
    }
    return true;
}
// encrypt a single block of 16 bytes
bool aes::encrypt(const void *pt, void* ct) const
   aes_state
                 s;
      if(key_len)
             state_in(s, pt);
             add_round_key(s, key_sch[0]);
             for(int r = 1; r < key_len + 6; ++r)
                   sub_bytes(s);
                   shift rows(s);
                   mix columns(s);
                   add_round_key(s, key_sch[r]);
             }
             sub_bytes(s);
             shift_rows(s);
             add_round_key(s, key_sch[key_len + 6]);
             state_out(s, ct);
             return true;
      else
             return false;
// decrypt a single block of 16 bytes
```

```
bool aes::decrypt(const void* ct, void* pt) const
    aes_state
               s;
      if(key_len)
            state_in(s, ct);
            add_round_key(s, key_sch[key_len + 6]);
            for(int r = \text{key\_len} + 5; r > 0; --r)
                  inv_shift_rows(s);
                  inv_sub_bytes(s);
                  add_round_key(s, key_sch[r]);
                  inv mix columns(s);
            inv shift rows(s);
            inv_sub_bytes(s);
            add_round_key(s, key_sch[0]);
            state_out(s, pt);
            return true;
      else
            return false;
}
```

13. Rijndael Development Test Vectors

All vectors are in hexadecimal notation with each pair of characters giving a byte value where the left and right characters of each pair provide the bit pattern for the 4 bit group containing the higher and lower numbered bits respectively using the format explained in Section 1.2. The array index for all bytes (groups of two hexadecimal digits) within these test vectors starts at zero on the left and increases from left to right.

Considered instead as bit sequences, with hexadecimal digits numbered from left to right starting from 0, hexadecimal digit n gives the value of bits 4n to 4n+3 in the sequence using the 4-bit notation given in Section 1.2 except that lower numbered bits are now on the left (this arises because bits in bit sequences and bits in bytes are mapped in reverse).

```
These test have been generated by Dr Brian Gladman using the
LEGEND FOR ENCRYPT (round number r = 0 to 10, 12 or 14)
input: cipher input
start: state at start of round[r]
s box:
         state after s_box substitution
s_row: state after shift row transformation
m_col: state after mix column transformation
k_sch: key schedule value for round[r]
output: cipher output
LEGEND FOR DECRYPT (round number r = 0 to 10, 12 or 14)
KEY SCHEDULE FOR KEY XOR FOLLOWED BY INVERSE MIX COLUMN
iinput: inverse cipher input
istart: state at start of round[r]
is_box: state after inverse s_box substitution
is_row: state after inverse shift row transformation
ik_sch: key schedule value for round[r]
ik_add: state after key addition
ioutput: cipher output
LEGEND FOR DECRYPT (MOD) (round number r = 0 to 10, 12 or 14)
KEY SCHEDULE FOR INVERSE MIX COLUMN FOLLOWED BY KEY XOR
iinput: inverse cipher input
istart: state at start of round[r]
```

```
state after inverse s_box substitution
is_box:
         state after inverse shift row transformation
is_row:
im_col:
         state after inverse mix column transformation
ik_sch:
         key schedule value for round[r]
ioutput: cipher output
              3243f6a8885a308d313198a2e0370734 (pi * 2^124)
PLAINTEXT:
              2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c ( e * 2^124)
KEY:
ENCRYPT
              3243f6a8885a308d313198a2e0370734
R[ 0].input
              2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c
R[ 0].k_sch
R[ 1].start
R[ 1].s_box
              193de3bea0f4e22b9ac68d2ae9f84808
              d42711aee0bf98f1b8b45de51e415230
R[ 1].s_row
              d4bf5d30e0b452aeb84111f11e2798e5
R[ 1].m_col
             046681e5e0cb199a48f8d37a2806264c
            a0fafe1788542cb123a339392a6c7605
R[ 1].k_sch
R[ 2].start
R[ 2].s_box
              a49c7ff2689f352b6b5bea43026a5049
              49ded28945db96f17f39871a7702533b
              49db873b453953897f02d2f177de961a
R[ 2].s_row
R[ 2].m_col
              584dcaf11b4b5aacdbe7caa81b6bb0e5
R[ 2].k_sch
              f2c295f27a96b9435935807a7359f67f
R [
   3].start
              aa8f5f0361dde3ef82d24ad26832469a
              ac73cf7befc111df13b5d6b545235ab8
R[ 3].s_box
R[ 3].s_row
              acc1d6b8efb55a7b1323cfdf457311b5
R[3].m\_col
              75ec0993200b633353c0cf7cbb25d0dc
R[ 3].k_sch
R[ 4].start
              3d80477d4716fe3e1e237e446d7a883b
              486c4eee671d9d0d4de3b138d65f58e7
R[ 4].s_box
              52502f2885a45ed7e311c807f6cf6a94
R[ 4].s_row
              52a4c89485116a28e3cf2fd7f6505e07
R[ 4].m_col
              0fd6daa9603138bf6fc0106b5eb31301
RΓ
  4].k_sch
              ef44a541a8525b7fb671253bdb0bad00
R[ 5].start
              e0927fe8c86363c0d9b1355085b8be01
R[ 5].s box
              e14fd29be8fbfbba35c89653976cae7c
R[ 5].s_row
              e1fb967ce8c8ae9b356cd2ba974ffb53
R[ 5].m_col
R[ 5].k_sch
              25d1a9adbd11d168b63a338e4c4cc0b0
              d4d1c6f87c839d87caf2b8bc11f915bc
R[ 6].start
             f1006f55c1924cef7cc88b325db5d50c
R[ 6].s_box a163a8fc784f29df10e83d234cd503fe
R[ 6].s_row
              a14f3dfe78e803fc10d5a8df4c632923
R[ 6].m_col
R[ 6].k_sch
              4b868d6d2c4a8980339df4e837d218d8
              6d88a37a110b3efddbf98641ca0093fd
R[ 7].start
              260e2e173d41b77de86472a9fdd28b25
R[ 7].s_box
              f7ab31f02783a9ff9b4340d354b53d3f
R[ 7].s_row
              f783403f27433df09bb531ff54aba9d3
R [
   7].m_col
              1415b5bf461615ec274656d7342ad843
R[ 7].k_sch
              4e54f70e5f5fc9f384a64fb24ea6dc4f
R[ 8].start
              5a4142b11949dc1fa3e019657a8c040c
R[ 8].s_box
              be832cc8d43b86c00ae1d44dda64f2fe
R[ 8].s_row
R[ 8].m_col
              be3bd4fed4e1f2c80a642cc0da83864d
              00512fd1b1c889ff54766dcdfa1b99ea
R[ 8].k sch
              ead27321b58dbad2312bf5607f8d292f
R[ 9].start
              ea835cf00445332d655d98ad8596b0c5
R[ 9].s_box
              87ec4a8cf26ec3d84d4c46959790e7a6
   9].s_row
              876e46a6f24ce78c4d904ad897ecc395
RΓ
R[ 9].m_col
              473794ed40d4e4a5a3703aa64c9f42bc
R[ 9].k sch
              ac7766f319fadc2128d12941575c006e
R[10].start
              eb40f21e592e38848ba113e71bc342d2
              e9098972cb31075f3d327d94af2e2cb5
R[10].s_box
R[10].s_row
              e9317db5cb322c723d2e895faf090794
R[10].k_sch
              d014f9a8c9ee2589e13f0cc8b6630ca6
R[10].output
              3925841d02dc09fbdc118597196a0b32
DECRYPT
R[ 0].iinput
              3925841d02dc09fbdc118597196a0b32
R[ 0].ik_sch
              d014f9a8c9ee2589e13f0cc8b6630ca6
              e9317db5cb322c723d2e895faf090794
R[ 1].istart
              e9098972cb31075f3d327d94af2e2cb5
R[ 1].is_row
R[ 1].is_box
R[ 1].ik_sch
              eb40f21e592e38848ba113e71bc342d2
              ac7766f319fadc2128d12941575c006e
R[ 1].ik_add
              473794ed40d4e4a5a3703aa64c9f42bc
R[ 2].istart
              876e46a6f24ce78c4d904ad897ecc395
```

```
87ec4a8cf26ec3d84d4c46959790e7a6
R[ 2].is_row
R[ 2].is_box
              ea835cf00445332d655d98ad8596b0c5
R[ 2].ik_sch
R[ 2].ik_add
              ead27321b58dbad2312bf5607f8d292f
              00512fd1b1c889ff54766dcdfa1b99ea
R[ 3].istart
              be3bd4fed4e1f2c80a642cc0da83864d
R[ 3].is_row
              be832cc8d43b86c00ae1d44dda64f2fe
R[ 3].is_box
              5a4142b11949dc1fa3e019657a8c040c
   3].ik sch
              4e54f70e5f5fc9f384a64fb24ea6dc4f
R [
R[ 3].ik_ben
R[ 3].ik add
              1415b5bf461615ec274656d7342ad843
              f783403f27433df09bb531ff54aba9d3
R[ 4].istart
R[ 4].is_row
              f7ab31f02783a9ff9b4340d354b53d3f
R[ 4].is_box
               260e2e173d41b77de86472a9fdd28b25
R[ 4].ik_sch
               6d88a37a110b3efddbf98641ca0093fd
R[ 4].ik_add
              4b868d6d2c4a8980339df4e837d218d8
R[ 5].istart
              a14f3dfe78e803fc10d5a8df4c632923
R[ 5].is_row
              a163a8fc784f29df10e83d234cd503fe
R[ 5].is_box
R[ 5].ik_sch
              f1006f55c1924cef7cc88b325db5d50c
              d4d1c6f87c839d87caf2b8bc11f915bc
R[5].ik_add
              25d1a9adbd11d168b63a338e4c4cc0b0
R[ 6].istart
              elfb967ce8c8ae9b356cd2ba974ffb53
R[ 6].is_row
              e14fd29be8fbfbba35c89653976cae7c
R [
   6].is_box
              e0927fe8c86363c0d9b1355085b8be01
R[ 6].ik_sch
              ef44a541a8525b7fb671253bdb0bad00
R[ 6].ik_add
              0fd6daa9603138bf6fc0106b5eb31301
R[ 7].istart
              52a4c89485116a28e3cf2fd7f6505e07
R[ 7].is_row
R[ 7].is_box
              52502f2885a45ed7e311c807f6cf6a94
              486c4eee671d9d0d4de3b138d65f58e7
R[ 7].ik_sch
              3d80477d4716fe3e1e237e446d7a883b
R[ 7].ik_add
              75ec0993200b633353c0cf7cbb25d0dc
R[ 8].istart
              acc1d6b8efb55a7b1323cfdf457311b5
RΓ
   8].is_row
              ac73cf7befc111df13b5d6b545235ab8
R[ 8].is box
              aa8f5f0361dde3ef82d24ad26832469a
R[ 8].ik sch
              f2c295f27a96b9435935807a7359f67f
R[ 8].ik_add
              584dcaf11b4b5aacdbe7caa81b6bb0e5
R[ 9].istart
R[ 9].is_row
              49db873b453953897f02d2f177de961a
              49ded28945db96f17f39871a7702533b
R[ 9].is_box a49c7ff2689f352b6b5bea43026a5049
R[ 9].ik_sch
              a0fafe1788542cb123a339392a6c7605
R[ 9].ik_add
              046681e5e0cb199a48f8d37a2806264c
R[10].istart
              d4bf5d30e0b452aeb84111f11e2798e5
              d42711aee0bf98f1b8b45de51e415230
R[10].is_row
R[10].is box
              193de3bea0f4e22b9ac68d2ae9f84808
R[10].ik_sch
               2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c
R[10].ioutput 3243f6a8885a308d313198a2e0370734
DECRYPT (MOD)
R[ 0].iinput
              3925841d02dc09fbdc118597196a0b32
R[ 0].ik_sch
              d014f9a8c9ee2589e13f0cc8b6630ca6
              e9317db5cb322c723d2e895faf090794
R[ 1].istart
R[ 1].is_box
R[ 1].is_row
   1].is_box
              eb2e13d259a1421e8bc3f2841b4038e7
              eb40f21e592e38848ba113e71bc342d2
R[ 1].im_col
              8b151cc5e1550d72fda9c248f1a03821
R[ 1].ik_sch
              0c7b5a631319eafeb0398890664cfbb4
R[ 2].istart
              876e46a6f24ce78c4d904ad897ecc395
   2].is_box
              ea4598c5045db0f065965c2d858333ad
RΓ
R[ 2].is_row
              ea835cf00445332d655d98ad8596b0c5
R[ 2].im col
              614646a4cb834255a9444eae0cf6f569
              df7d925a1f62b09da320626ed6757324
R[ 2].ik_sch
R[ 3].istart R[ 3].is_box
              be3bd4fed4e1f2c80a642cc0da83864d
              5a49190c19e004b1a38c421f7a41dc65
R[ 3].is_row
              5a4142b11949dc1fa3e019657a8c040c
R[ 3].im_col
              e5433678e75c1f3727f7e30c21feb899
R[ 3].ik_sch
              12c07647c01f22c7bc42d2f37555114a
R[ 4].istart
R[ 4].is_box
               f783403f27433df09bb531ff54aba9d3
              264172253d648b17e8d22e7dfd0eb7a9
              260e2e173d41b77de86472a9fdd28b25
R[ 4].is row
              cfb3e588aa37577c6c8858eb8574ea9a
R[ 4].im_col
R[ 4].ik_sch
R[ 5].istart
              6efcd876d2df54807c5df034c917c3b9
  4].ik_sch
              a14f3dfe78e803fc10d5a8df4c632923
R[ 5].is_box
              f1928b0cc1c8d5557cb56fef5d004c32
R[ 5].is_row
              f1006f55c1924cef7cc88b325db5d50c
```

```
8f589c8054eb226d9bee760e2205c8de
R[ 5].im_col
R[ 5].ik_sch 6ea30afcbc238cf6ae82a4b4b54a338d
              e1fb967ce8c8ae9b356cd2ba974ffb53
R[ 6].istart
R[ 6].is_box
              e0633501c8b1bee8d9b87fc085926350
R[ 6].is_row
              e0927fe8c86363c0d9b1355085b8be01
R[ 6].im_col
              c22c8c875791ec22f16e0795ed98c93e
R[ 6].ik_sch
              90884413d280860a12a128421bc89739
              52a4c89485116a28e3cf2fd7f6505e07
RΓ
   7].istart
R[ 7].is box
             481db1e767e358ee4d5f4e0dd66c9d38
              486c4eee671d9d0d4de3b138d65f58e7
R[ 7].is row
              d0dec54fadbd9862d30261974c1aaece
R[ 7].im_col
R[ 7].ik_sch
              7c1f13f74208c219c021ae480969bf7b
R[ 8].istart
              acc1d6b8efb55a7b1323cfdf457311b5
R[ 8].is_box
              aadd4a9a61d2460382325fef688fe3d2
R[ 8].is_row
              aa8f5f0361dde3ef82d24ad26832469a
R[ 8].im_col
              85ae82d07b2e8267fd2bbea0be968729
R[ 8].ik_sch
R[ 9].istart
              cc7505eb3e17d1ee82296c51c9481133
              49db873b453953897f02d2f177de961a
R[ 9].is_box a49fea49685b50f26b6a7f2b029c3543
R[ 9].is_row
              a49c7ff2689f352b6b5bea43026a5049
R[ 9].im_col
R[ 9].ik_sch
              ff88559712d686ab047fac4e5546e587
              2b3708a7f262d405bc3ebdbf4b617d62
R[10].istart
              d4bf5d30e0b452aeb84111f11e2798e5
R[10].is_box
              19f48d08a0c648be9af8e32be93de22a
R[10].is_row
              193de3bea0f4e22b9ac68d2ae9f84808
              2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c
R[10].ik_sch
R[10].ioutput 3243f6a8885a308d313198a2e0370734
PLAINTEXT:
              3243f6a8885a308d313198a2e0370734 (pi * 2^124)
KEY:
              2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c ( e * 2^188)
              762e7160f38b4da5
ENCRYPT
R[ 0].input
              3243f6a8885a308d313198a2e0370734
R[ 0].k_sch
              2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c
R[ 1].start R[ 1].s_box
              193de3bea0f4e22b9ac68d2ae9f84808
              d42711aee0bf98f1b8b45de51e415230
R[ 1].s_row
              d4bf5d30e0b452aeb84111f11e2798e5
R[ 1].m_col
              046681e5e0cb199a48f8d37a2806264c
R[ 1].k_sch
              762e7160f38b4da5179d131b3f33c1bd
R [
   2].start
              7248f0851340543f5f65c0611735e7f1
R[ 2].s_box
              40528c977d092075cf4dbaeff09694a1
R[ 2].s row
              4009baa17d4d9497cf968c75f05220ef
R[ 2].m_col
              8026de2a2ed7a16bdd02c5bac2dbc8bc
R[ 2].k_sch
              94c4d4359d0b9b09eb25ea6918aea7cc
R [
   3].start
              14e20a1fb3dc3a6236272fd3da756f70
R[3].s_box
              fa9867c06d8680aa05cc1566579da851
R[ 3].s_row
              fa8615516dcca8c0059d67aa57988066
              3a83a524fdcdb1487b27b3bafb817e2d
R[ 3].m_col
R [
  3].k_sch
              f1c158b6cef2990b5a364d3ec73dd637
R[ 4].start
              cb42fd92333f28432111fe843cbca81a
R[ 4].s_box
              1f2c544fc375341afd82bb5feb65c2a2
R[ 4].s_row
              1f75bba2c382c24ffd65541aeb2c345f
R[4].m\_col
              b881fab08dce0f8000d11e19d2b04e80
  4].k_sch
              2c183c5e34b69b92bbd517ae75278ea5
RΓ
R[ 5].start
              9499c6eeb9789412bb0409b7a797c025
R[ 5].s box
              22eeb42856bc22c9eaf201a95c88ba3f
R[ 5].s_row
              22bc013f56f2ba28ea88b4c95cee22a9
              a57ddda53354b3e231ef51901a541661
R [
   5].m_col
R[ 5].k_sch
              2f11c39be82c15acc43429f2f082b260
R[ 6].start
              8a6c1e3edb78a64ef5db7862ead6a401
R[ 6].s_box
              7e5072b2b9bc242fe6b9bcaa87f6497c
              7ebcbc7cb9b949b2e6f6722f875024aa
R[ 6].s_row
              e3be257a42b95f5f8ba885eb6be17aa9
R [
   6].m_col
              a0e2c722d5c54987fad48a1c12f89fb0
   6].k_sch
R [
R[ 7].start
              435ce258977c16d8717c0ff77919e519
R [
   7].s_box
              1a4a986a88104761a3107668b6d4d9d4
              1a1076d48810d96aa3d49861b64a4768
R [
   7].s_row
  7].m_col
R [
              a67481fb88b28f9ec3c2ff708683ca1c
R[ 7].k_sch
              d6ccb642264e04229f1054d54ad51d52
R[ 8].start
              70b837b9aefc8bbc5cd2aba5cc56d74e
```

```
R[ 8].s_box
              516c9a56e4b03d654ab562064bb10e2f
R[ 8].s_row
              51b0622fe4b50e564ab19a654b6c3d06
R[ 8].m_col
R[ 8].k_sch
              24a3547f4fd1b720a3e37b3f19d25780
              b001974ea2f908fe7435bebc527bba9e
R[ 9].start
              94a2c331ed28bfded7d6c5834ba9ed1e
R[ 9].s_box
              223a2ec75534081d0ef6a6ecb3d35572
R[ 9].s_row
              2234a67255f655c70ed32e1db33a08ec
  9].m col
              ccc9d710399a5bc941dca6d5d733b63f
R [
R[ 9].k_sch
              9ee45fd5d43142876430d5c9c6c9dd37
R[10].start
              522d88c5edab194e25ec731c11fa6b08
              00d8c4a65562d42f3fce8f9c822d7f30
R[10].s_box
R[10].s_row
              00628f3055ce7fa63f2dc42f82d8d49c
R[10].m_{col}
              197e378d3af59419e21df0f624d256b2
R[10].k_sch
              b2fc638be087d915c9d106341de044b3
R[11].start
              ab825406da724d0c2bccf6c239321201
R[11].s_box
              6213206f5740e3fef14b42251223c97c
              6240427c574bc96ff12320fe1213e325
R[11].s_row
R[11].m_{col}
              3a58225cd5ee24a542298becd72fb38c
R[11].k sch
              79d0917abf194c4d0de52fc6ed62f6d3
R[12].start
              4388b3266af768e84fcca42a3a4d455f
R[12].s_box
              lac46df70268459b844b49e580e36ecf
R[12].s_row
              1a6849cf024b6ef784e36d9b80c445e5
R[12].k_sch
              e3936061fe7324d287a3b5a838baf9e5
R[12].output
             f9fb29aefc384a250340d833b87ebc00
DECRYPT
R[ 0].iinput
R[ 0].ik_sch
              f9fb29aefc384a250340d833b87ebc00
              e3936061fe7324d287a3b5a838baf9e5
R[ 1].istart
              1a6849cf024b6ef784e36d9b80c445e5
R[ 1].is_row
              lac46df70268459b844b49e580e36ecf
R[ 1].is_box
              4388b3266af768e84fcca42a3a4d455f
RΓ
   1].ik_sch
              79d0917abf194c4d0de52fc6ed62f6d3
R[1].ik add
              3a58225cd5ee24a542298becd72fb38c
R[ 2].istart
              6240427c574bc96ff12320fe1213e325
R[ 2].is_row
              6213206f5740e3fef14b42251223c97c
R[ 2].is_box
R[ 2].ik_sch
              ab825406da724d0c2bccf6c239321201
              b2fc638be087d915c9d106341de044b3
R[ 2].ik_add
             197e378d3af59419e21df0f624d256b2
R[ 3].istart
              00628f3055ce7fa63f2dc42f82d8d49c
R[ 3].is_row
              00d8c4a65562d42f3fce8f9c822d7f30
R [
   3].is_box
              522d88c5edab194e25ec731c11fa6b08
R[ 3].ik_sch
              9ee45fd5d43142876430d5c9c6c9dd37
R[ 3].ik add
              ccc9d710399a5bc941dca6d5d733b63f
R[ 4].istart
              2234a67255f655c70ed32e1db33a08ec
R[ 4].is_row
              223a2ec75534081d0ef6a6ecb3d35572
R[ 4].is box
              94a2c331ed28bfded7d6c5834ba9ed1e
R[ 4].ik_sch
             b001974ea2f908fe7435bebc527bba9e
R[ 4].ik_add
             24a3547f4fd1b720a3e37b3f19d25780
R[ 5].istart
              51b0622fe4b50e564ab19a654b6c3d06
R [
   5].is_row
              516c9a56e4b03d654ab562064bb10e2f
R[ 5].is_low
R[ 5].is_box
              70b837b9aefc8bbc5cd2aba5cc56d74e
R[5].ik_sch
              d6ccb642264e04229f1054d54ad51d52
R[5].ik_add
              a67481fb88b28f9ec3c2ff708683ca1c
R[ 6].istart
              1a1076d48810d96aa3d49861b64a4768
   6].is_row
              1a4a986a88104761a3107668b6d4d9d4
RΓ
R[ 6].is_box
              435ce258977c16d8717c0ff77919e519
R[ 6].ik sch
              a0e2c722d5c54987fad48a1c12f89fb0
R[ 6].ik_add
              e3be257a42b95f5f8ba885eb6be17aa9
              7ebcbc7cb9b949b2e6f6722f875024aa
R [
   7].istart
R[ 7].is_row
              7e5072b2b9bc242fe6b9bcaa87f6497c
R[ 7].is_box
              8a6c1e3edb78a64ef5db7862ead6a401
R[ 7].ik_sch
              2f11c39be82c15acc43429f2f082b260
              a57ddda53354b3e231ef51901a541661
R[ 7].ik_add
              22bc013f56f2ba28ea88b4c95cee22a9
R [
   8].istart
R[ 8].is_row
              22eeb42856bc22c9eaf201a95c88ba3f
R[ 8].is box
              9499c6eeb9789412bb0409b7a797c025
              2c183c5e34b69b92bbd517ae75278ea5
R[ 8].ik_sch
R[ 8].ik_add R[ 9].istart
              b881fab08dce0f8000d11e19d2b04e80
              1f75bba2c382c24ffd65541aeb2c345f
R[ 9].is_row
              1f2c544fc375341afd82bb5feb65c2a2
R[ 9].is_box
              cb42fd92333f28432111fe843cbca81a
```

```
f1c158b6cef2990b5a364d3ec73dd637
R[ 9].ik_sch
R[ 9].ik_add
              3a83a524fdcdb1487b27b3bafb817e2d
              fa8615516dcca8c0059d67aa57988066
R[10].istart
R[10].is_row
              fa9867c06d8680aa05cc1566579da851
R[10].is_box
              14e20a1fb3dc3a6236272fd3da756f70
R[10].ik_sch
              94c4d4359d0b9b09eb25ea6918aea7cc
R[10].ik_add
              8026de2a2ed7a16bdd02c5bac2dbc8bc
R[11].istart
              4009baa17d4d9497cf968c75f05220ef
R[11].is_row
              40528c977d092075cf4dbaeff09694a1
              7248f0851340543f5f65c0611735e7f1
R[11].is box
R[11].ik_sch
              762e7160f38b4da5179d131b3f33c1bd
R[11].ik_add
              046681e5e0cb199a48f8d37a2806264c
R[12].istart
              d4bf5d30e0b452aeb84111f11e2798e5
R[12].is_row
              d42711aee0bf98f1b8b45de51e415230
R[12].is_box
              193de3bea0f4e22b9ac68d2ae9f84808
R[12].ik_sch
              2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c
R[12].ioutput 3243f6a8885a308d313198a2e0370734
DECRYPT (MOD)
R[ 0].iinput
              f9fb29aefc384a250340d833b87ebc00
R[ 0].ik_sch
              e3936061fe7324d287a3b5a838baf9e5
R[ 1].istart
              1a6849cf024b6ef784e36d9b80c445e5
R [
  1].is_box
              43f7a45f6acc45264f4db3e83a88682a
R[ 1].is_row
              4388b3266af768e84fcca42a3a4d455f
R[ 1].im_col
              bbe8f7fab65b8e7eb6cc47301b3dbef5
R[ 1].ik_sch
              d9a8b586e110471147ef67ce092e5dd0
R[ 2].istart R[ 2].is_box
              6240427c574bc96ff12320fe1213e325
              ab72f601dacc12062b32540c39824dc2
R[ 2].is_row
              ab825406da724d0c2bccf6c239321201
R[ 2].im_col
              a69dafef1b0f45b8b691d6225b664065
R[ 2].ik_sch
              a6ff20df4ec13a1e89bc120dd9be94f9
RΓ
   3].istart
              00628f3055ce7fa63f2dc42f82d8d49c
R[ 3].is box
              52ab7308edec6bc525fa884e112d191c
R[ 3].is row
              522d88c5edab194e25ec731c11fa6b08
R[ 3].im_col
              5048eec405f4d3330ec50f628b82fa7b
R[ 3].ik_sch
R[ 4].istart
              727c48b6500286f40016217f38b8f297
              2234a67255f655c70ed32e1db33a08ec
R[ 4].is_box
              9428c51eedd6ed31d7a9c3de4ba2bf83
R[ 4].is_row
              94a2c331ed28bfded7d6c5834ba9ed1e
R[ 4].im_col
              01a4c5a4dc1bddbed4f6482da35227c7
R[ 4].ik_sch
              5014a78b38aed3e89e47d248e83e1ac1
R[ 5].istart
              51b0622fe4b50e564ab19a654b6c3d06
              70fcab4eaed2d7b95c5637bcccb88ba5
R[5].is box
R[ 5].is_row
              70b837b9aefc8bbc5cd2aba5cc56d74e
R[ 5].im_col
              bcf97774fe6911e3460baa679434892a
R[5].ik_sch
              a6e901a07679c889e5df3206227ece42
R[ 6].istart
              1a1076d48810d96aa3d49861b64a4768
R[ 6].is_box
              437c0f19977ce5587119e2d8795c16f7
R[ 6].is_row
              435ce258977c16d8717c0ff77919e519
R[ 6].im_col
R[ 6].ik_sch
              35d1c5847e18b5f6949c1be6efea50c9
              4b6d79f8c7a1fc44726a69c968ba7463
R[ 7].istart
              7ebcbc7cb9b949b2e6f6722f875024aa
R[ 7].is_box
              8a787801dbdba43ef5d61e4eea6ca662
R[ 7].is_row
              8a6c1e3edb78a64ef5db7862ead6a401
   7].im_col
              977794b24c22a78224dbc10a8c7eeb80
RΓ
R[ 7].ik_sch
              b5cb958d1ad01daace5375c3d090c929
R[ 8].istart
              22bc013f56f2ba28ea88b4c95cee22a9
              94780925b904c0eebb97c612a79994b7
R[ 8].is_box
R[ 8].is_row R[ 8].im_col
              9499c6eeb9789412bb0409b7a797c025
              cbf6d3cbdd417ea529ed995c67e0b1e3
R[ 8].ik_sch
              d48368691ec3bcead488cd468ccc85bc
R[ 9].istart
              1f75bba2c382c24ffd65541aeb2c345f
R[ 9].is_box
              cb3ffe1a3311a89221bcfd433c422884
              cb42fd92333f28432111fe843cbca81a
R [
   9].is_row
R[ 9].im_col
              8ddd6cda3588e03a3c9a779bf8830841
R[ 9].ik sch
              775b798b584448fa39071031af1b8827
R[10].istart
              fa8615516dcca8c0059d67aa57988066
              14dc2f70b3276f1f36750a62dae23ad3
R[10].is_box
R[10].is_row
              14e20a1fb3dc3a6236272fd3da756f70
R[10].im_col
              214ae26aeb510c81b40e6c3b3a12f46c
R[10].ik_sch
              614358cb961c98167b98e04eca40d483
```

```
4009baa17d4d9497cf968c75f05220ef
R[11].istart
R[11].is_box
              7240c0f11365e7855f35f03f17485461
              7248f0851340543f5f65c0611735e7f1
R[11].is_row
R[11].im\_col
              393b2568516c66634e0bfc223138a994
R[11].ik_sch
             ed847858b1d834cdf64aedd32f1f3171
R[12].istart
              d4bf5d30e0b452aeb84111f11e2798e5
              19f48d08a0c648be9af8e32be93de22a
R[12].is_box
              193de3bea0f4e22b9ac68d2ae9f84808
R[12].is_row
              2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c
R[12].ik_sch
R[12].ioutput 3243f6a8885a308d313198a2e0370734
PLAINTEXT:
              3243f6a8885a308d313198a2e0370734 (pi * 2^124)
              2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c ( e * 2^252)
KEY:
              762e7160f38b4da56a784d9045190cfe
ENCRYPT
R[ 0].input
              3243f6a8885a308d313198a2e0370734
R[ 0].k_sch
R[ 1].start
              2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c
              193de3bea0f4e22b9ac68d2ae9f84808
R[ 1].s_box
              d42711aee0bf98f1b8b45de51e415230
R[ 1].s_row
              d4bf5d30e0b452aeb84111f11e2798e5
R[ 1].m_col
              046681e5e0cb199a48f8d37a2806264c
R [
   1].k_sch
              762e7160f38b4da56a784d9045190cfe
R[ 2].start
              7248f0851340543f22809eea6d1f2ab2
R[ 2].s_box
              40528c977d09207593cd0b873cc0e537
R[ 2].s_row
              40090b377dcde59793c08c753c522087
R[ 2].m_col
R[ 2].k_sch
              a77806acc45fc39a9ff2cf08297fbc23
              fe80ae78d62e7cde7dd969567416266a
R[ 3].start
              59f8a8d41271bf44e22ba65e5d699a49
R[ 3].s_box
              cb41c248c9a3081b98f124584cf9b83b
R[ 3].s_row
              cba3243bc9f1b84898f9c21b4c410858
RΓ
   3].m_col
              6cc16db771ab8b99e237d3be0b8ef52d
R[ 3].k_sch
              e469866217e2cbc77d9a865738838aa9
              88a8ebd56649405e9fad55e9330d7f84
R[ 4].start
R[ 4].s_box
              c4c2e903333b0958db95fc1ec3d7d25f
R[ 4].s_row
R[ 4].m_col
              c43bfc5f3395d203dbd7e958c3c2091e
              7df2fd2e136c1c147e162df8d75931a9
R[ 4].k_sch
              10fe7d7fc6d001a1bb0968f7cf1f4e9d
R[ 5].start
              6d0c8051d5bc1db5c51f450f18467f34
R[ 5].s_box
              3cfecdd10365a4d5a6c06e76ad5ad218
R [
   5].s_row
              3c656e1803c0d2d1a65acdd5adfea476
R[ 5].m_col
              a15cad7f5e2414aea18b19d78acb9a5a
R[ 5].k sch
              6ea9a93c794b62fb04d1e4ac3c526e05
R[ 6].start
              cff50443276f7655a55afd7bb699f45f
R[ 6].s_box
              8ae6f21acca838fc06be54214eeebfcf
   6].s_row
              8aa854cfccbebf1a06eef2fc4ee63821
R [
R[ 6].m_col
              77f2c0fcff6b397a2b3008f5b4f0bb4e
R[ 6].k_sch
              14611694d2b1173569b87fc2a6a7315f
              6393d6682dda2e4f4288773712578a11
R[ 7].start
R [
   7].s_box
              fbdcf645d85731842cc4f59ac95b7e82
R[ 7].s_row
              fb57f582d8c47e452c5bf684c9dc319a
R[ 7].m_col
              63d3c0abc78c2f43c71f17ca5da3c282
R[ 7].k_sch
              4af56ef333be0c08376fe8a40b3d86a1
R[ 8].start
              2926ae58f432234bf070ff6e569e4423
   8].s_box
              a5f7e46abf2326b38c51169fb10b1b26
RΓ
R[ 8].s_row
              a5231626bf511b6a8c0be4b3b1f7269f
R[ 8].m col
              04ffc08de75a6644491e9a1dc2b1b03c
              3b2524bfe994338a802c4c48268b7d17
R[ 8].k_sch
              3fdae4320ece55cec932d655e43acd2b
R [
   9].start
R[ 9].s_box
              75576923ab8bfc8bdd23f6fc6980bdf1
R[ 9].s_row
              758bf6f1ab23bd23dd80698b6957fcfc
R[ 9].m_col
              6b88011bb6128c3ed8f609982b24c2f3
              bdc891038e769d0bb91975afb224f30e
R[ 9].k_sch
R[10].start
              d64090183864113561ef7c37990031fd
R[10].s_box
              f60960ad07438296efdf109aee63c754
R[10].s row
              f643105407dfc7adef636096ee09829a
              761469fa1e5da150961fed1ec4fb4d8d
R[10].m_{col}
              1d288f88f4bcbc027490f04a521b8d5d
R[10].k_sch
R[11].start
              6b3ce672eae11d52e28f1d5496e0c0d0
R[11].s\_box
              7feb8e4087f8a4009873a42090e1ba70
R[11].s_row
              7ff8a4708773ba4098e18e0090eba420
```

```
3913443d7af45bdb9dc87edc998a48a4
R[11].m_{col}
R[11].k_sch
              bd67cc4f331151448a0824eb382cd7e5
              8474887249e50a9f17c05a37a1a69f41
R[12].start
R[12].s_box
              5f92c4403bd967dbf0babe9a3224db83
R[12].s_row
              5fd9be833bbadb40f024c4db3292679a
R[12].m_{col}
              f3ac7f9b3862ecac88343146343edb8c
              4c26568fb89aea8dcc0a1ac79e11979a
R[12].k\_sch
R[13].start
              bf8a291480f80621443e2b81aa2f4c16
R[13].s_box
              087ea5facd416ffd1bb2f10cac152947
              0841f147cdb229fa1b15a5fdac7e6f0c
R[13].s row
R[13].m_{col}
              65c579269f3338385138437ca2ed18e6
R[13].k_sch
              b6e544f785f415b30ffc315837d0e6bd
R[14].start
              d3203dd11ac72d8b5ec47224953dfe5b
R[14].s_box
              66b7273ea2c6d83d581c40362a27bb39
R[14].s_row
              66c64039a21cbb3e5827273d2ab7d836
R[14].k_sch
              7ca82c15c432c6980838dc5f96294bc5
              1a6e6c2c662e7da6501ffb62bc9e93f3
R[14].output
DECRYPT
R[ 0].iinput
              1a6e6c2c662e7da6501ffb62bc9e93f3
R[ 0].ik_sch
              7ca82c15c432c6980838dc5f96294bc5
R[ 1].istart
              66c64039a21cbb3e5827273d2ab7d836
   1].is_row
              66b7273ea2c6d83d581c40362a27bb39
R[ 1].is_box
              d3203dd11ac72d8b5ec47224953dfe5b
R[ 1].ik_sch
             b6e544f785f415b30ffc315837d0e6bd
R[ 1].ik_add
             65c579269f3338385138437ca2ed18e6
R[ 2].istart R[ 2].is_row
              0841f147cdb229fa1b15a5fdac7e6f0c
              087ea5facd416ffd1bb2f10cac152947
R[ 2].is_box
              bf8a291480f80621443e2b81aa2f4c16
R[ 2].ik_sch
              4c26568fb89aea8dcc0a1ac79e11979a
R[ 2].ik_add
              f3ac7f9b3862ecac88343146343edb8c
RΓ
   3].istart
              5fd9be833bbadb40f024c4db3292679a
R[ 3].is_row
              5f92c4403bd967dbf0babe9a3224db83
R[ 3].is box
              8474887249e50a9f17c05a37a1a69f41
R[ 3].ik_sch
             bd67cc4f331151448a0824eb382cd7e5
R[ 3].ik_add R[ 4].istart
              3913443d7af45bdb9dc87edc998a48a4
              7ff8a4708773ba4098e18e0090eba420
R[ 4].is_row
              7feb8e4087f8a4009873a42090e1ba70
R[ 4].is_box
              6b3ce672eae11d52e28f1d5496e0c0d0
R[ 4].ik_sch
              1d288f88f4bcbc027490f04a521b8d5d
R [
  4].ik_add
              761469fa1e5da150961fed1ec4fb4d8d
R[ 5].istart
              f643105407dfc7adef636096ee09829a
R[ 5].is row
              f60960ad07438296efdf109aee63c754
R[ 5].is_box
             d64090183864113561ef7c37990031fd
R[ 5].ik_sch
              bdc891038e769d0bb91975afb224f30e
R[5].ik_add
              6b88011bb6128c3ed8f609982b24c2f3
R[ 6].istart
              758bf6f1ab23bd23dd80698b6957fcfc
R[ 6].is_row
              75576923ab8bfc8bdd23f6fc6980bdf1
R[ 6].is_box
              3fdae4320ece55cec932d655e43acd2b
R[ 6].ik_sch
R[ 6].ik_add
              3b2524bfe994338a802c4c48268b7d17
              04ffc08de75a6644491e9a1dc2b1b03c
R[ 7].istart
              a5231626bf511b6a8c0be4b3b1f7269f
R[ 7].is_row
              a5f7e46abf2326b38c51169fb10b1b26
R[ 7].is_box
              2926ae58f432234bf070ff6e569e4423
   7].ik_sch
              4af56ef333be0c08376fe8a40b3d86a1
RΓ
R[ 7].ik_add
              63d3c0abc78c2f43c71f17ca5da3c282
R[ 8].istart
              fb57f582d8c47e452c5bf684c9dc319a
              fbdcf645d85731842cc4f59ac95b7e82
R[ 8].is_row
R[ 8].is_box
R[ 8].ik_sch
              6393d6682dda2e4f4288773712578a11
              14611694d2b1173569b87fc2a6a7315f
R[ 8].ik_add
              77f2c0fcff6b397a2b3008f5b4f0bb4e
R[ 9].istart
              8aa854cfccbebf1a06eef2fc4ee63821
R[ 9].is_row
              8ae6f21acca838fc06be54214eeebfcf
              cff50443276f7655a55afd7bb699f45f
R [
   9].is_box
R[ 9].ik_sch
              6ea9a93c794b62fb04d1e4ac3c526e05
R[ 9].ik add
              a15cad7f5e2414aea18b19d78acb9a5a
              3c656e1803c0d2d1a65acdd5adfea476
R[10].istart
              3cfecdd10365a4d5a6c06e76ad5ad218
R[10].is_row
R[10].is_box
              6d0c8051d5bc1db5c51f450f18467f34
R[10].ik_sch
              10fe7d7fc6d001a1bb0968f7cf1f4e9d
R[10].ik_add
              7df2fd2e136c1c147e162df8d75931a9
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c43bfc5f3395d203dbd7e958c3c2091e
R[11].istart
R[11].is_row
              c4c2e903333b0958db95fc1ec3d7d25f
              88a8ebd56649405e9fad55e9330d7f84
R[11].is_box
R[11].ik_sch
              e469866217e2cbc77d9a865738838aa9
R[11].ik_add
              6cc16db771ab8b99e237d3be0b8ef52d
R[12].istart
              cba3243bc9f1b84898f9c21b4c410858
R[12].is_row
              cb41c248c9a3081b98f124584cf9b83b
              59f8a8d41271bf44e22ba65e5d699a49
R[12].is box
R[12].ik_sch
             fe80ae78d62e7cde7dd969567416266a
R[12].ik add a77806acc45fc39a9ff2cf08297fbc23
R[13].istart
              40090b377dcde59793c08c753c522087
R[13].is_row
              40528c977d09207593cd0b873cc0e537
R[13].is_box
              7248f0851340543f22809eea6d1f2ab2
R[13].ik_sch
              762e7160f38b4da56a784d9045190cfe
R[13].ik_add
              046681e5e0cb199a48f8d37a2806264c
R[14].istart
              d4bf5d30e0b452aeb84111f11e2798e5
              d42711aee0bf98f1b8b45de51e415230
R[14].is_row
R[14].is_box
              193de3bea0f4e22b9ac68d2ae9f84808
R[14].ik sch
              2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c
R[14].ioutput 3243f6a8885a308d313198a2e0370734
DECRYPT (MOD)
R[ 0].iinput
              1a6e6c2c662e7da6501ffb62bc9e93f3
              7ca82c15c432c6980838dc5f96294bc5
R[ 0].ik_sch
R[ 1].istart
              66c64039a21cbb3e5827273d2ab7d836
R[ 1].is_box
              d3c7725b1ac4fed15e3d3d8b95202d24
R[ 1].is_row R[ 1].im_col
              d3203dd11ac72d8b5ec47224953dfe5b
              5c148cdbe9ad281737e8988b0c467d3a
R[ 1].ik_sch
              54557d9c241f01ed2cfd3d76a0381236
R[ 2].istart
              0841f147cdb229fa1b15a5fdac7e6f0c
R[ 2].is_box
              bff82b16803e4c14442f2921aa8a0681
RΓ
   2].is_row
              bf8a291480f80621443e2b81aa2f4c16
R[ 2].im col
              f3d1755fcfc7f7a01dd4c9d0737030ec
R[ 2].ik sch
              ac08cbdcf47d2ce0edf00d0b41e25776
R[ 3].istart
              5fd9be833bbadb40f024c4db3292679a
R[ 3].is_box
R[ 3].is_row
              84e55a4149c09f7217a6889fa1740a37
              8474887249e50a9f17c05a37a1a69f41
R[ 3].im_col
              15d50dc7f739c6319003b29b1c2e8b60
R[ 3].ik_sch
              6a2da9b7704a7c7108e23c9b8cc52f40
R[ 4].istart
              7ff8a4708773ba4098e18e0090eba420
R[ 4].is_box
R[ 4].is_row
              6be11dd0ea8fc072e2e0e652963c1d54
              6b3ce672eae11d52e28f1d5496e0c0d0
              463156e25faa2091f6ee417d421bd8e7
R[ 4].im col
R[ 4].ik_sch b07246b65875e73c198d21ebac125a7d
R[ 5].istart
              f643105407dfc7adef636096ee09829a
R[ 5].is_box
              d6647cfd38ef31186100903599401137
R[ 5].is_row
             d64090183864113561ef7c37990031fd
R[ 5].im_col
              0c6e760ab14468e5a5282961ed70ef27
R[ 5].ik_sch
              79e580fb1a67d5c678a840ea842713db
R[ 6].istart
R[ 6].is_box
              758bf6f1ab23bd23dd80698b6957fcfc
              3fced62b0e32cd32c93ae4cee4da5555
              3fdae4320ece55cec932d655e43acd2b
R[ 6].is_row
R[ 6].im_col
              1f9ba2155756bae0cdf3226404685d09
              bab8b433e807a18a41f8c6d7b59f7b96
R[ 6].ik_sch
   7].istart
              a5231626bf511b6a8c0be4b3b1f7269f
RΓ
R[ 7].is_box
              2932ff23f4704458f09eae4b5626236e
R[ 7].is row
              2926ae58f432234bf070ff6e569e4423
R[ 7].im_col
              6dbe0329bb462b784e9463a8355362ab
   7].ik_sch
              96e9f6ab6382553d62cf952cfc8f5331
R [
R[ 8].istart
              fb57f582d8c47e452c5bf684c9dc319a
R[ 8].is_box
              63da77112d888a684257d64f12932e37
R[ 8].is_row
              6393d6682dda2e4f4288773712578a11
              72d05bb79e01aaa3af1195a1ba818560
R[ 8].im_col
              f8780f7852bf15b9a9ff675df467bd41
R [
   8].ik_sch
R[ 9].istart
              8aa854cfccbebf1a06eef2fc4ee63821
R[ 9].is box
              cf6ffd5f275af443a5990455b6f5767b
R[ 9].is_row
              cff50443276f7655a55afd7bb699f45f
R[ 9].im_col
R[ 9].ik_sch
              025a3316f6ab7147a7170dc433be626b
   9].im_col
              3e3f5d0ef56ba396014dc0119e40c61d
R[10].istart
              3c656e1803c0d2d1a65acdd5adfea476
R[10].is_box
              6dbc4534d51f7f51c54680b5180c1d0f
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R[10].is_row	6d0c8051d5bc1db5c51f450f18467f34
R[10].im_col	7127e7019952c8c220979bbc9e5ad302
R[10].ik_sch	b51c1b5eaac71ac1fb4072e45d98da1c
R[11].istart	c43bfc5f3395d203dbd7e958c3c2091e
R[11].is box	8849558466ad7fd59f0deb5e33a840e9
R[11].is_row	88a8ebd56649405e9fad55e9330d7f84
R[11].im_col	b12fee6e02a546d06cdfa19cd34c0e54
R[11].ik sch	7a8cca55cb54fe98f42663879f0d060c
R[12].istart	cba3243bc9f1b84898f9c21b4c410858
R[12].is box	5971a649122b9ad4e269a8445df8bf5e
R[12].is row	59f8a8d41271bf44e22ba65e5d699a49
$R[12].im_col$	8687d60a6216e408c247e4509a8a887f
R[12].ik_sch	c68edd3d1fdb019f51876825a6d8a8f8
R[13].istart	40090b377dcde59793c08c753c522087
R[13].is_box	72409eb213802a85221ff03f6d4854ea
R[13].is_row	7248f0851340543f22809eea6d1f2ab2
R[13].im_col	393b2568516c666387338cee750cfd6e
R[13].ik_sch	ed847858b1d834cd3f729d1f6b2b658b
R[14].istart	d4bf5d30e0b452aeb84111f11e2798e5
R[14].is box	19f48d08a0c648be9af8e32be93de22a
R[14].is_row	193de3bea0f4e22b9ac68d2ae9f84808
R[14].ik_sch	2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c
R[14].ioutput	3243f6a8885a308d313198a2e0370734