# Zcash Protocol Specification

Sean Bowe — Daira Hopwood

December 16, 2015

### 1 Introduction

**Zcash** is an implementation of the *decentralized anonymous payment* (DAP) scheme **Zerocash** with minor adjustments to terminology, functionality and performance. It bridges the existing value transfer scheme used by Bitcoin with an anonymous payment scheme protected by zero-knowledge succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (**zk-SNARK**s).

## 2 Concepts

### 2.1 Integers and Endianness

Abstractly, integers have a signedness (signed or unsigned), and a bit length. The limits are the same as for the usual two's compliment system. All integers in the publicly-visible **Zcash** protocol are encoded in big endian two's compliment.

If unspecified, curve points, field elements, etc., are encoded according to the crypto libraries the **Zcash** implementation uses.

## 2.2 Cryptographic Functions

 ${f CRH}$  is a collision-resistant hash function. In  ${f Zcash}$ , the SHA-256 compression function is used which takes a 512-bit block and produces a 256-bit hash. This is different from the SHA-256 function, which hashes arbitrary-length strings.

 $\mathbf{PRF_{x}^{addr}}$ ,  $\mathbf{PRF_{x}^{sn}}$ , and  $\mathbf{PRF_{x}^{pk_{i}}}$ . It is required that  $\mathbf{PRF_{x}^{sn}}$  be collision-resistant in order to prevent a double-spending attack. In  $\mathbf{Zcash}$ , the  $\mathit{SHA-256}$  compression function is used to seed all three of these functions. The bits 00, 01 and 10 are included (respectively) within the blocks that are hashed, ensuring that the functions are independent.

### 2.3 Confidential Address Keypair


A keypair  $(addr_{pk}, addr_{sk})$  is generated by a user any time they wish to receive value from another in the system. The public  $addr_{pk}$  is called a *protected address* and is a tuple  $(a_{pk}, pk_{enc})$  which are the public components of a *spend authority* keypair  $(a_{pk}, a_{sk})$  and a *key-private encryption* keypair  $(pk_{enc}, sk_{enc})$ . The private  $addr_{sk}$  is called a *protected address secret* and is a tuple  $(a_{sk}, sk_{enc})$  which are the respective *private* components of the aforementioned *spend authority* and *key-private encryption* keypairs.

#### 2.4 Buckets

A bucket (denoted b) is a tuple  $(v, a_{pk_i}, r, \rho)$  which represents that a value v is spendable by the recipient who holds the *spend authority* keypair  $(a_{pk}, a_{sk})$ . r and  $\rho$  are randomly generated tokens which are used to blind the value and recipient *except* to those who possess these tokens.

In-band secret distribution In order to send the secret v, r and  $\rho$  to the recipient (necessary for the recipient to later spend) without requiring an out-of-band communication channel, the key-private encryption public key  $pk_{enc}$  is used to encrypt these secrets to form an encrypted bucket. The recipient's possession of the associated  $(addr_{pk}, addr_{sk})$  (which contains both  $a_{pk}$  and  $sk_{enc}$ ) is used to reconstruct the original bucket.


Bucket commitments The underlying v and  $a_{pk}$  are blinded with r and  $\rho$  using the collision-resistant hash function  $\mathbf{CRH}$  in a multi-layered process. The resulting hash bm is called a bucket commitment.



We say that the bucket commitment of a bucket b is bm = BucketCommitment(b).

**Serials** A serial sn is produced by  $\mathbf{PRF}^{\mathbf{sn}}_{a_{\mathsf{sk}}}(\rho)$ . Part of the process of spending a bucket is disclosing this serial without disclosing either  $\rho$  or  $a_{\mathsf{sk}}$ . This allows it to be used to prevent double-spending.

### 2.5 Bucket Commitment Tree



The bucket commitment tree is an *incremental merkle tree* of depth d used to store bucket commitments that transactions produce. Just as the *unspent transaction output set* (UTXO) used in Bitcoin proper, it is used to express the existence of value and the capability to spend it. However, unlike the UTXO, it is *not* the job of this tree to protect against double-spending, as it is append-only.

Blocks in the blockchain are associated (by all nodes) with the root of this tree after all of its constituent transactions' bucket commitments have been entered into the tree associated with the previous block.

### 2.6 Spent Serials Map

Transactions insert serials into a *spent serials map* which is maintained alongside the UTXO by all nodes. Transactions that attempt to insert a serial into this map that already exists within it are invalid as they are attempting to double-spend.

### 2.7 Bitcoin Transactions

Bitcoin transactions consist of a vector of inputs (vin) and a vector of outputs (vout). Inputs and outputs are associated with a value. The total value of the outputs must not exceed the total value of the inputs.

**Value pool** Transaction inputs insert value into a *value pool*, and transaction outputs remove value from this pool. The remaining value in the pool is available to miners as a fee.

### 3 Pour

Pours are the primary operations performed by transactions that interact with our scheme. In principle, it is the action of spending  $N_{Old}$  buckets  $b^{old}$  and creating  $N_{New}$  buckets  $b^{new}$ . **Zcash** transactions have an additional field **vpour**, which is a vector of **Pours**. Each **Pour** consists of:

vpub\_old which is a value vpub<sub>old</sub> that the pour removes from the value pool.

vpub\_new which is a value vpub\_new that the pour inserts into the value pool.

anchor which is a merkle root rt of the bucket commitment tree at some block height in the past, or the merkle root produced by a previous pour in this transaction. (TODO: clarify this)

scriptSig which is a Bitcoin script which creates conditions for acceptance of a Pour in a transaction. The SHA256Compress hash of this value is  $h_{Sig}$ .

scriptPubKey which is a Bitcoin script used to satisfy the conditions of the scriptSig.

serials which is an  $N_{Old}$  size vector of serials  $\mathsf{sn}_1^{old},\mathsf{sn}_2^{old},...,\mathsf{sn}_{N_{Old}}^{old}$ 

commitments which is a  $N_{New}$  size vector of bucket commitments  $\mathtt{bm}_1^{new}, \mathtt{bm}_2^{new}, ..., \mathtt{bm}_{N_{New}}^{new}$ .

encrypted\_buckets which is a  $N_{New}$  size vector of encrypted buckets.

vmacs which is a  $N_{Old}$  size vector of message authentication codes h which bind  $h_{Sig}$  to each  $a_{sk}$  of the Pour.

zkproof which is the zero-knowledge proof  $\pi_{POUR}$ .

Merkle root validity A Pour is valid if rt is a bucket commitment tree root found in either the blockchain or a merkle root produced by inserting the bucket commitments of a previous Pour in the transaction to the bucket commitment tree identified by that previous Pour's anchor.

Non-malleability A Pour is valid if the script formed by appending scriptPubKey to scriptSig returns true. The scriptSig is cryptographically bound to  $\pi_{POUR}$ .

Balance A Pour can be seen, from the perspective of the transaction, as an input and an output simultaneously. vpub\_old takes value from the value pool and vpub\_new adds value to the value pool. As a result, vpub\_old is treated like an *output* value, whereas vpub\_new is treated like an *input* value.

Commitments and Serials Transactions which contain Pours, when entered into the blockchain, append to the bucket commitment tree with all constituent bucket commitments. All of the constituent serials are also entered into the spent serials map of the blockchain *and* mempool. Transactions are not valid if they attempt to add a serial to the spent serials map that already exists.

### 3.1 $\pi_{POUR}$

In **Zcash**,  $N_{Old}$  and  $N_{New}$  are both 2.

A valid instance of  $\pi_{\text{POUR}}$  assures that given a  $primary\ input\ (\text{rt},\ \text{sn}_1^{old},\ \text{sn}_2^{old},\ \text{bm}_1^{new},\ \text{bm}_2^{new},\ \text{vpub}_{\text{old}},\ \text{vpub}_{\text{new}},\ \text{h}_{\text{Sig}},\ h_1,\ h_2),\ a\ \text{witness}\ of\ auxiliary\ input\ (\text{path}_1,\ \text{path}_2,\ \text{b}_1^{\text{old}},\ \text{b}_2^{\text{old}},\ \text{a}_{\text{sk}}_2^{old},\ \text{a}_{\text{sk}}_2^{\text{old}},\ \text{b}_1^{\text{new}},\ \text{b}_2^{\text{new}})\ \text{exists},\ \text{where:}$ 

$$\begin{split} \text{for each } i \in \{1,2\} \text{: } \mathsf{b}_{\mathsf{i}}^{\mathsf{old}} &= (\mathsf{v}_{\mathsf{i}}^{\mathsf{old}}, \mathsf{a}_{\mathsf{pk}_i}{}^{old}, \mathsf{r}_i^{old}, \rho_i^{old}) \\ \text{for each } i \in \{1,2\} \text{: } \mathsf{b}_{\mathsf{i}}^{\mathsf{new}} &= (\mathsf{v}_{\mathsf{i}}^{\mathsf{new}}, \mathsf{a}_{\mathsf{pk}_i}{}^{new}, \mathsf{r}_i^{new}, \rho_i^{new}). \end{split}$$

The following conditions hold:

**Merkle path validity** for each  $i \in \{1,2\} \mid \mathsf{v}_\mathsf{i}^\mathsf{old} \neq 0$ :  $\mathsf{path}_\mathsf{i}$  must be a valid path of depth d from  $\mathsf{BucketCommitment}(\mathsf{b}_\mathsf{i}^\mathsf{old})$  to bucket commitment merkle tree root rt.

 $\mathbf{Balance} \quad \mathsf{vpub}_{\mathsf{old}} + \mathsf{v}_1^{\mathsf{old}} + \mathsf{v}_2^{\mathsf{old}} = \mathsf{vpub}_{\mathsf{new}} + \mathsf{v}_1^{\mathsf{new}} + \mathsf{v}_2^{\mathsf{new}}.$ 

 $\textbf{Serial integrity} \quad \text{for each } i \in \{1,2\} \colon \mathbf{PRF^{sn}_{\mathsf{a_{\mathsf{sk}}},\mathsf{id}}}(\rho_i^{old}) = \mathsf{sn}_i^{old}.$ 

 $\mathbf{Spend} \ \mathbf{authority} \quad \text{for each } i \in \{1,2\} \colon \, \mathsf{a_{pk}}_i^{old} = \mathbf{PRF}^{\mathbf{addr}}_{\mathsf{a_{sk_i}old}}(0).$ 

Non-malleability for each  $i \in \{1, 2\}$ :  $h_i = \mathbf{PRF}_{\mathbf{a_{sk_i}^{iold}}}^{\mathbf{pk_{i-1}}}(\mathbf{h_{Sig}})$ 

Commitment integrity for each  $i \in \{1,2\}$ :  $bm_i^{new} = BucketCommitment(b_i^{new})$ 

# 4 Encoding addresses, private keys, buckets, and pours

This section describes how **Zcash** encodes public addresses, private keys, buckets, and pours.

Addresses, keys, and buckets, can be encoded as a byte string; this is called the *raw encoding*. This byte string can then be further encoded using Base58Check. The Base58Check layer is the same as for upstream Bitcoin addresses.

SHA-256 compression function outputs are always represented as strings of 32 bytes.

The language consisting of the following encoding possibilities is prefix-free.

### 4.1 Cleartext Public Addresses

TBD. Identical to Bitcoin?

### 4.2 Cleartext Private Keys

TBD. Identical to Bitcoin?

### 4.3 Protected Public Addresses

A protected address consists of  $a_{pk}$  and  $pk_{enc}$ .  $a_{pk}$  is a SHA-256 compression function output.  $pk_{enc}$  is an encryption public key (currently ECIES, but this may change to Curve25519/crypto\_box), which is an elliptic curve point.

### 4.3.1 Raw Encoding

The raw encoding of a protected address consists of:

0x??	a <sub>pk</sub> (32 bytes)	A 33-byte encoding of $pk_{enc}$
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- A byte, 0x??, indicating this version of the raw encoding of a **Zcash** public address.
- 32 bytes specifying a<sub>pk</sub>.
- An encoding of pk<sub>enc</sub>: The byte 0x01, followed by 32 bytes representing the x coordinate of the elliptic curve point according to the FE20SP primitive specified in section 5.5.4 of IEEE Std 1363-2000. [Non-normative note: Since the curve is over a prime field, this is just the 32-byte big-endian representation of the x coordinate. The overall encoding matches the EC20SP-X primitive specified in section 5.5.6.3 of IEEE Std 1363a-2004.]

TODO: pick a version byte distinct from other Bitcoin stuff, and that produces the correct Base58 leading character

TODO: what about the network version byte?

### 4.4 Protected Address Secrets

A protected address secret consists of  $a_{sk}$  and  $sk_{enc}$ .  $a_{sk}$  is a SHA-256 compression function output.  $sk_{enc}$  is an encryption private key (currently ECIES), which is an integer.

### 4.4.1 Raw Encoding

The raw encoding of a protected address secret consists of, in order:

$0x$ ?? $a_{sk}$ (32 bytes) $sk_{enc}$ (32 bytes)
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- A byte 0x?? indicating this version of the raw encoding of a Zcash private key.
- 32 bytes specifying a<sub>sk</sub>.
- 32 bytes specifying a big-endian encoding of skenc.

TODO: pick a version byte distinct from other Bitcoin stuff, and that produces the correct Base58 leading character

TODO: what about the network version byte?

### 4.5 Buckets (on the blockchain)

A bucket consists of (addr<sub>pk</sub>, v,  $\rho$ , r, bm), where:

- $\bullet$  addr<sub>pk</sub> is a **Zcash** public address.
- v is a 64-bit unsigned integer representing the value of the bucket in zatoshi.
- $\rho$  is a 32-byte  $\mathbf{PRF_{a_{sk}}^{sn}}$  seed.
- r is a 32-byte COMM trapdoor.
- bm is a commitment which is a SHA-256 compression function output.

Note that the value s described as being part of a bucket/coin in the Zerocash paper is not encoded because it is fixed to zero.

## 4.6 Raw Encoding

The raw encoding of a  $\mathbf{Zcash}$  bucket consists of, in order:

0x??	addr <sub>pk</sub>	v (8 bytes, big endian)	$\rho$ (32 bytes)	r (32 bytes)	bm (32 bytes)
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- $\bullet$  A byte 0x?? indicating this version of the raw encoding of a  $\bf Z cash$  bucket.
- $\bullet$  65 bytes specifying the raw encoding of the **Zcash** public address  $\mathsf{addr}_{\mathsf{pk}}$  (defined above).
- $\bullet\,$  8 bytes specifying a big-endian encoding of  $\mathsf{v}.$
- 32 bytes specifying  $\rho$ .
- 32 bytes specifying r.
- 32 bytes specifying bm.

# 5 Pours (within a transaction on the blockchain)

TBD.

## 6 Transactions

TBD.