
Nash Equilibria in Mixed Strategies Game Theory

Vincent Knight

$$\begin{pmatrix} (2,-2) & (-2,2) \\ (-1,1) & (1,-1) \end{pmatrix}$$



(2,-2) (-2,2) (-1,1) (1,-1)

T-T

(2,-2) (-2,2) (-1,1) (1,-1)

T-T-H

$$(2,-2) (-2,2) (-1,1) (1,-1)$$


$$(2,-2) (-2,2) (-1,1) (1,-1)$$

$$u_1(H, \sigma_2) = 2y - 2(1 - y) = 4y - 2$$


 $u_1(T, \sigma_2) = -y + (1 - y) = 1 - 2y$

$$u_1(H, \sigma_2) = 2y - 2(1 - y) = 4y - 2$$


 $u_1(T, \sigma_2) = -y + (1 - y) = 1 - 2y$



$$s_1^* = egin{cases} T, & ext{if } y < 1/2 \ H, & ext{if } y > 1/2 \ ext{Indifferent}, & ext{if } y = 1/2 \end{cases}$$



$$s_1^* = \begin{cases} T \Leftrightarrow x = 0, & \text{if } y < 1/2 \\ H \Leftrightarrow x = 1, & \text{if } y > 1/2 \\ \text{Indifferent}, & \text{if } y = 1/2 \end{cases}$$



Column player:

 $s_1^* = \begin{cases} T \Leftrightarrow x = 0, & \text{if } y < 1/2 \\ H \Leftrightarrow x = 1, & \text{if } y > 1/2 \end{cases} \qquad s_2^* = \begin{cases} H, & \text{if } x < 1/3 \\ T, & \text{if } x > 1/3 \end{cases}$ $\text{Indifferent,} & \text{if } y = 1/2 \end{cases}$

 $s_1^* = \begin{cases} T \Leftrightarrow x = 0, & \text{if } y < 1/2 \\ H \Leftrightarrow x = 1, & \text{if } y > 1/2 \\ \text{Indifferent}, & \text{if } y = 1/2 \end{cases} \qquad s_2^* = \begin{cases} H \Leftrightarrow y = 1, & \text{if } x < 1/3 \\ T \Leftrightarrow y = 0, & \text{if } x > 1/3 \\ \text{Indifferent}, & \text{if } x = 1/3 \end{cases}$

Column player: