


Routing Games


Game Theory

Vincent Knight


$$(G, r, c)$$

- ▶ $G = (V, E)$, with a defined set of sources s_i and sinks t_i ;
- ▶ A commodity r_i ;
- ▶ A set of latencies: c_e .






$$C(f) = \sum_{P \in \mathcal{P}} c_P(f_P) f_P = \sum_{e \in E} c_e(f_e) f_e$$



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
$$\alpha = .75 \Rightarrow f = (.75, .25)$$




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
$$\alpha = .75 \Rightarrow f = (.75, .25)$$

$$C(f) = 1 \times .75 + c(.25) \times .25 = 1 \times .75 + .25 \times .25 = .8125$$






An optimal flow f^* minimizes $C(f)$.



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
$$C(\alpha) = \alpha + (1 - \alpha)^2 = 1 - \alpha + \alpha^2$$




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
$$f^* = (.5, .5)$$





A Nash flow: \tilde{f} iff for every commodity i and any two paths $P_1, P_2 \in \mathcal{P}_i$ such that $f_{P_1} > 0$ then:

$$c_{P_1}(f) \leq c_{P_2}(f)$$



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$$\tilde{f} = (0, 1)$$