


# Stochastic Games

Game Theory

Vincent Knight

- ▶  $X$  a set of states with a stage game defined for each state;
- ▶ A set of strategies  $S_i(x)$  for each player for each state  $x \in X$ ;
- ▶ A set of rewards dependant on the state and the actions of the other players:  $u_i(x, s_1, s_2)$ ;
- ▶ A set of probabilities of transitioning to a future state:  
 $\pi(x'|x, s_1, s_2)$ ;
- ▶ Each stage game is played at a set of discrete times  $t$ .




Game 4

Game 2

Game 1

Game 3



Game 4

Game 2

Game 1

Game 3


Game 4

Game 2

Game 1

Game 3







Game 4

Game 2


Game 1


Game 3














$$U_i(r,s) = \left( u_i(x,r,s) + \delta \sum_{x' \in X} \pi(x'|x,r,s) U_i^*(x') \right)$$

$$U_i(r, s) = \left( u_i(x, r, s) + \delta \sum_{x' \in X} \pi(x'|x, r, s) U_i^*(x') \right)$$

Thus a Nash equilibrium satisfies:

$$U_1^*(x) = \max_{r \in S_1(x)} (u_i(x, r, s^*) + \delta \sum_{x' \in X} \pi(x'|x, r, s^*) U_1^*(x'))$$

$$U_2^*(x) = \max_{s \in S_2(x)} (u_i(x, r^*, s) + \delta \sum_{x' \in X} \pi(x'|x, r^*, s) U_2^*(x'))$$