


Finitely Repeated Games

Game Theory

Vincent Knight

$$\begin{pmatrix} (3, 2) & (0, 1) \\ (1, 0) & (2, 3) \end{pmatrix}$$

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“Player r_2 until opponent plays s_1 , then play r_1 .”

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