Finitely Repeated Games

Game Theory

Vincent Knight

$$\begin{pmatrix} (3,2) & (0,1) \\ (1,0) & (2,3) \end{pmatrix}$$

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

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"Play r_2 until opponent plays s_1, then play r_1."

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