Nash Equilibria in Mixed Strategies

Game Theory

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$$\begin{pmatrix} (2,-2) & (-2,2) \\ (-1,1) & (1,-1) \end{pmatrix}$$

s_2

$$\begin{pmatrix} (2,-2) & (-2,2) \\ (-1,1) & (1,-1) \end{pmatrix}$$

s_2

s_2

$$\begin{pmatrix} (2,-2) & (-2,2) \\ (-1,1) & (1,-1) \end{pmatrix}$$

r_2

s_2-r_2

s_1

$$\begin{pmatrix} (2,-2) & (-2,2) \\ (-1,1) & (1,-1) \end{pmatrix}$$

r_2

s_2-r_2-s_1

$$\begin{array}{cc} & \begin{array}{cc} s_1 & \end{array} \\ r_1 & \begin{pmatrix} (2,-2) & (-2,2) \\ (-1,1) & (1,-1) \end{pmatrix} \end{array}$$

s_2-r_2-s_1-r_1

s_2

$$r_1 \quad \begin{pmatrix} (2,-2) & (-2,2) \\ (-1,1) & (1,-1) \end{pmatrix}$$

s_2-r_2-s_1-r_1-s_2

$$u_1(r_1, \sigma_2) = 2y - 2(1-y) = 4y - 2$$
$$u_1(r_2, \sigma_2) = -y + (1-y) = 1 - 2y$$

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