Stochastic Games Game Theory

Vincent Knight

- X a set of states with a stage game defined for each state;
- ▶ A set of strategies $S_i(x)$ for each player for each state $x \in X$;
- A set of rewards dependant on the state and the actions of the other players: $u_i(x, s_1, s_2)$;
- ▶ A set of probabilities of transitioning to a future state: $\pi(x'|x,s_1,s_2);$

▶ Each stage game is played at a set of discrete times t.

Game 2

Game 1

 $\mathsf{Game}\ 3$

Game 2

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Game 3

Game 2


Game 1


Game 3


Game 2


Game 1


Game 3











$$U_i(r,s) = \left(u_i(x,r,s) + \delta \sum_{x' \in X} \pi(x'|x,r,s) U_i^*(x')\right)$$

$$U_i(r,s) = \left(u_i(x,r,s) + c\right)$$

is a Nash equilibrium satisfies:
$$U_1^*(x) = \max_{r \in S_1(x)} (u_i(x,r,s^*) + \delta \sum_{i=1}^n \pi(x'|x,r,s^*) U_1^*(x')$$

 $U_2^*(x) = \max_{s \in S_2(x)} (u_i(x, r^*, s) + \delta \sum_{s \in S_2(x)} \pi(x'|x, r^*, s) U_2^*(x')$

a Nash equilibrium satisfies:

$$U^*(x) = \max_{x \in X} (w(x, x, x^*) + \delta \sum_{x \in X} \pi(x') x, x \in X)$$

Thus a Nash equilibrium satisfies:

 $U_i(r,s) = \left(u_i(x,r,s) + \delta \sum_{x' \in X} \pi(x'|x,r,s) U_i^*(x')\right)$