

1 Homework sheet 3 - Extensive form games, subgame perfect equilibrium and repeated games






2. Obtain the Nash equilibrium for the following game:

Player 1 chooses a number $x \geq 0$, which player 2 observes. After this simulataneously and independatly player 1 and player 2 choose $y_2, y_1 \in \mathbb{R}$ respectively. The utility to player 1 is given by $2y_2y_1 + xy_1 - y_1^2 - x^3/3$ and the utility to player 2 is given by $-(y_1 - 2y_2)^2$.

3. For each of the following games:

- i. Identify all subgames.
- ii. Identify the corresponding normal form representations and hence obtain all Nash equilibrium.
- iii. Identify which Nash equilibrium are also subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.



4. For the following stage games:

- i. Plot all possible utility pairs for T=2;
- ii. Recalling that subgame perfect equilibrium for the repeated game must play a stage Nash equilibrium in the final stage attempt to identify a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the repeated game that is not a sequence of stage Nash profiles.

$$\begin{pmatrix} (4,3) & (7,6) \\ (1,1) & (4,3) \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\begin{pmatrix} (5,8) & (0,3) \\ (0,3) & (1,4) \\ (1,6) & (0,3) \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\begin{pmatrix} (1,2) & (0,3) & (-1,1) \\ (-1,0) & (-1,-1) & (0,1) \end{pmatrix}$$

5. Consider the following stage game:

$$\begin{pmatrix} (-1,1) & (3,-7) \\ (-2,6) & (2,2) \end{pmatrix}$$

- i. For $\delta=1/3$ obtain the utilities for the infinitely repeated game for the strategies S_D : "play the first strategy throughout" and S_C : "play the second strategy throughout".
- ii. Plot the space of feasible average payoffs and the space of individually rational payoffs.
- iii. State whether or not it is possible to obtain δ that ensures that a strategy profile exists that would give a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with average payoffs: (3/2,3/2), (0,3), (2,6) and (2,0) (you are not asked to find these values).