# OR 3: Lecture 6 - Nash equilibria in mixed strategies

## Recap

In the [previous lecture](Chapter_05-Nash_Equilibria_in_pure_strategies.html)

* The definition of Nash equilibria;
* Identifying Nash equilibria in pure strategies;
* Solving the duopoly game;

This brings us to a very import part of the course. We will now consider equilibria in mixed strategies.

## Recall of expected utility calculation

In the matching pennies game discussed previously:

A strategy profile of and implies that player 1 plays heads with probability .2 and player 2 plays heads with probability .6.


We can extend the utility function which maps from the set of pure strategies to using *expected payoffs*. For a two player game we have:

## Obtaining equilibria

Let us investigate the best response functions for the matching pennies game.

If we assume that player 2 plays a mixed strategy we have:

and




Thus we have:

1. If then is a best response for player 1.
2. If then is a best response for player 1.
3. If then player 1 is indifferent.

If we assume that player 1 plays a mixed strategy we have:


and



Thus we have:

1. If then is a best response for player 2.
2. If then is a best response for player 2.
3. If then player 2 is indifferent.

Let us plot both best responses on a single plot, indicating the best responses in each quadrant. The arrows show the deviation indicated by the best responses.



If either player plays a mixed strategy other than then the other player has an incentive to modify their strategy. Thus the Nash equilibria is:

This notion of "indifference" is important and we will now prove an important theorem that will prove useful when calculating Nash Equilibria.

## Equality of payoffs theorem

### Definition

In an player normal form game the **support** of a strategy is defined as:

I.e. the support of a strategy is the set of pure strategies that are played with non zero probability.

For example, if the strategy set is and then .

### Theorem

In an player normal form game if the strategy profile is a Nash equilibria then:

### Proof

If then the proof is trivial.

We assume that . Let us assume that the theorem is not true so that there exists such that

In particular as we can assume without loss of generality that

which implies that is not a Nash equilibrium.