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CP-ABE with constant-size keys for lightweight devices

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CP-ABE with constant-size keys for lightweight devices

Abstract

Lightweight devices, such as radio frequency identification tags, have a limited storage capacity, which has become a bottleneck for many applications, especially for security applications. Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) is a promising cryptographic tool, where the encryptor can decide the access structure that will be used to protect the sensitive data. However, current CP-ABE schemes suffer from the issue of having long decryption keys, in which the size is linear to and dependent on the number of attributes. This drawback prevents the use of lightweight devices in practice as a storage of the decryption keys of the CP-ABE for users. In this paper, we provide an affirmative answer to the above long standing issue, which will make the CP-ABE very practical. We propose a novel CP-ABE scheme with constant-size decryption keys independent of the number of attributes. We found that the size can be as small as 672 bits. In comparison with other schemes in the literature, the proposed scheme is the only CP-ABE with expressive access structures, which is suitable for CP-ABE key storage in lightweight devices.

Keywords

lightweight, keys, devices, size, constant, cp, abe

Disciplines

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CP-ABE with Constant-Size Keys for Lightweight Devices



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Abstract—Lightweight devices such as RFID tags have a limited storage capacity, which has become a bottleneck for many applications, especially for security applications. Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) is a promising cryptographic tool where the encryptor can decide the access structure that will be used to protect the sensitive data. However, current CP-ABE schemes suffer from the issue of having long decryption keys, in which the size is linear to and dependent on the number of attributes. This drawback prevents the use of lightweight devices in practice as a storage of the decryption keys of CP-ABE for users. In this paper, we provide an affirmative answer to the above long standing issue, which will make CP-ABE very practical. We propose a novel CP-ABE scheme with constant-size decryption keys independent of the number of attributes. We found that the size can be as small as 672 bits. In comparison with other schemes in the literature, the proposed scheme is *the only* CP-ABE with expressive access structures, which is suitable for CP-ABE key storage in lightweight devices.

Index Terms—Information Security, Encryption

I. INTRODUCTION

Lightweight devices such as Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags have many applications such as electronic passports, ID cards and secret data storage. (e.g., cryptographic key storage, as described in Fig. 1). As shown in Fig. 1, the authority generates decryption keys of users and stores them in an RFID tag embedded within a user's ID card. The user can extract the key from his/her ID card for a security use.

Lightweight devices usually have limited memory capacity. For example, a passive RFID tag only offers a storage of few kilo bits [1]. This has become a major challenge to applications such as key storage. Many encryption systems can offer short decryption keys. For example, identity-based broadcast encryption [2], identity-based encryption with traitor tracing [3], multi-identity single-key decryption [4], [5], [6]. Unfortunately, there is no any efficient attribute-based encryption scheme in the literature, which offers short decryption keys.

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Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is an extension of identity-based encryption [7] which allows users to encrypt and decrypt messages based on attributes and access structures. Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) is a type of ABE schemes where the decryption key is associated with a user's attribute set. The encryptor defines the access structure to protect sensitive data such that only users whose attributes satisfy the access structure can decrypt the messages. Due to this nice property, CP-ABE has attracted a lot of attention (e.g. [8], [9], [10]) in applications such as access control.

Many CP-ABE schemes (e.g. [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19]) have been proposed for various purposes such as short ciphertext and full security proofs. However, we found no CP-ABE scheme with expressive access structures in the literature addressing the size issue of decryption keys, which seems to be a drawback due to resource consumption. All existing CP-ABE schemes suffer from the issue of long decryption keys, in which the length is dependent on the number of attributes. This issue becomes more obvious, when CP-ABE decryption keys are applied to storage-constrained devices. Because of the popularity of lightweight devices and useful applications of CP-ABE, in this work, we propose a provably secure CP-ABE scheme that offers short decryption keys, which are applicable for key storage in lightweight devices.

A. Our Contributions

We propose a ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption in which the access structures are AND gates [13] [16]. A decryption key associated with an attribute set \mathbb{A} can decrypt ciphertexts with the access structure \mathbb{P} when $\mathbb{P} \subseteq \mathbb{A}$. Mostly important, the decryption key is constant-size and independent of the number of attributes. More precisely, the decryption key is composed of two group elements only and the size can be 672 bits at most under 80-bit security requirement. The proposed CP-ABE scheme is provably secure in the selective security model.

A detailed comparison of ABE is given in Table I (Section IV). The comparison shows that our scheme is the only expressive CP-ABE with constant-size decryption keys. Since the key size is constant and small, our CP-ABE scheme allows all applications with key storage in lightweight devices.



Fig. 1. A security use of decryption with decryption keys stored in storage-constrained devices.

B. Related Work

Attribute-based encryption (ABE) was first introduced by Sahai and Waters in [20]. There are two variants of ABE: Key-Policy ABE and Ciphertext-Policy ABE [11].

- KP-ABE: In a KP-ABE scheme, the ciphertext encrypting a message is associated with a set of attributes. A decryption key issued by an authority is associated with an access structure. The ciphertext can be decrypted with the decryption key if and only if the attribute set of ciphertext satisfies the access structure of decryption key.
- CP-ABE: In a CP-ABE scheme, on the contrary, the ciphertext encrypts a message with an access structure while a decryption key is associated with a set of attributes. The decryption condition is similar: if and only if the attribute set fulfils the access structure.

Many KP-ABE schemes [20] [11] [21] [22] [23] and CP-ABE schemes [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] have been proposed in the literature. In comparison with KP-ABE, CP-ABE is more appropriate in access control applications since it enables message encryptor to choose the access structure to decide who can access the message.

The notion of CP-ABE was first proposed by Goyal *et al.* in [11] but they did not offer any construction [12]. Soon after that, Bethencourt, Sahai and Waters [12] proposed the first CP-ABE construction. Then, Cheung and Newport [13] proposed another CP-ABE in which the access structures are AND gates.

CP-ABE towards constant-size ciphertexts have been proposed. Herranz *et al.* [17] and Chen *et al.* [22] proposed CP-ABE schemes with constant-size ciphertexts under the threshold access structure. Zhou and Huang [16] proposed a CP-ABE scheme with constant-size ciphertexts under AND gates access structure. CP-ABE schemes with constant-size ciphertexts are also studied in [24] [25].

Most of CP-ABE schemes in the literature have linear-size decryption keys. The only proposed scheme with constant-size key is proposed in [15]. However, the access structure is (n, n) -threshold, where the required attributes in the access structure and the user's attributes must be the same. This access structure does not fulfil the motivation of ABE for fuzzy decryption. In Section IV, we show there exists a simple construction of CP-ABE under this particular access structure.

Most of proposed CP-ABE schemes are provably secure in the selective security model. Lewko *et al.* [18] proposed the first fully secure CP-ABE using composite-order pairing. Okamoto and Takashima [26] proposed a fully secure

and unbounded CP-ABE scheme, where the setup phase does not need to fix the maximum number of attributes. Lewko and Waters [19] developed a new methodology for utilizing the prior techniques to prove full security of CP-ABE. Chen *et al.* [22] proposed a fully secure CP-ABE with constant-size ciphertexts.

CP-ABE schemes fall into different types of access structures. They are including AND gates access structure [13], and threshold access structure [17][22] for short ciphertexts. For general access structure, there are CP-ABE schemes based on monotone tree access structure [12][27] that support AND, OR, and threshold, and based on LSSS [18] [14] [19] in which any monotonic boolean formula can be converted into an LSSS representation. Okamoto and Takashima [26] proposed fully secure CP-ABE schemes under non-monotone access structure based on span program. Sahai and Waters [28] proposed the first ABE schemes for general circuit.

Other ABE schemes are proposed for different purposes. Chase [29] gave a construction of multi-authority attribute-based encryption. Nishide *et al.* [30] proposed ABE schemes with partially hidden access structures. Hohenberger and Waters [31] gave a construction of ABE scheme with fast decryption. Hinek *et al.* considered the problem of key cloning for attribute-based encryption in [32]. Liu *et al.* proposed white-box traceable CP-ABE with monotone access structure in [33].

II. PRELIMINARIES AND DEFINITIONS

In this section, we give all preliminaries and definitions associated with ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption.

A. Attribute Definition and Access Structure

We denote by A an attribute. Let $\{A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n\}$ be the set of all attributes. For convenience, we denote by subscript i the attribute A_i .

Let \mathbb{A} be an attribute set of a user. We define $\mathbb{A} \subset \{A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n\}$. In this paper, we represent the attribute set \mathbb{A} with an n -bit string $a_1 a_2 \dots a_n$ defined as follows.

$$\begin{cases} a_i = 1 : & A_i \in \mathbb{A} \\ a_i = 0 : & A_i \notin \mathbb{A} \end{cases}$$

For example, let $n = 4$. The 4-bit string $\mathbb{A} = 1011$ means the attribute set consists of the attributes $\{A_1, A_3, A_4\}$. We use $|\mathbb{A}|$ to denote the number of attributes in \mathbb{A} .

We consider the AND gate access structure represented by attributes from $\{A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n\}$. We utilize \mathbb{P} to define

an access structure specified with attributes. In this paper, we also represent the \mathbb{P} with an n -bit string $b_1b_2\cdots b_n$ defined as follows.

$$\begin{cases} b_i = 1 : & A_i \in \mathbb{P} \\ b_i = 0 : & A_i \notin \mathbb{P} \end{cases}$$

For example, let $n = 4$. The 4-bit string $\mathbb{P} = 1001$ means the access structure \mathbb{P} requires $\{A_1, A_4\}$ attributes. We use $|\mathbb{P}|$ to denote the number of attributes in \mathbb{P} .

In the rest of this paper, the attribute set \mathbb{A} and the access structure \mathbb{P} will be represented with an n -bit string.

Definition 1: An attribute set $\mathbb{A} = a_1a_2\cdots a_n$ fulfils the access structure $\mathbb{P} = b_1b_2\cdots b_n$ if for all $i = 1$ to n , the two bits a_i and b_i satisfies $a_i \geq b_i$. We write $\mathbb{P} \subseteq \mathbb{A}$ for the shorthand of \mathbb{A} fulfilling \mathbb{P} .

The above definition is based on the representation of bit strings, and useful in our scheme description. To easily understand the definition, we can view \mathbb{A} and \mathbb{P} as a set of attributes. We have \mathbb{A} fulfilling \mathbb{P} if \mathbb{P} is a subset of \mathbb{A} .

B. Definitions

A ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption scheme is composed of four algorithms: Setup, Encrypt, KeyGen, and Decrypt.

- **Setup:** Taking as input a security parameter λ and a universe of attributes $\{A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n\}$, the setup algorithm outputs public parameters MPK and a master secret key MSK .
- **Encrypt:** Taking as input the access structure \mathbb{P} , public parameters MPK and a message, the encrypt algorithm $\text{Enc}[\mathbb{P}, M]$ outputs a ciphertext C .
- **KeyGen:** Taking as input a subset of attributes \mathbb{A} , public parameters MPK and the master secret key MSK , the key generation algorithm outputs the decryption key of \mathbb{A} , which is denoted by $sk_{\mathbb{A}}$.
- **Decrypt:** Taking as input a ciphertext C generated with access policy \mathbb{P} , public parameters MPK and the decryption key $sk_{\mathbb{A}}$ corresponding to the attribute set \mathbb{A} , the decryption algorithm $\text{Dec}[C, \mathbb{P}, sk_{\mathbb{A}}, \mathbb{A}]$ outputs the message M or outputs \perp .

The correctness of CP-ABE must satisfy that for any (MPK, MSK) , ciphertext $\text{Enc}[\mathbb{P}, M]$ and $sk_{\mathbb{A}}$, if $\mathbb{P} \subseteq \mathbb{A}$, the decryption algorithm always outputs the corrected message M . Otherwise, the message in $\text{Enc}[\mathbb{P}, M]$ cannot be decrypted using $sk_{\mathbb{A}}$.

C. Security Model

Let \mathcal{A} be the adversary who tries to attack an encrypted message without a decryption key whose attributes satisfy the message's access policy. The game between an adversary and a challenger is described as follows.

- **Initiation:** The adversary outputs the n -bit string of access policy \mathbb{P}^* that it wants to attack.
- **Setup:** The challenger generates a key pair (MPK, MSK) with a security parameter λ , and sends MPK to the adversary.

- **Query:** The adversary can make the following queries to the challenger.
 - the decryption key $sk_{\mathbb{A}_i}$ for any \mathbb{A}_i .
 - the decryption on a ciphertext $\text{Dec}[\mathbb{P}, M]$.
- **Challenge:** In this phase, the adversary outputs (M_1, M_2) for challenge. It requires the adversary did not query a decryption key on \mathbb{A} satisfying $\mathbb{P}^* \subseteq \mathbb{A}$. The challenger responds by picking a random $c^* \in \{0, 1\}$ and outputs the ciphertext $\text{Enc}[\mathbb{P}^*, M_{c^*}]$ for challenge to the adversary.
- **Query:** The adversary can continue decryption key query and decryption query except with decryption key query on any \mathbb{A} satisfying $\mathbb{P}^* \subseteq \mathbb{A}$ and the decryption query on $\text{Enc}[\mathbb{P}^*, M_{c^*}]$.
- The adversary outputs a guess c_g^* of c^* and wins the game if $c_g^* = c^*$.

The CP-ABE scheme is (t, q_e, q_c, ϵ) selectively secure against chosen-ciphertext attack if for all t -polynomial time adversaries who make q_e decryption key queries at most and q_c decryption queries at most, we have ϵ is a negligible function of λ .

D. Cryptographic Background

Let $\mathbb{BG} = (\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, g_1, g_2, p, e)$ be the pairing group. More precisely, $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2$ are the elliptic group, and \mathbb{G}_T is the multiplicative group. The three groups are of the same order p . g_1 is a generator of \mathbb{G}_1 and g_2 is a generator of \mathbb{G}_2 . e is the bilinear map capturing the three properties:

- For all $g \in \mathbb{G}_1, h \in \mathbb{G}_2$ and $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, we have

$$e(g^a, h^b) = e(g, h)^{ab}.$$
- If g is a generator of \mathbb{G}_1 and h is a generator of \mathbb{G}_2 , we have $e(g, h)$ is a generator of \mathbb{G}_T .
- There exists an efficient algorithm to compute $e(g, h)$ for all $g \in \mathbb{G}_1, h \in \mathbb{G}_2$.

III. OUR CP-ABE WITH CONSTANT-SIZE KEYS

In this section, we give the construction of CP-ABE with constant-size keys. The decryption key of an attribute set \mathbb{A} is composed of one group element from \mathbb{G}_1 and another group element from \mathbb{G}_2 , which is independent of the number of attributes in \mathbb{A} .

A. Proposed Scheme

1) **Setup:** Taking as input a security parameter λ and a universe of attributes $\{A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n\}$ and supposing the attribute A_i is mapped to the index i for all $i = 1, 2, \dots, n$, the setup algorithm works as follows.

- Choose a pairing group $\mathbb{BG} = (\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, p, e)$ and its two random generators $g \in \mathbb{G}_1$ and $h \in \mathbb{G}_2$. Compute $e(g, h)$.
- Pick a random $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and compute v_i, h_i as follows.

$$\begin{aligned} v_i &= g^{\alpha^i} \text{ for all } i = 1, 2, \dots, n, \\ h_i &= h^{\alpha^i} \text{ for all } i = 1, 2, \dots, n. \end{aligned}$$

- Select four collision-resistant hash functions:

$$\begin{aligned} H_1, H_4 &: \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^* \\ H_2 &: \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{l_\sigma} \\ H_3 &: \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{l_m} \end{aligned}$$

Here, l_σ denotes the length of a random string under the security parameter and l_m denotes the length of message (data).

The parameters (MPK, MSK) are set as

$$\begin{aligned} MPK &= (v_i, h, h_i, e(g, h), \mathbb{B}\mathbb{G}, H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4), \\ MSK &= (\alpha, g). \end{aligned}$$

2) *Encrypt*: Our encryption is based the Fujisaki-Okamoto approach for the security against chosen-ciphertext adversary [34]:

$$E(\sigma, H_4(\mathbb{P}, M, \sigma)), H_3(\sigma) \oplus M,$$

where $E(\sigma, H_4(\mathbb{P}, M, \sigma))$ denotes an attribute-based encryption on σ using the hashing output $r = H_4(\mathbb{P}, M, \sigma)$ as the random number. More precisely, σ is encrypted with $e(g, h)^r$, denoted by C_3 in our ciphertext. The encryption algorithm also consists of other components $(C_1, C_{2,1}, C_{2,2}, \dots, C_{2,n-|\mathbb{P}|+1})$ for decryptors with a valid decryption key to compute $e(g, h)^r$. The encryption algorithm formally defines as follows.

Taking as input a message M , MPK and the access policy \mathbb{P} ($|\mathbb{P}| \neq 0$), the encryption algorithm works as follows.

- Pick a random $\sigma \in \{0, 1\}^{l_\sigma}$ and compute

$$r = H_4(\mathbb{P}, M, \sigma).$$

- Let $\mathbb{P} = b_1 b_2 \dots b_n$ be the policy string. Compute $f(\alpha, \mathbb{P})$ as

$$f(x, \mathbb{P}) = \prod_{i=1}^n (x + H_1(i))^{1-b_i},$$

where $f(x, \mathbb{P})$ is an $(n-1)$ -degree at most polynomial function in $\mathbb{Z}_p[x]$. Let f_i be the coefficient of x^i .

- Compute C_1 as

$$C_1 = \left(h^{f(\alpha, \mathbb{P})} \right)^r = \left(h^{f_0} \prod_{i=1}^{n-1} h^{f_i} \right)^r.$$

- Compute $C_{2,i}$ for all $i = 1, 2, \dots, n - |\mathbb{P}| + 1$ as

$$C_{2,i} = v_i^r.$$

- Compute $e(g, h)^r$ and (C_3, C_4) as

$$\begin{aligned} C_3 &= H_2(e(g, h)^r) \oplus \sigma \\ C_4 &= H_3(\sigma) \oplus M. \end{aligned}$$

- Output the ciphertext on M as

$$(\mathbb{P}, C_1, C_{2,1}, C_{2,2}, \dots, C_{2,n-|\mathbb{P}|+1}, C_3, C_4).$$

3) *KeyGen*: Taking as input an attribute set \mathbb{A} , MPK and the master secret key MSK , the key generation algorithm works as follows.

- Let $\mathbb{A} = a_1 a_2 \dots a_n$ be the attribute string. Compute $f(\alpha, \mathbb{A})$ as

$$f(\alpha, \mathbb{A}) = \prod_{i=1}^n \left(\alpha + H_1(i) \right)^{1-a_i},$$

where $f(x, \mathbb{A})$ is an n -degree at most polynomial function in $\mathbb{Z}_p[x]$.

- Pick a random $s \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and generate the decryption key for \mathbb{A} as

$$sk_{\mathbb{A}} = \left(g^{\frac{s}{f(\alpha, \mathbb{A})}}, h^{\frac{s-1}{\alpha}} \right).$$

According to the definition of polynomial functions $f(x, \mathbb{A})$ in the key generation and $f(x, \mathbb{P})$ in the encryption, we have

$$\frac{f(x, \mathbb{P})}{f(x, \mathbb{A})} = \prod_{i=1}^n (x + H_1(i))^{a_i - b_i}.$$

If $\mathbb{P} \subseteq \mathbb{A}$, it is not hard to verify that $\frac{f(x, \mathbb{P})}{f(x, \mathbb{A})}$ is a polynomial function in x . Otherwise, it is not a polynomial. We design the encryption and decryption key where $\frac{f(x, \mathbb{P})}{f(x, \mathbb{A})}$ must be a polynomial for a successful decryption.

4) *Decrypt*: The main task of decryption is to compute $e(g, h)^r$, which is used to compute σ for extracting message M . The decryption algorithm is defined as follows.

- If $\mathbb{A} = a_1 a_2 \dots a_n$ does not fulfil the policy \mathbb{P} , abort. Otherwise, compute c_i for $i = 1, 2, \dots, n$ as

$$c_i = a_i - b_i \in \{0, 1\}.$$

Let $F(x, \mathbb{A}, \mathbb{P})$ be the $(n - |\mathbb{P}|)$ -degree at most polynomial function in $\mathbb{Z}_p[x]$ defined as

$$F(x) = F(x, \mathbb{A}, \mathbb{P}) = \prod_{i=1}^n (x + H_1(i))^{c_i},$$

and $F_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ be the coefficient of x^i . We have $F_0 \neq 0$.

- Compute (U, V, W) as

$$U = e\left(C_{2,1}, \prod_{i=1}^{n-|\mathbb{P}|} h_{i-1}^{F_i}\right) = e(g, h)^{rF(\alpha) - rF_0}$$

$$V = e\left(\prod_{i=1}^{n-|\mathbb{P}|+1} C_{2,i}^{F_{i-1}}, h^{\frac{s-1}{\alpha}}\right) = e(g, h)^{rsF(\alpha) - rF(\alpha)}$$

$$W = e\left(g^{\frac{s}{f(\alpha, \mathbb{A})}}, C_1\right) = e(g, h)^{rsF(\alpha)}.$$

- Compute

$$e(g, h)^r = \left(\frac{W}{U \cdot V} \right)^{\frac{1}{F_0}}.$$

- Compute the randomness σ by

$$\sigma = H_2(e(g, h)^r) \oplus C_3$$

and the message M by

$$M = H_3(\sigma) \oplus C_4.$$

- Compute $r = H_4(\mathbb{P}, M, \sigma)$ and verify the ciphertext is encrypted with r . If it is false, output \perp ; otherwise, output M as the decryption of the ciphertext.

B. Correctness

The correctness of our encryption and decryption is showed as follows.

$$\begin{aligned}
 f(x, \mathbb{P}) &= \prod_{i=1}^n (x + H_1(i))^{1-b_i}, \\
 f(x, \mathbb{A}) &= \prod_{i=1}^n (x + H_1(i))^{1-a_i}, \\
 \frac{f(x, \mathbb{P})}{f(x, \mathbb{A})} &= \prod_{i=1}^n (x + H_1(i))^{(1-b_i)-(1-a_i)} \\
 &= \prod_{i=1}^n (x + H_1(i))^{a_i-b_i} \\
 &= \prod_{i=1}^n (x + H_1(i))^{c_i}.
 \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, we have

$$F(x) = F(x, \mathbb{A}, \mathbb{P}) = \prod_{i=1}^n (x + H_1(i))^{c_i} = \frac{f(x, \mathbb{P})}{f(x, \mathbb{A})}.$$

and $F(x)$ is a polynomial function when $c_i \in \{0, 1\}$ holds for all $i = 1, 2, \dots, n$. The equation of (U, V, W) and $e(g, h)^r$ are correct because

$$\begin{aligned}
 U &= e(C_{2,1}, \prod_{i=1}^{n-|\mathbb{P}|} h_{i-1}^{F_i}) \\
 &= e(g^{r\alpha}, \prod_{i=1}^{n-|\mathbb{P}|} h^{\alpha^{i-1}F_i}) \\
 &= e(g, h)^{r \sum_{i=1}^{n-|\mathbb{P}|} \alpha^i F_i + rF_0 - rF_0} \\
 &= e(g, h)^{rF(\alpha) - rF_0}, \\
 V &= e(\prod_{i=1}^{n-|\mathbb{P}|+1} C_{2,i}^{F_{i-1}}, h^{\frac{s-1}{\alpha}}) \\
 &= e(g^{r\alpha F(\alpha)}, h^{\frac{s-1}{\alpha}}) \\
 &= e(g, h)^{rsF(\alpha) - rF(\alpha)}, \\
 W &= e(g^{\frac{s}{F(\alpha, \mathbb{A})}}, C_1) \\
 &= e(g^{\frac{s}{F(\alpha, \mathbb{A})}}, h^{rf(\alpha, \mathbb{P})}) \\
 &= e(g, h)^{rsF(\alpha)}, \\
 \left(\frac{W}{UV}\right)^{\frac{1}{F_0}} &= \left(\frac{e(g, h)^{rsF(\alpha)}}{e(g, h)^{rF(\alpha) - rF_0} e(g, h)^{rsF(\alpha) - rF(\alpha)}}\right)^{\frac{1}{F_0}} \\
 &= \left(e(g, h)^{rF_0}\right)^{\frac{1}{F_0}} \\
 &= e(g, h)^r.
 \end{aligned}$$

IV. EFFICIENCY

In this section, we compare our scheme to other proposed CP-ABE in the literature.

The decryption key of our scheme is composed of two group elements only, and is independent of the number of attributes. The ciphertext mainly has $n - |\mathbb{P}| + 2$ group elements depending on the total attribute number and the number of attributes in access policy.

Table I shows the comparison of recently proposed attribute-based encryption schemes in terms of policy type, access structure, security model, length of decryption key and length of ciphertext. We compare the efficiency of schemes under CPA (chosen plaintext attack) security only as previous schemes utilized different generalized security transformation from CPA to CCA. In this table, $|\mathbb{A}|$ denotes the number of attributes of a user and $|\mathbb{P}|$ denotes the number of attributes of access policy. We use \mathbb{G} to denote the elliptic groups of \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 for prime-order bilinear pairing, and use $\mathbb{G}_c, \mathbb{G}_{T_c}$ to denote composite-order pairing. The comparison shows that only our scheme and the scheme proposed in [15] achieve constant-size decryption keys.

However, our scheme provides a more expressive access structure compared to [15]. Notice that [15] admits only (n, n) -threshold decryption policies [17]. In their scheme, a decryption key associated with attribute set \mathbb{A} can only decrypt a ciphertext generated from an access policy \mathbb{P} fulfilling $\mathbb{A} = \mathbb{P}$. While in our CP-ABE scheme, a decryption key associated with attribute set \mathbb{A} can decrypt any ciphertext under any access policy \mathbb{P} satisfying $\mathbb{P} \subseteq \mathbb{A}$.

We notice that it is not hard to construct CP-ABE with $\mathbb{A} = \mathbb{P}$ access structure, where the attribute set \mathbb{A} of a decryption key must be equivalent to the access policy \mathbb{P} . We can merely use a traditional identity-based encryption scheme to achieve this CP-ABE by setting $\mathbb{A} = ID$ and $\mathbb{P} = ID'$ as unique identities. A message encrypted with ID' is decrypted with the decryption key of ID when $ID = ID'$. The only problem we need to address is how to map an attribute set \mathbb{A} into a unique string ID . Let $\mathbb{A} = \{A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n\}$ and H be a collision-resistant hash function. We set ID to be the output of $H(A_{i_1}, A_{i_2}, \dots, A_{i_n})$ for $H(A_{i_1}) < H(A_{i_2}) < \dots < H(A_{i_n})$. It is not hard to verify that such a modification from any IBE can be used to construct CP-ABE with $\mathbb{A} = \mathbb{P}$ access structure.

Our proposed CP-ABE scheme is feasible for key storage in lightweight devices with limited-memory storage, like passive tags in RFID system. Suppose an RFID tag should carry both possessed attributes \mathbb{A} and the corresponding decryption key $sk_{\mathbb{A}}$. We can choose the pairing group \mathbb{G}_1 with 160 bits and \mathbb{G}_2 with 512 bits (under compression [35]) for 80-bit security so that $|sk_{\mathbb{A}}| = |\mathbb{G}_1| + |\mathbb{G}_2| = 672$ bits. Suppose the total attribute number is $n = 1000$, we have $|\mathbb{A}| = 1000$. We yield $|\mathbb{A} + sk_{\mathbb{A}}| = 1672$ bits. This is applicable for passive tags whose memory size has a few kilo bits only [1].

Our scheme is also comparable to other proposed CP-ABE schemes (Table I) in terms of computational efficiency. Our decryption key generation for each attribute set only costs two point multiplications, which is independent of the number of attributes and is much more efficient than the others with linear size decryption keys. Since $f(x, \mathbb{P})$ is an $(n - |\mathbb{P}|)$ -degree polynomial, our encryption therefore costs about $2(n - |\mathbb{P}|)$ point multiplications. We have $F(x, \mathbb{A}, \mathbb{P})$ is an $(|\mathbb{A}| - |\mathbb{P}|)$ -degree polynomial, and hence our decryption mainly costs about $2(|\mathbb{A}| - |\mathbb{P}|)$ point multi-

TABLE I
COMPARISON OF ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION SCHEMES.

Schemes	KP/CP-ABE	Access Structure	Security Model	Length of Decryption Key	Length of Ciphertext
SW[20]	KP-ABE	Threshold	Selective Security	$n\mathbb{G}$	$n\mathbb{G} + \mathbb{G}_T$
GPSW[11]	KP-ABE	Tree	Selective Security	$ \mathbb{A} \mathbb{G}$	$ \mathbb{P} \mathbb{G} + \mathbb{G}_T$
OSW[21]	KP-ABE	Tree	Selective Security	$2 \mathbb{A} \mathbb{G}$	$(\mathbb{P} + 1)\mathbb{G} + \mathbb{G}_T$
BSW[12]	CP-ABE	Tree	Selective Security	$(2 \mathbb{A} + 1)\mathbb{G}$	$(2 \mathbb{P} + 1)\mathbb{G} + \mathbb{G}_T$
HLR[17]	CP-ABE	Threshold	Selective Security	$(n + \mathbb{A})\mathbb{G}$	$2\mathbb{G} + \mathbb{G}_T$
CCLZFLW[22]	KP/CP-ABE	Threshold	Full Security	$O(n^2)$	$O(1)$
EMONS[15]	CP-ABE	(n, n) -Threshold	Selective Security	$2\mathbb{G}$	$2\mathbb{G} + \mathbb{G}_T$
LOSTW [18]	CP-ABE	LSSS	Full Security	$(\mathbb{A} + 2)\mathbb{G}_c$	$(2 \mathbb{P} + 1)\mathbb{G}_c + \mathbb{G}_{T_c}$
Waters[14]	CP-ABE	LSSS	Selective Security	$(\mathbb{A} + 2)\mathbb{G}$	$(2 \mathbb{P} + 1)\mathbb{G} + \mathbb{G}_T$
ALP[23]	KP-ABE	LSSS	Selective Security	$3 \mathbb{A} \mathbb{G}$	$2\mathbb{G} + \mathbb{G}_T$
LW[19]	CP-ABE	LSSS	Full Security	$(\mathbb{A} + 3)\mathbb{G}_c$	$(2 \mathbb{P} + 2)\mathbb{G}_c + \mathbb{G}_{T_c}$
CN[13]	CP-ABE	AND gates	Selective Security	$(2 \mathbb{A} + 1)\mathbb{G}$	$(\mathbb{P} + 1)\mathbb{G} + \mathbb{G}_T$
ZH[16]	CP-ABE	AND gates	Selective Security	$(\mathbb{A} + 1)\mathbb{G}$	$2\mathbb{G} + \mathbb{G}_T$
Our Scheme	CP-ABE	AND gates	Selective Security	$2\mathbb{G}$	$(n - \mathbb{P} + 2)\mathbb{G} + \mathbb{G}_T$

plications and three pairing computations. Both encryption and decryption are still efficient in linear time. We note that the efficiency of encryption and decryption in other schemes are also with regards to the input attribute number or threshold number. Our scheme offers short decryption key and therefore it does not trade off the computational efficiency.

V. SECURITY

Before proving the security of our CP-ABE scheme, we define the adopted hard problem for security reduction.

Let a pairing group be $\mathbb{BG} = (p, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, e)$. Let $f(x)$ and $g(x)$ be two co-prime polynomials in $\mathbb{Z}_p[x]$ with respective orders q_1, q_2 . Let g_0 be a generator of \mathbb{G}_1 and h_0 be a generator of \mathbb{G}_2 . Given

$$\begin{aligned}
&g_0, \quad g_0^\alpha, \quad g_0^{\alpha^2}, \quad \dots, \quad g_0^{\alpha^{q_1-1}} \\
&h_0, \quad h_0^\alpha, \quad h_0^{\alpha^2}, \quad \dots, \quad h_0^{\alpha^n} \\
&g_0^\omega, \quad g_0^{\omega\alpha}, \quad g_0^{\omega\alpha^2}, \quad \dots, \quad g_0^{\omega\alpha^{q_1}} \\
&h_0^\omega, \quad h_0^{\omega\alpha}, \quad h_0^{\omega\alpha^2}, \quad \dots, \quad h_0^{\omega\alpha^n} \\
&g_0^{\alpha f(\alpha)}, \quad g_0^{\alpha^2 f(\alpha)}, \quad \dots, \quad g_0^{\alpha^n f(\alpha)} \\
&g_0^{\gamma\alpha f(\alpha)}, \quad g_0^{\gamma\alpha^2 f(\alpha)}, \quad \dots, \quad g_0^{\gamma\alpha^n f(\alpha)}, \quad h_0^{\gamma g(\alpha)}
\end{aligned}$$

and $T \in \mathbb{G}_T$, the (q_1, q_2, n) -aMSE-DDH problem is deciding whether T is equal to $e(g_0, h_0)^{\gamma f(\alpha)}$ or is a random element of \mathbb{G}_T .

Definition 2: The (q_1, q_2, n) -aMSE-DDH problem is (t, ϵ) -hard if for all t -polynomial time adversaries, the maximum probability of solving this problem is ϵ .

The hard assumption we adopt is modified from the aMSE-DDH problem defined in [17]. The intractability of the modified (q_1, q_2, n) -aMSE-DDH is covered by the analysis in [2]. Here, we give the intractability analysis based on the generic group model analysis in [2].

Given the challenge instance, one can compute

$$g_0^{A(\alpha)}, \quad g_0^{\alpha B(\alpha)f(\alpha)}, \quad h_0^{C(\alpha)}, \quad g_0^{\gamma\alpha D(\alpha)f(\alpha)},$$

where

$A(x)$ is any $(q_1 - 1)$ -degree polynomial,
 $B(x)$ is any $(n - 1)$ -degree polynomial,
 $C(x)$ is any $(n - 1)$ -degree polynomial,
 $D(x)$ is any $(n - 1)$ -degree polynomial.

With the additional element $h_0^{\gamma g(\alpha)}$, one can further compute

$$\begin{aligned}
&e(g_0, h_0)^{\gamma A(\alpha)g(\alpha)}, \\
&e(g_0, h_0)^{\gamma\alpha B(\alpha)f(\alpha)g(\alpha)}, \\
&e(g_0, h_0)^{\gamma\alpha C(\alpha)D(\alpha)f(\alpha)},
\end{aligned}$$

where all of them contain the unknown randomness γ .

If $e(g_0, h_0)^{\gamma f(\alpha)}$ can be computed from the above combinations, we should have

$$\begin{aligned}
\gamma f(\alpha) &= \gamma A(\alpha)g(\alpha) + \gamma\alpha B(\alpha)f(\alpha)g(\alpha) + \\
&\quad \gamma\alpha C(\alpha)D(\alpha)f(\alpha).
\end{aligned}$$

That is, the polynomial $f(x)$ can be re-written into

$$\begin{aligned}
f(x) &= A(x)g(x) + xB(x)f(x)g(x) + xC(x)D(x)f(x) \\
&= A(x)g(x) + f(x)(xB(x)g(x) + xC(x)D(x))
\end{aligned}$$

We deduce $f(x)|A(x)$ due to the co-prime of $f(x)$ and $g(x)$. Since the degree of $A(x)$ is less than $f(x)$, we have $A(x) = 0$. Therefore, $f(x)$ can be further simplified as

$$f(x) = f(x)(xB(x)g(x) + xC(x)D(x)).$$

Obviously, from the above, we deduce

$$E(x) = xB(x)g(x) + xC(x)D(x) \equiv 1.$$

On the other hand, we have $E(0) = 0$ which contradicts $E(x) \equiv 1$. This contradiction indicates that $e(g_0, h_0)^{\gamma f(\alpha)}$ cannot be computed from the challenge instance.

Theorem 1: Our CP-ABE is (t, q_e, q_c, ϵ) -secure if the (q_1, q_2, n) -aMSE-DDH problem is (t', ϵ') -hard.

$$t' = t + O(nq_e t_e + nq_{H_4} t_e), \quad \epsilon' = \epsilon - \frac{q_{H_1}}{p},$$

$$q_1 = |\mathbb{P}^*|, \quad q_2 = n - |\mathbb{P}^*|,$$

where t_e denotes the average time of a point multiplication in \mathbb{G}_1 , q_{H_1}, q_{H_4} denotes the number of queries to the random oracles H_1 and H_4 , and $|\mathbb{P}^*|$ denotes the number of bit 1 in \mathbb{P}^* .

Proof: Suppose there exists an adversary who can break the security with advantage (t, q_e, q_c, ϵ) . We construct an algorithm \mathcal{B} that solves the (q_1, q_2, n) -aMSE-DDH problem with advantage (t', ϵ') at least. The algorithm \mathcal{B} is given the challenge input and the aim is to output $T = 1$ or 0 . The algorithm \mathcal{B} interacts with the adversary \mathcal{A} as below.

Initization: The adversary outputs the access policy \mathbb{P}^* to be challenged, where there are n attributes in total. Let $\mathbb{P}^* = b_1 b_2 \cdots b_n$. \mathcal{B} will set

$$f(x, \mathbb{P}^*) = \prod_{i=1}^n (x + H_i(i))^{1-b_i} = g(x),$$

$$\prod_{i=1}^n (x + H_i(i))^{b_i} = f(x),$$

where $g(x)$ is a $(n - |\mathbb{P}^*|)$ -degree polynomial function, and therefore the degree of $f(x)$ is $|\mathbb{P}^*|$.

Setup: \mathcal{B} sets the master secret key the same as α in the challenge instance. Then, the other components of public parameters are simulated as follows.

$$\begin{aligned} h &= h_0, \\ h_i &= h^{\alpha^i} = h_0^{\alpha^i}, \\ v_i &= g^{\alpha^i} = g_0^{\alpha^i f(\alpha)}, \\ e(g, h) &= e(g_0, h_0)^{f(\alpha)}. \end{aligned}$$

All (v_i, h_i) directly come from the change instance. $e(g, h)$ is simulated from $g_0, g_0^\alpha, \dots, g_0^{\alpha^{q_1-1}}$ and $h_0, h_0^\alpha, f(x)$. The challenger gives these parameters to the adversary excepting the four hash functions set as random oracles.

Hash Queries: The adversary can access the four random oracles H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4 . \mathcal{B} maintains four lists $\mathcal{L}_{H_1}, \mathcal{L}_{H_2}, \mathcal{L}_{H_3}, \mathcal{L}_{H_4}$ to record the query and response, respectively. If the query has been responded and recorded in the list, \mathcal{B} responds with the same result. For new queries, \mathcal{B} works as follows.

- Let the query to H_1 be i . If $i \notin [1, n]$, \mathcal{B} responds $H_1(i)$ with a random number in \mathbb{Z}_p . Otherwise, for $i \in [1, n]$. Let $\mathbb{P}^* = b_1 b_2 \cdots b_n$. It follows into two cases:
 - $b_i = 0$, \mathcal{B} responds $H_i(i)$ with a new root of $g(x)$.
 - Otherwise $b_i = 1$, \mathcal{B} responds $H_1(i)$ with a new root of $f(x)$.
- H_2 : Let the query to H_2 be $e(g, h)^{r_i}$. \mathcal{B} responds $H_2(e(g, h)^{r_i})$ with a random $R_i \in \{0, 1\}^{l_t}$.
- H_3 : Let the query to H_3 be t_i . \mathcal{B} responds $H_3(t_i)$ with a random $Q_i \in \{0, 1\}^{l_m}$.
- Let the query to H_4 be (t_i, M_i) for data encryption. \mathcal{B} responds $H_4(t_i, M_i)$ with a random $r_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$.

Query:

For any query on $\mathbb{A}_i = a_1 a_2 \cdots a_n$ for decryption key, we can write $f(x, \mathbb{A}_i)$ into

$$\begin{aligned} f(x, \mathbb{A}_i) &= \sum_{i=1}^n (x + H_1(i))^{1-a_i} \\ &= f_{f(x)}(x, \mathbb{A}_i) \cdot f_{g(x)}(x, \mathbb{A}_i), \end{aligned}$$

where all roots of $f_{f(x)}(x, \mathbb{A}_i)$ are from $f(x)$, and all roots of $f_{g(x)}(x, \mathbb{A}_i)$ are from $g(x)$. If \mathbb{A}_i does not satisfy the access policy \mathbb{P}^* , we must have $f_{f(x)}(x, \mathbb{A}_i)$ is not constant or its degree is nonzero.

Let $f_{g(x)}(0, \mathbb{A}_i) = f_g(0)$. \mathcal{B} randomly chooses $s_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and sets

$$\begin{aligned} f_{\mathbb{A}_i}^1(x) &= \frac{f(x)}{f(x, \mathbb{A}_i)} \cdot f_{g(x)}(x, \mathbb{A}_i) \left(s_i \omega x + \frac{1}{f_g(0)} \right) \\ &= \frac{f(x)}{f_{f(x)}(x, \mathbb{A}_i)} \cdot \left(s_i \omega x + \frac{1}{f_g(0)} \right) \\ &= \frac{f(x)}{f_{f(x)}(x, \mathbb{A}_i)} \cdot s_i \omega x + \frac{f(x)}{f_{f(x)}(x, \mathbb{A}_i)} \cdot \frac{1}{f_g(0)}, \\ f_{\mathbb{A}_i}^2(x) &= \frac{f_{g(x)}(x, \mathbb{A}_i) \left(s_i \omega x + \frac{1}{f_g(0)} \right) - 1}{x} \\ &= s_i \omega f_{g(x)}(x, \mathbb{A}_i) + \frac{\frac{f_{g(x)}(x, \mathbb{A}_i)}{f_g(0)} - 1}{x}. \end{aligned}$$

We have

$$\frac{f(x)}{f_{f(x)}(x, \mathbb{A}_i)} \cdot s_i \omega x = \omega \cdot f_{\mathbb{A}_i}^{1,1}(x),$$

where $f_{\mathbb{A}_i}^{1,1}(x)$ is a q_1 -degree at most polynomial function;

$$\frac{f(x)}{f_{f(x)}(x, \mathbb{A}_i)} \cdot \frac{1}{f_g(0)} = f_{\mathbb{A}_i}^{1,2}(x),$$

where $f_{\mathbb{A}_i}^{1,2}(x)$ is a $(q_1 - 1)$ -degree at most polynomial function;

$$s_i \omega f_{g(x)}(x, \mathbb{A}_i) = \omega \cdot f_{\mathbb{A}_i}^{2,1}(x),$$

where $f_{\mathbb{A}_i}^{2,1}(x)$ is a q_2 -degree at most polynomial function;

$$\frac{\frac{f_{g(x)}(x, \mathbb{A}_i)}{f_g(0)} - 1}{x} = 0 \text{ or } f_{\mathbb{A}_i}^{2,2}(x),$$

where $f_{\mathbb{A}_i}^{2,2}(x)$ is a $(q_2 - 1)$ -degree at most polynomial function.

\mathcal{B} computes $sk_{\mathbb{A}_i}$ as

$$\begin{aligned} sk_{\mathbb{A}_i} &= (d_1, d_2) \\ &= \left(g_0^{f_{\mathbb{A}_i}^1(\alpha)}, h_0^{f_{\mathbb{A}_i}^2(\alpha)} \right) \\ &= \left(g_0^{\omega f_{\mathbb{A}_i}^{1,1}(\alpha) + f_{\mathbb{A}_i}^{1,2}(\alpha)}, h_0^{\omega f_{\mathbb{A}_i}^{2,1}(\alpha) + f_{\mathbb{A}_i}^{2,2}(\alpha)} \right), \end{aligned}$$

where d_1, d_2 are computed as follows.

$$\begin{aligned} g_0^{\omega f_{\mathbb{A}_i}^{1,1}(\alpha)} &\leftarrow g_0^\omega, g_0^{\alpha\omega}, \dots, g_0^{\alpha^{q_1}\omega}, f_{\mathbb{A}_i}^{1,1}(x). \\ g_0^{f_{\mathbb{A}_i}^{1,2}(\alpha)} &\leftarrow g_0, g_0^\alpha, \dots, g_0^{\alpha^{q_1-1}}, f_{\mathbb{A}_i}^{1,2}(x). \\ h_0^{\omega f_{\mathbb{A}_i}^{2,1}(\alpha)} &\leftarrow h_0^\omega, h_0^{\alpha\omega}, \dots, h_0^{\alpha^{q_2}\omega}, f_{\mathbb{A}_i}^{2,1}(x). \\ h_0^{f_{\mathbb{A}_i}^{2,2}(\alpha)} &\leftarrow h_0, h_0^\alpha, \dots, h_0^{\alpha^{q_2-1}}, f_{\mathbb{A}_i}^{2,2}(x). \end{aligned}$$

Let $s' = f_{g(\alpha)}(\alpha, \mathbb{A}_i)(s_i \omega \alpha + \frac{1}{f_g(0)})$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{s'}{f_{g(\alpha)}(\alpha, \mathbb{A}_i)} &= g_0^{f_{\mathbb{A}_i}^1(\alpha)}, \\ h^{\frac{s'-1}{\alpha}} &= h_0^{f_{\mathbb{A}_i}^2(\alpha)}, \end{aligned}$$

which is a valid decryption key on \mathbb{A}_i . \mathcal{B} computes the decryption key and sends it to the adversary.

For any decryption query on $\text{Enc}[M_i, \mathbb{P}_i]$, if there exist (t_i, M_i, r_i, Q_i) in the query lists such that the ciphertext is generated using these parameters, \mathcal{B} outputs M_i as the decryption query. Otherwise, \mathcal{B} outputs \perp . No query will be aborted since all valid encryptions need the response from hash oracles, and the response contains the randomness r_i for encryption.

Challenge: The adversary outputs (M_0, M_1) for challenge where the queried decryption key does not fulfil the access policy \mathbb{P}^* . \mathcal{B} randomly chooses $R^* \in \{0, 1\}^{l_t}$, $Q^* \in \{0, 1\}^{l_m}$ and computes the challenge ciphertext as

$$\begin{aligned} C_1^* &= h_0^{\gamma g(\alpha)}, \\ C_{2,i}^* &= g_0^{\gamma \alpha^i f(\alpha)}, \\ C_3 &= R^*, \\ C_4 &= Q^*. \end{aligned}$$

Let the randomness r be $r = \gamma$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} C_1^* &= h_0^{\gamma g(\alpha)} = (h^{f(\alpha, \mathbb{P}^*)})^r, \\ C_{2,i}^* &= g_0^{\gamma \alpha^i f(\alpha)} = g^{\gamma \alpha^i} = v_i^r. \end{aligned}$$

$(C_1^*, C_{2,1}^*, \dots, C_{2,n-|\mathbb{P}^*|+1}^*)$ is a valid encryption of policy \mathbb{P}^* with randomness r . The decryption needs to compute $e(g, h)^r$. If $T = e(g_0, h_0)^{\gamma f(\alpha)}$, we have

$$e(g, h)^r = e(g_0^{f(\alpha)}, h_0)^\gamma = T.$$

Query: The response of this phase is the same as the former phase with the restriction that no decryption key query fulfilling the challenge policy and no decryption query on the challenge ciphertext.

Guess: The adversary output a guess of c^* and the challenger outputs 1 if there exists a query on T to the H_1 oracle; otherwise, T is a random element of \mathbb{G}_T .

In the guess phase, when the adversary can break the encryption with probability ϵ , $e(g, h)^r$ appears in the \mathcal{L}_{H_1} list with probability ϵ at least. The only error event is that T is a randomness but it is queried to H_1 oracle. This occurs with probability q_{H_1}/p at most. Therefore, \mathcal{B} can distinguish $T = 1$ or $T = 0$ with probability $\epsilon - q_{H_1}/p$ at least.

The simulation time is dominated by the decryption key generation and the decryption. Each key generation requires $O(n)$ point multiplications, and all decryption requires $O(q_{H_4}n)$ point multiplications, where q_{H_4} denotes the query number of the H_4 oracle. We therefore obtain the Theorem 1 and prove the security of our proposed scheme. ■

VI. CONCLUSION

Lightweight devices usually have a limited-memory storage, which could be too small to store the decryption keys of CP-ABE schemes, as the key size of existing CP-ABE schemes is linear to or dependent on the number of users' attributes. In this work, we proposed a provably secure CP-ABE scheme with AND gates access structure. Our CP-ABE scheme offers a constant-size decryption key whose length can be as small as 672 bits (80-bit security). The comparison showed that our scheme is the only expressive CP-ABE in which the decryption key can be stored in lightweight devices.

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