

Extending the Ciphertext-Policy Attribute Based Encryption Scheme for Supporting Flexible Access Control

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Abstract: Ciphertext-Policy Attribute Based Encryption (CP-ABE) is recognized as an important data protection mechanism in cloud computing environment for its flexible, scalable and fine-grained access control features. For enhancing its security, efficiency and policy flexibility, researchers have proposed different schemes of CP-ABE which have different kinds of access policy structures. However, as far as we know, most of these structures only support AND, OR and threshold attribute operations. In order to achieve more effective data self-protection mechanisms in open environments such as Cloud computing, CP-ABE needs to support more flexible attribute based policies, most of which are described using operators of NOT, $<$, \leq , $>$, \geq . This paper proposed an Extended CP-ABE(ECP-ABE) scheme based on the existing CP-ABE scheme. The ECP-ABE scheme can express any access policy represented by arithmetic comparison and logical expressions that involve NOT, $<$, \leq , $>$, \geq operators in addition to AND, OR and threshold operators. We prove the Chosen-plaintext Attack (CPA) security of our scheme under the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption in the standard model, and also discuss the experimental results of the efficiency of ECP-ABE.

1 INTRODUCTION

In open computing environment such as cloud computing, the protection mechanism of outsourced data (sometimes just simply called data) attracts much more attentions(Samarati et al., 2010); (Vimercati et al., 2010). These data departs from the control domain of its owner and is stored and managed by unreliable service providers. Hence, the self-protection capabilities of data become very important. Traditionally, access control and encryption are the two basic protection mechanisms for achieving data integrity and confidentiality. Self-protection of data means that data itself can ensure its integrity and confidentiality without depending on other parties.

Data encryption is the primary data self-protection means at present. Traditional Public-Key encryption and Identity Based Encryption schemes (Shamir, 1985) are designed for one-to-one communication, which means the information encrypted by a public key or identity can only be decrypted by the specific private key. This situation

has been changed since Sahai and Waters proposed the Attribute Based Encryption scheme (Sahai and Waters, 2005), where ciphertexts are not necessarily encrypted to one particular user. Both users' private keys and ciphertexts are associated with a set of attributes or a policy over attributes. When the attributes of a user's private key can match the attributes of the ciphertext in a certain extent, the user can be able to decrypt the ciphertext. By defining decryption attributes, ABE can dynamically control the user group of the encrypted data.

Goyal et al. further developed this idea and introduced two variants of ABE, namely key-policy attribute based encryption(KP-ABE) and ciphertext-policy attribute based encryption(CP-ABE). In KP-ABE, whose first construction is given by (Goyal et al., 2006), ciphertext is associated with a set of attributes and the secret key is associated with the access tree. A user will be able to decrypt if and only if the attributes in the ciphertext satisfy his access tree. In CP-ABE, the idea is reversed. The ciphertext is associated with the access tree and the secret key is associated with a set of attributes, and the encrypting party determines the decryption policy.

(Bethencourt et al., 2007) gave the initial structure of CP-ABE. We refer to this scheme as BSW07 in this paper. BSW07 is relatively expressive and efficient, but the security argument is based on generic group model, an artificial model which assumes the attacker needs to access an oracle in order to perform any group operation. After that, many researchers have presented different schemes for the less ideal security argument, trying to prove the security based on a well-studied complexity-theoretic problem. And also there are many people worked at improving the efficiency or the flexibility of access policy for the CP-ABE scheme. These schemes mainly support three kinds of access policy structure: AND-gates, tree structure and Linear Secret Share Scheme (LSSS) matrix. Among them, the tree structure and LSSS matrix are relatively flexible, which supports AND, OR and threshold operation. BSW07 uses “bag of bits” to express policies containing $<$, \leq , $>$, \geq . However, this approach is much complex and has poor scalability, and is hard to be used in practical applications. For NOT operator, BSW07 has no solution. To the best of our knowledge, there is no efficient way to express an access policy that contains operators such as NOT, $<$, \leq , $>$ and \geq in present CP-ABE schemes, which makes CP-ABE only support simple attribute policies.

Access control and encryption are the two key techniques in data-centric protection, and CP-ABE makes it possible to integrate these two techniques seamlessly. However, the limited access policy expression in CP-ABE restricts its access control capability.

Our Contribution. In the area of access control, Attribute-based Access Control (ABAC) model (Junbeom and Dong Kun, 2011, Lang et al., 2009, Wang et al., 2010) makes access control decisions based on user attributes. The policies in ABAC are defined as attribute expressions that contain attributes, constants, and AND, OR, NOT, $<$, \leq , $>$, \geq operators, and can express complex access control rules. If the access policy structure of CP-ABE can be enhanced to express complex attribute policies as ABAC, CP-ABE will become an ideal scheme for implementing data self-protection in open computing environments. Following this idea, we proposed the Extended CP-ABE scheme (ECP-ABE). In ECP-ABE, by introducing extended leaf nodes, the access tree of CP-ABE is enhanced to support all kinds of logical and arithmetic comparison operators, including $<$, \leq , $=$, $>$, \geq and NOT et al. Therefore, ECP-ABE can realize powerful access control as

well as encryption, and data processed by ECP-ABE will have strong self-protection capabilities. Our scheme is proven to be chosen plaintext (CPA) secure under the decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption in the standard model.

Organization. The remaining sections are organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce related work. In Section 3, we review the concepts of access structure, Shamir’s secret sharing scheme, bilinear maps, DBDH assumption and the backgrounds of the CP-ABE scheme. We present our extended CP-ABE (ECP-ABE) scheme in Section 4. We then discuss the performance of ECP-ABE from aspects of security and efficiency in Section 5. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 6.

2 RELATED WORK

BSW07 expresses the access policy by a tree structure which supports AND, OR and threshold operations. At the same time, the length of the ciphertext and the encryption or decryption time are linearly related with the number of attributes of the access structure tree. However, the security proof of BSW07 is based on generic group model, rather than the standard numerical theoretical assumptions. In addition, as a result of using polynomial interpolation to resume secret during the decryption phase, BSW07 needs greater number of bilinear mapping and exponentiation operation, and costs of these operations are relatively high.

After that many scholars have proposed different schemes (Su et al., 2011). Cheung and Newport first gave the CP-ABE scheme (CN07)(Cheung and Newport, 2007) under CPA security based on DBDH assumption. However, the scheme only have the AND and NOT operator in the access policy structure, and the ability of policy expression is poor. Moreover, the length of the ciphertext and the key, and the time of encryption or decryption are linearly related with the number of attributes, which lead to the lower efficiency. Goyal et al raised the Bounded Ciphertext Policy Attribute Based Encryption scheme (Goyal et al., 2008) based on DBDH assumption, which supported the AND, OR and threshold operations. (Liang et al., 2009a); (Liang et al., 2009b) shortened the system’s public key, the user’s private key and the length of the ciphertext and improved the efficiency of encryption and decryption based on BCP-ABE. But it limited the level of the access policy tree and the number of child non-leaf nodes.

Nishide gave an Attribute-Based encryption scheme (Nishide et al., 2008) with partially hidden encryptor-specified access structures, which only supported the AND operation and attributes have more than one candidate value. Emura et al first raised the CP-ABE with constant ciphertext length based on Nishide's scheme (Emura et al., 2009), which improved the efficiency of the algorithm. But it also just supported the AND operation. Ibraimi et al gave an efficient and provable secure CP-ABE scheme (Ibraimi et al., 2009) based on DBDH assumption using the threshold secret share technology (Shamir, 1979), which supported AND, OR and threshold operations. Its access structure was an n-tree and the costs of key generation, encryption and decryption are lower than the BSW07 scheme. Waters has used the LSSS matrix to express the access control policy and pointed out that the ability of expression is not lower than the tree structure (Waters, 2011). Lewko et al (Lewko et al., 2010) also applied the LSSS matrix structure in their scheme, which supported any monotone access formula. Attrapadung and Imai (Attrapadung and Imai, 2009) gave a revocable scheme which admits ciphertext and private key sizes roughly the same as the currently best (non-revocable) ciphertext-policy ABE.

In order to support complex Boolean access policies, Junod and Karlov (Junod and Karlov, 2010) proposed an efficient public-key ABE scheme allowing arbitrary access policies, which is based on a modification of the Boneh-Gentry-Waters broadcast encryption scheme. Chen et al (Chen et al., 2011) presented two new CP-ABE schemes, which have both constant-size and constant computation costs for a non-monotone AND gate policy. Jin et al (Li et al., 2011) enhanced the attribute-based encryption with attribute hierarchy and obtain a provable secure HABE under tree hierarchy. (Attrapadung et al., 2011); (Attrapadung et al., 2012) proposed the first KP-ABE schemes allowing for non-monotonic access structures and with constant ciphertext size. Zhiguo et al (Zhiguo et al., 2012) proposed a hierarchical attribute-set-based encryption (HASBE) scheme which extended the ciphertext-policy attribute-set-based encryption for access control in cloud computing.

From the view of security and expressive ability of access policy, only the W08 and ITHJ09 scheme supported the AND, OR and threshold operation under the theoretical assumptions of the standard numerical. And the computation cost of encryption and decryption of ITHJ09 is lower than W08's.

Therefore, we choose ITHJ09 as the basic CP-ABE scheme, and further expand the access policy tree of ITHJ09 to construct an Extended CP-ABE scheme.

3 ANALYSIS OF CP-ABE SCHEME

3.1 Preliminaries

We firstly give formal definition for access structure, and then introduce the relevant background information on Shamir secret sharing scheme, bilinear maps and the Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption.

3.1.1 Access Structure

Definition 1. Access Structure (Beimel, 1996). Let $\{P_1, P_2, \dots, P_n\}$ be a set of parties. A collection $A \subseteq 2^{\{P_1, P_2, \dots, P_n\}}$ is monotone if $\forall B, C : \text{if } B \in A \text{ and } B \subseteq C \text{ then } C \in A$. An access structure (respectively, monotone access structure) is a collection (respectively, monotone collection) A of non-empty subsets $\{P_1, P_2, \dots, P_n\}$, i.e., $A \subseteq 2^{\{P_1, P_2, \dots, P_n\}} \setminus \{\emptyset\}$. The sets in A are called the authorized sets, and the sets not in A are called the unauthorized sets.

In ECP-ABE, the access structure A will contain the set of authorized attributes.

3.1.2 Shamir Secret Sharing Scheme

In Shamir's secret sharing technique (Shamir, 1979) a secret s is divided into n shares in such a way that any subset of t shares, where $t \leq n$, can together reconstruct the secret; no subset smaller than t can reconstruct the secret. The technique is based on polynomial interpolation where a polynomial $y = f(x)$ of degree $t-1$ is uniquely defined by t points (x_i, y_i) . The details of the scheme are as follows:

1. Setup. The dealer D wants to distribute the secret $s > 0$ among t users.

a) D chooses a prime $p > \max(s, n)$, and define $a_0 = s$.

b) D selects $t-1$ random coefficients a_1, \dots, a_{t-1} , $0 \leq a_j \leq p-1$, and define the random polynomial over \mathbb{Z}_p :

$$f(x) = \sum_{j=0}^{t-1} a_j x^j$$

c) D computes $s_i = f(i) \bmod p$, and sends securely the share s_i to user p_i together with the public

index i .

2. Pooling of shares. Any group of t or more users pool their distinct shares $(x, y) = (i, s_i)$ allowing computation of the coefficients a_j of $f(x)$ by Lagrange interpolation,

$$f(x) = \sum_{j=0}^{t-1} l_j(x) \cdot s_j, \text{ where } l_j(x) = \prod_{0 \leq i \leq t-1, i \neq j} \frac{x - x_i}{x_j - x_i}$$

The secret s is $f(0) = a_0$.

3.1.3 Bilinear Maps

Let \mathbb{G} and \mathbb{G}_T be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p . Let g be a generator of \mathbb{G} and e be a bilinear map, $e: \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$, with the following properties:

- Bilinearity: for all $x, y \in \mathbb{G}$ and $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, we have $e(x^a, y^b) = e(x, y)^{ab}$.
- Non-degeneracy: $e(g, g) \neq 1$

If the group operation in \mathbb{G} and the bilinear map e are both efficiently computable, the multiplicative cyclic group \mathbb{G} is a bilinear group. Notice that the map e is symmetric since $e(g^a, g^b) = e(g, g)^{ab} = e(g^b, g^a)$.

3.1.4 The Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption

Let $a, b, c, z \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ be chosen randomly, Z be the random element from \mathbb{G}_T ($Z = e(g, g)^z$), and g be a generator of \mathbb{G} . \mathbb{G} and \mathbb{G}_T are two multiplicative cyclic groups mentioned in 3.1.3. The decisional BDH assumption (Boneh and Boyen, 2004); (Sahai and Waters, 2005) is that no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm β can distinguish the tuple $\langle g^a, g^b, g^c, e(g, g)^{abc} \rangle$ from the tuple $\langle g^a, g^b, g^c, Z \rangle$ with more than a negligible advantage ε :

$$\varepsilon = |\Pr[\beta(g^a, g^b, g^c, e(g, g)^{abc}) = 0] - \Pr[\beta(g^a, g^b, g^c, Z) = 0]|$$

Here the probability is over the random choice of Z in \mathbb{G}_T , the random choice of a, b, c in \mathbb{Z}_p , and the random bits of β .

3.2 CP-ABE

3.2.1 Access Tree

Definition 2. Access Tree (Bethencourt et al., 2007). Let \mathcal{T} be a tree representing an access structure. Each non-leaf node of the tree represents a threshold gate, described by its children and a threshold value. If num_x is the number of children of a node x and k_x is its threshold value, then $0 < k_x \leq num_x$. When $k_x = 1$,

the threshold gate is an OR gate and when $k_x = num_x$, it is an AND gate. Each leaf node x of the tree is described by an attribute and a threshold value $k_x = 1$.

We define tree functions over the tree. The function **parent(x)** represents the parent of node x . If x is a leaf node, we define the function **attr(x)** to denote the attribute with the leaf node. As the access tree has an ordering between the children of every node, the function **index(x)** represents the index number of each child node.

3.2.2 Satisfying an Access Tree

Definition 3. Satisfied Access Tree (Bethencourt et al., 2007). Let \mathcal{T} be an access tree with root r . Denote by \mathcal{T}_x the subtree of \mathcal{T} rooted at the node x . Thus, \mathcal{T} is the same as \mathcal{T}_r . If a set of attributes γ satisfies the access tree \mathcal{T}_x , we denote it as $\mathcal{T}_x(\gamma) = 1$. We compute $\mathcal{T}_x(\gamma)$ recursively as follows. If x is a non-leaf node, evaluate $\mathcal{T}_{x'}(\gamma)$ for all children x' of node x . $\mathcal{T}_x(\gamma)$ returns 1 if and only if at least k_x children return 1. If x is a leaf node, then $\mathcal{T}_x(\gamma)$ returns 1 if and only if **attr(x)** $\in \gamma$.

3.2.3 CP-ABE Algorithms

The ciphertext-policy attribute based encryption scheme consists of four fundamental algorithms (Bethencourt et al., 2007): Setup, Encrypt, Key Generation, and Decrypt.

Setup (k). The setup algorithm takes no input other than the security parameter k . It outputs the public parameters PK and a master key MK .

Key-Generation (MK, S). The key generation algorithm takes as input the master key MK and a set of attributes S that describe the key. It outputs a private key SK .

Encrypt (PK, M, A). The encryption algorithm takes as input the public parameters PK , a message M , and an access structure A over the universe of attributes. The algorithm will encrypt M and produce a ciphertext C_T such that only a user that possesses a set of attributes that satisfies the access structure will be able to decrypt the message. We will assume that the ciphertext implicitly contains A .

Decrypt (PK, C_T, SK). The decryption algorithm takes as input the public parameters PK , a ciphertext C_T which contains an access policy A , and a private key SK . If the set S of attributes satisfies the access structure A then the algorithm will decrypt the ciphertext and return a message M , otherwise return the error symbol \perp .

4 ECP-ABE SCHEME

The ITHJ09 used Shamir secret sharing technique to support AND, OR and of (threshold) nodes based on CP-ABE scheme. The access policy tree is n -ary tree. Each node has two attributes: the number of child nodes n and threshold value t ($1 \leq t \leq n$). When $t = 1$, it's an OR gate; when $t = n$, it's an AND gate; when $1 < t < n$, it's an *of* gate. The leaf node associates policy properties and its value t is 1. The ECP-ABE scheme we proposed is based on the ITHJ09 scheme and we extend the access tree to make it be able to express the complex policies that contain arithmetic and logical expressions.

4.1 Extended Leaf Node

The universal attribute set U is published by the Trusted Authority. Each user has his or her attribute set w which is used for key generation and we refer to it as the *basic attribute* set. In Attribute Based Access Control system, user's access right could be dynamically calculated according to his security character and the resource he applied for. Inspired by this, we extend the leaf node of the access policy tree.

We replace the original leaf node with the *operator node* and give it two children, which we refer to as the *attribute name node* and the *attribute value node*, as shown in Figure 1(a). The *operator node*, the *attribute name node* and the *attribute value node* compose an *extended leaf node*, and the attribute expression described by an extended leaf node is called an extended attribute, for instance, the attribute "age>18" is an extended attribute. Meanwhile, the range of threshold value t of the extended leaf node is less than 0 from the original value 1.

The *operator node* only has the threshold value t ($t < 0$). Different value of t denotes specific operator, for instance, $t = -1$ for not operator, $t = -2$ for > operator. The attribute name/value node denotes the attribute name and the attribute value respectively that are associated with the operator. With this structure, we can express policy attributes using operators of not, <, ≤, >, ≥. Figure 1(b) is an example of this structure, which express the policy attribute "school not software-engineering".

ECP-ABE scheme augments two kinds of operators: comparison operators and logic operators.

- Comparison operators: <, ≤, >, ≥.
- Logic operators: not.

The values of t and the corresponding operator that each value represents are defined in Table 1.

Table 1: Values of t and its corresponding operator.

| Value t | Operator |
|-----------|----------|
| -1 | not |
| -2 | < |
| -3 | > |
| -4 | ≤ |
| -5 | ≥ |

4.2 Transforming an extended Policy Tree to a Standard Tree

Now we define the extended policy tree as the *extended tree* T^* and the original tree is called the *standard tree* T . An extended tree can be transformed to an equivalent standard tree by removing the attribute name/value node, converting the operator node to the standard leaf node and then assigning the attribute expression described by the extended leaf node as an extended attribute to the stand leaf node. The extended tree T^* and the standard tree T express the same access policy. For example, the extended tree in Figure 2(a) can be transferred into the standard tree in Figure 2(b).

The user expresses the access policy using the extended tree and makes it the parameter for the encryption. The encryption algorithm will firstly transform the extended tree to a standard tree, and then encrypts the message using the standard access policy tree. Finally, we attach the extended tree in the ciphertext.

To decrypt the ciphertext, the decryption party needs to apply the secret key by giving PKG his basic attribute set and the extended parts of the access tree. At the PKG side, we use the *attribute verification* algorithm as shown in Algorithm 1 to verify and transform an extended leaf node.

Algorithm 1: Attribute Verification.

- 1: Get the expression $exp(N.O.V)$ of the extended leaf node, where N , O and V denote the basic attribute name, the operator and the attribute value respectively;
 - 2: Traverse the basic attribute set A' to find the basic attribute N and its value V' ;
 - 3: Let $N=V'$, and calculate the expression $exp(N.O.V)$;
 - 4: **if** the value of $exp(N.O.V)$ is true
 - 5: Convert $exp(N.O.V)$ to string $S="N.O.V"$
 - 6: **return** S ;
 - 7: **else**
 - 8: **return** null;
 - 9: **end if**
-




Figure 1: Extended access tree.




Figure 2: Examples of extended and standard access policy tree.

This algorithm will first get user's basic attribute set and then traverse the attribute set to check whether or not the attribute N satisfies the expression $exp(N.O.V)$. If the answer is yes, it returns the string form of $exp(N.O.V)$, i.e. "*attribute name operator attribute value*" which is regarded as an *extended attribute* of the user. Otherwise it will return null.

Here is an example of the transformation.

There is a file F in a campus network system and the file has an access policy: "It can be accessed if and only if the user is a teacher under age of 40 or an older than 18-year-old student who is not in school of software-engineering". So, we can give the policy " $T^* = (student \wedge school \text{ not software-engineering} \wedge age > 18) \vee (teacher \wedge age < 40)$ ", and the extended access tree for this policy is shown in Figure 2(a). Figure 2(b) is the standard access tree which converts from the extended tree in figure 2(a). The

encryption party encrypts the file F with T and attaches T^* in the ciphertext.

Suppose user A and user B wants to decrypt the file F . The basic attributes of A is {student, school=computer science, age=20}, and the basic attributes of B is {student, school=computer science, age=17}. Firstly, Both A and B need to extract the extended parts of T^* from the ciphertext and send them with their basic attribute set to PKG. Then, PKG verifies and generates the new attribute set {student, school not software-engineering, age > 18} for A, and the new attribute set { student, school not software-engineering, age = 17} for B. The corresponding private keys are generated using these new attribute sets by PGK concurrently. Obviously, user B's attribute set doesn't satisfy the access policy, hence user A can decrypt the file F while user B can't.

4.3 Encryption and Decryption Process of ECP-ABE

The encryption party expresses the access policy with an extended tree and the tree in the ciphertext is also in the extended structure. However, when encrypts a message, the encryption algorithm will first transform the extend tree to an equivalent standard tree and encrypt the message using the standard one. So in the encryption phase, we can use the algorithm of ITHJ09 scheme. For ciphertexts that encrypted under different extended access trees, users have to apply for different secret keys, since PKG need to verify and generate extended attributes according to the extended tree and user's basic attributes. Detailed encryption and decryption processes are described as follows.

- a. **Initialize:** the system initializes and generates public parameter pk and master key mk . It gives pk to the encryption party. The description of initialization algorithm Setup (k) is as follow.
 - i. Generate a bilinear group G of prime order p with a generator g and a bilinear map $e: G \times G \rightarrow GT$.
 - ii. Generate the attribute set $U = \{a_1, a_2, \dots, a_m\}$, for some integer m , and random elements $\alpha, t_1, t_2, \dots, t_m \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$. Let $y = e(g, g)^\alpha$, $T_j = gt_j$ ($1 \leq j \leq m$). The public key is $pk = (e, g, y, T_j (1 \leq j \leq m))$, and the master key is $mk = (\alpha, t_j (1 \leq j \leq m))$.
- b. **Specify the Access Policy:** the encryption party specifies access policy, which is expressed by an extended tree T^* .
- c. **Encryption:** the encryption party calls the encryption algorithm Encrypt (m, T^*, pk) with plaintext m , the extended tree T^* and the public parameter pk . The encryption algorithm will first transform T^* to the equivalent standard tree T , and then encrypt m under T using Shamir's secret sharing technique. Finally it returns the ciphertext C_T which contains T^* , such that only users who have the secret key generated from the attributes that satisfy T^* will be able to decrypt the message. The detail description is as follows:
 - i. Convert the T^* to the standard tree T ;
 - ii. Select a random element $s \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and compute $c_0 = g^s$ and $c_1 = M \cdot y^s = M \cdot e(g, g)^{\alpha s}$
 - iii. Set the value of the root node of T to be s , mark all child nodes as un-assigned, and mark the root node assigned. Recursively, for

each un-assigned non-leaf node, do the following:

If its child nodes are un-assigned, the secret s is divided using (t, n) -Shamir secret sharing technique. The relation of n and t is: if the symbol is of then $1 < t < n$; if the symbol is AND, then $t = n$; if the symbol is OR, then $t = 1$. To each child node a share secret $s_i = f(i)$ is assigned. Mark this node assigned.

- iv. For each leaf attribute $a_{j,i} \in T$, compute $c_{j,i} = T_j^{s_i}$, where i denote the index of the attribute in the access tree.
- v. Return the ciphertext: $C_T = (T, c_0, c_1, \forall a_{j,i} \in T: c_{j,i})$.
- d. **Secret Key Request:** when a user gets C_T and wants to decrypt, he first needs to analyze the structure of T^* and find the extended parts, then apply for the secret key by giving PKG his basic attribute set w and the extended parts of the access tree.
- e. **Secret Key Generation:** PKG first verify the user's basic attribute. If the basic attributes of the user are authenticated, PKG will extract the attribute name, the attribute value and the operator, and run Algorithm 1. Attributes in w that satisfy the extended leaf node will be replaced by the returned extended attributes. Finally PKG gets the new attribute set w^* and generates the secret key sk_{w^*} corresponds to w^* and sends it back to the user. The detailed description is as follows:
 - i. Select a random value $r \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$, $d_0 = g^{\alpha \cdot r}$.
 - ii. For each attribute a_j in w , compute $d_j = g^{r \cdot t_j^{-1}}$.
 - iii. Return the secret key $sk_w = (d_0, \forall a_j \in w: d_j)$
- f. **Decryption:** the user calls the decryption algorithm Decrypt(C_T, sk_w^*). The algorithm returns message m if the smallest attribute set $w' \in w^*$ that corresponds to sk_w^* satisfies T . Otherwise it returns an error symbol \perp . More details are as follows:

For every attribute $a_j \in w'$, computing:

$$m = \frac{c_1}{e(c_0, d_0) \cdot \prod_{a_j \in w'} e(c_{j,i}, d_j)^{l_i(0)}}$$

$l_i(0)$ is a Lagrange coefficient and can be computed by everyone who knows the index of the attribute in the access tree.

Correctness Proof:

$$\begin{aligned}
m' &= \frac{c_1}{e(c_0, d_0) \cdot \prod_{a_j \in w'} e(c_{j,i}, d_j)^{l_i(0)}} \\
&= \frac{m \cdot e(g, g)^{\alpha s}}{e(g^s, g^{\alpha-r}) \cdot e(T_j^{s_i}, g^{r_{j,i}^{-1}})^{l_i(0)}} \\
&= \frac{m \cdot e(g, g)^{\alpha s}}{e(g^s, g^{\alpha-r}) \cdot \prod_{a_j \in w'} e(g^{t_j s_i}, g^{r_{j,i}^{-1}})^{l_i(0)}} \\
&= \frac{m \cdot e(g, g)^{\alpha s}}{e(g^s, g^{\alpha-r}) \cdot e(g, g)^{rs}} = \frac{m \cdot e(g, g)^{\alpha s}}{e(g^s, g^{\alpha})} = m
\end{aligned}$$

5 ECP-ABE PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

5.1 Security

The major contribution of ECP-ABE scheme is the extension of the access tree. The core encryption/decryption algorithm of ECP-ABE is based on ITHJ09 scheme. In ITHJ09 scheme semantic security under chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) is modeled by IND-sAtt-CPA game. The security model of ECP-ABE will still be based on IND-sAtt-CPA game, but the challenging access tree provided by the adversary in **Init** phase will be an extended tree instead of a standard tree. IND-sAtt-CPA game of ECP-ABE security model is as follows:

- **Init.** The adversary A chooses the challenge access tree T^* and gives it to the challenger, T^* is an extended tree.
- **Setup.** The challenger runs Setup to generate (pk, mk) and gives the public key pk to adversary A . The challenger also transforms T^* to the equivalent standard tree T .
- **Phase1.** Adversary A makes a secret key request to the Keygen oracle for any attribute set $w = \{a_j \mid a_j \in U\}$, with the restriction $a_j \notin T^*$ and a_j does not satisfy the policy attribute requirement expressed by the extend part of T^* . The challenger runs Algorithm 1 to generate extended attribute set w^* and then returns $\text{Keygen}(w^*, mk)$.
- **Challenge.** Adversary A sends to the challenger two equal length messages m_0, m_1 . The challenger picks a random bit $b \in \{0,1\}$ and returns $C_b = \text{Encrypt}(m_b, T^*, pk)$.

- **Phase2.** Adversary A can continue querying Keygen oracle with the same restriction as in **Phase1**.

- **Guesss.** Adversary A outputs a guess $b' \in \{0,1\}$.

The advantage of A winning this game is defined as: $\varepsilon = |\Pr[b'=b] - 1/2|$.

Definition 1. ECP-ABE scheme is said to be secure against an adaptive chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) in the standard model if any polynomial-time adversary has only a negligible advantage in the above IND-sAtt-CPA game.

In the above game, adversary A uses an extended tree to challenge instead of a standard tree. We have the following analyse:

1. The limitation for the basic attribute set $w = \{a_j \mid a_j \in U\}$ provided by adversary A in **Phase1** is $a_j \notin T^*$ and a_j does not satisfy the policy attribute requirement expressed by the extended part of T^* . According to this limitation, we can infer that $\forall b_j^* \in w^*, b_j^* \notin T$. So in **Phase1**, changes of access tree will not introduce any new security problem, i.e. the secret key that A gets could not decrypt the ciphertext C_b .
2. Although adversary A submits the extended tree T^* in **Init** phase, message m_b is encrypted under standard tree T . Transformation between T^* and T is public. In **Phase1**, Challenge and **Phase2**, adversary A could design the query and challenge against T^* . So the attacking ability of A keeps the same.







Hence, we can conclude that in ECP-ABE scheme the advantage of A in the IND-sAtt-CPA game equals to the advantage of A in ITHJ09 scheme, i.e. in ECP-ABE scheme any polynomial-time adversary has only a negligible advantage in the IND-sAtt-CPA game.

So ECP-ABE scheme is secure against an adaptive chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) in the standard model. Our extension for the access tree will not lower the system security compared with ITHJ09.

5.2 Efficiency

In ITHJ09 scheme, encryption requires $|T|+1$ exponentiations in \mathbb{G} and one exponentiation in \mathbb{G}_T and $|T|$ is the number of attributes in the access tree T . Key generation requires $|w|+1$ exponentiations in \mathbb{G} , w is the attribute set the user has. Decryption requires $|w'|+1$ pairing operations, $|w'|$ multiplications, w' is the set of attributes satisfying the access tree, $w' \subseteq w$.

Table 2: The test samples without repetitive same name attributes.

| | 1-4 attribute nodes (4 nodes for instance) | 5-7 attribute nodes (6 nodes for instance) | 8-10 attribute nodes (9 nodes for instance) |
|---------------------------|---|--|--|
| Standard attribute policy |  |  |  |
| | <p>security_level=7 \wedgesalary=7500 \wedgegender=M \wedgeage=24</p> | <p>(security_level=7 \wedgegender=M) \wedge(department=product \wedgeexpired_date=201301 \wedgeage=24) \wedgename=Sky</p> | <p>(security_level=7 \wedgedepartment=product) \wedge(name=Sky \wedgegender=M \wedge(office=BC-1 \wedgeproject=T1 \wedgeage=24\wedgesalary=7500) \wedgeexpired_date=201301</p> |
| Extended attribute policy |  |  |  |
| | <p>(id not Bob@gmail.com) \wedge(name not Tom) \wedge(salary \geq 7000) \wedge(security_level \geq 4)</p> | <p>(age \geq 25)\wedge(salary \geq 9000) \wedge(department not account) \wedge(id not Tom@gmail.com) \wedge(name not jack) \wedge(security_level \geq 7)</p> | <p>(age \geq 20)\wedge(salary \geq 5000) \wedge(department not account) \wedge(name not tom) \wedge(project not S1) \wedge(id not Bob@gmail.com) \wedge(office not A1) \wedge(professional not PA) \wedge(security_level \geq 7)</p> |




Figure 3: The efficiency comparison of ECP-ABE and ITHJ09 scheme without repetitive same name attributes.

ECP-ABE uses the encryption and decryption algorithms of ITHJ09 scheme, so the calculation expenses and the length of ciphertext are the same as ITHJ09. The ECP-ABE scheme has two main differences compared with ITHJ09 scheme: the ECP-ABE has the conversion from an extended tree to a standard tree during the encryption; it also has

the verification and transformation of extended attributes during the key generation. Meanwhile, in ECP-ABE, the attribute set used to generate the private key will be expanded after the extended leaf node transformation. Therefore, the added calculation expense comes from the following three factors:

- The transformation from the extended tree to the standard tree during the encryption phase
- The verification and transformation of the extended attributes during the key generation phase

The following experiments illustrate the impact of the above factors on the actual efficiency.

We use two groups of policy file shown in Table 2 as test samples. One group only contains policies with the standard attributes which are used as the policies of the ITHJ09 scheme, and the other only contains policies with the extended attributes which are used as the policies of our ECP-ABE scheme.

Each group has 10 test policy files to test the efficiency when the number of attribute node varies from 1 to 10. The access tree is a two-tier structure when there are 1-4 attribute nodes, a three-tier structure when there are 5-7 attribute nodes, and a four-tier structure when there are 8-10 attribute nodes.

We run three times for each test policy file and get the average cost as the result. Figure 3 is the result of test.

Discussion: the verification of the extended leaf nodes and the transformation from the extended tree to the standard tree nearly have no effect on the performance during the encryption and key application phase. However, the ECP-ABE scheme has greatly enhanced the access policy expression capability.

6 CONCLUSIONS

The paper proposed an ECP-ABE scheme, which introduces the extended leaf nodes into the access policy tree to support access policy formulas involving operators including **NOT**, $<$, \leq , $>$, \geq in addition to AND, OR and threshold operators. Hence the scheme enhanced access control ability prominently, which is important to data self-protection in open computing environments.

ECP-ABE adopts the same implementation mechanism as other CP-ABE schemes. Basing on the experiments analysis, we can see that our scheme has nearly the same expense compared with ITHJ09 scheme, and ECP-ABE scheme is proven chosen plaintext (CPA) secure under the decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption in the standard model. Hence, ECP-ABE can keep the security and efficiency properties of the CP-ABE scheme which it based on, but prominently improves the access

capability of the baseline scheme. Also, the policy extension method used in ECP-ABE is not limited to the ITHJ09 scheme; it can be used on other CP-ABE schemes that utilize tree-based access policy structures.

For future work, it would be interesting to probe other more efficient way to enhance the access control capability of CP-ABE schemes, such as working on other access policy structures like LSSS, or designing new encryption/decryption algorithms.

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