`ICMarks`: A Robust Watermarking Framework for Integrated Circuit Physical Design IP Protection

Ruisi Zhang, Rachel Selina Rajarathnam, David Z. Pan, Farinaz Koushanfar

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Abstract—Physical design watermarking on contemporary integrated circuit (IC) layout encodes signatures without considering the dense connections and design constraints, which could lead to performance degradation on the watermarked products. This paper presents `ICMarks`, a quality-preserving and robust watermarking framework for modern IC physical design. `ICMarks` embeds unique watermark signatures during the physical design's placement stage, thereby authenticating the IC layout ownership. `ICMarks`'s novelty lies in (i) strategically identifying a region of cells to watermark with minimal impact on the layout performance and (ii) a two-level watermarking framework for augmented robustness toward potential removal and forging attacks. Extensive evaluations on benchmarks of different design objectives and sizes validate that `ICMarks` incurs no wirelength and timing metrics degradation, while successfully proving ownership. Furthermore, we demonstrate `ICMarks` is robust against two major watermarking attack categories, namely, watermark removal and forging attacks; even if the adversaries have prior knowledge of the watermarking schemes, the signatures cannot be removed without significantly undermining the layout quality.

Index Terms—Physical Design, Watermarking, IP Protection

I. INTRODUCTION

In the modern very-large-scale integrated circuit (VLSI) supply chain, companies across multiple countries collaborate to design, fabricate, assemble, and verify integrated circuits (ICs) [1], [2]. The final product integrates intellectual property (IP) components from various stakeholders, including design [3], [4], [5], [6] and fabrication houses [7], along the global supply chain. With the confluence of diverse inputs, safeguarding IP emerges as an undeniable critical necessity, particularly to preempt IP piracy threats [8], [9], [10]. The physical design of the supply chain bridges the logic design with the VSLI layout for manufacturing. It strategically optimizes the positioning and connectivity of components on the chip canvas and enhances power-performance-area (PPA) metrics. The optimizations not only translate into million-dollar manufacturing cost savings for chip producers [11] but also establish invaluable IPs. However, they are vulnerable to unauthorized use, like forging attacks by malicious third parties in the supply chain [12], and require robust protective measures.

Watermarking [13], [14], [15] has emerged as a viable methodology to safeguard physical design IP by embedding unique and confidential signatures into the IC layout. To authenticate ownership, the design houses verify the watermark signatures by decoding the watermarks from the IC layout. Existing physical design watermarking frameworks [12] proposed to insert watermarks from two directions: (i) constraint-based watermarking [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], and, (ii) invasive watermarking [5], [21], [6]. Constraint-based watermarking encodes signatures by setting cell position/topology as optimization constraints during the physical design. Such frameworks, primarily designed for partition-based placement algorithms [22], [23], do not consider new design constraints in modern IC layouts, such as fence regions, leading to quality degradation. The invasive watermarking adds redundant cells [5], [6] or wires [21] as watermarks. However, the signatures could be forged if the adversary has knowledge of the watermarking algorithms.

Inserting watermarks into modern IC layouts is non-trivial and exhibits several challenges. First, large-scale designs have dense standard cell connections, and slight perturbations of the cell locations/topologies can degrade the overall performance. Second, modern ICs often have additional design constraints like fence regions and macros. Developing watermarking algorithms without considering these additional design constraints will negatively affect overall performance on certain layouts. Finally, the watermarks should be robust against potential removal and forging attacks from the supply chain.

This paper devises `ICMarks`, a novel and robust watermarking framework to safeguard IC layout IP. It consists of two consecutive steps, namely, *Global Watermarking* (GW) and *Detailed Watermarking* (DW), and targets the watermark insertion at the global and detailed placement stages, respectively. *Global Watermarking* (GW) leverages a novel scoring scheme to identify a region to watermark that does not violate the design constraints and ensures minimal performance deterioration. The identified watermarked region, along with the associated cells inside it, encodes the GW signature by co-optimizing the placement such that only the associated cells intersect the watermarked region. Next, *Detailed Watermarking* (DW) selects cells that do not overlap with nearby cells when moving along the x/y axis within GW's watermarked region. The cells are watermarked by shifting in the x/y directions to encode DW signature in the detailed placement. As such, the strategically inserted watermarked region and cells ensure the signature insertion satisfies the modern IC design constraints and incurs minimal quality degradation. The design company proves ownership by reverse engineering [24], [25] the logic netlist and all standard cell locations from an IC layout in GDSII format, and employ `ICMarks` to decode signature for ownership verification.

`ICMarks` is robust against threats from the supply chain that aim to remove or forge the watermarks. By encoding signatures as placement co-optimization objectives, it can

Ruisi Zhang and Farinaz Koushanfar are with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of California, San Diego, CA. (e-mail: ruz032@ucsd.edu; fkoushanfar@ucsd.edu)

Rachel Selina Rajarathnam and David Z. Pan are with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX. (e-mail: rachelselina.r@utexas.edu; dpan@ece.utexas.edu)

withstand a spectrum of watermark removal attacks [12]. Extensive targeted watermark removal attacks in different layout regions validate that `ICMarks` still maintains over 90% watermark extraction rates when the adversaries compromise a maximum of ∼2% wirelength/timing quality. In addition, the two-level augmented GW and DW signatures make the watermark strength ∼ $10^{31} \times$ stronger compared with the best prior practice [20], [19], and forging the signatures becomes exceedingly harder.

In brief, our contributions are as follows:

- We present `ICMarks`, the first watermarking scheme with both region and position constraints for the modern VLSI layouts, which does not degrade the layout quality while being robust against watermark removal and forging attacks.
- Our watermark framework features: (i) a novel search algorithm to identify the watermarked region that adheres to design constraints and incurs minimal performance degradation in *Global Watermarking*; (ii) an innovative encoding mechanism for quality-preserving signature insertion and augmented robustness in *Detailed Watermarking*.
- We conduct experiments on benchmarks of different design objectives and sizes: (i) `ICMarks` introduces no degradations on the wirelength-driven ISPD'2015 [26] and ISPD'2019 [27] benchmarks, whereas the best prior method [5] degrades the average routed wirelength by up to 1.4%; (ii) `ICMarks` shows no degradations on the timing-driven ICCAD'2015 [28] benchmarks, whereas the best prior method [20], [19] degrades the total and worst negative slack by 1.14% and 1.51% respectively [1].
- We perform comprehensive robustness analysis: (i) `ICMarks` withstands watermark removal attacks targeting different layout regions and maintains over 90% watermark extraction rates; (ii) `ICMarks` resists watermark forging attacks and the watermark strength is $10^{31} \times$ stronger compared with best prior practice [20], [19], making it hard to counterfeit the signatures.

Paper Organization: The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II provides backgrounds on VLSI placement and VLSI watermarking. Section III describes the problem definition, including watermarking goals and threat models. Section IV introduces the proposed watermarking framework `ICMarks`, including global watermarking and detailed watermarking schemes, and how these two techniques can be combined to strengthen the overall `ICMarks`. Section V presents extensive experiments on various benchmarks and demonstrates the effectiveness of `ICMarks`. Section VI evaluates `ICMarks`'s robustness. Finally, Section VII summarizes the work.

II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK

In this section, we introduce the background for VLSI placement and IC design watermarking.

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[1]The IC physical design is fragile that 0.5% performance degradation can compromise the additional efforts from the design company for quality metrics optimization [29].

A. VLSI Placement

The integrated circuit (IC) design flow starts with design specifications that are converted to register transfer level (RTL) using a hardware description language (HDL). As depicted in Fig. 1, the physical design process synthesizes the design HDL to generate a logic-level netlist comprising macros and standard cells from the technology library. A floorplanning step determines regions and locations for the design's macros and the IO (input-output) ports. Typically, the standard cells are placed during the placement stage, followed by routing all the design connectivity. The routed design is verified to ensure manufacturability and the physical layout is generated in GDSII format to send to the fabrication unit for manufacturing.


Fig. 1: The VLSI physical design process. It generates the IC layout from a design RTL through synthesis, placement, and routing stages.

With fixed macro locations, placement is an essential step in the physical design flow to determine the locations of all the standard cells in the design [29], [30], [31], [32]. It significantly impacts the quality and efficiency of the subsequent stages, including routing and manufacturing. The VLSI placement typically consists of three stages: Global Placement, Legalization, and Detailed Placement.

1) Global Placement: In the global placement stage, the placer aims to achieve roughly legal cell locations by distributing the cells across the chip area to minimize overlaps. In addition, the placer also targets other objectives, such as minimizing wirelength and ensuring timing constraints are met.

Wirelength-driven Placement: A wirelength-driven placer aims to minimize the overall wirelength W while ensuring minimal cell overlap, as specified in Eqn. 1 [33].

$$min_{x,y}W(x,y) \ s.t. \ D(x,y) < \mathcal{D} \qquad (1)$$

where (x,y) is the location of cells in the placement, and $W(x,y)$ denotes the total wirelength of all cells in the design. $D(x,y)$ is a density measure of the overlaps among the cells, and it should be below the threshold $\mathcal{D}$.

Timing-driven Placement: A timing-driven placer prioritizes optimizing timing critical paths in the design while ensuring the overlaps among the cells are minimum [34]. Given a timing endpoint t (a primary output port or an input pin of memory element) with an arrival time of $t_{AT}(t)$ and a required arrival time $t_{RAT}(p)$, the *slack* of t is calculated as follows,

$$slack(t) = t_{RAT}(t) - t_{AT}(t)$$
$$TNS = \sum_{t \in P_{end}} min(0, slack(t)) \qquad (2)$$
$$WNS = \min_{t \in P_{end}} slack(t)$$

With the timing endpoints P_{end} in the design, the total negative slack *TNS* and the worst negative slack *WNS* are computed as shown in Eqn. 2. A timing-driven placer optimizes either the *WNS* or the *TNS* to meet the timing constraint of the design.

2) Legalization: The legalization stage moves cells to eliminate the cell overlaps, ensure the row alignments, and guarantee the the design constraints are met [35], [36], [37]. The multi-row height cells are prioritized for legalization before the single-row height cells.

3) Detailed Placement: The detailed placement stage refines the legalized placement to improve design metrics such as wirelength or timing constraints [38], [39]. The refinement can be achieved by operations like (i) Swapping the positions of two cells to improve the objectives without causing legality or timing violations and (ii) Window-based approaches to find optimal cell locations within the specified region.

B. Watermarking in IC Design

Watermarking [13], [14], [15] encodes unique and confidential signatures into the IC layouts to assist product owners in proof of ownership. Design houses leverage this technique to enhance IP rights protection in the chip supply chain and detect unauthorized usages or replications. These watermarks are typically inserted in the logic design or physical design level.

1) Logic Design Watermarking: The watermarking at the logic design level focuses on safeguarding the Register Transfer Level (RTL) or netlist ownership. Designers embed unique signatures into the RTL or netlist that do not impact the core functionality and are invisible upon adversaries' inspection. The signature insertion can be categorized as follows: (i) modifying the finite state machine (FSM) to add additional inputs or unused components as watermarks [3], [4]; (ii) adding additional power components as side-channel signatures [40], [41]; and (iii) introducing unique triggers during netlist design that induces the malfunctions when the triggers are detected [42].

More recent works introduce logic locking to add additional logic gates and circuits that alter the original design's functionality when the incorrect key is applied [43], [44]; obfuscation to adding dummy logic gates or additional circuit connections to make the logic design appear differently from the original one [45], [46]. These techniques are orthogonal to the logic design watermarking, which can be combined to establish more robust intellectual property protection (IPP) frameworks.

2) Physical Design Watermarking: The watermarking at the physical design level encodes signatures onto the IC layout from two directions: (i) constraint-based watermarking [16], [17], [18], [19], [20] that uses cell position/topology as the additional constraints during physical design; (ii) invasive watermarking [5], [21], [6] that adds redundant cells or wires as the watermark signatures.

It is beneficial to watermark at the physical design stage instead of the logic design for these reasons. (i) Adding additional watermarks into the logic design needs to consider physical design criteria like timing to maintain chip quality. However, watermarking after these constraints have been optimized at the physical design stage reduces such discrepancies.

(ii) In logic design, if the logic circuits are not performing correctly after watermark insertion, designers need to revisit the RTL design in the previous stage. Physical watermarking, however, does not modify the circuits' functionalities and only changes how cells are placed or connected on the canvas.

3) Comparison: The watermarking frameworks' quality is evaluated by the following metrics.

Criteria 1 - Fidelity: The watermarked layouts shall incur minimal quality degradation compared with non-watermarked ones on metrics like wirelength and timing. Besides, the watermarked layouts should adhere to the layouts' design constraints, such as fence regions and row alignments.

Criteria 2 - Efficiency: The watermarking framework shall be efficient with minimal overheads for watermark insertion.

Criteria 3 - Robustness: The watermarked layout shall be robust against various attacks targeting to remove or forge the signature.

Note that there are other metrics like stealthiness, where watermarked layouts are invisible upon inspection, and effectiveness, in which the watermark shall be successfully extracted. The watermarking frameworks above all possess such properties. Therefore, we skip the evaluations in Table I.

Stage	WM Method	Fidelity	Efficiency	Robustness
Logic Design	Logic Design WM [3], [40], [42]	◐	○	◐
Physical Design	Invasive WM [5], [21], [6]	◐	●	○
	Constraint-based WM [19], [20], [16], [17], [18]	◐	●	●
	ICMarks	●	●	●

TABLE I: Comparison of IC watermarking (WM) frameworks. ○ framework does not meet criteria; ◐ framework partially meets criteria; ● framework completely meets criteria.

As listed in Table I, during the logic design watermarking [3], [40], [42], the impact of layout quality and robustness depends on the design of the signature insertion algorithms. The watermark encoding also has to consider the physical design criteria in the later stages, and if certain requirements or design specifications are not met, the designers need to revisit the logic design for updates. Such alignments make it less efficient to insert watermarks at the logic design stage.

The constraint-based watermarking frameworks [19], [20], [16], [17], [18] encodes signatures during the placement stage of physical design. The watermarking frameworks did not consider the new design constraints, such as macros and fence regions could lead to performance degradation. In addition, the overhead of watermark insertion remains negligible compared to the time required to optimize the IC layout. The watermarks are embedded as part of the layout. By encoding the constraints into the layout, constraint-based watermarking are robust against removal or forging attacks.

By adding redundant cells/wires, the invasive watermark [5], [21], [6] is efficient for watermark insertion, and the quality degradation depends on how the corresponding algorithm designs the insertion mechanism. Nevertheless, the encoded watermarks can be forged if the adversaries have knowledge of the watermarking algorithm.

In this work, we propose a layout watermarking scheme `ICMarks` that combines region and position constraints. It can be seamlessly integrated into the physical design pipeline without degrading the layout performance or violating IC design constraints. Besides, its two-level strategic watermark insertion augments its watermarking strength and makes it exceedingly hard for the adversary to remove or counterfeit the signature.

III. PROBLEM FORMULATION

In this section, we introduce `ICMarks`'s goal and its threat model.

A. Watermarking Goal

In the physical design stage, the IC design company invests huge efforts in identifying and fine-tuning optimization objectives for better cell placement and net routing. The optimization and customization are infused into different levels of the final layout, including (but not limited to) blocks and cells, to boost IC performance and reduce manufacturing expenses. As such, the final IC layouts constitute invaluable intellectual property, emphasizing the need to safeguard it.

`ICMarks` establishes ownership proof for the VLSI physical design by inserting watermarks into the placement stage, thereby authenticating the IP for the final layout. Fig. 2 depicts a typical scenario within the supply chain. The IC design company D uses highly customized and optimized placement and routing algorithms to enhance physical design quality. The layout L_D from the physical design stage is watermarked and sent to the fabrication company for manufacturing. The manufactured ICs are verified for their functionalities in the test company. The design company D can employ reverse engineering approaches [24], [25] to extract the logic netlist and all standard cell locations from an IC layout in GDSII format, and employ `ICMarks` to decode the signature for ownership verification.


Fig. 2: IC layout watermark scenario in the supply chain. The design company watermarks the IC layout manufacturing and testing.

B. Threat Model

The adversary $\mathcal{A}$ in the fabricate or test company aims to steal the layout and stop D from claiming its ownership by executing different attacks.

Adversary's Locations: We consider the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ to be in the fabrication or test company and has access to the layouts produced by the design company.

Adversary's Objective: Adversary $\mathcal{A}$'s objective is to (i) prevent design company D from ownership proof by removing or forging the encoded signature; (ii) the attacked layout performance, such as wirelength or timing metrics shall not be significantly compromised.

Adversary's Capacities: We consider an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ with the following capacities: (i) The adversary $\mathcal{A}$ has access to the layout L_D. However, he cannot reverse-engineer the optimizations and customizations to reproduce L_D because they are infused into every level of the design. (ii) The adversary $\mathcal{A}$ has access to open-source physical design tools to remove or forge the watermark. He also knows the general algorithms to watermark the layout. However, the random seeds, signatures, and insertion parameters are beyond his reach.

IV. ICMARKS DESIGN

This section presents the proposed layout watermarking `ICMarks`, a two-level scheme that inserts watermarks during multiple stages of VLSI placement. In Section IV-A, we introduce the *Global Watermarking* method. Next, we propose an independent embedding of the watermark signatures as *Detailed Watermarking* in Section IV-B. While *Global* and *Detailed Watermarking* can be used independently for IP protection, ICMarks combines both techniques to take advantage of their best properties.

A. Global Watermarking (GW)

Global Watermarking embeds watermarks during the global placement stage. The watermarks, including a pre-defined watermarked region and associated cells in the region, are embedded as a co-optimization term during global placement. The co-optimization objective is to ensure only those associated cells are placed in the watermarked region.

1) GW Watermark Selection: Given the original, optimized placement denoting the position of all cells as P_{ori}, we employ a sliding window-based algorithm that traverses the placement to search for a region to watermark as in Fig. 3. An ideal watermarked region should meet three criteria: (i) the number of cells N_c within the region should be sufficient to accommodate the required number of signature bits N_w; (ii) the total cell area S_{cell} within the watermark region are S shall be small, thereby providing ample space for watermarked cells to maneuver; and (iii) the cells area $S_{overlap}$ overlap on the watermarked region boundary shall be minimized, such that their displacement from the watermarked region has minimal impact on the layout performance. These requirements are incorporated into an evaluation function f, as illustrated in Eqn. 3, to evaluate each region of the original placement P_{ori}.

$$f = \alpha \frac{N_w}{N_c} + \beta \frac{S_{cell}}{S} + \gamma \frac{S_{overlap}}{S} \quad (3)$$

The scoring function is balanced by adjusting the weights α, β, γ, where $\alpha, \beta, \gamma \in [0, 1]$. The scores of the traversed regions are then normalized into a range of $[0, 1]$. For regions that are nested within macros or other fence regions and any region where $N_c < N_w$, the evaluation function f yields the highest evaluation scores as 1.0, rendering the regions not suitable for inserting GW watermarks. The region with the minimum score is chosen as our target watermarked region R_w, and the set of associated cells within the region is denoted as C_{w1}.

Fig. 3: Global watermarking pipeline with stride = sliding window size.

2) GW Watermark Insertion: The watermarked region R_w and its associated cells C_{w1} is formulated as the additional watermarked region constraint in the placement objective. It enforces the associated cells C_{w1} to be in the watermarked region R_w and other cells to be out of R_w. For a design with K fence regions, the placement formulation includes watermarked region R_w as the additional optimization constraints, as specified in Eqn. 4 [47].

$$\min_v \quad \sum_{e \in E} W(e; v) + \lambda D(v),$$
$$\text{s.t.} \quad v_k = (x_k, y_k) \in R_k, \quad k = 0, \cdots, R_K, R_w, \quad (4)$$

W is the wirelength term and D is the cell density term with density multiplier λ. v denotes the (x, y) location of cell and $e \in E$ is the design net. The watermarked region R_w is added as an additional region constraint with associated cells C_{w1} to obtain a watermarked placement P_w.

GW Watermark Strength: Different hyperparameter settings α, β, γ result in different minimum-scored watermarked regions and associated cells. The p-value denoted as P_c in statistical Null Hypothesis test [48] measures the probability of a layout carrying the watermark purely by coincidence. A smaller P_c means a stronger watermark signature insertion. The probability that an overlapping cell is out of the watermarked region R_w is denoted as p, and the probability that the overlapping cell is in or overlaps R_w is $1 - p$. We measure the probability that x or more cells match the watermarking condition, that is, they are out of the watermarked region, as the probability of P_c in Eqn. 5. Here, $\mathbf{C}$ is the number of combinations of selecting i elements from $|N_o|$ distinct elements. The placement algorithms tend to place cells more compactly, which means the probability of a cell being away from its original place $p < 0.5$. In Eqn. 5, P_c is an increasing function of p when $p \in [0, 0.5]$. For simplicity of computation, we set $p = 0.5$ as an upper bound for P_c. In reality, P_c is even smaller because the position and size of the watermarked region are not revealed to the adversary, and it introduces more randomness to strengthen P_c.

$$P_c = \sum_{i=x}^{|N_o|} \left(\mathbf{C}(|N_o|, i) \cdot (1-p)^{|N_o|-i} \cdot (p)^i \right) \quad (5)$$

3) GW Watermark Extraction: The design owner asserts ownership by employing the watermarked region R_w to extract cells C'_{w1} within the region and comparing these with the associated cells C_{w1} and non-associated cells C_{w1o}. The

extraction rate of the watermark, denoted as WER_{GW}, is calculated in Eqn. 6.

$$\%WER_{GW} = 100 \times \frac{|(C'_{w1} \cap C_{w1}) - (C'_{w1} \cap C_{w1o})|}{|C_{w1}|} \quad (6)$$

B. Detailed Watermarking (DW)

In *Detailed Watermarking*, the watermarked cells are embedded by moving them slightly along the x- or y-axis after legalization. A follow-up detailed placement stage compensates for the performance degradation from the watermark insertion.

1) DW Watermark Selection: The *Detailed Watermarking* moves cells along the x- or y-axis to insert watermarks into the design. Randomly selecting watermarked cells and moving them without considering the dense interconnection could lead to significant performance degradation. To avoid this, *Detailed Watermarking* only selects cells that will not overlap with their neighbors after cell movements as the watermark as shown in Fig. 4.


Fig. 4: Detailed watermarking pipeline with Candidate cells from which Watermarked cells are selected.

Algorithm 1 outlines how *Detailed Watermarking* identifies cells that will not overlap with neighbors during watermarking movements and subsequently inserts the signature. It starts by comparing the positions of cells within each row and identifying the cell indices that can move $|d_x|$ along the x-axis. Then, the algorithm compares cells across adjacent rows to determine if they can be moved up or down for $|d_y|$. The cells C_x with room along the x-axis and C_y with room along the y-axis are identified as candidate cells for watermarking. D_x and D_y are associated with these candidate cells to retain a record of their movement directions and distances.

2) DW Watermark Insertion: At the end of legalization with placement $P_{lg} = (X_{lg}, Y_{lg})$, cells are moved along the x- or y-axis to insert unique watermark signatures hashed as N bit sequences B_N. If the i-th bit in the signature B_N is 1, the cell c_i randomly selected from the candidate watermarked cell set C_x is moved along the x-axis for $D_x[c_i]$. If the i-th signature bit is 0, the cell c_i is randomly chosen from the candidate watermarked cell set C_y and moved along the y-axis for $D_y[c_i]$. The resulting placement is denoted as intermediate placement $P_{itr} = (X_{itr}, Y_{itr})$, and the indices of the cells moved along the x- or y-axis form the watermarked cells C_{w2}. These movements are performed before detailed placement, allowing possible performance degradation to be compensated during the subsequent detailed placement phase and yield a watermarked solution $P_{wm} = (X_{wm}, Y_{wm})$. The selected watermarked cells C_{w2}, and their corresponding position distance $\text{Dist} = P_{itr}(C_{w2}) - P_{wm}(C_{w2})$ between

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Algorithm 1: DW Watermark Selection and Insertion

Require: Legalized placement (X_{lg}, Y_{lg}), Signature B_N, Unit distance $|d_x|$ and $|d_y|$
Ensure: Watermarked cells C_{w2}, Placement (X_{wm}, Y_{wm})
1: Initialize empty sets C_x, C_y, D_x, D_y
2: **for** $r = 0$ to total_num_rows **do**
3:    **for** c in cells_in_row(r) **do**
4:       **if** is_movable_x(c) **then**
5:          Append c to C_x
6:          $s =$ get_direction_x(c) // left: -1; right: 1
7:          Add $(s \times |d_x|)$ to D_x
8:       **if** is_movable_y(c) **then**
9:          Add c to C_y
10:         $s =$ get_direction_y(c) // down: -1; up: 1
11:         Add $(s \times |d_y|)$ to D_y
12: Random shuffle C_x and C_y
13: $X_{itr}, Y_{itr} = X_{lg}, Y_{lg}$
14: **for** $i = 0$ to $|B_N|$ **do**
15:    **if** $B_N[i] == 1$ **then**
16:       $c_i =$ random_choose(C_x) // no replacement
17:       $X_{itr}[c_i] = X_{lg}[c_i] + D_x[c_i]$
18:    **else**
19:       $c_i =$ random_choose(C_y) // no replacement
20:       $Y_{itr}[c_i] = Y_{lg}[c_i] + D_y[c_i]$
21:    Add c_i to C_{w2}
22: $X_{wm}, Y_{wm} = detailed\_placement(X_{itr}, Y_{itr})$
23: **return** C_{w2}, X_{wm}, Y_{wm}

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intermediate placement $P_{itr}(C_{w2})$ and the watermarked placement $P_{wm}(C_{w2})$ constitute the watermark.

DW Watermark Strength: The p-value P_c to measure the probability of a layout carrying the watermark purely by coincidence can be formulated by Eqn. 7. P_{cx} is the probability of cells moving along the x-axis being the same as the watermarked cells, and P_{cy} is the probability of cells moving along the y-axis being the same as the watermarked cells.

$$P_c = P_{cx} \cdot P_{cy} \tag{7}$$

In Eqn. 8, P_{cx} is the probability of x or more cells match the watermarked cells along x-axis as C_{wx}, and the $p_x = \frac{|C_{wx}|}{|C_x|}$ is the probability of the watermarked cells C_{wx} are chosen from all of the candidate cells C_x. Similarly, P_{cy} is the probability of y or more cells match the watermarked cells along the y-axis, and the $p_y = \frac{|C_{wy}|}{|C_y|}$. Given $|C_x| \gg |C_{wx}|$ and $|C_y| \gg |C_{wy}|$, the above p_x and p_y can be viewed as the approximate probability for no replacement watermarked cell selection.

$$P_{cx} = \sum_{i=x}^{|C_{wx}|} \cdot \mathbf{C}(|C_{wx}|, i) \cdot (p_x)^i \cdot (1 - p_x)^{X-i}$$
$$P_{cy} = \sum_{j=y}^{|C_{wx}|} \cdot \mathbf{C}(|C_{wy}|, j) \cdot (p_y)^j \cdot (1 - p_y)^{Y-j} \tag{8}$$

3) DW Watermark Extraction: The design owner detects watermarks in the placement P' by comparing the watermarked cell C_{w2} position with the intermediate placement P_{itr} and calculates the new distance Dist$'$ as $P_{itr}(C_{w2}) - P'(C_{w2})$. If C'_{w2} cells in the extracted Dist$'$ matches the Dist both along x- and y-axis, the watermark extraction rate is calculated as Eqn. 9.

$$\%WER_{DW} = 100 \times \frac{|C'_{w2}|}{|C_{w2}|} \tag{9}$$

C. *ICMarks Watermarking*

As a combination of both the GW and the DW, ICMarks applies global watermarking during its global placement stage and detailed watermarking on top of the watermarked region before its detailed placement stage. By combining these two watermarking schemes, the inserted watermark strength is further augmented.


Fig. 5: ICMarks framework. ICMarks first applies global watermarking during its global placement and then applies detailed watermarking on top of the watermarked region before the detailed placement.

1) ICMarks Watermark Insertion: As in Fig. 5, ICMarks employs a hybrid approach that combines *Global* and *Detailed Watermarking* to produce stronger watermarks. Initially, ICMarks searches for a watermarked region using the strategy akin to *Global Watermarking*, yielding a watermarked region R_w and associated cells C_{w1}. ICMarks runs global placement and legalization with such watermark constraints. Then, it perturbs cells along the x- and y-axis within the watermarked region R_w, following the approach of *Detailed Watermarking* and obtain an intermediate placement P_{itr}. Afterward, the detailed placement proceeds to compensate for watermarking degradation and produce the watermarked placement P_{wm}. The perturbed distance Dist and cells C_{w2} are the watermarks in the second step.

ICMarks Watermark Strength: Due to the combination of global and detailed watermarking, the watermark strength P_c of ICMarks is further augmented. To coincidentally carry the watermark, one has to overcome both the signatures from the global and detailed watermarking. Given the watermark strength of the global watermarking to be P_{cg} and the detailed watermarking to be P_{cd}, where the $|C_x|$ and $|C_y|$ are changed to the number of cells available to move in the watermarked region. We get the ICMarks's P_c as in Eqn. 10, further minimizing the coincidental probability.

$$P_c = P_{cg} \cdot P_{cd} \tag{10}$$

2) ICMarks Watermark Extraction: To claim ownership of the layout, given the cell positions P', the watermark holder can use the following two steps. (i) The extraction of the watermarks C'_{w1} from the watermarked region R_w, with the global extraction rate denoted as in Eqn. 6. (ii) Afterwards, the inserted signatures are extracted by comparing $P' - P_{itr}$ with Dist at the watermarked cell indices C_{w2}. The number of cells successfully matched is denoted as C'_{w2}, from which the detailed extraction rate is calculated as in Eqn. 9. The final WER is calculated in Eqn. 11.

$$\%WER_{\texttt{ICMarks}} = 100 \times \frac{WER_{GW} + WER_{DW}}{2} \qquad (11)$$

V. Experiments

In this section, we first introduce the experiment setups in Section V-A. Then, we evaluate the performance of wirelength-driven and timing-driven design watermarking in Section V-B. Next, we show the robustness of ICMarks under attacks in Section VI.

A. Experimental Setup

Datasets: We evaluate the watermarking impact on wirelength-driven benchmark suites: ISPD'2015 [26] and ISPD'2019 [27]; and the timing-driven ICCAD'2015 [28] benchmark suite. All designs in the ICCAD'2015 benchmark suite are large and contain more than 700k cells. The statistics of these designs are summarized in Table II, with designs having fence regions marked in blue. The macros, fence regions, and IO pin locations in the benchmarks are fixed.

Suite	Design	Cells	Nets	Size	Stride	α	β	γ
ISPD 2015 (WL)	perf_a	108K	115K	10	5	0.1	0.1	1
	perf_b	113K	113K	10	5	0.1	0.1	1
	dist_a	127K	134K	20	5	0.1	0.1	1
	mult_b	146K	152K	10	5	0.1	0.1	1
	mult_c	146K	152K	20	5	0.1	0.1	1
	pci_a	30K	34K	10	5	0.1	0.1	1
	pci_b	29K	33K	20	5	0.1	0.1	1
	superblue11	926K	936K	100	40	0.1	0.5	1
	superblue16	680K	697K	50	10	0.1	0.1	1
	perf_1	113K	113K	50	10	0.1	0.5	1
	fft_1	35K	33K	10	5	0.1	0.1	1
	fft_2	35K	33K	10	5	0.1	0.1	1
	fft_a	34K	32K	10	5	0.1	0.1	1
	fft_b	34K	32K	20	5	0.1	0.1	1
	mult_1	160K	159K	50	10	0.1	0.5	1
	mult_2	160K	159K	50	10	0.1	0.5	1
	mult_a	154K	154K	50	10	0.1	0.5	1
	superblue12	1293K	1293K	50	10	0.1	0.1	1
	superblue14	634K	620K	50	10	0.1	0.1	1
	superblue19	522K	512K	100	10	0.1	0.5	1
ISPD 2019 (WL)	ispd19test1	9K	3K	10	5	0.1	0.1	1
	ispd19test2	73K	72K	10	5	0.1	0.1	1
	ispd19test3	8K	9K	20	5	0.5	0.1	1
	ispd19test4	151K	146K	10	5	0.1	0.1	1
	ispd19test5	29K	29K	10	5	0.1	0.1	1
	ispd19test6	181K	180K	50	10	0.1	0.1	1
	ispd19test7	362K	359K	100	10	0.1	0	1
	ispd19test8	543K	538K	50	10	0.1	0.5	1
	ispd19test9	903K	895K	200	20	0.1	0.1	1
	ispd19test10	903K	895K	200	20	0.1	0.5	1
ICCAD 2015 (Timing)	superblue1	1209k	1215k	100	50	0.1	0	1
	superblue3	1213k	1224k	100	30	0.1	0	1
	superblue4	795k	802k	100	50	0.1	0	1
	superblue5	1086k	1100k	100	50	0.1	0.1	1
	superblue7	1931k	1933k	100	30	0.1	0	1
	superblue10	1876k	1898k	100	30	0.1	0.1	1
	superblue16	981k	999k	100	30	0.1	0	1
	superblue18	768k	771k	100	50	0.1	0	1

TABLE II: Benchmark statistics and hyperparameters. The designs with fence regions are in blue. The sliding window's size and stride are multiples of the adjacent row-height.

Experiment Setup: ICMarks is implemented with Python 3.9 and benchmarked on a Linux Ubuntu system equipped with NVIDIA TITAN XP GPUs, each with 12 GB RAM, and 48 Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPUs, accompanied by 128 GB

RAM. The watermarking methodology of ICMarks can be integrated into any VLSI physical design framework, and we chose to build upon the open-source placement framework, DREAMPlace [47] to demonstrate its viability. The DREAM-Place [47] accelerates the state-of-the-art placement algorithm ePlace [49]/RePlAce [50] on a GPU and maintains the same level of performance. For routing, we employ the open-source state-of-the-art framework CUGR [51]. For timing-driven benchmark suite, we use DREAMPlace 4.0 [34] where the timing metrics are measured by OpenTimer [52].

Hyperparameters: For the hyperparameters, we perform a grid search for the GW phase. In the search of Eqn. 3, the $\alpha = \{0.1, 0, 0.5\}$, $\beta = \{0.1, 0, 0.5\}$, and $\gamma = 1$. The search terminates when the watermarked layout quality is not compromised. For all the considered benchmark suites, we report the GW hyperparameters in Table II. In the DW phase, $d_x = 1$, and d_y is set to one adjacent row-height.

Baseline: We choose the following state-of-the-art watermarking frameworks as our baselines: (i) topology constraint-based **Row Parity** [20], [19] that inserts unique bit sequences as watermarks by shifting cells to different rows in the placement stage. Cells with a 1-bit are moved to an odd row, while cells with a 0-bit are moved to an even row; (ii) position constraint-based **Cell Scattering** [5] that employs pseudorandom coordinate transformation (PRCT) algorithms to scatter the watermarked cells on the chip canvas as watermarks. Cells with 1-bit are moved along the y-axis, and cells with 0-bit are moved along the x-axis if they do not overlap with their neighbors; (iii) invasive **Buffer Insertion** [6] that adds additional buffers as watermarks without affecting timing critical paths during the placement stage. Two buffers are inserted to represent 0-bit, and one buffer is inserted to represent 1-bit.

We skip the baselines that: (i) have different watermarking targets. [18], [17] are designed for smaller full-custom IC designs, [53], [54] are designed for FPGAs, whereas our watermarking targets are modern digital VLSI designs; (ii) have similar watermarking approaches as our baselines, and we use the baselines as a proof-of-concept. [16] inserts flip-flops instead of buffers into the layouts as watermarks. The signature length is set to 50-bit for all frameworks.

Evaluation Metrics: For the wirelength-driven benchmark suites, whose quality is measured by the layout wirelength, we use three metrics to evaluate the watermark performance:(i) **Placement WireLength Rate (PWLR)**: The rate of estimated half-perimeter wirelength (HPWL) of watermarked layout compared to the original one; (ii) **Routing WireLength Rate (RWLR)**: The rate of routed wirelength of watermarked layout compared to the original one; (iii) **Watermark Extraction Rate (WER)**: The percentage of signatures extracted from the watermarked layout. For the timing-driven benchmark suite, whose quality is measured by the timing slack, we use three metrics to evaluate the performance under static timing analysis [52]: (i) **Total Negative Slack Rate (TNSR)**: The rate of total negative slack (TNS) of watermarked layout compared to original one; (ii) **Worst Negative Slack Rate (WNSR)**:The rate of worst negative slack (WNS) of watermarked layout compared to original one; (iii) **Watermark Extraction Rate**

Design	Row Parity [20], [19]		Cell Scattering [5]		Buffer Insertion [6]		ICMarks: GW		ICMarks: DW		ICMarks: GW+DW	
	PWLR ↓	RWLR ↓	PWLR ↓	RWLR ↓	PWLR ↓	RWLR ↓	PWLR ↓	RWLR ↓	PWLR ↓	RWLR ↓	PWLR ↓	RWLR ↓
perf_a ⋆	1.0045	1.0155	0.9978	0.9967	1.5289	2.3270	0.9976	0.9873	0.9994	1.0003	**0.9972**	**0.9873**
perf_b	1.0058	1.0267	1.0020	1.0001	1.0176	1.0745	0.9930	0.9901	0.9990	1.0002	**0.9890**	**0.9901**
dist_a	1.0015	0.9999	0.9984	0.9965	1.0995	1.1072	1.0004	1.0052	0.9998	1.0005	**1.0004**	**1.0052**
mult_b ⋆	1.0047	1.0199	0.9991	0.9923	1.8966	2.9374	1.0010	1.0028	1.0002	1.0044	**0.9994**	**1.0028**
mult_c ⋆	1.0031	1.0252	0.9980	1.0023	1.6003	2.7459	1.0017	0.9979	0.9990	1.0020	**0.9963**	**0.9979**
pci_a ⋆	1.0080	1.0340	0.9931	0.9846	1.6269	1.6849	1.0361	1.0048	1.0011	1.0021	**0.9997**	**0.9950**
pci_b ⋆	1.0069	1.1173	0.9912	0.9977	1.2239	1.8207	0.9951	1.0026	0.9997	1.0008	**0.9951**	**1.0026**
superblue11 ⋆	1.0052	1.0344	1.0278	1.0358	1.6930	3.7086	0.9992	0.9992	0.9995	1.0005	**0.9986**	**0.9992**
superblue16	1.0030	1.0210	0.9988	0.9989	1.1023	1.1377	1.0018	1.0204	**1.0000**	**1.0000**	1.0017	1.0204
perf_1	1.0035	1.0199	0.9985	0.9983	1.0150	1.0642	1.0031	0.9973	1.0042	1.0019	**0.9964**	**0.9973**
fft_1	1.0017	1.0260	1.0167	1.0156	1.0680	1.1457	0.9671	0.9673	1.0026	0.9975	**0.9671**	**0.9673**
fft_2 ⋆	1.0050	1.0260	1.0148	1.0114	1.4603	1.4476	0.9767	0.9770	1.0027	0.9996	**0.9767**	**0.9770**
fft_a ⋆	1.0121	1.0200	1.0024	0.9933	1.8203	2.1923	0.9939	0.9895	1.0075	1.0094	**0.9939**	**0.9895**
fft_b ⋆	1.0018	1.0075	0.9961	1.0030	1.9859	2.5615	0.9909	0.9890	0.9991	1.0036	**0.9909**	**0.9890**
mult_1	1.0050	1.0238	1.0077	1.0065	1.0464	1.0631	0.9753	0.9744	1.0004	1.0008	**0.9753**	**0.9744**
mult_2	1.0033	1.0199	0.9984	0.9967	1.0736	1.1147	0.9867	0.9900	0.9990	0.9992	**0.9852**	**0.9900**
mult_a ⋆	1.0037	1.0105	0.9995	0.9968	1.3862	1.6738	0.9973	0.9916	1.0005	0.9958	**0.9973**	**0.9916**
superblue12	1.0031	1.0067	0.9979	0.9956	1.0683	1.1044	1.0036	0.9732	0.9994	0.9942	**0.9854**	**0.9732**
superblue14	1.0020	1.0057	0.9991	0.9981	1.0212	1.0286	**0.9851**	0.9867	1.0001	1.0000	0.9887	0.9867
superblue19	1.0025	1.0077	1.0001	1.0005	1.0295	1.0672	0.9881	0.9809	1.0003	1.0001	**0.9814**	**0.9809**
Average: FR	1.0047	1.0322	1.0006	1.0005	1.0724	1.1061	1.0028	1.0011	0.9997	1.0012	**0.9975**	**1.0000**
Average: All	1.0043	1.0231	1.0018	1.0012	1.0536	1.0901	0.9946	0.9913	1.0007	1.0006	**0.9908**	**0.9908**

TABLE III: Performance on the ISPD'2015 benchmarks [26]. All the design watermarks are successfully extracted, i.e., WER = 100%. The PWLR and RWLR are the placement and routed wirelength rates over the original designs. FR is fence region. The results in gray fail buffer insertion WM with significant degradation on the high-utilized designs (denoted with ⋆).

Design	Row Parity [20], [19]		Cell Scattering [5]		Buffer Insertion [6]		ICMarks: GW		ICMarks: DW		ICMarks: GW+DW	
	PWLR ↓	RWLR ↓	PWLR ↓	RWLR ↓	PWLR ↓	RWLR ↓	PWLR ↓	RWLR ↓	PWLR ↓	RWLR ↓	PWLR ↓	RWLR ↓
ispd19test1	1.0060	1.0129	0.9978	0.9998	1.0394	1.0619	0.9995	1.0015	1.0023	1.0043	**0.9955**	**1.0015**
ispd19test2	1.0184	1.0201	1.0096	1.0016	1.0127	1.0408	**0.9981**	0.9999	1.0021	1.0003	0.9988	**0.9999**
ispd19test3	1.0130	1.0475	1.0180	1.0193	1.0582	1.0801	1.0059	1.0045	**0.9961**	**0.9976**	1.0059	1.0045
ispd19test4	1.0017	1.0050	0.9999	0.9998	1.1452	1.2494	0.9957	0.9907	0.9998	1.0028	**0.9957**	**0.9907**
ispd19test5	1.0102	1.0556	1.0998	1.0975	0.9859	1.0121	1.0013	0.9998	**0.9996**	**0.9968**	1.0013	0.9998
ispd19test6	1.0032	1.0106	0.9994	0.9993	1.0044	1.1108	1.0023	1.0026	**1.0001**	**0.9997**	1.0023	1.0026
ispd19test7	1.0028	1.0160	1.0136	1.0109	1.0003	1.0717	1.0050	1.0054	**1.0000**	**0.9997**	1.0050	1.0054
ispd19test8	1.0001	1.0082	0.9966	0.9958	1.0118	1.0806	0.9961	0.9929	0.9999	0.9996	**0.9961**	**0.9929**
ispd19test9	1.0072	1.0108	1.0108	1.0095	1.0164	1.0814	1.0023	1.0023	**1.0009**	**0.9999**	1.0023	1.0023
ispd19test10	1.0025	1.0090	1.0043	1.0108	1.0378	1.0982	0.9972	0.9967	0.9999	1.0002	**0.9972**	**0.9966**
Average	1.0065	1.0194	1.0060	1.0140	1.0304	1.0871	1.0003	0.9996	1.0001	1.0001	**1.0000**	**0.9996**

TABLE IV: Performance on ISPD'2019 benchmarks [27]. All the design watermarks are successfully extracted, i.e., WER = 100%. The PWLR and RWLR are the placement and routed wirelength rates over the original designs.

Design	Row Parity [20], [19]		Cell Scattering [5]		Buffer Insertion [6]		ICMarks: GW		ICMarks: DW		ICMarks: GW+DW	
	TNSR ↓	WNSR ↓	TNSR ↓	WNSR ↓	TNSR ↓	WNSR ↓	TNSR ↓	WNSR ↓	TNSR ↓	WNSR ↓	TNSR ↓	WNSR ↓
superblue1	1.0053	1.0094	1.0119	1.0026	1.0083	1.0020	0.9001	**0.8514**	1.0256	1.0249	**0.8283**	1.0021
superblue3	1.0053	1.0176	1.0066	0.9891	1.1035	1.0988	**0.9302**	**0.9029**	1.0035	0.9884	0.9363	0.9047
superblue4	1.1299	0.9914	0.9698	1.0191	1.1954	1.1995	**0.9037**	**0.9370**	0.9554	0.9930	0.9221	1.0094
superblue5	0.9801	**0.9887**	1.0126	0.9977	1.0932	1.1174	0.9159	1.0001	0.9922	0.9959	**0.9159**	1.0508
superblue7	0.9801	0.9932	0.9979	1.0212	0.9933	1.0199	**0.9584**	0.9758	0.9934	1.0199	0.9636	**0.9727**
superblue10	1.0099	**1.0041**	1.0218	1.0141	1.0194	1.2918	1.0069	1.0072	**1.0058**	1.0068	1.0069	1.0072
superblue16	0.9814	1.1271	0.9067	1.3274	1.0109	1.0877	1.0166	1.0473	**0.9060**	1.3485	1.0069	**1.0072**
superblue18	1.0068	0.9965	0.9981	1.0064	1.0438	1.0613	0.9337	**0.9403**	1.0014	1.0002	**0.9254**	0.9449
Average	1.0114	1.0151	0.9900	1.0424	1.0566	1.1063	0.9448	**0.9559**	0.9848	1.0418	**0.9366**	0.9867

TABLE V: Performance on ICCAD'2015 benchmarks [28]. All the design watermarks are successfully extracted, i.e., WER = 100%. The TNSR and WNSR are the total and worst negative slack rates over the original designs.

(WER): The percentage of signatures extracted from the layout. The rate average is calculated by the geometric mean [55] of designs' metrics.

To preserve the optimized outcomes from the physical design algorithms, we set a threshold of layout quality degradation to not exceed 0.5%. Because surpassing this threshold would counteract the benefits derived from the performance enhancement efforts in physical design [29].

B. Experimental Results

1) Wirelength-driven Watermarking Fidelity: The performance of different watermarking schemes is tabulated in Table III for the ISPD'2015 benchmarks [26], and in Table IV for the ISPD'2019 benchmarks [27]. For all the layouts in Table III-Table IV, their inserted watermarks can be successfully extracted. Therefore, we evaluate how much layout performance is compromised to accommodate such watermark insertion among these watermarking frameworks.

Comparison with Prior Constraint-based Watermarking [20], [19], [5]: Among the two benchmark suites, ICMarks results in no PWLR and RWLR degradation for

accommodating the 50-bit signature. In contrast, the topology constraint-based Row Parity [20], [19] changes the row index of the cells to encode watermarks but does not consider potential design constraints (e.g., fence regions and macros) in VLSI design. As a result, it results in 2.31% and 1.94% routed wirelength (RWLR) degradation on ISPD'2015 [26] and ISPD'2019 [27], respectively. The position constraint-based Cell Scattering [5] perturbs cell locations in the optimized layout for signature insertion. However, randomly selecting and moving watermarked cells after the optimization is done results in quality degradation, as reflected by the 0.12% and 1.4% RWLR degradation over the original design on ISPD'2015 [26] and ISPD'2019 [27].

Comparison with Invasive Watermarking [6]: The invasive watermarking Buffer Insertion [6] overlooks the additional design constraints, like fence regions and macros, in the modern VLSI design. The additional 50 buffers might be added close to such design constraints and result in significant cell displacement, as the design has to accommodate the buffers while satisfying the design constraints. As in Table III-Table IV, Buffer Insertion [6] introduced 9.01% and 8.71% routed wirelength (RWLR) degradation on ISPD'2015 [26] and ISPD'2019 [27] benchmarks. `ICMarks`, however, has no wirelength degradation on both benchmarks. Besides, for the highly-utilized designs, where most of the layout space is filled with standard cell and fixed marcos/fence regions/IO pins, to accommodate the additional buffers, cells have to be displaced significantly from their non-watermarked position for buffer insertion. As such, it introduced significant PWLR and RWLR degradations as the grey numbers in Table III.

DW Insertion Before/After Detailed Placement: After the placement stage is finished, the baseline Cell Scattering [5] moves cells in the layout along the x/y axis if there is space. The key difference is Cell Scattering [5] performs the movement after detailed placement, whereas the `ICMarks: DW` is performed before detailed placement. As seen in Table III-IV, `ICMarks: DW` improves the RWLR quality from Cell Scattering [5] by 0.06% and 1.39%, respectively.

Comparison with the GW and DW submodules: As a combination of GW and DW, `ICMarks` takes advantage of their strength and further reduces the performance degradation from accommodating watermarks. In contrast to GW, `ICMarks` slightly improves the placement quality. This improvement stems from modifying cell positions within a designated region, either across different rows or along the x-axis. Such modifications inherently disturb solutions formulated during global placement. Given that these disturbances occur in less compact regions, they provide different inputs to the detailed placement process, thereby offering potential optimization trajectories to minimize overall wirelength. The optimization to GW depends on the quality of the perturbations introduced, where the refinement on ISPD'2019 [27] is marginal, and the improvement on ISPD'2015 [26] is 0.05% over GW.

Compared with DW, `ICMarks` watermarks upon the placement solution from GW, whereas DW watermarks the original solution. The additional co-optimization of the GW watermarked region makes the placer further refine the cell po-

sitions in the watermarked region and, thus, improves the watermarked layout quality. By encoding DW signature on the GW layout, `ICMarks` introduced no quality degradations. In contrast, DW watermarks upon the original placement solution, which could introduce more performance degradation when inserting DW signatures. It is reflected by the 0.06% and 0.01% RWLR improvement over the original design on ISPD'2015 [26] and ISPD'2019 [27] benchmarks, respectively.

2) Timing-driven Watermarking Fidelity: As depicted in Table V, `ICMarks` continuously preserves the layout quality in timing-driven watermarking benchmark ICCAD'2015 [28]. By strategically searching for the watermarked region and cells with minimal impact on the performance, `ICMarks` results in no WNS and TNS degradation. On the opposite, the constraint-based Row Parity [20], [19] and Cell Scattering [5] overlook design constraints in modern VLSI design and did not design the watermarking algorithms with the timing optimization objectives. It results in 1.51% and 4.24% WNSR degradation over the original designs, respectively. Furthermore, while Buffer Insertion [6] encodes additional buffers on the non-timing critical path, the inserted buffers still result in 5.66% TNSR and 10.63% WNSR timing metrics degradation.

3) Watermarking Capacity: The watermarking capacity is measured by the maximum length of watermark bits that can be inserted into the layout without significantly degrading the layout quality. For Row Parity [20], [19], Cell Scattering [5], and `ICMarks: DW`, the signature length corresponds to the moved/inserted cell number. For Buffer Insertion [6], the length is the number of buffer-inserted nets. For `ICMarks: GW`, the signature length corresponds to the N_w in Eqn. 3. For `ICMarks`, the signature length corresponds to the N_w cells in global watermarking and moves N_w cell over the watermarked region in the detailed watermarking.

We use ISPD'2019 [27] as the benchmarking target and display the results in Fig. 6. As seen, the maximum bits that can be inserted by Row Parity and Cell Scattering are both less than 30 bits. Both methods move the cells across rows after the detailed placement as watermarks, which leads to worse RWLR than PWLR, as the router has to cross rows to connect the cells. Buffer Insertion [6] inserts signatures without considering the design constraints, leading to significant cell displacement after signature insertion. Therefore, it exhibits low watermarking capacity on ISPD'2019 [27]. The `ICMarks: DW`'s capacity is larger and reaches ~ 100 bits. Because it moves the cells before detailed placement and the subsequent detailed placement compensates for the watermark insertion. `ICMarks: GW` and `ICMarks` further outperform the scheme. They both demonstrate a capacity of more than 200 bits by exploring the less compact region for watermark encoding. Since `ICMarks` builds the watermarking scheme on top of `ICMarks: GW`, the two PWLR and RWLR lines are close in Fig. 6.

4) Watermarking Strength: To successfully prove ownership, the owner not only needs to provide the signatures but also the exact distance information for `ICMarks: DW`; cell ID, and region positions for `ICMarks: GW`. The watermarking strength, if all watermarks are successfully extracted, is

Fig. 6: Watermarking capacity for different frameworks on ISPD'2019 benchmarks [27]. We consider the threshold for acceptable degradation layout quality as 0.5%. The red ⬡ indicates PWLR and RWLR are higher than the 5% limit.

$\sim 10^{-15}$ for Row Parity [20], [19], but will be 1.25×10^{-46} for `ICMarks` following Eqn. 10. As in Table VI, 50-bit signature provides sufficient protection to the layout.

Signature	ICMarks: GW	ICMarks: DW	ICMarks: GW + DW
30 bits	5.68×10^{-14}	1.91×10^{-55}	4.93×10^{-32}
50 bits	1.69×10^{-21}	7.88×10^{-81}	1.25×10^{-46}
100 bits	1.50×10^{-36}	7.88×10^{-131}	1.43×10^{-74}

TABLE VI: Watermarking strength for different signature lengths by the proposed `ICMarks` watermarking framework.

5) Watermarking Efficiency: The watermarking efficiency is benchmarked by the fraction of the additional time takes for `ICMarks`'s watermark insertion compared to the overall physical design stage, primarily placement and routing. We include the average time takes to encode 50-bit signatures onto the ISPD'2015 benchmark [26] and ISPD'2019 benchmark [27] in Table VII. The non-WM time and WM time is the average (geometric-mean) time it takes for placement and routing on the non-watermarked and watermarked layout. The Slow Down is the percentage overhead `ICMarks` introduced to the overall placement and routing phase. As seen, the time taken for watermark insertion is ~10% compared with the overall placement and routing stage, making `ICMarks` efficient for watermarking. Besides, no additional computation resources or external tools are required for the signature insertion.

Design	non-WM Time (s)	WM Time (s)	Slow Down (%)
ISPD'2015 [26]	141.37	157.96	11.73%
ISPD'2019 [27]	946.23	996.18	9.21%

TABLE VII: `ICMarks`'s efficiency on different benchmarks.

6) Watermarking Stealthiness: We display the layout watermarked by `ICMarks` with various sizes and different design constraints in Fig. 7. As seen, the watermarks are embedded as part of the layout, and invisible upon inspection while maintaining 100% WERs.

7) Ownership Proof in Real-World Settings: To prove ownership, the design company obtains the suspicious layout and employs reverse-engineering approaches [24], [25] to acquire the logic netlist and all standard cell locations. Such methodology [24], [25] recovers large layouts netlists (over 7000k cells) from the GDSII layout with over 98% accuracy and efficiency. Then, the design company uses the netlists to recover the standard cells' and macros' locations. The watermark extraction

(a) test5(WM)　(b) test5(non-WM)　(c) perf_a(WM)　(d) perf_a(non-WM)

Fig. 7: Watermarked Design Examples. The blue cells are the standard cells, and the red cells are the macros.

algorithms in Section IV are subsequently used for ownership proof. While the reverse-engineering misalignment might degrade the watermark extraction rates slightly, `ICMarks` still provides sufficient ownership proof for the design companies benefiting from two aspects: (i) high watermarking strength of 1.25×10^{-46} for 50-bit signature and 1.43×10^{-74} for 100-bit signature, as in Table VI; (ii) high watermarking capacity that can accommodate more than 200-bit signatures without significant quality degradation, as in Fig. 6. As a result, even if only 88% signatures are extracted (10% lost from attacks in Section VI and 2% lost from reverse engineering [24], [25]), `ICMarks` still provides the watermarking strength at the level of 10^{-27} and 10^{-43} for 50-bit and 100-bit signatures, respectively. In Null Hypothesis [56], a watermarking strength (p-value) of smaller than 0.05 indicates the statistically significant presence of a watermark. Given the much lower watermarking strength than 0.05 after reverse-engineering, the design company can thereby confidently claim ownership of the design layout.

VI. ATTACK EVALUATION

In this section, we evaluate `ICMarks`'s robustness under watermark removal and forging attacks.

1) Watermark Removal Attack: A successful watermark removal attack shall meet two criteria: (i) the encoded signatures are removed as reflected by the watermark extraction rate (WER) below 90% [20], [19]; (ii) the layout quality is not compromised, where the Placement Half-Perimeter WireLength Rate (PWLR), Routed Wirelength Rate (RWLR), Total Negative Slack Rate (TNSR), and Worst Negative Slack Rate (WNSR) do not exceed 1.005 [29]. The thresholds are reflected by the black dotted lines in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9.

For an IC layout watermarked by `ICMarks`, the watermarks are inserted by constraining the cell positions and cells' region. To remove the signature, the adversary perturbs the cell positions/regions for watermark removal attacks. We compare four types of attacks aiming to erase the signatures at different levels of watermarking and prevent the owner from claiming ownership: (i) swap location attacks (SLA) [19], which target to attack Row Parity framework by random swapping cell locations, (ii) constraint perturbation attacks (CPA), which target to attack Cell Scattering and `ICMarks`: DW by moving cells along x/y axis if there is space; (iii) Optimization attacks (OA), which target to attack all watermarking frameworks by running another round of detailed placement; and (iv) adaptive region attacks (ARA), which target to attack `ICMarks`: GW

(a) Swap location attack (0.1%)

(b) Swap location attack (0.5%)

(c) Constraint perturbation attack (0.1%)

(d) Constraint perturbation attack (1%)

(e) Constraint perturbation attack (10%)

(f) Optimization attack

(g) Adaptive region attack (top-1)

(h) Adaptive region attack (top-5)

Fig. 8: Watermarking performance under different attacks for wirelength-driven placement on the ISPD'2015 [26] and ISPD'2019 [27] benchmarks. The black dotted line in the two left subfigures denotes the quality degradation threshold of 1.005, and the black dotted line in the rightmost subfigure denotes the watermark extraction threshold of 90%.

and `ICMarks` framework by searching for less compacted regions and perturb cells around the region. We show `ICMarks` is robust against all removal attacks, and the results are summarized in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 for wirelength-driven and timing-driven placements respectively.

We skip Buffer Insertion [6] and the corresponding watermark removal attacks because (i) Buffer Insertion's [6] watermarked layout quality degradation is significantly higher than the considered threshold of 0.5% as in Table III-V; (ii) Other watermarking frameworks insert signatures without modifying the netlist, whereas Buffer Insertion [6] encodes adding buffers into the netlist as watermarks. While the buffer removal attacks, which remove multiple cascaded buffers, can potentially erase Buffer Insertion's signature, our primary goal is evaluating the robustness of `ICMarks` under attacks. Therefore, we did not include the attacks at the netlist level in this section.

Swap Location Attacks (SLA): In SLA [19], cells randomly exchange their locations with another set of cells. Then, a follow-up legalization and external detailed placement engine NTUPlace4dr [57] compensate for the performance degradation and ensure the cells follow the design rules. In Fig. 8a and Fig. 8b, we randomly choose 0.1% and 0.5% cells from the layout and pair them to exchange their locations. As seen, even small location swaps result in huge performance degradation on modern IC layouts. In terms of the watermark extraction, Row Parity [20], [19], Cell Scattering [5], and `ICMarks: DW` get WERs below 90% and failed to verify their ownership. Those watermarking frameworks spread the watermarks across the layout, where minor changes will subsequently modify most cell locations within the compact region. By embedding cells in the less compact region, `ICMarks: GW` and `ICMarks` are less sensitive to such changes. As a result, `ICMarks: GW` and `ICMarks` still maintain high

(a) Swap location attack (0.1%)   (b) Swap location attack (0.5%)   (c) Constraint perturbation attack (0.1%) (d) Constraint perturbation attack (1%)

(e) Constraint perturbation attack (10%)   (f) Optimization attack   (g) Adaptive region attack (top-1)   (h) Adaptive region attack (top-5)

Fig. 9: Watermarking performance under different attacks for timing-driven placement on the ICCAD'2015 benchmarks [28]. The black dotted line in the two left subfigures denotes the quality degradation threshold of 1.005, and the black dotted line in the rightmost subfigure denotes the watermark extraction threshold of 90%.

WERs.

Constraint Perturbation Attacks (CPA): In CPA, cells shift their location along the x-axis for $\delta_x = 1$ or y-axis for δ_y set to one adjacent row-height if such movements do not result in overlapping with their neighbors. In Fig. 8c, Fig. 8d, and Fig. 8e, we move the positions of 0.1%, 1%, 10% of the cells have space to move in the layout. From here, we find that under CPA 0.1% attack, layout performance hit the boundary of the wirelength degradation (PWLR and RWLR) threshold. For the watermark extraction, ICMarks, ICMarks: GW, and Row Parity [20], [19] achieve over 90% WER. However, the WER of Cell Scattering [5] and ICMarks: DW are subsequently lower than 90% because the constraint perturbation targets to remove the potential watermarked cell positions.

For the CPA 1% and 10% cell performance, however, the PWLR and RWLR degradations are greater than 1.005, meaning the attack failed to maintain the layout quality improvement from the design company's physical design optimizations. But ICMarks: GW and ICMarks still maintain higher than 90% WER and successfully help the design company to claim ownership of the layout.

Optimization Attacks (OA): This attack employs an additional optimization stage to remove the watermarks. The optimization is implemented through another round of detailed placement from an external open-source placer NTU-Place4dr [57]. It aims to change cell locations slightly for signature removal while maintaining the layout quality. As shown in Fig. 8f, the layout wirelength degradation in Cell Scattering [5], ICMarks: GW, ICMarks: DW, and ICMarks are all below 1.005, indicating the attack preserves the layout quality. The WER of Cell Scattering [5] and ICMarks: DW are below 90%, meaning OA successfully removed their signatures. In contrast, ICMarks: GW and ICMarks have over 90% WER, demonstrating their resiliency.

Adaptive Region Attacks (ARA): This attack targets to remove watermarks in ICMarks:GW. The adversary has prior knowledge of how ICMarks:GW performs the watermarking and has access to the hyperparameters used to search the watermarked region. The adversary operates on top of the watermarked layout. He tries to remove the inserted water-

marks by moving cells within the searched top-1 or top-5 regions if there is room. In Fig. 8g and Fig. 8h, the PWLR and RWLR degradation for ICMarks: GW, ICMarks: DW, and ICMarks are around the threshold of 0.5% degradation, and the attacks do not significantly degrade the layout quality. The WER of ICMarks: GW and ICMarks remain over 90%. As the watermark insertion is performed on a non-watermarked layout, and the attack regions searched by ARA are on a watermarked layout, the watermark signatures are not the same. Therefore, ARA fails to remove ICMarks: GW and ICMarks's signature, even if the same region watermarking algorithm is employed. In contrast, the watermarks of Row Parity [20], [19], Cell Scattering [5], and ICMarks:DW are spread across the layout, where minor changes in the compact area will subsequently modify the inserted watermarks. Therefore, these frameworks have compromised WER.

Attacks on Timing-driven Placement: In Fig. 9, the attack performance on timing-driven placement follows a similar trend as the wirelength-driven placement results in Fig. 8. ICMarks and ICMarks: GW remain resilient under all the removal attacks with a WER over 90%. Row Parity [20], [19] is also resilient to the attacks and has WER of over 90%. However, the watermarked layouts degrade the timing metrics (TNSR and WNSR) by $\geq 1\%$ in Table V for timing-driven placement. The signatures in the baseline Cell Scattering [5] and ICMarks:DW are removed with WER < 90%.

2) Watermark Forging Attack: Instead of removing the watermarked signature, the adversary in a watermark forging attack counterfeits another set of watermarks on the watermarked layout and falsely claims his ownership. Row Parity [20], [19] and Buffer Insertion [6] techniques are not resilient to forging attacks. If the adversary has prior knowledge of the watermarking algorithm, they can easily counterfeit a different set of forged signatures from the row index ID of cells or add additional buffers into the layout for false ownership proof. For Cell Scattering [5], signatures are harder to counterfeit because forging the signature requires both random seeds and a non-watermarked layout. However, the inserted signatures can be easily erased by different watermark

removal techniques in Section VI-1.

`ICMarks`: GW is resilient to forging attacks because the region with the minimal evaluation score is unique to the original non-watermarked placement. The non-watermarked layout and the scoring parameters are kept confidential. The `ICMarks`: GW signature verification requires the owner to provide that information to reproduce the watermark region R_w. Therefore, the adversary cannot counterfeit the watermarks without access to the non-watermark layout. `ICMarks`: DW also exhibits similar properties, where the signatures are encoded before detailed placement on the intermediate placement P_{itr}. As such, the adversary with only access to the watermarked layout cannot reproduce the watermarked cells or distance to forge the signature. `ICMarks`, as a combination of `ICMarks`: GW and `ICMarks`: DW is also resilient to watermark forging attacks.

VII. CONCLUSION

We present `ICMarks`, a robust watermarking framework for integrated circuits physical design IP protection in the supply chain. We first introduce a *Global Watermarking* method that identifies the watermarked region with insignificant performance degradation; then, we propose an independent *Detailed Watermarking* technique to select cells that do not overlap with neighbors after perturbation to encode watermarks. Based on these methods, we develop `ICMarks`, which combines the best attributes of both *Global* and *Detailed Watermarking*, thereby achieving minimal quality degradation with augmented robustness. Extensive experiments on ISPD'2015 [26], ISPD'2019 [27], and ICCAD'2015 [28] benchmarks demonstrate that `ICMarks` successfully inserts watermarks without compromising layout quality. Furthermore, we showcased `ICMarks`'s resiliency against watermark removal and forging attacks through comprehensive attack evaluations.

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