The Emergence of Social Meaning: A Theory of Action Construal

16

John Adamopoulos

The search for the meaning that underlies and is communicated by social behavior has been the focus of many research programs in social, cross-cultural, and personality psychology over the past half century (e.g., Adamopoulos 1984, 1988; Benjamin 1974; Leary 1957; Lonner 1980; Osgood 1970; Plutchik and Conte 1997; Triandis 1972, 1977, 1978, 1994, 1995; Wiggins 1979). Theoretical approaches to the study of social meaning have run the gamut from assuming that it is implicit in the very structure of overt interpersonal acts—thus *not* requiring extensive reliance on psychological states for understanding it (e.g., Mead 1934/1962)—to searching for its *psychological* structure (e.g., Lonner 1980; Triandis 1972), to making the *explanation* of such structure the explicit focus of experimental investigations (e.g., Adamopoulos and Stogiannidou 1996). Of course, Foa and Foa (1974, 1980) understood the dimensions of this problem quite well and dedicated many years to providing very useful insights on how to approach it by emphasizing that interpersonal interaction is best conceptualized as a *resource-exchange process*.

In the theoretical paradigm of Foa and Foa (1974), psychological meaning is found through the structural analysis of the exchange process (cf., Foa et al. 1993). This assumption has generally been supported by empirical evidence, though there have been on occasion inconsistent results. For example, while it appears that the six major resource classes Foa and Foa (1974) proposed (i.e., love, status, information, money, goods, and services) can summarize the variety of social behaviors that human beings produce in their daily lives, it may well be that the two psychological dimensions thought to underlie these resource classes—concreteness-abstractness and particularism-universalism—do not capture completely the functional relationships between the resources and the behaviors that correspond to them (e.g., Brinberg and Castell 1982).

This is precisely the starting point of the theoretical approach outlined in this chapter. In other words, accepting the assumption that all social behavior involves the exchange of resources, I will attempt to reconcile the major kinds of social meanings that have been identified in various research traditions with the cognitive dimensions of interpersonal resources proposed by Foa and Foa (1974). I will argue that these dimensions, if embedded in a broader framework, can be useful in explaining the emergence of social meaning across cultures and even over long periods of time. The first part of this chapter will review briefly social meanings identified in a few research programs. These meanings will then be organized in theoretical frameworks that are, to some extent, based on the work of Foa and Foa. In the final part, the possibility of using these frameworks to explain the construal of social behavior will be explored.

J. Adamopoulos (✉)
Department of Psychology, Grand Valley State University, Allendale, MI 49401, USA
e-mail: adamopoj@gvsu.edu

K. Törnblom and A. Kazemi (eds.), *Handbook of Social Resource Theory: Theoretical Extensions, Empirical Insights, and Social Applications*, Critical Issues in Social Justice,
DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-4175-5_16,

Varieties of Social Meaning

Over the past few decades, a number of distinct research programs on the nature of social meaning have resulted in some remarkable convergences. It appears that, regardless of culture being studied, methodological preference, or theoretical commitment, certain ideas seem to be involved in most interpersonal interactions and communication. In retrospect, the ideas themselves are not particularly surprising—we all communicate them to others and recognized them with ease in other people's behavior. Rather, it is remarkable that a relatively small number of ideas or social meanings form the core of a large amount of theorizing in psychology, though they often appear as distinct terms, idiosyncratic to particular research traditions. A few of these traditions are summarized below.

The Universal Structure of Interpersonal Behavior

One of the most sustained efforts in describing the basic meaning of social behavior has been that of Triandis and his colleagues (e.g., Adamopoulos 1988; Triandis 1972, 1978, 1994). Over a period spanning more than 30 years, Triandis and colleagues identified a number of perceptual dimensions that seem to reflect the manner in which people understand social interaction. The basic approach employed in many of these studies involved the rating by research participants of the likelihood of the occurrence of a large number of social behaviors in various situational contexts—what Triandis (1972) called the "behavioral differential"—and the subsequent structural analysis of the behavior intercorrelation matrices.

After investigations using this technique in cultures as diverse as the USA, Japan, India, and Greece, among others, Triandis (1978) concluded that there are at least three major dimensions of interpersonal behavior that appear to be true psychological universals: (1) *association-dissociation*, (2) *superordination-subordination*, and (3) *intimacy-formality*. The first dimension refers to behaviors that are affiliative in nature or involve moving away from someone, the second dimension involves the concepts of dominance and submissiveness, and the third dimension involves interpersonal closeness or distance.

It is worth noting that very similar dimensions—especially the first two—have been identified independently by other research programs in social psychology (e.g., Wish et al. 1976) or in personality psychology (e.g., Wiggins 1979), but much of this research lacked the cross-cultural component of the work by Triandis (1972, 1994) and thus could not lead to conclusions about the universality of the interpersonal structure.

The Structure of Interpersonal Verbs

Following his pioneering work on the measurement of affective meaning (Osgood et al. 1957), Osgood (1970) undertook an original, if somewhat subjective, analysis of the structure of interpersonal verbs (intentions) in the English language. The basic rationale of the investigation was that some sort of psychological system must exist that can explain the meaning embedded in verbs of action. After experimenting with decoding systematically various semantic features of such verbs, Osgood identified four major *interpersonal* dimensions, as well as several others that added to the semantic "refinement" of the verb codes: (1) *associative-dissociative*, (2) *supraordinate-subordinate*, (3) *initiating-reacting*, and (4) *ego-oriented-alter-oriented*. He further speculated that these may be universal, though such a statement is, naturally, subject to empirical verification.

The first two of these dimensions seem to be identical to constructs identified by Triandis (1994). Osgood (1970, p. 240) defined the associative-dissociative features as involving an intent by an actor to "generate and/or maintain positive affective…or…negative affective relations" with another person. The supraordinate and subordinate features were defined as involving the expression of superior and inferior status, respectively.

The remaining two features seem to have more to do with the form of the interpersonal interaction rather than its psychological meaning, but may nevertheless be very useful in the explanation of behavior, as we will see later on.

Elementary Forms of Sociality

Fiske (1991, 1992) has presented a typology of the most basic models of sociality based mostly on anthropological observations but also some psychological evidence (e.g., Fiske 1993). Fiske's argument is that all human relationships can be classified as involving one of four types of exchange: (1) *Communal sharing* involves the free give-and-take of pooled resources in a community of people who share an identity. (2) *Authority ranking* involves a clear hierarchy in a community, with higher-status persons receiving more resources than their subordinates. (3) *Equality matching* is found in communities of distinct individuals who, however, are expected to contribute equally and have equal rights to resources. (4) *Market pricing* involves exchanges that are based on proportionality relative to some commonly accepted standard or "utility" metric.

This interesting typology of relational models, which very clearly assume that the basic characteristic of all human interaction is the exchange of resources, bears many conceptual similarities to the work reviewed previously. Even though the four sociality models occasionally have been treated as irreducible, in fact they all involve at least two interpersonal features: (1) They all implicitly or explicitly emphasize status—with communal sharing and equality matching promoting relative status equality and authority ranking and market pricing reflecting resource inequality. (2) They all involve affiliation to a greater or lesser extent. For example, communal sharing, according to Fiske (1991, p. 14), "is a relationship based on duties and sentiments generating kindness and generosity among people conceived to be of the same kind, especially kin." On the other hand, in market pricing, people "… may bargain in an adversarial and explicitly self-interested manner…" (Fiske 1991, p. 16).

Basic Human Values

Schwartz's (1992; Schwartz et al. 1999) cross-cultural investigation of human values has received a great deal of attention in recent years. While the purported intent of the theory—to provide an alternative explanation of human behavior to standard utilitarian/attitudinal (e.g., Malpass 1977) or even culturally based (e.g., Triandis 1995) approaches—appears distinctly different from the other theoretical approaches reviewed so far, its main constructs bear a great deal of resemblance to the social meanings described in an earlier section. Schwartz (1992) proposed that there are ten major universal types of human values that motivate behavior: *power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, and security*. These values form roughly a circumplex that is defined by the more abstract dimensions of *self-transcendence* versus *self-enhancement* and *conservation* versus *openness to change*.

Schwartz et al. (1999) have provided explicit definitions of these value types along with descriptions ("portraits") of the kinds of things individuals who hold particular values are likely to think, feel, and do in a broad sense. The concepts of association (affiliation), superordination, and subordination appear fairly explicitly in the majority of these value definitions and portraits. For example, superordination is the main attribute of the values *power*, *achievement*, and *self-direction*; subordination defines *tradition* and *conformity*; and association is used to define *universalism* and *benevolence*. The obvious conclusion is that there are a handful of meanings that are absolutely essential to all social explanation and thus inevitably become components—explicit or implicit—of practically all attempts to account for interpersonal behavior.

The Diachronic Structure of Interpersonal Behavior

Inspired by the work of Triandis (1978, 1994) regarding the possibility that certain social meanings are psychological universals, I have made the

argument that in order to claim universality with confidence, we must attempt to show that constructs are not simply found across cultures but across historical time as well—that is, that they are *diachronic* universals (Adamopoulos 1988, 1991, 2009; Adamopoulos and Bontempo 1986). To explore this possibility, literary documents depicting human interaction in different cultures and at different historical times were used as data sources. For example, interactions in the Homeric epics—the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*—and in old French (*Song of Roland*) and English (*Beowulf*) epic poetry, among other literary works, were coded across specific social contexts. Structural analyses led to the general conclusion that some social meanings (e.g., association and superordination) may have emerged relatively early in recorded human history, but others (e.g., intimacy) may have appeared at a later, more recent time (cf., Adamopoulos 1982a, 1991, 2009). Specifically, constructs like association or superordination emerge relatively clearly as independent dimensions even in the Homeric epics (ca. eighth century B.C.E.). On the other hand, while intimate *behaviors* appear very clearly in these epics, the notion of intimacy as a general meaning does not emerge as an independent construct, but, rather, appears in conjunction with—folded into—other psychological meanings (e.g., superordination or association). For example, the kind of love and closeness (intimacy) that Odysseus experienced appears to be inseparable from his superordinate position as the head of his household and court (e.g., Adamopoulos and Lonner 1994).

This line of research, while still under development, leads to a fundamental set of questions: Wherefore these meanings? Where do they come from? How can we account *at the same time* for their cross-cultural commonality and the possibility of their emergence over time? Emergence is an idea that is receiving increased attention in a number of areas in psychology (e.g., Adamopoulos 2008), but its complexity presents a significant challenge to the construction of theoretical conceptualizations (e.g., Holland 1998). A process of emergence will be outlined in the second part of this chapter.

Varieties of Explanation of the Origins of Social Meaning

Attempts to explain the wherefore of social meanings like association or dominance are not at all well developed. Traditionally, such attempts were at the margins of most psychological theorizing, and it is only in recent years that questions of origins and emergence have become a central concern to a number of theorists. The efforts that have been made to date fall into two broad categories: (1) theorizing that evokes biological and genetic mechanisms and, ultimately, evolutionary processes; and (2) theorizing that describes sociocultural transmission mechanisms because they are considered by many social and cultural psychologists as far more efficient devices for the production of effective human activity in avariety of social contexts (cf., Berry et al. 1992).

Evolutionary Explanations

I will address the first category only briefly because it is clearly not the focus of this chapter. Analyses from this perspective are rather diverse and hard to summarize. One approach to such explanation involves recent research by personality psychologists (e.g., McCrae 2000) who argue that the basic dimensions of personality—which very clearly include ideas like affiliation and dominance—are heritable not only at a very general level of broad dispositions but also at a much more specific trait level (e.g., Jang et al. 1998). This by no means negates the role of culture or even its (partial) causal influence on personality, but it certainly relegates cross-cultural work to a lower level of theoretical significance, with its primary purpose being the establishment of the (already assumed) universal validity of basic personality dimensions, rather than the explication of the *emergence* of its structure.

Similar arguments can be made about a number of evolutionary approaches to personality (e.g., MacDonald 1998), which propose the significance of species-wide human adaptations to shared environmental features as explanations

of the universal structure of personality systems like the five-factor model (e.g., McCrae and Costa 1997). The general argument seems to be that since humans evolved to live in groups, negotiating status and group membership, with all the costs and benefits that this entails, were extremely adaptive. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that these basic social meanings reflect such adaptations. A similar and quite sophisticated argument has been formulated in social psychology to explain the importance of coordinated activity in the evolution of cooperative (and presumably associative) behavior (e.g., Caporael 2007).

Sociocultural Explanations

One of the earliest theorists to wonder about the emergence (the "wherefore") of semantic structures was Osgood (1969). Osgood's pioneering cross-cultural work with the semantic differential established that three affective dimensions of meaning—*evaluation*, *potency*, and *activity*—were psychological universals (Osgood et al. 1957, 1975). It was inevitable that Osgood would eventually confront the problem of the origins of these semantic features, and he did so in a rather original fashion. Osgood (1969) speculated that early humans had to address three very important questions that concerned their daily survival: On facing a potential threat (e.g., a saber-toothed tiger), our ancestors would have to decide (presumably quite fast) if the threat were friendly or unfriendly (*evaluation*), stronger or weaker (*potency*), and faster or slower (*activity*)—so they could outrun it. The survival value of these decisions could have led to the development of cultural transmission mechanisms (socialization and educational practices) that became deeply embedded in the manner in which people across the world perceived and understood their environment.

We could argue in a very similar manner that the basic social meanings described earlier had significant implications for the survival of human beings. Affiliating with others and forming problem-solving groups, accepting a knowledgeable leader's commands at times of great danger, or attempting to dominate the social environment by controlling resources can all be understood as patterns of action that can improve an individual's chances of survival. The major question here is: Is it necessary to formulate biological mechanisms for the transmission of these ideas across generations, or can we describe other processes that can account for the emergence of these social meanings across cultures and historical periods? What would such processes look like? The remainder of this chapter will address this issue in some detail and develop the foundation for a system that may eventually lead to our being able to understand the structure of all social interaction.

The Emergence of Social Meaning

The Explanation of Interpersonal Structure

I have discussed elsewhere (Adamopoulos 1984, 1988, 1991) a model that describes a process for the emergence of some basic social meanings—including association-dissociation, superordination-subordination, and intimacy-formality. This model is based on one fundamental assumption that it shares with the work of Foa and Foa (1974): All interpersonal behavior is understood as involving the exchange of resources because through this exchange, human beings are able to secure what they need for survival and indeed for thriving.

This assumption is by no means unique to the present model or to the resource theory of Foa and Foa (1974). The utilitarianism implicit in it has a long history in psychological theorizing. In fact, it reaches all the way back to Aristotle's (ca. 384–322 B.C.E.) major social-psychological treatise—the *Nicomachean Ethics*. In this book, Aristotle (1987) fairly explicitly described the purpose ("end" or "aim") of all action as the "practicable" or "realizable" good. But, he continued in his argument, the final good is self-sufficiency ("autarkeia"), which does not mean solitude or isolation, but, rather, a desirable life with family and friends—a life free of wants. Clearly, the assumption that social behavior aims at securing resources has a very solid foundation in the history of ideas!

As described earlier in this chapter, Foa and Foa (1974, 1980) assumed that the resource-exchange process involves six major resource classes arranged as a circumplex defined by the dimensions of *abstractness-concreteness* and *universalism-particularism*. The first of these dimensions involves the contrast between material and symbolic resources (e.g., goods vs. information), and the second refers to the significance that the specific identities of the individuals participating in exchange have for the satisfactory completion of the interaction. Presumably, a customer does not really care about the identity of the bank teller who gives him/her his money, but an individual cares a great deal about the identity of the person with whom he/she chooses to fall in love.

These ideas seem to be fundamental to the conceptualization of social behavior. Indeed, we can think of a minimal social interaction as a situation in which an actor gives or denies a resource to another individual. As we elaborate the situation, we can take into consideration the relationship between the actor and the recipient of the action: Is it a specific (particularistic) relationship as that between, for example, a mother and her child, or is it a general one as that between two strangers who pass each other on the street? Elaborating even further, we can consider the nature of the resource being exchanged: Is it a material one, as in offering food to a hungry person, or is it a symbolic one, as in acknowledging a person's social status or superior knowledge?

This brief analysis suggests that any social interaction is *constrained* by a number of factors, such as the mode of the exchange (*giving* vs. *denying* a resource), the relationship between the participants (*specific* or *particularistic* vs. *general* or *universalistic*), and the type of resource being exchanged (*material* or *concrete* vs. *symbolic* or *abstract*). We can further speculate that these three types of constraints appeared in early human history in a certain order, with the mode being the most basic. The relationship between the individuals involved in the interaction was probably something that appeared fairly early as well, since the ability to distinguish between friend and stranger or between one's own child and any child could be critical to the successful completion of one's *intended* action. The ability to make such distinctions can be thought of as corresponding to the ability of children to distinguish self from other and to expand from egocentrism to an understanding of multiple perspectives. Finally, we can speculate that recognizing the nature of the interaction—reflecting an ability to distinguish between physical object and symbol—may have appeared more recently in human history since thinking in symbolic terms is an activity that probably developed as human beings invented culture.

Taken together, these constraints form the inputs of the model that appears in Fig. 16.1. The basic implication of the model is that complex social meanings emerge as these constraints—which can be thought of as elemental meanings—are combined and become integrated over a period of time. Thus, *association* emerges as individuals learn to differentiate between giving and denying resources, but this feature becomes more intense as people differentiate between giving resources to "specific" as opposed to "general" others. In others words, behaviors that involve giving resources to specific others are considered more *associative* than behaviors that involve giving to general others. Similarly, behaviors that involve denying resources to specific others are more *dissociative* than behaviors denying resources to general others.

In an analogous fashion, *superordination* becomes differentiated from *subordination* as denying symbolic resources (e.g., status) to specific others becomes distinct from giving resources to such individuals. *Bargaining and trading* emerge as meanings when primarily material (concrete) resources are exchanged (or exchanges are denied) in the marketplace and in other social situations. *Intimacy* presents a somewhat more complicated picture: It is defined by particularistic interactions or exchanges that are frequently, though not exclusively, physical (material). For instance, many behaviors that typically represent intimacy as a behavioral dimension (e.g., *kissing* and *petting*) emphasize the physical aspects of an interpersonal relationship, but behaviors like *declaring one's deep affection*



Fig. 16.1 The emergence of the meaning of interpersonal behavior (Adapted from Adamopoulos 1991, 2009)

for someone reflect a more symbolic side of the construct. However, all exchanges communicating intimacy involve *either* the giving *or* the denying of resources. Thus, for example, behaviors like "hitting" or "scolding" someone—clearly indicating the denial of a resource—are also often considered intimate because they involve interpersonal closeness (a "specific" other) (e.g., Adamopoulos 1982b; Triandis 1977). This complexity associated with *intimacy* as a social meaning is in line with the finding, reported earlier, that it may have emerged later than the other social meanings as an independent idea. Presumably, more complex meanings develop over longer time periods.

Finally, it is important to note that all predictions are to a large extent based on a formal property of the model. Specifically, the order in which the various constraints are believed to have appeared over time (in human history) and have become integrated is critical to, and strictly determines, the types of social meanings that emerge as well as the relationships among these meanings. The emergent structure leads to hypotheses about particular empirical relationships between social meanings (interpersonal dimensions) because it is expected that the closer any two meanings are in the model, the more psychologically related they are. For example, the association-dissociation dimension is expected to be more highly correlated with intimacy-formality than with superordination-subordination because in the model, intimacy is closer to higher levels of association (or dissociation) than is superordination (or subordination). Similarly, superordination-subordination and intimacy-formality are expected to be somewhat correlated, rather than completely orthogonal, dimensions. In general, predictions of the model are in line with empirical relationships among meaning dimensions identified in a number of investigations (e.g., Adamopoulos 1984, 2009; Adamopoulos and Bontempo 1986; Triandis 1977, 1978, 1994).

The Emergence of Cultural Patterns of Social Behavior

The past 25 years have witnessed a virtual explosion of cross-cultural studies in psychology and related disciplines. The theoretical benefits from this growth have been numerous, but perhaps none are greater than the construction of frameworks to provide psychological explanations of cultural differences (e.g., Adamopoulos and Lonner 2001). Among the most important ideas

in this endeavor has been the development of "cultural syndromes," or shared patterns "of beliefs, attitudes, self-definitions, norms, roles, and values organized around a theme" (Triandis 2001, p. 43). One syndrome that has drawn particular attention and has been utilized extensively in cultural explanation incorporates the constructs of *individualism and collectivism* (e.g., Hofstede 1980, 2001; Triandis 1995, 2001). According to Triandis (2001), the primary attributes of the two constructs are

> the definition of the self as independent (in individualism) or interdependent (in collectivism), the primacy of personal or ingroup goals, the primary emphasis on attitudes or norms as the determinants of social behavior, and the importance of exchange or communal relationships. (p. 36)

Triandis (1995) offered a further refinement of these constructs by differentiating between vertical and horizontal individualism and collectivism. Briefly, vertical individualism involves an emphasis on individual uniqueness and personal success and distinction. Horizontal individualism involves individual uniqueness with a sense of equality across people. Vertical collectivism emphasizes the subjugation of the individual to the needs of the group or of higher-status persons. Finally, horizontal collectivism implies status equality with no distinctions or a sense of uniqueness among group members.

Individualism-collectivism theory and other culturally based theories like Schwartz's value theory (Schwartz 1992) or Fiske's (1992) typology of the models of sociality, both reviewed earlier, in a sense have been competing for the explanation of similar phenomena—all related to interpersonal relations. The model of interpersonal structure presented in Fig. 16.1, modified accordingly, can offer a broader framework that incorporates most of these competing theories because it belongs to a family of models that aim to explain the emergence of social meaning. Specifically, as I have argued elsewhere (Adamopoulos 1999), it is important to introduce another component in this case—that of the orientation of the relationship, or, alternatively, the beneficiary of the interpersonal interaction (*self* vs. *other*). For convenience, I have dropped the exchange mode since this model deals with broad behavior patterns rather than specific interactions. The resulting modification appears in Fig. 16.2.

The basic idea conveyed by this model is that cultural patterns differ with respect to whether they tend to emphasize benefiting others as opposed to benefiting the self in typical relationships. If the emphasis is on benefiting the self, then the general cultural pattern will tend toward individualism; if on benefiting the other, then it will tend toward collectivism. The model distinguishes among a number of different broad behavior patterns, most of which are self explanatory (see Fig. 16.2). For example, if most actions in a particular cultural context are oriented toward securing resources for the individual with little emphasis on particular relationships, then the overall cultural pattern will be oriented toward individual survival (what might even be called ego-sustaining individualism or "protoindividualism"). The same pattern oriented toward benefiting any other will reflect the prosocial and even philanthropic patterns of certain cultures (altruistic collectivism).

Cultural patterns that emphasize the exchange of symbolic resources and aim to benefit the self will tend to achieve to some extent the glorification of the individual—hence the label "egocentric" to characterize this type of individualism. On the other hand, if the pattern involves primarily symbolic (i.e., status) exchanges with specific others, the pattern reflects an ego-protective function. In material exchanges, the emphasis is on wealth accumulation—hence the term "acquisitive" individualism.

On the collectivist side, interactions focusing on concrete exchanges (e.g., services, love) with specific others lead to a cultural pattern reflecting an emphasis on relations (relational collectivism). Symbolic exchanges, on the other hand, reflect a concern with status and social hierarchy (referential collectivism). Finally, a pattern involving an "other-orientation" that is based on a concern with upholding highly regarded cultural values reflects ideational collectivism. The term here is deliberately borrowed from the cultural theory of Sorokin (1962) and is meant to refer to the nonmaterial, values-based type of



Fig. 16.2 The emergence of some cultural patterns and syndromes (Adapted from Adamopoulos 1999)

culture he labeled "ideational." Figure 16.2 also presents a tentative, and I hope fairly self-evident, proposal about how several other theories that have been reviewed so far can be subsumed under, and understood within, the context of the model developed in this section based on a resource-exchange process.

Toward a Theory of the Construal of Action

The theoretical models presented so far have as their primary purpose to account for fundamental, even universal, social meanings that form the basis of all human interactions. As we have seen, these models can also be used to account for a variety of theories that have been developed in social, personality, and cross-cultural psychology in recent years to explain a variety of highly related phenomena—from the structure of personality to the values that may guide human social relationships. Whatever success this family of models enjoys is, above all, a confirmation of the usefulness of the resource-exchange approach to the study of human interaction.

An emerging additional benefit of the approach implicit in these models is that it can be useful in the development of tools for the analysis of *specific* behavioral events, actions, or interaction episodes. Put in a different way, this approach can be used to develop a "grammar" of action in interpersonal settings, or a set of tools to understand how different components of the social environment can be put together to form socially meaningful behavior. I will present below some preliminary thoughts about such a process, with the understanding that this is still mostly at the level of theoretical speculation and somewhat removed from the rigors of empirical testing.

Components and Rules of Action Construal

The structural orientation of resource theory in general and of the models reviewed in this chapter in particular invite a rule-theoretic approach to the construal of action (Fig. 16.3). By rule-theoretic, I mean that any interpersonal action can be conceptualized as a configuration consisting of a number of components of varying complexity bound together by certain rules. Two sets of rules are proposed here: (a) rules about the elements of the *primitive* (i.e., the most basic) components of action (*componential rules*) and (b) rules about the manner in which all components are combined to formulate meaningful action (*syntactical rules*).

As I described in a previous section, a fundamental assumption behind this work is that (interpersonal) action is subject to a certain number of *constraints* that characterize all human exchanges. Specifically, in any interaction, a resource *must* be given or denied (*mode*), it *must* be material or symbolic (*type*), and so on. These constraints, which form the primitive components of the proposed system, appear in the third row (from the top) of Fig. 16.3.

We can start by creating a series of rules that extend some of the basic characteristics of the interpersonal models presented in Figs. 16.1 and 16.2:

A. Componential Rules

1. *Mode* consists of *giving* a resource *or denying* a resource.
2. The *beneficiary* can be the *self or* the *other*.
3. The resource *type* can be either *material or symbolic*.
4. The *interpersonal relationship* can be either *target specific or target general*.

B. Syntactical Rules

1. Any *action* consists of a *direction and* a *resource*.
2. *Direction* includes a *mode* component *and* a *beneficiary*.
3. *Resource* includes a resource *type and* an *interpersonal relationship*.

These two sets of "rules" of an "action grammar" are by no means arbitrary, merely descriptive, or without specific functions. I have already discussed in detail in previous sections the conceptual dependencies in the first set of rules: Each primitive component includes elements that constitute a constraint. The second set of rules also seems to reflect certain conceptual dependencies between pairs of components. For example, rule *B3* reflects the whole circumplex that formed the core of social resource theory, and the relationship between the two constraints has been supported empirically (Foa and Foa 1974; Foa et al. 1993). By combining the *mode* (give/deny) with the *beneficiary* (self/other), rule *B2* creates a meaningful conceptual unit (*direction*) that, in some ways, defines the context of the action. In other words, this configuration includes a generic act (i.e., an act without much specific content) and a generic social connection (i.e., a relationship that merely points to the broad orientation of the exchange toward the actor or the target of the action). These two components together create a sense of the milieu or context within which a



Fig. 16.3 Components of the process of construing interpersonal behavior

specific exchange may take place (e.g., a situation that involves something being given to benefit the target of the action, or a situation in which something is given for the benefit of the self, and so on). A somewhat similar configuration that involved behaviors occurring within social role relationships was found to account for a substantial portion of the variance in at least one analysis of individual perceptions of interpersonal behavior (Adamopoulos 1982b). This implies a possibility that such a configuration may be psychologically meaningful in the organization of social interaction and, therefore, is included as a basic syntactical rule in the proposed action construal system.

The clear implication here is that each syntactical rule presents a unified cognitive configuration that should have important psychological properties. For example, it can be predicted that the conceptual units are perceived—and, therefore, recalled—together and that they play an important role in the explanation of action by perceivers and actors alike. Empirical tests of these predictions are, of course, essential in establishing the validity of the proposed approach.

Examples of the Construal of Action

Figure 16.4 provides two simple examples of the analytic usefulness of the action construal model. We can see how with a change in only one component of rule *A2* we generate actions with extremely different psychological implications. Case A involves the *giving of target-specific* (particularistic) and *material* resources (e.g., services) in order to *benefit the self*. An action such as "seeking sexual gratification from someone close"—an individual with whom one has a close, personal relationship—is a plausible action for this structure. Note that by changing the beneficiary from *self* to *other*, the particular episode would become "giving sexual gratification to someone close." Naturally, many other behaviors have a similar structure, as described in case B. Thus, this theory of action construal may ultimately allow the parsing of interaction episodes into conceptual units that capture important underlying social meanings.

It should be fairly clear that the action construal system proposed here can function both in a top-down and in a bottom-up fashion. For the former, the proposed componential and syntactical rules can be used to *generate* behaviors occurring in social contexts, as outlined in Fig. 16.4 and described in the preceding paragraph. A social exchange can easily be formed in this manner by simply selecting four component elements (e.g., giving or denying a resource, interacting in a situation in which the actor-other relationship is particularly important, and so on). From this perspective, even this early version of the theory of action construal—only involving four basic components—is capable of generating a remarkably rich repertoire of social behaviors whose particular meanings are precisely defined by the system. The basic orientation in this case is reminiscent of a process of *encoding*—creating specific contexts and situations of interpersonal interaction in order to communicate various social meanings.

The second, bottom-up process of construal is more similar to a process of *decoding*—deriving a social meaning by parsing a specific interaction to its constituent components (mode of exchange, type of resource, etc.). Such a process, to the extent that it is successful, can lead to the psychological comparison of seemingly disparate social interactions, which, nevertheless, may communicate very similar meanings. Consider, for example, the interactions that take place in the context of an athletic training camp and those that are involved during a meal in a large dining hall. Most social interactions, of course, may have multiple meanings. In this case, it is possible that the latter may involve a friendlier, more cooperative series of exchanges, whereas the former may be perceived as more competitive (e.g., Forgas 1981). At a deeper level, however, there is a structural similarity between these two situations that, the theory of action construal predicts, would lead to a fairly similar understanding of both: The two social situations involve the giving of primarily material resources to benefit the self in interactions with others who are not



Fig. 16.4 Two examples of action construal

necessarily connected to the actors in close or particularistic relationships. In general, then, the decoding process can lead to predictions about psychological similarities or differences between social exchanges that are not always immediately obvious.

A Brief Empirical Exploration and Demonstration of Action Construal

A first test of the decoding process afforded by the theory of action construal—based on the structural similarities among different social interaction situations—will be attempted here as a way of illustrating the potential of the proposed theoretical development. The fundamental idea underlying this approach is that, if the theory actually reflects the emergence of social meaning, then the parsing of social exchanges using the rules outlined earlier ought to generate the psychological meanings of these exchanges. In other words, the application of the theory's rules to the parsing of social situations ought to yield results similar to those obtained from independent structural analyses of the meaning of these situations.

In this case, I made an effort to show the empirical reach of the theory by parsing a set of social interactions that were used in a different research tradition. Forgas (1976, 1977, 1981) explored the perceptions of a number of interaction episodes by a variety of groups, such as athletic team members, college students, and members of an academic department at a British university. He used a methodological approach that relied on the multidimensional scaling of similarity judgments of a variety of "social episodes" by members of these groups in order to derive the dimensions of the meaning of the episodes. In most of his studies, some of the derived social meaning dimensions involved concepts like friendliness, intimacy, competence and knowledge how to act in a situation, evaluation, and sociability.

Forgas (1976) obtained similarity indexes of 25 social episodes from a number of middle-class housewives at Oxford, who participated in a sorting task. Multidimensional scaling of the indexes yielded two dimensions of social meaning: (a) perceived knowledge of how to behave in the situation and (b) perceived intimacy and involvement. Semantic differential-type scales fitted to the multidimensional space supported this interpretation. The proposed action construal theory can offer an explanation of the basis of the obtained dimensions of social meaning. If the basic assumption of the theory is correct, then the structural similarities among the social episodes should explain, to a large extent but not necessarily completely, these dimensions.[1]

I decoded quickly and intuitively the 25 social episodes examined in Forgas' (1976) group of housewives.[2] The episodes and the intuitive code "strips" I assigned to them appear in Table 16.1. In each case, I tried to think of the most salient aspect of the episode for me today—which, of course, is conceivably quite different from the salient characteristics of the episodes for 20–30-year-old British housewives in the 1970s. In other words, I tried to maximize the psychological distance between the decoding process and the original structural analyses. In addition, I did not take at all into consideration the possibility that most of the episodes had multiple meanings. This possibility could be explored with the sorting method used in the original study but was not investigated in the present case. Each social episode, then, was decoded into a *single* configuration or code strip that included one element from each of the following components: mode, beneficiary, resource type, and interpersonal relationship. Following this procedure, an index of similarity was computed for every possible pair of social episodes by counting the number of common coding elements in their respective code strips.[3]

[1] It is important to note that any episode or social exchange can have multiple meanings, which makes interpretation a complicated process. Normally, in order to explain the meaning of any single social episode exhaustively, several different parsings using the proposed rules of action construal may be necessary.

[2] I decoded the 25 episodes into the elements of the four components of the theory of social construal very quickly, without any prior knowledge of their location in the multidimensional space derived in Forgas' (1976) analysis and without second-guessing myself at any point about the correct identification of the elements involved. In all cases in this analysis, I focused only on the first, perhaps most salient, "image" for each episode that came to mind. Thus, incorrect or incomplete decoding of the episodes stemming from this fast-moving process added to the "noise" in the study.

[3] All episodes in this case involved *giving* a resource. Consequently, the number of common elements in any comparison between pairs of code strips varied from 1 to 4.

Table 16.1 Intuitive coding of action components of 25 social episodes (Forgas 1976)

Social episode	Action construal code <Mode, Beneficiary, Type, Relationship>
1. Having a short chat with house delivery man	<1,0,0,0>
2. Playing with your children	<1,0,1,1>
3. Your husband rings up from work to discuss something	<1,0,0,1>
4. Having a short chat with the shop assistant while shopping	<1,0,0,0>
5. Having dinner with your family	<1,0,0,1>
6. Shopping on Saturday morning with your husband at the supermarket	<1,0,1,1>
7. Attending a wedding ceremony	<1,0,0,1>
8. Having a drink with some friends in the pub	<1,1,1,1>
9. Washing up dishes after dinner with family help	<1,0,1,1>
10. Chatting over morning coffee with some friends	<1,1,1,1>
11. Reading and talking in bed before going to sleep	<1,1,0,1>
12. Chatting with an acquaintance who unexpectedly gave you a lift	<1,0,0,0>
13. Watching TV with your family after dinner	<1,1,1,1>
14. Having a short chat with an acquaintance whom you met on the street	<1,0,0,0>
15. Going to the pictures with some friends	<1,1,1,1>
16. Discussing the events of the day with your husband in the evening	<1,0,0,1>
17. Talking to other customers while queuing in a shop	<1,0,0,0>
18. Talking to a neighbor who called to borrow some household equipment	<1,0,0,1>
19. Having guests for dinner	<1,0,1,0>
20. Visiting a friend in hospital	<1,0,0,1>
21. Chatting with others while waiting for your washing in the coin laundry	<1,0,0,0>
22. Talking to a neighbor through the backyard fence	<1,0,0,0>
23. Playing chess	<1,1,0,0>
24. Going to the bank	<1,1,1,0>
25. Visiting your doctor	<1,1,1,1>

Note
Mode: give = 1/deny = 0; Beneficiary: self = 1/other = 0;
Type: material = 1/symbolic = 0; Relationship: target specific = 1/target general = 0

Dissimilarities for all pairs of episodes were computed from the number of elements (out of 4) that any two episodes had in common. The dissimilarity matrix was subjected to a multidimensional scaling analysis (MDS) in order to derive a set of meanings, based on the structural characteristics of the episodes, which could then be compared to the meanings obtained from the original sorting task. One- to four-dimensional solutions were computed. Based on the obtained stress values and other measures of fit, it was decided to retain the three-dimensional solution as the best-fitting configuration. The first dimension appeared to involve the contrast of formality versus intimacy (e.g., being polite in public exchanges with other persons who are strangers or distant acquaintances versus interacting with others who are close). The second dimension could be interpreted as concerning interactions oriented toward and benefitting well-known, specific others versus interactions that involve a generalized other. Finally, the third dimension concerned situations in which actions are taken for personal benefit versus situations in which services are offered to specific others.

In order to explore the basic tenet of the theory of action construal that social meaning emerges from the underlying structure of action, the coordinates of the 25 social episodes on each of the two dimensions derived from the original sorting task (i.e., Forgas 1976) were predicted from their coordinates on the three dimensions derived from

Table 16.2 Prediction of perceptual dimensions of social episodes (Forgas 1976) from action construal component dimensions

Social episodes	
Dimension 1[a]	Standardized regression weights
Action construal dimension 1[b]	–0.42*
Action construal dimension 2[c]	0.13
Action construal dimension 3[d]	0.16
Dimension 2[e]	
Action construal dimension 1[b]	0.53**
Action construal dimension 2[c]	–0.33*
Action construal dimension 3[d]	0.09

Note
*$p \leq 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$
[a]Occasional, involved, and complex episodes without clear knowledge of how to behave versus regular and simple episodes in which it is easy to know how to behave
[b]Formality versus intimacy (e.g., being polite to and chatting with others in general versus interacting with others who are close)
[c]Exchanges oriented toward and benefitting well-known, specific others versus a general other
[d]Behavior for self-benefit versus offering services to specific other
[e]Non-intimate and uninvolved episodes versus intimate and involved

the code strip comparisons using multiple regression analysis.[4] The results of this analysis appear in Table 16.2. As can be seen, both original meaning dimensions can be reliably predicted either from the first or from a combination of the first and second dimensions obtained from the analysis of the action construal codes. In particular, the first dimension reported in the original study (not knowing how to behave in situations, one finds oneself only occasionally) was negatively correlated with the formal-informal dimension obtained from the scaling of the code strips. The second dimension in the original investigation (noninvolvement and non-intimacy) was positively correlated with the formality dimension of the code strip analysis and negatively correlated with the second dimension obtained in this analysis (exchanges with well-known, specific others).[5]

The results suggest the possibility that the original interpretation by Forgas (1976) of the dimensions obtained from the use of the sorting task may not be complete. Specifically, based on the semantic differential scales fitted onto the multidimensional episode space, Forgas concluded that dimension 1 reflected complex and rather involved social situations in which there may not be clear rules for appropriate behavior versus situations that occur with relative regularity and in which people know how to behave. The dimension is correlated negatively with the first dimension derived from the analysis of the action construal codes (formality vs. intimacy). This implies that it may be the specificity of the relationship with the person with whom one is interacting, as well as the fact that the relevant situations are oriented toward benefitting or offering a resource to the self, that account, at least to some extent, for the meaning of this dimension and particularly for the judgment that some social episodes are "complex." Complexity in this case probably reflects the fact that these episodes are considered personal and, therefore, provide a wide range of possible interactions for the participants. Indeed, it would be difficult to explain otherwise why chatting with friends over coffee in the morning might be more strongly associated with not knowing how to behave than going to the bank, as was found in the original investigation.

In a similar vein, the negative correlation of the second dimension from the original analysis (non-intimate and uninvolved vs. intimate and involved) with the second dimension of the construal codes analysis, as well as its high positive correlation with the first dimension of the latter analysis (formality vs. intimacy), suggests that this cluster of situations is strongly associated with the specificity of the relationship between episode participants, which is how the models

[4]Forgas (1976) did not provide the actual dimensional coordinates of the 25 episodes, but, rather, a detailed graphic representation of the structure. I estimated the episode coordinates from this configuration.

[5]The polarities of the two dimensions and the order in which they are discussed here are arbitrary and only reflect the manner in which the primary axes of the configuration described in Forgas (1976) were transferred and coded for the present analysis.

presented earlier in this chapter defined intimacy theoretically.

These findings provide strong initial support for the basic claim of the theory of action construal that meaning emerges as elements of basic action components combine in structural configurations that reflect the underlying social exchange process.

Concluding Comments

It is possible to envision the development of a fairly detailed cultural theory based on the perspective outlined in this section. However, it is clear that before such a theory can be completed, it will be essential to engage systematically in the empirical testing of the preliminary components of the action construal system in order to establish the psychological validity of the proposed configurations of elements. In addition, it will be necessary to examine in much greater detail the cultural sensitivity of this model and, in particular, the extent to which the availability of different kinds of resources has a causal influence on the development of specific interpersonal actions at the individual level. Such an analysis is essential for all types of resource theories that wish to claim cultural universality.

A related set of questions pertain to the theoretical adequacy of the type of system advocated here. This means that a strict set of criteria must be developed to ensure that the system generates meaningful actions under different circumstances. Even more important, all theories that aim to explain how action is generated must ultimately be able to demonstrate that they do not generate meaningless behavior as well. This is a very strict but necessary criterion in testing any theory. In the present case, it probably means that additional constraints on interpersonal behavior—which can be thought of as filters that eliminate nonsensical actions—will have to be introduced into later versions of the proposed theoretical system.

Finally, the theory of action construal must ultimately relate social meanings not only to culturally invariant structures (e.g., giving or denying a resource) but also to culture-specific content such as the *kinds* of resources available within particular cultural contexts. For example, a society substantially lacking in material resources may tend to develop meanings, behavior patterns, and, ultimately, even social institutions that are more closely associated with exchanges of symbolic resources. Alternatively, such a society may choose to exaggerate the importance of the exchange of material resources and come to celebrate the social significance of wealth and property ownership. These are ultimately empirical questions, but the theory of action construal raises the conceptual issues that underlie such questions. To date, connections among societal resources, cultural practices, the constraints that impinge on interpersonal relationships, and the production of individual social behavior have not been investigated systematically.

References

Adamopoulos, J. (1982a). Analysis of interpersonal structures in literary works of three historical periods. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 13*, 157–168.

Adamopoulos, J. (1982b). The perception of interpersonal behavior: Dimensionality and importance of the social environment. *Environment and Behavior, 14*, 29–44.

Adamopoulos, J. (1984). The differentiation of interpersonal behavior: Toward an explanation of universal interpersonal structures. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 15*, 487–508.

Adamopoulos, J. (1988). Interpersonal behavior: Cross-cultural and historical perspectives. In M. H. Bond (Ed.), *The cross-cultural challenge to social psychology* (pp. 196–207). Newbury Park: Sage.

Adamopoulos, J. (1991). The emergence of interpersonal behavior: Diachronic and cross-cultural processes in the evolution of intimacy. In S. Ting-Toomey & F. Korzenny (Eds.), *International and intercultural communication annual* (Vol. 15, pp. 155–170). Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Adamopoulos, J. (1999). The emergence of cultural patterns of interpersonal behavior. In J. Adamopoulos & Y. Kashima (Eds.), *Social psychology and cultural context* (pp. 63–76). Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Adamopoulos, J. (2008). On the entanglement of culture and individual behavior. In F. J. R. van de Vijver, D. A. van Hemert, & Y. H. Poortinga (Eds.), *Multilevel analysis of individuals and cultures* (pp. 27–62). New York: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Adamopoulos, J. (2009). From Homer to the 21st century: Charting the emergence of the structure of interpersonal meaning. In A. Gari & K. Mylonas (Eds.),

Q.E.D.: From Herodotus' ethnographic journeys to cross-cultural research (pp. 33–41). Athens: Pedio Books.

Adamopoulos, J., & Bontempo, R. N. (1986). Diachronic universals in interpersonal structures: Evidence from literary sources. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 17*, 169–189.

Adamopoulos, J., & Lonner, W. J. (1994). Absolutism, relativism, and universalism in the study of human behavior. In W. J. Lonner & R. Malpass (Eds.), *Psychology and culture* (pp. 129–134). Boston: Allyn & Bacon.

Adamopoulos, J., & Lonner, W. J. (2001). Culture and psychology at a crossroad: Historical perspective and theoretical analysis. In D. Matsumoto (Ed.), *The handbook of culture and psychology* (pp. 11–34). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Adamopoulos, J., & Stogiannidou, A. (1996). The perception of interpersonal action: Culture-general and culture-specific components. In H. Grad, A. Blanco, & J. Georgas (Eds.), *Key issues in cross-cultural psychology* (pp. 263–275). Lisse: Swets & Zeitlinger.

Aristotle (1987). *The Nicomachean ethics* (trans: Welldon, J. E. C.). Amherst: Prometheus Books.

Benjamin, L. S. (1974). Structural analysis of social behavior. *Psychological Review, 81*, 392–425.

Berry, J. W., Poortinga, Y. H., Segall, M. H., & Dasen, P. R. (1992). *Cross-cultural psychology: Research and applications*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brinberg, D., & Castell, P. (1982). A resource exchange theory approach to interpersonal interactions: A test of Foa's theory. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 43*, 260–269.

Caporael, L. R. (2007). Evolutionary theory for social and cultural psychology. In A. W. Kruglanski & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), *Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles* (2nd ed., pp. 3–18). New York: The Guilford Press.

Fiske, A. P. (1991). *Structures of social life: The four elementary forms of human relations*. New York: Free Press.

Fiske, A. P. (1992). The four elementary forms of sociality: Framework for a unified theory of social relations. *Psychological Review, 99*, 689–723.

Fiske, A. P. (1993). Social errors in four cultures: Evidence about universal forms of social relations. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 24*, 463–494.

Foa, E. B., & Foa, U. G. (1980). Resource theory: Interpersonal behavior as exchange. In K. J. Gergen, M. S. Greenberg, & R. H. Willis (Eds.), *Social exchange: Advances in theory and research* (pp. 77–94). New York: Plenum.

Foa, U. G., & Foa, E. B. (1974). *Societal structures of the mind*. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas.

Foa, U. G., Törnblom, K., Foa, E. B., & Converse, J., Jr. (1993). Introduction: Resource theory in social psychology. In U. G. Foa, J. Converse Jr., K. Törnblom, & E. B. Foa (Eds.), *Resource theory: Explorations and applications* (pp. 1–10). San Diego: Academic.

Forgas, J. P. (1976). The perception of social episodes: Categorical and dimensional representations in two different social milieus. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34*, 199–209.

Forgas, J. P. (1977). Social episodes and social structure in an academic setting: The social environment of an intact group. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 14*, 434–448.

Forgas, J. P. (1981). Social episodes and group milieu: A study in social cognition. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 20*, 77–87.

Hofstede, G. (1980). *Culture's consequences: International differences in work-related values*. Beverly Hills: Sage.

Hofstede, G. (2001). *Culture's consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across nations* (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Holland, J. H. (1998). *Emergence: From chaos to order*. Reading: Addison-Wesley.

Jang, K. L., McCrae, R. R., Angleitner, A., Riemann, R., & Livesley, W. J. (1998). Heritability of facet-level traits in a cross-cultural twin sample: Support for a hierarchical model of personality. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74*, 1556–1565.

Leary, T. (1957). *Interpersonal diagnosis of personality: A functional theory and methodology for personality evaluation*. New York: Ronald Press.

Lonner, W. J. (1980). The search for psychological universals. In H. C. Triandis & W. W. Lambert (Eds.), *Handbook of cross-cultural psychology: Perspectives* (Vol. 1, pp. 143–204). Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

MacDonald, K. (1998). Evolution, culture, and the five-factor model. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 29*, 119–149.

McCrae, R. R. (2000). Trait psychology and the revival of personality and culture studies. *American Behavioral Scientist, 44*, 10–31.

McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T. (1997). Personality trait structure as a human universal. *American Psychologist, 52*, 509–516.

Malpass, R. S. (1977). Theory and method in cross-cultural psychology. *American Psychologist, 32*, 1069–1079.

Mead, G. H. (1934/1962). *Mind, self, and society*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Osgood, C. E. (1969). On the whys are wherefores of E, P. and A. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 12*, 194–199.

Osgood, C. E. (1970). Speculation on the structure of interpersonal intentions. *Behavioral Science, 15*, 237–254.

Osgood, C. E., May, W. H., & Miron, M. S. (1975). *Cross-cultural universals of affective meaning*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Osgood, C. E., Suci, G. A., & Tannenbaum, P. H. (1957). *The measurement of meaning*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Plutchik, R., & Conte, H. R. (Eds.). (1997). *Circumplex models of personality and emotions*. Washington: American Psychological Association.

Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the structure and content of values: Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries. In M. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 25, pp. 1–65). Orlando: Academic.

Schwartz, S. H., Lehmann, A., & Roccas, S. (1999). Multimethod probes of basic human values. In J. Adamopoulos & Y. Kashima (Eds.), *Social psychology and cultural context* (pp. 107–123). Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Sorokin, P. A. (1962). *Social and cultural dynamics* (Fluctuation of forms and art, Vol. 1). New York: The Bedminster Press.

Triandis, H. C. (1972). *The analysis of subjective culture*. New York: Wiley-Interscience.

Triandis, H. C. (1977). *Interpersonal behavior*. Monterey: Brooks/Cole.

Triandis, H. C. (1978). Some universals of social behavior. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 4*, 1–6.

Triandis, H. C. (1994). *Culture and social behavior*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Triandis, H. C. (1995). *Individualism and collectivism*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Triandis, H. C. (2001). Individualism and collectivism: Past, present, and future. In D. Matsumoto (Ed.), *The handbook of culture and psychology* (pp. 35–50). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wiggins, J. S. (1979). A psychological taxonomy of trait-descriptive terms: The interpersonal domain. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37*, 395–412.

Wish, M., Deutsch, M., & Kaplan, S. J. (1976). Perceived dimensions of interpersonal relations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 33*, 409–420.