

Mathematical Logic (XIII)

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1. Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems

Let \mathbb{P} be a program over \mathcal{A} . Assume that \mathbb{P} consists of instructions $\alpha_0, \dots, \alpha_k$. Let n be the maximum index i such that R_i is used by \mathbb{P} . Then a configuration of \mathbb{P} is an $(n+2)$ -tuple

$$(L, m_0, \dots, m_n),$$

where $L \leq k$ and $m_0, \dots, m_n \in \mathbb{N}$, meaning that α_L is the instruction to be executed next and every register R_i contains m_i , i.e., the word $\underbrace{|| \dots ||}_{m_i \text{ times}}$.

We have shown:

Lemma 1.1. *From the above program \mathbb{P} we can compute an S_{ar} -formula*

$$\chi_{\mathbb{P}}(x_0, \dots, x_n, z, y_0, \dots, y_n)$$

such that for all $\ell_0, \dots, \ell_n, L, m_0, \dots, m_n \in \mathbb{N}$

$$\mathfrak{N} \models \chi_{\mathbb{P}}[\ell_0, \dots, \ell_n, L, m_0, \dots, m_n]$$

if and only if \mathbb{P} , beginning with the configuration $(0, \ell_0, \dots, \ell_n)$, after finitely many steps, reaches the configuration (L, m_0, \dots, m_n) . \dashv

Using Lemma 1.1 it is now routine to prove:

Theorem 1.2. *Let $r \geq 1$.*

- (i) *Let $\mathcal{R} \subseteq \mathbb{N}^r$ be an R -decidable relation. Then there is an $L^{S_{ar}}$ -formula $\varphi(v_0, \dots, v_{r-1}) \in \mathbb{N}$ such that for all $\ell_0, \dots, \ell_{r-1} \in \mathbb{N}$*

$$(\ell_0, \dots, \ell_{r-1}) \in \mathcal{R} \iff \mathfrak{N} \models \varphi(\bar{\ell}_0, \dots, \bar{\ell}_{r-1}). \quad \mathfrak{N} \models \varphi \Leftrightarrow Th(\mathfrak{N}) \vdash \varphi$$

- (ii) *Let $f : \mathbb{N}^r \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ be an R -computable function. Then there is an $L^{S_{ar}}$ -formula $\varphi(v_0, \dots, v_{r-1}, v_r)$ such that for all $\ell_0, \dots, \ell_{r-1}, \ell_r \in \mathbb{N}$*

$$f(\ell_0, \dots, \ell_{r-1}) = \ell_r \iff \mathfrak{N} \models \varphi(\bar{\ell}_0, \dots, \bar{\ell}_{r-1}, \bar{\ell}_r).$$

Therefore,

$$\mathfrak{N} \models \exists^{=1} v_r \varphi(\bar{\ell}_0, \dots, \bar{\ell}_{r-1}, v_r),$$

where $\exists^{=1} x \theta(x)$ denotes the formula

$$\exists x (\theta(x) \wedge \forall y (\theta(y) \rightarrow y \equiv x)). \quad \dashv$$

Let $\Phi \subseteq L_0^{S_{ar}}$.

Definition 1.3. Let $r \geq 1$.

- (i) A relation $\mathcal{R} \subseteq \mathbb{N}^r$ is *representable in Φ* if there is an $L^{S_{ar}}$ -formula $\varphi(v_0, \dots, v_{r-1})$ such that for all $n_0, \dots, n_{r-1} \in \mathbb{N}$

$$\begin{aligned} (n_0, \dots, n_{r-1}) \in \mathcal{R} &\implies \Phi \vdash \varphi(\bar{n}_0, \dots, \bar{n}_{r-1}), \\ (n_0, \dots, n_{r-1}) \notin \mathcal{R} &\implies \Phi \vdash \neg \varphi(\bar{n}_0, \dots, \bar{n}_{r-1}). \end{aligned}$$

if $\text{cons}(\Phi) = \text{true}$ can be replaced by " \models "

- (ii) A function $F : \mathbb{N}^r \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ is *representable in Φ* if there is an $L^{S_{ar}}$ -formula $\varphi(v_0, \dots, v_{r-1}, v_r)$ such that for all $n_0, \dots, n_{r-1}, n_r \in \mathbb{N}$

$$\begin{aligned} f(n_0, \dots, n_{r-1}) = n_r &\implies \Phi \vdash \varphi(\bar{n}_0, \dots, \bar{n}_{r-1}, \bar{n}_r), \\ f(n_0, \dots, n_{r-1}) \neq n_r &\implies \Phi \vdash \neg \varphi(\bar{n}_0, \dots, \bar{n}_{r-1}, \bar{n}_r). \end{aligned}$$

Moreover,

$$\Phi \vdash \exists^{=1} v_r \varphi(\bar{n}_0, \dots, \bar{n}_{r-1}, v_r). \quad \dashv$$

Lemma 1.4. (i) If Φ is inconsistent, then every relation over \mathbb{N} and every function over \mathbb{N} is representable in Φ .

- (ii) Let $\Phi \subseteq \Phi' \subseteq L^{S_{ar}}$. Then every relation representable in Φ is also representable in Φ' . Similarly, every function representable in Φ is representable in Φ' as well.

- (iii) Let Φ be consistent. If Φ is R-decidable, then every relation representable in Φ is R-decidable, and every function representable in Φ is R-computable. $\rightarrow \Phi \nVdash \varphi(\dots)$
 $\dashv \rightarrow$ 枚举证明

Definition 1.5. Φ *allows representations* if all R-decidable relations and all R-computable functions over \mathbb{N} are representable in Φ . \dashv

By Theorem 1.2:

Theorem 1.6. $\text{Th}(\mathfrak{N})$ *allows representations*. \dashv

With some extra efforts we can prove:

Theorem 1.7. Φ_{PA} *allows representations*. \dashv

Recall that we have exhibited the so-called Gödel numbering of register programs. For later purposes, we do the same for $L^{S_{ar}}$ -formulas. Let

$$\varphi_0, \varphi_1, \dots, \quad (1)$$

be an *effective* enumeration of all $L^{S_{ar}}$ -formulas without repetition. That is, there is a program that prints out the sequence (1). Then for every $\varphi \in L^{S_{ar}}$ we let

$$[\varphi] := n \quad \text{where } \varphi = \varphi_n.$$

Observe that both

$$n \mapsto \varphi_n \quad \text{and} \quad \varphi \mapsto [\varphi]$$

are R-computable.

Theorem 1.8 (Fixed Point Theorem). Assume that Φ allows representations. Then for every $\psi \in L_1^{S_{ar}}$, there is an S_{ar} -sentence φ such that

$$\Phi \vdash (\varphi \leftrightarrow \psi([\varphi])). \quad (2)$$

" $\varphi = \psi(\varphi)$ "

Proof: We define a function $F : \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ as follows. For every $n, m \in \mathbb{N}$

$$F(n, m) := \begin{cases} [\varphi_n(\bar{m})] & \text{if } \text{free}(\varphi_n) = \{v_0\}, \\ & \text{i.e., } \varphi_n \in L_1^{S_{ar}} \setminus L_0^{S_{ar}}, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

It is easy to see that F is R-computable, and for every $\varphi \in L_1^{S_{ar}} \setminus L_0^{S_{ar}}$ we have

$$F([\varphi], m) = [\varphi(\bar{m})]. \quad (3)$$

Since Φ allows representations, there is an S_{ar} -formula $\varphi_F(x, y, z)$ such that for all $n, m, \ell \in \mathbb{N}$

$$F(n, m) = \ell \implies \Phi \vdash \varphi_F(\bar{n}, \bar{m}, \bar{\ell}), \quad (4)$$

$$F(n, m) \neq \ell \implies \Phi \vdash \neg \varphi_F(\bar{n}, \bar{m}, \bar{\ell}). \quad (5)$$

Moreover,

$$\Phi \vdash \exists^{=1} z \varphi_F(\bar{n}, \bar{m}, z). \quad (6)$$

Let

$$\chi(v_0) := \forall x (\varphi_F(v_0, v_0, x) \rightarrow \psi(x)).$$

In particular, $\text{free}(\chi) = \{v_0\}$. Finally we define the desired

$$\varphi := \chi(\bar{n}) \quad \text{with } n = [\chi].$$

We show that (2) holds. First, by (3)

$$F(n, n) = F([\chi], n) = [\chi(\bar{n})] = [\varphi].$$

Then (4) implies

$$\Phi \vdash \varphi_F(\bar{n}, \bar{n}, [\varphi]) \quad (7)$$

Recall

$$\varphi = \chi(\bar{n}) = \forall x (\varphi_F(\bar{n}, \bar{n}, x) \rightarrow \psi(x)).$$

Combined with (7) we obtain

$$\Phi \cup \{\varphi\} \vdash \psi([\varphi]).$$

Equivalently

$$\Phi \vdash (\varphi \rightarrow \psi([\varphi])).$$

For the other direction in (2), observe that (6) and (7) guarantee that

$$\Phi \vdash \forall z (\varphi_F(\bar{n}, \bar{n}, z) \rightarrow z \equiv [\varphi]). \quad \exists^{=1}$$

Thus

$$\Phi \cup \{\psi([\varphi])\} \vdash \forall x (\varphi_F(\bar{n}, \bar{n}, x) \rightarrow \psi(x)),$$

i.e., $\Phi \cup \{\psi([\varphi])\} \vdash \varphi$. It follows that

$$\Phi \vdash \psi([\varphi]) \rightarrow \varphi. \quad \square$$

Definition 1.9. Let $\Phi \subseteq L^{S_{ar}}$. Then

$$\Phi^\perp := \{\varphi \in L^{S_{ar}} \mid \Phi \vdash \varphi\} = \Phi^F$$

We say that Φ^\perp is *representable in Φ* if

$$\{[\varphi] \in \mathbb{N} \mid \varphi \in \Phi^\perp\} = \{[\varphi] \mid \varphi \in L^{S_{ar}} \text{ and } \Phi \vdash \varphi\}.$$

is representable in Φ .

⊥

Lemma 1.10. Let $\Phi \subseteq L^{S_{ar}}$ be consistent and allow representations. Then Φ^\vdash is not representable in Φ .

Proof: Assume that Φ^\vdash is representable in Φ . In particular, there is a $\chi(v_0) \in L_1^{S_{ar}}$ such that for all $\varphi \in L_0^{S_{ar}}$

$$\begin{aligned} \varphi \in \Phi^\vdash &\Leftrightarrow \Phi \vdash \varphi \implies \Phi \vdash \chi(\overline{[\varphi]}), \\ \varphi \notin \Phi^\vdash &\Leftrightarrow \Phi \not\vdash \varphi \implies \Phi \vdash \neg\chi(\overline{[\varphi]}). \end{aligned}$$

$\neg\chi(v_0)$ i.e. " v_0 is not provable in Φ "

Since Φ is consistent, we conclude

$$\Phi \not\vdash \varphi \iff \Phi \vdash \neg\chi(\overline{[\varphi]}). \quad (8)$$

We apply the Fixed Point Theorem 1.8 to $\neg\chi$ to obtain a sentence φ such that

$$\Phi \vdash \varphi \leftrightarrow \neg\chi(\overline{[\varphi]}). \quad (9)$$

Then

$$\begin{aligned} \Phi \vdash \varphi &\iff \Phi \vdash \neg\chi(\overline{[\varphi]}) \\ &\iff \Phi \not\vdash \varphi, \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \varphi &\leftrightarrow \overline{[\varphi]} \\ IP &\leftrightarrow WIP \end{aligned}$$

(by (9))

(by (8))

which is a contradiction. \square

Theorem 1.11 (Tarski's Undefinability of the Arithmetic Truth).

- (i) Let $\Phi \subseteq L^{S_{ar}}$ be consistent and allow representations. Then Φ^\models is not representable in Φ .
- (ii) $\text{Th}(\mathfrak{N})$ is not representable in $\text{Th}(\mathfrak{N})$.

Proof: By the Completeness Theorem

$$\Phi^\models = \Phi^\vdash.$$

So (i) is a direct consequence of Lemma 1.10.

(ii) is a special case of (i). \square

Theorem 1.12 (Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem). Let $\Phi \subseteq L^{S_{ar}}$ be consistent and allow representations. Moreover, Φ is R-decidable. Then there is an $L^{S_{ar}}$ -sentence φ such that neither $\Phi \vdash \varphi$ nor $\Phi \vdash \neg\varphi$.

Proof: Assume for every $L^{S_{ar}}$ -sentence φ either $\Phi \vdash \varphi$ or $\Phi \vdash \neg\varphi$. Thus Φ is complete. By the R-decidability of Φ , we can then conclude that Φ^\vdash is R-decidable too.

Since Φ allows representations, Φ^\vdash is representable in Φ . Together with the consistency of Φ , we obtain a contradiction to Lemma 1.10. \square

\neg negation
 \uparrow decidable \Rightarrow representable

In the following we fix an R-decidable $\Phi \subseteq L_0^{S_{ar}}$ which allows representations.

We choose an effective enumeration of all derivations in the sequent calculus associated with S_{ar} and define a relation $\mathcal{H} \subseteq \mathbb{N}^2$ by

$$(n, m) \in \mathcal{H} \iff \text{the } m\text{-th derivation in the above enumeration ends with a sequent } \psi_0, \dots, \psi_{k-1}, \varphi \text{ with } \psi_0, \dots, \psi_{k-1} \in \Phi \text{ and } n = [\varphi],$$

Clearly, \mathcal{H} is R-decidable by the R-decidability of Φ . Moreover, for every $\varphi \in L^{S_{ar}}$

$$\Phi \vdash \varphi \iff \text{there is an } m \in \mathbb{N} \text{ with } ([\varphi], m) \in \mathcal{H}.$$

Since Φ allows representation, there is a $\varphi_{\mathcal{H}}(v_0, v_1) \in L_2^{S_{ar}}$ such that for every $n, m \in \mathbb{N}$

$$(n, m) \in \mathcal{H} \implies \Phi \vdash \varphi_{\mathcal{H}}(\bar{n}, \bar{m}), \quad (10)$$

$$(n, m) \notin \mathcal{H} \implies \Phi \vdash \neg \varphi_{\mathcal{H}}(\bar{n}, \bar{m}). \quad (11)$$

We set

$$\text{DER}_{\Phi}(x) := \exists y \varphi_{\mathcal{H}}(x, y),$$

which intuitively says that x is provable in Φ .

Applying Lemma 1.8 to $\psi(x) := \neg \text{DER}_{\Phi}(x)$, we obtain an $L_0^{S_{ar}}$ -sentence φ such that

$$\Phi \vdash \varphi \leftrightarrow \neg \text{DER}_{\Phi}(\bar{[\varphi]}). \quad (12)$$



Theorem 1.15 (Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem). Assume Φ is consistent and R-decidable with $\Phi_{PA} \subseteq \Phi$. Then

$$\Phi \not\vdash \text{CONS}_{\Phi}.$$

Proof: Assume $\Phi \vdash \text{CONS}_{\Phi}$. Then Lemma 1.14 implies

$$\Phi \vdash \neg \text{DER}_{\Phi}(\bar{[\varphi]}).$$

By (12) we have

$$\Phi \vdash \varphi,$$

which contradicts Lemma 1.13. □