The cultural dimension: cleavage theory revisited

Session 05

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Spring Term 2021-2022

- 1 Overview of the last sessions
- 2 Introduction to the spatial model I: the unidimensional model
- 3 Introduction to the spatial model II: the bidimensional model
- The emergence of a new value-based cleavage? Introducing the cultural dimension
- **5** Cross-country variation and current trends
- **6** References

Take-home points from Session 1 to 4 (who's up for a summary?):

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- Session 2
 - Since the 60s, a transformation in the economic structure and generational replacement led to a shift from materialistic to post-materialistic values. This provided the necessary context to initiate some changes in the configuration of party systems, mainly driven by green and new left parties

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 - As a counter-reaction to the changes initiated in the 60s, a wave of new far right parties took place, introducing a progressive transformation on the traditional class cleavage and the overall conflict structure
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 - In contrast to the progressive cumulative change in NWE, some SE countries, that had been less affected by the green and PRR wave, experienced a series of party systems shock after political and economic crises

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- To follow these updates, we will first review some basic notions of the spatial theory of voting and party competition

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- He proposed an analysis of elections as electoral markets in which the demand side was the electorate and the supply side was the competing parties
- In his initial model, based on the USA context, two parties competed to maximize voters over one dimension
- We will use this basic set-up for simplicity, although Europe is mostly characterize by multi-party systems

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 - 2 In our setup -> policy preferences that range from 0 (the left) to 10 (the right)

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- To recall:
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- The main assumption of the Downsian model is that parties aim to maximize votes to win the election
- The second assumption is that each voter have a fixed policy preference over the continuum, which gives place to a preference distribution

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 - 3 Preferences are normally distributed within the population






Figure 1: Unidimensional space with two parties and abstention

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 - What happens if the position of the parties is 3 and 7 respectively and they have programmatic constraints/reputation (i.e., they cannot credibly shift without a cost)?



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- Representing cleavages with dimensions of competition help us to analyse the interaction between parties (i.e., party systems) as well as parties and voters (i.e., electoral competition), under a given set of conditions

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 - 1 The left-right economic dimension is rooted in the class cleavage
 - 2 The pro-independence anti-independence is rooted in the centre-periphery cleavage

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


Figure 2: Bimensional competition with two parties and correlated preferences




Figure 3: Bimensional competition with two parties and orthogonal preferences

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- As more dimensions cross-cut each other, the space opened for new parties becomes larger and the party system will tend to be more fragmented

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- This is the main cleavage structuring the political competition Western Europe
- In fact, the left-right (or first order) dimension, which is the most used dimension in European political studies, captures preferences deeply rooted in the class cleavage

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 - The state-church cleavage has eroded as a result of growing secularization
 - 2 The urban-rural cleavage (although re-emerging according to some scholars) have eroded with massive migration from the country side to the city
 - 3 The centre-periphery cleavage is the only exception, since it has become even stronger in some cases (e.g., Catalonia in Spain or Scotland in the UK)

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 - 2 Or a new cleavage is structuring the political conflict in Europe
- This is why scholars situated on the latter tradition argue that Western Europe is increasingly structured by a two-dimensional political space¹
 - ¹And the reason why I wanted to be sure that you understand the party-system implications of spatial models with two dimensions

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- But all of these accounts coincide on some basic features

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 - The cleavage raises opposed cultural values and preferences. Losers tend to manifest traditional, nativist an authoritarian-oriented values while winners tend to support progressive, multiculturalist and libertarian policies
 - The parties that better represent each of the poles of this conflict are the new left parties for the winners and the PRR parties for the losers

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 - 1 In NWE, the second and first dimensions are more orthogonal and new parties have been the main drivers of shifts to the second dimension
 - 2 In SE, the second and first dimensions are less orthogonal and traditional parties more frequently own second dimension issues

- Why these differences?
 - 1 Authoritarian legacies

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- 6 Others?
- The recent irruption of PRR parties in Portugal and Spain suggest some degree of convergence

• Final activity! Let look at two paradigmatic cases visualized with real data from 15 years ago: what can we say about them?
What do they tell about recent events?




Figure 4: Austria 2006 and Greece 2007 compared / Source: Bornschier (2010) and Hutter and Kriesi (2019) respectively

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