Session 10

Álvaro Canalejo-Molero

University of Lucerne

Spring Term 2021-2022

- **1** Explaining party system change: demand vs. supply factors
- **2** Factors of change I: demand-side explanations
- 3 The changing role of class: "Explaining Workers' Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe" (Oesch, 2008)
- **4** References

• So far, we have studied party-systems from a holistic perspective:

- So far, we have studied party-systems from a holistic perspective:
 - Comparatively (e.g., differences between SE and NWE)

- So far, we have studied party-systems from a holistic perspective:
 - Comparatively (e.g., differences between SE and NWE)
 - Historically (e.g., from 1920s to the 1960s)

- So far, we have studied party-systems from a holistic perspective:
 - Comparatively (e.g., differences between SE and NWE)
 - Historically (e.g., from 1920s to the 1960s)
 - Focusing either on general trends (e.g., Green and Far Right parties)

- So far, we have studied party-systems from a holistic perspective:
 - Comparatively (e.g., differences between SE and NWE)
 - Historically (e.g., from 1920s to the 1960s)
 - Focusing either on general trends (e.g., Green and Far Right parties)
 - Or on strong specific shocks (e.g., Tangetopoli)

- So far, we have studied party-systems from a holistic perspective:
 - Comparatively (e.g., differences between SE and NWE)
 - Historically (e.g., from 1920s to the 1960s)
 - Focusing either on general trends (e.g., Green and Far Right parties)
 - Or on strong specific shocks (e.g., Tangetopoli)
 - We have reviewed some theories of party-system change (e.g., the freezing hypothesis)

- So far, we have studied party-systems from a holistic perspective:
 - Comparatively (e.g., differences between SE and NWE)
 - Historically (e.g., from 1920s to the 1960s)
 - Focusing either on general trends (e.g., Green and Far Right parties)
 - Or on strong specific shocks (e.g., Tangetopoli)
 - We have reviewed some theories of party-system change (e.g., the freezing hypothesis)
 - Or try to adequate empirical patterns to the existent theories (e.g., cleavage theory)

• But what happens if we want to decompound these over-arching explanations and focus in more specific phenomena?

- But what happens if we want to decompound these over-arching explanations and focus in more specific phenomena?
- From analyses at the aggregate-level (country, party-system or election level) to analyses at the party and voter (i.e., individual) levels

 One way to do this analysis is to distinguish between supply and demand side explanations

- One way to do this analysis is to distinguish between supply and demand side explanations
- The supply side (tomorrow):

- One way to do this analysis is to distinguish between supply and demand side explanations
- The supply side (tomorrow):
 - Level of analysis: parties

- One way to do this analysis is to distinguish between supply and demand side explanations
- The supply side (tomorrow):
 - Level of analysis: parties
 - Question: how do new parties get votes?

- One way to do this analysis is to distinguish between supply and demand side explanations
- The supply side (tomorrow):
 - Level of analysis: parties
 - Question: how do new parties get votes?
- The demand side (today):

- One way to do this analysis is to distinguish between supply and demand side explanations
- The supply side (tomorrow):
 - Level of analysis: parties
 - Question: how do new parties get votes?
- The demand side (today):
 - Level of analysis: individuals/voters

- One way to do this analysis is to distinguish between supply and demand side explanations
- The supply side (tomorrow):
 - Level of analysis: parties
 - Question: how do new parties get votes?
- The demand side (today):
 - Level of analysis: individuals/voters
 - Question: who votes for new parties and why?

 Shifting from the analysis of countries, party-systems and elections to voters (not only: meso-level units of observations too [e.g., regions or municipalities])

- Shifting from the analysis of countries, party-systems and elections to voters (not only: meso-level units of observations too [e.g., regions or municipalities])
- What demand-side factors may explain voters shifting to new/challenger parties? (think on implications of the theories we have reviewed!)

- Shifting from the analysis of countries, party-systems and elections to voters (not only: meso-level units of observations too [e.g., regions or municipalities])
- What demand-side factors may explain voters shifting to new/challenger parties? (think on implications of the theories we have reviewed!)
 - Age

- Shifting from the analysis of countries, party-systems and elections to voters (not only: meso-level units of observations too [e.g., regions or municipalities])
- What demand-side factors may explain voters shifting to new/challenger parties? (think on implications of the theories we have reviewed!)
 - Age
 - Gender

- Shifting from the analysis of countries, party-systems and elections to voters (not only: meso-level units of observations too [e.g., regions or municipalities])
- What demand-side factors may explain voters shifting to new/challenger parties? (think on implications of the theories we have reviewed!)
 - Age
 - Gender
 - Education

- Shifting from the analysis of countries, party-systems and elections to voters (not only: meso-level units of observations too [e.g., regions or municipalities])
- What demand-side factors may explain voters shifting to new/challenger parties? (think on implications of the theories we have reviewed!)
 - Age
 - Gender
 - Education
 - •

- Shifting from the analysis of countries, party-systems and elections to voters (not only: meso-level units of observations too [e.g., regions or municipalities])
- What demand-side factors may explain voters shifting to new/challenger parties? (think on implications of the theories we have reviewed!)
 - Age
 - Gender
 - Education
 - •
 - Class

- Shifting from the analysis of countries, party-systems and elections to voters (not only: meso-level units of observations too [e.g., regions or municipalities])
- What demand-side factors may explain voters shifting to new/challenger parties? (think on implications of the theories we have reviewed!)
 - Age
 - Gender
 - Education
 - •
 - Class
- Explaining Workers' Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe (Oesch, 2008)



The changing role of class: "Explaining Workers' Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe" (Oesch, 2008)

- The puzzle:
 - A emerging new kind of far right (Ignazi, 1992)

- A emerging new kind of far right (Ignazi, 1992)
 - Austrian Freedom Party, Belgian Flemish Block, French National Front, Danish People's Party, Norwegian Progress Party

- A emerging new kind of far right (Ignazi, 1992)
 - Austrian Freedom Party, Belgian Flemish Block, French National Front, Danish People's Party, Norwegian Progress Party
 - Italian Lega Nord, Swiss Poeple's Party

- A emerging new kind of far right (Ignazi, 1992)
 - Austrian Freedom Party, Belgian Flemish Block, French National Front, Danish People's Party, Norwegian Progress Party
 - Italian Lega Nord, Swiss Poeple's Party
- New type of working-class party?

- A emerging new kind of far right (Ignazi, 1992)
 - Austrian Freedom Party, Belgian Flemish Block, French National Front, Danish People's Party, Norwegian Progress Party
 - Italian Lega Nord, Swiss Poeple's Party
- New type of working-class party?
- Class cleavage traditionally explained vote for left/right parties: the sociological premise is that low-income voters should support parties that proposes a stronger intervention of the state on the economy to minimize risk exposure

- A emerging new kind of far right (Ignazi, 1992)
 - Austrian Freedom Party, Belgian Flemish Block, French National Front, Danish People's Party, Norwegian Progress Party
 - Italian Lega Nord, Swiss Poeple's Party
- New type of working-class party?
- Class cleavage traditionally explained vote for left/right parties: the sociological premise is that low-income voters should support parties that proposes a stronger intervention of the state on the economy to minimize risk exposure
- Therefore, Research Quesion: why workers are more likely than any other class (with exceptions) to vote for RPPs?

- Emerging theses to explain why workers would shift from socialist and communist parties:
 - H1. Economic anxieties
 - H2. Cultural threat
 - H3. Social alienation/political dissatisfaction

H1. Economic anxieties

• Anti-immigration attitudes gained center stage

- Anti-immigration attitudes gained center stage
- Two possible motives:

- Anti-immigration attitudes gained center stage
- Two possible motives:
 - Economic reasons (fear of pressure on wages and welfare benefits)

- Anti-immigration attitudes gained center stage
- Two possible motives:
 - Economic reasons (fear of pressure on wages and welfare benefits)
 - Cultural reasons (unease about multiculturalism and the granting of citizens rights to foreigners)

- Anti-immigration attitudes gained center stage
- Two possible motives:
 - Economic reasons (fear of pressure on wages and welfare benefits)
 - Cultural reasons (unease about multiculturalism and the granting of citizens rights to foreigners)
- Economic reasons

H1. Economic anxieties

- Anti-immigration attitudes gained center stage
- Two possible motives:
 - Economic reasons (fear of pressure on wages and welfare benefits)
 - Cultural reasons (unease about multiculturalism and the granting of citizens rights to foreigners)

Economic reasons

"Modernization losers" (lack of convertible skills)

H1. Economic anxieties

- Anti-immigration attitudes gained center stage
- Two possible motives:
 - Economic reasons (fear of pressure on wages and welfare benefits)
 - Cultural reasons (unease about multiculturalism and the granting of citizens rights to foreigners)

- "Modernization losers" (lack of convertible skills)
- Two hypotheses:

H1. Economic anxieties

- Anti-immigration attitudes gained center stage
- Two possible motives:
 - Economic reasons (fear of pressure on wages and welfare benefits)
 - Cultural reasons (unease about multiculturalism and the granting of citizens rights to foreigners)

- "Modernization losers" (lack of convertible skills)
- Two hypotheses:
 - Vote for RPPs as a response to perceived competition from immigrants for jobs, wages, social benefits, etc.(economic protectionism hypothesis)

H1. Economic anxieties

- Anti-immigration attitudes gained center stage
- Two possible motives:
 - Economic reasons (fear of pressure on wages and welfare benefits)
 - Cultural reasons (unease about multiculturalism and the granting of citizens rights to foreigners)

- "Modernization losers" (lack of convertible skills)
- Two hypotheses:
 - Vote for RPPs as a response to perceived competition from immigrants for jobs, wages, social benefits, etc.(economic protectionism hypothesis)
 - Vote for RPPs because of the opinion that social benefits should be restricted to nationals (welfare competition hypothesis)



H1. Economic anxieties

- Anti-immigration attitudes gained center stage
- Two possible motives:
 - Economic reasons (fear of pressure on wages and welfare benefits)
 - Cultural reasons (unease about multiculturalism and the granting of citizens rights to foreigners)

- "Modernization losers" (lack of convertible skills)
- Two hypotheses:
 - Vote for RPPs as a response to perceived competition from immigrants for jobs, wages, social benefits, etc.(economic protectionism hypothesis)
 - Vote for RPPs because of the opinion that social benefits should be restricted to nationals (welfare competition hypothesis)
- QUESTION: how is the second hypothesis different from the first one?

H2. Cultural threat

Questions of community and identity instead of distributional conflicts

- Questions of community and identity instead of distributional conflicts
- "The emergence of RPPs thus represents the authoritarian response to the dominance of libertarian values and multicultural models of living" (p. 352)

- Questions of community and identity instead of distributional conflicts
- "The emergence of RPPs thus represents the authoritarian response to the dominance of libertarian values and multicultural models of living" (p. 352)
- "Individuals in less privileged class locations are expected to be more receptive to the concept of "national preference" and an exclusionary notion of citizenship" (p. 352)

- Questions of community and identity instead of distributional conflicts
- "The emergence of RPPs thus represents the authoritarian response to the dominance of libertarian values and multicultural models of living" (p. 352)
- "Individuals in less privileged class locations are expected to be more receptive to the concept of "national preference" and an exclusionary notion of citizenship" (p. 352)
 - Two hypotheses:

- Questions of community and identity instead of distributional conflicts
- "The emergence of RPPs thus represents the authoritarian response to the dominance of libertarian values and multicultural models of living" (p. 352)
- "Individuals in less privileged class locations are expected to be more receptive to the concept of "national preference" and an exclusionary notion of citizenship" (p. 352)
 - Two hypotheses:
 - Vote for RPPs because of fear that a country's culture is undermined by immigrants (cultural protectionism hypothesis)

- Questions of community and identity instead of distributional conflicts
- "The emergence of RPPs thus represents the authoritarian response to the dominance of libertarian values and multicultural models of living" (p. 352)
- "Individuals in less privileged class locations are expected to be more receptive to the concept of "national preference" and an exclusionary notion of citizenship" (p. 352)
 - Two hypotheses:
 - Vote for RPPs because of fear that a country's culture is undermined by immigrants (cultural protectionism hypothesis)
 - Vote for RPPs because of an exclusive definition of citizenship (differential nativism hypothesis)



- Questions of community and identity instead of distributional conflicts
- "The emergence of RPPs thus represents the authoritarian response to the dominance of libertarian values and multicultural models of living" (p. 352)
- "Individuals in less privileged class locations are expected to be more receptive to the concept of "national preference" and an exclusionary notion of citizenship" (p. 352)
 - Two hypotheses:
 - Vote for RPPs because of fear that a country's culture is undermined by immigrants (cultural protectionism hypothesis)
 - Vote for RPPs because of an exclusive definition of citizenship (differential nativism hypothesis)
- QUESTION: why should workers be more likely to hold this kind of opinions?



- H3. Social alienation/political dissatisfaction
 - Protest voting as a cornerstone explanation (RPPs as protest parties)

- H3. Social alienation/political dissatisfaction
 - Protest voting as a cornerstone explanation (RPPs as protest parties)
 - "Confronted with mass unemployment and stagnating real income, workers are expected to be particularly prone to nurture resentment against the political establishment" (p. 353)

- Protest voting as a cornerstone explanation (RPPs as protest parties)
- "Confronted with mass unemployment and stagnating real income, workers are expected to be particularly prone to nurture resentment against the political establishment" (p. 353)
- Alternative explanation: social anomie (remember the 'fading party ties' hypothesis?)

- Protest voting as a cornerstone explanation (RPPs as protest parties)
- "Confronted with mass unemployment and stagnating real income, workers are expected to be particularly prone to nurture resentment against the political establishment" (p. 353)
- Alternative explanation: social anomie (remember the 'fading party ties' hypothesis?)
 - Two hypotheses:

- Protest voting as a cornerstone explanation (RPPs as protest parties)
- "Confronted with mass unemployment and stagnating real income, workers are expected to be particularly prone to nurture resentment against the political establishment" (p. 353)
- Alternative explanation: social anomie (remember the 'fading party ties' hypothesis?)
 - Two hypotheses:
 - Vote for RPPs because of dissatisfaction with how democracy works (protest voting hypothesis)

- Protest voting as a cornerstone explanation (RPPs as protest parties)
- "Confronted with mass unemployment and stagnating real income, workers are expected to be particularly prone to nurture resentment against the political establishment" (p. 353)
- Alternative explanation: social anomie (remember the 'fading party ties' hypothesis?)
 - Two hypotheses:
 - Vote for RPPs because of dissatisfaction with how democracy works (protest voting hypothesis)
 - Vote for RPPs when not integrated into intermediary networks (social disorganization hypothesis)

- Protest voting as a cornerstone explanation (RPPs as protest parties)
- "Confronted with mass unemployment and stagnating real income, workers are expected to be particularly prone to nurture resentment against the political establishment" (p. 353)
- Alternative explanation: social anomie (remember the 'fading party ties' hypothesis?)
 - Two hypotheses:
 - Vote for RPPs because of dissatisfaction with how democracy works (protest voting hypothesis)
 - Vote for RPPs when not integrated into intermediary networks (social disorganization hypothesis)
- QUESTION: what do the author mean by intermediary networks?



 Five Western European countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland

- Five Western European countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland
- In all five countries there is a large right-wing populist party

- Five Western European countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland
- In all five countries there is a large right-wing populist party
- "We considered only RPPs that obtained at least 5 percent of votes in parliamentary elections in or prior to 2002" (p. 354)

- Five Western European countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland
- In all five countries there is a large right-wing populist party
- "We considered only RPPs that obtained at least 5 percent of votes in parliamentary elections in or prior to 2002" (p. 354)
- QUESTION: which are these parties in each country?

- Five Western European countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland
- In all five countries there is a large right-wing populist party
- "We considered only RPPs that obtained at least 5 percent of votes in parliamentary elections in or prior to 2002" (p. 354)
- QUESTION: which are these parties in each country?
- QUESTION: what do you think of this case selection strategy?

• RPPs:

- RPPs:
 - 1 a location at the extreme right on the ideological axis ranging from libertarian-universalistic to traditionalist-communitarian positions

- RPPs:
 - 1 a location at the extreme right on the ideological axis ranging from libertarian-universalistic to traditionalist-communitarian positions
 - 2 a populist anti-establishment discourse

• RPPs:

- a location at the extreme right on the ideological axis ranging from libertarian-universalistic to traditionalist-communitarian positions
- 2 a populist anti-establishment discourse
- a hierarchical internal structure which sets them apart from pluralist parties

- RPPs:
 - 1 a location at the extreme right on the ideological axis ranging from libertarian-universalistic to traditionalist-communitarian positions
 - 2 a populist anti-establishment discourse
 - a hierarchical internal structure which sets them apart from pluralist parties
- QUESTION: does this definition coincide with the Mudde's definition?

Data and models

• ESS 02/03

- ESS 02/03
- ESS underestimation of PRR voting (why?)

- ESS 02/03
- ESS underestimation of PRR voting (why?)
- DV: self-declared vote for a PRR party

- ESS 02/03
- ESS underestimation of PRR voting (why?)
- DV: self-declared vote for a PRR party
- IV: Sex, age, class + one attitudinal variable for each hypothesis

- ESS 02/03
- ESS underestimation of PRR voting (why?)
- DV: self-declared vote for a PRR party
- IV: Sex, age, class + one attitudinal variable for each hypothesis
- Expectation: remove the effect of the working class when introducing the attitudinal variables

- ESS 02/03
- ESS underestimation of PRR voting (why?)
- DV: self-declared vote for a PRR party
- IV: Sex, age, class + one attitudinal variable for each hypothesis
- Expectation: remove the effect of the working class when introducing the attitudinal variables
- QUESTION: what do you think of this empirical strategy?

Proportion of RPP supporters by class and country




FIGURE 2. Class Composition of the Right-Wing Populist Parties' Electorate

Figure 1: Figure 2 in Oesch (2008)

• Proportion of RPP supporters by class and country (p. 356)

- Proportion of RPP supporters by class and country (p. 356)
 - "First, the thesis of a proletarianization of the right-wing populist parties' electorate clearly seems correct for the five countries on which this study focuses"

- Proportion of RPP supporters by class and country (p. 356)
 - "First, the thesis of a proletarianization of the right-wing populist parties' electorate clearly seems correct for the five countries on which this study focuses"
 - "Second, alongside the two little-privileged classes of production and service workers, a third category is over-represented among RPP followers, namely, small-business owners"

- Proportion of RPP supporters by class and country (p. 356)
 - "First, the thesis of a proletarianization of the right-wing populist parties' electorate clearly seems correct for the five countries on which this study focuses"
 - "Second, alongside the two little-privileged classes of production and service workers, a third category is over-represented among RPP followers, namely, small-business owners"
 - (3) "Third, two categories show very little sympathy for RPPs in all five countries. This applies to the traditional bourgeoisie (comprising large employers and self-employed professionals) and, above all, sociocultural professionals and semi-professionals"

• Main conclusions from the multivariate analysis (p. 365):

- Main conclusions from the multivariate analysis (p. 365):
 - "only one variable is significantly linked with RPP support in all five countries: people's fear that immigrants undermine the country's culture"

- Main conclusions from the multivariate analysis (p. 365):
 - "only one variable is significantly linked with RPP support in all five countries: people's fear that immigrants undermine the country's culture"
 - In general, cultural explanations work better than economic explanations

- Main conclusions from the multivariate analysis (p. 365):
 - "only one variable is significantly linked with RPP support in all five countries: people's fear that immigrants undermine the country's culture"
 - In general, cultural explanations work better than economic explanations
 - In Switzerland and Austria, alineation doesn't have any effect but it is very important in the other countries, why??

- Main conclusions from the multivariate analysis (p. 365):
 - "only one variable is significantly linked with RPP support in all five countries: people's fear that immigrants undermine the country's culture"
 - In general, cultural explanations work better than economic explanations
 - In Switzerland and Austria, alineation doesn't have any effect but it is very important in the other countries, why??
 - "It is noteworthy that these determinants of RPP support do not entirely pick up the class effect." What does this mean?

- Main conclusions from the multivariate analysis (p. 365):
 - "only one variable is significantly linked with RPP support in all five countries: people's fear that immigrants undermine the country's culture"
 - In general, cultural explanations work better than economic explanations
 - In Switzerland and Austria, alineation doesn't have any effect but it is very important in the other countries, why??
 - "It is noteworthy that these determinants of RPP support do not entirely pick up the class effect." What does this mean?
 - Conclusion: "voters' attitudes make a much bigger explanatory contribution than their socio-demographic characteristics"

• Cross-country differences:

- Cross-country differences:
 - 1 Switzerland and Austria

- Cross-country differences:
 - 1 Switzerland and Austria
 - 2 Belgium, France and Norway

• Main take-away?

- Main take-away?
- What do you think of the paper?

- Main take-away?
- What do you think of the paper?
- Future avenues of research?

- Main take-away?
- What do you think of the paper?
- Future avenues of research?
- Questions or doubts?

 "Electoral competition in Europe's new tripolar political space: Class voting for the left, centre-right and radical right" (Oesch & Rennwald, 2018)

- "Electoral competition in Europe's new tripolar political space: Class voting for the left, centre-right and radical right" (Oesch & Rennwald, 2018)
- Tri-polar instead of bi-polar competition:

- "Electoral competition in Europe's new tripolar political space: Class voting for the left, centre-right and radical right" (Oesch & Rennwald, 2018)
- Tri-polar instead of bi-polar competition:
 - 1 the left

- "Electoral competition in Europe's new tripolar political space: Class voting for the left, centre-right and radical right" (Oesch & Rennwald, 2018)
- Tri-polar instead of bi-polar competition:
 - 1 the left
 - 2 the centre-right

- "Electoral competition in Europe's new tripolar political space: Class voting for the left, centre-right and radical right" (Oesch & Rennwald, 2018)
- Tri-polar instead of bi-polar competition:
 - 1 the left
 - 2 the centre-right
 - 3 the PRR

• Five class categories and two types of voting classes:

- Five class categories and two types of voting classes:
 - 1 Preserve classes: sociocultural professionals for the left and large employers and managers for the centre-right

- Five class categories and two types of voting classes:
 - Preserve classes: sociocultural professionals for the left and large employers and managers for the centre-right
 - 2 Contested strongholds: small business owners for the centre-right and the PRR and working-class for the left and the PRR

- Five class categories and two types of voting classes:
 - Preserve classes: sociocultural professionals for the left and large employers and managers for the centre-right
 - 2 Contested strongholds: small business owners for the centre-right and the PRR and working-class for the left and the PRR
- Conclusion: "Old patterns are structured by an economic conflict: Production workers vote for the left and small business owners for the centre-right based on their economic attitudes. In contrast, new patterns are linked to the rise of the radical right and structured by a cultural conflict"

Additional readings

 "The Paradox of Well-being: Do Unfavorable Socioeconomic and Sociocultural Contexts Deepen or Dampen Radical Left and Right Voting Among the Less Well-Off?" (Rooduijn & Burgoon, 2018)

Additional readings

- "The Paradox of Well-being: Do Unfavorable Socioeconomic and Sociocultural Contexts Deepen or Dampen Radical Left and Right Voting Among the Less Well-Off?" (Rooduijn & Burgoon, 2018)
- "Education and Anti-Immigration Attitudes: Evidence from Compulsory Schooling Reforms across Western Europe" (Cavaille & Marshall, 2019)

References

References I

- Cavaille, C., & Marshall, J. (2019). Education and anti–immigration attitudes: Evidence from compulsory schooling reforms across Western Europe. *American Political Science Review*, 113(1), 254–263.
- Ignazi, P. (1992). The silent counter–revolution: Hypotheses on the emergence of extreme right–wing parties in Europe. *European Journal of Political Research*, 22(1), 3–34.
- Oesch, D. (2008). Explaining workers' support for right—wing populist parties in Western Europe: Evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland. *International Political Science Review*, 29(3), 349–373.
- Oesch, D., & Rennwald, L. (2018). Electoral competition in Europe's new tripolar political space: Class voting for the left, centre right and radical right. *European Journal of Political Research*, *57*(4), 783–807.
- Rooduijn, M., & Burgoon, B. (2018). The paradox of well–being: do unfavorable socioeconomic and sociocultural contexts deepen or dampen radical left and right voting among the less well–off? *Comparative Political Studies*, *51*(13), 1720–1753.