

Factors of change II: supply-side explanations

Session 12

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- ① Explaining party system change: demand vs. supply factors
- ② Factors of change II: supply-side explanations
- ③ Issue politization: “The electoral success of issue entrepreneurs”
- ④ More recent findings
- ⑤ Additional readings
- ⑥ References

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 - Question: how do new parties get votes?

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 - **Politization of new issues**

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 - **Politization of new issues**
- ***When dimensions collide: The electoral success of issue entrepreneurs*** ([Hobolt & De Vries, 2012](#))

Issue politization: “The electoral success of issue entrepreneurs”

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 - ① **Polarizing** a previously non-salient issue
 - ② Making this issue more **salience**
- But this theory assumes a two-party system, so ***Research Question:*** **does this model *or* how does this model apply to multi-party systems like those in Europe?**

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- This paper applies the theory of **issue evolution** to European multi-party system to argue that **new/challenger parties** are those driving dimensional change (*note the distinct emphasis here: **from voters to parties***)

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- **QUESTION(s)**: what is the puzzle of this paper? do you remember the dimensionality debate?

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- “(...) losers on the dominant dimensions of competition have the most powerful incentive to promote a new issue” (similar to Riker's theory of issue manipulation - similar to agenda setting) (p. 249)

Hypotheses




Figure 1. Carmines and Stimson's model of partisan issue evolution.
Source: Carmines and Stimson (1986, 1989).

Figure 1: Figure 1 in Hobolt and De Vries (2012)

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 - ③ Challenger parties (**QUESTION**: What is a challenger party?)

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 - ① Mainstream government
 - ② Mainstream opposition
 - ③ Challenger parties (**QUESTION:** What is a challenger party?)
- **QUESTION:** Why challenger parties are more likely to carry out strategies of issue entrepreneurship than mainstream opposition parties in multi-party systems?

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- “In previous work, we have shown that, when it comes to the issue of European integration, challenger parties are more likely issue entrepreneurs than mainstream parties” (p. 252)
- “Since European integration was conceived as a top-down project based on a broad elite consensus, the ‘mainstream’ position among European political parties has been broadly pro-integrationist” (p. 252)

Hypotheses

- But is issue entrepreneurship successful (i.e., does it alter the dimensions of competition)?

H1: Voters choosing to vote for a challenger party are more likely to base their vote choice on preferences related to the new issue dimension, all other things being equal.

H2: Parties engaging in an issue entrepreneurial strategy are more likely to increase their vote share, all other things being equal.

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- **QUESTION:** what do you think of this research design?

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 - **QUESTION:** why these control variables?

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 - **QUESTION:** why the multilevel approach?

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Empirical evidence

Table 1. Effects of Euroscepticism on vote choice for party types

Party type	Model 1		Model 2	
	MOP	CP	MOP	CP
<i>Individual-level predictors</i>				
Intercept	-.223** (.0429)	-1.545** (.047)	-.439** (.143)	-.031 (.057)
Euroscepticism	.044 (.075)	.543** (.104)	-.105 (.076)	.444** (.102)
Left/right ideology	—	—	.025 (.010)	-.074** (.016)
Retrospective economic evaluations	—	—	-.061** (.023)	-.025 (.043)
Prospective economic evaluations	—	—	-.063** (.029)	-.100** (.044)
Government approval	—	—	-.675** (.051)	-.863** (.082)
Education	—	—	-.005 (.004)	.007 (.007)
Income	—	—	.019 (.017)	-.038* (.026)
Religiosity	—	—	-.005 (.021)	.044 (.032)
<i>System-level predictors</i>				
Communist legacy	—	—	-.531** (.215)	.048 (.088)
<i>Model summary</i>				
Variance component	3.702**		2.827**	
N (system, individual)	(21, 19,254)		(21, 19,254)	

Notes: The table entries are log odds with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is multinomial in nature (Mainstream Government Party, MGP; Mainstream Opposition Party, MOP; Challenger Party, CP) and Mainstream Government Party is the reference category. The models have been estimated using second-order penalized quasi-likelihood (Browne, 2003). Employing a Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo method yields almost identical results.

**significant at the $p \leq .01$ level; *significant at the $p \leq .05$ level (two-tailed).

Figure 2: Table 1 in Hobolt and De Vries (2012)

Empirical evidence

Table 3. Effects of issue entrepreneurship on changes in vote share

Predictors (min, max)	Coefficient	PCSE
Issue entrepreneurship (-16-16)	.014*	.005
Government party (0-1)	.201**	.086
Left/right ideology (0-10)	-.179**	.082
Left/right ideology squared (0-100)	.014**	.003
Distance from mean voter left/right (0-5)	.087	.086
Party size (0-51)	.001	.005
N	2484	
Groups	178	

Notes: Table entries are Prais-Winsten regression coefficients correcting for panel-level heteroscedasticity with country dummies (not shown in table) and standard errors. The minimum and maximum values of the different variables are given in the first column in parentheses.

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Figure 3: Table 3 in Hobolt and De Vries (2012)

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- “Second, (...) people do not vote on the issues they actually care about. As the study shows, challenger parties are able to attract voters by mobilizing them around the issue they – the parties – put forward, only for strategic purpose” (Rémy’s response paper)

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- “When connecting this text to the one written by Daniel Oesch, we might wonder: are those voters – those who fall into this “trap” – mainly coming from the working class?” (Rémy’s response paper)

Response papers

- “the workers, who are strongly exposed to labour market risks, should be willing more state intervention, but however, they are overwhelmingly voting for RRPs. We argue that the “agenda manipulation,” which diverts the electorate’s attention from its real interests, could be an explanation for this paradox” (Rémy’s response paper)

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- “I wonder whether transnational cleavages are new” (Luca’s response paper)
- “I am reluctant to accept the idea that the migration crisis and European integration pose a more central cleavage than other issues, such as climate change” (Luca’s response paper)

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- Therefore, the **interaction between demand and supply side** matters

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 - Important **link between the role of economic voting and crises AND the role of second-dimension issues** on altering party-systems

Additional readings

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- “Party convergence and vote switching: Explaining mainstream party decline across Europe” ([Spoon & Klüver, 2019](#))

“(…) it is hypothesised that as mainstream parties converge on the left-right scale, voters will switch from supporting a mainstream party to a non-mainstream party in the next election as they look for an alternative that better represents their ideological views.”
(abstract)

References

References I

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