

# Factors of change II: supply-side explanations

## Session 12

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Spring Term 2021-2022

- ① Explaining party system change: demand vs. supply factors
- ② Factors of change II: supply-side explanations
- ③ Issue politization: “The electoral success of issue entrepreneurs”
- ④ More recent findings
- ⑤ Additional readings
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# Explaining party system change: demand vs. supply factors

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- The supply side (today):
  - Level of analysis: parties
  - Question: how do new parties get votes?

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  - **Politization of new issues**

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  - **Politization of new issues**
- ***When dimensions collide: The electoral success of issue entrepreneurs*** ([Hobolt & De Vries, 2012](#))

# Issue politization: “The electoral success of issue entrepreneurs”

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  - ② Making this issue more **salience**
- But this theory assumes a two-party system, so ***Research Question:*** **does this model *or* how does this model apply to multi-party systems like those in Europe?**

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- This paper applies the theory of **issue evolution** to European multi-party system to argue that **new/challenger parties** are those driving dimensional change (*note the distinct emphasis here: **from voters to parties***)

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- This paper applies the theory of **issue evolution** to European multi-party system to argue that **new/challenger parties** are those driving dimensional change (*note the distinct emphasis here: **from voters to parties***)
- **QUESTION(s)**: what is the puzzle of this paper? do you remember the dimensionality debate?

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
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- “(...) losers on the dominant dimensions of competition have the most powerful incentive to promote a new issue” (similar to Riker's theory of issue manipulation - similar to agenda setting) (p. 249)

# Hypotheses



**Figure 1.** Carmines and Stimson's model of partisan issue evolution.  
*Source:* Carmines and Stimson (1986, 1989).

**Figure 1:** Figure 1 in Hobolt and De Vries (2012)

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  - ① Mainstream government
  - ② Mainstream opposition
  - ③ Challenger parties (**QUESTION:** What is a challenger party?)
- **QUESTION:** Why challenger parties are more likely to carry out strategies of issue entrepreneurship than mainstream opposition parties in multi-party systems?

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# Hypotheses

- The issue under study here: **European integration** (QUESTION: why?)
- “In previous work, we have shown that, when it comes to the issue of European integration, challenger parties are more likely issue entrepreneurs than mainstream parties” (p. 252)
- “Since European integration was conceived as a top-down project based on a broad elite consensus, the ‘mainstream’ position among European political parties has been broadly pro-integrationist” (p. 252)

# Hypotheses

- But is issue entrepreneurship successful (i.e., does it alter the dimensions of competition)?

H1: Voters choosing to vote for a challenger party are more likely to base their vote choice on preferences related to the new issue dimension, all other things being equal.

H2: Parties engaging in an issue entrepreneurial strategy are more likely to increase their vote share, all other things being equal.

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- **QUESTION:** what do you think of this research design?

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  - **QUESTION:** why the multilevel approach?

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  - **QUESTION:** why these control variables?

# Empirical evidence

**Table 1.** Effects of Euroscepticism on vote choice for party types

Party type	Model 1		Model 2	
	MOP	CP	MOP	CP
<i>Individual-level predictors</i>				
Intercept	-.223** (.0429)	-1.545** (.047)	-.439** (.143)	-.031 (.057)
Euroscepticism	.044 (.075)	.543** (.104)	-.105 (.076)	.444** (.102)
Left/right ideology	—	—	.025 (.010)	-.074** (.016)
Retrospective economic evaluations	—	—	-.061** (.023)	-.025 (.043)
Prospective economic evaluations	—	—	-.063** (.029)	-.100** (.044)
Government approval	—	—	-.675** (.051)	-.863** (.082)
Education	—	—	-.005 (.004)	.007 (.007)
Income	—	—	.019 (.017)	-.038* (.026)
Religiosity	—	—	-.005 (.021)	.044 (.032)
<i>System-level predictors</i>				
Communist legacy	—	—	-.531** (.215)	.048 (.088)
<i>Model summary</i>				
Variance component	3.702**		2.827**	
N (system, individual)	(21, 19,254)		(21, 19,254)	

Notes: The table entries are log odds with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is multinomial in nature (Mainstream Government Party, MGP; Mainstream Opposition Party, MOP; Challenger Party, CP) and Mainstream Government Party is the reference category. The models have been estimated using second-order penalized quasi-likelihood (Browne, 2003). Employing a Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo method yields almost identical results.

\*\*significant at the  $p \leq .01$  level; \*significant at the  $p \leq .05$  level (two-tailed).

**Figure 2:** Table 1 in Hobolt and De Vries (2012)

## Empirical evidence

**Table 3.** Effects of issue entrepreneurship on changes in vote share

Predictors (min, max)	Coefficient	PCSE
Issue entrepreneurship (-16-16)	.014*	.005
Government party (0-1)	.201**	.086
Left/right ideology (0-10)	-.179**	.082
Left/right ideology squared (0-100)	.014**	.003
Distance from mean voter left/right (0-5)	.087	.086
Party size (0-51)	.001	.005
N	2484	
Groups	178	

Notes: Table entries are Prais-Winsten regression coefficients correcting for panel-level heteroscedasticity with country dummies (not shown in table) and standard errors. The minimum and maximum values of the different variables are given in the first column in parentheses.

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**Figure 3:** Table 3 in Hobolt and De Vries (2012)

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    - ② “(...) parties only highlight a previously ignored issue when it is conceived as a potentially winning strategy. Specifically, parties only promote a previously ignored issue when their policy position is close to the mean voter position and when their position is characterized by a lack of internal dissent.” (p. 1177)

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- Therefore, the **interaction between demand and supply side** matters

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  - “the choice of specific challenger party is shaped by preferences on three issues that directly flow from the euro crisis: EU integration, austerity and immigration” (abstract)
  - Important **link between the role of economic voting and crises AND the role of second-dimension issues** on altering party-systems

## Additional readings

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- “Party convergence and vote switching: Explaining mainstream party decline across Europe” ([Spoon & Klüver, 2019](#))

“(…) it is hypothesised that as mainstream parties converge on the left-right scale, voters will switch from supporting a mainstream party to a non-mainstream party in the next election as they look for an alternative that better represents their ideological views.”  
(abstract)



# References

## References I

- Hobolt, S. B., & De Vries, C. E. (2012). When dimensions collide: The electoral success of issue entrepreneurs. *European Union Politics*, 13(2), 246–268.
- Hobolt, S. B., & De Vries, C. E. (2015). Issue entrepreneurship and multiparty competition. *Comparative Political Studies*, 48(9), 1159–1185.
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