Blinded by Out-group Hatred. Why does Radical Party Entry Reduce its Voters' Satisfaction with Democracy?

Supplementary Materials

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Appendix A. Experimental design

A1. Summary of the hypotheses

Table A1: Summary of the hypotheses

Hypothesis	Treatment	Expectation
Pre-registered		
Hypothesis 1a	T1a	+SWD
Hypothesis 1b	T1b	+SWD
Hypothesis 3	T2	-SWD
Exploratory		
Hypothesis 2	T1a < T1b	ΔSWD
Hypothesis 4	T2	-OutgroupAffects

A2. Summary of the micro-targetting strategy

Table A2: Summary of the micro-targetting strategy

Age	Gender	Ads	Interests
18-39	Female	Ad 1/Ad 2	M6 TV channel/RTL TV/Touche Pas à Mon Poste
40-65	Female	Ad 2/Ad 3	M6 TV channel/TF1/Touche Pas à Mon Poste
+65	Female	Ad 3	M6 TV channel/TF1/Touche Pas à Mon Poste
18-39	Male	Ad 4/Ad 5	M6 TV channel/RTL TV/Touche Pas à Mon Poste
40-65	Male	Ad 5/Ad 6	M6 TV channel/TF1/Touche Pas à Mon Poste
+65	Male	Ad 6	M6 TV channel/TF1/Touche Pas à Mon Poste

A3. Images of Facebook targeted ads



Figure A1: Facebook ads

A4. Original vignettes in French

Table A4: Description of the vignettes by treatment condition

Condition	Text
Control	Les résultats du premier tour de l'élection présidentielle sont connus depuis le 10 avril dernier. Parmi les candidats, Emmanuel Macron et Marine Le Pen ont été qualifiés pour le second tour. Les candidats suivants, Jean-Luc Mélenchon et Éric Zemmour sont respectivement les troisième et quatrième candidats à avoir obtenu le plus de voix.
T1a In-group Government *(Zemmour version - Blocks I and III)*	+ Certaines personnes soulignent que les résultats d'Éric Zemmour sont particulièrement bons, notamment parce que le gagnant du second tour des élections pourrait l'intégrer dans le nouveau gouvernement.
T1a In-group Government *(Le Pen version - Block II)*	+ Certaines personnes soulignent que les résultats de Marine Le Pen sont particulièrement bons, notamment parce qu'elle a de grandes chances de gagner le second tour des élections.
T1b In-group Parliament *(Zemmour version - Blocks I and III)*	+ Certaines personnes soulignent que les résultats d'Éric Zemmour sont particulièrement bons, notamment parce qu'avec la confirmation d'un tel résultat lors des élections législatives, il pourrait jouer un rôle indispensable dans l'Assemblée nationale.
T1b In-group Parliament *(Le Pen version - Block II)*	+ Certaines personnes soulignent que les résultats de Marine Le Pen sont particulièrement bons, notamment parce qu'avec la confirmation d'un tel résultat lors des élections législatives, elle pourrait jouer un rôle indispensable dans l'Assemblée nationale.
T2 Out-group Government	+ Certaines personnes soulignent que les résultats d'Emmanuel Macron sont particulièrement bons, notamment parce qu'il a de grandes chances de gagner le second tour des élections.
Placebo Social Norm	+ Certaines personnes soulignent que les résultats d'Éric Zemmour sont particulièrement inquiétants, notamment du fait de ses opinions controversées pendant la campagne.

A5. Description of the manipulation checks

A5.1. Perceptions of electoral success

"If you think about the outcome of the election, which candidates do belong to the winners and which to the losers?"

[For all the parties nominated to the first round of the elections]

1. Clearly to the losers
2. Rather to the losers
3. Neither to the losers nor to the winners
4. Rather to the winner
5. Clearly to the winners

A5.2. Text comprehension check

"To what extent do you think this text was difficult or easy to understand?"

1. To a very large extent
2. To a large extent
3. To a moderate extent
4. To a small extent
5. To a very small extent

A6. 2022 French presidential elections: party and candidates results

Table A5: Party and candidates results in the 2022 French presidential elections

Candidate and party	1st round results	2nd round results
Emmanuel Macron		
La République en Marche	27.85 %	58.55 %
Marine Le Pen		
Rassemblement National	23.15 %	41.45 %
Jean-Luc Mélenchon		
La France Insoumise	21.95 %	-
Éric Zemmour		
Reconquête	7.07 %	-
Valérie Pécresse		
Les Républicains	4.78 %	-
Yannick Jadot		
Europe Écologie les Verts	4.63 %	-
Jean Lassalle		
Résistons	3.13 %	-
Fabien Roussel		
Parti Communiste Français	2.28 %	-
Nicolas Dupont-Aignan		
Debout la France	2.06 %	-
Anne Hidalgo		
Parti Socialiste	1.74 %	-
Philippe Poutou		
Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste	0.76 %	-
Nathalie Arthaud		
Lutte Ouvrière	0.56 %	-

Appendix B. Data description

B1. Summary of descriptive statistics

B1.1. Descriptive statistics Facebook survey data

Table B1: Summary of descriptive statistics - Zemmour supporters (Block I)

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Municipality Size	122	2.3	1.2	1	5
Gender	123	1.8	0.4	1	2
Education	123	4.6	1.3	1	6
Occupation	123	5.3	2.2	1	8
Income	123	2.6	1.5	1	5
SWD Change	123	0.6	2.2	−4	10

Table B2: Summary of descriptive statistics - Le Pen supporters (Block II)

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Municipality Size	64	1.8	1.0	1	5
Gender	64	1.7	0.5	1	2
Education	64	4.0	1.6	1	6
Occupation	64	6.3	1.7	2	8
Income	64	2.4	1.5	1	5
SWD Change	64	1.0	2.5	−6	8

Table B3: Summary of descriptive statistics - Others (Block III)

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Municipality Size	173	2.2	1.2	1	5
Gender	176	1.6	0.5	1	3
Education	175	5.0	1.3	1	6
Occupation	175	5.4	2.2	1	8
Income	174	2.6	1.5	1	5
SWD Change	176	0.7	2.1	−7	9

B1.2. Descriptive statistics FES survey data

Table B4: Summary of descriptive statistics: representative sample of Zemmour supporters in the 2022 French Electoral Survey (FES)

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Pctl. 25	Pctl. 75	Max
Gender	53						
... Female	17	32%					
... Male	36	68%					
Age	46	57	12	29	49	69	74
Education	53						
... Primary, middle school, or none	12	23%					
... Professional Certificate	8	15%					
... High School	8	15%					
... University first-cycle	16	30%					
... University second-cycle	9	17%					
Left-right	52	7.5	1.8	2	7	9	10

B2. Like-dislike distribution across blocks of respondents



Figure B1: Like-dislike scales (experiment data)

B3. Distribution of electoral expectations



Figure B2: Distribution of electoral expectations (experiment data)

Appendix C. Qualitative data analysis

C1. Qualitative codebook schema and results

Table C1: Qualitative codebook schema and results

Code	Zemmour Block	Prop. Code Z	Other Block	Prop. Code O	Le Pen Block	Prop. Code LP
FEELING	76	59.84	100	55.25	36	55.38
Disgust_Loathing	5	3.94	10	5.52	2	3.08
Unsurprised	6	4.72	8	4.42	4	6.15
Disbelief	4	3.15	1	0.55	4	6.15
Disapointment	28	22.05	33	18.23	5	7.69
Fatalism	17	13.39	23	12.71	9	13.85
Negative	10	7.87	17	9.39	3	4.62
Fear_Anxiety	8	6.3	15	8.29	3	4.62
Surprised	5	3.94	3	1.66	1	1.54
Satisfaction	2	1.57	5	2.76	5	7.69
Hope	2	1.57	2	1.1	4	6.15
Pride_Enthusiasm	5	3.94	5	2.76	0	0
GROUP	79	62.2	71	39.23	33	50.77
I. POSITIVE	16	12.6	13	7.18	7	10.77
R_Zemmour	8	6.3	0	0	0	0
Radical_Right	3	2.36	0	0	1	1.54
RN_LePen	5	3.94	1	0.55	6	9.23
LREM_Macron	0	0	4	2.21	0	0
LFI_Melenchon	0	0	8	4.42	0	0
Left	0	0	2	1.1	0	0
LR_Pecresse	1	0.79	0	0	0	0
II. NEGATIVE	74	58.27	67	37.02	27	41.54
LREM_Macron	38	29.92	18	9.94	19	29.23
PS_Hidalgo	1	0.79	2	1.1	1	1.54
LR_Pecresse	1	0.79	1	0.55	3	4.62
Radical_Left	2	1.57	1	0.55	0	0
EELV_Jadot	0	0	0	0	1	1.54
Media	21	16.54	11	6.08	3	4.62
French_people	19	14.96	10	5.52	7	10.77
LFI_Melenchon	8	6.3	6	3.31	3	4.62
Elites	4	3.15	6	3.31	3	4.62
Left	4	3.15	7	3.87	1	1.54
RN_LePen	6	4.72	18	9.94	2	3.08
Extremism	1	0.79	3	1.66	0	0
Radical_Right	0	0	5	2.76	0	0
Populist	0	0	3	1.66	0	0
R_Zemmour	9	7.09	2	1.1	0	0
III. DESCRIPTIVE	0	0	0	0	0	0
PS_Hidalgo	2	1.57	3	1.66	0	0
LR_Pecresse	2	1.57	3	1.66	0	0
Left	0	0	1	0.55	0	0
LREM_Macron	2	1.57	3	1.66	0	0
RN_LePen	5	3.94	2	1.1	0	0
LFI_Melenchon	1	0.79	1	0.55	0	0
Extremism	0	0	1	0.55	0	0
DEMOCRATIC EVALUATIONS	40	31.5	49	27.07	17	26.15
Rigged_Elections	20	15.75	16	8.84	12	18.46
Other_Eval_Negative	11	8.66	20	11.05	1	1.54
Electoral_System	5	3.94	11	6.08	2	3.08
Bias	14	11.02	10	5.52	2	3.08

Appendix D. Quantitative analysis of the experiment

D1. Distribution of the treatment among respondents



Figure D1: Distribution of the treatment across blocks

D2. Covariate balance



Figure D2: Covariate balance plots

D3. Analysis of the manipulation checks

D3.1. Regression tables: estimate of the ATE on Perceptions of Electoral Success

	DV: Zemmour W	DV: Zemmour W
(Intercept)	2.59***	2.59***
	(0.62)	(0.42)
Placebo Social Norm	0.18	0.18
	(0.22)	(0.22)
In-group Government	0.42·	0.42*
	(0.22)	(0.21)
Out-group Government	0.36	0.36
	(0.22)	(0.22)
In-group Parliament	0.52*	0.52*
	(0.22)	(0.22)
Age	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Gender (= Female)	0.07	0.07
	(0.15)	(0.15)
Gender (= Other)	0.33	0.33
	(0.84)	(1.88)
Education (= Middle School)	0.03	0.03
	(0.66)	(0.51)
Education (= Professional certificate)	−0.10	−0.10
	(0.56)	(0.34)
Education (= High School)	−0.04	−0.04
	(0.55)	(0.31)
Education (= University first-cycle)	−0.16	−0.16
	(0.55)	(0.30)
Education (= University second-cycle)	−0.16	−0.16
	(0.54)	(0.31)
Income (= 2nd Quintile)	−0.30	−0.30
	(0.20)	(0.21)
Income (= 3rd Quintile)	−0.02	−0.02
	(0.20)	(0.20)
Income (= 4th Quintile)	−0.03	−0.03
	(0.28)	(0.25)
Income (= 5th Quintile)	0.08	0.08
	(0.21)	(0.20)
Zemmour Likely Winner 1st Round	0.17	0.17
	(0.30)	(0.29)
Zemmour Likely Winner 2nd Round	0.87***	0.87***
	(0.24)	(0.24)
Macron Likely Winner 2nd Round	−0.12	−0.12
	(0.21)	(0.21)
Le Pen Likely Winner 2nd Round	0.27	0.27
	(0.26)	(0.26)
Macron Likely Winner 1st Round	−0.06	−0.06
	(0.24)	(0.25)
Le Pen Likely Winner 1st Round	−0.17	−0.17
	(0.27)	(0.29)
Robust Std. Errors	No	Yes
R^2	0.18	0.18
Adj. R^2	0.11	0.11
Num. obs.	286	286
RMSE		1.14

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\cdot}p < 0.1$

Table D1: OLS Specifications. DV: Perceptions of Zemmour as a Winner

	DV: Macron W	DV: Macron W	DV: Le Pen W	DV: Le Pen W
(Intercept)	3.49***	3.49***	4.44***	4.44***
	(0.57)	(0.44)	(0.51)	(0.33)
Placebo Social Norm	−0.17	−0.17	−0.04	−0.04
	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.20)
In-group Government	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.16)	(0.17)
Out-group Government	0.01	0.01	0.16	0.16
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.16)
In-group Parliament	0.05	0.05	0.35*	0.35*
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Age	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01·	−0.01·
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Gender (= Female)	−0.11	−0.11	−0.11	−0.11
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Gender (= Other)	0.02	0.02	0.27	0.27
	(0.71)	(0.92)	(0.64)	(0.42)
Education (= Middle School)	0.92	0.92·	−0.28	−0.28
	(0.60)	(0.50)	(0.54)	(0.29)
Education (= Professional certificate)	0.47	0.47	−0.43	−0.43
	(0.52)	(0.38)	(0.47)	(0.29)
Education (= High School)	0.74	0.74*	−0.18	−0.18
	(0.51)	(0.36)	(0.46)	(0.20)
Education (= University first-cycle)	0.74	0.74*	−0.05	−0.05
	(0.51)	(0.35)	(0.46)	(0.20)
Education (= University second-cycle)	1.08*	1.08**	−0.12	−0.12
	(0.51)	(0.34)	(0.46)	(0.21)
Income (= 2nd Quintile)	−0.01	−0.01	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Income (= 3rd Quintile)	0.10	0.10	−0.25	−0.25
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.17)
Income (= 4th Quintile)	0.04	0.04	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.19)
Income (= 5th Quintile)	0.03	0.03	−0.05	−0.05
	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.14)
Zemmour Likely Winner 1st Round	−0.49·	−0.49·	0.14	0.14
	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.23)	(0.20)
Zemmour Likely Winner 2nd Round	0.10	0.10	0.05	0.05
	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.19)	(0.16)
Macron Likely Winner 2nd Round	0.49**	0.49**	−0.13	−0.13
	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Le Pen Likely Winner 2nd Round	0.04	0.04	0.27	0.27
	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.20)	(0.18)
Macron Likely Winner 1st Round	0.10	0.10	0.19	0.19
	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Le Pen Likely Winner 1st Round	−0.16	−0.16	0.09	0.09
	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.21)	(0.24)
Robust Std. Errors	No	Yes	No	Yes
R^2	0.29	0.29	0.09	0.09
Adj. R^2	0.23	0.23	0.01	0.01
Num. obs.	279	279	284	284
RMSE		0.96		0.87

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\cdot}p < 0.1$

Table D2: OLS Specifications. DV: Perceptions of Macron/Le Pen as a Winner

D3.2. Coefficient plot: estimate of the ATE on Perceptions of Electoral Success



Figure D3: ATE on perceptions of Zemmour/Macron/Le Pen as a winner

D3.3. Distribution of the answer to the comprehension check across blocks and experiment groups



Figure D4: Stacked barplot of the comprehension check

D4. Regression tables: estimate of the ATE on Change in SWD and Affects toward LREM

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
(Intercept)	1.31**	1.31*	1.72	2.35*
	(0.44)	(0.65)	(2.51)	(1.04)
Placebo Social Norm	−0.61	−0.61	−0.96	−0.69
	(0.64)	(0.69)	(0.63)	(0.67)
In-group Government	−0.64	−0.64	−0.35	−0.54
	(0.63)	(0.79)	(0.62)	(0.69)
Out-group Government	−1.27*	−1.27·	−1.32*	−1.35·
	(0.63)	(0.76)	(0.62)	(0.70)
In-group Parliament	−0.85	−0.85	−0.77	−0.57
	(0.62)	(0.73)	(0.61)	(0.65)
Age			0.02	
			(0.01)	
Gender (= Female)			−0.34	−0.47
			(0.50)	(0.57)
Education (= Middle School)			0.95	
			(2.38)	
Education (= Professional certificate)			−0.52	
			(2.28)	
Education (= High School)			−0.79	
			(2.28)	
Education (= University first-cycle)			0.39	
			(2.25)	
Education (= University second-cycle)			−0.04	
			(2.25)	
Income (= 2nd Quintile)			−0.54	−0.53
			(0.59)	(0.48)
Income (= 3rd Quintile)			−1.91***	−1.88***
			(0.55)	(0.55)
Income (= 4th Quintile)			−2.14*	−1.89*
			(0.88)	(0.86)
Income (= 5th Quintile)			−0.66	−0.57
			(0.57)	(0.56)
Robust Std. Errors	No	Yes	No	Yes
R^2	0.04	0.04	0.21	0.15
Adj. R^2	0.00	0.00	0.10	0.08
Num. obs.	123	123	123	123
RMSE		2.22		2.13

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\cdot}p < 0.1$

Table D3: OLS specifications Block I (Zemmour supporters). DV: Change in SWD

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
(Intercept)	1.24*	1.24·	1.18	1.18
	(0.48)	(0.65)	(0.83)	(0.83)
Placebo Social Norm	−0.61	−0.61	−0.60	−0.60
	(0.64)	(0.69)	(0.64)	(0.67)
In-group Government	−0.64	−0.64	−0.62	−0.62
	(0.63)	(0.79)	(0.64)	(0.77)
Out-group Government	−1.29*	−1.29·	−1.28*	−1.28·
	(0.63)	(0.78)	(0.64)	(0.76)
In-group Parliament	−0.85	−0.85	−0.84	−0.84
	(0.62)	(0.73)	(0.63)	(0.71)
Expectation Of Zemmour winning the 2nd round	0.13	0.13	0.14	0.14
	(0.41)	(0.42)	(0.41)	(0.43)
Age			0.01	0.01
			(0.01)	(0.01)
Gender (= Female)			−0.28	−0.28
			(0.50)	(0.56)
Robust Std. Errors	No	Yes	No	Yes
R^2	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
Adj. R^2	−0.01	−0.01	−0.02	−0.02
Num. obs.	123	123	123	123
RMSE		2.23		2.24

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\cdot}p < 0.1$

Table D4: OLS specifications controlling for electoral expectations Block I (Zemmour supporters). DV: Change in SWD

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
(Intercept)	0.12	0.12	0.42	0.42
	(0.24)	(0.15)	(1.39)	(0.72)
Placebo Social Norm	−0.03	−0.03	−0.20	−0.20
	(0.34)	(0.23)	(0.35)	(0.27)
In-group Government	−0.08	−0.08	0.09	0.09
	(0.34)	(0.38)	(0.35)	(0.36)
Out-group Government	−0.51	−0.51$^{\cdot}$	−0.44	−0.44
	(0.34)	(0.27)	(0.35)	(0.27)
In-group Parliament	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.06
	(0.33)	(0.30)	(0.34)	(0.31)
Age			0.00	0.00
			(0.01)	(0.01)
Gender (= Female)			−0.31	−0.31
			(0.27)	(0.23)
Education (= Middle School)			0.49	0.49
			(1.30)	(0.54)
Education (= Professional certificate)			−0.33	−0.33
			(1.26)	(0.30)
Education (= High School)			−0.47	−0.47
			(1.26)	(0.53)
Education (= University first-cycle)			0.19	0.19
			(1.25)	(0.35)
Education (= University second-cycle)			−0.10	−0.10
			(1.25)	(0.37)
Robust Std. Errors	No	Yes	No	Yes
R^2	0.03	0.03	0.09	0.09
Adj. R^2	−0.00	−0.00	0.00	0.00
Num. obs.	120	120	120	120
RMSE		1.18		1.18

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\cdot}p < 0.1$

Table D5: OLS specifications Block I (Zemmour supporters). DV: Change in Affects toward LREM

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
(Intercept)	0.92	0.92$^{\cdot}$	2.00	2.00
	(0.71)	(0.48)	(1.80)	(1.60)
Placebo Social Norm	−0.76	−0.76	−0.89	−0.89
	(0.99)	(0.75)	(1.08)	(0.97)
In-group Government	0.17	0.17	−0.22	−0.22
	(1.01)	(1.07)	(1.06)	(1.01)
Out-group Government	1.15	1.15	0.42	0.42
	(0.97)	(0.86)	(1.21)	(0.97)
In-group Parliament	−0.07	−0.07	−1.11	−1.11
	(0.99)	(0.81)	(1.15)	(1.11)
Age			−0.03	−0.03
			(0.03)	(0.03)
Gender (= Female)			0.26	0.26
			(0.84)	(0.78)
Education (= Middle School)			1.25	1.25
			(2.18)	(2.45)
Education (= Professional certificate)			−0.16	−0.16
			(1.20)	(1.01)
Education (= High School)			1.60	1.60
			(1.26)	(1.06)
Education (= University first-cycle)			0.83	0.83
			(1.16)	(1.03)
Education (= University second-cycle)			−1.23	−1.23
			(1.32)	(1.13)
Income (= 2nd Quintile)			1.31	1.31
			(1.08)	(1.13)
Income (= 3rd Quintile)			1.07	1.07
			(1.22)	(1.13)
Income (= 4th Quintile)			0.88	0.88
			(1.29)	(1.31)
Income (= 5th Quintile)			1.21	1.21
			(1.03)	(1.01)
Robust Std. Errors	No	Yes	No	Yes
R^2	0.07	0.07	0.24	0.24
Adj. R^2	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01
Num. obs.	64	64	64	64
RMSE		2.47		2.47

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\cdot}p < 0.1$

Table D6: OLS Specifications Block II (Le Pen supporters). DV: Change in SWD

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
(Intercept)	1.11**	1.11**	1.08	1.08
	(0.35)	(0.37)	(1.34)	(1.17)
Placebo Social Norm	−0.48	−0.48	−0.31	−0.31
	(0.51)	(0.49)	(0.55)	(0.52)
In-group Government	−1.20*	−1.20*	−1.22*	−1.22·
	(0.50)	(0.58)	(0.53)	(0.63)
Out-group Government	−0.00	−0.00	0.14	0.14
	(0.50)	(0.49)	(0.53)	(0.52)
In-group Parliament	−0.59	−0.59	−0.55	−0.55
	(0.50)	(0.46)	(0.53)	(0.47)
Age			−0.01	−0.01
			(0.01)	(0.01)
Gender (= Female)			−0.56	−0.56
			(0.35)	(0.35)
Gender (= Other)			−0.67	−0.67
			(1.61)	(0.53)
Education (= Middle School)			1.43	1.43
			(1.70)	(1.09)
Education (= Professional certificate)			1.14	1.14
			(1.21)	(1.12)
Education (= High School)			0.92	0.92
			(1.24)	(1.03)
Education (= University first-cycle)			0.70	0.70
			(1.20)	(1.05)
Education (= University second-cycle)			0.86	0.86
			(1.19)	(1.03)
Income (= 2nd Quintile)			0.04	0.04
			(0.47)	(0.57)
Income (= 3rd Quintile)			−0.15	−0.15
			(0.51)	(0.49)
Income (= 4th Quintile)			0.21	0.21
			(0.66)	(0.55)
Income (= 5th Quintile)			0.05	0.05
			(0.52)	(0.43)
Robust Std. Errors	No	Yes	No	Yes
R^2	0.04	0.04	0.08	0.08
Adj. R^2	0.02	0.02	−0.01	−0.01
Num. obs.	176	176	173	173
RMSE		2.09		2.14

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\cdot}p < 0.1$

Table D7: OLS Specifications Block III (Other party supporters). DV: Change in SWD

D5. Coefficient plots: estimate of the ATE on Change in SWD and Affects toward LREM



Figure D5: ATE on Change in SWD/Affects toward LREM

D6. Multiple hypotheses testing for the estimated ATE on Change in SWD and Affects toward LREM

In this section, we include a correction for multiple hypotheses testing to comply with our research plan according to the preregistration. However, it should be noted that due to the low statistical power, any adjustment would lead to non-significant effects. Furthermore, given recent methodological advances, we are now aware that the need to adjust for multiple hypotheses testing is misleading in our case, as each of our hypotheses concerns a single experimental arm and is independent of the others (Rubin, 2024).

Table D8: Comparison of p.values before/after multiple hypotheses testing correction - ATE on Change in SWD

Coefficient	Original p.values	Bonferroni correction	Holm correction
Intercept	0.00	0.02	0.02
In-group Government	0.34	1.00	0.62
In-group Parliament	0.31	1.00	0.62
Out-group Government	0.05	0.23	0.18
Placebo	0.17	0.86	0.52

Notes: The baseline p-values are taken from Model 1 in Table D1.

Table D9: Comparison of p.values before/after multiple hypotheses testing correction - ATE on Change in Feelings towards LREM

Coefficient	Original p.values	Bonferroni correction	Holm correction
Intercept	0.61	1.00	1.00
In-group Government	0.92	1.00	1.00
In-group Parliament	0.82	1.00	1.00
Out-group Government	0.14	0.69	0.69
Placebo	0.83	1.00	1.00

Notes: The baseline p-values are taken from Model 1 in Table D3.

D7. Post-experimental power simulation for the estimate of the ATE on Change in SWD

D7.1. Motivation and description of the simulation

Given attrition in the second wave of the survey, our experiment resulted in a total of 123 participants, with an average of 24 participants per treatment group. This may raise concerns about statistical power. For this reason, we conducted a retrospective power analysis using the results from the experiment data to assess the extent to which our main treatment, priming Zemmour supporters with the potential out-group win, lacks statistical power.

We utilised a simulation-based approach that closely mirrored the structure and conditions of our original experiment. In each simulation, we generated data for a given group size, distributed evenly across the five groups, including the control and four treatment groups, with particular emphasis on the treatment priming the potential out-group win (T). The dependent variable, change in SWD (Y), was simulated following a normal distribution, incorporating the observed effect size for T ($= -1.2660$) and the residual standard deviation ($= 2.219$) in our main model (see Model 1 in Table 9). The effect size of the other three treatments was set to 0 for simplicity.

We repeated these simulations 500 times for varying group sizes, ranging from 20 to 250 participants per group ($n \in [100, 1250]$) in increments of 10. The key metric of interest is the proportion of simulations in which the effect of T achieved statistical significance ($p < 0.05$), providing an estimate of the statistical power at each group size. The results of our power analysis reveal that a minimum group size of 50 respondents per group ($n = 250$) would have been necessary to attain a power level of 80%, a standard benchmark for adequate power, assuming that our estimated effect size approximates the true effect. Therefore, while we can conclude that our experiment is underpowered, only doubling the number of observations would have been enough to drastically reduce uncertainty around our main estimates. Figure D6 plots the statistical power associated with each simulated group size. Figure D7 plots the coefficients of our estimated ATE on change in SWD in the real and simulated data ($n = 300$).

D7.2. Simulation plot



Figure D6: Post-experimental power simulation

D7.3. Regression table: comparing etsimate of the ATE on change in SWD with simulated and real data

	Simulated data	Real data
(Intercept)	0.15	1.31**
	(0.28)	(0.44)
Placebo Social Norm	−0.22	−0.61
	(0.40)	(0.64)
In-group Government	−0.18	−0.64
	(0.40)	(0.63)
Out-group Government	−1.46***	−1.27*
	(0.40)	(0.63)
In-group Parliament	0.28	−0.85
	(0.40)	(0.62)
R^2	0.07	0.04
Adj. R^2	0.06	0.00
Num. obs.	300	123

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\cdot}p < 0.1$

Table D9: OLS Specifications comparing simulated and real data. DV: Change in SWD

D7.4. Coefficient plot: comparing etsimate of the ATE with simulated and real data

Figure D7: Simulated vs. real-data ATE estimation

D8. Evidence of electoral uncertainty between the first and second rounds of the presidential election

We provide evidence of the validity of our main assumption: that there is uncertainty about the results of the second round of the presidential election. Under conditions of uncertainty, we can manipulate the perceived success of each candidate by emphasizing different potential outcomes. In the left-hand side plot of Figure @ref(fig:uncertainty), we show that respondents in our sample had relatively accurate expectations about the potential election winner. When voters were asked who they think will win the second round of the election, Macron emerged as the main potential winner, followed by Marine Le Pen, and despite a substantial proportion of respondents mistakenly thinking that Zemmour could be the winner. Given the over-representation of Zemmour supporters in our sample, this pattern is consistent with existing evidence of wishful thinking among partisans (Babad et al., 1992; Meffert et al., 2011). While this factor should be (and is) considered when interpreting the results, it enhances the credibility that respondents in our sample were uncertain about the most likely election outcome.

Does this uncertainty persist after the first round? Although we lack a repeated measure

of electoral expectations in the second wave of our survey, we asked respondents whether they think each candidate is clearly one of the winners, mostly a winner, neither a winner nor a loser, mostly a loser, or clearly a loser. If voters were certain about the results, we would expect them to consider Macron a winner and Le Pen a loser. Instead, as shown in the right-hand side plot of Figure @ref(fig:uncertainty), Le Pen is actually considered a winner more often than Macron, and overall, both candidates are similarly perceived as election winners. Therefore, we are well-positioned to manipulate respondents' perceptions of success in different potential scenarios.



Figure D8: Pre-electoral expectations and perceptions of winners and losers

Appendix E. Pilot study analysis

E1. Description of the pilot study

To decide on the targeting parameters of our Meta Ads campaign, we first launched a pre-test campaign linked to a pilot survey in Qualtrics. The pre-test campaign was divided into two ad-sets. The first ad set targeted only Facebook users between 18 and 39 years old, while the second ad set targeted only FB users between 40 and more than 65 years old. In

both cases, we included interest in media channels strongly biased towards right and radical right ideology as our main targeting parameters. The sample of the pilot survey confirmed that our strategy was successful. The mean ideology of the sample is 7.4, and the median is 8.5 ($SD = 3.43$). The preference for radical right-wing candidates is over-represented, with 30.45% of the respondents declaring vote intention for Zemmour and 16.25% declaring vote intention for Le Pen. In comparison, vote intention for Macron is only 7.25%. The total number of respondents who completed the whole questionnaire of the pilot study is 578.

The pilot study also included a pilot experiment. Since the pilot study was fielded before the first round of the presidential elections, we asked respondents to imagine that the elections had been celebrated the day before and that the results emulated those of the average poll predictions. For the rest, the pilot experiment proceeded the same way as the definitive one. There is only one additional change. It has a different placebo condition highlighting the lousy state of the economy due to the government management of the COVID-19 crisis instead of the treatment priming respondents with the Zemmour potential to enter the government coalition. The additional placebo condition was too strong due to the high salience of the economic dimension after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, happening between designing and launching the pilot. As a result, we decided to remove it from the final experiment to maximise power while including the 'potential for government' treatment condition. The results point in the same direction: even the hypothetical idea that Macron could win the elections reduces SWD among Zemmour supporters.

E2. Regression table: estimate of the ATE on SWD with the pilot study sample

	Model 1	Model 2
(Intercept)	3.79***	3.79***
	(0.48)	(0.51)
In-group Parliament	−0.39	−0.39
	(0.68)	(0.83)
Out-group Government	−1.18·	−1.18·
	(0.66)	(0.61)
Final Placebo (Social Norm)	−0.21	−0.21
	(0.69)	(0.75)
Discarded Placebo (Economy + COVID)	−1.34*	−1.34*
	(0.66)	(0.57)
Robust Std. Errors	No	Yes
R^2	0.05	0.05
Adj. R^2	0.02	0.02
Num. obs.	130	130
RMSE		2.38

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\cdot}p < 0.1$

Table E1: OLS Specifications Pilot Study sample. DV: SWD

E3. Coefficient plot: estimate of the ATE on SWD with the pilot study sample



Figure E1: ATE on change in SWD (pilot study)

Appendix F. Panel study analysis FES 2022

F1. Regression table: SWD Change regressed on Vote Choice

	Baseline	soc. controls	full spec.
(Intercept)	0.24 (0.03)***	0.30 (0.11)**	0.29 (0.12)*
Pre-election SWD	−0.41 (0.04)***	−0.40 (0.04)***	−0.40 (0.04)***
Abstention	−0.06 (0.03)*	−0.01 (0.03)	−0.02 (0.03)
Blank/Null Vote	−0.11 (0.05)*	−0.02 (0.03)	−0.01 (0.03)
Vote for Éric Zemmour	−0.08 (0.05)·	−0.12 (0.05)**	−0.11 (0.05)*
Vote for Marine Le Pen	−0.13 (0.03)***	−0.08 (0.03)**	−0.08 (0.03)**
Vote for Jean-Luc Mélenchon	−0.06 (0.03)*	−0.02 (0.03)	−0.01 (0.03)
Vote for Emmanuel Macron	0.04 (0.03)	0.06 (0.03)*	0.06 (0.03)*
Age (= 30-34)		−0.06 (0.11)	−0.06 (0.11)
Age (= 35-39)		−0.10 (0.11)	−0.09 (0.11)
Age (= 40-44)		−0.03 (0.11)	−0.02 (0.11)
Age (= 45-49)		−0.05 (0.11)	−0.05 (0.11)
Age (= 50-54)		−0.01 (0.11)	−0.01 (0.11)
Age (= 55-59)		−0.04 (0.11)	−0.04 (0.11)
Age (= 60-64)		0.00 (0.12)	0.01 (0.12)
Age (= 65-69)		−0.04 (0.12)	−0.03 (0.12)
Age (= 70+)		−0.02 (0.12)	−0.01 (0.12)
Age (= -25)		−0.13 (0.12)	−0.13 (0.12)
Gender (= Male)		−0.01 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)
Education (= High School)		−0.04 (0.03)	−0.04 (0.03)
Education (= Middle School or Less)		−0.02 (0.03)	−0.02 (0.03)
Education (= Undergraduate Studies)		−0.04 (0.03)	−0.04 (0.03)
Education (= Vocatonal Training)		−0.01 (0.03)	−0.01 (0.03)
Income (= From 1400€ to 1650€)		−0.04 (0.04)	−0.04 (0.04)
Income (= From 1650€ to 1900€)		−0.00 (0.04)	−0.00 (0.04)
Income (= From 1900€ to 2200€)		0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
Income (= From 2200€ to 2500€)		−0.04 (0.03)	−0.04 (0.03)
Income (= From 2500€ to 3200€)		−0.03 (0.04)	−0.03 (0.04)
Income (= From 650€ to 950€)		0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)
Income (= From 950€ to 1200€)		−0.03 (0.04)	−0.03 (0.04)
Income (= Less than 650€)		−0.10 (0.05)·	−0.10 (0.05)·
Income (= More than 3200€)		−0.01 (0.04)	−0.01 (0.04)
Employment (= Retired)		0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
Employment (= Student)		0.06 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)
Employment (= Unemployed)		−0.00 (0.03)	−0.00 (0.03)
Left-Right Ideology			0.17 (0.37)
Left-Right Ideology Squared			−0.45 (0.28)
Political Interest			−0.00 (0.01)
Robust SE	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.28	0.35	0.36
Adj. R^2	0.28	0.33	0.33
Num. obs.	1375	892	892
RMSE	0.17	0.14	0.14

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\cdot}p < 0.1$

Table F1: OLS Specifications. DV: Change in SWD

F2. Regression table: Affects toward LREM regressed on Vote Choice

	Baseline	Soc. controls	Full spec.
(Intercept)	3.99 (0.22)***	3.53 (0.80)***	1.83 (1.17)
Abstention	−0.92 (0.37)*	−0.23 (0.51)	−0.35 (0.45)
Blank/Null Vote	−1.24 (0.53)*	−0.77 (0.81)	−0.09 (0.71)
Vote for Éric Zemmour	−1.21 (0.79)	−2.10 (0.52)***	−1.89 (0.54)***
Vote for Marine Le Pen	−1.49 (0.44)***	−0.89 (0.53)·	−0.73 (0.48)
Vote for Jean-Luc Mélenchon	−1.55 (0.32)***	−1.18 (0.41)**	−0.60 (0.39)
Vote for Emmanuel Macron	3.18 (0.32)***	3.21 (0.47)***	2.49 (0.45)***
Age (= 30-34)		0.10 (0.89)	−0.48 (0.98)
Age (= 35-39)		0.50 (0.77)	0.32 (0.97)
Age (= 40-44)		0.87 (0.75)	0.40 (1.00)
Age (= 45-49)		0.48 (0.75)	0.13 (0.97)
Age (= 50-54)		0.73 (0.75)	−0.13 (0.99)
Age (= 55-59)		1.00 (0.77)	0.30 (0.99)
Age (= 60-64)		1.44 (1.01)	0.89 (1.18)
Age (= 65-69)		0.83 (1.01)	0.66 (1.18)
Age (= 70+)		1.20 (1.10)	0.86 (1.26)
Age (= -25)		0.86 (0.79)	0.11 (1.06)
Gender (= Male)		0.17 (0.38)	0.14 (0.32)
Education (= High School)		−0.71 (0.43)	−0.74 (0.41)·
Education (= Middle School or Less)		−0.80 (0.43)·	−0.41 (0.43)
Education (= Undergraduate Studies)		−0.17 (0.38)	−0.33 (0.36)
Education (= Vocatonal Training)		−0.53 (0.57)	−0.34 (0.43)
Income (= From 1400€ to 1650€)		−0.23 (0.52)	−0.05 (0.51)
Income (= From 1650€ to 1900€)		−0.24 (0.49)	−0.15 (0.53)
Income (= From 1900€ to 2200€)		0.97 (1.00)	0.49 (0.81)
Income (= From 2200€ to 2500€)		−0.88 (0.71)	−0.96 (0.65)
Income (= From 2500€ to 3200€)		−0.54 (0.68)	−0.67 (0.65)
Income (= From 650€ to 950€)		−0.15 (0.49)	−0.04 (0.53)
Income (= From 950€ to 1200€)		−0.48 (0.62)	−0.31 (0.60)
Income (= Less than 650€)		−0.90 (0.65)	−0.82 (0.64)
Income (= More than 3200€)		−0.47 (0.58)	−0.42 (0.58)
Employment (= Retired)		0.32 (0.78)	−0.10 (0.75)
Employment (= Student)		3.54 (0.90)***	2.23 (1.06)*
Employment (= Unemployed)		−0.21 (0.46)	−0.16 (0.43)
Pre-election SWD			3.51 (0.49)***
Left-Right Ideology			19.69 (6.77)**
Left-Right Ideology Squared			−25.52 (9.74)**
Political Interest			0.26 (0.21)
Robust SE	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.38	0.41	0.53
Adj. R^2	0.37	0.38	0.51
Num. obs.	1417	894	880
RMSE	2.38	2.22	1.98

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\cdot}p < 0.1$

Table F2: OLS Specifications. DV: Change in Affects toward LREM

Appendix G. Research ethics of the project

This study is in complete conformity with all *Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research* adopted by the APSA Council on April 4th, 2020, and follows all requirements stated in the *2022 APSA Guide to Professional Ethics in Political Science*. More particularly, this study follows all the principles and guidelines stated in the European University Institute *Code of Ethics in Academic Research* as well as all GDPR regulations related to data protection. This study was submitted for ethics review in February 2022 but was not reviewed due to time constraints of the IRB prior to data collection.

In particular, the research study implemented the following to comply with the principles of human subject research:

- **General principles.** It respects the autonomy, considers the well-being of participants, and has been open about potential ethical issues.
- **Power.** It has considered potential power differentials and has not identified any vulnerable group as part of this research. Participants in the survey were not compensated for their participation, were informed about it and accepted to participate on a voluntary basis. To incentivise participation and minimise attrition, a lottery for a 200€ Amazon voucher was organised for participants of the two waves of the survey. Still, participation in the second wave of the survey was completely voluntary and dependent on new consent from the participants. The random nature of the prize attribution to the second-wave participants ensured the free nature of consent.
- **Consent.** Consent from participants was fully informed and voluntary, ensured via a consent form before responding to *each wave* of the online survey. The consent form included the researchers' names and affiliations (and contact information when appropriate), the general purpose of the research, an explanation of what participation entails, how identities and data are protected according to the GDPR rules, and the sources of financial support for the research.
- **Deception.** The study avoided any deception and consent was fully informed. In addition, a debriefing note informed respondents at the end of the survey regarding the specific treatment conditions (which all informed about real-world electoral results of the 1st round of the presidential elections) they were exposed to.
- **Harm and Trauma.** The researchers have identified no potential source of harm and trauma due to their participation in the study.

- **Confidentiality.** Respondents have been informed about the confidentiality and anonymity of their answers via the consent form. The data collected is completely anonymous and follows all the GDPR legislation. Regarding qualitative excerpts, careful consideration was given in order to select quotes that do not allow the identification of respondents, and most qualitative results have been summarised and presented in an aggregated format.
- **Impact.** No potential harm to respondents or indirect harm to non-participants was identified by researchers. The only potential impact of the research for respondents concerns the reiteration of the information regarding the electoral results following the first round of the French presidential elections, which was accessible via regular media and sources of information. In addition, all respondents were informed about the exposure to different treatment conditions in a debriefing note at the end of the online survey.
- **Laws, Regulations, and Prospective Review.** This study follows all the local (French) laws and regulations, including the GDPR regulations. In addition, this study follows the European University Institute *Code of Ethics in Academic Research* and the research project was submitted for IRB review. Other ethical considerations, beyond legislations and regulations by the local IRB, were carefully considered by the researchers.
- **Shared Responsibility.** This research project was transparent and accessible to the academic community from an early stage via the publication of an open-access pre-analysis plan. In addition, the design and ethical aspects of this project were formally reviewed and approved by the authors' supervisors and colleagues.

Disclaimer on the lack of IRB approval

The researchers produced a Research Plan and Data Protection Protocol and compiled an Ethics guidelines checklist, which were submitted for approval to the IRB of the European University Institute. The IRB of the European University Institute provided feedback stating that the documentation provided complied with the Ethics Guidelines of the European University Institute. However, following the guidelines for Ethics review of the European University Institute, the IRB considered that our project could not be formally reviewed because our data collection would not start at least six weeks after submission. Due to the hard deadline imposed by the fixed date of the 1st round of the French presidential elections, the researchers could not delay the starting date of the fieldwork. As a result, the project could not be formally issued a positive review by the IRB of the European University Institute

despite complying with all the guidelines in its regulations.

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