



REALTEK

AN0500

Ameba-ZII application note

## Abstract

Ameba-ZII is a high-integrated IC. Its features include 802.11 Wi-Fi, RF, Bluetooth and configurable GPIOs. This manual introduce users how to develop Ameba-ZII, including SDK compiling and downloading image to Ameba-ZII.

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## **USING THIS DOCUMENT**

This document is intended for the software engineer's reference and provides detailed programming information.

Though every effort has been made to ensure that this document is current and accurate, more information may have become available subsequent to the production of this guide.

## REVISION HISTORY

Revision	Release Date	Summary
0.1	2018/11/27	Initial draft
0.2	2019/01/09	Add OTA part
0.3	2019/02/25	Add EVB V2.0 build and image tool environment
0.4	2019/02/28	Add How to enable secure boot & boot time
0.5	2019/03/01	Add DEV_2V0 board user guide
0.6	2019/03/06	Add trust zone project
0.7	2019/03/12	Update OTA implementation method
0.8	2019/03/27	Update TrustZone layout
0.9	2019/04/02	Add How to generate flash image combines both firmware1 and firmware2
1.0	2019/04/22	Add SDK Build Environment Setup, GCC Environment
1.1	2019/04/26	Add Bluetooth section
1.2	2019/05/14	Add Bluetooth 128 bit UUID configuration example
1.3	2019/05/15	Update IAR trust zone project; Add trust zone project instruction under GCC environment; Update trust zone layout; Add troubleshooting chapter.
1.4	2019/05/17	Update OTA FW update behavior
1.5	2019/05/22	Must use FT232 UART adapter to download code

<b>COPYRIGHT .....</b>	2
<b>DISCLAIMER .....</b>	2
<b>TRADEMARKS .....</b>	2
<b>USING THIS DOCUMENT .....</b>	2
<b>REVISION HISTORY .....</b>	3
1 Demo Board User Guide .....	9
1.1 Demo board overview (DEV_1V0) .....	9
1.2 Demo board overview (DEV_2V0) .....	11
1.3 Pin Mux Alternate Functions (DEV_1V0) .....	13
1.3.1 Pin mux table .....	13
1.3.2 Pin-Out Reference.....	14
1.4 Pin Mux Alternate Functions (DEV_2V0) .....	15
1.4.1 Pin mux table .....	15
1.4.2 Pin-Out Reference.....	16
1.5 Module Features .....	17
2 SDK Build Environment Setup.....	19
2.1 Introduction.....	19
2.2 Debugger Settings .....	19
2.2.1 J-Link .....	19
2.2.2 OpenOCD/CMSIS-DAP (TBD).....	22
2.3 Log UART Settings .....	22
2.3.1 EVB V1.0.....	22
2.3.2 EVB V2.0.....	23
2.4 IAR Environment .....	24
2.4.1 Install and setup IAR IDE in Windows .....	24
2.4.2 IAR Project introduction .....	24
2.4.3 IAR memory configuration.....	28
2.4.4 IAR memory overflow .....	29
2.5 GCC Environment .....	29
2.5.1 Install Cygwin .....	29
2.5.2 GCC memory configuration .....	32
2.5.3 GCC memory overflow .....	32

3	Image Tool.....	32
3.1	Introduction.....	32
3.2	Environment Setup.....	33
3.2.1	Hardware Setup .....	33
3.2.2	Software Setup.....	35
3.3	Image download.....	35
4	Memory Layout.....	36
4.1	Memory type.....	36
4.2	Flash memory layout.....	36
4.2.1	Partition table .....	37
4.2.2	System data.....	39
4.2.3	Calibration data.....	40
4.2.4	Boot image .....	40
4.2.5	Firmware 1/Firmware 2 .....	41
4.3	SRAM layout.....	43
4.4	TrustZone Memory Layout.....	44
4.4.1	Image Generation .....	45
4.4.2	Secure Gateway to Trustzone.....	45
4.4.3	Usage Example .....	46
5	Boot process .....	47
5.1	Boot flow .....	47
5.2	Secure boot .....	47
5.2.1	Secure boot flow .....	47
5.2.2	Partition table and Boot image decryption flow .....	48
5.2.3	Secure boot use scenario.....	50
5.2.4	How to enable secure boot.....	51
5.3	Boot time (TBD).....	62
6	Secure JTAG/SWD .....	63
6.1	Functional description (TBD).....	63
6.2	How to enable and use Secure JTAG/SWD (TBD) .....	63
7	Over-the-Air (OTA) Firmware Update.....	64
7.1	OTA operation flow .....	65

7.2 Boot process flow .....	66
7.3 Upgraded partition.....	67
7.4 Firmware image output.....	68
7.4.1 OTA firmware swap behavior .....	68
7.4.2 Configuration for building OTA firmware .....	69
7.5 Implement OTA over Wi-Fi.....	70
7.5.1 OTA using local download server base on socket .....	70
7.5.2 OTA using local download server based on HTTP .....	73
7.6 OTA signature.....	76
8     Bluetooth .....	77
8.1 Features.....	77
8.2 Memory Usage .....	77
8.2.1 Wi-Fi only .....	77
8.2.2 Wi-Fi + BT .....	77
8.3 Examples .....	77
8.3.1 ble_peripheral.....	77
8.3.2 bt_beacon .....	77
8.3.3 bt_config .....	78
8.3.4 128 bit UUID Configuration.....	79
9     Troubleshooting.....	81
9.1 Hard Fault.....	81
9.1.1 IAR environment.....	81
9.1.2 GCC environment.....	83

## List of Figures

Figure 1-1 Top View of Ameba-ZII 1V0 Demo Board .....	9
Figure 1-2 Ameba-ZII 1V0 Demo Board PCB Layout .....	10
Figure 1-3 Top View of Ameba-ZII 2V0 Dev Board .....	11
Figure 1-4 Ameba-ZII 2V0 Dev Board PCB Layout.....	12
Figure 1-5 Pin Out Reference .....	14
Figure 1-6 Pin Out Reference for DEV_2V0 .....	16
Figure 2-1 Connection between J-Link Adapter and Ameba-ZII SWD connector.....	19
Figure 2-2 Outlook of J-Link adapter and Ameba-ZII SWD connection .....	20
Figure 2-3 J-Link GDB server UI under Windows .....	21
Figure 2-4 J-Link GDB server connect under Windows.....	22
Figure 2-5 Log UART via FT232 on EVB V1.0.....	23
Figure 2-6 Log UART via FT232 on EVB V2.0.....	23
Figure 3-1 AmebaZII Image Tool UI.....	33
Figure 3-2 Ameba-ZII EVB V1.0 Hardware Setup.....	34
Figure 3-3 Ameba-ZII EVB V2.0 Hardware Setup .....	34
Figure 4-1 Address Allocation of Different Memories on Ameba-ZII .....	36
Figure 4-2 Flash memory layout .....	37
Figure 4-3 TrustZone Memory Layout .....	44
Figure 4-4 TrustZone function call principle .....	45
Figure 4-5 Secure gateway to TrustZones .....	46
Figure 5-1 Overview of boot flow .....	47
Figure 5-2 Secure boot flow.....	48
Figure 5-3 Partition table and boot image decryption flow .....	49
Figure 5-4 secure boot use scenario.....	50
Figure 7-1 Methodology to Update Firmware via OTA .....	64
Figure 7-2 OTA Process Flow .....	65
Figure 7-3 Boot Process Flow.....	66
Figure 7-4 OTA update procedure .....	67
Figure 7-5 OTA Firmware SWAP Procedure.....	68

## List of Table

Table 1-1 GPIOA Pin MUX: DEV_1V0 Board .....	13
Table 1-2 GPIOA Pin MUX: DEV_2V0 Board .....	15
Table 1-3 RTL8720C Features & Specifications.....	18
Table 4-1 Size of Different Memories on Ameba-ZII .....	36
Table 4-2 Description of flash layout .....	37
Table 4-3 The layout of Partition table .....	38
Table 4-4 OTA/MP TRAP map .....	38
Table 4-5 Layout of system data.....	39
Table 4-6 Definition for OTA section in system data .....	39
Table 4-7 Definition for Flash section in system data.....	40
Table 4-8 Definition for Log UART section in system data .....	40
Table 4-9 The layout of boot image.....	40
Table 4-10 The layout of firmware image.....	41
Table 4-11 AmebaZII DTCM (256KB) memory layout .....	43
Table 4-12 Description of RAM layout .....	44

# 1 Demo Board User Guide

## 1.1 Demo board overview (DEV\_1V0)

RTL8720C embedded on Ameba-ZII DEV demo board, which consists of various I/O interfaces. The corresponding HDK (Hardware Development Kit) documents are available at:

- Module HDK version: HDK-XXXX
- DEV HDK version: RTL-AMEBAZII\_DEV01\_1V0




Figure 1-1 Top View of Ameba-ZII 1V0 Demo Board





Figure 1-2 Ameba-ZII 1V0 Demo Board PCB Layout

## 1.2 Demo board overview (DEV\_2V0)

The corresponding HDK (Hardware Development Kit) documents are available at:

- Module HDK version: HDK-XXXX
  - DEV HDK version: RTL-AMEBAZII\_DEV\_2V0



**Figure 1-3 Top View of Ameba-ZII 2V0 Dev Board**




Figure 1-4 Ameba-ZII 2V0 Dev Board PCB Layout

## 1.3 Pin Mux Alternate Functions (DEV\_1V0)


### 1.3.1 Pin mux table

<i>Pin Name</i>	<i>SPIC-Flash/SDIO</i>	<i>JTAG</i>	<i>UART</i>	<i>SPI/WL_LED/EXT_32K</i>	<i>I2C</i>	<i>PWM</i>
<i>GPIOA_0</i>		JTAG_CLK	UART1_IN	EXT_32K		PWM[0]
<i>GPIOA_1</i>		JTAG_TMS	UART1_OUT	BT_LED		PWM[1]
<i>GPIOA_2</i>		JTAG_TDO	UART1_IN	SPI_CS <sub>n</sub>	I2C_SCL	PWM[2]
<i>GPIOA_3</i>		JTAG_TDI	UART1_OUT	SPI_SCL	I2C_SDA	PWM[3]
<i>GPIOA_4</i>		JTAG_TRST	UART1_CTS	SPI_MOSI		PWM[4]
<i>GPIOA_5</i>			UART1_RTS	SPI_MISO		PWM[5]
<i>GPIOA_6</i>						PWM[6]
<i>GPIOA_7</i>	SPI_M_CS			SPI_CS <sub>n</sub>		
<i>GPIOA_8</i>	SPI_M_CLK			SPI_SCL		
<i>GPIOA_9</i>	SPI_M_DATA[2]		UART0_RTS	SPI_MOSI		
<i>GPIOA_10</i>	SPI_M_DATA[1]		UART0_CTS	SPI_MISO		
<i>GPIOA_11</i>	SPI_M_DATA[0]		UART0_OUT		I2C_SCL	PWM[0]
<i>GPIOA_12</i>	SPI_M_DATA[3]		UART0_IN		I2C_SDA	PWM[1]
<i>GPIOA_13</i>			UART0_IN			PWM[7]
<i>GPIOA_14</i>	SDIO_INT		UART0_OUT			PWM[2]
<i>GPIOA_15</i>	SD_D[2]		UART2_IN	SPI_CS <sub>n</sub>	I2C_SCL	PWM[3]
<i>GPIOA_16</i>	SD_D[3]		UART2_OUT	SPI_SCL	I2C_SDA	PWM[4]
<i>GPIOA_17</i>	SD_CMD					PWM[5]
<i>GPIOA_18</i>	SD_CLK					PWM[6]
<i>GPIOA_19</i>	SD_D[0]		UART2_CTS	SPI_MOSI	I2C_SCL	PWM[7]
<i>GPIOA_20</i>	SD_D[1]		UART2_RTS	SPI_MISO	I2C_SDA	PWM[0]
<i>GPIOA_21</i>			UART2_IN		I2C_SCL	PWM[1]
<i>GPIOA_22</i>			UART2_OUT	LED_0	I2C_SDA	PWM[2]
<i>GPIOA_23</i>				LED_0		PWM[7]

Table 1-1 GPIOA Pin MUX: DEV\_1V0 Board

Note: This table may not be up-to-date, please check the HDK and datasheet for more details.

### 1.3.2 Pin-Out Reference



## Figure 1-5 Pin Out Reference

## 1.4 Pin Mux Alternate Functions (DEV\_2V0)


### 1.4.1 Pin mux table

<i>Pin Name</i>	<i>SPIC-Flash/SDIO</i>	<i>JTAG</i>	<i>UART</i>	<i>SPI/WL_LED/EXT_32K</i>	<i>I2C</i>	<i>PWM</i>
<i>GPIOA_0</i>		JTAG_CLK	UART1_IN	EXT_32K		PWM[0]
<i>GPIOA_1</i>		JTAG_TMS	UART1_OUT	BT_LED		PWM[1]
<i>GPIOA_2</i>		JTAG_TDO	UART1_IN	SPI_CS <sub>n</sub>	I2C_SCL	PWM[2]
<i>GPIOA_3</i>		JTAG_TDI	UART1_OUT	SPI_SCL	I2C_SDA	PWM[3]
<i>GPIOA_4</i>		JTAG_TRST	UART1_CTS	SPI_MOSI		PWM[4]
<i>GPIOA_5</i>			UART1_RTS	SPI_MISO		PWM[5]
<i>GPIOA_6</i>						PWM[6]
<i>GPIOA_7</i>	SPI_M_CS			SPI_CS <sub>n</sub>		
<i>GPIOA_8</i>	SPI_M_CLK			SPI_SCL		
<i>GPIOA_9</i>	SPI_M_DATA[2]		UART0_RTS	SPI_MOSI		
<i>GPIOA_10</i>	SPI_M_DATA[1]		UART0_CTS	SPI_MISO		
<i>GPIOA_11</i>	SPI_M_DATA[0]		UART0_OUT		I2C_SCL	PWM[0]
<i>GPIOA_12</i>	SPI_M_DATA[3]		UART0_IN		I2C_SDA	PWM[1]
<i>GPIOA_13</i>			UART0_IN			PWM[7]
<i>GPIOA_14</i>	SDIO_INT		UART0_OUT			PWM[2]
<i>GPIOA_15</i>	SD_D[2]		UART2_IN	SPI_CS <sub>n</sub>	I2C_SCL	PWM[3]
<i>GPIOA_16</i>	SD_D[3]		UART2_OUT	SPI_SCL	I2C_SDA	PWM[4]
<i>GPIOA_17</i>	SD_CMD					PWM[5]
<i>GPIOA_18</i>	SD_CLK					PWM[6]
<i>GPIOA_19</i>	SD_D[0]		UART2_CTS	SPI_MOSI	I2C_SCL	PWM[7]
<i>GPIOA_20</i>	SD_D[1]		UART2_RTS	SPI_MISO	I2C_SDA	PWM[0]
<i>GPIOA_21</i>			UART2_IN		I2C_SCL	PWM[1]
<i>GPIOA_22</i>			UART2_OUT	LED_0	I2C_SDA	PWM[2]
<i>GPIOA_23</i>				LED_0		PWM[7]

Table 1-2 GPIOA Pin MUX: DEV\_2V0 Board

Note: This table may not be up-to-date, please check the HDK and datasheet for more details.

## 1.4.2 Pin-Out Reference



## Figure 1-6 Pin Out Reference for DEV\_2V0

## 1.5 Module Features

<b>Feature list</b>			<b>RTL8720CF</b>	<b>RTL8720CM</b>	<b>RTL8710CX</b>
<b>Package</b>	trays and tape-in-reel		(5x5mm^2) QFN40	(5x5mm^2) QFN40	(5x5mm^2) QFN40
<b>Integrated core</b>	Core type		KM4	KM4	KM4
	Core clock maximum freq.		100MHz	100MHz	100MHz
<b>Memory</b>	Internal ROM		384KB	384KB	384KB
	Internal SRAM		256KB	256KB	256KB
	Flash (2MB)		Yes	No	No
	pSRAM (4MB)		No	Yes	No
<b>FPU</b>	Floating point unit		No	No	No
<b>SWD/JTAG</b>			SWD/JTAG	SWD/JTAG	SWD/JTAG
<b>Secure boot</b>			Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Trust-zone-M</b>			Yes	Yes	Yes
			(Fixed size: 32KB)	(Fixed size: 32KB)	(Fixed size: 32KB)
<b>Backup register</b>	Backup register for power save		No	No	No
<b>F/W protection</b>			No	No	No
<b>WIFI</b>	802.11 b/g/n		Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Bluetooth</b>			Yes	Yes	No
<b>BOR</b>	BOR Detection		Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Peripherals</b>	UART		3	3	3
	SPI Master	Max. 20Mbps	1	1	1
	SPI Slave	Max. 4Mbps	1	1	1
	I2C	Max. 400Kbps	1	1	1
	GDMA	2 channel	1	1	1
	GPIO	IN/OUT/INT	20	14	14
	I2S		0	0	0
	RTC	D/H/M/S	0	0	0
		OUTPUT	0	0	0

	Timer	Basic timer use 32K	1	1	1
		Advanced timer use 40M	8	8	8
	PWM	OUTPUT	8	8	8
		INPUT Capture	0	0	0
	WDG		1	1	1
	USB device		0	0	0
	SDIO 2.0 Device		1	1	1
<b>External 32K</b>	External 32K		1	1	1
<b>Dsleep Wakepin</b>	Deep sleep wake pin		20	14	14

Table 1-3 RTL8720C Features & Specifications

Note: This table may not be up-to-date, please check the HDK and datasheet for more details.

## 2 SDK Build Environment Setup

### 2.1 Introduction

This document illustrates how to build Realtek WiFi SDK. We will focus on both Windows platform and Linux distribution in this document. For Windows, we use Windows 7 64-bit as our platform.

And this SDK supports two compiling toolchains, both IAR and GCC.

### 2.2 Debugger Settings

To download code or debug on Ameba-ZII, user needs to make sure the debugger is setup properly first.

Ameba-ZII supports J-Link and CMSIS-DAP for code download and entering debugger mode. The settings are described below.

#### 2.2.1 J-Link

Ameba-ZII supports J-Link debugger. We need to connect the SWD connector to J-Link debugger. The SWD pin definitions can refer to section 1.2.2 and the connection is shown as below. After finished these configuration, please connect it to PC side. Note that if you are using Virtual Machine as your platform, please make sure the USB connection setting between VM host and client is correct so that the VM client can detect the device.




Figure 2-1 Connection between J-Link Adapter and Ameba-ZII SWD connector



Figure 2-2 Outlook of J-Link adapter and Ameba-ZII SWD connection

**Note:** To be able to debugger Ameba-ZII which is powered by Cortex-M33, user needs a J-Link debugger with the latest hardware version (Check [https://wiki.segger.com/Software\\_and\\_Hardware\\_Features\\_Overview](https://wiki.segger.com/Software_and_Hardware_Features_Overview) for details). J-Link EDU with hardware version V10 is used to prepare this document.

### 2.2.1.1 Windows

To be able to use J-Link debugger, user needs install J-Link GDB server first. For Windows, please check <http://www.segger.com> and download “J-Link Software and Documentation Pack” (<https://www.segger.com/downloads/jlink>).

**Note:** to support TrustZone feature, it's better to download the latest version of J-Link Software. Version 6.40 is used to prepare this document.

To check whether the connection works fine, user can go to the location of SEGGER J-Link tool and run “JLinkGDBServer.exe”. Make sure the configuration is correct and click “OK”.




Figure 2-3 J-Link GDB server UI under Windows

Please check and make sure below information is shown properly.




Figure 2-4 J-Link GDB server connect under Windows

### 2.2.1.2 Linux (TBD)

### 2.2.2 OpenOCD/CMSIS-DAP (TBD)

#### 2.2.2.1 Windows (TBD)

#### 2.2.2.2 Linux (TBD)

### 2.3 Log UART Settings

To be able to start development with the demo board, Log UART must be connected properly. Different versions of EVBs have different connections.

#### 2.3.1 EVB V1.0

By default, UART2 (GPIOA\_15/GPIOA\_16, check figure 1-3) is used as system log UART. User needs to connect UART2 to CON3 (FT232) or CON2 (DAP).

- 1) Connection to log UART via FT232

PA15 <-> J41-1, PA16 <-> J43-1




Figure 2-5 Log UART via FT232 on EVB V1.0

- 2) Connection to log UART via DAP (TBD)

### 2.3.2 EVB V2.0

By default, UART2 (GPIOA\_15/GPIOA\_16, check figure 1-3) is used as system log UART. User needs to connect jumpers to J33 for CON3 (FT232) or CON2 (DAP).

- 1) Connection to log UART via FT232




Figure 2-6 Log UART via FT232 on EVB V2.0

- 2) Connection to log UART via DAP (TBD)

## 2.4 IAR Environment

IAR IDE supports only Windows, so this section is applicable for Windows only.

### 2.4.1 Install and setup IAR IDE in Windows

IAR IDE provides the toolchain for Ameba-ZII. It allows users to write programs, compile and upload them to your board. Also, it supports step-by-step debug.

User can visit the official website of IAR Embedded Workbench, and install the IDE by following its instructions.

**Note: Please use IAR version 8.30 or above.**

### 2.4.2 IAR Project introduction

#### 2.4.2.1 *Ignore secure project*

Currently users can use ignore secure mode. Project\_is (ignore secure) is the project without TrustZone configuration. This project is easier to develop and suit for first-time developer.

##### 2.4.2.1.1 Compile

- 1) Open SDK/project/realtek\_amebaz2\_v0\_example/EWARM-RELEASE/Project\_is.eww.
- 2) Confirm application\_is in Work Space, right click application\_is and choose “Rebuild All” to compile.
- 3) Make sure there is no error after compile.

##### 2.4.2.1.2 Generating image binary

After compile, the images partition.bin, bootloader.bin, firmware\_is.bin and flash\_is.bin can be seen in the EWARM-RELEASE\Debug\Exe.

- 1) partition.bin stores partition table, recording the address of Boot image and firmware image;
- 2) bootloader.bin is bootloader image;
- 3) firmware\_is.bin is application image;
- 4) flash\_is.bin links partition.bin, bootloader.bin and firmware\_is.bin. Users need to choose flash\_is.bin when downloading the image to board by PG Tool.

##### 2.4.2.1.3 Download

After a successfully compilation and flash\_is.bin is generated without error, user can either

- 1) Directly download the image binary on to demo board from IAR IDE (as below)




Figure 2-7 IAR download binary on flash

**Note:** Please make the project first when some code is modified before download the bin file on the board, otherwise the download will fail and below logs will be shown.




Figure 2-8 IAR download code on flash error message on IDE

```
Realtek Ameba-ZII Flash Loader Build @ 19:38:43, Nov 28 2018
DownloadingImage size <8b80980f> is invalid! Make sure the image is generated before the download
```

Figure 2-9 IAR download code on flash error message on Log UART

- 2) Or using the PG tool for Ameba-ZII (Will not be shown here, please check chapter 3 for details).

#### 2.4.2.2 TrustZone project

If it is in trust zone mode, “*project\_tz.eww*” (tz means trust zone) is the project with trust zone configuration. The code can be decided as secure or not by putting the code to *application\_s* or *application\_ns*. Secure code can be executed by enabling EXAMPLE\_TRUST\_ZONE in platform\_opts.h.

##### 2.4.2.2.1 Compile

- 1) Open SDK/project/realtek\_amebaz2\_v0\_example/EWARM-RELEASE/Project\_tz.eww.
- 2) Confirm *application\_ns* and *application\_s* are in Work Space.
- 3) Right click *application\_s* and click “Rebuild All” to compile *application\_s* first. If *application\_s* is compiled successfully, it will generate a file named *application\_s\_import\_lib.o* and the file will be put in “lib” folder of *application\_ns*, shown in Figure 2-10.




Figure 2-10 application\_s compile result

- 4) Make sure *application\_ns* is compiled successfully and the file *application\_ns\_import\_lib.o* has been put under “lib” in *application\_ns*.
- 5) Right click *application\_ns* and click “Rebuild All” to build *application\_ns*.
- 6) Make sure the *application\_ns* is compiled successfully.

#### 2.4.2.2.2 Generating image binary

After compile, the images *partition.bin*, *bootloader.bin*, *firmware\_tz.bin* and *flash\_tz.bin* can be seen in the EWARM-RELEASE\Debug\Exe.

- 1) *partition.bin* stores partition table, recording the address of Boot image and firmware image;
- 2) *bootloader.bin* is bootloader image;
- 3) *firmware\_tz.bin* is application image;
- 4) *flash\_tz.bin* links *partition.bin*, *bootloader.bin* and *firmware\_tz.bin*. Users need to choose *flash\_tz.bin* when downloading the image to board by PG Tool.

#### 2.4.2.2.3 Download

After a successfully compilation and *flash\_tz.bin* is generated without error, user can either

- 1) Directly download the image binary on to demo board from IAR IDE (as below)




Figure 2-11 IAR download binary on flash

- 2) Or using the PG tool for Ameba-ZII (Will not be shown here, please check chapter 3 for details).

### 2.4.3 IAR memory configuration

The whole memory layout of Ameba-ZII can refer to chapter Memory Layout.

And there will be some extra configurations user needs to do if they want to put some code to certain memory region.

#### 2.4.3.1 Configure memory from IAR IDE

In IAR Workspace (figure 2-8), there are “@ERAM” and “@SRAM” group. “@ERAM” represents external RAM, which can be known as PSRAM. “@SRAM” represents SRAM. Except “@ERAM” and “@SRAM” group, the rest of read-only section (TEXT and RODATA) will be placed on XIP.

If users want to link a particular file into PSRAM (need to make sure that PSRAM is available, refer to section 4.1.), users can drag-and-drop the files into “@ERAM”. For example, “test.c” will be linked to PSRAM as the graph above. If users want to place specific source file into SRAM, users can drag-and-drop the files into “@SRAM”. For example, “flash\_api.c”, “flash\_fatfs.c”, “hal\_flash.c” is placed in SRAM as the graph above.




Figure 2-12 Overview of IAR Workspace

**Note:** There are some files which must NOT be linked to XIP section. Please keep the default settings of the IAR project if one doesn't know about this.

### **2.4.3.2 Configure memory from ICF file**

IAR uses ICF (IAR Configuration File) to configure memory allocation so users can configure memory allocation by ICF file.

ICF file of Ameba-ZII locates: “SDK/project/realtek\_amebaz2\_v0\_example/EWARM-RELEASE/ application\_is.icf”

Open “application\_is.icf” with any text editor. There are some memory regions in it, which is:

- DTCM\_RAM\_region
- ERAM\_region
- XIP\_FLASH\_region

Users can reference IAR document if they don't know the format of ICF.

### **2.4.4 IAR memory overflow**

In default, Ameba-ZII place read-only (TEXT and RODATA) section in XIP area. If XIP does not have enough space, it will show the errors as below while linking.

Error[Lp011]: section placement failed

unable to allocate space for sections/blocks with a total estimated minimum size of 0x110'3e5e bytes (max align 0x8) in <[0x9b00'0140-0xbff'ffff]> (total uncommitted space 0xff'fec0).

The solution is to either minimize the code or move the code to other memory region. Same rule applies to SRAM and PSRAM if it's available.

## **2.5 GCC Environment**

### **2.5.1 Install Cygwin**

Cygwin a large collection of GNU and Open Source tools which provide functionality similar to a Linux distribution on Windows. It provides the GCC toolchain for Ameba-ZII.

User can visit the official website of Cygwin, and install by following its instructions.

- During the Cygwin installation, please install “math” “bc: Arbitrary precision calculator language”
- During the Cygwin installation, please install “devel” “make: The GNU version of the ‘make’ utility”

**Note: Please use Cygwin 32bit.**

#### **2.5.1.1 GCC Project introduction**

#### **2.5.1.2 Ignore secure project**

##### **2.5.1.2.1 Compile**

- 1) Open “Cygwin Terminal”
- 2) Direct to compile path. Enter command “cd /SDK /project/realtek\_amebaz2\_v0\_example/GCC-RELEASE”
- 3) Clean up previous compilation files. Enter command “make clean”
- 4) Build all libraries and application. Enter command “make all”

- 5) Make sure there is no error after compile.

#### 2.5.1.2.2 Generating image binary

After compile, the images partition.bin, bootloader.bin, firmware\_is.bin and flash\_is.bin can be seen in different folders of \GCC-RELEASE.

- 1) partition.bin stores partition table, recording the address of Boot image and firmware image; located at folder \GCC-RELEASE;
- 2) bootloader.bin is bootloader image; located at folder \GCC-RELEASE\bootloader\Debug\bin;
- 3) firmware\_is.bin is application image; located at folder \GCC-RELEASE\application\_is\Debug\bin;
- 4) flash\_is.bin links partition.bin, bootloader.bin and firmware\_is.bin. Located at folder \GCC-RELEASE\application\_is\Debug\bin.  
Users need to choose flash\_is.bin when downloading the image to board by PG Tool.

#### 2.5.1.2.3 Download

After a successfully compilation and flash\_is.bin is generated without error, user can either

- 1) Directly download the image binary on to demo board from Cygwin (as below)  
Connect SWD to board and open “JLinkGDBServer.exe”. Please refer to 2.2.1 Jlink for SWD connection.  
Enter command “make flash” at Cygwin.
- 2) Or using the PG tool for Ameba-ZII (Will not be shown here, please check chapter 3 for details).

### 2.5.1.3 TrustZone project

#### 2.5.1.3.1 Compile

- 1) Open “Cygwin Terminal”.
- 2) Direct to compile path. Enter command “cd /SDK /project/realtek\_amebaz2\_v0\_example/GCC-RELEASE”.
- 3) Clean up previous compilation files. Enter command “make clean”.
- 4) Build all libraries and application. Enter command “make tz” .
- 5) Make sure there is no error after compile.

#### 2.5.1.3.2 Generating image binary

After compile, the images partition.bin, bootloader.bin, firmware\_tz.bin and flash\_tz.bin can be seen in different folders of \GCC-RELEASE.

- 1) partition.bin stores partition table, recording the address of Boot image and firmware image; located at folder \GCC-RELEASE;

- 2) bootloader.bin is bootloader image; located at folder \GCC-RELEASE\bootloader\Debug\bin;
- 3) firmware\_tz.bin is application image; located at folder \GCC-RELEASE\application\_tz;
- 4) flash\_tz.bin links partition.bin, bootloader.bin and firmware\_tz.bin. Located at folder \GCC-RELEASE\application\_tz.  
Users need to choose flash\_tz.bin when downloading the image to board by PG Tool.

#### 2.5.1.3.3 Download

After a successfully compilation and flash\_tz.bin is generated without error, user can either

- 1) Directly download the image binary on to demo board from Cygwin (as below)  
Connect SWD to board and open “JLinkGDBServer.exe”. Please refer to 2.2.1 Jlink for SWD connection.  
Enter command “make flash\_tz” at Cygwin.
- 2) Or using the PG tool for Ameba-ZII (Will not be shown here, please check chapter 3 for details).

## 2.5.2 GCC memory configuration

The whole memory layout of Ameba-ZII can refer to chapter Memory Layout. And there will be some extra configurations user needs to do if they want to put some code to certain memory region.

### 2.5.2.1 Configure memory from LD file

GCC uses ld files to configure memory allocation so users can configure memory allocation by ld file.

ld file of Ameba-ZII locates: “SDK/project/realtek\_amebaz2\_v0\_example/GCC-RELEASE/rtl8710c\_ram.ld”

Open “rtl8710c\_ram.ld” with any text editor. There are some memory regions in it, which is:

- DTCM\_RAM
- PSRAM
- XIP\_FLASH\_region

Users can reference GCC document if they don't know the format of ld.

## 2.5.3 GCC memory overflow

In default, Ameba-ZII place read-only (TEXT and RODATA) section in XIP area. If XIP does not have enough space, there will be errors. The solution is to either minimize the code or move the code to other memory region. Same rule applies to SRAM (DTCM\_RAM) and PSRAM if it's available.

## 3 Image Tool

### 3.1 Introduction

This chapter introduces how to use Image Tool to generate and download images. As show in Figure 3-1, Image Tool has two menu pages:

- Download: used as image download server to transmit images to Ameba through UART.
- Generate: contact individual images and generate a composite image.

**Note: If you need to download code via external uart, must use FT232 USB To UART dongle.**




Figure 3-1 AmebaZII Image Tool UI

## 3.2 Environment Setup

### 3.2.1 Hardware Setup

There is difference for hardware setup of different EVB versions.

#### 3.2.1.1 EVB V1.0

User needs to connect CON3 to user's PC via a Micro USB cable.




Figure 3-2 Ameba-ZII EVB V1.0 Hardware Setup

### 3.2.1.2 EVB V2.0

User needs to connect CON3 to user's PC via a Micro USB cable. Add jumpers for J34 and J33 (J33 is for log UART which has two jumpers) if there is no connections.




Figure 3-3 Ameba-ZII EVB V2.0 Hardware Setup

### 3.2.2 Software Setup

- Environment Requirements: EX. WinXP, Win 7 Above, Microsoft .NET Framework 3.5
- AmebaZII\_PGTool\_v1.0.1.exe

## 3.3 Image download

User can download the image on demo board by following below steps:

- 1) Trigger Ameba-ZII chip enter UART download mode by
  - a. Different version of EVBs has different ways to enter UART download mode
    - (a) EVB V1.0  
Connect both PA0 and PA13 to 3.3v, and make sure the log UART is connected properly (refer to section 2.3).
    - (b) EVB V2.0  
Press and hold the UART DOWNLOAD button then press the RESET button and release both buttons. And make sure the log UART is connected properly (refer to section 2.3).
  - b. Press RESET button and release, then below log should be shown on log UART console. (Please remember to disconnect the log UART before using Image Tool to download, because the tool will also need to connect to this log UART port)




Figure 3-4 Ameba-ZII UART download mode

- 2) Choose the correct UART port (use rescan to update the port list)
- 3) “Browse” to choose the image to be downloaded (flash\_xx.bin)
- 4) Choose “Mode” “1. Program flash memory”
- 5) Choose correct “Flash Pin” according to the IC part number

Flash Pin	IC part number
PIN_A7_A12	RTL8710CX/RTL8720CM
PIN_B6_B12	RTL8720CF

- 6) Click “Download” to start downloading image. While downloading, the status will be shown on the left bar.

Note: it's recommended to use the default settings unless user is familiar with them.

## 4 Memory Layout

This chapter introduces the memory in Ameba-ZII, including ROM, RAM, SRAM, PSRAM and Flash. Also, this chapter provides the guide that users can place their program to the specific memory to fit user's requirement. However, some of program is fixed in specific memory and cannot be moved. This program is also discussed in this chapter.

### 4.1 Memory type

The size and configuration is as shown below

	Size(bytes)	Description
<b>ROM</b>	384K	Reserved
<b>RAM</b>	256K	Internal DTCM
<b>PSRAM</b>	4M	MCM PSRAM, only available on RTL8720CM
<b>XIP</b>	16M	Execute in Place, section TEXT and RODATA, virtual address remapped by SCE (Secure Code Engine). Physical address of Flash starts from 0x98000000 which can refer to the datasheet for more details.

Table 4-1 Size of Different Memories on Ameba-ZII

And the graph of configuration on Ameba-ZII is as shown below:




Figure 4-1 Address Allocation of Different Memories on Ameba-ZII

### 4.2 Flash memory layout

The default flash layout used in SDK is shown in below figure.




Figure 4-2 Flash memory layout

And the description of each block is in below Table 4-2.


Items	Start Offset Address	Limit Offset Address	Address adjustable	Size	Description	Mandatory
Partition table	0x00000000	0x00001000-1	N	4KB	The first 32 bytes is flash calibration pattern. The actual partition table starts from 0x20	Y
System data	0x00001000	0x00002000-1	N	4KB	To store some system settings	Y
Calibration data	0x00002000	0x00003000-1	N	4KB	RESERVED, user don't need to configure this portion	Y
Reserved	0x00003000	0x00004000-1	N	4KB	RESERVED, user don't need to configure this portion	Y
Boot image	0x00004000	0x0000C000-1	Y	32KB	Bootloader code/data	Y
Firmware 1	0x0000C000	0x0000C000 + N*4KB-1	Y	N*4KB	Application image	Y

Table 4-2 Description of flash layout

## 4.2.1 Partition table

### 4.2.1.1 The layout of partition table

The partition table stores below information



**Table 4-3 The layout of Partition table**

- Curve25519 Dec public key: the public key used to generate AES key to decrypt image
  - Curve25519 Hash public key: the public key used to generate Hash key to validate the hash value
  - Header: partition table image header
  - Partition table image info
    - NUM: The record number in the partition table, not including “Boot Image Partition record”
    - FW1/FW2/VAR/MP IDX : FW1/FW2/VAR/MP Partition record index
    - Key\_Exp\_Op[2:0]
      - 1: Export AES keys of the latest FW
      - 2: Export AES keys for both FW1 & FW2
      - Other: Don’t export any AES to RAM code
  - User Data Len: the length(in bytes) of user data
  - OTA TRAP/MP TRAP

<b>15b</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>
Valid	RESV					Level	Port Number			Pin Number					

**Table 4-4 OTA/MP TRAP map**

- Partition record x (includes boot image partition record)

- Start address: the offset address on Flash for the image, align to 4K
- Length: the length of the image, align to 4K
- TYPE: type of the image (Pt=0/boot/sys/cal/user/fw1/fw2/var/mp/rdp/resv)
- DBG\_SKIP : skip download to ram from flash when debug mode enable
- HKeyValid: indicates the Hash Key is valid(bit[0]!=0) or not(bit[0]=0)
- Hash key : to do all firmware validation ( from first byte to end)
- User Data: user secret data
- Hash: from the first byte of partition table to the end of user data (two public keys + Header + partition info + partition records + user data), calculated before encryption if the encryption is on

#### **4.2.1.2 How to configure partition table (TBD)**

#### **4.2.2 System data**

System data section is the one which stores some system settings, including OTA section, Flash section, Log UART section etc... The size of system data section is 4KB.

Offset	0x00	0x04	0x08	0x0C
0x00	RSVD	RSVD	Force old OTA	RSVD
0x10	RSVD	RSVD	RSVD	RSVD
0x20	WORD1: RSVD WORD0: SPI Mode	WORD1: Flash Size WORD0: Flash ID	RSVD	RSVD
0x30	ULOG Baudrate	RSVD	RSVD	RSVD
0x40 ~ 0x70	RSVD (SPIC calibration setting)			
...	RSVD			
0xFE0	BT FTL GC status	RSVD	RSVD	RSVD
0xFF0	BT Calibration Data			

Table 4-5 Layout of system data

#### **4.2.2.1 OTA section**

Offset	Bit	Function	Description
0x00	[31:0]	RSVD	RSVD
0x04	[31:0]	RSVD	RSVD
0x08	[31:8]	RSVD	RSVD
	[7:0]	Force old OTA	Select GPIO to force booting from old OTA image. Available GPIO pins may vary from different Chip part number. (GPIOA2~6, GPIOA13) BIT[7]: active_state, 0 or 1 BIT[6]: RSVD BIT[5]: port BIT[4:0]: pin number
0x0C	[31:0]	RSVD	RSVD

Table 4-6 Definition for OTA section in system data

##### **4.2.2.1.1 Force old OTA**

The platform provides a “Force old OTA” option to let user roll back to the previous OTA image by using a GPIO pin as trigger.

#### 4.2.2.2 Flash section

Offset	Bit	Function	Description
0x20	[31:16]	RSVD	RSVD
	[15:0]	SPI IO Mode	0xFFFF: Quad IO mode 0x7FFF: Quad Output mode 0x3FFF: Dual IO mode 0x1FFF: Dual Output mode 0x0FFF: One IO mode
0x24	[31:16]	Flash Size	0xFFFF: 2MB 0x7FFF: 32MB 0x3FFF: 16MB 0x1FFF: 8MB 0x0FFF: 4MB 0x07FF: 2MB 0x03FF: 1MB
	[15:0]	Flash ID	Use it only if the flash ID cannot get by flash ID cmd
0x28	[31:0]	RSVD	RSVD
0x2C	[31:0]	RSVD	RSVD

Table 4-7 Definition for Flash section in system data

#### 4.2.2.3 Log UART section

Offset	Bit	Function	Description
0x30	[31:0]	Baudrate	0xFFFFFFFF: 115200 110~40000000
0x34	[31:0]	RSVD	RSVD
0x38	[31:0]	RSVD	RSVD
0x3C	[31:0]	RSVD	RSVD

Table 4-8 Definition for Log UART section in system data

### 4.2.3 Calibration data

Reserved

### 4.2.4 Boot image

#### 4.2.4.1 The layout of boot image

The format of the boot image is as below




Table 4-9 The layout of boot image

- Curve25519 Dec public key: the public key used to generate AES key to decrypt image
- Curve25519 Hash public key: the public key used to generate Hash key to validate the hash value
- Header: boot image header

- Boot Image: boot image body (TEXT+DATA), will be padded with 0 to make its size is multiple of 32 bytes.
- Hash: two public keys + Header + Boot Image, calculated before encryption if image encryption is on

#### **4.2.4.2 How to configure boot image (TBD)**

#### **4.2.5 Firmware 1/Firmware 2**

##### **4.2.5.1 The layout of firmware image**

The format of the Firmware image is as below



**Table 4-10 The layout of firmware image**

- OTA signature: The hash result of the 1<sup>st</sup> Image header “Sub FW Image 0 Header”
- Public key 0 ~ 5: Encryption key
  - key 0 is dedicated to enc/dec all “OTA signature/Header/FST”
  - key 1~5 are reserved
- Sub-image x Header: image header of FW sub-image x

- Sub-image x FST: Firmware Security Table of FW sub-image x
  - Each sub-image has image sections which have a section header and a section image body
- Hash: calculated with Encrypted FW image if image encryption is on
  - The 1<sup>st</sup> sub-image
    - From OTA Signature to the last image section, including all padding bytes
  - Other sub-image
    - From the sub image header to the last image section, including all padding bytes

#### **4.2.5.2 How to configure firmware image (TBD)**

#### **4.2.5.3 How to generate flash image combines both firmware1 and firmware2**

There may be requirements need to generate flash image combines both firmware1 and firmware2. The default set of AmebaZ2 flash image contains partition table, boot image, and firmware1 image. In order to add firmware2 image to flash image, extra configurations need to be done.

- Prepare firmware2 image.  
Please note that there is serial number needs to be customized for firmware2 image. Refer to “7.4.2 Configuration for building OTA firmware” for details of the serial number setting.  
Please note that default serial number is “100”, any number larger than “100” will set firmware2 image as default for flash image otherwise firmware1 image is default.  
Add firmware2 image at “project\realtek\_amebaz2\_v0\_example\EWARM-RELEASE\Debug\Exe”
- Update “postbuild\_is.bat” for combines firmware1 and firmware2  
Add “FW2=Debug\Exe\firmware2\_is.bin” after “FW1=Debug\Exe\firmware\_is.bin” at “component\soc\realtek\8710c\misc\iar\_utility\postbuild\_is.bat” refers the following table

```
::generate flash image, including partition + bootloader + firmware
%tooldir%\elf2bin.exe combine Debug/Exe/flash_is.bin
PTAB=Debug\Exe\partition.bin,BOOT=Debug\Exe\bootloader.bin,FW1=Debug\Exe\firmware_is.bin,FW2=Debug\Exe\firmware2_is.bin >> postbuild_is_log.txt
if not exist Debug\Exe\flash_is.bin (
    echo flash_is.bin isn't generated, check postbuild_is_log.txt
    echo flash_is.bin isn't generated > postbuild_is_error.txt
    goto error_exit
)
```

Please note that firmware2 image must have the same name as the code added in “postbuild\_is.bat”.

- Generate and download flash image

Please refer to “[2.4.2 IAR Project introduction](#)” for generate flash image. The firmware1 image is auto generated when generating flash image. The generated image (“flash\_is.bin”) is the flash image combines both firmware1 and firmware2.

Please note that the flash image is only downloadable by Image Tool. Refer to “[3.3 Image download](#)” for details of using Image Tool downloading.

- Switch between firmware1 image and firmware2 image

To switch firmware1 image and firmware2 image please refer to ATCMD “ATSC” and “ATSR” which is detailed in “[AN0075 Realtek Ameba-all at command v2.0.docx](#)”

### **4.3 SRAM layout**

The range of DTCM is from 0x10000000 to 0x10040000. The layout of this memory region is illustrated below.

Note: the layout may be changed according to actual application, please refer to the linker file for exact layout details.

0x10000000	Vector Table
0x100000A0	Reserved for ROM
0x10000480	RAM Entry Table
0x100004F0	RAM Image Signature
0x10000500	Image2 RAM
0x10030000	RAM Bootloader
0x1003EA00	MSP
0x1003FA00	Reserved for ROM
0x1003FFFF	

**Table 4-11 AmebaZII DTCM (256KB) memory layout**

Items	Start Offset Address	Limit Offset Address	Address adjustable	Size	Description	Mandatory
Vector Table	0x10000000	0x100000A0 -1	N	160B	The vector table	Y
Reserved for ROM	0x100000A0	0x10000480-1	N	992B	Reserved for ROM code	Y
RAM Entry Table	0x10000480	0x100004F0-1	N	112B	Entry function table of Image 2	Y
RAM Image Signature	0x100004F0	0x10000500-1	N	16B	RTK pattern for RAM Image	Y
Image2 RAM	0x10000500	0x10030000-1	Y	~190KB	User application image (TEXT+DATA+BSS+HEAP)	Y
RAM Bootloader	0x10030000	0x1003EA00-1	N	~58KB	RAM boot image, will be recycled by Image2 for BSS and HEAP	Y
MSP	0x1003EA00	0x1003FA00-1	Y	4KB	CPU main stack	Y

Reserved for ROM	0x1003FA00	0x1003FFFF	N	1535B	Reserved for ROM(NS) code	Y
------------------	------------	------------	---	-------	---------------------------	---

Table 4-12 Description of RAM layout

#### 4.4 TrustZone Memory Layout

By default the memory is marked as secure, unless the address matches a region defined in SAU (Security Attribution Unit) which is used to define a number of memory regions as non-secure or NSC (Non-Secure Callable).

AmebaZII support 4 SAUs, and the regions are configured for ROM, RAM, PSRAM and XIP, which covers all memory units. The total region and boundary for RAM, PSRAM and XIP are configurable. Below is the default configuration of each SAU.

- SAU 0: 0x00019000 ~ 0x0005ffff as Non-Secure
  - ROM. The region is fixed and must not be modified.
- SAU 1: 0x10008000 ~ 0x4fffffff as Non-Secure
  - RAM.
- SAU 2: 0x60100000 ~ 0x9bfefeff as Non-Secure
  - PSRAM and XIP share SAU2. The start address of SAU2 must be located in PSRAM and the end address of SAU2 must be located in XIP
- SAU 3: 0x9bf00000 ~ 0x9bffff as Secure(NSC)
  - XIP. NSC is suggested to be located at the end (end is 0x9c00 0000)

Thus, if the TrustZone is enabled, the system memory layout will become as below.




Figure 4-3 TrustZone Memory Layout

#### 4.4.1 Image Generation

The Secure code/data is put in Trustzone project and Non-Secure code/data is put in Ignore Secure project. The data/code put in Trustzone project will be located in Trustzone area. Linker script should match SAU setting so that linker locates code/data in proper area during linking timer, and then the image generated by post-build tool is programmed into flash by image tool. Application code/data can be located in RAM, PSRAM, or XIP depend on user design.




Figure 4-4 TrustZone function call principle

If application code is located in Secure area, it can access Secure Data, however, if application code is located in Non-Secure area, the direct access of Secure Data will cause security hardfault.

#### 4.4.2 Secure Gateway to Trustzone

The Non-Secure Callable is the secure gateway (instruction set: SG) for Non-Secure code to call Secure API. User put entry function in Non-Secure Callable, and compiler that supports ARM Trustzone generates corresponding SG instruction set, and user does not need to care for it. To assign an API to be Non-Secure Callable, the attribute should be declared in the beginning of the API.

If the Non-Secure area calls Secure area without going through Non-Secure Callable, it will cause security hardfault.




Figure 4-5 Secure gateway to TrustZones

The debugger mode (monitor mode) is provided and designed by ARM which is a hardware block.

#### 4.4.3 Usage Example

##### Key Storage

Trustzone can be used to store key, and it is suggested that no matter the credential data is located in flash, transferred from network or peripheral, it is suggested to be encrypted, and the decryption of credential data should be implemented in Secure area.

## 5 Boot process

This chapter describes the boot process of AmebaZII platform.

### 5.1 Boot flow

While booting, the system will firstly load the partition table which has all image information, such as the image address, keys, user data etc... Then from the partition table, boot image will be loaded, and firmware image will be loaded at the end of the boot process.




Figure 5-1 Overview of boot flow


### 5.2 Secure boot

Secure boot aims at firmware protection, which prevents attackers from modifying or replacing firmware maliciously. When the chip is power on, the ROM security boot executes to check the validation of each image.

If the image is valid, then the authentication will be successful, which means the firmware is safe. And the subsequent process can be continued. Otherwise, the SoC will go into infinite loop.

#### 5.2.1 Secure boot flow


While booting, the system will use the encryption private key which locates in super secure efuse, and the public key which locates in flash, to generate AES keys and Hash keys, then use them to decrypt and verify each image.



**Figure 5-2 Secure boot flow**

### 5.2.2 Partition table and Boot image decryption flow

Figure 5-3 illustrates the decryption flow of partition table and boot image in secure boot process.



**Figure 5-3 Partition table and boot image decryption flow**

### 5.2.3 Secure boot use scenario

Figure 5-4 illustrates the use scenario of secure boot in a real product development. Firstly software developer needs to generate key pairs, and encrypt and hash the firmware properly. And when it comes to mass production, manufacturing facility will program the encrypted firmware along with a reference hash value on device, and program the private key in super secure efuse zone. While device boots up, it will use the super secure private key and public key to verify the hash value and decrypt each image. If case of any error or failure in the image validation process, the device won't boot.




Figure 5-4 secure boot use scenario

## 5.2.4 How to enable secure boot

This chapter shows how to enable the secure boot.

### 5.2.4.1 Keys configuration

As mentioned above, while booting, the system will use the encryption private key which locates in super secure efuse, and the public key which locates in flash, to generate AES keys and Hash keys, then use them to decrypt and verify each image.

The super secure private key (named as “privkey\_enc”) and the encrypted hash private key (named as “privkey\_hash”) are configured in *keycfg.json* under *project\realtek\_amebaz2\_v0\_example\EWARM-RELEASE\*.

What shows following is the default value. You can configure the keys by yourself in *keycfg.json*.

```
{  
    "__comment_0":"configuration for private key, use auto to generate random key",  
    "__comment_1":"private key maybe different from your desired input, program will  
modify first byte and last byte of key",  
    "__comment_2":"to get actual private key, please open key.json after key generated.",  
    "__comment_3":"hash private key in key.json will be encrypted",  
  
    "privkey_enc":"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1  
D1E5F",  
    "privkey_enc1":"auto",  
  
    "privkey_hash":"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C  
1D1E5F",  
    "privkey_hash1":"auto"  
}
```

### 5.2.4.2 Keys programming in Efuse

After configuring the keys in *keycfg.json*, rebuild the whole project in IAR. The *key.json* file under *project\realtek\_amebaz2\_v0\_example\EWARM-RELEASE\* will be updated after compiling. The “privkey\_enc” is the same with the “privkey\_enc” in *keycfg.json*, but the “privkey\_hash” has been changed after Hash algorithm.

```
{  
    "__comment_EFUSE":"should keep these two key in safe place, or secure firmware  
protection is useless",  
    "EFUSE":{  
        "__comment_privkey_enc":"this key in EFUSE SUPER SECURE ZONE",  
  
        "privkey_enc":"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A  
1B1C1D1E5F",  
        "__comment_privkey_hash":"this key in EFUSE SECURE ZONE, encrypted by  
upper key",  
    }
```

```

    "privkey_hash":"64A7433FCF027D19DDA4D446EEF8E78A22A8C33CB2C337C07366
C040612EE0F2"
},
"TOOL":{
    "__comment_pubkey_enc":"public key for encryption",
    "pubkey_enc":"8F40C5ADB68F25624AE5B214EA767A6EC94D829D3D7B5E1AD1BA
6F3E2138285F",
    "__comment_pubkey_hash":"public key for hash, only for partition table
and bootloader",
    "pubkey_hash":"8F40C5ADB68F25624AE5B214EA767A6EC94D829D3D7B5E1AD1B
A6F3E2138285F"
}
}

```

“example\_secure\_boot.c” is an example provided for enabling secure boot. To write the keys to efuse, firstly, change CONFIG\_EXAMPLE\_SECURE\_BOOT to 1 in platform\_opts.h.

```

/*For secure boot example */
#define CONFIG_EXAMPLE_SECURE_BOOT 1

```

Secondly, modify the super secure key “susec\_key[]” and the secure key “sec\_key[]” to correspond with “privkey\_enc” and “privkey\_hash” in key.json file under *project\realtek\_amebaz2\_v0\_example\EWARM-RELEASE\* in “example\_secure\_boot.c”. In another word, “susec\_key[]” should be the same with “privkey\_enc” in key.json, and “sec\_key[]” should be the same with “privkey\_hash” in key.json.

```

//these two keys are the same default keys used in SDK
const uint8_t susec_key[PRIV_KEY_LEN] = {
    0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
    0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F,
    0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17,
    0x18, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x5F
};
const uint8_t sec_key[PRIV_KEY_LEN] = {
    0x64, 0xA7, 0x43, 0x3F, 0xCF, 0x02, 0x7D, 0x19,
    0xDD, 0xA4, 0xD4, 0x46, 0xEE, 0xF8, 0xE7, 0x8A,
    0x22, 0xA8, 0xC3, 0x3C, 0xB2, 0xC3, 0x37, 0xC0,
    0x73, 0x66, 0xC0, 0x40, 0x61, 0x2E, 0xE0, 0xF2
};

```

Thirdly, modify 0 to 1 to enable write super secure key function and write secure key function to write keys to efuse. What needs to be noted is, the efuse is one-time writable, please make sure the key is correct before programming in efuse.

```

// write SS key
memset(write_buf, 0xFF, PRIV_KEY_LEN);
if(1){ // fill your data
    for(i=0; i<PRIV_KEY_LEN; i++)
        write_buf[i] = susec_key[i];
}
if(1){ // write
    device_mutex_lock(RT_DEV_LOCK_EFUSE);
    ret = efuse_susec_key_write(write_buf);
    device_mutex_unlock(RT_DEV_LOCK_EFUSE);
    if(ret < 0){
        dbg_printf("efuse SS key: write address and length error\r\n");
        goto exit;
    }
    dbg_printf("\r\nWrite Done.\r\n");
}else{
    dbg_printf("\r\nPlease make sure the key is correct before programming in
efuse.\r\n");
}
dbg_printf("\r\n");
// write S key
memset(write_buf, 0xFF, PRIV_KEY_LEN);
if(1){ // fill your data
    for(i=0; i<PRIV_KEY_LEN; i++)
        write_buf[i] = sec_key[i];
}
if(1){ // write
    device_mutex_lock(RT_DEV_LOCK_EFUSE);
    ret = efuse_sec_key_write(write_buf, 0);
    device_mutex_unlock(RT_DEV_LOCK_EFUSE);
    if(ret < 0){
        dbg_printf("efuse S key: write address and length error\r\n");
        goto exit;
    }
    dbg_printf("\r\nWrite Done.\r\n");
}else{
    dbg_printf("\r\nPlease make sure the key is correct before programming in
efuse.\r\n");
}
dbg_printf("\r\n");

```

The SS key locker can be enabled by changing 0 to 1 marked as yellow here. If the locker is enabled, the SS key turns to be unreadable forever. So this configuration is irreversible, please do if only you are certain about SS key.

```

/*
Step 3: lock and protect the SS key from being read by CPU
*/
// lock SS key, make SS key unreadable forever.
// this configure is irreversible, so please do this only if you are certain about SS key
if(1){
    device_mutex_lock(RT_DEV_LOCK_EFUSE);
    ret = efuse_lock_susec_key();
    device_mutex_unlock(RT_DEV_LOCK_EFUSE);
    if(ret < 0){
        dbg_printf("efuse SS key lock error\r\n");
        goto exit;
    }
}

```

Enable secure boot by setting the flag to 1 in step 4. After enabling the secure boot, the device will only boot with encrypted image. The configure is also irreversible, so please do this if you are certain that the firmware image is encrypted and hashed with the correct SS key and S key.

```

/*
Step 4: enable the secure boot so that device will only boot with encrypted image
*/
// enable secure boot, make device boot only with correctly encrypted image
// this configure is irreversible, so please do this only if you are certain that the fw image
is encrypted and hashed with the correct SS key and S key
if(1){
    device_mutex_lock(RT_DEV_LOCK_EFUSE);
    ret = efuse_fw_verify_enable();
    device_mutex_unlock(RT_DEV_LOCK_EFUSE);
    if(ret < 0){
        dbg_printf("efuse secure boot enable error\r\n");
        goto exit;
    }
    device_mutex_lock(RT_DEV_LOCK_EFUSE);
    ret = efuse_fw_verify_check();
    device_mutex_unlock(RT_DEV_LOCK_EFUSE);
    if(ret)
        dbg_printf("secure boot is enabled!");
}

```

What needs to highlight is, chapter 5.2.4.1 and chapter 5.2.4.2 aim to write keys to efuse and enable secure boot. Before enabling secure boot, the Ameba-ZII is in non-secure boot mode, that means encrypted image cannot boot. So till now, the application is built to enable secure boot. After enabling, encrypt the image and then the Ameba-ZII can boot with encrypted image.

#### 5.2.4.3 Encrypt the image

The boot/firmware 1/firmware 2 addresses are stored in partition records, defined in *partition.json* under *project\realtek\_amebaz2\_v0\_example\EWARM-RELEASE*. The addresses can be modified if needed.

```
"boot":{  
    "start_addr" : "0x4000",  
    "length" : "0x8000",  
    "type": "BOOT",  
    "dbg_skip": false,  
  
    "hash_key":"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF...FFFFFFFFFFF  
},  
    "fw1":{  
        "start_addr" : "0x10000",  
        "length" : "0x80000",  
        "type": "FW1",  
        "dbg_skip": false,  
  
        "hash_key":"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E  
5F"  
    },  
    "fw2":{  
        "start_addr" : "0x90000",  
        "length" : "0x80000",  
        "type": "FW2",  
        "dbg_skip": false,  
  
        "hash_key":"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E  
5F"  
    }  
}
```

Ameba-ZII is defaulted as non-secure boot mode, secure boot asks encrypted firmware. The keys to enable firmware encryption are defined in *amebaz2\_bootloader.json/amebaz2\_firmware\_is.json* under *project\realtek\_amebaz2\_v0\_example\EWARM-RELEASE*. “enc” can be changed from *false* to *true* in following code to enable corresponding module encryption.

In *amebaz2\_bootloader.json*,

```
"PARTAB": {  
    "source":null,  
    "header":{  
        "next":null,  
        "__comment_type":"Support  
Type:PARTAB,BOOT,FWHS,FWLS,ISP,VOE,WLN,DTCM,ITCM,SRAM,ERAM,XIP,M0,CPFW",  
        "type":"PARTAB",  
        "enc":true,  
    }  
}
```

```

        "serial": 0
    },
    "list" : ["partab"],
    "partab": {
        "__comment_ptable":"move to partition.json",
        "__comment_file":"TODO: use binary file directly",
        "file": null
    }
},
"BOOT": {
    "source":"Debug/Exe/bootloader.out",
    "header":{
        "next":null,
        "__comment_type":"Support
Type:PARTAB,BOOT,FWHS,FWLS,ISP,VOE,WLN,DTCM,ITCM,SRAM,ERAM,XIP,M0,CPFW",
        "type":"BOOT",
        "enc":true,
"user_key1":"AA0102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1
E1F",
        "serial": 0
    },
    "list" : ["sram"],
    "sram": {
        "__comment_option":"TODO: not ready",
        "option": null,
        "__comment_entry":"startup function table symbol",
        "entry":"gRamStartFun",
        "start": "RAM_FUNTAB$$Base",
        "end": "RAM_RODATA$$Limit",
        "__comment_file":"TODO: use binary file directly",
        "file": null
    }
}
}

```

In *amebaz2\_firmware\_is.json*, “*enc*” also is set to *true* to encrypt the image. But what needs to be noted is, the “*enc*” in “*XIP\_FLASH\_P*” could not be set to *true* because this section is reserved for plain data.

```

"FWHS": {
    "source":"Debug/Exe/application_is.out",
    "header":{
        "next":null,
        "__comment_type":"Support
Type:PARTAB,BOOT,FWHS_S,FWHS_NS,FWLS,ISP,VOE,WLN,DTCM,ITCM,SRAM,ERAM,XIP,
M0,CPFW",
        "type":"FWHS_S",
        "enc":true,
        "user_key2":"BB0102030405060708090A0B0C0D0EOF101112131415161718191A1
B1C1D1E1F",
        "__comment_pkey_idx":"assign by program, no need to
configure",
        "serial": 107
    },
    "FST":{
        "__comment_FST0": "enc_algorithm: cbc/ecb with cipher key",
        "__comment_FST1": "validpat is used for section header validation",
        "__comment_FST2": "hash_en/enc_en?",
        "enc_algorithm": "cbc",
        "hash_algorithm": "sha256",
        "part_size": "4096",
        "__comment_validpat": "use auto or dedicated value",
        "validpat": "0001020304050607",
        "hash_en": true,
        "enc_en":true,
        "cipherkey": null,
        "cipheriv": null
    },
}
}

"XIP_FLASH_C": {
    "source":"Debug/Exe/application_is.out",
    "header":{
        "next":null,
        "__comment_type":"Support
Type:PARTAB,BOOT,FWHS_S,FWHS_NS,FWLS,ISP,VOE,WLN,DTCM,ITCM,SRAM,ERAM,XIP,
M0,CPFW",
        "type": "XIP",
        "enc":true,
        "user_key2": "BB0102030405060708090A0B0C0D0EOF101112131415161718191A1
B1C1D1E1F",
        "__comment_pkey_idx": "assign by program, no need to
configure",
        "serial": 0
    },
    "FST":{
}
}

```

```

        "__comment_FST0": "enc_algorithm: cbc/ecb with cipher key",
        "__comment_FST1": "validpat is used for section header validation",
        "__comment_FST2": "hash_en/enc_en?",
    "enc_algorithm": "cbc",
        "hash_algorithm": "sha256",
        "part_size": "4096",

        "__comment_validpat": "use auto or dedicated value",
        "validpat": "0001020304050607",
        "hash_en": true,
        "enc_en": true,
        "cipherkey": null,
        "cipheriv": null
    },
}

"XIP_FLASH_P": {
    "source": "Debug/Exe/application_is.out",
    "header": {
        "next": null,
        "__comment_type": "Support"
    },
    "type": "XIP",
    "enc": false,
    "__comment_pkey_idx": "assign by program, no need to
configure",
    "serial": 0
},
"FST": {
    "__comment_FST0": "enc_algorithm: cbc/ecb with cipher key",
    "__comment_FST1": "validpat is used for section header validation",
    "__comment_FST2": "hash_en/enc_en?",
    "enc_algorithm": "cbc",
        "hash_algorithm": "sha256",
        "part_size": "4096",

        "__comment_validpat": "use auto or dedicated value",
        "validpat": "0001020304050607",
        "hash_en": true,
        "enc_en": false,
        "cipherkey": null,
        "cipheriv": null
    },
}

```

#### **5.2.4.4 Open "secure\_bit"**

"secure\_bit" in *postbuild\_is.bat* under *component\soc\realtek\8710c\misc\iar\_utility* needs to be set to 1.

```
%tooldir%\elf2bin.exe convert amebaz2_bootloader.json BOOTLOADER secure_bit=1 >>
postbuild_is_log.txt
if not exist Debug\Exe\bootloader.bin (
    echo bootloader.bin isn't generated, check postbuild_is_log.txt
    echo bootloader.bin isn't generated > postbuild_is_error.txt
    pause
    exit 2 /b
)

::generate partition table
%tooldir%\elf2bin.exe convert amebaz2_bootloader.json PARTITIONTABLE secure_bit=1 >>
postbuild_is_log.txt
if not exist Debug\Exe\partition.bin (
    echo partition.bin isn't generated, check postbuild_is_log.txt
    echo partition.bin isn't generated > postbuild_is_error.txt
    pause
    exit 2 /b
)

::generate firmware image
if not exist amebaz2_firmware_is.json (
    echo amebaz2_firmware_is.json is missing
    echo amebaz2_firmware_is.json is missing > postbuild_is_error.txt
    pause
    exit 2 /b
)
%tooldir%\elf2bin.exe convert amebaz2_firmware_is.json FIRMWARE secure_bit=1 >>
postbuild_is_log.txt
if not exist Debug\Exe\firmware_is.bin (
    echo firmware_is.bin isn't generated, check postbuild_is_log.txt
    echo firmware_is.bin isn't generated > postbuild_is_error.txt
    pause
    exit 2 /b
)
```

#### 5.2.4.5 Secure boot execution

Set the “privkey\_enc” and “privkey\_hash” in *keycfg.json* as shown below, in this example, just change the last character of default value from F to 0.

```
{  
    "__comment_0":"configuration for private key, use auto to generate random key",  
    "__comment_1":"private key maybe different from your desired input, program will  
modify first byte and last byte of key",  
    "__comment_2":"to get actual private key, please open key.json after key generated.",  
    "__comment_3":"hash private key in key.json will be encrypted",  
  
    "privkey_enc":"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1  
D1E50",  
    "privkey_enc1":"auto",  
  
    "privkey_hash":"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C  
1D1E50",  
    "privkey_hash1":"auto"  
}
```

After rebuilding the project, the keys are updated in *key.json*.

```
{  
    "__comment_EFUSE":"should keep these two key in safe place, or secure firmware  
protection is useless",  
    "EFUSE":{  
        "__comment_privkey_enc":"this key in EFUSE SUPER SECURE ZONE",  
  
        "privkey_enc":"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A  
1B1C1D1E50",  
        "__comment_privkey_hash":"this key in EFUSE SECURE ZONE, encrypted by  
upper key",  
  
        "privkey_hash":"1C219D029C32C0744FBDAE9BC306D0CC57F02049217C3A94D8E  
105D5AA264A0"  
    },  
    "TOOL":{  
        "__comment_pubkey_enc":"public key for encryption",  
  
        "pubkey_enc":"B496A6CF209834D1F22C7FEA41172F5888F9540B069874F4700B41  
1E77576E03",  
        "__comment_pubkey_hash":"public key for hash, only for partition table  
and bootloader",  
  
        "pubkey_hash":"B496A6CF209834D1F22C7FEA41172F5888F9540B069874F4700B4  
11E77576E03"  
    }  
}
```

Set the flag CONFIG\_EXAMPLE\_SECURE\_BOOT to 1 in platform\_opts.h.

```
/*For secure boot example */  
#define CONFIG_EXAMPLE_SECURE_BOOT 1
```

Change the keys in example\_secure\_boot.c, make susec\_key[] equal to “privkey\_enc” and sec\_key[] equal to “privkey\_hash” in key.json.

```
//these two keys are the same default keys used in SDK  
const uint8_t susec_key[PRIV_KEY_LEN] = {  
    0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,  
    0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F,  
    0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17,  
    0x18, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x50  
};  
const uint8_t sec_key[PRIV_KEY_LEN] = {  
    0x1C, 0x21, 0x9D, 0x02, 0x9C, 0x32, 0xC0, 0x74,  
    0x4F, 0xBD, 0xAA, 0xE9, 0xBC, 0x30, 0x6D, 0x0C,  
    0xC5, 0x7F, 0x02, 0x04, 0x92, 0x17, 0xC3, 0xA9,  
    0x4D, 0x8E, 0x10, 0x5D, 0x5A, 0xA2, 0x64, 0xA0  
};
```

Enable write SS key function, write S key function, lock SS key function and secure boot function by setting if condition as 1 (details are shown in chapter 5.2.4.2). Build the application and download it to Ameba-ZII to enable secure boot.

If secure boot is enabled successfully, the message will be

```
#  
efuse secure boot: Test Start  
[0]      FF FF FF FF  FF FF FF FF  
[8]      FF FF FF FF  FF FF FF FF  
[16]     FF FF FF FF  FF FF FF FF  
[24]     FF FF FF FF  FF FF FF FF  
  
write Done.  
  
[0]      00 01 02 03  04 05 06 07  
[8]      08 09 0A 0B  0C 0D 0E 0F  
[16]     10 11 12 13  14 15 16 17  
[24]     18 19 1A 1B  1C 1D 1E 50  
[0]      FF FF FF FF  FF FF FF FF  
[8]      FF FF FF FF  FF FF FF FF  
[16]     FF FF FF FF  FF FF FF FF  
[24]     FF FF FF FF  FF FF FF FF  
  
write Done.  
  
[0]      1C 21 9D 02  9C 32 C0 74  
[8]      4F BD AA E9  BC 30 6D 0C  
[16]     C5 7F 02 04  92 17 C3 A9  
[24]     4D 8E 10 5D  5A A2 64 A0  
efuse secure boot keys: Test Done  
eFuse Key Locked!! , Super-Secure Key Reading is Inhibited!!  
secure boot is enabled!
```

Enabling secure boot successfully means only encrypted image can boot on this Ameba-ZII board.

To run your own application, you need to encrypt image by setting the “*enc*” as *true* in *amebaz2\_bootloader.json/amebaz2\_firmware\_is.json* under *project\realtek\_amebaz2\_v0\_example\EWARM-RELEASE\*(details are shown in chapter 5.2.4.3). Also, set “*secure\_bit=1*” in *postbuild\_is.bat* under *component\soc\realtek\8710c\misc\iar\_utility* (details are shown in chapter 5.2.4.4). Finally, the Ameba-ZII board can run with encrypted image.

### 5.3 Boot time (TBD)

There is a table to show the time cost of the boot process.

Image Size:374KB	SECURE BOOT			NON-SECURE BOOT		
	ROM	BOOT LOADER	WIFI CONNECT	ROM	BOOT LOADER	WIFI CONNECT
1	96ms	47ms	3507ms	0.0ms	49.4ms	3508.9ms
2	77ms	51ms	3508ms	29.8ms	16.0ms	6046.0ms
3	96ms	46ms	3508ms	0.0ms	47.9ms	3503.1ms
4	96ms	49ms	3502ms	0.0ms	1.1ms	3700.1ms
5	75ms	46ms	3506ms	0.0ms	50.8ms	6509.0ms
6	94ms	44ms	5517ms	0.0ms	49.5ms	3502.2ms
7	80ms	44ms	3504ms	0.0ms	42.5ms	3500.5ms
8	76ms	45ms	3509ms	0.0ms	41.4ms	2998.3ms
9	77ms	44ms	4012ms	0.0ms	48.9ms	3503.5ms
10	95ms	50ms	3506ms	0.0ms	16.3ms	3002.7ms
Average	86.2ms	46.4ms	3757.9ms	2.98ms	36.38ms	3977.43ms

## **6 Secure JTAG/SWD**

For security purpose, many products will disable JTAG/SWD function while mass production. But if one needs to debug the product after mass production, it will need to enable JTAG/SWD function again. AmebaZII supports “Password JTAG/SWD” for this use scenario.

### **6.1 Functional description (TBD)**

### **6.2 How to enable and use Secure JTAG/SWD (TBD)**

## 7 Over-the-Air (OTA) Firmware Update

Over-the-air programming (OTA) provides a methodology to update device firmware remotely via TCP/IP network connection.




Figure 7-1 Methodology to Update Firmware via OTA

## 7.1 OTA operation flow




Figure 7-2 OTA Process Flow

 During the step of “Write received data to update firmware address”, the 32 bytes OTA signature need set to 0xff, which is invalid signature. The correct OTA signature needs to be appended at the end of OTA process to prevent device booting from incomplete firmware.

## 7.2 Boot process flow

Boot loader will select latest (based on serial number) updated firmware and load it.




Figure 7-3 Boot Process Flow

### 7.3 Upgraded partition




Figure 7-4 OTA update procedure

In Ameba-ZII OTA update procedure, Firmware 1 and Firmware 2 are swapped each other.

The Firmware 1/Firmware 2 addresses are stored in partition records, defined in *partition.json* under *project\realtek\_amebaz2\_v0\_example\EWARM-RELEASE\*. Please adjust it according to your firmware size.

```
"fw1":{  
    "start_addr" : "0x10000",  
    "length" : "0x80000",  
    "type": "FW1",  
    "dbg_skip": false,  
  
    "hash_key":"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B  
1C1D1E5F"  
},  
"fw2":{  
    "start_addr" : "0x90000",  
    "length" : "0x80000",  
    "type": "FW2",  
    "dbg_skip": false,  
  
    "hash_key":"000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B  
1C1D1E5F"  
}
```

## 7.4 Firmware image output

After building project source files in SDK, it would generate firmware as `firmware_is.bin`, which is the OTA Firmware as mentioned earlier.

### 7.4.1 OTA firmware swap behavior

When device executes OTA procedure, it would update the other OTA block, rather than the current running OTA block. The OTA firmware swap behavior should be looked like as below figure if the updated firmware keeps using newer serial number value.




Figure 7-5 OTA Firmware SWAP Procedure

## 7.4.2 Configuration for building OTA firmware

Before building the project, the bootloader would check the serial number of OTA firmware to determine the boot sequence, the serial number of the OTA firmware need to be configured correctly before project build.

### 7.4.2.1 Serial number

Ameba-ZII OTA use serial number to decide the boot sequence if the signature of firmware is valid. Hence before building the project, please make sure the serial number is correctly configured. To set the serial number of a firmware, please follow below steps:

Step 1: The serial number setting of a firmware is as same as the serial number of its first image. You can check the images sequence in  
`project\realtek_amebaz2_v0_example\EWARM-RELEASE\amebaz2_firmware_is.json`.

```
"FIRMWARE":{  
    "images": [  
        {"img": "FWHS", "offset": "0x00"},  
        {"img": "XIP_FLASH_C", "offset": "0x00"},  
        {"img": "XIP_FLASH_P", "offset": "0x00"}  
    ]  
},
```

For this example, the FWHS is located at the top sequence. Hence it is the first image of this firmware.

Step 2: Modify the serial number setting of the first image. Take above figure for example, we need to modify the serial number of “FWHS”:

```
"FWHS": {  
    "source": "Debug/Exe/application_is.out",  
    "header": {  
        "next": null,  
        "__comment_type": "Support  
Type:PARTAB,BOOT,FWHS_S,FWHS_NS,FWLS,ISP,VOE,WLN,DTCM,ITCM,SRAM,ERA  
M,XIP,M0,CPFW",  
        "type": "FWHS_S",  
        "enc": false,  
  
        "user_key2": "BB0102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F10111213141516171  
8191A1B1C1D1E1F",  
        "__comment_pkey_idx": "assign by program, no need to  
configure",  
        "serial": 100  
    },
```

The Serial number is stored as 4 byte digital number and is valid from 1. Please modify it according to your firmware version. Please note that the default number 0 means maximum version number.

Step 3: After building project source files in SDK, it should automatically generate *SDK\_folder/project/project\_name/EWARM-RELEASE/Debug/Exe/firmware\_is.bin*, which is the application of OTA Firmware. The serial information would also be included in this firmware.

## 7.5 Implement OTA over Wi-Fi

### 7.5.1 OTA using local download server base on socket

The example shows how device updates image from a local download server. The local download server send image to device based on network socket.

Make sure both device and PC are connecting to the same local network.

#### 7.5.1.1 Build OTA application image

##### Turn on OTA command

The flag defined in *\project\realtek\_amebaz2\_v0\_example\inc\platform\_opts.h*.

```
//on/off relative commands in log service  
#define CONFIG_OTA_UPDATE 1
```

##### Check current loaded firmware index and acquire the upgraded firmware address

```
/* ota_8710c.c */  
uint32_t update_ota_prepare_addr(void){  
    uint32_t NewFWAddr;  
    fw_img_export_info_type_t *pfw_image_info;  
  
    pfw_image_info = get_fw_img_info_tbl();  
  
    printf("\n\r[%s] Get loaded_fw_idx %d\n\r", __FUNCTION__,  
    pfw_image_info->loaded_fw_idx);  
    if(pfw_image_info->loaded_fw_idx == 1)  
        NewFWAddr = pfw_image_info->fw2_start_offset;  
    else if(pfw_image_info->loaded_fw_idx == 2)  
        NewFWAddr = pfw_image_info->fw1_start_offset;  
    else {  
        printf("\n\r[%s] Unexpected index %d", __FUNCTION__,  
        pfw_image_info->loaded_fw_idx);  
        return -1;  
    }  
    printf("\n\r[%s]fw1 sn is %d, fw2 sn is %d\r\n", __FUNCTION__,  
    pfw_image_info->fw1_sn,pfw_image_info->fw2_sn);  
    printf("\n\r[%s] NewFWAddr %08X\n\r", __FUNCTION__, NewFWAddr);  
    return NewFWAddr;  
}
```

**Download the firmware to Ameba-ZII board to execute OTA.**

#### **7.5.1.2 Setup local download server**

Step 1: Build **new** firmware firmware\_is.bin and place it to tools\DownloadServer folder.

Step 2: Edit start.bat file: Port = 8082, file = firmware\_is.bin

```
@echo off  
DownloadServer 8082 firmware_is.bin  
set /p DUMMY=Press Enter to Continue ...
```

Step 3: Execute start.bat.

```
c():checksum 0x202f57d  
Listening on port (8082) to send firmware_is.bin (318592 bytes)  
waiting for client ...
```

#### **7.5.1.3 Execute OTA procedure**

After device connects to AP, enter command: **ATWO=IP[PORT]**. Please note that the device and your PC need under the same AP. The IP in ATWO command is the IP of your PC.

```
# ATWO=192.168.0.103[8082]  
[ATWO] : _AT_WLAN_OTA_UPDATE_  
  
[MEM] After do cmd, available heap 92768  
  
#  
[update_ota_local_task] Update task start  
[update_ota_prepare_addr] fw1 sn is 100, fw2 sn is 0  
[update_ota_prepare_addr] NewFWAddr 00090000  
  
[update_ota_local_task] Read info first  
[update_ota_local_task] info 12 bytes  
[update_ota_local_task] tx file size 0x4dc80  
[update_ota_local_task] Current firmware index is 1  
  
[update_ota_erase_upg_region] NewFWLen 318592  
[update_ota_erase_upg_region] NewFWB1kSize 78 0x4e  
[update_ota_local_task] Start to read data 318592 bytes  
  
[update_ota_local_task] sig_backup for 32 bytes from index 0  
.....  
.....  
Read data finished  
  
[update_ota_signature] Append OTA signature  
[update_ota_signature] signature:  
64 89 F2 09 0A 2A EC 7B 82 3F 1A 15 3C 92 00 66  
98 6E 45 94 1E 1D 71 9C E0 E3 15 7A 7F 76 B1 89  
[update_ota_local_task] Update task exit  
[update_ota_local_task] ReaÂy to reboot  
== Rt18710c IoT Platform ==
```

Local download server success message:

```
c():checksum 0x202f57d
Listening on port (8082) to send firmware_is.bin (318592 bytes)

Waiting for client ...
Accept client connection from 192.168.0.108
Send checksum and file size first
Send checksum byte 12
Sending file...
.
.
.
.
.
.
Total send 318592 bytes
Client Disconnected.
Waiting for client ...
```

After finishing downloading image, device will be auto-rebooted, and the bootloader will boot by the firmware with larger serial number.

## 7.5.2 OTA using local download server based on HTTP

This example shows how device updates image from a local http download server.

The local http download server will send the http response which data part is *firmware\_is.bin* after receiving the http request.

Make sure both device and PC are connecting to the same local network.

### 7.5.2.1 Build OTA application image

#### Turn on OTA command

The flags defined in `\project\realtek_amebaz2_v0_example\inc\platform_opts.h` and `\component\soc\realtek\8710c\misc\platform\ota_8710c.h`.

```
/* platform_opts.h */  
//on/off relative commands in log service  
#define CONFIG_OTA_UPDATE    1  
  
#define CONFIG_EXAMPLE_OTA_HTTP    1
```

```
/* ota_8710c.h */  
#define HTTP_OTA_UPDATE
```

#### Define Server IP and PORT in `example_ota_http.c` file

(In `\component\common\example\ota_http\example_ota_http.c`)

```
#define PORT          8082  
#define IP           "192.168.0.103"  
#define RESOURCE     "firmware_is.bin"
```

### Check current loaded firmware index and acquire the upgraded firmware address

```
/* ota_8710c.c */
uint32_t update_ota_prepare_addr(void){
    uint32_t NewFWAddr;
    fw_img_export_info_type_t *pfw_image_info;

    pfw_image_info = get_fw_img_info_tbl();

    printf("\n\r[%s] Get loaded_firmware_idx %d\n\r", __FUNCTION__,
    pfw_image_info->loaded_firmware_idx);
    if(pfw_image_info->loaded_firmware_idx == 1)
        NewFWAddr = pfw_image_info->fw2_start_offset;
    else if(pfw_image_info->loaded_firmware_idx == 2)
        NewFWAddr = pfw_image_info->fw1_start_offset;
    else {
        printf("\n\r[%s] Unexpected index %d", __FUNCTION__,
        pfw_image_info->loaded_firmware_idx);
        return -1;
    }
    printf("\n\r[%s] fw1 sn is %d, fw2 sn is %d\n\r", __FUNCTION__,
    pfw_image_info->fw1_sn,pfw_image_info->fw2_sn);
    printf("\n\r[%s] NewFWAddr %08X\n\r", __FUNCTION__, NewFWAddr);
    return NewFWAddr;
}
```

### Download the firmware to Ameba-ZII board to execute OTA.

#### Communication with Local HTTP download server

1. In *http\_update\_ota\_task()*, after connecting with server, Ameba will send a HTTP request to server : "GET /RESOURCE HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: host\r\n\r\n".
2. The local HTTP download server will send the HTTP response after receiving the request. The response header contains the "Content-Length" which is the length of the *firmware\_is.bin*. The response data part is just *firmware\_is.bin*.
3. After Ameba receiving the HTTP response, it will parse the http response header to get the content length to judge if the receiving *firmware\_is.bin* is completed.

### 7.5.2.2 Setup local HTTP download server

Step 1: Build **new** firmware firmware\_is.bin and place to tools\DownloadServer(HTTP) folder.

Step 2: Edit start.bat file: Port = 8082, file = firmware\_is.bin

```
@echo off  
DownloadServer 8082 firmware_is.bin  
set /p DUMMY=Press Enter to Continue ...
```

Step 3: Execute start.bat.

```
<Local HTTP Download Server>  
Listening on port (8082) to send firmware_is.bin (320256 bytes)  
waiting for client ...
```

### 7.5.2.3 Execute OTA procedure

Reboot the device and connect to AP, it should start the OTA update through HTTP protocol after 1 minute.

```
#  
#[update_ota_prepare_addr] fw1 sn is 100, fw2 sn is 0  
#[update_ota_prepare_addr] NewFWAddr 00090000  
  
[http_update_ota] Download new firmware begin, total size : 320256  
[http_update_ota] current firmware index is 1  
[http_update_ota] fw size 320256, NewFWAddr 00090000  
  
[update_ota_erase_upg_region] NewFWLen 320256  
[update_ota_erase_upg_region] NewFWBlkSize 79 0x4f.  
[http_update_ota] sig_backup for 32 bytes from 0 index  
.....  
[http_update_ota] Download new firmware 320256 bytes completed  
[update_ota_signature] Append OTA signature  
[update_ota_signature] signature:  
DD E9 FE 19 3B 15 79 99 8A 3C 84 FE 28 FB A2 13  
53 0F DE 71 3B 7E 46 48 9F 9D 03 2C DB EB D3 B7  
[http_update_ota_task] Update task exit  
[http_update_ota_task] Ready to reboot  
== Rt8710c IoT Platform ==
```

Local download server success message:

```
<Local HTTP Download Server>
Listening on port (8082) to send firmware_is.bin (320256 bytes)

Waiting for client ...
Accept client connection from 192.168.0.108
Waiting for client's request...
Receiving GET request, start sending file...
.
.
.
Total send 320299 bytes
Client Disconnected.
Waiting for client ...
```

After finishing downloading image, device will be auto-rebooted, and the bootloader will load new firmware if it exists.

## 7.6 OTA signature

ATSC is an AT command to clear the OTA signature of current running firmware.

ATSR is an AT command to recover the OTA signature of the firmware whose signature is cleared. Please note that you need to reset your board after using ATSC & ATSR command. For more details, please refer to AN0025.

## 8 Bluetooth

### 8.1 Features

Please refer to user manual *UM0501 Realtek AmebaZ2 BLE Stack User Manual EN.pdf* and *UM0501 Realtek AmebaZ2 BLE Stack User Manual CN.pdf*.

### 8.2 Memory Usage

Since Wi-Fi and BT share same RF block, so to enable BT, it is required to enable Wi-Fi. The following is the memory usage of Wi-Fi only and Wi-Fi + BT.

#### 8.2.1 Wi-Fi only

- XIP code size: 244 KB
- SRAM used: 72 KB
- Available Heap Size: 94 KB

#### 8.2.2 Wi-Fi + BT

BT examples	Code size (XIP, Kbyte)	RAM size (Kbyte) (Compare with Wi-Fi only)		
		SRAM	Heap Used	Total (SRAM+Heap)
Example ble_peripheral	343	+ 3	+ 33	+ 36
Example bt_beacon	339	+ 2	+ 33	+ 35
Example bt_configl	348	+ 3	+ 44	+ 47

### 8.3 Examples

#### 8.3.1 ble\_peripheral

This example shows how to create and run GATT service on GATT server.

To run ble\_peripheral example, turn on the following flags defined in

`\project\realtek_amebaz2_v0_example\inc\platform_opts_bt.h`

```
#define CONFIG_BT           1
#define CONFIG_BT_PERIPHERAL 1
```

The default device name is BLE\_PERIPHERAL. You can use apps such as "LightBlue" on iOS or "nRF Connect for Mobile" on Android as GATT Client to connect it.

#### 8.3.2 bt\_beacon

This example shows how to send BLE Beacons.

To run bt\_beacon example, turn on the following flags defined in  
\\project\\realtek\\amebaz2\_v0\_example\\inc\\platform\_opts\_bt.h.

```
#define CONFIG_BT          1
#define CONFIG_BT_BEACON    1
```

In this example, you can choose to send Apple iBeacon or Radius Networks AltBeacons.  
Choose beacon type in \\component\\common\\bluetooth\\realtek\\sdk\\example\\bt\_beacon.

```
#define I_BEACON          1
#define ALT_BEACON          2
#define BEACON_TYPE         I_BEACON
```

You can use apps such as "LightBlue" on iOS or "nRF Connect for Mobile" on Android to observe beacons.

### 8.3.3 bt\_config

BT Config provides a simple way for Wi-Fi device to associate to AP easily.

To run bt\_config example, turn on the following flags defined in  
\\project\\realtek\\amebaz2\_v0\_example\\inc\\platform\_opts\_bt.h.

```
#define CONFIG_BT          1
#define CONFIG_BT_CONFIG    1
```

ATBB is an AT command for BT Config. Using “ATBB=1” to enter BT Config mode, which allows BT Config APP to discover and connect to AmebaZII.

Once see the following message, you can open BT Config APP to associate AP.

```
[BT Config wifi] BT Config wifi ready
[BT Config wifi] ADV started
```

BT Config execution log:

```
[BT Config wifi] BT Config wifi ready
[BT Config wifi] ADV started
[BT Config wifi] Bluetooth Connection Established
[BT Config wifi] Band Request
[BT Config wifi] Scan Request
[BT Config wifi] Scan 2.4G AP
[BT Config wifi] Connect Request
[Driver]: set BSSID: 90:94:e4:c5:d3:f0
[Driver]: set ssid [Test_ap]
[Driver]: start auth to 90:94:e4:c5:d3:f0
[Driver]: auth success, start assoc
[Driver]: association success(res=7)
[Driver]: set pairwise key to hw: alg:4(WEP40-1 WEP104-5 TKIP-2 AES-4)
```

```
[Driver]: set group key to hw: alg:2(WEP40-1 WEP104-5 TKIP-2 AES-4)
keyid:1

[BT Config wifi] Connected after 3458ms.

Interface 0 IP address : 192.168.0.102
[BT Config wifi] Got IP after 3500ms.

[BT Config wifi] Bluetooth Connection Disconnected

[BT Config wifi] ADV started

[BT Config wifi] [BC_status_monitor] wifi connected, delete
BC_cmd_task and BC_status_monitor

[BT Config wifi] ADV stopped
```

When AmebaZ2 is connected to an AP and the BT connection is disconnected, AmebaZ2 becomes undiscoverable to BT Config APP. You can use ATBB=1 to enter BT Config mode again.

**Note:** Enter BT Config mode will disconnect existing Wi-Fi connection.

Please refer to BT Config APP User Guide in `\tools\bluetooth\BT Config` for more details.

### 8.3.4 128 bit UUID Configuration

This example shows how to configure BLE service with 128 bit UUID.

Modify service table as follow to configure BLE service with 128 bit UUID.

```
const uint8_t GATT_UUID128_CUSTOMIZED_PRIMARY_SERVICE [16] =
{0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88, 0x99, 0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC, 0xDD,
0xEE, 0xFF, 0x00};

#define GATT_UUID128_CUSTOMIZED_CHAR 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0x0A,
0xBC, 0xDE, 0xFF, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77,

static const T_ATTRIB_APPL customized_UUID128_service_tbl[] =
{
    {
        (ATTRIB_FLAG_VOID | ATTRIB_FLAG_LE),
        {
            LO_WORD(GATT_UUID_PRIMARY_SERVICE),
            HI_WORD(GATT_UUID_PRIMARY_SERVICE),
        },
        UUID_128BIT_SIZE,
        (void *) GATT_UUID128_CUSTOMIZED_PRIMARY_SERVICE,
        GATT_PERM_READ
    },
    {
        ATTRIB_FLAG_VALUE_INCL,
        {
```

```
    LO_WORD(GATT_UUID_CHARACTERISTIC),
    HI_WORD(GATT_UUID_CHARACTERISTIC),
    GATT_CHAR_PROP_READ | GATT_CHAR_PROP_WRITE,
},
1,
NULL,
GATT_PERM_READ
},

{
ATTRIB_FLAG_VALUE_APPL | ATTRIB_FLAG_UUID_128BIT,
{
    GATT_UUID128_CUSTOMIZED_CHAR
},
0,
NULL,
GATT_PERM_READ | GATT_PERM_WRITE
},
};

};
```

## 9 Troubleshooting

There may be issues while developing user applications. Hence, there are some troubleshooting methods that can be referring to.

### 9.1 Hard Fault

AmebaZ2 platform provides a detail back trace information when a hard fault exception happens. Please refer to the following approach to see the full back trace which will help debugging a lot.

#### 9.1.1 IAR environment

##### 9.1.1.1 Download and install GCC toolchain for Windows

- 1). Please refer to the link and follow the step to download and install GCC toolchain for Windows.
  - a. <https://developer.arm.com/tools-and-software/open-source-software/developer-tools/gnu-toolchain/gnu-rm/downloads>
- 2). After installation, arm-none-eabi-addr2line.exe can be found in below folder.
  - a. \$INSTALL\_PATH/bin

##### 9.1.1.2 Trace hard fault

Please refer to the following example of tracing the hard fault.

```
S-Domain Fault Handler: msp=0x1003f998 psp=0x1002bf70 Tr=0xffffffff1
fault_id=2

Bus Fault:
SCB Configurable Fault Status Reg = 0x00000400

Bus Fault Status:
BusFault Address Reg is invalid(Asyn. BusFault)
Imprecise data bus error:
a data bus error has occurred, but the return address in the stack
frame is not related to the instruction that caused the error.

S-domain exception from Handler mode, Standard Stack frame on S-MSP
Registers Saved to stack

Stacked:
R0  = 0x10018f60
R1  = 0x9b01b7d1
R2  = 0x00000000
R3  = 0x1001dee4
R4  = 0x10017860
R5  = 0x1002c02b
R6  = 0x0002ea5d
R7  = 0x0002f424
R8  = 0x00000000
R9  = 0x1002c02b
R10 = 0x9b801c5b
R11 = 0x1002c068
R12 = 0x00000000
LR  = 0x9b0465e1
PC  = 0x9b01b7d0
PSR = 0xa100001c

Current:
```

```

LR    = 0xfffffffff1
MSP   = 0x1003f9b8
PSP   = 0x1002bf70
xPSR = 0xa0000005
CFSR  = 0x00000400
HFSR  = 0x00000000
DFSR  = 0x00000000
MMFAR = 0x00000000
BFAR  = 0x00000000
AFSR  = 0x00000000
PriMask = 0x00000000
SVC priority: 0x00
PendSVC priority: 0xe0
Systick priority: 0xe0

MSP Data:
1003F9B8: 10018F60 9B01B7D1 00000000 1001DEE4
1003F9C8: 00000000 9B0465E1 9B01B7D0 A100001C
1003F9D8: 00000065 FFFFFFFD 00000000 100007C4
1003F9E8: 0000002D 0001869F 10008044 9B005959
1003F9F8: 9B0468B8 61000000 77CF8CC5 8B024015
1003FA08: 26384558 942D314C 0CEF815D 2AA0505C
1003FA18: CBB9C6F0 1847AA69 BE94F781 37E00DAD
1003FA28: CFE4C7DC 849BE050 2FFA91C4 89421B95
1003FA38: FABAC7E8 356CADA8 8DF7F0D3 B10E0054
1003FA48: D9F23435 E4AA8154 F6AE6C73 300910C2
1003FA58: C1E4AFA1 49208098 3F0E59BE B1B32F18
1003FA68: 3D179AF4 DC5894C0 8E33CD8C E0323486
1003FA78: A0FD56A3 AD4C2ACE B6571FF4 E94209D0
1003FA88: 1FF5FD14 B8960ACF 373E09F4 17819289
1003FA98: EF31AB8D 27F1EC18 529B29C4 E26100D0
1003FAA8: 7F3908FE 768860C0 9F7568AD 65D81576

PSP Data:
1002BF70: 1000E0B8 00000065 40040400 00000010
1002BF80: 00000000 0002EA69 000060D4 21000000
1002BF90: 0000000B 0002ECD3 0005F650 9B802D9C
1002BFA0: 1002BFE0 FFFFFFFF 1000DA78 00000001
1002BFB0: 00000000 00000000 1002C02A 00000000
1002BFC0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
1002BFD0: 00000001 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF 0000001A
1002BFE0: 00000300 00000000 00000000 00000000
1002BFF0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
1002C000: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
1002C010: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
1002C020: 00000000 00000000 0A310000 00000020
1002C030: 00000000 0002EB15 00000001 00000001
1002C040: 00000001 9B801C40 9B801C64 10007FB4
1002C050: 00000200 9B005F2F 1002C048 00000004
1002C060: 9B00AD61 00000001 00000200 1002C048

== NS Dump ==
CFSR_NS  = 0x00000000
HFSR_NS  = 0x00000000
DFSR_NS  = 0x00000000
MMFAR_NS = 0x00000000
BFAR_NS  = 0x00000000
AFSR_NS  = 0x00000000
MSP_NS   = 0x00000000
PSP_NS   = 0x00000000
NS HardFault Status Reg = 0x00000000
SCB Configurable Fault Status Reg = 0x00000000

== Back Trace ==
msp=0x1003f9b8 psp=0x1002bf70
Main stack back trace:
top=0x1003fa00 lim=0x1003ea00
9b01b7d0 @ sp = 00000000

```

```

9b0465dd @ sp = 00000000
0001869b @ sp = 1003f9ec
9b005955 @ sp = 1003f9f4

Backtrace information may not correct! Use this command to get C
source level information:
arm-none-eabi-addr2line -e ELF_file -a -f 9b01b7d0 9b0465dd 0001869b
9b005955

```

User needs to check the last sentence of the hard fault (highlighted in yellow).

- 1). Open CMD window, go to the path of “application\_is.dbg.out” which should be under /project/realtek\_amebaz2\_v0\_example/EWARM-RELEASE/Debug/Exe. (If for trust zone project, please replace “application\_is” by “application\_tz”.)

- 2). Use installed arm-none-eabi-addr2line.exe to get the back trace.

```
$INSTALL_PATH/bin/arm-none-eabi-addr2line.exe -e application_is.dbg.out -a -f 9b01b7d0
9b0465dd 0001869b 9b005955
```

The result will be

```

/cygdrive/d/v7.1a/project/realtek_amebaz2_v0_example/EWARM-
RELEASE/Debug/Exe
$ /cygdrive/d/GNU Tools ARM Embedded/8 2018-q4-major/bin/arm-none-
eabi-addr2line.exe -e application_is.dbg.out -a -f 9b01b7d0 9b0465dd
0001869b 9b005955
0x9b01b7d0
_freertos_up_sema_from_isr
D:\v7.1a\component\os\freertos\freertos_service.c:139
0x9b0465dd
axi_bus_dma_Interrupt
D:\v7.1a\component\common\drivers\wlan\realtek\src\hci\axi\axi_intf.c
:205
0x0001869b
??
??:0
0x9b005955
xPortStartScheduler
D:\v7.1a\component\os\freertos\freertos_v10.0.1\Source\portable\IAR\A
RM_RTL8710C\port.c:319

```

According to the result, user can trace the hard fault from **xPortStartScheduler** -> **axi\_bus\_dma\_Interrupt** -> **\_freertos\_up\_sema\_from\_isr**. The hard fault comes from **\_freertos\_up\_sema\_from\_isr()** that located in D:\v7.1a\component\os\freertos\freertos\_service.c:139.

## 9.1.2 GCC environment

### 9.1.2.1 Install Cygwin

Please refer to chapter 2.5.1.

### 9.1.2.2 Unzip toolchain

- 1). Open “Cygwin Terminal”.

- 2). Direct to unzip path. Enter command “cd /SDK
- /project/realtek\_amebaz2\_v0\_example/GCC-RELEASE”.
- 3). Enter command “make toolchain” to unzip toolchain.

### 9.1.2.3 Trace hard fault

Please refer to the following example of tracing the hard fault.

```
S-Domain Fault Handler: msp=0x1003f998 psp=0x1002bf70 Tr=0xffffffff1
fault_id=2

Bus Fault:
SCB Configurable Fault Status Reg = 0x00000400

Bus Fault Status:
BusFault Address Reg is invalid(Asyn. BusFault)
Imprecise data bus error:
a data bus error has occurred, but the return address in the stack
frame is not related to the instruction that caused the error.

S-domain exception from Handler mode, Standard Stack frame on S-MSP
Registers Saved to stack

Stacked:
R0  = 0x10018f60
R1  = 0x9b01b7d1
R2  = 0x00000000
R3  = 0x1001dee4
R4  = 0x10017860
R5  = 0x1002c02b
R6  = 0x0002ea5d
R7  = 0x0002f424
R8  = 0x00000000
R9  = 0x1002c02b
R10 = 0x9b801c5b
R11 = 0x1002c068
R12 = 0x00000000
LR  = 0x9b0465e1
PC  = 0x9b01b7d0
PSR = 0xa100001c

Current:
LR   = 0xffffffff1
MSP  = 0x1003f9b8
PSP  = 0x1002bf70
xPSR = 0xa0000005
CFSR = 0x00000400
HFSR = 0x00000000
DFSR = 0x00000000
MMFAR = 0x00000000
BFAR = 0x00000000
AFSR = 0x00000000
PriMask = 0x00000000
SVC priority: 0x00
PendSVC priority: 0xe0
Systick priority: 0xe0

MSP Data:
1003F9B8:    10018F60    9B01B7D1    00000000    1001DEE4
1003F9C8:    00000000    9B0465E1    9B01B7D0    A100001C
1003F9D8:    00000065    FFFFFFFD    00000000    100007C4
1003F9E8:    0000002D    0001869F    10008044    9B005959
1003F9F8:    9B0468B8    61000000    77CF8CC5    8B024015
1003FA08:    26384558    942D314C    0CEF815D    2AA0505C
1003FA18:    CBB9C6F0    1847AA69    BE94F781    37E00DAD
1003FA28:    CFE4C7DC    849BE050    2FFA91C4    89421B95
1003FA38:    FABAC7E8    356CADA8    8DF7F0D3    B10E0054
1003FA48:    D9F23435    E4AA8154    F6AE6C73    300910C2
```

1003FA58:	C1E4AFA1	49208098	3F0E59BE	B1B32F18
1003FA68:	3D179AF4	DC5894C0	8E33CDBC	E0323486
1003FA78:	A0FD56A3	AD4C2ACE	B6571FF4	E94209D0
1003FA88:	1FF5FD14	B8960ACF	373E09F4	17819289
1003FA98:	EF31AB8D	27F1EC18	529B29C4	E26100D0
1003FAA8:	7F3908FE	768860C0	9F7568AD	65D81576
<b>PSP Data:</b>				
1002BF70:	1000E0B8	00000065	40040400	00000010
1002BF80:	00000000	0002EA69	000060D4	21000000
1002BF90:	0000000B	0002ECD3	0005F650	9B802D9C
1002BFA0:	1002BFE0	FFFFFFFFFF	1000DA78	00000001
1002BFB0:	00000000	00000000	1002C02A	00000000
1002BFC0:	00000000	00000000	00000000	00000000
1002BFDO:	00000001	FFFFFFFFFF	FFFFFFFFFF	0000001A
1002BFE0:	00000300	00000000	00000000	00000000
1002BFF0:	00000000	00000000	00000000	00000000
1002C000:	00000000	00000000	00000000	00000000
1002C010:	00000000	00000000	00000000	00000000
1002C020:	00000000	00000000	0A310000	00000020
1002C030:	00000000	0002EB15	00000001	00000001
1002C040:	00000001	9B801C40	9B801C64	10007FB4
1002C050:	00000200	9B005F2F	1002C048	00000004
1002C060:	9B00AD61	00000001	00000200	1002C048
<b>== NS Dump ==</b>				
CFSR_NS	= 0x00000000			
HFSR_NS	= 0x00000000			
DFSR_NS	= 0x00000000			
MMFAR_NS	= 0x00000000			
BFAR_NS	= 0x00000000			
AFSR_NS	= 0x00000000			
MSP_NS	= 0x00000000			
PSP_NS	= 0x00000000			
NS HardFault Status Reg	= 0x00000000			
SCB Configurable Fault Status Reg	= 0x00000000			
<b>== Back Trace ==</b>				
msp=0x1003f9b8 psp=0x1002bf70				
Main stack back trace:				
top=0x1003fa00 lim=0x1003ea00				
9b01b7d0 @ sp = 00000000				
9b0465dd @ sp = 00000000				
0001869b @ sp = 1003f9ec				
9b005955 @ sp = 1003f9f4				
Backtrace information may not correct! Use this command to get C source level information:				
arm-none-eabi-addr2line -e ELF_file -a -f 9b01b7d0 9b0465dd 0001869b				
9b005955				

- 1). Use “cd” command to direct to the path of “application\_is.dbg.axf” which under /project/realtek\_amebaz2\_v0\_example/GCC-RELEASE/application\_is/Debug/bin. (If for trust zone project, please replace “application\_is” by “application\_tz”.)
- 2). Use installed arm-none-eabi-addr2line.exe to get the back trace.  

```
$ /tools/arm-none-eabi-gcc/asdk/cygwin/newlib/bin/arm-none-eabi-addr2line.exe -e application_is.dbg.axf -a -f 9b01b7d0 9b0465dd 0001869b 9b005955
```

The result will be

```
/cygdrive/d/v7.1a/project/realtek_amebaz2_v0_example/GCC-
RELEASE/application_is/debug/bin
$ ./cygdrive/d/v7.1a/tools/arm-none-eabi-
gcc/asdk/cygwin/newlib/bin/arm-none-eabi-addr2line.exe -e
application_is.dbg.axf -a -f 9b01b7d0 9b0465dd 0001869b 9b005955
0x9b01b7d0
_freertos_up_sema_from_isr
D:\v7.1a\component\os\freertos\freertos_service.c:139
0x9b0465dd
axi_bus_dma_Interrupt
D:\v7.1a\component\common\drivers\wlan\realtek\src\hci\axi\axi_intf.c
:205
0x0001869b
??
???:0
0x9b005955
xPortStartScheduler
D:\v7.1a\component\os\freertos\freertos_v10.0.1\Source\portable\IAR\A
RM_RTL8710C\port.c:319
```

According to the result, user can trace the hard fault from **xPortStartScheduler** -> **axi\_bus\_dma\_Interrupt** -> **\_freertos\_up\_sema\_from\_isr**. The hard fault comes from **\_freertos\_up\_sema\_from\_isr()** that located in **D:\v7.1a\component\os\freertos\freertos\_service.c:139.**