
Offensive Powershell 101

[AFK.conf]

Atomic Red Team



Red Team

Red Teaming é o processo de usar táticas, técnicas e procedimentos (TTPs) para emular uma ameaça do mundo real, com o objetivo de medir a eficácia das pessoas, processos e tecnologias usadas para defender um ambiente.

MITRE | ATT&CK®

Reconnaissance 10 techniques	Resource Development 7 techniques	Initial Access 9 techniques	Execution 12 techniques	Persistence 19 techniques	Privilege Escalation 13 techniques	Defense Evasion 40 techniques	Credential Access 15 techniques	Discovery 29 techniques	Lateral Movement 9 techniques	Colle 17 tech
	Development				Escalation		Access		Movement	
			Instrumentation	Hijack Execution Flow (0/11) Implant Internal Image	Process Injection (O/11) Scheduled Task/Job (O/6)	Hijack Execution Flow (0/11) Impair Defenses (0/9) Indicator Removal on Host (0/6)	Steal Application Access Token Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets	Network Service Scanning Network Share Discovery Network Sniffing	Material (0/4)	Drive Data fron Removab Media Data Stag

Tactics

Reconnaissance 10 techniques	Resource Development 7 techniques	Initial Access 9 techniques	Execution 12 techniques	Persistence 19 techniques	Privilege Escalation 13 techniques	Defense Evasion 40 techniques	Credential Access 15 techniques	Discovery 29 techniques	Lateral Movement 9 techniques	Colle 17 tech
Active Scanning (0/2) Gather Victim Host	Acquire Infrastructure (0/6)	Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter (0/8)	Account Manipulation (0/4)	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (0/4)	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (0/4)	Adversary-in- the-Middle (0/2)	Account Discovery (0/4)	Exploitation of Remote Services	Adversar the-Midd
Information (0/4)	Compromise Accounts (0/2)	Exploit Public- Facing Application	Container Administration	BITS Jobs Boot or Logon	Access Token Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation (0/5)	Brute Force _(0/4)	Application Window Discovery	Internal Spearphishing	Archive Collected Data (0/3)
Information (0/3) Gather Victim Network	Compromise Infrastructure (0/6)	External Remote Services	Command Deploy Container	Autostart Execution (0/15)	Boot or Logon Autostart	BITS Jobs	Credentials from Password Stores (0/5)	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Lateral Tool Transfer	Audio Ca
Information (0/6) Gather Victim Org	Develop Capabilities (0/4)	Hardware Additions	Exploitation for Client Execution	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (0/5)	Execution (0/15) Boot or Logon Initialization	Build Image on Host Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Exploitation for Credential Access	Cloud Infrastructure Discovery Cloud Service	Remote Service Session	Automate Collection Browser :
Information (0/4) Phishing for Information (0/3)	Accounts (0/2)	Phishing (0/3)	Inter-Process Communication _(0/2)	Browser Extensions	Scripts (0/5) Create or Modify	Deploy Container	Forced Authentication	Dashboard Cloud Service	Hijacking (0/2)	Hijacking Clipboard
Search Closed Sources (0/2)	Capabilities (0/6)	Through Removable Media	Native API Scheduled	Compromise Client Software Binary	System Process (0/4)	Domain Policy	Forge Web Credentials (0/2)	Discovery Cloud Storage Object	Services (0/6)	Data fron Storage (
Search Open Technical I Databases (0/5)	Capabilities (0/5)	Supply Chain Compromise (0/3)	Task/Job (0/6) Shared Modules	Create Account (0/3)	Domain Policy Modification (0/2)	Modification (0/2) Execution Guardrails (0/1)	Input Capture _(0/4)	Discovery Container and Resource Discovery	Through Removable Media	Data fron Configura Reposito
Search Open Websites/Domains		Trusted Relationship	Software Deployment Tools	Create or Modify System Process (0/4)	Event Triggered Execution (0/15)	Exploitation for Defense Evasion	Modify Authentication Process (0/4)	Domain Trust Discovery	Software Deployment Tools	Data fron
Search Victim-Owned Websites	'	Valid Accounts (0/4)	System Services (0/2)	Event Triggered Execution (0/15)	Exploitation for Privilege	File and Directory Permissions	Network Il Sniffing	File and Directory Discovery	Taint Shared Content	Repositor
			User Execution (0/3) Windows Management	External Remote Services	Escalation Hijack Execution Flow (0/11)	Modification (0/2) Hide Artifacts (0/9)	OS Credential Dumping (0/8)	Group Policy Discovery	Use Alternate Authentication Material (0/4)	System Data fron Network
			Instrumentation	Hijack Execution Flow (0/11)	Process Injection (0/11)	Hijack Execution Flow (0/11)	Steal Application Access Token	Network Service Scanning	Material (0/4)	Drive Data fron
				Implant Internal Image	Scheduled Task/Job (0/6)	Impair Defenses (0/9) Indicator Removal on	Steal or Forge Kerberos	Network Share Discovery		Removab Media
				Modify	(0/6)	Host (0/6)	Tickets (0/4)	Network Sniffing		Data Staç


Techniques

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Information (0/4) Gather Victim Identity Information (0/3)	Compromise Accounts (0/2)	Exploit Public- Facing Application	Container Administration Command	BITS Jobs Boot or Logon Autostart	Access Token Manipulation (0/5)	Access Token Manipulation (0/5)	Brute Force (0/4) Credentials	Application Window Discovery Browser Bookmark	Internal Spearphishing	Archive Collectec Data (0/3)
Gather Victim Network	Infrastructure (0/6)	External Remote Services	Deploy Container	Execution (0/15)	Boot or Logon Autostart	BITS Jobs	from Password Stores (0/5)	Discovery	Lateral Tool Transfer	Audio Ca
Information (0/6) Gather Victim Org	Develop Capabilities (0/4)	Hardware Additions	Exploitation for Client Execution	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (0/5)	Execution (0/15) Boot or Logon	Build Image on Host Deobfuscate/Decode	Exploitation for Credential	Cloud Infrastructure Discovery	Remote Service	Automate Collection
Information (0/4) Phishing for	Establish Accounts (0/2)	Phishing (0/3)	Inter-Process Communication	Browser Extensions	Initialization Scripts _(0/5)	Files or Information Deploy Container	Access	Cloud Service Dashboard	Session Hijacking _(0/2)	Browser ! Hijacking
Information (0/3) Search Closed	Obtain Capabilities _(0/6)	Replication Through Removable	Native API	Compromise Client Software	Create or Modify System Process (0/4)	Direct Volume Access	Authentication Forge Web	Cloud Service Discovery	Remote Services (0/6)	II Clipboard Data fron
Sources (0/2) Search Open	Stage Capabilities (0/5)	Media Supply Chain	Scheduled Task/Job (0/6)	Binary Create	Domain Policy Modification (0/2)	Domain Policy Modification (0/2)	Credentials (0/2)	Cloud Storage Object Discovery	Replication Through Removable	Storage (Data fron
Technical II Databases (0/5)		Compromise (0/3)	Shared Modules Software	Account (0/3) Create or Modify	Escape to Host	Execution Guardrails (0/1)	Capture (0/4)	Container and Resource Discovery	Media Software	Configura Reposito
Search Open Websites/Domains (0/2)		Relationship	Deployment Tools	System Process (0/4)	Event Triggered Execution (0/15)	Exploitation for Defense Evasion	Authentication Process (0/4)	Domain Trust Discovery	Deployment Tools	Data fron
Search Victim-Owned Websites		Accounts (0/4)	System Services (0/2)	Event Triggered Execution (0/15)	Exploitation for Privilege	File and Directory Permissions	Network Sniffing	File and Directory Discovery	Taint Shared Content	Repositor Data fron
			User Execution (0/3) Windows	External Remote Services	Escalation Hijack Execution	Modification (0/2) Hide Artifacts (0/9)	OS Credential Dumping (0/8)	Group Policy Discovery	Use Alternate Authentication	System Data fron
			Management Instrumentation	Hijack Execution Flow (0/11)	Flow (0/11) Process	Hijack Execution	Steal Application	Network Service Scanning	Material (0/4)	Network Drive
				Implant Internal	Injection (0/11) Scheduled	Impair Defenses (0/9)	Access Token Steal or Forge	Network Share Discovery		Data fron Removab Media
				Modify	Task/Job (0/6)	Indicator Removal on Host _(0/6)	Kerberos Tickets (0/4)	Network Sniffing		Data Staç

Sub-Techniques

Credential Access

15 techniques



Details

Brute Force: Password Spraying

Other sub-technic	^	
ID	Name	
T1110.001	Password Guessing	
T1110.002	Password Cracking	
T1110.003	Password Spraying	
T1110.004	Credential Stuffing	

Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acquire valid account credentials. Password spraying uses one password (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of commonly used passwords, that may match the complexity policy of the domain. Logins are attempted with that password against many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords. [1]

Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when password spraying. Commonly targeted services include the following:

ID: T1110.003

Sub-technique of: T1110

- (i) Tactic: Credential Access
- (i) Platforms: Azure AD, Containers, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS
- i) Permissions Required: User
- (i) CAPEC ID: CAPEC-565

Contributors: John Strand; Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)

Version: 1.2

Created: 11 February 2020

Last Modified: 06 April 2021

Version Permalink

Mitigations

Detection

Mitigations

ID	Mitigation	Description
M1036	Account Use Policies	Set account lockout policies after a certain number of failed login attempts to prevent passwords from being guessed. Too strict a policy may create a denial of service condition and render environments un-usable, with all accounts used in the brute force being locked-out.
M1032	Multi-factor Authentication	Use multi-factor authentication. Where possible, also enable multi-factor authentication on externally facing services.
M1027	Password Policies	Refer to NIST guidelines when creating password policies. [19]

Detection

ID	Data Source	Data Component
DS0015	Application Log	Application Log Content
DS0002	User Account	User Account Authentication

Monitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of Valid Accounts. Specifically, monitor for many failed authentication attempts across various accounts that may result from password spraying attempts.

Consider the following event IDs:[20]

- · Domain Controllers: "Audit Logon" (Success & Failure) for event ID 4625.
- . Domain Controllers: "Audit Kerberos Authentication Service" (Success & Failure) for event ID 4771.
- · All systems: "Audit Logon" (Success & Failure) for event ID 4648.

APT Advanced Persistent Threat

Procedure Examples

ID	Name	Description
G0007	APT28	APT28 has used a brute-force/password-spray tooling that operated in two modes: in password-spraying mode it conducted approximately four authentication attempts per hour per targeted account over the course of several days or weeks. ^{[3][4]} APT28 has also used a Kubernetes cluster to conduct distributed, large-scale password spray attacks. ^[5]
G0016	APT29	APT29 has conducted brute force password spray attacks. ^[6]
G0064	APT33	APT33 has used password spraying to gain access to target systems. ^{[7][8]}
S0606	Bad Rabbit	Bad Rabbit's infpub.dat file uses NTLM login credentials to brute force Windows machines. ^[9]
G0114	Chimera	Chimera has used multiple password spraying attacks against victim's remote services to obtain valid user and administrator accounts. ^[10]
S0488	CrackMapExec	CrackMapExec can brute force credential authentication by using a supplied list of usernames and a single password. ^[11]
G0032	Lazarus Group	Lazarus Group malware attempts to connect to Windows shares for lateral movement by using a generated list of usernames, which center around permutations of the username Administrator, and weak passwords. ^{[12][13]}
G0077	Leafminer	Leafminer used a tool called Total SMB BruteForcer to perform internal password spraying. ^[14]
S0362	Linux Rabbit	Linux Rabbit brute forces SSH passwords in order to attempt to gain access and install its


APTs


https://www.vx-underground.org/apts.html

2022

2022.01.03/North Korean Group "KONNI" Targets the Russian Diplomatic Sector with new Versions of Malware Implants 2022.01.05/Elephant Beetle: Uncovering an Organized Financial-Theft Operation 2022.01.05/The Evolution of Doppel Spider from BitPaymer to Grief Ransomware 2022.01.06/NOBELIUM's EnvyScout infection chain goes in the registry, targeting embassies 2022.01.07/Patchwork APT caught in its own web 2022.01.27/LuoYu: Continuous Espionage Activities Targeting Japan with the new version of WinDealer in 2021 2022.01.11/APT35 exploits Log4i vulnerability to distribute new modular PowerShell toolkit 2022.01.11/CISA: Understanding and Mitigating Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Threats to U.S. Critical Infrastructure 2022.01.12/OceanLotus (APT32) hackers turn to web archive files to deploy backdoors 2022.01.12/Iranian intel cyber suite of malware uses open source tools (MuddyWater) 2022.01.13/The BlueNoroff cryptocurrency hunt is still on 2022.01.13/FIN7 Uses Flash Drives to Spread Remote Access Trojan 2022.01.13/North Korean Hackers Have Prolific Year 2022.01.15/Destructive malware targeting Ukrainian organizations 2022.01.17/Earth Lusca Employs Sophisticated Infrastructure, Varied Tools and Techniques 2022.01.17/Tracking A Renewable Energy Intelligence Gathering Campaign 2022.01.18/Knownsec: Annual APT Group Threat Research Report (Chinese) 2022.01.18/DoNot Go! Do not respawn! 2022.01.20/APT41 - MoonBounce: the dark side of UEFI firmware 2022.01.20/Turla Microsoft Outlook Backdoor 2022.01.20/FBI Flash report on the connection between Diavol and the TrickBot Group 2022.01.20/New espionage attack by Molerats APT targeting users in the Middle East 2022.01.24/Investigating APT36's Attack Chain and Malware Arsenal 2022.01.25/Watering hole deploys new macOS malware, DazzleSpy, in Asia 2022.01.25/Prime Minister's Office Compromised: Details of Recent Espionage Campaign 2022.01.26/German govt warns of APT27 hackers backdooring business networks 2022.01.26/Kimsuky - KONNI evolves into stealthier RAT 2022.01.26/Prophet Spider is exploiting Log4J in VMware Horizon 2022.01.27/Cozy Bear (APT29) - Early Bird Catches the Wormhole: Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign 2022.01.27/North Korea's Lazarus APT (APT38) leverages Windows Update client, GitHub in latest campaign 2022.01.28/Indian Army Personnel Face Remote Access Trojan Attacks 2022.01.31/Iranian APT MuddyWater targets Turkish users via malicious PDFs, executables 2022.01.31/Gamaredon (Shuckworm) Continues Cyber-Espionage Attacks Against Ukraine 2022.01.31/CERT-UA: Outsteel Stealer and SaintBot Loader targeting government institutions 2022.02.01/StrifeWater RAT: Iranian APT Moses Staff adds new Trojan to Ransomware Operations 2022.02.01/PowerLess Trojan: Iranian APT Phosphorus adds new PowerShell Backdoor for Espionage 2022.02.02/Arid Viper APT targets Palestine with new wave of politically themed phishing attacks, malware 2022.02.02/White Rabbit Continued: Sardonic (FIN8) and F5 2022.02.03/Analysis of Attack Against National Games of China Systems 2022.02.03/Antlion: Chinese APT (APT23) uses custom Backdoor to target Financial Institutions in Taiwan 2022.02.04/ACTINIUM targets Ukrainian organizations

Atomic Red Team





Atomic Red Team



Atomic Red Team™ is library of tests mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK® framework. Security teams can use Atomic Red Team to quickly, portably, and reproducibly test their environments.

All Atomic Tests by ATT&CK Tactic & Technique

credential-access

- T1003.008 /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow
 - Atomic Test #1: Access /etc/shadow (Local) [linux]
 - Atomic Test #2: Access /etc/passwd (Local) [linux]
 - Atomic Test #3: Access /etc/{shadow,passwd} with a standard bin that's not cat [linux]
 - Atomic Test #4: Access /etc/{shadow,passwd} with shell builtins [linux]
- T1557.002 ARP Cache Poisoning CONTRIBUTE A TEST
- T1558.004 AS-REP Roasting
 - Atomic Test #1: Rubeus asreproast [windows]
- T1552.003 Bash History
 - Atomic Test #1: Search Through Bash History [linux, macos]
- T1110 Brute Force CONTRIBUTE A TEST
- T1003.005 Cached Domain Credentials CONTRIBUTE A TEST
- T1552.005 Cloud Instance Metadata API CONTRIBUTE A TEST
- T1552.007 Container API
 - Atomic Test #1: ListSecrets [containers]
 - Atomic Test #2: Cat the contents of a Kubernetes service account token file [linux]
- T1056.004 Credential API Hooking
 - Atomic Test #1: Hook PowerShell TLS Encrypt/Decrypt Messages [windows]

- T1110.003 Password Spraying
 - Atomic Test #1: Password Spray all Domain Users [windows]
 - Atomic Test #2: Password Spray (DomainPasswordSpray) [windows]
 - Atomic Test #3: Password spray all Active Directory domain users with a single password via LDAP against domain controller (NTLM or Kerberos) [windows]
 - Atomic Test #4: Password spray all Azure AD users with a single password [azure-ad]

Atomic Test #2 - Password Spray (DomainPasswordSpray)

Perform a domain password spray using the DomainPasswordSpray tool. It will try a single password against all users in the domain

https://github.com/dafthack/DomainPasswordSpray

Supported Platforms: Windows

auto_generated_guid: 263ae743-515f-4786-ac7d-41ef3a0d4b2b

Inputs:

Name	Description	Туре	Default Value
domain	Domain to brute force against	String	\$Env:USERDOMAIN

Attack Commands: Run with powershell!

 Choose an ATT&CK technique

Make improvements to your defenses

Choose a test for that technique

Analyze your detections of the procedure

Execute the test procedure

INTRODUCTION

Welcome to the 2021 Threat Detection Report

This in-depth look at the most prevalent ATT&CK® techniques is designed to help you and your team focus on what matters most.

DOWNLOAD REPORT >

14M

INVESTIGATIVE LEADS

20K

CONFIRMED THREATS

1 REPORT

Techniques

The following chart illustrates the ranking of MITRE ATT&CK techniques associated with confirmed threats across our customers' environments. We counted techniques by total threat volume, and the percentages below are a measure of each technique's share of overall detection volume. Since multiple techniques can be mapped to any confirmed threat, the percentages below add up to more than 100 percent. Clicking on any of these techniques will either take you to an analysis or a landing page containing one or more sub-techniques to choose from.

