12

1227: Treatise on Nomadology—The War Machine

In 1972 a few months after the publication of *Anti-Oedipus* and eight years before the publication of *A Thousand Plateaus*, Guattari writes, "Gilles is working like a madman on his nomads."[1] The two implications here are that Deleuze and Guattari began working on the sequel to *Anti-Oedipus* immediately after its completion, and that Deleuze's starting point for that sequel was the war machine. Within this context it's clear that the concerns of *Anti-Oedipus*, particularly the state and capitalism, are taken up from a new perspective, the perspective of the outside. To be precise, the "Nomadology" takes up the perspective of the outside of the state, and the next plateau, "Apparatus of Capture," takes up the perspective of the outside of capitalism. As we've seen since the beginning of this guide, though, caution is needed to avoid turning Deleuze and Guattari's claims about the war machine into moral claims. It is not the case that politically there are two kinds of objects, states and war machines, and that states are "bad" and war machines are "good." No, the opposition here, as with all of the oppositions in *A Thousand Plateaus*, is the opposition between the two tendencies found in any assemblage. Of course, states and war machines have more or less clear historical exemplars that allow Deleuze and Guattari to clarify the nature of this opposition and to explicate these tendencies, but the purpose of the plateau is not to offer a field guide that would allow us to classify some things as states and others as war machines. There are only assemblages that combine these tendencies in a particular ratio.

The plateau itself is structured differently from the other plateaus. Surprisingly, it is organized around a series of axioms, problems, and propositions. There are three axioms, three problems,

and nine propositions. Propositions ten through fourteen are taken up in "Apparatus of Capture" but refer to the state not the war machine. The structure is surprising because it seems at odds with the critique of "royal science" that occurs here and elsewhere in the book. Perhaps it is a tribute to the structure of Spinoza's *Ethics*. Or, perhaps it is a play on their analysis of capitalism in *Anti-Oedipus*, where Deleuze and Guattari argue that while state forms operate on the discontinuous relation between alliance and filiation, capitalism collapses alliance and filiation and functions according to an axiomatic. At the end of "Apparatus of Capture" they write: "the deepest law of capitalism: it continually sets and then repels its own limits, but in so doing gives rise to numerous flows in all directions that escape its axiomatic" (TP 472). The war machine is one way of talking about the flows that escape the capitalist axiomatic, but what are the deepest laws of the war machine? How do they escape the capitalist axiomatic? In order to answer these questions, we'll first need to articulate the war machine's externality.

THE EXTERNALITY OF THE WAR MACHINE

The first axiom of the Nomadology is that the "war machine is exterior to the state apparatus" (TP 351). If the war machine is exterior to the state, what is the state? In order to answer this question, Deleuze and Guattari use a wide range of illustrations and draw on their previous analyses, particularly the "Geology of Morals." The state is a stratification. As such, it is articulated into content and expression. They refer to Georges Dumézil's work in Indo-European mythology to show that this double articulation manifests itself in the two heads of sovereignty: "the magician-king and the jurist-priest . . . They are the principal elements of a State apparatus that proceeds by a One-Two, distributes binary distinctions, and forms a milieu of interiority. It is a double articulation that makes the State apparatus into a *stratum*" (TP 351, emphasis in original). That is, the stratum of the state maintains its unity by dividing its order, keeping power between two heads. These two heads are the keepers of stasis. They promulgate the laws that ensure the smooth functioning of the state. Dumézil's chief example here is the way in which this order-keeping is divided between Mitra and Varuna in Indo-European mythology.[2] Following Dumézil, Deleuze and Guattari argue that sovereignty does not include war. The power to make war lies outside the interiority established by this sovereignty. The exteriority of the power of war is expressed mythologically in

the powers of a different god, in this case Indra. While there may be temporary conflicts between Mitra and Varuna, the defining conflict of this mythology is the conflict between Indra, the god of war, and the two-headed god of sovereignty.

Conflict, however, does not entail externality. Why could we not conceive of this conflict as an interior conflict within a state, rather than a conflict between the interiority of state sovereignty and its exterior? Deleuze and Guattari answer this question by looking at two different games: Chess and Go. "Chess is a game of State . . ." (TP 352). Go is a game of the war machine. Why? "Chess pieces are coded . . ." (TP 352). They are coded not only according to their allowable moves but also their shape. Pawns look like other pawns, but not like knights. Pawns always move in the same way, which is manifestly not like a knight. Despite the astronomical number of combinations these pieces can enter into, Chess is fundamentally static. In contrast to this, Go is played with flat stones that are indistinguishable from one another. The function of any given piece is completely determined by its external relation to the other pieces on the board, whereas internal relations determine the function of Chess pieces. Within this context we can see that what separates Go from Chess is a different conception of space. Go operates in a smooth space, whereas Chess operates in a striated space. We'll explore this distinction further in our discussion of "The Smooth and the Striated" plateau. For now we can note that this difference in space is one of the ways that we can distinguish between the interior of the state and its exterior. Indra is exterior to Mitra-Varuna. He is the breaker of walls. He makes striated space smooth. He is the betrayer and mischief-maker. He's playing a different game from Mitra and Varuna.

Deleuze and Guattari claim that we must follow this logic to its most extreme point. "It is not enough to affirm that the war machine is external to the apparatus. It is necessary to reach the point of conceiving the war machine as itself a pure form of exteriority, whereas the State apparatus constitutes the form of interiority we habitually take as a model, or according to which we are in the habit of thinking" (TP 354). Two important points are at stake here. First, as a matter of clarifying what is at stake in the war machine's exteriority, we must attempt to think exteriority as such. That is, we must think exteriority as the abstract pole of a continuum that has interiority as its opposite pole. The difficulty here, and this is the second point, is that thought itself is already colonized as interiority. Interiority is the model for thought that we habitually fall into.

As a result, thinking pure exteriority becomes remarkably difficult. Later in this plateau Deleuze and Guattari will go on to argue in the same vein that the state is the image of thought. Because the state is the image of thought, the temptation is to give a merely negative account of the war machine, as simply the negation of everything the state is. The difficulty in thinking pure exteriority is to give a positive account of it.

In order to give a positive account of the war machine Deleuze and Guattari turn to the works of Heinrich von Kleist, where it is celebrated. We've already looked briefly at one of Kleist's plays, *Penthesilea*, in our discussion of becoming-animal. What sets Kleist's work apart is precisely his ability to write characters and conflict in terms of affective becomings. Reading Kleist there is a sense of breathlessness. This is created in part by the fact that his stories have no breaks, no sections or chapters. They simply flow continuously. In *Michael Kohlhaas*, Kleist tells the story of a sixteenth-century German horse dealer who is cheated out of two horses by a petty baron, the Junker von Tronka. Kohlhaas does his best to work within the legal system to get redress. At one point the baron agrees to give the horses back, but they have been worked very hard and are no longer a sufficient repayment for Kohlhaas' losses. At this point Kohlhaas sees that he can no longer work within the strictures of the state and becomes an outlaw. He gathers a small band of men around him and lays siege to the baron's castle, destroying it. The baron narrowly escapes, and Kohlhaas pursues, while his band of outlaws continues to grow. Fear begins to spread across the countryside as various forces try to bring Kohlhaas to heel but invariably fail as he outwits them at every turn. It is clear by this point in the story that Kohlhaas' war is no longer against a local baron but against the state itself, which refuses him justice. Kohlhaas is now a war machine that disturbs civil unity at every turn.

Kohlhaas' disturbance of the peace is so great that even the leader of the Protestant reformation, Martin Luther, weighs in. Luther writes a letter to Kohlhaas, which so disturbs him that he travels to Wittenberg in disguise to meet with him. Upon meeting him Luther exclaims, "Your breath is a pestilence, your presence perdition . . . Damnable, terrible man! . . . Who gave you the right—other than you yourself—to fall upon the Junker von Tronka and then, not finding him in his castle, to visit with fire and sword the whole community that is protecting him?"[3] Kohlhaas' reply turns on the notion of community. "The war I am waging on the community of humankind is an evil deed if I was not . . . expelled from

it."[4] Luther is baffled by Kohlhaas' thinking here. It is inconceivable that one be outside the state. "Expelled! . . . What madness seized your thinking? Who could have expelled you from the community of the state in which you lived? Indeed, has it ever been the case, since states existed, that any man, whoever he might be, has been expelled from one?"[5] For Luther, one necessarily belongs to the state. There is nothing outside the state. In Kleist's story theology has also taken the state-form as the image of thought. The parallels with Kant are clear. The nomads disrupting the civil unity of state philosophy must be incorporated into the state. They cannot remain external.

The inability of the war machine to remain external in Kleist's works (indeed in his life) raises the first of three problems in this plateau: "Is there a way of warding off the formation of a State apparatus (or its equivalents in a group)?" (TP 356). Answering this question takes up the next two propositions, which also still concern the exteriority of the war machine. The first of these propositions concerns evidence for the exteriority of the war machine drawn from ethnology. In particular (and following Pierre Clastres) Deleuze and Guattari argue that both the state and the war machine are originary, neither derives from the other. The originarity of the state is not new to *A Thousand Plateaus*. It appears already in *Anti-Oedipus* in their discussion of the *Urstaat*. That is, even pre-state societies were aware that the state was a possible way to organize society and put safeguards in place to avoid this. They raise the same issue in a different context in "Micropolitics and Segmentarity." So, what is at issue here is not the originarity of the state but the originarity of war. Here they follow Clastres in "identifying war in primitive societies as the surest mechanism directed against the formation of the State: war maintains the dispersal and segmentarity of groups" (TP 357). Thus, the originarity of the state is inseparable from the originarity of war.[6] The existence of the state as interiority necessarily implies the exteriority of the war machine.

> It is in terms not of independence, but of coexistence and competition in a perpetual field of interaction, that we must conceive of interiority and exteriority, war machines of metamorphosis and State apparatuses of identity . . . The same field circumscribes its interiority in States, but describes its exteriority in what escapes States or stands against States. (TP 360–1)

It would be a mistake, though, to assume that the articulation of the poles of interiority and exteriority imply that there is only one kind

of state or one kind of war machine. We've already seen different state formations in "Several Regimes of Signs," and here Deleuze and Guattari indicate that the "outside appears simultaneously in two directions" (TP 360). In the first direction lie "huge worldwide machines." Under this rubric we find a whole host of global entities that traverse the interiority of multiple states simultaneously. The internet as a whole is a clear example of a machine of this type, but so are religious movements such as Christianity and Islam, and multinational corporations. In "Apparatus of Capture" we'll see that Deleuze and Guattari call these types of formations "ecumenical" or "international." In the second direction lie "local mechanisms of bands, margins, minorities, which continue to affirm the rights of segmentary societies in opposition to the organs of State power" (TP 360). Exteriorities of this type would include everything from the kids who smoked behind the bike shed at school to the Occupy movement to the Tea Party movement in the US. The exteriority of the war machine is not any less complex for occupying a smooth space.

Deleuze and Guattari take up exteriority and smooth space in relation to the history of science in the next proposition, which further corroborates the exteriority of the war machine. Deleuze and Guattari's understanding of the history of science parallels their understandings of art and philosophy in that in each case they're looking for alternate lines of development, lines not explored in the dominant tradition. In philosophy this means following a path from Lucretius through Scotus, Spinoza, and Nietzsche to Bergson. It also means rereading philosophers in the dominant tradition with an eye toward those points at which they're not quite consistent with themselves. For example, Deleuze in his early *Kant's Critical Philosophy* brilliantly exploits the role of reflective judgment in relation to determining judgment to argue for the priority of reflective judgment in opposition to Kant's stated aims. The result is a much more affective and Spinozist Kant. The method, as we've repeatedly indicated, is a perceptual semiotics, a way of seeing otherwise. This perceptual semiotics is at play in Deleuze and Guattari's examination of the history of science. Following Michel Serres, they trace the existence of an "eccentric science." Eccentric science does not follow the typical path of service to the state ("royal science") but instead maps out a path exterior to the state. This is "nomad" or "minor" science.

Deleuze and Guattari lay out four characteristics of nomad science. All of these are opposed to the corresponding characteristics

in royal science. For example, nomad science uses a "hydraulic model, rather than . . . a theory of solids treating fluids as a special case" (TP 361). Treating reality as a set of flows rather than a series of discrete solids results in a very different account of reality. This is nothing other than the difference between continuity and discontinuity. A theory of solids immediately raises the problem of transcendent form. A hydraulic model, in contrast, sees solids as a special instance of flow, a temporary coagulation. Solids do not preexist, they have a genesis. This brings us to the second characteristic of nomad science. It is a model of "becoming and heterogeneity, as opposed to the stable, the eternal, the identical, the constant" (TP 361). Whereas royal science seeks purity and stability—indeed, it seeks stability through purity—nomad science is messy. It begins with assemblages, which are always heterogeneous, always becoming. The third characteristic of nomad science hinges on the type of space that it projects. A concept of flows requires a concept of smooth, topographical space. As we saw above in the "Geology of Morals," topographical space is the space of transformation, a space that describes the deformations that an object can undergo and still be the same object (a donut and coffee cup, for example). The rigid, striated space required by royal science forecloses on the possibility of transformation. Its lines never meet. They always remain parallel. The final characteristic of nomad science is that it is "problematic, rather than theorematic" (TP 362). We can again refer here to the difference between Archimedean (problematic) and Euclidean (theorematic) geometries. For Euclid reality is seen as a series of discrete, solid figures that do not quite live up to the pure accounts of their essential nature that he outlines in the *Elements*. For Archimedes there is no transcendent standard that measures reality. Rather, each figure is an event, a set of transformations or affections. The task of nomad science is not to identify the discrete figure, but map out its ways of affecting and being affected. That is, problematic geometry constructs "figures using a straightedge and compass," while theorematic geometry deduces figures from first principles.[7] There is no guarantee or necessity that these constructed figures conform in any way to the first principles of a theorematic geometry. The constructed figures are a set of affections, a problematic. They are a war machine operating in smooth space exterior to the striated space of theorematic geometry.

The relation between nomad science and royal science has a long and complicated history. For the most part it is the story of the state appropriating nomad science for its own ends (in exactly the

same way that the state appropriates the war machine and converts it into a military) and legitimating that use through the methodologies of royal science. Using Anne Querrien's work, Deleuze and Guattari illustrate this "tension-limit" between royal and nomad science. The first illustration is the building of Gothic cathedrals in the twelfth century. Two construction techniques were available: squaring and templates. Squaring is the Archimedean method. It uses a straightedge and compass to decide which stones are cut and how they're cut. This method can be used to lay out a Gothic arch in a fairly straightforward way. Divide the width of the arch by five and take four-fifths of the length as the radius. The two curves will meet at a point above the center forming an arch. This operation can accommodate itself to the materials at hand and be easily taught to new apprentices. It requires no knowledge of Euclidean principles whatsoever. It only requires experimenting with what's at hand.

In contrast to this, "royal, or State, science only tolerates and appropriates stone cutting by means of *templates* (the opposite of squaring), under conditions that restore the primacy of the fixed model of form, mathematical figures, and measurement" (TP 365). This is the shift from problematic to theorematic. Under this model the conditions for the arch must be laid out first as the intersecting arc of two circles. Once this relation has been established the arch is infinitely repeatable because it is the function of a static relation between discrete solids. Such an equation can also be controlled by the state. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that one of the reasons that the state banned the masonry guilds was to limit the spread of this nomad science.

In the end, Deleuze and Guattari argue that nomad sciences and royal sciences need one another. Or, to put this in terms we are already familiar with, scientific practice is itself an assemblage that has nomadic and royal tendencies. The tendency historically has been to overlook or even suppress the nomadic tendencies at least until they can be accounted for theorematically. "Due to all their procedures, the ambulant [nomad] sciences quickly overstep the possibility of calculation; they inhabit that 'more' that exceeds the space of reproduction and soon run into problems that are insurmountable from that point of view; they eventually resolve those problems by means of real-life operations" (TP 374). The nomadic tendency in science continually exceeds the methodological bounds set by the royal tendency. This nomadic tendency describes an exteriority to both the state and royal science, which is the epistemological expression of the interiority of the state.

Within this context it's difficult to see how Deleuze and Guattari solve the first problem that they pose: "Is there a way of warding off the formation of a State apparatus?" Given their discussion of the last two propositions, the answer seems to be, "No." Proposition two argues that the state has always been. Proposition three argues that nomad science needs the state in the form of royal science so that the knowledge gleaned from nomad science can be extracted from its embeddedness in real-life operations and made autonomous. But maybe we are thinking about this all wrong. Maybe the "problems" posed here are not to be thought in the usual sense as obstacles in need of overcoming. Perhaps we are to think "problem" here in precisely the sense of the nomad sciences. Thought in this way, the state (and royal science) is not a problem to be overcome, but a problematic, a horizon that indicates the limits of thought. In Kant, for example, God, soul, and world are problematic objects. That is, they are not problems that we can overcome and be done with. They are objects that both cannot be thought (theoretically) but must be thought (practically). They are limits that regulate thought itself. For Deleuze and Guattari the state is a problematic object in this same sense. The state can't be eliminated but it must be thought. Thinking the state, though, requires thinking what escapes it, its outside. The war machine is problematic in the same way as the state, which is why they are to be thought as the abstract poles of a continuum. However, as we'll see in the next section, thought itself has the state and not the war machine as its image of thought.

"Image of thought" is not original to *A Thousand Plateaus*. It appears in Deleuze's earlier works *Nietzsche and Philosophy* and *Difference and Repetition*, and it is also taken up again in *What is Philosophy?* In every case the image of thought refers to the pre-philosophical conditions of thought, which it borrows from common sense and good sense (what everybody knows). *Difference and Repetition* argues that in the dominant image of thought "thought has an affinity with the true; it formally possesses the true and materially wants the true. It is *in terms of* this image that everybody knows and is presumed to know what it means to think."[8] As the previous section shows, the assumption of the affinity between thought and truth is taken up by royal science. At the same time, Deleuze and Guattari go on to argue in *A Thousand Plateaus* that the image of thought is the state-form. In relation to this image of thought they pose a problem and a proposition. "Is there a way to extricate thought from the State model?" is the problem, and "The

exteriority of the war machine is attested to, finally, by noology" is the proposition (TP 374). "Noology," the term they coin here, "is precisely the study of images of thought, and their historicity" (TP 376). In order to show that thought has taken the state-form as its image they return to the two-headed figure of sovereignty, Mitra and Varuna, and show that thought itself is divided in exactly the same way. On the one hand, thought is its own self-founding gesture, "the *imperium* of true thinking" (TP 374). On the other hand, thought is the free relation of those who think, "a republic of free spirits" (TP 375). These are the twin heads formalized in the two questions that cannot be asked without reference to one another: 1) What is thinking? 2) Who thinks?

Deleuze and Guattari are quick to point out that the relation between thought and the state-form "is not simply a metaphor . . . It is the necessary condition for the constitution of thought as a principle, or as a form of interiority, as a stratum" (TP 375). The parallels between the two arise as a function of stratification itself. In order for thought to organize itself it undergoes a process of double articulation into content and expression. Content and expression can be understood here as the relation between thinking and who thinks. We can also see this double articulation in Plato in the complex interrelation between *mythos* and *logos*, or the relation in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* between religion and philosophy, as having identical content but differing forms. As a result of this convergence of the state-form and the image of thought, each becomes mutually reinforcing to the other. Deleuze and Guattari write:

> It is easy to see what thought gains from this: a gravity it would never have on its own, a center that makes everything, including the State, appear to exist by its own efficacy or on its own sanction. But the State gains just as much. Indeed, by developing in thought in this way the State-form gains something essential: a whole consensus. Only thought is capable of inventing the fiction of a State that is universal by right, of elevating the State to the level of de jure universality. (TP 375)

Thought's connection to the state thus legitimizes thought. The order and organization of thought is bolstered by being the same as the order and organization of the state. At the same time, thought for its part consecrates the state-form by arguing that it is not historically contingent but necessary.

Thought itself appears, then, as something foreordained, what everybody already knows. Of course, we thinkers know what it means to think. What could be more natural, more obvious? Except that

the smooth functioning of thought is sometimes interrupted by "counterthoughts, which are violent in their acts and discontinuous in their appearance, and whose existence is mobile in history" (TP 376). Counterthoughts are the exterior of a thought defined by the interiority of its image. Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Kleist are examples of counterthinkers who disturb the placid equanimity of thought. Deleuze and Guattari return to Kleist at precisely the point that they're differentiating the statist thought of Kant from the war machine. Given what we've seen of Deleuze's earliest interpretations of Kant, it's no surprise that they focus on the notion of *Gemüt* in Kleist, particularly his short essay "On the Gradual Production of Thoughts whilst Speaking."[9] *Gemüt* is a difficult word to translate, and would normally be translated as "mind," "soul," "heart," or "disposition." The problem with translating the word in this way is the unavoidable connotations of interiority that Deleuze and Guattari are trying to avoid. In this context it's clear that the better translation is "affect," insofar as it suggests a connection between the speaker and an exteriority that produces something new. What Kleist argues in the essay is that speech is not controlled by the interiority of the concept, and can only produce new thoughts when it is under pressure from external forces. He proposes the following method for producing new ideas: "I put in a few unarticulated sounds, dwell lengthily on the conjunctions, perhaps make use of apposition where it is not necessary, and have recourse to other tricks which will spin out of my speech, all to gain time for the fabrication of my idea in the workshop of the mind [*Vernunft*]."[10] The reference to *Vernunft* (reason) here is crucial, since it plainly reverses the Kantian project. For Kant reason is a tribunal that dispenses determining judgments that keep concepts within their appointed boundaries. For Kleist reason is a workshop that creates ideas under the pressure of having to speak. Here we are not too far from Deleuze's contention in *Kant's Critical Philosophy* that the determining judgments of reason presuppose a free play of the faculties.

Even in this essay about the relation between speaking and new ideas Kleist uses metaphors of war. The kind of war Kleist refers to, though, is fundamentally different from Kant's use of military images. While Kant uses images of war in support of the state and its unity, Kleist uses images of war that suggest the externality of the war machine.

> And in this process nothing helps me more than if my sister makes a move suggesting she wishes to interrupt; for such an attempt from

> outside to wrest speech from its grasp still further excites my already hard-worked mind and, *like a general* when circumstances press, its powers are raised a further *degree*.[11]

Notice that the general's task here is not to restore order but to increase intensity on the basis of external circumstances. This shift to the register of intensity is reinforced later in the essay and also in martial terms when he writes, "And in general if two men have the same clarity of thought the *faster* speaker will always have an advantage since he brings, so to speak, more *forces* to the battle than his opponent."[12] For Kleist the clarity of thought is not a sufficient guarantee of success. Thought must be opened to an outside. Opening to an outside does not result in the determination of the outside by thought. Rather, external intensities draw transversal lines between the well-ordered points of thought, which fashions new thoughts that "with a convulsive movement, take fire, seize a chance to speak and bring something incomprehensible into the world."[13]

This production of new thoughts by engaging with the external through speech returns us to *Gemüt* or affect. Affects are impersonal, non-subjective, and non-signifying. They are not the possession of a subjective interiority or thought. Affects are external to every interiority and in fact are the conditions for the possibility of interiority. What Kleist provides in this essay is a method for mobilizing *Gemüt* in order to open thought to its outside. He makes this explicit when he writes, "For it is not *we* who know things but pre-eminently a certain *condition* of ours which knows."[14] Knowledge is not a property for Kleist as it is for Kant. Knowledge is also not guaranteed by a transcendental unity of apperception. Knowledge is external to the subject and located in affect. Learning something new is not a matter of securing one's boundaries and subjecting every entrant to the tribunal of reason. Bringing something incomprehensible into the world must risk opening thought to the outside:

> A thought grappling with exterior forces instead of being gathered up in an interior form, operating by relays instead of forming an image; an event-thought, a haecceity, instead of a subject-thought, a problem-thought instead of an essence-thought or theorem; a thought that appeals to a people instead of taking itself for a government ministry. (TP 378)

Thought thus takes the two-headed state-form as its image. Thinkers such as Nietzsche and Kleist bring a counterthought to bear on this image. The counterthought is affective, and it arises between the two "universals" that anchor thought, "the Whole

as the final ground of being or all-encompassing horizon, and the Subject as the principle that converts being into being-for-us. *Imperium* and republic" (TP 379). In response to these universals a counterthought poses a smooth space and a race. "A tribe in the desert instead of a universal subject within the horizon of all-encompassing Being" (TP 379). A race is not a subject; it is a multiplicity, a pack traversed by affects. A smooth space is horizonless, unstriated, a place of speeds not movement. The image of thought arrests thought, makes it represent, and always makes it represent the same. Thought always escapes the strictures of representation; it is a becoming, a becoming-race of subject and a becoming-smooth of space.

NOMADS AND THE WAR MACHINE

Now that Deleuze and Guattari have established the exteriority of the war machine, they move next to a discussion of nomads and their relation to the war machine. Nomads invented the war machine. From the nomads' invention we can deduce three further aspects of the war machine: 1) "a spatiogeographic aspect," 2) "an arithmetic or algebraic aspect," and 3) "an affective aspect" (TP 380). These three aspects correspond with the next three propositions (5–8) in this plateau. One way that we might think about these three aspects as a whole is in the distinction between nomads and migrants. It is easy to confuse the two, since they seem to be doing the same thing (moving from place to place), but Deleuze and Guattari show through these aspects that such a description turns nomads into migrants. Nomads inhabit space differently from migrants; they relate to number differently from migrants; and finally a nomadic assemblage is different from a migratory assemblage in that its ways of affecting and being affected are different. A nomadic assemblage affects and is affected through the weapons of a war machine. A migratory assemblage is not. Or, to put the matter starkly, "the nomad reterritorializes on deterritorialization itself" (TP 381).

As we've progressed through *A Thousand Plateaus* the distinction between smooth space and striated space has come into increasingly sharp focus. It is deployed here in the distinction between nomads and migrants. Nomads inhabit a smooth space, while migrants inhabit a striated space. This initially seems like a strange claim, since their activities seem so similar. A migrant moves from one point to another, the homeland to the new land. In contrast

to this, the nomad follows a trajectory. A trajectory runs between points, not from one point to another. On a trajectory points are relays not places to remain. A nomad's path may be customary but it differs from a road. A road "*parcel[s] out a closed space to people,*" but a trajectory "*distributes people (or animals) in an open space*" (TP 380, emphasis in original). We can think about the claim here in terms of the difference that we saw between Chess and Go above. In chess the space is closed, rigid. This closed space is always divided the same way and the position of the pieces is determined before the game begins. In Go the space is open. The position of the pieces is not predetermined, and there is no distinction among the pieces. In Go not only does the Queen not begin by occupying her "color," there is no Queen. Deleuze and Guattari take this insight about the way that nomads occupy space to the seemingly counter-intuitive claim that nomads don't move. Here they're following the historian Arthur Toynbee, but that doesn't make the claim any less counter-intuitive. How can they claim that nomads don't move, when movement seems to be their defining characteristic? In order to answer this question Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between speed and movement. "Movement is extensive; speed is intensive" (TP 381). Nomads have speed but they do not have movement. Movement requires extensive space, because movement requires starting from one point and arriving at another. This can only be case if the space is already divided, striated. Speed does not require a divided, striated space. It is an indivisible intensity and requires a smooth space. We implicitly use this distinction when we talk about thought. We readily speak about our thoughts being fast or slow, but we never talk about our thoughts moving anywhere. Our thoughts always stay in the same "place" regardless of how fast they are. Nomads are composed of speeds and slownesses, not movements. They occupy a smooth space intensively. Thus they occupy it with speed not movement. They do not move. As with thought, they are capable of springing up anywhere.

Another way we might think about the difference between migrants and nomads is in terms of deterritorialization. Migrants certainly deterritorialize but only to reterritorialize again. This is because the migrant thinks of territory as property, that is, in a geographical and political sense. Property assumes the parceling out of a closed space. As we saw in the refrain plateau, though, this is not the only way to think about territory. Territory can be conceived in sonorous terms, as arising out of a rhythm. Thinking of territory as property would be to convert the rhythm into a cadence, but this is

not a requirement. On the contrary, one can think of a territory not only in sonorous terms, but also as opening up to other territories. One can even follow a rhythm beyond territories altogether. This is the cosmic refrain. It is a line of flight, a trajectory of absolute deterritorialization. In contrast to the nomad's absolute deterritorialization, the migrant pursues a relative deterritorialization.

In response to the externality of the war machine invented by the nomads, the state's response is uniform: "to striate the space over which it reigns, or to utilize smooth spaces as a means of communication in the service of striated space" (TP 385). That is, the state never ceases to regulate flows. It not only regulates the flows of money, commerce, and people, it also uses smooth space in the service of striated space. On the use of smooth space in the service of striated space, the clearest example might be the government regulation of communication frequencies. Broadcasting a signal requires a license that can only be provided by the government. Attempts to broadcast without a license are called "pirate broadcasts," as if a frequency could be stolen.

Deleuze and Guattari caution as they conclude this proposition that being a war machine does not guarantee a revolution. There is no pure war machine any more than there is a pure state. All assemblages are mixed:

> We say this as a reminder that smooth space and the form of exteriority do not have an irresistible revolutionary calling but change meaning drastically depending on the interactions they are part of and the concrete conditions of their exercise or establishment (for example, the way in which total war, and even guerilla warfare, borrow one another's methods). (TP 387)

Recent philosophers such as Slavoj Žižek and Peter Hallward have criticized Deleuze and Guattari's notion of the war machine and its relation to smooth space by noting that the Israeli army has developed a new strategy in urban warfare that smoothes striated space by blowing holes through the walls in hostile environments.[15] Even if we grant that this is, in fact, smoothing striated space (and not striating it differently), it's difficult to see how a critique of Deleuze and Guattari follows from this. It would only be a critique if one took *A Thousand Plateaus* to be a moral book rather than an ethical one. One would have to suppose that Deleuze and Guattari were arguing that smooth is better than striated, or that good always follows from a smooth space. In short, one would have to overlook the numerous cautions throughout the book including the one quoted above and

most blatantly the last line of the final plateau: "Never believe that a smooth space will suffice to save us" (TP 500).

In proposition six Deleuze and Guattari take up the way in which number is transformed in relation to nomads. The operative distinction here is between the numbering number and the numbered number. The numbering number is the *arithmetical* aspect of the war machine. The numbered number is the *geometric* aspect of the state. Once again the issue here is two ways of occupying space. The state occupies space by striating it. That is, it closes space off and distributes it as property. In this respect space is numbered, organized geometrically, and only then can people (or things) occupy it. The chessboard provides the perfect image here. Not only does it represent war, but it represents a very particular kind of war, a war between two states on a grid of stratified space. The grid has a horizontal and vertical organization that allows each square to be uniquely identified. Each square becomes a property to be controlled. Typically, the winner is one who is able to control the most property with the fewest pieces. In Go the strategy is to occupy space, but it is not a numbered space. The starting points are not set. There is a grid but its points are not uniquely identifiable. The importance of space on the board is a function of adding pieces to the board, which themselves may shift in function and importance throughout the match. Smooth space "is occupied without being counted" (TP 389). Numbering number thus refers to "autonomous arithmetic organization" independent of space, whereas numbered number makes arithmetic organization dependent on space.

The numbering number has two characteristics. It is always complex, and it is always doubled in the form of a special body. The complexity that Deleuze and Guattari have in mind here arises from the fact that the "arithmetic base unit is therefore a unit of assemblage, for example, man-horse-bow, 1 X 1 X 1, according to the formula that carried the Scythians to triumph" (TP 391). A unit of the numbering number is never simply the man of war. The man of war is always already combined with technologies that increase his power, a sword or a bow, or combined with technologies that allow him to combine with other men of war, such as the shield in a phalanx. Technologies even allow men of war to be combined with animals. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the stirrup, for example, in increasing a cavalry's power.

Nomads organize themselves numerically. The numbering number takes complex assemblages as its units and groups them into tens, hundreds, thousands, etc. This process of selection and

organization into groups also at the same time doubles this selection process and constitutes "a special numerical body" (TP 391). For evidence of this Deleuze and Guattari draw on the book of *Numbers* in the Hebrew Bible. Here Moses is organizing the recently liberated Jews by taking a census and constituting an army, which is to be arrayed around the tabernacle. The Levites are exempted from this census, though. The Levites are not to be members of the army but constitute a priesthood. As a group consecrated to priestly service, the Levites redeem and stand in for all the first-born of Israel. To the degree that the number of first-born exceeds the Levites, a tax is levied.[16] The secret body is, of course, not unique to nomads, but its invention is. The state uses secret bodies to reinforce its stratifications. State military apparatuses select out special bodies from the rank and file. The US Army has its Delta Force (know simply as "The Unit"), and the US Navy has its SEALs. We also saw a similar process occurring in the movie *Fight Club* in our discussion of the "Becoming-Intense . . ." plateau. Deleuze and Guattari's point is that this selection of special bodies happens as a result of numerical organization. The key distinction in this regard is whether numerical organization is autonomous (the numbering number) or subordinated to the state apparatus (the numbered number).

Proposition seven concerns the "affects" of nomad existence. Deleuze and Guattari's claim is that the weapons of a war machine are the affects of nomad existence. There are two related distinctions implicit in this proposition. The first distinction is between weapon and tool. The second distinction is between affect and feeling. The weapon/tool distinction is the subject of a long-running debate in anthropology, because the distinction itself is thought to be ambiguous. Deleuze and Guattari quote Leroi-Gourhan, who writes, "For ages on end agricultural implements and weapons of war must have remained identical" (TP 395). Deleuze and Guattari are convinced, however, that they can articulate five intrinsic differences between tools and weapons. They locate these differences in five points of view: 1) direction, 2) vector, 3) model, 4) expression, and 5) tonality (TP 402). Each of these points of view names a set of oppositions that explicate the distinction between tools and weapons. These oppositions can be schematized as shown in Chart 10. There are numerous ways we can describe what Deleuze and Guattari have in mind with the first point of view. Both weapon and tool act at a distance, but the tool acts at a distance in order to achieve or reinstate some kind of equilibrium. The hoe prepares the soil. Weapons are ballistic, projective. They move

Chart 10

Point of View	Weapon	Tool
Direction	Projection	Introjection
Vector	Speed	Gravity
Model	Free-action	Work
Tonality	Affect	Feeling
Expression	Jewelry	Signs

outwardly. Tools act centripetally; weapons act centrifugally. From the point of view of vector, the weapon/tool distinction reproduces the speed/movement distinction. Weapons have a speed, while tools have movement. That is, weapons capture and redirect intensities, while tools capture and redirect extensities. This insight (along with the work of Paul Virilio) allows Deleuze and Guattari to rethink the relation between war and hunting. It is easy to assume that war is nothing but the hunting instinct turned against other humans instead of animals. Instead of the hunter/prey model, they propose the breeder/bred model. In the breeder/bred model the goal is to conserve and redirect animal forces. In the hunter/prey model the goal is to destroy animal forces through slaughter. In breeding the breeder actually captures the forces of the *hunted* animal, which are then directed outward in a vector of speed. This is the becoming-animal of the war machine.

The objection that arises here is that surely, in the sense just outlined, speed is as much a property of the tool as of a weapon. If the issue is the capturing and redirecting of forces, both tools and weapons do this. In response to this objection Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between free-action and work. Both are "motor causes," but they both occupy different kinds of space. Work occupies an extensive space with obstacles and resistance along with movement between points. Free-action occupies an intensive space. The weapon has a speed whether it is "moving" or not. Deleuze and Guattari caution, though, that ultimately the distinction between work and free-action, and indeed the distinction between weapon and tool, cannot be made in a vacuum. These are determined relations that presuppose an assemblage. "It is the machine that is primary in relation to the technical element . . . but the social or collective machine, the machinic assemblage that determines what is a

technical element at a given moment . . ." (TP 398). Thus, the distinction between weapon and tool, between free-action and work, is at bottom a distinction between different kinds of assemblage. The same technical element may be taken up in one assemblage as a tool and in another as a weapon.

Assemblages can also be distinguished according to the type of desire that they assemble: feelings or affects. This is the point of view of tonality. An assemblage that has the technical elements of work and tool as components assembles feelings. An assemblage that has the technical elements of free-action and weapon as components assembles affects. Not only do different assemblages assemble different technical aspects, they assemble desire differently. "Affect is the active discharge of emotion, the counterattack, whereas feeling is an always displaced, retarded, resisting emotion. Affects are projectiles just like weapons; feelings are introceptive like tools" (TP 400). For Deleuze and Guattari one way of articulating the difference between affects and feelings is in terms of their differing regimes of signs. As we saw in our previous discussion of regimes of signs, the postsignifying regime was characterized by its passional flight in betrayal of the despotic, signifying regime. The flight itself coalesces around a subject, which is oriented toward a black hole. The signifying regime is the regime of feelings; the subject that concerns Deleuze and Guattari here is the "worker." In contrast to this, the war machine is a countersignifying regime. It remains external to the state, which is found at the intersection between the despotic and passional regimes. The countersignifying regime does not produce tools and feelings; it produces weapons and affects.

If we pursue this relation between regimes of signs further, we come to the final point of view that distinguishes tools and weapons, namely, expression. From the point of view of expression tools are correlated with signs, while weapons are correlated with jewelry. The tool-sign connection is not surprising given the way that it is bound up with the state apparatus, especially work. Work requires record-keeping, writing. Work assumes a property (that is, a striated space) to be worked and a bureaucracy that tracks work, not only for the purpose of monumental works but also for taxation. "For there to be work, there must be a capture of activity by the State apparatus, and a semiotization of activity by writing" (TP 401). In contrast to the close connection among the tool, writing, and the state, the weapon is closely allied with nomads and jewelry. The connection with jewelry will be especially important as we discuss metallurgy

below. For now, though, Deleuze and Guattari are keen to point out that jewelry and decoration in general are not to be thought of as a stunted or incipient language. To do so simply reinforces the idea that nomads are a stunted or incipient state, a retarded developmental form. "Metalworking, jewelry making, ornamentation, even decoration, do not form a writing, even though they have a power of abstraction that is in every way equal to that of writing. But this power is assembled differently" (TP 401). The war machine and the state have different substances and forms of expression. The state captures activity and then organizes the activity through writing. The war machine is mobile. It has a speed not a movement. Jewelry is the expression of this speed.

METALLURGY

The connection between the war machine and jewelry precipitates a discussion of metallurgy. Articulating the importance of metallurgy involves the last problem and axiom of the plateau. The problem that Deleuze and Guattari pose is deceptively simple: Where do the nomads get their weapons? If we pursue an answer in terms of the state/war machine dichotomy, though, we quickly run into difficulties. The first difficulty is the archaeological prejudice against nomads. The working assumption is that nomads are technologically deficient. They don't invent; they steal. This assumption automatically answers the question in favor of the state. In response to this difficulty Deleuze and Guattari argue for nomads getting their due. Even in the case of the saber, "where the facts already speak sufficiently in favor of an imperial [Chinese] origin," it seems that this still doesn't explain how the nomads got the weapons. The nomads would already need to have sufficient technological prowess to take advantage of anything taken from the state (TP 405). No, the story must be more complicated than nomad thievery.

Deleuze and Guattari complicate the story, and this is the second difficulty, by arguing that the simple opposition between the state and the war machine is a false dichotomy. That is, it is impossible to say definitively that technological advances such as carbon steel are the property of either the state or the war machine. The better way to think about metallurgy is as a deterritorializing edge. We saw examples of this in our discussion of becoming in the figure of the sorcerer, that point of contact between the pack and the outside. In the case of metallurgy, it is a technology that is found both in the state and among nomads, but not as a property. The

state may capture metallurgical technology from time to time and even provide resources for its support, but the smiths, who possess the technological knowledge and shape (and sometimes mine) the metals to be shaped, are in the state but not of it. The smiths follow the metal, the seams of which form a line of flight outside the state. Thus, the question of whether metallurgy is the property of the state or the war machine is badly posed. Rather, Deleuze and Guattari articulate their claim in the eighth proposition in this way: "Metallurgy in itself constitutes a flow necessarily confluent with nomadism" (TP 404). Itinerant metallurgists are themselves nomadic, and, as a result, sometimes their technology gets taken up by the state. Sometimes their technology gets taken up by the war machine. Sometimes their technology (as in the case of the saber) gets taken up by the war machine with the state as an intermediary.

Even supposing that Deleuze and Guattari's account is correct, it doesn't explain the importance of metallurgy. At this point all we know is that it helps account for jewelry, but there is something deeper going on here. At bottom, metal, its mining, its refining, and its shaping are indicative of the critique of hylomorphism that we've been pursuing throughout this book. To make the connection between metal and hylomorphism Deleuze and Guattari draw (as they have often done throughout *A Thousand Plateaus*) on the work of Gilbert Simondon. Metal and metallurgy are emblematic of a flow that produces its own variable form, which we have called "hylozoism." Deleuze and Guattari call this flow the "machinic phylum." The machinic phylum is "matter in movement, in flux, in variation, matter as a conveyor of singularities and traits of expression" (TP 409). The "artisan" is one who follows the flow. Artisans are by definition itinerant. Importantly, though, following does not require movement. A woodworker follows the grain of the wood without going anywhere. At the same time, there might be great journeys required to find the exact right wood for a given project. In the case of metallurgists these great journeys may be underground. In short, the artisan thinks of matter as intensive rather than extensive. Matter is continuous not discontinuous. This comes to the fore most clearly in the case of metal. "Metallurgy is the consciousness or thought of the matter-flow, and metal the correlate of this consciousness . . . Metal is neither a thing nor an organism, but a *body* without organs" (TP 411). Both "thing" and "organism" indicate an extensive, discrete account of matter. That is, there is no matter that is not already formed in some way. As we've seen, the body without organs is a way of thinking about matter that is

un-formed, matter that flows. Metallurgy deals with matter in this sense. It is "minor science in person" (TP 411). Of course, Deleuze and Guattari argue that all matter can be seen in this way. This is the task of perceptual semiotics, of schizoanalysis. Their point is that metallurgy historically demonstrates this perspective.

Because metallurgy is a deterritorializing edge it arises at the interstices of the state and the war machine. We have already seen how metallurgy communicates with both by following the matter-flow that traverses assemblages of all kinds. By way of concluding their discussion of metallurgy, Deleuze and Guattari ask if there is a kind of space commensurate with metallurgy. They answer that "holey space" is the kind of space commensurate with metallurgy. "Holey space" is the space created by mining. It is a space created by engaging directly with the "subsoil" rather than the smooth space of the nomads or the striated space of the state. Metallurgists mine. They follow the metallic line and shape it into ingots. The metallic flow continues in ingot form as the ingots are melted, shaped, melted again and reshaped. In this way holey space communicates with both the smooth space of the nomads and the striated space of the state. The nature of this communication, though, is asymmetrical. Holey space "is always *connected* to nomad space, whereas it *conjugates* with [striated] space" (TP 415). Deleuze and Guattari first posited the distinction between connection and conjugation in *Anti-Oedipus*. In that book the terms distinguished different syntheses of desire. In this plateau and the next, the distinction between connection and conjugation maps onto the rhizomatic/arborescent distinction. Connections are rhizomatic. They connect to an outside. Conjugations are arborescent. All conjugations are subordinated to hierarchical relations.

Deleuze and Guattari summarize the relation between metallurgy and the war machine in their third axiom: "The nomad war machine is the form of expression, of which itinerant metallurgy is the correlative form of content" (TP 415). We can schematize the claim of this axiom by returning to the chart we first developed above in the discussion of the "Geology of Morals" (see Chart 11). The content that is expressed here is substantially the metallic line followed by the itinerant metallurgists. Formally, metallurgy makes ingots out of this metallic line, which can be traded and shaped. The expression of this content is formally the war machine. That is, the ingots are shaped into weapons instead of tools. Concomitant with this formal expression is the substantial expression of a smooth space. Although Deleuze and Guattari do not make this explicit, the

Chart 11



Chart 12



same content can be expressed differently, if it is captured (conjugated) by the state. In this case (see Chart 12), the formal expression of the metallic line in ingot form is the state and its substance is striated space. Here the ingots are formed into tools, not weapons. Or, if there are weapons formed, they are subordinated to a military chain of command. Here we can see more clearly what Deleuze and Guattari are claiming about the saber. Even if we suppose that it has a state origin, as such it is a particular expression of content. Regardless of how the saber passes to the nomads, the same content is expressed differently. It is no longer conjugated as a segment of striated space. Rather, the saber is now connected to smooth space, and thus undergoes deformations as it connects the nomads to an outside.

CLAUSEWITZ AND THE WAR MACHINE

Having said so much about the war machine, it would be strange if Deleuze and Guattari didn't compare their findings to Carl von Clausewitz's definitive book *On War* (1832). In particular, since this plateau is about the relation between the war machine and the state, Clausewitz's most famous dictum, that "war is the continuation of politics by other means," seems particularly germane to

their argument. In the last proposition of the plateau Deleuze and Guattari settle accounts with Clausewitz. In order to do this they are faced with three questions:

1. "Is battle the 'object' of war?"
2. "Is war the 'object' of the war machine?"
3. "Is the war machine the 'object' of the state?" (TP 416)

The summary answers to two of these questions are given in the ninth proposition: "War does not necessarily have the battle as its object, and more important, the war machine does not necessarily have war as its object, although war and the battle may be its necessary result (under certain conditions)" (TP 416). As the scare quotes around "object" make clear, Deleuze and Guattari intend to problematize the notion of "object" here. In the case of the relation between war and battle, they propose that war can have both battle and non-battle as its object. Sometimes war is threatened precisely so that battle may be avoided.

With regard to the relation between war and the war machine, they propose three commensurate takes on "object": Aristotelian, Kantian, and Derridean. In Aristotelian terms, Deleuze and Guattari see "object" not as a necessary or sufficient condition but as that which accompanies an action. This is the relation, for example, between happiness and pleasure for Aristotle. Happiness is not the pursuit of pleasure, but it does accompany it.[17] With Kant Deleuze and Guattari argue that "object" here means "necessary but 'synthetic'" (TP 417). This, of course, is exactly the way that Kant describes the foundations of knowledge in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Knowledge for Kant presupposes synthetic a priori principles. That is, necessary principles which nevertheless add something beyond what is contained in the subject.[18] Finally, in Derridean terms the "supplement" refers to the undecidable relation between two binary terms. In the case of speech and writing, for example, the history of philosophy in general (and Rousseau in particular) holds that writing is a supplement to speech. The intended meaning is that speech grasps being in its plenitude, and that writing is therefore an unnecessary addition. As Derrida deftly points out, though, "supplement" also means to fill up what is incomplete. This is why we call vitamins "supplements."[19] It is in these three commensurate accounts of "object" that Deleuze and Guattari take war to be the object of the war machine.

The relation between the war machine and the state is more complex. The opening propositions of this plateau argue that the

war machine is external to the state. This distinction, however, applies to the war machine and the state insofar as they are opposed tendencies on a continuum. Historically speaking, though, the state has sought to limit the predations of the war machine by appropriating it. We'll further explore the mechanism by which the state appropriates the war machine in the next chapter. For now, we can say that the state appropriates the war machine through territoriality, work, and taxes. These are the state's three apparatuses of capture. The important point that Deleuze and Guattari want to make here is that it is only when the state appropriates the war machine that the war machine takes war as its necessary *and* analytic object.

Within the context of the state appropriation of the war machine Deleuze and Guattari are able to address Clausewitz directly. According to Clausewitz "war" has three distinct senses: 1) the idea of war; 2) real wars; 3) total war. For Clausewitz the idea of war is nothing other than the idea of the elimination of the enemy. For Deleuze and Guattari, however, the idea of war is nothing other than the war machine itself. Importantly, though, it is the pure idea of the war machine as external to the state, not the historical de facto mixes into which nomads and states enter. Real wars (supplementarily) arise first in the conflict between nomads and the state, but once the war machine has been captured by the state, the state uses the war machine (now subordinated to its political aims through a hierarchical military apparatus) to engage in war as a necessary, analytic object. These real wars can range from limited engagement to total war. In a total war all the resources of the state are mobilized to annihilate the enemy. Deleuze and Guattari make two important points with regard to total war. The first point is the ineluctable connection between total war and capitalism. Total war requires massive investment in both people and equipment in order to accomplish its aims. This kind of mobilization requires an unfettered capitalism that at first seems subordinate to the state but soon outstrips it. The second point is that once the state shifts to total war it is no longer clear whether the state is in charge of the war or the war is in charge of the state. Deleuze and Guattari note Clausewitz's vacillation on this point. Their contention is that as the state approaches total war, at the very same time it approaches the idea of war. That is, in total war the state becomes the war machine. The state goes beyond itself and smoothes striated space.

The war machine that arises from the state in total war has two figures. The first figure is fascist. As Deleuze and Guattari argued in

"Micropolitics and Segmentarity," fascism is a suicidal war machine. The second figure is the current figure of the worldwide security state, where "total war itself is surpassed, toward a form of peace more terrifying still" (TP 421). Following Virilio, Deleuze and Guattari's referent here is no doubt the nuclear détente of the Cold War. However, we can easily see how this applies to the indeterminate and interminable wars against drugs and terror. Only when the state becomes adapted to the war machine in total war is it possible to reverse Clausewitz's dictum and say "politics is the continuation of war by other means."[20]

By way of conclusion to this plateau, Deleuze and Guattari return to the twin overriding themes of caution and experimentation. A war machine's power can be choked out of existence by the state. A war machine's power can also be ramified and unleashed by the state. A war machine can be killed by organ-ization, and it can also kill in a suicidal and annihilating gesture. The existence of a war machine guarantees nothing. We must also not put too much faith in the nomads. They invented the war machine but they are not the sole source of the war machine. Anything can be a war machine—an internet community, an artistic movement, or a scientific movement. The only criterion for being a war machine is that it creates something new, that it connects rather than conjugates, that it opens striated space onto smooth space, that it creates a line of flight. As long as it does this, it embodies a war machine. Any war machine is fragile, though. It can easily be appropriated by the state or fall into a black hole. The key for Deleuze and Guattari is to keep experimenting.

NOTES

1. Guattari, *The Anti-Oedipus Papers*, p. 397.
2. Dumézil, *Mitra-Varuna: An Essay on Two Indo-European Representatives of Sovereignty.*
3. Kleist, *Selected Writings*, p. 236.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., pp. 236–7.
6. While Clastres' fundamental insight, namely that primitive societies ward off the state, remains correct, the mechanism he proposes has come under scrutiny. More recent work, such as Christopher Boehm's *Moral Origins: The Evolution of Virtue, Altruism, and Shame*, argues that egalitarian relations in hunter-gatherer societies were maintained through mechanisms of social selection. Thus, inter-tribal war did not ward off the state so much as ridicule, ostracism, exile, and execution.

For the purposes of Deleuze and Guattari's argument here it is sufficient to note that non-hierarchical societies can only maintain themselves to the degree that they can dissipate hierarchical structures. As we'll see, these societies that refuse the state-form are "war machines" whether they take war as their object or not. For a further analysis of the state in *A Thousand Plateaus*, see Sibertin-Blanc, *Politique et État chez Deleuze et Guattari*.

7. Smith, *Essays on Deleuze*, p. 291.
8. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 131.
9. Kleist, *Selected Writings*, pp. 405–9.
10. Ibid., p. 406.
11. Ibid., my emphasis.
12. Ibid., my emphasis.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., p. 408, emphasis in original.
15. See, for example, Žižek, "Introduction," in Mao Zedong, *On Practice and Contradiction*, pp. 26–7.
16. Numbers 3:40–51.
17. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book 10.
18. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B10–18.
19. Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, pp. 141ff.
20. Virilio, *Speed and Politics*, p. 43.