INTRODUCTION

Feminism and Historical Time

Feminist attitudes toward tradition are typically suspicious and subversive. Yet, as feminism itself has become a political tradition, significant questions have emerged for feminists to address. How can feminism draw productively on its own history, without passively conforming to expectations of the past, or elevating the past as a nostalgic ideal against which to measure and compare the present? Conversely, how can we usher in *new* ideas and approaches without simply "burying" feminisms of the past? And how can we speak of "feminist history" without instating or reproducing a singular master narrative? This book considers such questions through investigating the concept of "historical time," and the ways in which feminists conceptualize and produce the temporalities of feminism.

In recent years, feminists have become increasingly critical of the "great hegemonic model" of feminism as an ascending series of "waves" or "phases" (Sandoval 2000, 47). This model severely constrains the ways in which feminist histories can be mapped and understood, and fosters problematic historiographical orientations and habits of thought. The ordering of different feminisms into successive waves or phases implies that only one kind of feminism is possible at a time and, moreover, that older forms of theory and practice necessarily become obsolete as time moves on. This begets a closed-minded attitude toward the past, preventing us from grasping the unfinished possibilities of feminisms from earlier times. Further, the hegemonic model privileges the trajectories of Western European and North American feminism, and implies that feminisms everywhere have undergone, or will eventually undergo, the same shifts and patterns. In this way, it perpetuates the idea that some feminisms are more "advanced" than others.

As a means of overturning the linear wave model, various feminists have called for alternative, nonlinear concepts of historical time: more specifically, for concepts that are *multilinear*, and could therefore

account for coexisting feminist "histories in the plural" (Friedman 1995); and that are also *multidirectional*, and could thus facilitate productive conversations between feminisms of the past and the present (see, e.g., Fernandes 2010; Roof 1997). However, while such multidirectional or multilinear concepts of historical time have been mooted, there is further work to be done unpacking and explaining exactly what this might mean. There have been several insightful, provocative investigations into time and history within feminist and queer theory over the past decade or so (see, e.g., Brown 2001; Freeman 2000, 2010; Grosz 2004, 2005; Halberstam 2005; Wiegman 2000, 2004;).[1] Yet despite this "time and history boom," I suggest that the specific concept of "historical time" remains somewhat vague and under-articulated within feminist historiographical discourse. Indeed, historical time is one of the most notoriously elusive concepts within historiography and the philosophy of history more generally speaking. When we invoke historical time, are we referring to "objective" or "subjective" conceptions of time? To a "time in which" historical events occur, or to the temporality of historical events? And what does it mean to say that historical time "moves in more than one direction," or to speak of "different times at the same time"? Is historical time bound by the laws of physics? Is it "real" or "imagined" time?

In light of these kinds of questions, this book undertakes an in-depth, philosophical investigation into historical time, to elucidate and make sense of the idea that historical time is multilinear and multidirectional. In the first instance, I argue that historical time needs to be understood as a form of *lived time*. This gives us a solid basis for claiming that historical time "moves in more than one direction," because what accounts of lived time consistently demonstrate—whether they are phenomenologically, hermeneutically, or sociologically oriented—is that our various ways of living time do not conform to a straightforward past–present–future chronology. Perception and experience are constituted through a complex blend of retention and anticipation, memory and expectation. Hence, there is a dynamic interplay and interrelation between past, present, and future as modes of temporal orientation. Further, I argue that historical time should be understood as *polytemporal*.[2] It is an internally complex, "composite" time, generated through the interweaving of different temporal layers and strands. As such, there is no "one" historical time or temporal structure within which diverse histories are all embroiled. On the contrary, there will always be multiple, shifting patterns of historical time, as different histories have their own mixes of time and their own temporalities.

This basic understanding of historical time as *lived* and *polytemporal* will be sketched out in a preliminary fashion in chapter 1. Then, to move toward a more nuanced and fine-grained account, the rest of the book is organized around four kinds of time that play a vital role in determining configurations of historical time: the *time of the trace*, *narrative time*, *calendar time*, and *generational time*.[3] Chapter 2 will investigate the *time of the trace*, characterized by a "two-way" temporality, as past events spill forward into the present in the form of traces, and conversely, through tracing the past we are oriented "back in time." Chapter 3 takes on *narrative time*, which generates temporal orders through marking beginnings, middles, and ends; flashbacks and flash-forwards; turning points and returns. Chapter 4 conducts an analysis of *calendar time*, which dates and organizes history through temporal markers such as years, decades, and centuries. And finally, chapter 5 explores *generational time*: a relational time that enables the transmission and negotiation of cultural and political heritages.

Over the course of the book, I draw on a variety of theorists including Dipesh Chakrabarty, Johannes Fabian, Paul Ricoeur, Reinhardt Koselleck, Walter Mignolo, Martin Heidegger, Hannah Arendt, Luce Irigaray, Judith Butler, and Hortense Spillers. It is an eclectic range, but if historical time is multilayered and multifaceted, then it requires a theoretical approach that is itself multilayered and interdisciplinary (Couzens-Hoy 2009, 185–6; Ricoeur 1984, 21). Moreover, what these theorists share in common is a desire to articulate and engage with lived temporalities and the politics of time. Thus, from their different phenomenological, hermeneutical, or sociopolitical perspectives, each brings valuable insights to feminist historiography, as we seek to develop nonlinear concepts of historical time, and explore its different dimensions as a traced time, a narrated time, a dated time, and a relational time.[4]

Before beginning this reconstructive project, however, it is important to outline in more detail exactly why feminism needs alternative concepts of historical time in the first place. As such, I will use the rest of the Introduction to clarify my terms, my philosophical approach to feminist historiography, and the problematic of historical time that I am seeking to address.

Philosophical Feminist Historiography

The term "historiography" has two key meanings. In the first instance, it refers to a self-reflexive mode of historical practice: "a critical

consciousness at work in the writing of history" (Chandler 1999, 77). In the second instance, it refers to a theoretical or philosophical exercise that takes a step back from the actual writing or producing of history to critically examine the "deeper" conceptual models that underpin historical practice. In this book, I refer to "historiography" primarily in the second sense, and use the term "feminist historiography" to mean a theoretical meta-reflection on the ways that feminists conceive and construct histories of feminism, and the resulting impacts upon feminist political and intellectual practice. As such, while it does take a philosophical "step back" from substantive history, this kind of approach does not take a *disinterested* view of the dynamics of feminist history-making. Rather, it is a strategic, engaged historiography, intimately linked to political concerns (La Capra 1985).

"Feminism," it should be acknowledged, is itself a contentious term, particularly when associated with the universalizing presumptions of certain strands of white "western feminism."[5] Consequently, various alternative terms such as "womanism," "third world feminism," "US third world feminism," "black feminism," or "Mestiza feminism" are frequently used, which emphasize geographical, cultural, and historical specificity, and mark a feminist consciousness and practice that is attentive to differences between women as well as to shared circumstances and potential commonalities.[6] While registering its potentially problematic connotations, however, this book retains the term "feminism" as a "placeholder." I use it in its broadest sense to denote the plethora of groups and individuals engaged in challenging the subordination and oppression of women within male-dominated societies, and the marginalization and distortion of women's knowledges and experiences within androcentric discourses. This means adopting a problem-centered understanding of "feminism," as opposed to understanding it as a coherent political identity or unified theoretical framework. That is, I use the feminist "we," not in presumption of a shared perspective, approach, or experience, but rather in presumption of a shared interest in a certain set of problems (Elam and Wiegman 1995; Marder 1992).[7]

In the simple sense that feminism means challenging patriarchal domination and androcentric norms, the field of "feminist history" (which I use throughout as a form of shorthand for "feminist histories of feminism") necessarily overlaps the field of "*women's* history" (i.e., "feminist histories of women's lives"). Certainly the historical project of recovering female pasts and making women visible in history is a vital feminist practice (Bennett 2006; Lerner 1979). Yet, the

distinct idea of "*feminist* history" has emerged in conjunction with the consolidation of the idea of "feminism" itself, as a self-consciously articulated, organized intellectual and political movement, or coalition of movements.[8] As Susan Stanford Friedman explains, "the feminist desire to 'make history' entangles the desire to effect change with the desire to be the historian of change." This means that "writing the history of feminism functions as an act in the present that can (depending on its influence) contribute to the shape of feminism's future" (Friedman 1995, 13). In other words, feminist narrations of the history of feminism have themselves become part of the history of feminism (Scott 1996, 18). My interest is thus in how feminists have sought to position themselves within histories and legacies of feminism, thereby self-consciously and strategically building an intellectual and political tradition, and a historiographical community.

Focusing on the "internal" dynamics of feminist history—that is, on how feminists conceptualize, construct, and mobilize feminist histories—does admittedly risk a kind of feminist insularity. After all, one of the biggest problems facing feminists in contemporary contexts is how feminism is represented by the "*outside*," for example, by discourses declaring the "end of feminism," or referring to "post-feminism" as a way of marking feminism's decline or obsolescence (Henry 2004, 19). Another serious problem is the appropriation and redeployment of feminist concepts, for instance, by advertising companies advising on what is "empowering" for women, or by governments justifying military invasion in the name of "feminism" (Butler 2004; Power 2009).[9] Theories and narratives that are too internal to feminism, as Nancy Fraser points out, can "fail to situate interior changes in relation to broader historical developments and the larger political context" (Fraser 2008, 101). Moreover, separating feminism off as its own field can signify a failure to appreciate the various pathways into and out of feminism, and the ways in which feminisms have arisen in tandem with antislavery, antiracist, and anticolonial struggles, or with nationalist and modernization movements (Heng 1997; Roth 2004).

By treating the "internal" temporal dynamics of feminism as a distinct *topic*, however, I am not thereby arguing for the autonomy of feminism *per se*. Engaging with wider political and socioeconomic contexts, and with antifeminist discourses, are undeniably crucial feminist tasks. Yet, as Diane Elam insists, "while the backlash against feminism must be taken seriously . . . merely instituting protective measures against threatening patriarchal intruders would be too simple a

solution to the problem. Rather . . . it is important to ask some serious questions about what is happening *within* feminism" (Elam 1997, 55; see also Siegel 1997). On the one hand there is a pressing urgency to reclaim histories of feminism in response to the persistent erasure and misrepresentation of feminism, but this project must not be a simple resuscitation of the same old stories and historical models. This is because, in Friedman's words, "our actions as feminists—including the productions of our own history—run the risk of repeating the same patterns of thought and action that excluded, distorted, muted or erased women from the master narratives of history in the first place" (Friedman 1995, 12). As such, we need to reflexively examine the ways in which we are constructing and representing feminist histories to ensure that the kinds of stories we are telling and models we are using are not contrary to our aims.

Such reflexive investigations have begun to appear fairly regularly within feminist theory in the past few years, identifying the various guises of feminism's "great hegemonic model," and how it is secured through various representational and rhetorical techniques (see, e.g., Bailey 1997; Gillis et al. 2004; Hemmings 2005, 2011; Hewitt 2010; Sandoval 2000).[10] Yet, as well as scrutinizing our writing habits and "political grammar" (Hemmings 2011), we must also interrogate our *philosophical* presumptions about historical reality and historical time. If we continue to believe, for example, that historical time is "*really*" unidirectional, or that there is ultimately "one" historical time that we are all "in," the thoroughgoing reconceptualization of historical time that feminist historiography requires cannot be achieved. Thus, it is not simply a question of being reflexive about how we *write* histories, but also about our philosophical presumptions concerning history and historical time more generally. To this end, it is illuminating to situate the problems ailing feminist historiography within the broader context of the philosophy of history, and to consider how feminist theory has both challenged, and been shaped by, prevailing philosophical paradigms. The focus in the following discussion will be on the legacy of the speculative philosophies of "world history" that emerged in Europe during the "age of Enlightenment" in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

The Legacy of Speculative Philosophies of "World History"

It must first be emphasized that there is no singular or uniform "Enlightenment" philosophy of history.[11] There are philosophers of the era such as Hamaan or Herder who repudiated not only the

idea of human progress, but further the idea that one can understand human histories in unified terms at all (Hamaan 1996a; 1996b; Herder 1969).[12] Moreover, those philosophers such as Kant and Hegel who do develop a speculative philosophy of "world history" or "universal history" differ significantly in terms of the principles or ends that they postulate, and moreover, their general philosophical systems which inform their philosophies of history[13] (Hutchings 2008, 39–46). Nevertheless, while it has been formulated in a variety of ways, the basic speculative thesis that history has reason, purpose, and direction, and can be treated in the collective singular as "world" or "universal history," is a recurring and central feature of Enlightenment philosophies during this era (Brown 2001; Gray 2007; Koselleck 2004; Nisbet 1980).[14] Indeed, several feminist theorists have argued that the concept of historical time brought forth by Enlightenment philosophy is *irredeemably* bound to notions of teleological progress. In Julia Kristeva's renowned essay "Women's Time," for example, she describes "the time of history" as the time of "project, teleology, linear and prospective unfolding" (Kristeva 1986c, 192).

Of all the speculative philosophies of history, Hegel's has arguably been the most influential. It is outlined most explicitly in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History* (1975), which are worth briefly summarizing here for the exposition that Hegel provides of his core ideas of "graduated progression" and historical "totality."[15] In the *Lectures*, Hegel claims that the immanent purpose or goal of history is for human beings to become conscious of themselves as freely and historically self-determining beings. "World history," he writes, represents "the development of the spirit's consciousness of its own freedom and of the consequent realization of this freedom" (Hegel 1975, 138).[16] Freedom, or self-determination, is the *telos* within Hegel's philosophy of history and also the principle or "mechanism," as the emergence of such self-consciousness is what drives history forward (Houlgate 2005, 21–2). Freedom, in Hegelian terms, is not an ahistorical phenomenon grounded in the will of individuals but rather one that is only meaningful within institutionalized relations of mutual recognition (Hutchings 2008, 44). The realization of freedom, in Hegel's account, is thus not simply about individual enlightenment. He proposes that the ultimate end of "world history" is that "spirit" should "actualize" or "objectivize this knowledge and transform it into a real world, and give itself an objective existence" (Hegel 1975, 64). As such, the rise of the modern state is vital to Hegel's account of "world history" where the state emerges as the

self-conscious imposition of constraints by a community of autonomous individuals. It is an explicit realization of history's implicit principle and *telos*:

> The state is the more specific object of world history in general, in which freedom attains its objectivity and enjoys the fruits of this objectivity. For the law is the objectivity of the spirit, and the will in its true expression; and only that will which obeys the law is free: for it obeys itself and is self-sufficient and therefore free. When the state or fatherland constitutes a community of existence, and when the subjective will of men subordinates itself to laws, the opposition between freedom and necessity disappears. (ibid., 97)

According to Hegel, all societies are working out this underlying logic of realizing freedom through the institutionalization of the state. "World history," he writes, unfolds in a variety of "determinate forms"—different "nations," "civilizations," or "worlds"—which can be interpreted in terms of different levels of self-conscious recognition of the meaning of social life as self-determination (ibid., 51–4). Hegel speaks of four "worlds" in his *Lectures*: "Oriental", "Greek", "Roman" and "Germanic".[17] Though tenuously linked to specific geographical areas and historical eras, they are better described as "world-outlooks" that stand in a formal relation to one another (Rauch 1988, ix). Thus, Hegel writes that while there may be a *coexistence* of different "determinate forms," each *represents* a "particular stage of development, so that they correspond to epochs in the history of the world" (Hegel 1975, 64). This makes it possible for Hegel to delineate a temporal hierarchy in which particular nations or geographical regions become identified with particular stages of historical development. At any given time, there will be a culture or civilization that is most "advanced":

> The aim of the world spirit in world history is to realize its essence and to obtain the prerogative of freedom . . . but it accomplishes this in gradual stages rather than at a single step . . . Each new individual national spirit represents a new stage in the conquering march of the world spirit as it wins its way to consciousness and freedom . . . the world spirit progresses from lower determinations to higher determinations and concepts of its own nature, to more fully developed expressions of its Idea. (ibid., 63)

For Hegel, "world history" must therefore be treated as a unity, even though different societies and cultures do not work out and

"actualize" the underlying logic of self-conscious self-determination at the same time or at the same rate. While a merely empirical study might suggest there is simply a plurality of human societies, cultures, and histories, for Hegel, the "philosophical" perspective enables us to subsume this plurality under a higher principle of unity or totality.[18] "The principles of the national spirits in their necessary progression," he writes, "are themselves only moments of the one universal spirit, which ascends through them in the course of history to its consummation in an all-embracing *totality*" (ibid., 65). Moreover, though empirical studies may indicate that historical events arise and relate to one another in an arbitrary and haphazard way, the "philosophical" perspective reveals a rationally determinable pattern, principle, and purpose within history. This perspective, Hegel argues, permits us to see beyond not only the apparent arbitrariness of historical happenings, but also beyond historical injustices and atrocities, via the process of "intellectual reconciliation." The "only thought which philosophy brings with it," he claims, "is the simple idea of reason – the idea that reason governs the world, and that world history is therefore a rational process" (ibid., 27). Accordingly, philosophy "transfigures reality with all its apparent injustices and reconciles it with the rational" (ibid., 67).

Within contemporary historiography, it is very rare to find an advocate of the speculative approach.[19] In the first instance, any philosophical account that postulates an overall historical "direction" is easily discredited when faced with historical actualities. Hegel's claim that reason and freedom are gradually becoming "realized" in social life and institutions, for example, is difficult to defend in light of empirical evidence to the contrary. Moreover, Hegel's insistence that "reason governs the world" is extremely problematic in light of the injustices and atrocities that have continued to occur throughout the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries (Adorno 1973, 306; Arendt 2006, 86–8; Ricoeur 1988, 205).[20] Speculative philosophies of history such as Hegel's, or at least the version he presents in the *Lectures*, have therefore been largely abandoned: first, on epistemological grounds, as we admit the impossibility of grasping human history as a whole and determining an overall pattern; and second, on ethicopolitical grounds, as we oppose reconciliatory attempts to rationalize historical injustices and atrocities.

This second point relates strongly to postcolonial theories that link speculative Enlightenment philosophies of history with colonial logics and practices.[21] The rationalization of colonialism in terms of bringing "civilization" to peoples who are "behind" is

clearly connected with the idea of a unified teleology, which makes it possible to devise a temporal hierarchy for coexisting geographical regions. Indeed, while this logic is arguably made most explicit within European Enlightenment philosophies of history like Hegel's, Latin American theorists, such as Enrique Dussel, have traced the emergence of colonial temporalities back to the late fifteenth century, over three centuries before Hegel presented his *Lectures* at the University of Berlin. The Eurocentric perspective on modernity, Dussel argues, presumes that modern forms of subjectivity and historical consciousness originated exclusively in Europe, and pays singular attention to the so-called Italian Renaissance, Protestant Reformation, German Enlightenment, and French Revolution (Dussel 1995, 10).[22] But in Dussel's account, the "birthdate" for modernity was in fact 1492: Europe's "discovery" of America and "confrontation with the Other" (ibid., 12). When this earlier period becomes our focus, he argues, we see that modernity has arisen out of conquest and colonization, when Europe began to "organize the world system" and install itself as the "managerial" center and "reflexive consciousness of world history." As a result, non-European cultures that have been equally constitutive of modernity became relegated to the "periphery" or "underside," or in temporal terms, to the permanently "behind" (ibid., 9–11; see also Dussel 1996, 2011; Alcoff and Mendieta 2000).[23] Dussel, therefore, not only challenges the idea that modernity is an endogenously European phenomenon; he also demonstrates the firm alliance between colonial domination and the speculative attempt to devise a "world history" under the sign of "progress."

Feminist theorists have also been instrumental in challenging ideas of teleological progress and "world history." With the exception of those, such as Shulamith Firestone, who offer "grand narratives" of the history of patriarchy,[24] feminists have frequently argued that diverse histories cannot be subsumed under universalizing categories and temporal schemas. The approach of "gendering" history, for example, is premised upon the principle that differently positioned subjects experience and make sense of historical shifts and events in different ways (see, e.g., Kelly 1984; Lerner 1979; Newton 1989; Scott 1986). From this perspective, "individual groups have their own distinct histories, rhythms and temporalities quite apart from traditional forms of periodization" (Felski 2000, 3). Nonetheless, when it comes to narrating histories of feminism *itself*, feminists have often imported those very historical models and temporal logics that they have so vehemently criticized.[25] The "great hegemonic model" of feminism as a series of successive "phases" or "waves" maps out a "graduated

progression" of feminist thought, and presents an integrated account of "feminist history" *as a whole*. In this sense, the legacy of speculative philosophies of history is more entrenched within feminist theory than may be immediately apparent.

The Hegemonic Model of Feminist History

The idea of different "phases" of feminism is perhaps most famously articulated by Kristeva in "Women's Time," first published in French in 1979, and in English in 1981.[26] In this essay, Kristeva outlines three key historical phases through which feminism has passed, each characterized by a distinct attitude toward time and history and a distinct way of positioning itself within space.[27] The first phase or "attitude," she writes, embraced an "egalitarian" ethos, and a commitment to a progressive concept of historical time. Included in this phase are not only feminists of a liberal persuasion but also Marxist/socialist feminists. In contrast, Kristeva proposes, the second phase of feminism has been guided by "Freudianism" and relinquished the earlier generation's aspiration to progressive incorporation into the social contract. This more radical generation, she writes, has engaged in an "almost total refusal" of linear temporality, and an "exacerbated distrust of the entire political dimension" (Kristeva 1986c, 194). Accordingly, in Kristeva's depiction, the feminist struggle in its second phase becomes a separatist struggle with difference and specificity:

> By demanding recognition of an irreducible identity, without equal in the opposite sex . . . this feminism situates itself outside the linear time of identities which communicate through projection and revindication. Such a feminism rejoins, on the one hand, the archaic (mythical) memory and, on the other, the cyclical or monumental temporality of marginal movements. (ibid.)

Kristeva views the second phase as an improvement on the first phase, due to its more thoroughgoing investigation into the relationship of the subject to power, language, and meaning (ibid., 196–8). However, while feminism has "at least had the merit of showing what is . . . deadly in the social contract," she claims, it has in fact reverted to another means of regulating difference and fabricated a "scapegoat victim" (ibid., 209–10). This is the inevitable result of invoking a universal subject "Woman" and "mak[ing] of the second sex a *countersociety*" (ibid., 202). As a way out of this "inverted sexism," Kristeva

points to a new phase of (post)feminism[28] that is emerging in Europe. She characterizes this as an "avant-garde" form of consciousness and practice, that can "break free of [the] belief in Woman, Her power, Her writing," and "bring out the singularities of each woman, and beyond this, her multiplicities, her plural languages" (ibid., 208).

In fact, Kristeva's historical narrative of feminism functions in "Women's Time" as a way of framing her main discussion, which concerns the possibility of transforming the symbolic order from a productive to a reproductive economy. Indeed, Judith Roof suggests that the gesture of locating a history of feminism in the essay is a "false counter" or "decoy" to her other, more "monumental argument" (Roof 1997, 81). Further, while presenting a highly schematic account of feminism's history, Kristeva's intention is actually to propose a more complex understanding of historical time, characterized by a multiplicity of temporalities (Jardine 1981). For her, it is the "third attitude" of avant-garde (post)feminism that holds the key to this novel understanding. She claims that the third attitude does not exclude the previous two attitudes, but rather makes possible "the *parallel* existence of all three 'phases' of feminism within the same historical time" (Kristeva 1986c, 209). In other words, the previous two attitudes—"insertion into history and the radical refusal of the subjective limitations imposed by this history's time"—can be mixed or held together in the third attitude (ibid.). She also suggests an interesting way of rethinking the term "generation" in the essay, arguing it can imply "less a chronology and more a mental or 'signifying space'" (ibid.).

However, despite the promise of a new understanding of historical time, Kristeva does not develop these ideas in much depth or detail. Moreover, by reserving temporal complexity for the "third phase" alone, the essay cannot accommodate the different temporalities and positions that have coexisted *throughout* feminist pasts and presents. It therefore effectively blocks the thought of a more complex kind of historical time, where temporal plurality is conceived in terms of "slicing across time instead of being enclosed within a particular period or epoch" (Felski 2000, 3). Kristeva's enticing conception of "generation" as a "signifying space" is similarly undermined by her presentation of the three "generations" of feminism in terms of a linear generational succession, even as she purports to dislodge "generations" from chronology. Consequently, while Kristeva's essay opens up the problematic of time and temporality as a crucial site for feminist exploration, and also the possibility of a different understanding of historical time, it also ultimately repeats and reinforces the linear

model of history that she wishes to refuse (Osborne 1995; Roof 1997).

Since the publication of "Women's Time," the idea of "phases" of feminism has become deeply ingrained within Western feminist theory, across its various institutional contexts and theoretical strands.[29] This is not only due to Kristeva's influence, but also the influence of several classificatory typologies constructed by prominent feminist theorists in Europe and the United States in the 1980s, as Chela Sandoval demonstrates in her survey of "hegemonic feminism" (Sandoval 2000).[30] The typologies and narratives examined by Sandoval often differ quite markedly from one another in terms of their specific content, and in terms of their author's own theoretical position. Yet, there are similarities in terms of *general* content, and also in terms of historiographical *form*. Thus, as Sandoval puts it, "manifestly different types of hegemonic feminist theory and practice are, in fact, unified at a deeper level into a great structure" (ibid.).

A brief comparison between Kristeva's account in 'Women's Time' and the typology formulated by Alison Jaggar in *Feminist Politics and Human Nature* (1983) can demonstrate this effectively. The different phases of feminism that each author identifies in their respective texts do not exactly map on to one another. For example, Kristeva puts liberal, Marxist, and socialist feminisms together within one phase of "egalitarian" feminism, whereas Jaggar separates out liberalism and Marxism into two distinct types, and she also distinguishes between Marxist and socialist feminism, presenting socialist feminism as a synthesis of radical feminism and Marxism (Jaggar 1983, 123). Thus, Kristeva identifies three phases: (1) egalitarian, (2) radical, and (3) avant-garde, while Jaggar's account identifies four: (1) liberal, (2) Marxist, (3) radical, and (4) socialist. Moreover, the two authors offer different diagnoses of the feminist present and future. Kristeva, as we have seen, characterizes the (post)feminist present in terms of a nascent avant-garde attitude that can "bring out the singularities of each woman." In contrast, Jaggar identifies the feminist present with an emerging form of socialist feminism that can register the significance of class and race-based differences, while continuing to challenge the inequitable socioeconomic structures of capitalist patriarchy. In this way, she hopes, it will "synthesize the best insights of radical feminism and of the Marxist tradition and . . . simultaneously will escape the problems associated with each" (Jaggar 1983, 123).

Despite the divergences between Kristeva's and Jaggar's respective accounts, however, both authors recount a similar general storyline, portraying feminist thought as a singular journey that begins with a

universalistic egalitarianism; moves on to challenge the terms of the social contract and explore a specially female worldview; and finally, registers the significance of the differences *between* women. Moreover, there is a similarity of form, as both authors construct a linear narrative of progress that culminates in the author's own theoretical position in the present. Kristeva depicts her preferred avant-garde (post)feminism as an "emerging" phase of feminism that is eclipsing the earlier forms; similarly, Jaggar portrays her preferred socialist feminism as a "developing" theory that has grown out of Marxist and radical feminisms and is moving beyond them. In both cases, the theoretical position to which the author aligns herself is accorded superiority through being designated as present or emergent, surpassing all the other phases that feminist theory has passed through to arrive at this moment of theoretical sophistication and promise for the future.

Admittedly, the comparison above extracts Kristeva and Jaggar's typologies of feminism from the context of their broader bodies of work, which potentially does both theorists an injustice. Kristeva has been highly influential in developing nonlinear understandings of temporality through her notion of the "subject-in-process," and also her discussions of maternal temporality (1986b; 2002). And elsewhere, Jaggar has been careful to register and think through the ambiguities and tensions within feminist theory, for example in *Living with Contradictions* (1994). Nevertheless, the comparison of Kristeva's and Jaggar's respective typologies in 'Women's Time' and *Feminist Politics and Human Nature* is instructive, because it shows how different feminist theorists have relied upon a common historiographical structure when they construct a narrative of feminist history, even when they do not share a common theoretical perspective.

Clare Hemmings' more recent research study into "feminist storytelling" in the 1990s and 2000s further attests to the ubiquity of this historiographical structure (Hemmings 2005; 2011).[31] She argues that since the late 1990s narratives of feminist history have become crystallized around decade-specific periodizations—the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s—and more concentrated around questions of racial and cultural difference. In the accounts that Hemmings surveys, "1970s feminism" is consistently associated with universalizing and essentialist perspectives, and represented as largely white and middle class. The 1980s is associated with "challenges" to those perspectives by black and US third world feminists, and characterized as the era of "identity politics." Finally, the 1990s is associated with the rise of a more "sophisticated" form of feminist theory, most notably post-structuralism, and an embrace of difference and diversity. Once

again, we find a common storyline that moves from "sameness to difference," and is organized around a series of phases that overcome one another in steady succession.

Hemmings claims that this storyline is generally told from three different vantage points in the present. The first views the rise of post-structuralism as a positive phenomenon, and thus tells the story as a "progress narrative"; the second views the rise of post-structuralism as a sign of feminism's depoliticization and institutionalization, and hence tells the story as a "lament" or "loss narrative." The third vantage point tells the story as a "return narrative" that uses similar markers and rehearses similar shifts, but adds on an "emerging" phase of "new materialism." This is presented as a synthesis of the "earlier" focus on the material and the "later" focus on the cultural and the linguistic, within a "*new* materialism" that can take us forward into the future (2011, 97).[32] Indeed, one of Hemmings' most interesting observations is that while protagonists of new materialism often propose "a nonlinear methodology that transforms the past rather than relinquishing or returning to it," this proclaimed epistemological openness is often undermined by the schematic structure of the narratives that repeat the same phases of the hegemonic "common sense" narratives of feminist history, only with a new phase added on (ibid., 108; see also Ahmed 2008).[33] As with Kristeva's 'Women's Time,' a more complex understanding of historical time and the time of feminism is being promised; yet the narratives framing these proposals fall back on the progressive, singular model of history under disavowal.

As a final illustration, feminism's "great hegemonic model" can also be found within narratives of feminist "waves."[34] The "wave" trope is the preferred term within discussions about feminism conducted outside the academy, particularly in the media.[35] Moreover, while the narratives of "phases" examined above concentrate predominantly upon intellectual shifts in feminist thought, narratives of feminist "waves" usually take a broader view of feminism outside, as well as inside, the academy. "Wave" narratives therefore tend to focus more upon specific political goals and events as well as theoretical developments. For example, the beginning of the "first wave" in the United States is conventionally marked by the Women's Rights Convention in Seneca Falls, New York, 1848, with its "ebb" being marked by the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920 (Hewitt 2010, 3). The beginning of the "second wave" is similarly marked within wave narratives by significant political events, such as the rise of the Civil Rights movement and counter-cultural protests

in the United States and Europe, or the passing of the Equal Rights Amendment (Dicker and Piepmeier 2003, 9–10). We should also register the specific temporal implications of the trope of "waves," which connotes a surge or swell of activity followed by a decline, whereas the idea of "phases" implies a more continuous transition from one phase to another.

Yet, while there are features that render the "wave" trope distinct, wave narratives do tend to present shifts in feminist consciousness very similar in content to those presented in the phasic accounts of academic feminist theory cited above. The first wave is generally associated with an egalitarian consciousness and a reformist approach, the second wave with a consciousness of sexual difference and a revolutionary approach, and the "third wave" with a consciousness of diversity and a pluralistic approach. Further, each self-designated "wave" has tended to view themselves as "both building on *and* improving" the wave(s) that preceded them (Hewitt 2010, 2, emphasis added; see also Bailey 1997). Like the phasic narratives, then, wave narratives unify "feminist history" into the collective singular, and classify feminist thought according to a developmental taxonomy, representing higher and higher levels of historical, moral, political, and aesthetic development (Sandoval 2000, 47).

In sum, these different variations of the hegemonic model of feminist history reinscribe two of the key characteristics of Hegel's speculative philosophy of history outlined above: first, the idea of a "graduated progression," and second, the idea that diverse histories can be treated as instances of a more general pattern or unified historical trajectory. Sandoval, Hemmings, and others, have already made trenchant critiques of the hegemonic model; however, in the final part of this chapter, I want to clarify the major problems that result from its deployment, focusing on what I identify as its two core temporal logics: "teleological totalization" and "sequential negation."

Teleological Totalization

"Teleological" is a term usually associated with speculative philosophies of history that postulate an *inevitable* progression toward ever-greater freedom and enlightenment. Such teleological philosophies of history are rooted in metaphysical meta-narratives that imbue the course of history "as a whole" with meaning or purpose: in the case of Hegel, an immanent conception of "spirit" or human nature as self-conscious self-determination (Dray 1964, 62–3). Yet, "teleology" can also have a more restricted application, denoting the retrospective

designation of a particular course of events as a *developmental* trajectory, which has culminated in the present of the narrator. That is, teleological reasoning focuses on the end as a means of explaining and justifying the course of historical development (Hutchings 2008, 51). The term "totalization," similarly, need not only be used in the "grand" sense of speculatively making "history as a whole" into a "complete picture" (Dienstag 1994). Rather, the term can also be used to refer to the practice of totalizing a designated "segment" of history from a standpoint in the present (Megill 1995).[36]

To claim that the hegemonic feminist narratives are "teleological" or "totalizing" thus does not mean they adhere to anything like Hegel's "grand narrative" of "world history" as the inevitable realization of reason/freedom in history. The point, rather, is that they import teleological and totalizing *logics* into their accounts when they construct a "master narrative" and discern an overall direction within feminist history that has culminated in the present. In other words, the particular present of an author is accorded with a diagnostic privilege as they identify a singular trajectory leading from the past to the present moment: totalizing the past from the perspective of a knowing present and understanding their own approach as "last and best" (Spencer 2004, 9).[37] A major problem with the teleological approach is that it denies contingency, and blocks out alternative ways of thinking about or reading the past. It gives rise to a sense of inevitability and implacable certainty that we know what the past was all about, what it has meant, and what it has to teach us. This results in a "closedness to the past": a resistance to letting the past surprise us and interrupt our subject positions and perspectives in the present. Further, the treatment of the past as a complete story that has led up to the present can also lead to a "closedness to the future," as it encourages us to think that the identified direction will necessarily continue, and hence can prevent us from considering the future in terms of unpredictability, or a range of possibilities.

The other key problem with the logic of teleological totalization is its embroilment in universalizing and evolutionist presumptions. That is, teleological models lend themselves to universalizing evolutionism because it is presumed there is an inevitable logic being worked out in local instances. As we have seen, Hegel's hierarchical treatment of diverse cultures and societies as representative of different stages of historical development depends upon his thesis that different cultures and societies are all working out the same underlying logic of self-conscious self-determination (Hegel 1975, 51–4). In the case of feminism, the legacy of this kind of teleological thinking is

evident in the common presumption that the supposed trajectory of Western feminist theory is *the* trajectory of feminist theory, and thus, that feminisms everywhere are working out the same kinds of issues and problematics. The teleological aspect of feminism's hegemonic model thereby accedes to the temporal structure of "First in the West, and then elsewhere" that has functioned as a cornerstone of colonial philosophy and policy (Chakrabarty 2000, 8).[38]

For example, the attempt to universalize historical trajectories specific to Anglo-American and Western European feminist movements has resulted in the presumption that feminism is something that Western women "export" overseas: that the first and second waves of feminism in the West are "precursors" to feminist movements in other parts of the world (Spivak 1981, 160–1; Tripp 2006, 54). Moreover, the universalization of "time-charged terminologies" such as Kristeva's three-stage theory of feminist consciousness has led to assumptions and judgments that non-Western feminisms are "stuck," for example, in the "liberal stage" or the "nationalist stage" (Shih 2002, 98). A clear example of this kind of attitude, Shumei Shih argues, is discernible in Kristeva's text *Des Chinoises* or "About Chinese Women" (Kristeva 1986a). In this text, we find Kristeva struggling to determine the status of Chinese women according to "the usual temporal hierarchy of the West over China" (Shih 2002, 98). Chinese women had greater legal equality with Chinese men than did European women with European men in the 1950s and after. This subverts the usual temporal hierarchy in which the West is more "advanced." Yet Kristeva's attitude toward this state of affairs is highly ambivalent. The advanced legal status of Chinese women, Shih writes, is "both the site of envy and anxiety . . . For Kristeva, Chinese women were both liberated under Mao and embodiments of the silent, primordial Orient" (ibid.). While Kristeva registers Chinese women's legal equality with men, her analysis remains rooted in the temporal topographies of "French High Feminism" (Spivak 1981, 160–1). Ultimately, then, European modes of subjectivity and sociality must still be somehow "ahead."

Sequential Negation

The logic of teleological totalization frequently goes hand in hand with the logic of sequential negation when accounts of teleological progress are presented as a "*graduated* progression," where a "series of successive determinations" are organized into an ascending order as each negates and overtakes the former (Hegel 1975, 138). As we

have seen, this is one of the main organizing mechanisms of the hegemonic model of feminist history, as feminist history is consistently divided into categories like "liberalism," "Marxism," "radical feminism," and "poststructuralism," which are mapped onto a progressive chronology, and presented as different phases or stages that oppose and come one after the another.

Different feminisms do of course emerge at different times. Poststructuralist feminist theory, for example, informed by theorists such as Lacan, Kristeva, Derrida, or Spivak, has emerged at a later time than liberal feminist theory informed by thinkers such as Wollstonecraft or Mill. Yet, liberal feminism has not simply *disappeared* following the advent of post-structuralist theory; rather, it persists, and poses its own challenges to post-structuralist feminism in return. Indeed, feminist theorists often insist upon the productivity of such disagreements, debates, and arguments (Howie and Tauchert 2004; MacCormack 2009). The logic of sequential negation, however, seeks to contain and manage these disagreements through the imposition of a neat sequential order, where one phase comes after and displaces another. This implies that the discussion is closed, and moreover, that there *are* neatly bounded positions or types of feminist theory in the first place. While some feminists do indeed describe their feminism in distinctly titled terms (e.g., "Marxist," "liberal," or "post-structuralist"), other feminists have in fact often moved "between and among" different approaches and strategies, especially given feminism's interdisciplinary nature (Sandoval 2000, 57). But this kind of methodological fluidity and coexistence cannot be grasped by the logic of sequential negation, with the consequence that productive explorations of the interrelations between different approaches and histories may be precluded.

A related problem with the logic of sequential negation is the implication that perspectives and approaches derived at earlier times necessarily become redundant and "out of date." We therefore confine them to the "dustbin of history" or treat them as a "historical artefact" rather than as a project or part of a living body of work (Weeks 2011, 117). This way of treating the past is a consistent feature of modern historicism, when a given text or theoretical paradigm is treated as "not only *of* its time—developed within a particular political conjuncture and conceptual horizon—but as *only* of its time" (ibid.). In other words, the gesture of "locating" a text, idea, or practice within a historical context often comes with a presumption that this is where it should stay, that it has no relevance outside of this context: "Each contribution is fixed to a linear time by a logic . . . that marks, seals, and divides each moment" (ibid.; see also Fleissner 2002).[39]

It is certainly necessary for feminism to be attuned to changes in social, economic, and cultural conditions. Indeed, the most promising aspect of self-declared third wave feminisms, I would argue, is the level of commitment to grappling with the "specificity of our historical situation" (Heywood and Drake 1997, 4). Leslie Heywood and Jennifer Drake, for instance, are particularly keen to outline the economic determinants of third wave feminism in the United States, emphasizing that "transnational capital, downsizing, privatization, and a shift to a service economy have had a drastic impact on the world these generations have inherited" (Heywood and Drake 2004, 13). The claim here is that the "new world order" necessitates an "overhaul" of feminism, as we come to recognize that "global capitalism is overtaking many of the social structures under which second wave feminists operated" (Sidler 1997, 37–8).

Having said this, however, there is a marked tendency within third wave literature to present the theoretical outlook of the third wave as an inevitable by-product of its historical moment (Henry 2004, 35). The problem with this kind of presumption is that, in actuality, there is no easy correlation between the context, the problem, and the type of theory that is required, as third wave narratives often seem to suggest. Gillian Howie describes this kind of slippage as a confusion of the "logic of intellectual debate with the condition of the world," for example, when post-structuralism or postmodernism is mapped on to post-Fordism as the next historical stage (Howie 2010b, 5). This leads to presumptions that only postmodern theory is able to contend with the "messiness" of globalized high-capitalist conditions, when it might well be argued that postmodernism is part of the problem rather than the solution. Such slippages or presumptions are fuelled by the logic of sequential negation, which implies that only the newest forms of theory are adequate to deal with political challenges in the present.

The logic of sequential negation is particularly potent when it is deployed as a form of "temporal othering,"[40] or as Johannes Fabian terms it, "temporal distancing" (Fabian 1983, 30). This occurs when all those characteristics an author wishes to define their own position *against*—universalism, essentialism, racism, ethnocentrism, heterosexism, prudishness, humorlessness, authoritarianism—are projected *backwards in time*, most often on to second wave or "1970s feminism." As a consequence, feminist work produced during this era is frequently dismissed in a generalizing manner as "essentialist" or "universalizing," without being engaged with in any detail or depth (Hemmings 2011; Henry 2004). An example of this can be found in

Rory Dicker and Alison Piepmeier's introduction to their anthology of third wave feminist essays, where they write that "[whilst] many of the goals of the third wave are similar to those of the second wave, some, such as its insistence on women's diversity, are new" (Dicker and Piepmeier 2003, 10). The claim here that "insistence on women's diversity" is something "new," something that belongs to third wave feminism, implies that (old) second wave feminist theory did not address the issue of women's diversity, or consider it important, without offering any arguments or citational evidence for thinking that this was the case.

This is not to deny that the frequent characterization of the so-called second wave as "universalizing," "essentialist," or "racist," for example, contains many grains of truth. It is undoubtedly true that many feminist texts written by white feminists in the 1970s (and before and since) have indeed been implicitly and/or explicitly racist, or seemingly oblivious to the differences that racialization makes.[41] White women's writings and activism, moreover, have received much more attention from outside and inside feminist circles, rendering it a white-dominated or "white-washed" discourse and movement (Roth 2004, 6). Accordingly, the depiction of the second wave as "homogenous" or "racist" within third wave narratives is intended as "an acknowledgement of the dominance of white feminists, and the secondary status given to black feminists or feminists of color during the last forty years of feminist theory and movement" (Henry 2004, 33).[42]

The temporal logic of the gesture, however, often backfires, because when second wave feminism is consistently represented as white and middle class, the presence of nonwhite, non-middle class women in 1970s feminism *remains erased*. As Lisa Marie Hogeland writes, "it's become a truism that the second wave was racist . . . no matter that such a blanket argument writes out of our history the enormous contributions of women of color in the 1970s" (Hogeland 2001, 110; see also Henry 2004, 33). A similar effect is produced by narratives that present the work of feminists of color as "critiques" of second wave feminism.[43] For example, feminists such as Gloria Anzaldúa or Audre Lordes are the contemporaries of many white feminists who are associated with the second wave; yet their work is consistently positioned as a *response* to the second wave and thus as inaugurating a "new era" of inclusive third wave feminism (Fernandes 2010). Although the intention here is to cultivate a more diverse kind of feminism, the organization of the narrative into sequential phases means that "the differences represented by . . . women of

color only become visible in the last phase" (Sandoval 2000, 50). [44] Consequently, as Rita Felski argues, "difference loses much of its power by being seen in epochal terms . . . [it] is recognized only in the context of the present and subsumed within a familiar story of evolution from sameness to difference, from the one to the many" (Felski 2000, 2–3; see also Davis 1995, 282).

Conclusion

The aim of this introductory chapter has been to demonstrate why feminism needs alternative concepts of historical time, and to begin to situate feminist historiography within the broader context of the philosophy of history. To this end, I have considered the influence of speculative philosophies of "world history" upon the ways in which feminists have narrated and conceptualized the history of feminism. Though it may seem like something of a leap to move from Hegel's nineteenth-century *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* to twenty-first-century narratives of third wave feminism, I have argued that the motifs of graduated progression and teleology that are expounded so clearly in Hegel's lectures can also be found in narratives of feminist "waves" and "phases." As such, the legacy of speculative philosophies of history survives within feminist historiography in the form of temporal logics, which have a powerful effect on the way that we relate to feminisms of different times and places.

The question, then, is how we might unsettle and dislodge these temporal logics and the concepts of historical time that sustain them. As Wendy Brown observes, "whilst many have lost confidence in a historiography bound to a notion of progress . . . we have coined no political substitute for progressive understandings of where we have come from and where we are going" (2001, 3). For some, the answer is to refuse the idea of historical time altogether, arguing that it is irredeemably entangled with ideas of teleological progress and totality (see, e.g., Ermath 1992). This kind of antipathy toward the concept of historical time is discernible, for example, within various feminist writings on "women's time," where historical time is consistently characterized as a patriarchal, "phallocentrically structured, forward moving time" (Forman and Sowton 1989, xii; see also Kristeva 1986c; Showalter 1985a). Undoubtedly, the concept of "women's time" has opened up many fruitful enquiries into women's temporal perspectives and experiences, which have importantly challenged androcentric and patriarchal accounts of time-consciousness and temporal existence. Yet, to position "women's time" *against* "historical time"

is to overlook the important ways in which the idea of historical time has shaped, and continues to shape, women's lives and feminist politics (Felski 2000, 3; Watts 1988, 14).[45]

A different strategy is to call for a reconceptualization of historical time, rather than for its abandonment. It is certainly true that ideas about historical time have been dominated by teleological, totalizing models; however, the concept of historical time is not simply *reducible* to grand notions of teleological progress and totality. It has a much wider reach and range of meanings, as well as having value as a "large-scale" time that enables the sharing of multiple pasts, presents, and futures. This point has been well made by Felski, who argues forcefully against any reductive or generalizing claims about the modern understanding and sense of "history" or "historical time," and proposes that neither concept can be easily "banished from our repertoires of useful tools to think with" (ibid., 13). Following in this spirit, the rest of the book will take a reconstructive approach that seeks to articulate a multidirectional, multilinear model of historical time as a basis for thinking and constructing feminist histories differently.

CHAPTER 1

Lived Time and Polytemporality

Feminist movements and trajectories have always been manifold and diverse, with crossovers and points of connection as well as divergences and points of contention. "Feminism is not," as Misha Kavka writes, "the object of a singular history, but rather a term under which people have in different times and places invested in a more general struggle for social justice and in doing so have participated in and produced multiple histories" (Kavka 2001, xii). It has become common, however, to narrate "feminist history" as a singular, progressive trajectory that is divided into "waves" or "phases." Consequently, the "potentially enlightening and liberating spaces" produced by various feminisms have morphed into a "great hegemonic model," which systematically misrepresents and curtails the ways in which feminist thought and activisms can be related, conceptualized, and mobilized (Sandoval 2000, 47).

In response to this historiographical malaise, several feminists have called for alternative models of historical time, to inform a more productive approach to feminist histories and historiography. For example, Fernandes (2010) and Roof (1997) propose the following:

> Feminist thought . . . requires a conception of history that can contain both the insights of the past and the potential breakthroughs of the future within the messy, unresolved contestations of political and intellectual practice in the present. (Fernandes 2010, 114)
>
> Can we conceive of time as multidirectional as well as linear? Can we conceive of cause and effect going both ways? (Roof 1997, 86)

While such multidirectional or multilinear models of historical time have been proposed, however, they are in need of elaboration and conceptual content. I suggest this is because the concept of historical time remains rather intangible and under-articulated, both within feminist historiography and within historiography and

the philosophy of history more broadly speaking. There are very few philosophical essays or monographs that consider, for example, the extent to which determinations of historical time are bound by metaphysical, physical, or phenomenological models of time, or what kind of "reality" historical time has (see, e.g., Ricoeur 1984, 1985, 1988; or Osborne 1995). This can make it difficult to understand what it might actually mean to say that historical time "moves in more than one direction," or that there are "different times at the same time." Indeed, without conceptual elaboration, the danger is that such ideas can easily be dismissed as fanciful or incoherent, and business continues as usual (Felski 2000, 2).

The task of this chapter, therefore, is to outline my basic understanding of historical time, which will then be articulated in greater detail in the following chapters in relation to feminist historiography. The key aim is to advance a *polytemporal* conception of historical time, as a time that is generated through the intersection of various times and temporalities. To this end, I draw primarily upon the work of Dipesh Chakrabarty and Johannes Fabian, theorizing the interrelation of multiple times via the idea of "complex coevalness." The chapter also considers the question of totality, challenging arguments made by Paul Ricoeur and Fredric Jameson that historiography requires a concept of historico-temporal totality as a "regulative idea" or "figurative device" guiding historical thought and practice. First, however, I set out my fundamental claim that historical time should be approached and theorized as a form of *lived time*. Framing historical time as a lived time guards against the reduction of historical time to the realm of pure textuality or imagination (it is "real" in its effects and manifestation in social practices); yet nevertheless affirms the importance of discursive mediation, and maintains the theoretical distinction between historical time and scientific, metaphysical, or transcendental concepts of time.

Lived Time

Within philosophical accounts of time, the concept of lived time foregrounds the experiential, relational, and discursive aspects of temporal existence, as opposed to scientific and metaphysical approaches that are interested in time as an objective condition or phenomenon of the universe. Scientific approaches do of course differ from metaphysical approaches. While scientific approaches use empirical data or mathematics to develop physical, biological, or astronomical theories of time, metaphysical approaches use speculative reason, often

postulating that there is a gap between our empirical and cognitive grasp of the world and the world as it is "in itself." That said, there is often a certain amount of mutual "borrowing," given that both scientists and metaphysicians share an interest in the objective realities of time, regardless of how time might be perceived or conceived in a sociological or subjective sense (Dainton 2001).[1] The notion of lived time, in contrast, pertains to the way that different individuals and societies think, feel, behave, and relate to one another according to their experiences of, and ideas about, time.

Analyses of lived time in philosophy have been greatly influenced by Kant's "Copernican turn," which shifts away from a treatment of time as a mind-independent condition of the world, toward a treatment of time (and space) as a function of our minds and a framework through which we structure experience. This is the "first step" away from a physics and a metaphysics of time, toward a philosophy of lived time or temporality (Couzens Hoy 2009, 7). Yet in fact, Kant's transcendental idealist account does not itself offer a philosophy of lived time because, for Kant, time is not something that is known or experienced. Instead, he proposes that time is a *transcendental condition* of knowledge and experience. "Time is not an empirical concept that has been derived from any experience," he writes in his "Transcendental Aesthetic," nor is it a "discursive concept" (Kant 2007, 74–5, A30/B46). Rather, time is an a priori form or "intuition" that is imposed on to the "manifold of sense experience" via three distinct modes: persistence or duration, simultaneity, and succession (ibid., 74–8, A31/B47).[2] He also characterizes time as the "form of inner sense," which conditions the "intuition of ourselves and of our inner state," and ultimately depends upon the "transcendental unity of apperception" (ibid., 77). As such, in Kant's account, time itself is not something that is lived; it is a transcendental *condition* of sensible and intellectual life.

The following chapters thus do not treat historical time in terms of time as an objective condition "out there," nor as a transcendental condition of subjective experience. As an investigation into lived time, my approach can be considered essentially phenomenological in the broadest sense that phenomenology is concerned with the perception and experience of time. The classical phenomenological method seeks to bracket what Husserl refers to as the "natural attitude": an attitude that takes for granted metaphysical or scientific theories of time,[3] and assumes an "unreflective belief that the world exists in a realm apart from consciousness, as an unproblematic objective reality" (Guenther 2013, 25). For phenomenologists, consciousness is not a "blank slate

upon which external objects impose themselves" (ibid.); rather, consciousness is intentional, and co-related to the world. Bracketing the "natural attitude" means, therefore, that we attend to "the *way* in which [objects of experience] are given to consciousness and the way that consciousness orients itself toward these objects" (ibid., 26). In the case of time, this means examining the structures of consciousness that enable us to experience "temporal objects" *as temporal*: as having a duration, and as being "now," "no longer," and "not yet." Indeed, Husserl claims that time-consciousness is the most important of all phenomenological problems, because all experience for intentional consciousness has a temporal character (Husserl 1964).[4]

In his lectures on *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness* (1964), Husserl proposes that the structures of time consciousness are essentially "retentional" and "protentional." Conscious temporal experience is constituted through retentions of the "just passed"—the "comet's tail" of what has been perceived—and *protentions*, or immediate anticipations of what *will* be perceived (Husserl 1964, 44–57). Unlike secondary "recollections" and "expectations" that come and go, and require an active awareness, retention and protention are passive, immediate phenomena that belong to all experience (ibid., 68–71). Husserl describes the retentional-protentional process as a "sinking," "shading," or "running-off phenomenon . . . a continuity of constant transformations . . . not severable into parts which could be by themselves nor divisible into phases, points of the continuity" (ibid., 48).[5] The example Husserl gives is of hearing a melody. When hearing a melody, consciousness is not simply perceiving or "intending" the single tone given at that moment of listening. Indeed, experience of a melody would be impossible if consciousness were only ever conscious of a discrete now-point. Rather, consciousness retains the tonal phase that has just passed and protends or anticipates the imminent phase, such that the melody can be experienced as an unfolding unity, rather than as a simple succession or series of tones, one after the other (ibid., 43).

The crucial insight to be gained from classical Husserlian phenomenology is that "present," "past," and "future" are not successive, isolated moments or "parts of time," but rather interrelated modes by which things appear as temporal (Kelly 2005). The way that time is lived does not conform to a simple, sequential temporal order; rather, temporal experience is always a complex blend of presence and absence, retention and protention, recollection and expectation. This basic phenomenological framework offers a useful entry into thinking about time as nonlinear. If we want to derive a concept of

historical time as a lived time, however (as I argue in chapter 3), we need to extend the notion of lived time beyond the subject-centered frame of reference. Historical time is a "large-scale" time that transcends the limits of our personal experience or existence, and enables us to communicate, link, and organize multiple pasts, presents, and futures (Felski 2000, 18). As Paul Ricoeur contends, historical time is a mediated and a mediating time, which bridges or connects the time of the subject and the time of the public, or the time of the world (Ricoeur 1984). A theory of historical time thus needs to give due weight to the constitutive importance of intersubjective relations and encounters, and moreover, to sociocultural norms, institutions, and practices.

Accordingly, I suggest a preliminary definition of historical time as a socially and culturally mediated form of "large-scale" time that is lived and generated through intersubjective temporalizations of history. "Temporalization," as Johannes Fabian explains, is "a complex praxis of encoding Time" with various dimensions including the linguistic, the interpretative, and the performative (Fabian 1983, 74). By "temporalizations of history," therefore, I mean the collective practice of endowing "history" or historical trajectories with a particular temporal structure, and relating pasts, presents, and futures in socially and politically significant ways (Koselleck 2004; Osborne 1995, 200; Ricoeur 1988, 104). I am particularly interested in Fabian's definition of temporalization as a complex "*praxis*" of encoding time as it implies that historical time is something that is put into practice, or operationalized. Approaching historical time in this way enables us to engage in what Peter Osborne calls a "politics of time": examining competing articulations of historical time and the "struggles over the experience of time," which are central to all politics (Osborne 1995, 200):

> How do the practices in which we engage structure and produce, enable and distort, different senses of time and possibility? What kinds of experience of history do they make possible or impede? Whose futures do they ensure? These are the questions to which a politics of time would attend, interrogating temporal structures about the possibilities they encode or foreclose, in specific temporal modes. (ibid.)

It should be acknowledged that by treating historical time as a lived, mediated, operationalized time, my approach diverges from the "new materialist" feminist philosophers who have turned to scientific theories to rethink time and history. Elizabeth Grosz's recent work has been particularly influential, such as *The Nick of Time* (2004), or

Time Travels (2005), where she claims that feminism has left behind notions of nature and matter by focusing too exclusively upon epistemological questions and the historical effects of sexual difference.[6] To rectify this occlusion, she suggests that the Darwinian model of evolution can provide a promising model of history and time, which "offers a subtle and complex critique of both essentialism and teleology," through a "complex account of the movements of difference, bifurcation, and becoming that characterize all forms of life" (Grosz 2005, 17).[7] Manuel De Landa's *A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History* (1997) is another influential materialist study that draws on scientific theory, examining the movements of matter and energy through human populations in the last millennium as a way of countering presumptions of linear progress and teleology.[8]

The forces and rhythms tracked by the natural sciences do inevitably affect historical time: the "arrow" of time,[9] the "deep time" of geology,[10] and the biological time of reproduction, birth, ageing, and death. Indeed, Grosz's argument is that these forces and times are the very *conditions* of culture and history (Grosz 1999, 31–2), something that seems to be entirely disavowed by the conception of history as an arena of texts, archives, discourses, and ideologies, and also by the phenomenological attempt to bracket the "natural attitude." On the other hand, however, historical time is a concept that is distinct from scientific concepts of "time," "evolution," and "change," and the times and temporalities studied by natural scientists cannot be transformed unmediated into a concept of historical time (Koselleck 2004, 95–6).[11] Historical time is intertwined with biological, geological, and astronomical times and temporalities, but it is also determined through sociocultural systems of representation and schemas of shared experience (Chakrabarty 2000, 74). [12]

Accordingly, while the insights brought to historiography by "new materialist" thinkers are vital and illuminating, my own interest is in the sociopolitical work and effects of temporalization, and so I draw upon philosophies and theories of lived time, rather than the natural sciences. This approach enables us to retain a critical view, and investigate why we conceive of historical time as we do and, moreover, the experiential and political implications. To claim that historical time is a mediated or operationalized form of time does not mean that historical time is not "real," or that historiographical enquiry must retreat from all questions of ontology. Rather, from a non- or "postpositivist" perspective,[13] the reality of an abstract idea or concept such as "historical time" exists in its effects: its manifestation in social practices, relations, and structures, and its role within

conceptual schemas that give both content and form to social and individual experience.[14]

Further, insofar as we consider historical time to be a form of lived time, it cannot be dismissed as a straightforwardly "linear" time. Within modern historicism, historical time has consistently been presupposed as a homogenous or "empty" series of "now-points" as both Martin Heidegger and Walter Benjamin have so forcefully argued (Benjamin 2007; Heidegger 2009). Yet, if we rethink historical time as a form of lived time, we can move beyond the reductive historicist conception. The fundamental idea emerging from studies and accounts of lived time is that lived time is qualitatively different from serial, chronological temporality. Our experience is "directed towards, and itself assumes, temporally extended forms in which future, present and past mutually determine one another" (Carr 1986, 31). This means that the experiential schema of past, present, and future is never reducible to a serial succession of discrete instants or now-points (Husserl 1964, 48).[15] Within lived time, there is no neat division between past, present, and future, and no compulsory or rudimentary chronological temporality. Rather, "it is because we live in time-knots that we can undertake the exercise of straightening out, as it were, some part of the knot (which is how we might think of chronology)" (Chakrabarty 2000, 112). And these "time-knots" become even more complex when we move beyond the subject-centered frame of classical phenomenology, and begin to think in terms of multiple temporalities and temporal orders or, in other words, in terms of *polytemporality.* [16]

Polytemporality

The polytemporal conception of historical time that I am advocating rests upon the basic claim that historical time is "composite" and internally complex. It is produced through the intersection of different temporal layers and strands that combine in distinct ways to produce particular experiences and discursive formations of historical time. The idea that historical time consists of multiple temporalities and forms of time emerges in several historiographical studies. Dipesh Chakrabarty, for example, insists that historical time is "out of joint with itself"; hence, "the writing of history must always presume a plurality of times coexisting together"[17] (Chakrabarty 2000, 109; 16). Reinhardt Koselleck similarly claims that we ought not to speak of one historical time, but rather "of many forms of time superimposed one upon the other" (2004, 2). For Rita Felski, "history is not one

broad river, but a number of distinct and separate streams, each moving at its own pace and tempo" (Felski 2000, 3); and Paul Ricoeur's *Time and Narrative* unfolds various layers of historical time (1984; 1985; 1988).

But the question arises: how should we theorize the interrelation of these multiple times and temporalities? On the one hand, those such as Ricoeur argue that although there are various dimensions and configurations of historical time, we nevertheless require an idea of historico-temporal totality or "oneness" (Ricoeur 1988, 249–61). That is, there may be different experiences, articulations, and configurations, but ultimately, there is only one history and one time. On the other hand, those such as Chakrabarty contend that we must "*stay with*" multiple temporalities, and reject the framework of temporal totality or "oneness" as a means of theorizing temporal interrelations (Chakrabarty 2000, 107). From this perspective, there is no need to accept metaphysical or transcendental arguments about the oneness of time, nor arguments that we must "project a totality" for methodological or pragmatic reasons (Jameson 1988, 40). Rather, if historical time is a form of lived time, historical temporalities will necessarily be diverse and disjunctive, and to take this diversity seriously, we need to think in terms of specificity and relationality instead of a higher totality. Following this line of argument, I will propose the idea of "complex coevalness" as a way of making sense of "different times at the same time" without recourse to the concept of totality or oneness. The move away from totality, however, cannot be undertaken lightly. I will therefore set out some of the arguments below in greater detail.

The Question of Totality

It is rare, as the introductory chapter has pointed out, to find a speculative theory of "history as a whole" within a post-Hegelian philosophical context. Hegel's teleological account of an underlying rationality to "world history" is easily discredited on ethical grounds when faced with the actualities of historical atrocities and injustices. Moreover, the speculative attempt to decipher the "supreme plot" of "History" and determine "the basis upon which the history of the world may be thought as a completed whole," has been abandoned on epistemological grounds, as we admit the partiality and "finitude of interpretation" (Ricoeur 1988, 206). We must therefore, as Ricoeur puts it, "renounce" the possibility of a "total mediation," and accept that the temporal mediations performed by historical practice and

consciousness are open and imperfect (ibid., 261). However, it is with a heavy heart that Ricoeur renounces Hegel. "For what readers of Hegel," he asks, "once they have been seduced by the power of Hegel's thought as I have, do not feel the abandoning of his philosophy as a wound?" (ibid., 206). Moreover, while he accepts that the *speculative* totalization of historical time at the level of "world history" is no longer a viable option, Ricoeur nevertheless insists that the *idea* of a total historical time must not die along with Hegel's philosophy of history. This idea cannot be abandoned, he argues, precisely because of the question of time. Historical thinking must face up to the "unavoidable" notion of time conceived as a totality, a collective singular. After all, he says, "we always speak of 'time'" (ibid., 250).

Ricoeur's influence here is Kant, for whom the oneness of time is an a priori "intuition" that cannot be threatened by the plurality of determinations of time at the level of experience (Kant 2007, 185–6, A145/B184). As Kant writes in his "Transcendental Aesthetic," "different times are but parts of one and the same time" (ibid., 75, A31/B47). And again: "the infinitude of time signifies nothing more than that every determinate magnitude of time is possible only through the limitations of one single time that underlies it" (ibid., A32/B48). It is therefore, Ricoeur confirms, "as *a priori* that the intuition of time is posited as the intuition of one unique time" (Ricoeur 1988, 251). Accordingly, while the discussions in *Time and Narrative* do articulate multiple temporal layers and mediations, Ricoeur's final question in the conclusion is how historiography can "respond" to this "transcendental axiom" of Kant's. What corresponds on the side of historical consciousness, he asks, to the Kantian axiom that "different times are just parts of the same time"? (Ricoeur 1988, 257). Can historical thinking provide a response to this "unavoidable intuition" of the totality of time, even while we appreciate the many different ways of configuring and conceiving historical time?

It is in light of this question that Ricoeur recognizes the limitations of his central thesis in *Time and Narrative*, which is that the "poetics of narrative" provide a response to the "philosophical aporias" of time. His argument thus far has been that "imperfect" narrative mediations and inscriptions offer a way of negotiating or resolving the aporetic "time of the philosophers," which is essentially split between the "time of the subject" and the universal "time of the world." Philosophy, he argues, consistently fails to bridge the irreducible gap between the time of the subject and the time of the world, and thus to provide a theoretically unified account of time. But narrative configurations offer a way of bridging this "aporia of the dual

perspective," albeit in localized and imperfect ways. In his conclusion, however, Ricoeur concedes that while narrative may provide a way of temporarily overcoming the aporia of the dual or split perspective, when it comes to the aporia of temporal *totality*, narrative in fact cannot constitute an adequate "reply." This is because "the notion of plot gives preference to the plural at the expense of the collective singular in the refiguration of time" (ibid., 259). To conceive of a plot or a narrative is to conceive of a unique author with a unique perspective, which could never encompass all possible experiences, interpretations, and scenarios. Hence the notion of plot ultimately leads us toward many different narratives and temporalities, rather than one single time.[18]

Ricoeur, however, is dissatisfied with the possibility that his articulation of historical time is "a mere multiplication of mediations between time and narrative" (ibid., 241), and thus persists in his quest to find the historiographical "version" of Kant's axiom of the oneness of time. He initially considers the Heideggerian solution to the problem of temporal totality in *Being and Time*, which is to subsume the multiple levels of temporal experience within the radically privatized temporal totality of "Being-towards-death" (Heidegger 2009, 279–311).[19] Yet, Ricoeur is clear that Heidegger's analysis of "Being-a whole" as "Being-towards-death" is an inadequate basis from which to derive the collective time-concepts and temporal frameworks required by history (Ricoeur 1984; 1988). That is, even if we accepted Heidegger's claim that at the level of the individual, existential temporality is a totality because of our Being-towards-death, we cannot simply jump from this level to make a claim about historical time as a totality. Ricoeur's aim, therefore, is to move beyond both the Hegelian solution (which posits a speculative totalization of historical time at the level of "world history") and the Heideggerian solution (which posits a temporal totalization at the level of individual existence).

To do so, Ricoeur turns back to Kant himself, arguing that Kant's conception of the "regulative idea" holds the key to finding a historiographical "reply" to the transcendental axiom of the totality or oneness of time. The "solution" to the "aporia of totality," Ricoeur claims, can be found in the Kantian notion of the regulative idea, because it enables us to rethink the idea of "history" *itself*—in the collective singular—as a regulative idea that "stands over and against" the axiom of the oneness of time (1988, 257–8). Ricoeur is referring here to Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason* (rather than the *Critique of Pure Reason*), because his argument is that historical thinking requires a horizon of historical totality as a guiding idea of historical *practice*

rather than speculation. It is on the "plane of collective practice," Ricoeur contends, that the "imperfect mediations" between expectation (future), traditionality (past), and initiative (present), require the horizon of a single history, which in turn, "corresponds to the axiom of a single time" (ibid., 259). The idea of one history and one historical time is therefore not "an empty and lifeless transcendental," because it intends the "principle of hope" that underpins the fundamentally *practical* historical interest in collective memory, anticipation and communication (ibid., 258). This argument echoes Kant's own suggestion in his "Idea for a Universal History on a Cosmopolitan Plan" that even if the idea of a universal, purposeful history may well be impossible to verify, philosophy must nevertheless interpret history *as if* this were the case (Kant 1991, 52). Indeed, Ricoeur contends that the equivalence between the ideas of "one time," "one history," and "one humanity," is in fact the implicit presupposition behind Kant's cosmopolitan philosophy of history (Ricoeur 1988, 258).

According to Ricoeur's final conclusion in *Time and Narrative*, then, historical thinking takes us beyond plural and imperfect temporal mediations to the regulative idea of a historico-temporal totality: "To think of history as one is to posit the equivalence between three ideas: one time, one humanity, and one history" (1988, 258). However, in the first instance, we can simply reject Ricoeur's problem, that is, his insistence that historiography *must* "respond" to Kant's transcendental axiom of the oneness of time and find an equivalent or corresponding idea of its own. If we accept that historical time is a socioculturally constituted form of lived time, then it follows that the idea of "one" historical time, and indeed, of "history" in the collective singular, is itself a socioculturally determined and contingent idea, not an "intuitively" or "transcendentally unavoidable" one (Rée 1991, 976). As Koselleck points out in his account of historical consciousness in modern Europe:

> Only from around 1780 can one talk of 'history in general', 'history in and for itself', and 'history pure and simple', and as all elaborations on this theme indicate, there was an emphasis on the departure of this new, self-referring concept from the traditional histories in the plural. If anyone had said before 1780 that he studied history, he would have at once been asked by his interlocutor: Which history? History of what? (Koselleck 2004, 194)

If the ideas of "one history" and "one historical time" are historically and socioculturally determined, rather than transcendentally

required, I suggest that there is no reason to accept Ricoeur's argument that it is necessary for a theory of historical time to "respond" to the axioms and aporias generated by Kant's transcendental idealism. The question then becomes a pragmatic one. Even if it is not transcendentally necessary or unavoidable, is the idea of historico-temporal totality nevertheless practically or methodologically indispensible, as Ricoeur claims? The implication of Ricoeur's argument is that without the regulative idea of totality—"one history, one time, one humanity"—it would be impossible to create and conceive of collective, effective, shared histories. Instead, there would simply be a "mere multiplication" of historical temporalizations (Ricoeur 1988, 258).

Fredric Jameson is another theorist who defends the idea or figure of totality as a "methodological imperative" guiding historical and textual interpretation, though from a Marxist rather than a Kantian perspective. In *The Political Unconscious*, Jameson is clear, like Ricoeur, that while we may strive or aspire toward totality, it cannot be attained in a theoretical or speculative sense. "Totality is not available for representation, any more than it is accessible in the form of some ultimate truth" (Jameson 1988, 55). Instead, for Jameson, totality is a figurative means of imaginative and cognitive "mapping," where to "totalize" is to "to project a totality greater than the surface appearance of things." It is necessary to "project a totality" and push "the horizon of our vision outward to include ultimately the totality of human experience," he argues, because relationality is "only explained at the highest level, from the perspective of the whole." The appeal to some "ultimate underlying unity of the various 'levels' supplies the rationale and philosophical justification for that more concrete and local practice of mediation" (ibid., 40).

For Jameson, then, the idea of totality guarantees or underwrites the project to relate, connect, and translate or "transcode" distinct texts and phenomena. It is impossible, he claims, to invent "local codes" for interpretation "except against the background of some more general identity" (ibid., 41–2). In this regard, argue Michael Hardt and Kathi Weeks, totality functions within Jameson's work as an epistemological and aesthetic prescription to "strive constantly to relate and connect, to situate and interpret each object or phenomenon in the context of those social and historical forces that shape and enable it, and ultimately with respect to the entire set of its conditions of possibilities" (Hardt and Weeks 2000, 22). Moreover, Jameson insists that totality provides the political and ethical *impetus* for generating critical and transformative histories. According to this

line of argument, only the thought of totality carries the requisite power to inspire us to join collective forces and disparate narratives, to trace patterns and face up to the big issues that drive political thought and practice:

> These matters can recover their urgency only if they are retold within the unit of a single great collective story; only if, in however disguised and symbolic form, they are seen as sharing a single fundamental theme . . . only if they are grasped as vital episodes in a single vast unfinished plot. (Jameson 1988, 19–20)

The claim, however, that issues of historical injustice "can recover their urgency only if they are retold within the unit of a single great collective story" seems rather far-fetched. To undermine the claim, one could simply point out instances where people are passionately engaged in tracing connections and conducting transformative historical projects without "projecting a totality," or having a guiding idea of "one humanity," "one history," or "one time." Indeed, such historical-political projects—one may think of subaltern or women's studies here— are often fuelled by an acute sense of specificity or historical difference, and a desire to break *away* from grand historical narratives and themes. Further, if our priority is to uncover and explore a range of determinations of historical time, projecting a totality may in fact be counterproductive. Chakrabarty argues that the thought of a higher totality makes it difficult to value and take plural historical temporalities seriously, because it encourages us to think that these temporalities are only *approximations* of a greater totality, which might not be available to representation, but nevertheless exists as an "absent cause" or at a "higher level" of completeness (Chakrabarty 2000, 250). This means that partial or localized determinations can only be regarded as "incomplete" or "lacking," rather than as *constitutive* of historical time (ibid.). Accordingly, those who insist that we must think in terms of temporal totality or "one" historical time may be "constitutionally unprepared" for the possibility that there are unknown or unforeseen ways of thinking and configuring historical time (ibid.).[20]

It is important to reiterate that the heuristic *idea* of a single, total history or historical time must be distinguished from speculative theories and narratives of history, and moreover, from the political system of totalitarianism: a conflation that Jameson has described as "baleful" (Jameson 2000, 284). Another important distinction to register is the difference between a "closed totality," where everything

is subsumed under the order of a single, central controlling force or idea, and an "open totality," in contrast, which has no fixed or pre-given end, but is always "moving and growing," staying "open" because of the "unpredictable efficacy of the new" (Hardt and Weeks 2000, 22). Nevertheless, even if the historical totality projected by Jameson is always "moving and growing," and even if it is a "figurative device" and not a speculative theory, it still invites the thought of historical time as a "higher" time that contains or subsumes diverse historical temporalities within itself. Hence the issue with Jameson's rallying call for us to "always historicize!", argues Chakrabarty, lies with the term "always," because it perpetuates the idea of a "continuous, homogenous, infinitely stretched out time that makes possible the imagination of an 'always'" (ibid., 111).

As we have seen, feminists are becoming increasingly aware of the problems that emerge when we treat feminist history as a single plot that can subsume all feminist trajectories and temporalities within its all-encompassing sweep forward through time. Accordingly, if we want to pursue historiographical approaches that can take seriously the multiple trajectories and temporalities of feminism, there is a strong case for rejecting the idea of totality as a means of connecting diverse historical temporalities and conceiving of shared historical time. This is not to imply that we can wholly or easily surpass the idea of totality, of one historical time. As discussed in the introductory chapter, feminism is deeply entangled in the analytics and imaginaries of totality and totalization, and it is impossible to simply shake off its influence over historical thinking with a single act of will. Nevertheless, while recognizing its persistence, my point is that there is no need to be mournful regarding the demise of the Hegelian project to speculatively determine a total history; and no need to insist on totality as a methodological imperative guiding historical and historiographical practice. On the contrary, the waning of the influence of Hegelian and Kantian philosophies of history and time over historiographical thinking presents an opportunity for generating different models and methods.

Complex Coevalness and Relationality

Once we have claimed that there are multiple pasts, presents, and futures, which are lived and conceived according to different temporal schemas and concepts, we need to develop a framework or language of temporal coexistence and shared time, which can register and work with this temporal plurality. On its own, the claim that there are

"multiple times" does not get us very far, as it does not address the question of how different times and temporalities coexist and interrelate with one another. Indeed, as Johannes Fabian contends, the idea of "multiple times" can lead to a debilitating cultural relativism: "walling-in the Time of others so that it cannot spill into ours" (ibid., 52). The challenge, then, is to find a way of conceptualizing shared time and temporal relations, without falling back on presumptions of a higher historico-temporal totality or oneness. How can we speak of shared historical "moments," or indeed of a shared "present" in which we relate or dispute understandings of the past, and propose or contest different visions and hopes for the future?

It is important, first of all, to distinguish between what scientists might mean when they speak of coexisting and sharing a "moment" of time, and what it might mean in an existential or sociological sense. To this end, Fabian draws a helpful distinction between three terms: "synchronous," "contemporary," and "coeval." In Fabian's usage, "synchronicity" refers to events occurring at the same physical time;[21] "contemporaneity" refers to co-occurrence in "typological" time (i.e., periodized time); and "coevalness" refers to the active "occupation" or sharing of time (Fabian 1983, 31). It is this last term, I propose, that holds the key to conceiving of a shared "moment" of historical time from a polytemporal perspective. "Coevalness," Fabian explains, "is a mode of temporal relations. It cannot be defined as a thing or state with certain properties. It is not 'there' and cannot be put there; it must be created or at least approached" (ibid., 34). The reason that coevalness must be created, Fabian argues, is that coevalness is the condition for communication. "The term *coevalness*," he writes, "marks a central assumption, namely that all temporal relations . . . are embedded in culturally organized praxis." If social interaction presupposes intersubjectivity, then intersubjectivity, in turn, is inconceivable without assuming that the participants are coeval, that they share time. "Communication," then, is "ultimately about creating shared Time" (ibid., 34).

This basic definition of coevalness as a condition for communication can be taken as a pragmatic presupposition, which means that if coevalness is a necessary condition for communication, it is a necessary condition for historical and historiographical discourse. If we accept that historical time is generated through intersubjective temporalizations of history, then it follows that coevalness, as a "mode of temporal relations," is a necessary condition for historical time itself. In other words, *there would be no historical time without temporal relations*, without the practice of sharing time, even indirectly

or diachronically "through" or "across" time. This is essentially a reversal of the idea that being "in" a homogenous historical time is what makes the sharing of time possible. Instead, sharing time, or forging temporal connections, is what makes the idea of historical time itself possible.

Adhering to Fabian's notion of coevalness thus enables us to shift the problematic: from a problematic of totality to a problematic of relationality.[22] The relational idea of coevalness also paves the way for understanding the shared historical moment or present as plural and "*not-one*" (Chakrabarty 2000, 125). Ordinarily, as Michelle Bastian argues, shared time is conceptualized in terms of a "homogeneous present or presence. That is, the time that we share is thought to be a 'now' that brings differing experiences, histories and anticipations into a certain alignment" (Bastian 2011, 153). Yet, if we think of the shared moment or present as something that must be *created*, rather than being something that automatically exists, we see that any historical present or "now" will always be a complex and fragmentary conjunction of plural pasts, presents, and futures.

This conception of the present, or the moment, as plural, fragmentary, and "not-one" can be found in the work of various feminist theorists interested in lived time and historical temporalities. Christine Battersby, for example, taking inspiration from Kierkegaard, describes the present as a "generative caesura," where the many different paths leading from ambiguous pasts intersect in a complex present, to produce multiple interpretations and possibilities that stretch into the future (Battersby 1998, 150–1). This makes it "impossible to think of the 'moment' in terms of a single, linear series of 'nows' that are aligned or linked together through one temporal backdrop or uniting history" (ibid.).[23] Bastian suggests that a similar understanding of the co-occupied moment can be found in the work of Gloria Anzaldúa, whose writings and poetry conceive of coexistence without succumbing to the "lure of unity" or "mathematical ideas of equivalence" (Bastian 2011, 153). One passage that Bastian cites to help give a sense of what "coevalness" or "at the same time" means in Anzaldúa's work appears twice in the first section of *Borderlands/La Frontera* (1999): once at the beginning as part of a larger poem, and again at the end, as the final words:

> This land was Mexican once
> was Indian always
> and is.
> And will be again. (Anzaldúa 1999, 113)

The land Anzaldúa is referring to here is Aztlán: the mythical homeland of the Aztec people, which has played a key role in the Chicano movement's attempt to claim national rights to the Southwestern United States. Yet, Anzaldúa's evocation of Aztlán performs a radical subversion of the traditional "origin myth" prototype that links a unified people to a "rightful home." She does not construct a "loss narrative" staked on an "interrupted trajectory," nor does she offer a linear, sequentialist history of the Southwestern United States, (as that which was successively Native American, then Mexican, then part of the United States). Instead, Anzaldúa highlights the shifting allegiances and competing claims that have resulted from invasions and re-invasions, as the land has variously been "home" to Native Mexican and American civilizations, to Spanish conquistadors and Anglo-Americans (Bastian 2011, 158). Bastian's interest in the passage focuses on Anzaldúa's use of a "confusing amalgam of incongruent presents, pasts and futures," as she traces the multiple lines of this turbulent and violent history and considers the differing, yet simultaneous political demands that emerge from it in the present. Her claim "was Indian always," for example, suggests that "the history upon which indigenous claims are based abides within the present as a past that can never be cancelled out" (ibid.). The unconventional nature of Anzaldúa's temporalizations thus enables her to write "a history of the borderlands that affirms and recognizes its contradictory historical trajectories simultaneously" (ibid., 158–9).

The crucial point here for Bastian is that Anzaldúa is not "attempting to manage these diverse histories by rendering them commensurable (in reference to an all-encompassing spatial or temporal background)," or by ordering them hierarchically within a linear history that splits and divides differences by "isolating them within different stages or moments, thus obscuring both the diversity of the present and the continuing claims of the past" (ibid., 159). As such, Anzaldúa's complex evocations and negotiations of her heritage implicitly offer an account of time that "enables contradictory histories and contradictory ways of acting to share the same time, to be coeval with each other"(ibid., 162; see also Fernandes 2010).[24] Indeed, from this perspective, "to be coeval (i.e., to live in the same time with another)," is precisely about recognizing "the multiple lines of time and of history that operate within the present" (ibid., 157–8).

Within the framework I am terming "complex coevalness," different historical temporalities and trajectories may interrelate and intersect, but they are not "additive" parts of a greater totality or

whole. Instead, *not*-being-one or *not*-being-a-totality is taken to be a "constitutional characteristic of the 'now'" (Chakrabarty 2000, 250). As Chakrabarty explains it, temporal existence means living in "time-knots" composed of the traces and fragments of the multiple pasts that we inhabit, and also "the futurity that laces every moment of human existence" (ibid.). Past worlds are never completely lost or finished. Indeed, the reason we have points of entry into the past times that we study as "history" is that "they are never completely alien; we inhabit them to begin with" (ibid., 113). Pasts "*are* there," in practices of embodiment, in the "cultural training the senses have received over generations"; just as futures already "*are* there," in the sense that we cannot help but be oriented toward the future. This is not the conscious thought of a future, Chakrabarty explains, not "the future" that "will be"; but rather the sense of futurity and possibility we cannot avoid being aligned with (ibid., 251).[25] These pasts and futures that saturate and intend our existences are "plural and do not illustrate any idea of the whole or one" (ibid.). Rather than projecting a higher totality, then, the task is to generate "conjoined and disjunctive" genealogies, as we "contemplate the necessarily fragmentary histories of human belonging," which never add up to a totality, a whole, or a one (ibid., 125).[26]

A significant political objection to this kind of polytemporal approach is that by focusing on the specific and fragmentary, it cannot adequately grasp or tackle the totalizing processes of global capitalism. Indeed, this is one of Jameson's key arguments in favor of "projecting a totality." The concept of totality is necessary, he claims, not only because of the need to underwrite the task of connecting and "transcoding" distinct texts and phenomena but, moreover, because of the expansive nature of capital and the tendency of the capitalist mode of production to "make of the world a totality." An analysis of capital, therefore, must itself strive toward totality. Yet, this approach of meeting "like with like" is not the only option. The polytemporal approach advocated by Chakrabarty and others does not simply ignore totalizing processes such as those of global capital, or the continuing power of grand historical narratives like the "end of history" thesis heralding the triumph of liberal capitalism (Fukuyama 1992). The idea, rather, is that instead of tackling these processes and narratives through an equally grand counter-narrative or totalizing theoretical framework, we "release into the space" occupied by dominant histories and political processes a wider spectrum of existing life practices and temporal frameworks: "For it is only in this way that we can create plural normative horizons specific to our existence

and relevant to the examination of our lives and their possibilities" (Chakrabarty 2000, 20).

In *Provincializing Europe*, Chakrabarty frames this approach in terms of what he calls "History 1" and "History 2." History 1 proceeds according to the rules of "analytic" social science, which assimilate the local to abstract universals such as "reason," "capital," "labor," or the "human"; while History 2 proceeds according to the "hermeneutic" tradition in the social sciences, producing a "loving grasp of detail in search of an understanding of the diversity of human life-worlds . . . [finding] thought intimately tied to places and to particular forms of life" (2000, 18). Chakrabarty's argument is that History 1 continues to do important work, as universal categories such as "capital" give us a way of thinking about history on a global scale, and of "thinking about the globe that capitalism produces" (ibid.). Moreover, he contends, without the universals forged in eighteenth-century Europe, such as the abstract figure of reason or the human, or concepts of rights, liberty, and equality, "there would be no social science that addresses issues of modern social justice" (ibid., 5).[27] Yet, at the same time, History 1 is continuously interrupted and modified by affective, specific histories or "History 2s," which cannot be contained or sublated into History 1. These "beckon us to more *affective* narratives of human belonging where life forms, although porous to one another, do not seem exchangeable through a third term of equivalence." Hence, History 2s "act as our grounds for claiming historical difference" (ibid., 71).

Chakrabarty in fact adopts this idea of the dual perspective of History 1 and History 2 from the distinction Marx draws in the posthumously published *Theories of Surplus Value* between two kinds of histories: histories "posited by capital" and histories that do not belong to capital's "life process" (ibid., 63). Histories "posited by capital" fall into the category of History 1. From the perspective of the Marxist historian, pasts that are "antecedent" to capital can nevertheless be treated as part of the history of capital, because the "becoming" or "arising" of capital can be worked out retrospectively. History 1, then, is "a past posited by capital itself as its precondition" (ibid., 63). On the other hand, however, Marx also identifies another kind of "antecedent" that capital encounters "not as antecedents established by itself, not as forms of its own life process" (Marx, quoted in Chakrabarty 2000, 63). The examples Marx gives in this passage are surprising, as he seems to suggest that while capital cannot be conceptualized without the antecedents of money and commodity, they could nevertheless have existed without giving rise to capital.

"Capital," he writes, "originally finds the commodity already in existence, but not as its own product, and likewise finds money circulation, but not as an element in its own reproduction . . . both of them must first be destroyed as independent forms and subordinated to industrial capital" (quoted in Chakrabarty 2000, 64).

We can read this passage, Chakrabarty suggests, as a heterogeneous understanding of the history of money and commodity, and thus as an implicit acknowledgement that there are phenomena, practices, or types of relation that do not necessarily contribute to the reproduction of capital, and that exceed its logic and grasp. As such, there are traces of History 2s in Marx's own writings: traces that "beckon us" toward a more complex notion of historical time that exceeds and complicates the temporal frameworks of traditional Marxist historiography. This is not to say that History 2s are entirely separate from, or unaffected by, History 1. They "do not constitute a dialectical Other of the necessary logic of History 1," because "to think thus would be to subsume History 2 to History 1" (ibid., 66). Instead, History 2s should be understood as polytemporal pasts and life forms that are entangled with History 1, yet constantly interrupt its "totalizing thrusts." These pasts and life forms "may be under the institutional domination of the logic of capital and exist in proximate relationship to it, but they also do not belong to the 'life process' of capital" (ibid.). They are not "automatically aligned with it" (ibid.), and continually interrupt and "punctuate the run of capital's own logic" (ibid., 64). This idea contravenes the supposition that the logic of capital sublates all differences into itself, and allows us to make room for the "politics of human belonging and diversity" (ibid., 67). It gives rise to an approach of frustrating the totalizing ambitions of global capitalism, by seizing on the fact that geopolitically diffuse temporalities will always exceed and obstruct globalizing orders of unification, rationalization, and alignment, even as they intersect and intertwine with them.

Conclusion

To theorize the interrelation of multiple times and temporalities, this chapter has outlined a framework I have termed "complex coevalness," where shared historical moments are created and forged through the entangling of different histories and temporalities: a cross-fertilization or "mutual contamination of 'nows'" (Hutchings 2008, 166–7). This means that any historical present will always be fragmentary and out of joint with itself, and that no temporal structure or grand historical

narrative of "History 1" can ever be all-encompassing. Chakrabarty focuses in *Provincializing Europe* upon History 1 as the history of capital, and thus examines how subaltern pasts interrupt, complicate, and modify the history of capital produced by Marxist historians. But we can also view feminism's "great hegemonic model" of phases and waves as a kind of History 1, which has become dominant within Western feminist discourse, but nevertheless is continually disrupted and punctuated by History 2s, or as Deleuze and Guattari would say, "minor" feminist histories.[28]

Chakrabarty's argument cannot be seamlessly transposed into feminist historiography however because, for him, History 1 as the history of capital fulfils a vital function in diagnosing the workings of global capitalism, while the hegemonic model of feminist history does not fulfill an analogous function for feminists. In the sense that History 1 refers to a method that proceeds via the universal categories of social science and modern politics, some kind of History 1 does arguably remain important to feminism. Abstract universals and markers enable feminist social scientists to track and analyze inequalities and injustices; and universal ideals such as equality and freedom continue to inspire feminist struggles across various regions and contexts. Yet, there is no requirement for feminists to have a master narrative of feminism itself. It may seem that it plays a practical role as shorthand; but in fact, a problem-centered definition of feminism—which sets out the kinds of concerns that feminists share— can be just as brief and pithy as a potted history of different waves or phases. What I am suggesting, then, is that feminism does not need Feminism 1.

The idea of "complex coevalness" has much to offer feminist theory and historiography, as we attempt to break away from the master narrative of feminist history and its all-encompassing reach. On the hegemonic model of waves or phases, different feminisms are ordered within a singular unilinear history that treats them as parts of a whole, while also isolating them within different "moments" or phases that come one after another. The continuing exchanges and debates between different strands of feminism are thereby contained and "managed," by being mapped on to a progressive, sequential chronology. If we think in terms of polytemporal coexistence or complex coevalness, however, sharing the same time does not require an ironing out of temporal differences, or a purging of political contest through separation into phases or a temporal hierarchy (Bastian 2011, 164). Instead, it becomes possible to "think difference within the supposedly singular moment of time," and to enable multiple feminist histories, loyalties, and modes of acting to interrelate and

exist simultaneously (ibid.). The image conjured here is not of stages or waves, but rather of a shifting entanglement of trajectories and temporalities: of feminism as multilinear rather than unilinear.

The framework of complex coevalness also provides a useful frame for analyzing the *politics of time* within feminist historiography and uncovering how certain time-schemes come to dominate over others. As we have seen, coevalness or creating shared time, according to Fabian, is a necessary condition of communication and discourse. In practice, however, coevalness is often "denied." Fabian describes the denial or refusal of coevalness as a technique of "temporal distancing" that appears in his own field of anthropology as the "persistent and systematic tendency to place the referent(s) of anthropology in a Time other than the present of the producer of anthropological discourse" (Fabian 1983, 31). On the one hand, he argues, anthropologists recognize that productive empirical research is only possible when the researcher and the researched share time or co-occupy a moment through communicative praxis; yet on the other hand, this coevalness is denied in practice, as "the discourse that pretends to interpret, analyze, and communicate ethnographic knowledge to the researcher's society is pronounced from a 'distance', that is, from a position which denies coevalness to the object of enquiry'" (ibid., 73).

Fabian is referring to the politics of time within the discipline of anthropology, yet his reflections apply equally well to the field of feminist theory and practice. Productive research and discourse within feminism can only occur when feminists share time and discursive spaces; yet feminists who have collectively produced histories of feminism nevertheless distance themselves from one another by setting up temporal barriers and boundaries. For example, as discussed in the introductory chapter, the ordering of different feminisms into successive phases or waves can be interrogated as a practice of "temporal distancing" or "othering," whereby certain kinds of feminism emerge as "current," "contemporary," and "cutting edge," while others are relegated to a "bad," "embarrassing," or "outmoded" feminist past. What I am interested in exploring further is the different forms and tools of time that do the work of temporalizing feminist histories, of instilling or inscribing certain temporal regimes and structures. As such, the focus in the following four chapters will be upon the mechanisms of temporalization and the temporal dynamics through which certain ideas, experiences, and orderings of historical time emerge within feminism.[29]

These chapters focus on four times that consistently enter into configurations of historical time: the "time of the trace," "narrative time,"

"calendar time," and "generational time." The typology deployed here, I want to stress, is not intended as a complete or all-encompassing model or theory. In focusing on these four different times, I am not suggesting that they are exhaustive of historical time.[30] There are other strands of time that are also crucial in determining and configuring historical time, including biological, geological, and astronomical times, and also technological or digital times.[31] Further, I do not mean to suggest that these four times must all be in evidence if we are to speak of historical time. If we accept that there are multiple ways of configuring and living historical time, and that each history has its own mix of times and its own temporalities, then we must admit the impossibility of giving an exhaustive or complete account of historical time. There will always be temporal logics and fields of time that escape our own knowledge and experience, or elude our understanding.[32] Moreover, the typology might not always be useful, in cases where it is not possible or beneficial to try and analytically separate out forms of time that have become inextricably merged or inscribed on to one another.

Nevertheless, articulating a partial, provisional model of historical time in this way is, I hope, of analytical value, helping us to be clear about what we might mean by multidirectional, multilinear concepts of historical time. It is also critically important to become cognizant of the various processes of temporalization through which historical time is generated and organized. Thus, I give content and detail to my polytemporal model of historical time through reference to the four times mentioned above, beginning with the "time of the trace" in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 2

The Time of the Trace

"History" is a term with two distinct, though intersecting, meanings. On the one hand, it is used to refer to events that happened in the past. And on the other, it designates the *practice* of history: the accounts we give of what we think happened in the past. The relation between these two different senses of history—the past event and the historical representation—is a vital area of debate within historiography and the philosophy of history. There are very few proponents of "naïve" historical realism within contemporary historiography: an epistemology premised upon the belief that historians can offer neutral, disinterested, objective accounts that reconstruct the past "as it really was."[1] Due to various intellectual movements including feminist theory, it has become generally accepted that linguistic conventions, institutional contexts, and social positions inevitably inform the kinds of histories we search for and the kinds of histories we write.[2] The challenge to "naïve" or "objectivist" historical realism, therefore, is no longer a controversial issue. The point of debate concerns the *implications* of this challenge.

For the "narrativist" school of historiography—associated with structuralist theorists such as Roland Barthes and Hayden White—the challenge to naïve historical realism culminates in what has been termed an "agnostic" or "anti-realist" epistemology.[3] From this perspective, the present acts as a block or barrier to the past: we cannot escape the linguistic and interpretative worlds we inhabit in the present to access "what really happened" in the past. "The 'real past,'" as Leon Goldstein explains it, "plays no role in the practice of history; what we know of the human past we know only by means of the discipline of history . . . there is no way to jump outside the framework of that discipline to a real past of any sort" (Goldstein 1980, 429). Narrativist historiographers therefore set aside the *referential* ambition of historical narratives to represent a past event that really

happened. Instead, they focus upon the linguistic and literary protocols that condition the writing and reading of history in the present. Rather than asking whether a historical narrative is true, or whether it "really happened," the narrativist historiographer will consider how it achieves the effect of truth, and how it operates within a particular discursive context.

The narrativist approach has engendered a much-needed scrutiny of our assumptions around historical fact, description, and interpretation; yet it has also come under serious critical fire. In the first instance, questions have been raised over the political risks of removing historiography from an engagement with "historical reality," particularly in regard to historical injustices and atrocities.[4] Moreover, by focusing exclusively on the practice or discipline of history in the present, narrativist historiography often fails to capture and attend to the temporalities and vacillations of history: the way that history *moves*. Accordingly, we have been witnessing a revived attempt within feminist historiography to engage with the dynamic temporalities and "eventfulness" of feminist histories[5] (Hesford 2013); to bring the historical "real" back into the historiographical frame.

The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to articulate a philosophical alternative to the narrativist position, showing that feminist historiography can uphold its challenge to naïve historical realism, but without having to set aside questions about "what really happened" and historical truth-telling. As Gillian Howie contends, to claim that our theories and narratives are tied to "real" events or states of affairs is not the same thing as claiming that they are "objective" (Howie 2010a, 4). [6] To make this argument, I draw significantly upon Paul Ricoeur's analysis of the metaphorical nature of historical language, the indirect referential mode of historical narratives, and the paradoxical ontology of the trace. Although I rejected Ricoeur's arguments regarding historico-temporal totality in chapter 1, these other aspects of his work offer a dynamic understanding of historical reality that, I suggest, can help us steer a course between the traditional approach of "getting the story straight," and the "dissolution of history into the area of pure textuality" (Kellner 2000, 276).

The approach opened up by Ricoeur acknowledges that present assumptions, perspectives, and positions always condition our understandings of the past. But it simultaneously affirms the ontological primacy of the traces of past events, which provoke historical enquiry and interpretation in the first place, and further, will always exceed or "outrun" any one historical account (Felman 2000, 264). The time of the trace can thus be articulated in terms of a nonlinear or "two-

way" temporality. Traces of the past "spill forwards" into the present, yet the historical past is also "constituted backwards" when traces are taken up and configured within a historical narrative. Taking this view, I argue, can enable feminists to cultivate a more generative relation to feminisms of the past: maintaining a critical reflexivity around what we bring to the idea and practice of history; yet also being open to the surprise and strangeness of the past, allowing the present to be interrupted and transformed through the re-emergence of the past in the form of the trace.

Feminist Storytelling: The Politics of the Present

The question of historical representation and reality has generated considerable interest within feminist theory recently, as feminists have critically examined the ways in which narratives of feminist history are constructed and the role that such narratives play in securing certain political or theoretical positions. One of the most influential scholars in this area has been Clare Hemmings (2005; 2007; 2011), who proposes that "all history takes place in the present, as we make and remake stories about the past to enable a particular present to gain legitimacy" (2005, 118). In making this claim, Hemmings aligns herself with theorists including Hayden White,[7] Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak,[8] and Jennifer Terry,[9] for whom "wanting to get the story straight" is an act of "disavowed epistemic violence, which prevents attention to the political investments that motivate the desire to know, and that generate a writer's epistemological and methodological practices" (ibid.). Accordingly, Hemmings argues, the focus of critical historiography should be on "the politics of the present in the making of the past," and "the location of the historian or teller of tales" (ibid.).

As discussed in the book's introduction, Hemmings' research into western feminist storytelling identifies an endemic narrative of western feminism that presents "the development of feminist thought as a relentless march of progress or loss," depending upon the particular position of the narrator. Such narratives, she claims, are highly misrepresentative, fixing certain writers and perspectives within particular decades, and dramatically oversimplifying the complex history of western feminisms (2005, 115). However, following in the spirit of White, Spivak, and Terry, Hemmings' solution is not to offer a revised, more accurate account of the history of feminism that "sets the story straight" or "corrects" the hegemonic

narratives. Indeed, she is extremely wary of the revisionist approach that "goes back to the archives" to discover the "truth that lies buried" there. When the revisionist asks "What really happened?", Hemmings contends, she presents herself as "innocent of what she might find out," thereby revealing an underlying commitment to a fantasy of historical objectivity and neutrality, and deflecting attention from her own interests and motivations in wanting to tell a different tale (ibid.). Moreover, Hemmings suggests, the revisionist project is inherently wedded to a developmental model of history, where the story is corrected "in a linear fashion—that is from past to present." Revisionism "implicitly tends towards the construction of new master narratives—a consensus and synthesis of perspectives—which effects a closing down and fixing of the past" (2007, 72). Feminists should therefore try to resist the "pull towards the corrective" and the desire to "intervene at the level of truth-telling." As an alternative, Hemmings proposes a "textually reflexive" approach that privileges "methodology over content," and questions about representation over questions about reality (2007, 72–4). The interest here is not so much in the truth of Western feminist stories, but rather "the technology of Western feminist storytelling—its form, function and effects" (2005, 117).

To demonstrate this approach, Hemmings conducts an illuminating textual analysis of a range of extracts taken from Anglophone feminist journals published in the 1990s and 2000s that give "common sense glosses" of the development of Western feminist theory. She identifies several textual practices that are consistently used to secure these narrative glosses, such as the general lack of specific examples and citations, or the "mobilization of affect" through the rhetorical tone of the narrative (Hemmings 2011, 24).[10] Another technique is the use of present and past tense, for instance, when black feminist contributions are referred to in the past tense, in contrast to post-structuralist contributions that tend to be described in the present tense. As a consequence, black feminism is "fixed" in the 1990s and depicted as a phase that is over and done with, while post-structuralism, in contrast, is portrayed as "linguistically alive and present" (2011, 46).[11] Alongside these critical insights into the "political grammar" of Western feminist storytelling, Hemmings also proposes a range of textual tactics for transforming the way feminist stories are told, such as "re-citation."[12] The argument here is that if textual affect, discursive framings, and citation practices are the means by which the dominant narratives are secured, they can also offer a key to their undoing. Textual strategies of "re-narration," she

explains, "offer ways of approaching feminist stories and politics over the temptation to produce a more correct account" (2011, 27).

Learning to tell feminist stories differently is undoubtedly crucial; but Hemmings' emphasis upon method over content, re-narration rather than counter-narratives, has also caused consternation. Could textual strategies of re-narration alone be enough to interrupt and overturn the hegemonic narratives of feminist history? Indeed, as Rachel Torr has pointed out, keeping these narratives in the central frame to be dissected and "re-narrated" may risk perpetuating and entrenching them even further (Torr 2007, 65–6). This relates to a wider issue within feminist theory, which arises when textual analysis is taken to be sufficient in itself as an oppositional methodology. Shumei Shih suggests that the textual or "deconstructive turn" in feminist theory can in fact be regarded as a "displacement" of the need to attend to the substantive complexities of nonhegemonic histories and lived experiences. "The deconstruction of Western universalist discourse," she writes, "ends up exercising the muscles of Western universalist discourse . . . after all, if we want to study power and hegemony, we should study the West, right?" (Shih 2002, 96). Shih's broader point here is applicable to our more specific problematic of countering feminism's "great hegemonic model." While it is important to analyze narrative form and consider how stories might be told differently, different stories must also be told, if the many dimensions and forms of feminism are to be appreciated and engaged with.[13] This is something that Hemmings herself acknowledges when she speaks of her "respect for projects that seek to tell alternative stories that highlight what has been left out . . . " (2011, 13); and asks "How might feminist theory generate a proliferation of stories about its recent past that more accurately reflect the diversity of perspectives within (or outside) its orbit? How might we reform the relationship between feminism's constituent pasts to allow what are currently phantom presences to take shape?" (2005, 130).

These questions, I suggest, imply that the politics of the present are inextricably entangled with ideas about "what really happened" in the past, and a commitment to "tell the truth" about past and present realities. Indeed as Howie insists: "political beliefs are unintelligible in isolation from claims about the real states of the world" (Howie 2010a, 3). Hemmings rightly points out that asserting there is no single historical truth "does not mean that history is simply a matter of individual opinion, that all truths are somehow equal." Rather, feminist historiographers have highlighted the ways in which "the challenge to a single truth allows for increased rather than decreased

political accountability in the present" (2005, 117). We can interrogate, for instance, how the hegemonic narratives of feminist history perpetuate the privileged status of Western feminism in the present, when they establish a teleological frame for comparing feminisms of different geographical regions, and invoke Western Europe or North America as the site of feminism's origin. However, we also need to be able to engage with the truth claims about the past that a historical narrative is making, even if we do not accept that there is one single historical truth. That is, alongside interrogating the political work that the hegemonic narratives do in the present, it is also important to challenge the truth claims they make: showing, for example, that feminism *has never been* an exclusive or endogenous product of the West that is benevolently "exported" to the rest of the world. After all, the guiding idea behind Hemmings' significant interventions is that the hegemonic narratives of feminism are *wrong*: that there are alternative pasts not being represented in these narratives, and pasts that are being actively misrepresented.

It seems, then, that feminist historiography requires both reflexive narrative analysis *and* revisionist projects that make claims and ask questions about "what really happened." As such, Hemmings' arguments need not be taken as an absolute prohibition against revisionist projects that "go back to the archives," or as a claim that finding new stories and finding new ways to tell stories are mutually exclusive alternatives. Instead, we can read her arguments as a vital warning against a certain kind of naïve revisionism that treats archives as "the last edifice standing in a received history" (Callahan 2010, 6).[14] Naïve revisionism does indeed risk presenting the feminist historian or historiographer as an "innocent" observer or investigator, and further, risks creating a new master narrative that simply "corrects" the previous in a linear fashion, thereby "closing down" the past. Yet, not all revisionist projects disavow the interested nature of historical enquiry and storytelling.[15] The challenge can thus be rephrased: it is not that we must resist altogether the pull toward the corrective or the "real," but rather that we need to practice a reflexive kind of revisionism that does not presuppose a false innocence or a naïve objectivist realism.

There are many examples of this kind of reflexive historical work within feminist studies, such as Victoria Hesford's recent "immersion analysis" of documents from the archive of the US women's liberation movement in 1970 (Hesford 2013, 7). Hesford is under no illusions about historical objectivity and is highly attentive to the knowledge politics and desires driving her research and the questions she asks. But she nevertheless attempts to connect with the "complex

eventfulness" of women's liberation movements of the recent past via an archival engagement, to cultivate an "open-ended fidelity to the event"[16] (ibid., 259). Her "return" to 1970, Hesford explains, is not about reconstructing the "hidden truth" of the movement, but rather about historicizing its production and attending to some of the forces that produced particular issues, images, and narratives "through which the movement has since been constructed as an object of knowledge and memory" (ibid., 5). Instead of treating the archive as a "repository of things" which holds evidence of distinct theoretical positions, Hesford approaches it as a "process of knowledge production" (ibid., 7), taking up particular terms, phrases and images as "access points" to the contingencies of the movement's "moment of invention" (ibid., 19). In attending to the productive detail of the archive, she suggests, we can break through the stale hegemonic narratives about the movement, capturing the newness and improvisational nature of its beginnings.

Projects such as these demonstrate that reflexivity and revisionism can be complementary and intertwined rather than antithetical: that a newly revised story need not "erase its own construction" (Hemmings 2007, 72–3). Indeed, as Kate Eichhorn points out, historical narration and archival investigation are not always so easily separated. Rather than operating as a "site of preservation" or a "destination for knowledges already produced," she argues, the making of archives is "frequently where the knowledge production begins" (Eichhorn 2013, 3). Eichhorn's focus is particularly upon feminist archivist activism since the mid-1990s, arguing that feminist scholars are "seizing the archive as an apparatus to legitimize new forms of knowledge and cultural production in an economically and politically precious present" (ibid.). She explores, for example, how the archivization of the Riot Grrrl movement "holds the potential to rewrite the history of Riot Grrrl" (ibid., 22). In this case, we can identify what Dominick La Capra describes as a "mutually provocative relation between the empirical and the rhetorical as equally necessary aspects of history-writing" (La Capra 1985, 21).

I would suggest, however, that alongside this kind of historical and archival work, it is also important for feminist theorists and philosophers to continue considering epistemological and ontological questions about historical representation and reality, and outlining alternative ways of conceptualizing historical reality and truth in light of narrativism and the so-called linguistic turn. If there can be no objective knowledge of the past, what kind of knowledge do we gain from archival research and historical narratives? If history

is determined by the concerns of the present, what role is played by the past event? Without engaging fully with such questions, we can find ourselves in a rather ambivalent position where we are committed to a certain understanding of social and historical realities, yet are reluctant to make claims about "what really happened," for fear of reinstating objectivist paradigms, or presenting partial, mediated knowledges and truths as "*the* truth." In what follows, therefore, I will undertake something of a philosophical "detour," to show how the challenge to naïve or objectivist realism can lead us to a different way of understanding historical reality and truth, rather than to an "agnostic" or "anti-realist" position.

Structural Linguistics and the Reality Effect

A consideration of the agnostic or anti-realist arguments stance taken by narrativist historiographers in the continental tradition is impossible without acknowledging the influence of Fernand de Saussure's structural linguistics. For Saussure, the linguistic "sign" is a two-sided entity comprised of the "signifier" (the sound-image) and the "signified" (the thought or concept). Saussure's insistence on the arbitrary relation between the signified and the signifier leads him to claim that language can be analyzed as a formal, enclosed system of signs ("*langue*"), considered separately from the series of communicative speech acts that make use of this grammatical and semiotic system ("*parole*"), and moreover, from its material "referents" (de Saussure 1970).[17] That is, from the Saussurean perspective, language is a self-contained system that does not depend upon a relation with the "outside world" for meaning. In the historiographical context, this idea translates into a re-description of history as a self-referential system of historical signs or texts, rather than a series of historical events (Rayment Pickard 2000, 275).

The Saussurean influence is clearly evident, for example, in Roland Barthes' essay on "Historical Discourse" (1970), in which he famously claims that "historical discourse does not follow reality, it only signifies it; it asserts at every moment: *this happened*, but the meaning conveyed is only that someone is making that assertion" (Barthes 1970, 154). For Barthes, history is simply one "species of narrative." What distinguishes historical narrative as a genre is not its referential links with a historical "real," but rather the literary and discursive features that produce the "reality effect," signifying or coding the text as "history" rather than "fiction" (ibid.). In support of this argument,

Barthes refers to Nietzsche's claim that "for a fact to exist, we must first introduce meaning," arguing that we can only designate something as a "fact" if we already possess the interpretative framework by which to categorize it as something factual as opposed to fictive (ibid., 153).[18] The "fact," Barthes argues, can only exist within language, as a term in a discourse. Yet historical discourse behaves "as if it were a simple reproduction of something on another plane of existence altogether, some extra-structural 'reality'" (ibid.). Indeed, Barthes questions any kind of realism in literature or narrative, historical or otherwise. "The function of narrative," he writes, "is not to 'represent', it is to constitute a spectacle . . . not of the mimetic order . . . 'What takes place' in a narrative is from the referential (reality) point of view literally *nothing*; 'what happens' is language alone, the adventure of language" (Barthes 1982, 294–5).[19]

Hayden White similarly rejects the idea that historical discourse simply "follows" reality. "It is sometimes said," he writes, "that the aim of the historian is to explain the past by 'finding', 'identifying' or 'uncovering' the 'stories' that lie buried in chronicles, and that the difference between 'history' and 'fiction' is that the historian 'finds' his stories, whilst the fiction writer 'invents' his. This conception of the historian's task, however, obscures the extent to which 'invention' also plays a part in the historian's operations" (White 1973, 6–7). Linguistic tropes and interpretative modes, White argues, underlie not only the "emplotment" of the story, but also underlie what are usually considered to be the "primitive elements" of the process of history-writing, that is the processes of selecting and arranging "unprocessed" historical data.[20] Although this level of understanding and description is ordinarily seen as essentially pre-interpretative, he claims, "descriptions of events already constitute interpretations of their nature" (White 2009, 361).[21] Echoing Barthes' Nietzschean point, White argues that even when we think we are simply identifying or describing sets of events that we "find" within historical records and archives, there are figurative tropes at work that dictate the way in which those events are described, as "facts" or otherwise (White 1978, 22).

It should be acknowledged that White takes a much less cavalier approach to the question of historical reality than Barthes. Barthes' reduction of the status of historical reality to a "reality effect" entirely dismantles the distinction between historical and fictional literature, in that he treats them simply as different genres (Rayment Pickard 2000, 275). "From now on," he writes, "the touchstone of history is not so much reality as intelligibility" (Barthes 1970, 155). In contrast,

White is careful to emphasize that his aim is not to eradicate historical truth claims, or to "deny the reality of the referent" (1982, 131; 2009, 354). As such, White seems to confirm that the "touchstone" that distinguishes a historical narrative from a fictional narrative is its referential properties, rather than simply "intelligibility" or the literary features that produce the "reality effect."

Nonetheless, White's view is that any link or correlation between the historical text and the "real past" is in fact impossible to determine, not only because the past event is no longer available to perception or (direct) experience, but, moreover, because historical representation is a *linguistic phenomenon*. Knowledge gleaned from historical texts is knowledge about the way a particular literary culture makes sense of personal and public pasts, rather than a "scientific" knowledge corresponding to a determinate set of historical events. Hence, he argues, what should interest the historiographer is the "literature of fact": the linguistic techniques or strategies that are used to constitute an event as factual or fictive. Indeed, because "there are no apodictically certain theoretical grounds on which one can legitimately claim that any one representative mode is more 'realistic' than another," he claims, "the best grounds for choosing one perspective on history rather than another are ultimately aesthetic or moral rather than epistemological" (1973, xii).

The "real" past event "on the other side" of the narration thus appears in White's work as a rather shadowy figure. In Kantian terms, it has the status of *that which must be thought but cannot be known*: functioning as the idea that prevents history from sliding wholesale into fiction, but is fundamentally inaccessible. What emerges, I suggest, is a tenuous dualism between historical discourse and historical reality, which implies not only that past and present are fundamentally disconnected, but, further, that historical reality is a realm that is somehow separate from the conceptual frameworks through which we interpret the worlds we inherit and inhabit. This is a highly obscure notion, as what would "historical reality" be, if stripped of its symbolic, interpretative determinations?[22] To be clear: the problem is not with White's claim that "we should no longer naively expect that statements about a given epoch or complex of events in the past 'correspond' to some preexistent body of 'raw facts'" (White 1978, 47). Historical events will always be symbolically mediated and subject to various interpretations, both in retrospect and at the time of their occurrence, precisely because they are *lived* events. The problem, rather, lies with the implication that because an event is symbolically or tropologically mediated, its "reality" cannot be known; that

because there are "no *apodictically certain* theoretical grounds" upon which one could adjudicate between competing claims about past realities, we should set aside the question of "what really happened" in the past. This, in Ricoeur's view, risks "ratify[ing] the positivism we are fighting against – namely, the prejudice that only a datum that is given in such a way as can be empirically observed and scientifically described is 'real'" (1984, 79).

In sum, historiographical theory requires a more complex and richer notion of historical reality to serve as an alternative to the naïve idea that past reality is simply a reservoir of "raw facts" waiting to be discovered, *and* to the narrativist idea that historical reality can be understood as an "effect of language," or an "external" or "prior" realm that is separate from the symbolic frameworks through which historical discourses and knowledges are shaped. We need a theory that accounts not only for determinations of the past through historical narratives, but also for the *happening* of past events in the first place. As Ricoeur argues, the epistemological question about the status of historical knowledge or representation often masks or deflects the ontological question: "what is it knowledge *of*?" (Ricoeur 2009, 366) This question demands that we revisit the question of reference, and reconsider the relationship between historical reality and historical language.

Reference and Metaphor

In some respects, Ricoeur is a fellow traveler with Hayden White, in that both are concerned to bring the problem of representing the past event "to language" (Ricoeur 2009, 371). For Ricoeur, White helps us to clarify the paradoxical nature of the historical operation: "The intention is certainly oriented toward what really happened in the past, but the paradox is that one can designate what it is that precedes all narrative only by *prefiguring* it" (ibid., 370). Further, argues Ricoeur, White is right to understand the "reality" of the historical past as "metaphorical" (Ricoeur 1984, 81). Where Ricoeur departs from White, however, is in his understanding of the nature and function of metaphor.[23]

In *Metahistory*, White claims that there are four linguistic "master tropes" governing the construction of historical discourse: metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony (White 1973, 31–8). These master tropes are immanent in the language the historian must use to describe the events, White explains, even prior to constructing them into a narrative. In its metaphorical mode, historical discourse is

essentially representational or mimetic, asserting a relation of resemblance between the event and the narrative. In the metonymic mode, it tends toward a reductive or schematic classification; and in the synecdochic mode, it is predisposed to see the whole of history represented in its parts. Finally, in the ironic mode, historical discourse represents a stage of consciousness in which the problematic nature of language itself has been recognized, in contrast to the "naivety" of the other tropes, which presuppose the capacity of figurative language to grasp the nature of reality (ibid., 34–7).[24] Strictly speaking, however, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony are all kinds of metaphor, White argues, in that each trope seeks to "*liken*" the described event to "some form with which we have already become familiar in our literary culture" (White 2009, 358). In this sense, the master tropes governing historical discourse are variations on a "metaphorical continuum," despite the different kinds of illuminations they aim at on the figurative level (1973, 34).

White's concern is thus with metaphor's "status and operation as a basic linguistic operation" (Roof 1996b, 20). Historical representation, for White, is a phenomenon "inside" language, and what we learn from the statement "this really happened" is that the event under description has been metaphorically coded as a historical event as opposed to a fictive event. In contrast, Ricoeur takes an ontologically oriented view of language and metaphor that is concerned with metaphor's referential, "productive propensities."[25] For Ricoeur, language "does not constitute a world for itself. It is not even a world" (Ricoeur 1984, 78). His "ontological presupposition of reference," rather, is that "because we are in the world and affected by situations, we try to orient ourselves in them by means of understanding; we also have something to say, an experience to bring to language and to share." Language is therefore oriented beyond itself; it says something *about* something, and is not a static, self-sustaining system (ibid.).[26]

This basic premise guides Ricoeur's concluding argument in *The Rule of Metaphor,* which postulates that the metaphorical statement or utterance functions in "two referential fields at once" (Ricoeur 1978, 299). While White's tropology treats metaphor as simply "a function of transference common to a diverse range of [figurative] tropes," Ricoeur proposes that there is a metaphorical transfer from "one referential field to another." On the one hand, there is the familiar referential field of language "where the meaning is already constituted"; but there is also another referential field, of happenings and affective encounters, which "exerts an attraction on the already constituted

sense in order to tear it away from its initial haven" (ibid.).[27] Metaphor thus brings an "unknown referential field towards language," telling us something new about reality, and providing an extension of meaning (ibid., 299–300). This gain in meaning is not to be thought of as a conceptual gain, but rather as a "semantic shock": a shock that produces the need for articulation and interpretation in the first place (ibid., 296).

In developing his account of metaphor, Ricoeur refers to Nietzsche's essay "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense," where Nietzsche discusses metaphor in relation to the formation of concepts (Nietzsche 2006c). Arguing against the idea that there is a relation of direct correspondence between language and "things themselves," Nietzsche claims that language is essentially metaphorical: "We believe we know something about the things themselves when we speak of trees, colors, snow, and flowers; and yet we possess nothing but metaphors for these things – metaphors which in no way correspond to the original entities" (2006c, 116). Yet, he also draws a graduated distinction between the "primitive world of metaphor" (ibid., 119), and the world of concepts (ibid., 117). The world of "primitive," "individual," or "perceptual" metaphors, Nietzsche writes, testifies to a "unique and entirely original experience" of a material, sensuous world: a "suggestive transference" or "stammering translation," for which there is required "a freely inventing intermediate sphere and mediating force" (ibid., 119). However, when metaphors have become "worn out and have been drained of sensuous force," they morph into general concepts: hardened, congealed, and "volatized into a schema." The concept is thus only a "residue of a metaphor" (ibid., 118–20). Or as Ricoeur puts it, the living metaphor is "replaced by the production of a concept that erases its trace" (Ricoeur 1978, 286).

Ricoeur's reference to Nietzsche makes an interesting comparison to Barthes' "Historical Discourse" essay, where he cites Nietzsche's claim that "for a fact to exist, we must first introduce meaning." For Barthes, this implies that the referential ambition of historical narratives to represent or reproduce reality is essentially delusional; but Ricoeur finds in Nietzsche a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between language and reality. While Nietzsche is impatient with sedimented linguistic systems of concepts and truths that cover over material singularities and affective encounters, he nevertheless alludes to a sensuous, material reality that is brought to language through a "stammering," "suggestive" transferral: an "inventing intermediate sphere and mediating force." On Ricoeur's reading, this attests to a dynamic interplay between the field of affective materiality

and the field of language, an idea that he refines through his notion of split reference. Indeed, for Ricoeur, the "tensional situation" of metaphor's split reference has significant ontological implications, as expressed within the metaphorical copula, in which "is" is a kind of "being-as":

> Being as . . . means being and not being. In this way, the dynamism of meaning allows access to the dynamic vision of reality which is the implicit ontology of the metaphorical utterance. (ibid., 297)

For Ricoeur, then, the claim that historical discourse is "metaphorical" does not imply that it has no connection with historical reality. Rather, it means that historical discourse operates in "two referential fields at once." There is a dynamic interrelation between the prefigured field of discursive forms and a fluctuating field of material happenings. Such happenings defy objective description, but nevertheless cross "*through* the tropics of discourse" and provoke an extension or revision of historical meaning and understanding (Ricoeur 2009, 371). Ricoeur concurs with White and Barthes that there is no unmediated truth to be told about historical reality, that being-in-the-world is to be in a world that is always "already marked by linguistic practice" and structures of meaning (1984, 81). Yet Ricoeur's model of discourse moves away from the focus on discursive *forms*, and emphasizes the etymological meaning of discourse as a *movement* "to and fro": a referential movement backward and forward between textual mediations, and a material, affective world (ibid., 78; see also 2004, 179). He describes this as a dynamic "dialectic of event and meaning" governing the semantic autonomy or "distanciation" of the text (ibid.).[28] While it could be argued that Ricoeur's presentation of split reference can tend toward a dualistic depiction of event and language, my understanding is that it effectively expresses the *interdependence* between event and language. As Reinhardt Koselleck explains:

> Historical events are not possible without linguistic activity; the experience gained from these events cannot be communicated except through language. However, neither events nor experiences are exhausted by their linguistic articulation. There are numerous extra-linguistic factors that enter into every event, and there are levels of experience that escape linguistic determination . . . Stated more generally, language and history depend on each other but never coincide. (Koselleck 2004, 22)

This idea of a noncoincidental interdependence between historical language and historical events takes us beyond the structuralist notion of historical reality as a "reality effect" or a realm "outside" language. Instead, it gestures toward a more nuanced understanding of historical reality, as a discursively mediated form of reality that nevertheless is irreducible to language. To elaborate further, I will now turn to Ricoeur's concept of the trace. This is particularly important, as it gives a stronger account of the *temporality* of the interdependent, reciprocal relation between past happenings and historical configurations.

The Trace

The concept of the trace is vital to Ricoeur's philosophy of history because the constraint imposed by the trace of the past is precisely what makes historical narratives distinct from fictive interpretations of reality. In its most basic sense, he explains, the trace refers to the documents and artifacts of the historical archive, which incur a "kind of debt" to the past upon historical discourse and "demand an endless *rectification* on its part" (2009, 371). [29] White would object here that Ricoeur's notion of a "debt" to the past inclines history toward a backward-looking conservatism, via a commitment to the "dead truths of the past" (Kellner 2009, 4). Moreover, as feminists have consistently pointed out, archives are ideologically formed: conserving or "housing" those documents and artifacts that meet the criteria of visibility and worth, as determined by those with authority to sanction and preserve.[30] However, Ricoeur's concept of the trace does not depend solely on the empirical trace as embodied in the existing archive, document, or artifact. Ultimately, he argues, the source of the authority of the archive and the historical document stems from the ontological presupposition that "the past has left a trace, which has become the archives and documents that bear witness to the past" (1988, 184). The trace, Ricoeur explains, is thus a more "radical phenomenon" than the document or archive (ibid.). In coming to *stand for* the past, claims Ricoeur, the trace is a representation of the indirect referential link between past and present. The "reality of the historical past" consists in this substitution of the past by the trace that it leaves behind:

> Inasmuch as [the trace] is *left* by the past, it *stands for* the past, it 'represents' the past, not in the sense that the past itself would appear in

> the mind (Vorstellung) but in the sense that the trace takes place of (Vertretung) the past, absent from historical discourse . . . [Taking-the-place-of] characterizes the indirect reference specific to knowledge through traces and distinguishes from any other the referential mode of the history of the past. This referential mode is inseparable from the work of configuration itself: for it is only by means of the unending rectification of our configurations that we form an idea of the inexhaustible resources of the past. (Ricoeur 2009, 365)

The ontological status of the trace is thus essentially paradoxical. On the one hand, the trace is visible to present perception as a vestige or empirical mark that takes the place of the past: "The passage is no longer but the trace remains" (Ricoeur 1988, 119).[31] On the other hand, the empirical trace is a marker of absence, as it "indicates the pastness of the past without showing or bringing to appearance what passed" (ibid.). Moreover, while the trace is a representation of the survival of the past into the present, it is nevertheless dependent upon the work of configuration to become absorbed into the meaningful reality of the present. The trace, Ricoeur writes, is therefore "one of the more enigmatic instruments by which history refigures time . . . it does so by constructing the junction brought about by the overlapping of the existential and the empirical in the significance of the trace" (ibid., 125–6).

A key advantage of Ricoeur's concept of the trace is that it is not simply an abstract notion, but rather has a practical grounding. It is empirical traces or "marks," and the practical construction of historical narratives on the basis of these, that keep the reality of the historical past in play. "If the trace is a more radical phenomenon than the document or the archive," Ricoeur writes, "it is nevertheless the use of documents and archives that makes the trace an actual operator of historical time" (ibid., 184). In other words, it is the practical work of tracing the past that connects our collective presents and futures to our collective pasts, and enables a sense of historical time to come into being. However, Ricoeur's extension of the trace beyond the merely empirical is equally crucial because it accounts for the intention to somehow grasp past realities, even when no empirical traces or marks have survived into the present as "marks" or "sign-effects." "The past event," he writes, "however absent it may be from present perception, nonetheless governs the historical intentionality" (Ricoeur 1984, 82). Writers of feminist and women's history, for example, have consistently had to contend with the absence of documentation of women's lives. Nevertheless, feminist historians have developed a sophisticated

and creative engagement with traces embedded in records of seemingly banal or trivial events; even in archival absences or silences themselves which, after all, can tell us something about past realities. Such versatility in pursuit of the traces of women's pasts testifies to the significance of the more "radical" sense of the trace as a historical ontology.

With its overlapping existential and empirical aspects, Ricoeur's ontology of the trace aptly captures the movement of history between presence and absence, and provides an alternative account of the reality of the historical past that could be extremely valuable within feminist historiography. On Ricoeur's account, the reality of the historical past is not conceived as a complete sum of unmediated "raw facts," but neither is it "set aside" or reduced to a linguistic "reality effect." Rather, it emerges in the interplay between the fragmentary and indeterminate traces of past happenings that spill over into the present, and the "work of configuration" that keeps those traces, and thus the reality of the historical past, in play. This gives us another way of theorizing the "noncoincidental" or asymmetrical interdependence between past happenings and historical interpretation. On the one hand, the way in which a happening or event is interpreted and configured becomes part of the event's reality. This requires a reflexive awareness around what we bring to historical enquiry and the making of history. But on the other hand, a past event will always exceed any one specific interpretation or conceptualization. Hence what it means, what it meant—and therefore what it "was" or "is"—is always ambiguous and in process. Shoshana Felman writes of this eloquently, arguing that history (in the sense of the happening of the event) "outruns narrative, as though the narrative did not quite have time to catch its breath and catch up with history, to catch up with the full significance as well as the abruptness, the overwhelming aspect of the crisis and of the change that history has meant" (Felman 2000, 264).

The temporality of this dynamic model of historical reality—whereby the historical narrative configures the past event but is nevertheless "outrun" by it—is much richer than the presentism of the narrativist approach. White, for example, claims that the historical past is "constituted backwards," because history is only ever written as part of a contest in the present "between contending poetic figurations of what the past *might* consist of" (White 2009, 363). However, this claim implicitly disavows the historicity of our linguistic and interpretative frameworks, which do not simply materialize out of thin air in the present. White places considerable emphasis on

the capacity of the historian to "choose" the linguistic model they adopt to represent historical reality, thereby overstating the break between past and present, and the extent to which we can distance ourselves from, and thus "choose" a perspective on, the past.[32] In contrast, Ricoeur's account of historical reality acknowledges the determinative role of the past as well as that of the present, and takes seriously our "being-affected" by the past. This means that past and present cannot be treated independently of the other, as there is a mutual determination of the present by the past and the past by the present. In this sense, I suggest, the time of the trace operates as a "two-way" temporality, as the historical past is constituted through a "backwards-forwards" movement between present and past.

In turn, this dynamic model of historical reality opens up a way of rethinking historical truth, because if "truth" means the "agreement of an idea with reality," it follows that historical truth-telling is also a dynamic, ongoing process that can never be "drained" of interpretation (Alcoff 2003, 251). As Battersby argues, there is no one fixed historical truth, only a "temporally enfolded complex of symbols, traces, feelings, moods that invite us to confront the 'givens' that are made mysterious via encodement with the multiplicity of paths that might have led from the past" (Battersby 1998, 171). Like Ricoeur, Battersby draws on Nietzsche's essay "'On Truth and Lies" as she considers the relation between historical knowledges and past events.[33] As we have seen, in Nietzsche's account, we "forget" material, affective encounters, and events as we form concepts and truths; yet, these forgotten singularities do not simply disappear. Rather, what is excluded or forgotten persists as a trace or an echo, with the potential to disturb our sedimented conceptual understanding of reality, or as Nietzsche puts it, "smash it to pieces" (Battersby 2007, 188; Nietzsche 2006c, 117). Battersby further extends this reading of Nietzsche by drawing on a passage in *Beyond Good and Evil*: "The greatest events and thoughts are understood last. The sexes, generations or races[34] that are simultaneous with them do not live through such events – they live right past them" (quoted in Battersby 2007, 185; see also Nietzsche 2006a, 358). "Untimely" events, as Nietzsche suggests here, pass us by because they do not conform to our existing frameworks of understanding. But this does not mean that they simply fade into nothing. Rather, "there is an 'event' (*Ereignis*) and a 'something' (*Etwas*) awaiting the encounter . . . an indefinite something already there – waiting to be registered" (Battersby 2007, 186).[35]

What this implies is that our understandings of historical truth and reality are constantly being reworked, as traces of past events

reemerge from within the fringes and folds of our established histories. This does not mean that we are free to reinvent any historical truth or narrative we wish, due to the constraint of the archive and the historical imperative of truth-telling guided by the ontological presupposition of the trace (Ricoeur 1988, 184). Neither does it mean that any historical object can sustain an infinite number of interpretations. The truth claims we make can be placed under scrutiny, in light of resources that survive into the present and "take the place of" the past (Ricoeur 2009, 365). But as Koselleck contends, while sources may have the "power of veto" and can "prevent us from making statements that we should not make," a source "can never tell us what we ought to say." This is why we need a politics and theory of history: precisely because "there is always more at stake in historical knowledge than what is contained in the sources" (Koselleck 2004, 150–1). Echoes and traces of the past will not survive or be preserved in the same way; and will be received, understood, and reactivated differently by differently situated subjects. "Knowledge through traces," therefore, is an "indirect" kind of knowledge with a contextual, interpretative character that cannot be assessed according to empiricist or positivist criteria. It can only ever have the character of likelihood, plausibility or credibility, rather than "apodictic certainty."[36] And this is what makes historical truth-telling an imperfect, yet urgent and inexhaustible practice (Ricoeur 2009, 365).

Restless Revisionism

The discussions above have outlined a dynamic account of historical reality, premised upon the noncoincidental, asymmetrical interdependence between event and language, and the "two-way" temporality of the trace. This account allows us to uphold the challenge to naïve historical realism, while nevertheless allowing for continuities or links between historical narratives constructed in the present and events as they happened in the past. It thus enables criteria for accountability that are not restricted to methods or techniques of storytelling and, moreover, leaves room for revisionist projects that can coexist with, and mutually inform, critical historiographical methodologies focused on representational strategies.

This kind of revisionism is different to the naïve revisionism that Hemmings warns us against. Hemmings, we can recall, makes two key arguments against revisionist projects that "return" to the archives to "set the story straight." In the first instance, she claims, by asking "what really happened?", the revisionist implicitly disavows

the selective nature of history-writing, and positions herself as an "innocent" enquirer (Hemmings 2007, 73). Her second argument is that revisionism can lead to the reinstatement of master narratives and a fixed perspective on the past when revisionist accounts claim to have "corrected" previous versions (ibid., 72). However, the model of historical reality developed above gives rise to a different kind of revisionism that is not aligned to a fantasy of innocence or objectivity, and nor does it tend toward master narratives that "close down" the past. Indeed, it is aimed toward opening up the past, and can be described as a "restless revisionism" that operates in three historiographical modes: *active*, *reflexive*, and *receptive*.

The active mode consists in taking the initiative and asking "what really happened?" in order to generate alternative historical narratives. This is crucial in overturning the hegemonic narratives that have become so deeply entrenched and have had such a strong and problematic influence within feminist theory and discourse. Moreover, as Dana Heller points out, popular culture, at the least in the United States, has become very successful in either promoting various "ministers of antifeminist backlash," or in altering and/or dismissing popular memories of feminist struggle.[37] "Given the tendency of neoconservative national myth to empty history of feminism and given popular culture's coding of feminism as time-sensitive, antiquated, and bygone", she argues, it is becoming increasingly vital that feminists "take the lead in the redirection of popular and political discourses, remembering feminist histories in all their variation and belligerency" (Heller 2002, 96). According to Ricoeur's account of metaphor, "dead" or "worn-out metaphors," enshrined in catalogued meaning, can be disrupted and broken apart through the emergence of "living metaphors," that "tell us something new about reality" and provoke fresh perspectives (Ricoeur 1978, 291). So if the "wave" metaphor, for example, is a worn-out metaphor that constricts the way that feminist narratives can be mapped and constructed, we need to generate different metaphors, through actively seeking out forgotten traces and fragments of feminist pasts. Alternative historical narratives, in Heller's words, can be "set into motion by the trope of 'found footage', or the discovery of documented images and voices that tell us something we need to know about the past." Such images and voices can of course be appropriated for antifeminist agendas, but they may also serve as "metaphoric evidence of vanished possibilities, heroic gains heretofore unrecognized, and invitations to reconsider the consequences of feminism's struggles to continue itself, to reproduce itself through time" (Heller 2002, 85).

This kind of active revisionism brings forth new narratives; but it need not construct a new master narrative as a "finished product." The documents and artifacts of the historical archive, in Ricoeur's words, "incur a kind of debt to the past upon historical discourse and demand an endless rectification on its part" (2009, 371). Though the term "rectification" used here by Ricoeur does perhaps suggest replacement, or an increase in "correctness," I want to emphasize the term "*endless*" instead, which recasts the project of revisionism in process-oriented terms. As argued above, the meaning of a historical event is dependent upon the ongoing work of configuration and interpretation: what it "is" or "was" cannot be settled once and for all. And while traces of the past spill over into the present, the past is not given directly as "raw fact"; nor is it given in the same way for everyone. From this perspective, different narratives do not need to agree or aggregate into a comprehensive master narrative to tell us something about feminist ideas or practices that took place in the past.[38] As Sasha Roseneil writes of her collection of narratives about the Greenham Common Women's Peace Camp in the United Kingdom in the 1980s: "There is no one story of Greenham to be told. To attempt to pin down the diverse experiences which constituted Greenham in order to construct a seamless chronological narrative would be to do grave injury to the constantly changing character of Greenham, to the multiplicity of stories of Greenham, the many Greenhams which existed in the lives of the women who composed it and which live on in their memories" (Roseneil 2000, 7). It is not the case that one story of Greenham will be right, and hence another will be wrong; or that they need to tessellate or fill in one another's gaps to make up a "complete" picture. Rather, each story can tell us something meaningful about past realities through different interpretative frameworks and filters in the present.

The importance of the "work of configuration," moreover, demands a reflexive mode of practice, as we ask "why do I want to tell this story, and in telling it, what kind of subject do I become?" (Hemmings 2005, 119). Deborah Withers has described this as an "engaged" approach that is fully immersed in the knowledge politics that permeate historical work, and attentive to the selective, partisan nature of historical practice. Such an approach is well exemplified by Roseneil in her work on Greenham Common, and also by Withers in her archival research into "Sistershow": a feminist theatre troupe based in Bristol in the United Kingdom between 1973 and 1975 (Withers 2011).[39] Withers' analysis of the project contains many reflexive insights as she considers her role as curator and

researcher, and she does not claim that the narrative she constructs is in any way "definitive" or that it should "replace" existing narratives about feminism in the 1970s. The point, rather, is to "bring in an unruly, undisciplined historical narrative," which unsettles or "playfully trouble[s]" those narratives that present "second wave" 1970s feminism as puritanical and heterosexist (Withers and Chidgey 2010, 312). Highlighting "queer tendencies" and "camp aesthetics" within *Sistershow* performances and practices—tendencies and aesthetics that are usually associated with "third wave" feminism—the intention is to "jam dominant trajectories" and subvert the "straighter" hegemonic narratives of the women's movement (ibid., 312). As such, the project enables "*Sistershow* happenings" to open up and "expand the conditions of existence of contemporary feminism," by releasing the traces of those past feminist events within the present (ibid., 312).

In this sense, then, as well as harnessing the reflexive and active aspects of historical practice, a restless revisionism also entails a receptive attitude. This "receptiveness" is not an innocence, but rather a willingness to be transformed or surprised by encounters with past feminisms that have long been forgotten, or had never been within our orbit. This more receptive element of historical research often finds expression in researchers' claims that a topic "found me," or in feelings of disbelief or delight: "were there *really* feminists in the 1970s doing such things?" (Withers 2011, 3) For instance, as well as reflecting on archival encounters with 1970s women's liberation movements, Withers also reflects on her encounters with the cultural legacies of the UK suffrage movement: "On display there were board games, figurines, cards, classical anthems, images of theatrical processions, tea towels, scripts and costumes. And as I have grazed through other suffrage histories that sometimes rise to surface . . . I have learnt about tree planting, UK caravan tours, vegetarian tearooms, international lecture tours, newspapers and playful (gender bending) activist antics." Although dominant narratives of the suffrage movement tend to reduce all forms of activism to the goal of "getting the vote," Withers affirms how these objects and images can provoke new understandings of the movement and, in turn, open new possibilities in the present: "[They] bring different worlds to life, the culture that emerged around suffrage activism . . . a different social arrangement that rewrote the rules of what women could do and be, either as individuals, or in relation to each other" (Withers, forthcoming).[40]

According to the dynamic account of historical reality opened up by Ricoeur among others, the historical past is not only constituted "backwards," through the way that we frame and narrate the past.

It also depends upon a "forwards" movement: the overflow of the past into the present, as traces of past events and ideas interrupt the present, and can provoke new ways of thinking or acting. "The allure of 'what really happened,'" as Hesford writes, "lies precisely in its capacity to draw us backward to a past that confounds and eludes us, while simultaneously providing arresting images and found objects that can incite new concepts, new ways of life, and new narratives of explanation in the present" (Hesford 2013, 267–8). When we open ourselves up to this two-way temporality, which oscillates back and forth between past and present, we cultivate not only an active and reflexive attitude but, further, a receptivity to the past. We are, it is true, never innocent of what we might find; but we *can* be surprised by it, hence the subversive power of history.

Conclusion

The primary aim of this chapter has been to suggest ways of overcoming the limitations of narrativist or structuralist historiography, but without reverting to a naïve historical realism. To do so, I have proposed a dynamic understanding of historical reality, premised upon the two-way temporality of the trace and the asymmetrical interdependence between historical interpretations and past events. On the one hand, the historical interpretation or representation can be understood as *part* of the "happening" of history. The ways in which events are recorded and narrated are caught up in the "happening" of the event at the time, and further, significantly determine the ways in which past events are then received and reactivated in the present. Indeed, the events of history always belong to an interpretative chain of telling and retelling; as I discuss in the following chapter, every lived, narrated event is part of a wider narrative web. This is not to claim, however, that linguistic mediation exhausts history to the extent that linguistic analysis is all that need concern us. Rather, past events can always "outrun" or exceed our capacities to narrate and represent them, which means that the practice of tracing the past is necessarily incomplete and ongoing.

I want to end now by drawing out more clearly the implications of the discussions above for a theory of historical time. In one sense, as Hayden White argues, history is indeed "constituted backwards," according to the kinds of questions we ask and the interpretative frameworks that predominate in the present. Yet, by bringing the past event back into the frame, we can reconceptualize the process of historical enquiry as not only a movement "backwards" from present

to past, but more of a two-way "backwards-forwards" movement between past and present, as the past event spills over into the present in the form of a trace: a sign-effect that, in turn, orients us "back in time." This not only challenges the presentist model that confines historiographical enquiry to the workings of the present but, further, challenges the linear model whereby historical knowledge moves ever forward as it grows inevitably more expansive and sophisticated. Rethinking revisionism as a restless process encourages a receptivity and openness to the past, as well as an awareness of how we shape and direct our understanding of the past from the position of hindsight in the present. The chapter has therefore explained one way in which the temporality of history can be understood as multilinear and multidirectional, that is, through considering the dynamic oscillation between the interpretative workings of the present and the provocative traces of the past. It has also begun to articulate historical time as a lived, practical time. This is implicit in Ricoeur's claim that while the trace is "a more radical phenomenon than the document or the archive…it is nevertheless the use of documents and archives that makes the trace an *actual operator* of historical time" (1988, 184, emphasis added). The following chapter will build on this idea of historical time as an "operationalized" time, further considering the role that narrative structuration plays in configuring historical time.

CHAPTER 3

Narrative Time

Historical narratives are bound to archives and traces of the past, which provoke and give sustenance to the restless pursuit of past realities. Yet, historical narratives are equally dependent upon the work of configuration, which determines how traces of the past are taken up in the present, and thus how historical time is lived and conceived. The previous chapter examined the complex "two-way" temporality of the trace, focusing on the indirect referential mode of historical narratives. But we need to further consider the temporal structures of narrative itself, and the ways in which historical events and trajectories can be temporalized through narrative configuration. Accordingly, this chapter will explore in more detail the relationship between historical time and narrative time: the time of beginnings, middles, and ends; flashbacks and flash-forwards; turning points and returns.

There has been a significant level of feminist suspicion directed toward narrative histories. This is due to the synthesizing properties of narrative, which can have the effect of sealing up or masking the restlessness of the past, transforming indeterminacy and contingency into determinateness and finality. Once we have arranged past events into a recognizable narrative form, the depicted course of events can attain an aura of inevitability and appear to be "closed." As Judith Roof puts it, narrative constantly reproduces the "phantom of a whole . . . [an] apparently unified vision of the truths of existence" (Roof 1996a, xv). Narrative configuration can thus reinforce linear, totalizing understandings of history as "one complete story," and in turn, the linear, master-narrative model of feminist history. Nonetheless, it is extremely difficult to *escape* narrative, given its pervasiveness: "Narrative is so subtly and ubiquitously operative that I cannot even define it except through narrative – a narrative of narrative . . . " (ibid.). Thus, as Rita Felski suggests: "Instead of trying to 'transcend' narrative, feminists would do better to admit . . . [we] are

enmeshed in story and history. Yet the political and cultural meanings of feminist stories are not always obvious…We need to think about how they circulate, how they are used, what kind of work they do" (Felski 2000, 145).

The analysis in this chapter, however, will approach the dynamics and politics of feminist storytelling via a slightly different set of questions: Is there a distinction between "real" historical time and the time of narrative? Are narrative temporalities "internal" or "external" to historical time? Are stories lived or simply told? Such philosophical questions may seem somewhat removed from the specific concerns of feminist historiography; but the guiding idea of this book is that feminist historiography needs to engage with these kinds of questions, as we develop alternative concepts of historical time that can inform and support transformed historiographical practices. As such, the chapter will give a theoretical account of the relationship between historical time and narrative time, considering the practical and political implications for feminist historiography in the latter sections.

The key argument running through the chapter will be that narrative structures and temporalities can be understood as intertwined and "internal" to historical time, rather than a form of temporalization that is external or secondary. In the first instance, narratives play a hugely significant role in determining our identities and perspectives on the world. Who "I" am, or who "we" are, depends upon the stories we are told about ourselves, our relations with others, and our position within specific sociohistorical situations. Not only do we tell stories, but "stories tell us" (Bennett and Royle 1995, 41). Moreover, we often go through our lives with a sense of beginnings, endings, turning points and so on, even if a "complete" narrative account can only be provided in retrospect. Narrative configurations can therefore play a crucial role in determining how historical events are lived and how they unfold: at the time of their occurrence, and also as they become absorbed and re-lived as part of a broader historical memory.

To develop this theoretical understanding, the chapter will first consider David Carr's phenomenological account of the "affinity" between lived time and narrative configuration. It will then build on this account with a critical hermeneutical analysis, drawing primarily upon Reinhardt Koselleck's hermeneutics of historical time and the "pluritopic hermeneutics" expounded by Walter Mignolo. While Koselleck offers a "hermeneutical key" to understanding the role that narrative plays in enabling different experiences of historical time and possibility, Mignolo emphasizes the coexistence of multiple horizons

of intelligibility and meaning, and the significance of heterogeneous and competing narratives. This emphasis, I argue, is crucial as we build a multilinear model of historical time, and a historiographical practice that can allow multiple feminist narratives and temporalities to be articulated and deployed.

Narrative Configuration and Lived Time

In *Time, Narrative and History* (1986), David Carr argues that lived experience is complex and structured, or "configured," and in this sense, there is an "affinity" between narrative configuration and the temporal structures of lived events. Further, as lived events are the "building blocks" or basic components of history, we can understand the relationship between lived time, historical time, and narrative in terms of a continuum. In making this argument, one of Carr's primary aims is to refute the dualistic approach found in structuralist historiography, which treats historical time and narrative time as fundamentally separate temporal orders. On this dualistic model, the "time of history" is treated as a simple, chronological order of events unfolding in a sequence. In contrast, narrative time or the "time of the history book" is treated as a secondary, "external" representative schema, which reconfigures the temporality of historical events only after they have occurred, through a more complex narrative structuration (Barthes 1970, 147).[1] From this perspective, stories are not lived, they are told: first comes the sequence of events, and then comes the narrative.

This kind of dualism can be found in Hayden White's work, for example, when he suggests that narrative imposes a temporal order upon sets of events that *in themselves* they do not have. We can recall from chapter 2 that White argues there are no epistemologically certain grounds upon which any mode of historical representation can claim to be more "realistic" than another. Yet at the same time, he suggests in an essay on "The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality" (1980) that non-narrative histories, which "refuse to tell a story," do in fact come closer to representing the "real" nature of events unfolding in time. It is annals and chronicles, he argues, rather than historical narratives, that ultimately come closest to representing reality as it "presents itself": either "as mere sequence without beginning or end or as sequences of beginnings that only terminate and never conclude" (ibid., 27). Narrative representations of reality in the form of a story, he claims, are "marked by a desire for a kind of order and fullness in an account of reality that

remains *theoretically unjustified*... wear(ing) the mask of a meaning, the completeness and fullness of which we can only imagine, never experience" (ibid., 20–4).

From a phenomenological perspective, however, the claim that reality "presents itself" as "mere sequence" is glaringly false. Indeed, to say that reality is given in mere sequence seems to forgo any kind of analysis of temporal experience altogether. Such claims, arguably, stem from what Husserl calls the "natural attitude," whereby naturalistic or commonsense models of time and reality are taken for granted, such that the way in which "temporal objects" are actually perceived and experienced is overlooked. Ostensibly, White is theoretically committed to a position that confines itself to the text and remains agnostic about matters of historical reality and real time. However, White does imply that historical time is "really" and simply sequential or chronological, prior to being configured through narrative structuration. By failing to adequately qualify the term "reality," Carr argues, White thereby succumbs to reductive commonsense presumptions about how historical time "really" is: "Human reality, in order to make good on the contrast between 'art' and 'life', is... construed according to the model of the ticking clock" (Carr 1986, 20).[2]

To demonstrate the implausibility of the claim that reality "presents itself" in "mere sequence," Carr draws upon Husserl's account of internal time consciousness. As discussed in chapter 1, Husserl's method is to bracket the "natural attitude," and examine the structures of consciousness that enable us to experience "temporal objects," such as a melody, as complex temporal wholes. His key claim is that the structures of time-consciousness are "retentional" and "protentional": a "sinking," "shading," or "running-off phenomenon... a continuity of constant transformations... not severable into parts which could be by themselves nor divisible into phases, points of the continuity" (Husserl 1964, 48). In the example of hearing a melody, these structures make it possible for a subject to retain a tonal phase that has just passed and to anticipate the imminent phase, such that what she experiences is a melody, and not simply a punctuated series of tonal phases, one after the other. "The temporal phases of my hearing," as Carr explains it, "stand in the same part-whole relation to each other as do the notes of the melody I hear. Just as each note is experienced as part of the melody as a whole, so the experience of it is lived through as part of the complex experience of the melody" (Carr 1986, 27–8).

Husserl's analysis thereby renders the phenomenological present entirely distinct from the point-like instant of serial or chronological time (Husserl 1964, 107). Unlike the point-like instant, the

phenomenological present contains the "totality of the temporal spectrum within itself" (Osborne 1995, 49–50). As such, the phenomenological schema of past, present, and future, as "modes of temporal orientation," cannot be reduced to, or even mapped on to, a serial or chronological succession of instants (Husserl 1964, 48). Indeed, not only does the phenomenological account fundamentally differentiate experiential temporality from the serial temporality of simple chronology; it also raises the question of whether a "mere sequence" of events, while thinkable or conceivable in an abstract sense, is in fact *experiencable* at all (Carr 1986, 24). According to Husserl, the idea of a simple succession of instants is a secondary, conceptual construction that arises when the present, which serves as the "perpetual source" of the retentional-protentional series, is abstracted from the durational continuity it establishes (Husserl 1964, 50). On this account, the idea of a chronological historical time can be posited as a "secondary" or "derived" time, in contrast to the phenomenological primacy of retentional-protentional lived time. Hence the phenomenological account in effect *reverses* the structuralist notion that "mere sequence" comes first. "It is the 'mere sequence,'" Carr contends, "that has turned out to be fictional, in the sense that we speak of a 'theoretical fiction'" (Carr 1986, 25).

In fact, there are problems with trying to derive an account of chronological, sequential time entirely through the phenomenological reduction, which Carr does not adequately acknowledge. As Ricoeur points out, "the perception of duration never ceases to presuppose the duration of perception, and hence a time to which the subject is subjected, as much as a time which it constitutes" (Ricoeur 1988, 24). Further, Husserl regularly "borrows" from the natural sciences in his "primary" phenomenological descriptions of lived time, relying upon notions of objective simultaneity, or objective equality between intervals of time (ibid.) Even for Husserl, then, it seems the phenomenological reduction can never be entirely successful, which implies that a "pure phenomenology of time" is impossible (ibid., 83). Nevertheless, we can retain the basic Husserlian proposal that "retention" and "protention" belong to even the most basic level of passive, pre-reflective experience. As such, Husserl's analysis of "inner time consciousness" is valuable in refuting the structuralist proposition that reality "presents itself" as "mere sequence," and that complex temporal configurations are a secondary literary phenomenon.

For Carr, moreover, the Husserlian analysis can also help us uncover the link between *historical time* and narrative. Husserl's phenomenological account demonstrates that temporal "configuration"

inheres in experience itself. This, Carr suggests, implies it also inheres in lived *events*, which are the basic elements of lived histories and historical narratives. The idea of an "event," he writes, is already of something that has "temporal thickness," because events are experienced as the "phases and elements of other, larger-scale events and processes. These make up the temporal configurations, like melodies and other daily occurrences and happenings, that are the stuff of our daily experience. Even though as temporal they unfold bit by bit, we experience them *as* configurations thanks to our retentional and protentional 'gaze' which spans future and past" (ibid., 24).

Carr's analysis of the temporality of the "event" thus extends the concepts of "retention" and "protention" beyond the Husserlian account (which considers pre-reflective or passive experience like hearing a melody) to include the temporality of our active, practical lives. Like passive experience, Carr argues, action can be considered as an event that the actor "lives through," and whichever stage of the action she is located in, she has "a kind of 'prospective' and 'retrospective' 'grasp'" of the past and future elements of the action (ibid., 34). This "grasp" effects a kind of "closure which articulates time by separating the given temporal configuration (action or event) from what goes before or after" (ibid., 41). The example Carr uses here is of a person serving a tennis ball: an action where the different phases are integrated into one another and cannot be reduced to a simple chronological sequence. "The intimate and complementary interrelation of present, future, and past…is an important part of action, or at least of a relatively short-term action such as that of hitting a tennis ball" (ibid., 34). In this sense, Carr contends, the temporality of action is comparable to the temporality of pre-reflective or passive experience; hence, the concepts of "retention" and "protention" have a wider applicability than the phenomenology of internal, passive, or pre-reflective time-consciousness.

The key argument, then, is that "the bedrock of human events is not 'mere sequence' but 'configured sequence'…[which] inheres in the most basic of lived events and actions." If configured temporal structures inhere in phenomena at this most basic level, Carr claims, then "it cannot be maintained that they are imported from outside" and achieved "only at the hand of literary invention" (ibid., 49). Instead, there is a kind of rudimentary "narrative structure" within certain prefigured features of time-consciousness and action, out of which fully fledged literary and verbalized narratives arise (Carr 1986, 16). However, while there may be an "affinity" between narrative configuration and lived time at this basic small-scale level, narrative is not associated with only

such basic actions and experiences as Carr describes, like hearing a melody or serving a tennis ball. The function of a narrative is not only to describe or report simple, everyday phenomena, but rather, to convey complex sequences and complex configurations that involve more than just one experiencing and acting individual. Historical time, moreover, is a large-scale time that involves multiple people and stretches far beyond an individual's inner time consciousness.

The utility of first-person phenomenology in explaining the relationship between historical time and narrative is therefore limited. The capacity to develop a historical consciousness, and to construct or follow a narrative, does of course depend to an extent upon the subjective structures and modes of time-consciousness. Any philosophy of history, as Robert Burns points out, does *presuppose* individual consciousness (Burns 2000b, 220). Yet, while Carr manages to effectively overturn the structuralist idea that at some basic level historical events are merely sequential in their temporality, his method of beginning with a phenomenology of internal time-consciousness and only then moving "outwards" toward a theory of intersubjective historical time runs into difficulties. The move from subjectivity to intersubjectivity, or "from I to We," requires an extension of the notion of experience, such that an individual can speak of "our" experience, even if she has had no such experience directly (ibid., 133). In the case of historical time, this is particularly crucial, as the "we" both predates and survives the individuals that constitute the "we" at any given time. But when we try to reach a collective singular—"we"—through a first-person phenomenological methodology, there is a tendency to think in reductive and generic terms (Oksala 2006, 239).[3] Husserl's phenomenological reduction claims to bracket not only the "object-in-itself" but, further, on the subjective side, aspects of the concrete, social person with all that this includes of embodied, social, sexual, gendered, and racialized difference (ibid.). As Alia Al-Saji argues:

> The consciousness that results is not only an empty, pure ego, it is also a universalized (masculine) consciousness that has been produced by the exclusion of (feminine) body, and hence implicitly relies on the elision of sexual difference. The phenomenological method's claim to 'neutrality' thus appears rooted in a form of double forgetfulness that serves to normalize, and validate, the standpoint of the phenomenological observer. (Al-Saji, 2010)[4]

Feminist theorists have become acutely aware of the problems that arise when we try and move "outwards" from the subjective level of

individual consciousness and experience to the intersubjective and the social. This kind of inside-out method has resulted in generalizing presumptions about "women's experience," based upon the experiences of just one individual or distinct group of women (Mohanty 1995). Feminists have also been sharply critical of the "epistemological foundationalism" that ensues when we treat experience as a source for knowledge that needs no further interrogation or interpretation (Scott 1991; Stoller 2009).[5] Cultural theorists and historians alike have argued that "experiential facts" always come with an "interpretative overlay," thereby stressing the need to theorize and interpret the sociohistorical norms, institutions, and practices that shape experience (Battersby 2006, 209). Just as importantly, feminist psychoanalytic theorists have stressed the role of *unconscious* structures and attachments (Brennan 2000; Minsky 1996). "Experience," therefore, must not be taken as an unproblematic foundation for knowledge, but rather as a complex and intersubjective "field of experience" to be critically considered and interpreted (Stoller 2009, 716).

Consequently, while phenomenological analyses may overcome the dualisms of structuralist historiography by establishing a continuity or "affinity" between lived time and narrative configuration, the relationship between historical time and narrative time cannot be adequately theorized via the first-person standpoint of classical phenomenology. As Alfred Shutz explains, individuals' "inner time" does not provide an adequate temporal structure for the intersubjective life-world. In communicating with others, we engage in interpretative activity, and through this intersubjective engagement, a "new dimension of time" is established (Shutz 1982, 219; see also Weiss 2011, 182). This requires a different kind of analysis and a different set of theoretical tools.

Shifting Configurations of Historical Time

To move beyond the first-person standpoint of phenomenology, the chapter will now take a hermeneutical turn. In its narrowest sense, hermeneutics refers to the interpretation of texts; but I draw here on the ontologically oriented hermeneutical tradition associated with Martin Heidegger, Hans Georg Gadamer, and Paul Ricoeur, which anchors the practice of interpretation within the dynamics of historical existence. The key idea behind this kind of philosophical hermeneutics is that consciousness is "historically effected" (Gadamer 1975, 301). Any kind of understanding or interpretation depends upon a

historical situatedness, and a background or "forestructure" of prior engagement and involvement (ibid., 269), which may not immediately "present itself" for phenomenological analysis but requires reflexive interpretation to be made explicit (Dahlstrom 2010, 408).[6] Hermeneutical interpretation therefore "aims at making explicit its own conditions of interpretation," including first, the historical character of the interpreter; second, the experience, event, object, or text to be interpreted; and third, the concepts and frameworks by means of which they are to be interpreted (ibid., 409–10).

The historical character of interpretation means that any hermeneutical operation is inevitably circular, though in fact, Daniel Dahlstrom argues that the process is better envisaged as a "helical" rather than a circular motion, "moving forward by moving back" (ibid., 412). When the interpreter reflects on the conditions of interpretation, "the return is not so much a turn back as it is a turn forward to the conditions as they are considered in the present . . . in view of something projected (hoped for, feared, awaited . . .) as the future" (ibid., 411). To appreciate the historical character of interpretation is to appreciate the difference between past and present, but also to recognize the open-ended, future horizons of interpretation. This means that any interpretation is characterized by a mix of presence and absence, determinacy and indeterminacy (ibid.). Or as Ricoeur explains it, there is an interplay between expectation, tradition, and the "untimely upheaval of the present" (Ricoeur 1988, 103).

In *Time and Narrative*, Ricoeur describes the hermeneutical circle in terms of an interrelation between three "mimetic" modes, as he considers the relationship between lived time and narrative configuration.[7] In Ricoeur's mimetic formulation, "Mimesis 1" denotes the prefigured, "forestructured" world of action and experience with its practical and symbolic resources: the level of everyday temporality, practice, and interpretation. "Mimesis 2" refers to the formal configuration of a particular historical or fictional narrative, where time is narrated via grammatical and poetic apparatuses. "Mimesis 3," finally, designates the refigured world of action and experience: a world made anew via the work of configuration at Mimesis 2, as our temporal experience is refigured by this constructed, narrated time (ibid., 53–4). Mimesis 3 thus marks the "intersection between the world of the text and the world of the reader or listener" (1988, 159). It is a "circle," but never a closed circle, because the fundamentally open structure of lived time and action means that the textual configurations at the level of Mimesis 2 can shape and refigure lived time, but can never be fully enclosing or determining (Osborne 1995, 53).

From a hermeneutical perspective, then, the possibility of any interpretation or configuration of historical time depends upon the "forestructures" of everyday lived time. But conversely, the way that historical time is configured within historical narratives affects the lived experience of time. This is one sense in which the hermeneutical circle operates in relation to historical time: the way we live time determines the stories we tell, and the stories we tell determine the way we live time. But the hermeneutical circle is also at work in the sense that historical time is conditioned by history. That is, historical time must be understood in relation to the historical conditions and horizons that make possible certain articulations of historical experience and time. As Reinhardt Koselleck puts it: historical time "alters along with history" (2004, 259).

This is the guiding idea behind Koselleck's hermeneutics of historical time, as he attempts to grasp the shifting temporal structures of historical time via two "meta-historical" concepts: the "space of experience" and the "horizon of expectation." These concepts are appropriate for the treatment of historical time, he argues, because of the way that "they embody past and future . . . they do so by demonstrating the inner relation between past and future or yesterday, today and tomorrow" (ibid., 258). The "space of experience" and "horizon of expectation" are intersubjective categories, which indicate shared, discursively determined, interpretative fields that exceed and precede the time consciousness of the individual. Importantly, these categories take into account the role of unconscious determinations of temporal experience: "within experience, a rational reworking is included, together with unconscious modes of conduct which do not have to be present in awareness" (ibid., 259). They also incorporate the "element of alien experience contained and preserved in experience conveyed by generations and institutions" (ibid.).

The "space of experience" refers to the dimensions of both past and present existence. Experience is "specified by the fact that it has processed past occurrence . . . experience based on the past is assembled through many layers of earlier times" (ibid., 260). In contrast, the "horizon of expectation" refers to the futural dimension of historical existence, and is described as "that line behind which a new space of experience will open, but which cannot yet be seen" (ibid., 260–1). In many ways, Koselleck reflects, experience and expectation presuppose and are entangled within one other. For example, "new experiences might open up other experiences," or new hopes or disappointments can enter into old experiences with retroactive effect (ibid., 262). Moreover, expectation of the future always takes place in

the present and past, such that expectation can be described as "the future made present" (ibid., 259). The meta-historical concepts of the "space of experience" and the "horizon of expectation" thereby enable us to demonstrate the complex interdependence between present, past, and future (ibid., 258).

On the other hand, however, while the "space of experience" and the "horizon of expectation" do presuppose and mutually constitute one another to an extent, they are not "symmetrical complementary concepts which might mutually relate past and future." On the contrary, experience and expectation are of different orders. Expectation itself, or the prospect of the future, is certainly experienced in the past and present, in the form of raised hopes or anxieties for example. Yet, "the intended conditions, situations, or consequences of expectation are not themselves experiential entities" (ibid). The "legibility of the future," Koselleck writes, "despite possible prognoses confronts an absolute limit, for it cannot be experienced . . . an expectation can never be entirely deduced from experience because it directs itself to the not-yet, to the nonexperienced, to that which is to be revealed" (ibid., 260–1). Consequently, while experience and expectation do partially "presuppose" one another, they are in fact asymmetrical, "dissimilar modes of existence," which do not coexist in a symmetrical or static relation (ibid., 261).

For Koselleck, it is the tension between the space of experience and the horizon of expectation that offers a "hermeneutical key" to registering the shifting patterns of historical time. As the horizon of expectation expands, the space of experience contracts, or vice versa, thereby producing specific temporal configurations of history, and redoubling past and future on one another in an unequal manner (ibid., 263). This formula underpins Koselleck's methodological approach to the "semantics of historical time," as he studies the graduation of social and political concepts according to the relationship between the space of experience and horizon of expectation that such concepts convey. For example, concepts such as "revolution" and "progress," which came into regular use in Western Europe in the decades around 1800, reveal a contraction of the space of experience, and a concomitant expansion of the futural horizon of expectation: "they are temporal indications that had never been used before in the same way" (ibid., 236).

Koselleck's principal argument is that these concepts manifest a consciousness of "new time" or "*neue Zeit*," whereby time becomes "a dynamic and historical force in its own right" (ibid., 236). Hitherto, he argues, the experience of time had been structured by Christian

eschatology: the doctrine of the End of the World and the Last Judgment. For Martin Luther, for instance, "the compression of time is a visible sign that, according to God's will, the final judgement is imminent, that the world is about to end" (ibid.,12). Church doctrine thereby controlled and limited the tension between experience and expectation. Due to the immovable limit to the horizon of expectation, "the future remained bound to the past" (ibid., 264). Yet, the gradual displacement of the eschatology of future perfection on to a worldly philosophy of improvement on earth meant that the horizon of expectation attained a historically new quality: "endowed with a coefficient of change that advanced in step with time" (ibid., 266). For example, for Robespierre in Revolutionary France, the acceleration of time was understood as "a human task, presaging an epoch of freedom and happiness, the golden future" (ibid., 12–13).

Now that progress was being understood in terms of an active transformation of *this* world, Koselleck argues, the "horizon of expectation" was no longer experienced as an immovable limit. Expectations that reached out for the future "became detached from all that previous experience had to offer" (ibid., 266–7). Moreover, the "space of experience" was also transformed, because events and phenomena of the past and present were now progressively divided up and "ranked." Hence, alongside this increasing distance between past and future, he claims, there also emerged a new concept of "history" in the collective singular that could incorporate *all* experience and expectation: "Since then there has existed and does exist the consciousness of living in a transitional period that graduates the difference between experience and expectation in distinct temporal phases" (ibid., 269).

The hermeneutical approach developed by Koselleck offers a valuable way of examining and making explicit the shifting patterns of historical time: via analysis of historical texts and concepts to discern the experiences and cultures of time they disclose. While the structuralist account separates historical time from discursively produced configurations of time, Koselleck's hermeneutical account proposes that historical time *is* discursively produced, through interpretative activity that is determined by, and determines, specific historical experiences of time. In the first instance, "there is no history which could be constituted independently of the experiences and expectations of active human agents" (ibid., 256). But equally, such experiences and expectations are themselves determined by historical, sociocultural determinations and contexts. This is why historical time is not simply an empty definition, but is rather, "an entity that alters along with history and from whose changing structure it is possible to deduce

the shifting classifications of experience and expectation" (ibid., 259). There is no fixed relation between these categories because the fundamental openness of action and interpretation mean that the temporalization of history is a contingent and changing process.

Moreover, the hermeneutical approach offers a means of explaining the relation between historical time and *narrative time*, given that narrative plays such a vital role in configuring and reconfiguring the past–present–future relation, and therefore in generating ever-shifting patterns and experiences of historical time. "Every history," Koselleck writes, "bears out that acting subjects perceive a certain duration: of inauguration, high points, peripateia, crises, and termination," and accordingly, these internal conditions "determine the sequence of events" (ibid., 106). The claim that "*every* history" demonstrates this may be somewhat exaggerated, but it is certainly true that acting, reflective subjects do *frequently* perceive points of inauguration, climax, crisis, termination and so on, and that such perceptions or interpretations significantly shape how events take place. Narrative configurations can broaden and open out the "space of experience" or the "horizon of expectation," or alternatively, narrow and close them down, thereby determining how historical time is discursively produced, imagined, and experienced. Through narrative, we configure experience and negotiate expectations, carrying the past into the future, or retroactively transforming our accumulated memories of the past.

Yet, while Koselleck affirms that there are shifting determinations and patterns of historical time, he arguably does not pay sufficient attention to the power dynamics that produce particular narratives and temporalizations of history, nor to the differences *internal* to cultures of time. For example, in tracing the gradual emergence of "*neue Zeit*," he discusses the appearance of the term "Renaissance" within western Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: a retrospective periodization designating the Renaissance as a "new" era of "rebirth," which decisively broke from the past (ibid., 228). While "the thinkers and artists of the Renaissance, as well as believers of the Reformation, did consider the question of whether a *mittlere Zeit* would by negation produce a *Neue Zeit*," Koselleck writes, "none of them actually formulated this as a theoreticohistorical concept" (ibid., 228). It was the retrospective designation of this period as "the Renaissance," he claims, which extracted the experience of a "new time" from a historical culture in which it was merely implicit or "hidden" (ibid., 226). However, feminist historian Joan Kelly argues that no adequate analysis can be made of the time culture

of "Renaissance" Italy without acknowledging the significant differences between men's and women's historical experiences during this era. "Women as a group," she claims, "especially among the classes that dominated Italian urban life, experienced a contraction of social and personal options that men of their classes either did not, as was the case with the bourgeoisie, or did not experience as markedly, as was the case with the nobility" (Kelly 1984, 20). Hence it may not make sense to speak of an Italian "Renaissance," implicit or not, from the perspective of "women's time" at all.

Similarly, postcolonial historians and theorists have insisted on differences within "the time of the modern," and considered forms of temporal experience that do not conform to the dominant ways of characterizing modern temporality as synonymous with the "time of the new," or as wholly antithetical to tradition (Felski 2000, 69–72; Bhabha 1994). In *The Black Atlantic*, for instance, Paul Gilroy's analysis of black popular music brings forth an understanding of modern temporality as a complex blend of innovation and cross-cultural, cross-historical continuities (Gilroy 1993). These musical forms are "modern and western," he argues, but "this is not all they are." Their "special power derives from a doubleness, their unsteady location simultaneously inside and outside the conventions, assumptions and aesthetic rules which distinguish and periodise modernity" (ibid., 73). They express a "stubborn modernity," but also an "anti-modernity" that appears "in the (dis)guise of a premodernity that is both actively reimagined in the present and transmitted intermittently in eloquent pulses from the past" (74). Black musical culture, Gilroy claims, thus encloses a "living legacy" of "histories of borrowing, displacement, transformation, and continual displacement" (ibid., 102).

Studies such as Kelly's and Gilroy's demonstrate that different groups and individuals experience changes in their modes of temporality in distinctive and uneven ways (Felski 2000, 25). They also draw attention to the *politics* of time."The peaks and valleys of historical time," Felski writes, "may appear in very different places, depending on who is looking and whose fortunes are being tracked across the centuries" (ibid., 15). Accordingly, we cannot presume that there is a single unified "space of experience" or "horizon of expectation," nor one narrative configuration that could draw together and express diverse historical experiences within one encompassing temporal structure. Koselleck's approach offers a rudimentary "hermeneutical key" to registering the shifting patterns of historical time and the role played by narrative; but it needs to be supplemented by a critical,

"pluritopic" approach that can register the significance of multiple, competing narratives and interpretative positions.

Pluritopic Hermeneutics

In *The Darker Side of the Renaissance* (1995), Walter Mignolo explains his conception of "pluritopic hermeneutics" [8] by drawing a distinction between pluritopic hermeneutics and the "monotopic" hermeneutics expounded by Gadamer. For Gadamer, "hermeneutics teaches us . . . to see through the dogmatism of asserting an opposition and separation between the ongoing, natural tradition and the reflective appropriation of it. For behind this assertion stands a dogmatic objectivism that distorts the very concept of hermeneutical reflection itself. In this objectivism the understander is seen . . . not in relationship to the hermeneutic situation and the constant operativeness of history in his own consciousness" (Gadamer 1976, 28). Mignolo endorses this hermeneutical critique of positivism and objectivism, but he objects to Gadamer's notion of an "ongoing natural tradition," as it presumes a universal tradition understood by a universal subject who "speaks for the rest of humanity" (Mignolo 1995, 11). In this way, he argues, monotopic hermeneutics has "served to maintain the universality of European culture at the same time that it justified the tendency of its members to perceive themselves as the reference point to evaluate all cultures" (18). Feminists have been similarly critical of Gadamer's presumption of "tradition" in the singular,[9] and also his notion of "understanding" as a "fusion of horizons." In Gadamer's account, understanding is a process of coming to agreement, such that all that is unfamiliar or anomalous can be integrated into a newly fused interpretative framework. For many feminists, this appears as a form of assimilation, a subsumption of different viewpoints to the detriment of the less powerful (Code 2003, 5).[10]

In contrast, a "pluritopic" hermeneutics presupposes more than one interpretative tradition or horizon within any experiential and cultural field, rather than an "ongoing, natural" tradition. Moreover, it takes an explicitly critical approach to the process of interpretation, reflecting on the politics of intellectual inquiry and "call[ing] into question the positionality and the homogeneity of the understanding subject" (Mignolo 1995, 12). The need for a pluritopic hermeneutics, Mignolo argues, is crystallized and made most apparent within colonial situations, which involve a plurality of traditions, and in which interpretative horizons are not easily "fused" in a benign or "friendly" manner (ibid., 19). Historical processes of migration and colonialism

may well have led to increasing levels of interconnection between events in apparently disparate times and places. But we are nevertheless a "very long way from having a shared framework and experience of time and history, in terms of which it might be possible to arrive at a single evaluation of those events" (Hodge 2011, 209–21). Colonial or postcolonial situations therefore give rise to the following questions: "In which of the cultural traditions to be understood does the understanding subject place him- or herself by constructing his or her locus of enunciation? How can the act of reading and the concept of interpretation be rethought within pluritopically oriented hermeneutics?" (Mignolo 1995, 16).[11]

My suggestion here is that the "pluritopic" approach proposed by Mignolo allows us to modify and hone the hermeneutical treatment of historical time, such that we can critically register significant interpretative differences that exist *within* particular societies and cultures of time. Rather than a "monotopic" hermeneutics that presupposes an internally consistent "space of experience" and unified "horizon of expectation," pluritopic hermeneutics presupposes plural spaces of experience and multiple horizons of expectation, which cannot always be "fused."[12] This means that there will always be more than one configuration of historical time operative within any given society or political community, even though there may be a particular configuration that is dominant.

This is certainly the case within feminism, which can be illustrated through a comparison of two well-known texts produced in the 1970s. First, let us consider the opening lines of Germaine Greer's *The Female Eunuch*, published in London in 1970:

> This book is part of the second feminist wave . . . The new emphasis is different. Then genteel middle-class ladies clamored for reform, now ungenteel middle-class women are calling for revolution . . . The difference is radical, for the faith that the suffragettes had in the existing political systems and their deep desire to participate in them have perished. In the old days ladies were anxious to point out that they did not seek to disrupt society or to unseat God. Marriage, the family, private property and the state were threatened by their actions, but they were anxious to allay the fears of conservatives, and in doing so the suffragettes betrayed their own cause and prepared the way for the failure of emancipation . . . The cage door had been opened but the canary had refused to fly out. (1970, 1)

These lines inscribe a progressive temporalization of feminist history, positing a break between the reformist feminism of yesterday

and the revolutionary feminism of today and tomorrow. Greer's reference to "genteel middle-class ladies" performs a textual contraction of the feminist past, which is represented here via a single issue (the campaign for women's suffrage), and a singular image of normative white femininity: the "lady protestor," or bored middle-class housewife who poses no serious threat to the establishment or status quo (Hesford 2013, 43–53). The "failure of emancipation" in the wake of the suffrage movement is thereby framed as inevitable; but at the same time, it paves the way for a new, emerging radical feminism to "fly out of the cage."

In some respects, the extract does establish continuities between past and present feminisms. When Greer speaks of the "genteel middle-class ladies" of the past, and the "ungenteel middle-class women" of the second wave, feminist history is represented as an exclusively middle-class affair. She also explicitly traces a continuity between the "genteel ladies" of the past and reformist movements in the present, claiming that "there are feminist organizations still in existence which follow the reforming tracks laid down by the suffragettes," such as Betty Friedan's National Organization of Women.[13] Yet, it is the contrast between the two terms "reform" and "revolution" that forms the rhetorical crux of Greer's temporalization: "Then genteel middle-class ladies clamored for reform, now ungenteel middle-class women are calling for revolution . . . " To use Koselleck's terminology, the term "revolution" conveys a contraction of the "space of experience," and an expansion of the "horizon of expectation," as "expectations that reach out for the future" become detached from "all that previous experience has to offer" (Koselleck 2004, 266–7). In this way, Greer's temporalization accords with characterizations of modern time consciousness as a self-conscious designation of one's own time as novel, and an improvement upon what has gone before. Now, Greer writes, is the moment where feminism breaks off from its past and becomes truly radical; the horizon of expectation is "no longer limited by the space of experience" (ibid.).

Greer's temporalization of feminist history is markedly different from that produced by another feminist text that circulated in the 1970s: the definitive statement of the Combahee River Collective, a feminist organization active in Boston between 1974 and 1980 that was named after the campaign led by Harriet Tubman to rescue over 750 slaves at the Combahee River in South Carolina in 1863. The statement recognizes that a black feminist presence has evolved "most obviously in connection with the second wave of the American women's movement beginning in the late 1960s." It also affirms

the collective's connection to movements for black liberation in the 1960s and 1970s, including civil rights, black nationalism, and the Black Panthers. Yet, due to "reactionary forces and racism and elitism within the [women's] movement itself," and the sexism of the male-dominated black liberation movements, it became necessary for black feminists to separate and "develop a politics that was anti-racist, unlike those of white women, and anti-sexist, unlike those of Black and white men." In this way, the feminist history charted by the collective does feature ruptures and new beginnings: the "horizon of expectation" for black feminists becomes separated from past and present experience of involvement with white feminist movements and male-dominated black liberation movements. But most strikingly, the history of black feminism is represented in the statement through the language of a "continuum of struggle," in which we can identify, in Koselleck's words, a "transference of earlier experiences into coming expectations . . . " (Koselleck 2004, 264):

> We find our origins in the historical reality of Afro-American women's continuous life-and-death struggle for survival and liberation . . . There have always been Black women activists—some known, like Sojourner Truth, Harriet Tubman, Frances E. W. Harper, Ida B. Wells Barnett, and Mary Church Terrell, and thousands upon thousands unknown—who have had a shared awareness of how their sexual identity combined with their racial identity to make their whole life situation and the focus of their political struggles unique. Contemporary Black feminism is the outgrowth of countless generations of personal sacrifice, militancy, and work by our mothers and sisters. (Eisenstein and Jardine 1979)

The comparison between these different texts by Greer and by the Combahee River Collective illustrates that no singular feminist experience or configuration of historical time can ever be presumed. The two texts both belong to "1970s feminism"; yet what we find are very different characterizations and temporalizations of feminist history, according to the specific sociopolitical positions that the narrators inhabited within their distinct contexts. These positions gave rise to different forms of historical experience and hence to different configurations of historical time. For Greer, writing in 1970s London, past feminism is equated primarily with the suffrage campaigns of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This is the feminist legacy with the most cultural and political currency in mainstream British history, and hence is prominent in the historical imagination of the white middle-class activist. From Greer's perspective, past feminism

holds little inspiration as it was too closely tied to the norms and protocols of the political establishment. Consequently, feminism of the past must be transcended by a new kind of feminism whose radicality knows no precedent. But the Combahee River Collective's sense of historical time is fuelled by an acute consciousness of "Afro-American women's continuous life-and-death struggle for survival and liberation": a shared history of racial and sexual oppression, and an ongoing struggle against these forces that have so significantly structured the lives of African American women in the United States. Hence, the history of black feminism is temporalized in this text through a complex blend of "repetition as well as innovation, stability as well as flux" (Felski 2000, 70).

What I am proposing is that pluritopic hermeneutics can enable us to become more critically attuned to such different configurations and narrations of historical time within feminist discourse. This is not to say, though, that different configurations of historical time must be treated in isolation as entirely distinct and separate from one another. As Linda Martín Alcoff argues in *Visible Identities* (2006), one's *own* hermeneutic horizon is always "pluritopic," because "multiple others are constitutive aspects of our interpretative horizon." Accordingly, "we cannot assume that any hermeneutic horizon . . . is in fact coherent or closed to other horizons" (2006, 125). In this way, pluritopic hermeneutics enables us to register the differences between historical temporalizations, but also to explore possible interconnections and points of "porousness" (Chakrabarty 2000, 71). For example, Greer does intimate in the opening pages of her book that the "spirit" of the suffragettes has "revive[d] in younger women with a new and vital cast" (even though their aims and tactics are to be rejected); that the "cage" was opened by previous feminists (even though they did not fly out). This offers the possibility of a different kind of temporality: a temporality of return or re-emergence that has affinities with the Combahee River Collective's vision of the tradition of black women's struggle carrying the spirit and hope of liberation into the present and future.

The pluritopic approach can also help us become more attuned to the relational politics of narrative configuration, because it emphasizes the "locus of enunciation" and "the social and human interests in the act of telling a story as a political intervention" (Mignolo 1995, 15–17). In the first instance, narratives can be used to link or bridge different experiences and horizons, enabling a shared experience and understanding of historical time. Greer's narrative of a new wave, for example, could draw certain women into a shared sense of inhabiting

a "new time"; just as the River Collective's statement could articulate a sense of a shared history of struggle, establishing "Black feminism as the logical political movement to combat the manifold and simultaneous oppressions that all women of color face." Yet this linking or bridging may not always be successful, as different experiences and horizons may not be communicable, meaningful, or available to all who inhabit a social or political space. Further, certain narratives can become amplified, while others are eclipsed or subsumed.

These kinds of issues have consistently emerged within feminist consciousness raising groups, where feminists tell personal stories as a way of generating a collective political consciousness. On the one hand, this collective practice of narration has been vital in generating a feminist understanding of experience as mediated and defined in political struggle, and also of narration as a relational practice (Mulinari and Sandell 1999). Adriana Cavarero, for example, in *Relating Narratives* (2000), has described the Consciousness Raising groups in Italy in the 1970s as scenes of "reciprocal narration," where autobiographical materials are offered and then "given back," when the group tell the story back again to the one who is the protagonist (2000, 62–3). [14] Within scenes of reciprocal narration like this, Cavarero writes, one's story might be given back in a new form or new light, as another subject witnesses and listens, discerning narrative threads and meanings which to oneself are invisible or opaque (Cavarero 2000, 80). This dynamic underscores the relational underpinning of narration and exposes the insufficiency and contingency of the solo, autobiographical standpoint. Yet, on the other hand, the ideal of reciprocal narration has often been confounded by the existence of inequalities and tensions between participants based on class, race, sexuality, age, domestic situation, and physical ability. As Withers documents: "encounters between women who had different life experiences could not only produce conflict and disagreement . . . but also created powerful emotional chasms amongst women in the movement" (2012, 84). And the possibilities for reciprocal narration can be confounded even further by the very subject matter of feminist narrations:

> When discussions turned to surviving sexual and domestic abuse, incest, illegal and legal abortions, or coming to terms with lesbian sexuality in a very homophobic and sexist world, what strategies and tools did these women have in dealing with the magnitude of these experiences? How possible was it to share experiences with others, experiences that were in many ways resistant to narration because of their traumatic nature? (ibid., 81–2)

The work of interpretation and narration, therefore, is a relational practice that is politically and affectively charged. There is a struggle within feminism over the articulation of historical experience and historical time: "The competing stories and interpretations passed down within the complex of intersecting histories belonging to a conflictual culture are unequally available: the domination of some of these goes hand in hand with the dimming down or leveling off of others" (Leland 2001, 124–5). I have suggested that adopting a "pluritopic" rather than a "monotopic" hermeneutic can help us become more critically attuned to plural feminist "spaces of experience" and "horizons of expectation," mediated by multiple narrations, and bound up in politically and emotionally laden "scenes of address" (Butler 2005, 27). Yet, in the final section, I want to consider further how these theoretical approaches can influence the way that we narrate histories of feminism. How can we try to resist the domination of certain narratives over others? How can we articulate and uncover the multiple voices that feed into historical narratives and configure the shifting patterns of historical time?

Contrapuntal Reading and Fractured Forms

The chapter began by noting the suspicion that narrative configuration can provoke, as it so often works to mask the vagaries and ambiguities of historical interpretation, and the multiple perspectives that will attend any set of events. To configure events within a narrative is to impose order and "synthesize the heterogeneous" (Ricoeur 1984). This kind of synthesis, as Hayden White has argued, can cover over the selective nature of the narrative, and lead to a complacent attitude toward history that sees the present as the inevitable or rational culmination of the events of the past. Narrative histories, he writes, reveal to us "a world that is putatively 'finished', done with, over, and yet not dissolved, not falling apart . . . " (White 1980, 24).

However, I have advocated an approach that does not treat historical narratives as isolated texts, but instead, grounds the practice of historical interpretation and narration within the conditions and dynamics of shared historical existence. This is the key idea behind ontologically oriented hermeneutics, which considers not only the "internal laws of a work of literature" but also the "arc of operations by which practical experience provides itself with works, authors, and readers" (Ricoeur 1984, 53). From this perspective, narrative may well be "totalizing"

in strictly formal terms, because, as Louis Mink argues, it generates it own distinctive and bounded "imaginative space" (Mink 1978). This, after all, is why we describe a narrative in the singular as *a* narrative. But if we consider the practical, material worlds within which a particular narrative text is produced—the "other sides" of the text—we see that singular narrative "wholes" are only *temporary* closures, which are always incomplete and entangled with other narratives. The prehistory of a story binds it to a larger context and gives it "a background made up of the 'living imbrication' of every lived story with every other such story" (Ricoeur 1984, 75).

This living imbrication is well captured by the paradigm of "narrativity" that has become prevalent within the field of narrative studies. Essentially, the term refers to the narrativized and narrativizing context within which any narrative is constructed (MacQuillan 2000). We are always embroiled within interlocking, overlapping narratives upon which we depend for conducting and constituting ourselves as social, historical, narrating/narrated subjects. Theorists of narrativity are thus concerned with narrativization as a discursive practice, referring to "the work that narrative does, and its effects," rather than to the formal structures and purely figurative dimension of narrative (Smith 2000).[15] "To produce a narrative," Martin MacQuillan explains, "is to make a moment of inter-subjective experience knowable, or discernible as such, through communication" (MacQuillan 2000, 8). As such, the task is to embed any narrative text within its relational context, and within "the specificity of a textual practice where it is materially inscribed" (de Lauretis 2000, 211).

If we adopt narrativity as a guiding paradigm, we approach historical narratives with an awareness that the narrativized and narrativizing context is always excessive of any singular narrative that would seek to give a definitive account of it. The production of a singular narrative depends upon the experience of a "communal narrative-matrix" out of which it arises, and which it cannot fully express, even if it tries to disguise this through the figure of closure (MacQuillan 2000, 23–4). This understanding can give rise to a practice of reading that Edward Said describes as "contrapuntal reading," whereby the "readerly subject" extends their reading of texts to "include what was once forcibly excluded," seeking out counter-narratives and appreciating that the singular narrative only exists as an activity of production within a larger discursive and material context (Said 1993, 79). MacQuillan extends this idea of contrapuntal reading, arguing that it is necessary to not only seek out excluded material and counter-narratives, but also to discern the excluded material or "resisting strands" *within* the

material that the narrative presents. In this sense, he claims, counter-narratives can be thought of as structurally integral to any singular account (MacQuillan 2000, 24).

To read contrapuntally, then, is to recognize that if historical narratives are dependent upon intersubjective encounters and relations, it is inevitable that they will express a multiplicity of perspectives and experiences, even when they *appear* to be unified and internally consistent. We can look for breaks and slippages that reveal a multiplicity and indeterminacy behind narrative coherence and apparently seamless structuration. An interesting illustration of this occurs in Lynn Segal's feminist memoir *Making Trouble* (2007). The memoir is constructed in the traditional autobiographical format, as the authorial voice guides us through her own political journey and simultaneously diagnoses the changes of the times. There is, however, an arresting passage when the author jumps out of her own narrative account into another's narrative, which includes an account of Segal herself (depicted using a pseudonym "Marie").[16] Segal quotes this passage (with displeasure) in her own book:

> She drew an . . . [un]flattering sketch of me at the time . . . as she saw us all within the collective household . . . We are easily recognisable, my name changed, incongruously, to Marie:
>
> There was Marie who darted around the borough on political errands . . . Marie, up to her neck in local politics. . . . (Segal 2007, 77)

Segal is quick to resume her autobiographical narration, yet this opening out on to a different narrative has enacted a rupture that disturbs and unsettles the authoritative narrative voice. The sudden switch to another's narrative, and then back to autobiography again, evokes a sense of temporal strangeness through a doubled retrospection. By seizing on such moments of temporal strangeness, and reading contrapuntally, we can tease out the relational, political, and temporal dynamics that underpin any singular narrative, as we are offered a fleeting glimpse into alternative narrations and rememberings. Clare Hemmings proposes something similar when she identifies those moments of "affective rupture" that occur when empathy or recognition are strained or break down in the process of reading a feminist narrative (Hemmings 2011, 223). For example, she discusses feminist accounts of female genital cutting or transsexual surgery, where affects such as shock and horror are expressed by an author, or are induced in oneself as a reader (ibid., 219–33).[17] Dwelling on such moments of affective rupture or "pauses in the grammatical

construction of subject," Hemmings suggests, allows us to probe the limits of self-knowledge and knowledge of the other, and invites us to reconsider how we ourselves might figure in another's historical narrative (ibid., 214).

Alongside contrapuntal reading practices, the theoretical framework of narrativity can also prompt experimentation with different ways of constructing and writing feminist histories. Helen Carr poses the question as such: "If we are coming to see that cultures can be understood as collections of narratives, not only stories into which we are born . . . but also stories we learn to tell, how do these fractured forms explore the competing and conflicting narratives we meet in our culturally diverse society?" (Carr 2011, 321). This kind of question gives rise to an immanent approach of working *with* and *within* narrative, trying to turn narrative's figures and operations against restrictive narrative determinations (Roof 1996a). Aristotle famously wrote that a "well-constructed plot must neither begin nor end in a haphazard way," but rather must conform to a clear beginning, middle, and end structure (Aristotle 1996, 13). However, while the classic Aristotelian ideal of narrative form is certainly pervasive, this kind of narrative configuration is not exhaustive or inevitable. As Genevieve Lloyd points out: "there are many resources in narrative that go beyond the tightly structured telling of a unified story with a beginning, middle and end" (Lloyd 1993a, 10–11). Narrative configurations, therefore, can temporalize history in various ways: they can impose a linear order and perform a sense of narrative "closure"; but they can also reflect inconsistencies, irresolvable tensions, and multiple perspectives.

In this regard, feminist literary studies can offer interesting insights and approaches to feminist historiography, as feminist novelists and critics have developed various techniques for creating fractured, decentered, discontinuous narratives within women's fictional writing, challenging the authority of the single narrator, and refusing to provide a sense of narrative closure and finality.[18],[19] Feminist theoretical and historiographical writing itself also features many examples of experimentation with dialogic narrative structures and nonlinear formats. One might think of Kristeva's "Stabat Mater" essay (1986b), or Diane Elam and Robyn Wiegman's introduction to their edited anthology *Feminism Beside Itself* (1995), written as two narratives in two side-by-side columns. The stories that each author tells intersect and echo each other, but by splitting the introduction into two, the authors force a recognition of the contested and polyvocal nature of feminist storytelling, and refuse a neat synthesis of perspectives.

Cherríe Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa's feminist anthology *This Bridge Called My Back* (1981) presents an even more thoroughgoing challenge to linear, narrative closure, as it intersperses more traditional narratives with poetry, snapshot reflections, "stream of consciousness" journal entries, speeches, statements, dialogues, and letters. The created effect is of multiple voices, styles, and "cultural tongues" (Moraga 1981), emerging from a web of intersecting lives and stories that cannot be captured or subsumed within one overarching narrative or temporal schema.

To produce a narrative may well be to generate a bounded "imaginative space," or "narrative mark" (MacQuillan 2000; Mink 1978). But these boundaries will always intersect with those of another narrative, and will be open to contest and re-narrativization. Every narrative is bound up in a wider narrative web, and storytelling is a relational practice that is ongoing, reciprocal, incomplete. This understanding can make a significant difference to the ways that we construct and approach feminist histories, inspiring us to read through narrative closures, to make space for heterogeneous narrative configurations and voices. As the writer Jeanette Winterson expresses it:

> When we tell a story we exercise control, but in such a way as to leave a gap, an opening. It is a version, but never the final one. And perhaps we hope that the silences will be heard by someone else, and the story can continue, and be retold. . . . (Winterson 2011, 8)

Conclusion

This chapter has considered the relation between narrative time and historical time, arguing that narrative temporalities should be understood as "internal" to historical time, rather than as a secondary, external, or artificial form of temporalization. This line of argument begins to shift us away from the idea that historical events simply happen or unfold sequentially "in time," toward a conception that historical events *are temporal*, with distinct time frames and temporalities. And these are significantly shaped through narrative configurations and articulations, as we generate ever-shifting patterns of historical time, connecting and relating our spaces of experience and horizons of expectation in politically significant ways.

This is not to say, however, that narratives need have a privileged position within historiography and historical practice. As Butler argues: "For the past to be lived in the present, narration is not the only route, and not necessarily the most affectively engaging" (Butler

2005, 68). Indeed, "we might well become more clear in moments of interruption, stoppage, open-endedness – in enigmatic articulations that cannot easily be translated into narrative form" (ibid., 64).[20] Traumatic events, for example, may escape the dynamics of "readable" remembrance and recuperation, persisting rather as unarticulated or unarticulable events that continue to influence and disturb in opaque and unconscious ways (Cvetovitch 2003; Halsema 2011, 116; Withers 2012). Thus, while recognizing the significance of narrative configurations, we also need to take account of their limitations and contingencies. Not everything can become part of a communicable story or be taken up in a hermeneutical circle. And as argued previously, any singular historical narrative will always be "outrun" by traces of past events that exceed its grasp.

Moreover, while the chapter has criticized the equation of historical time with reductive conceptions of chronology or "mere sequence," the question of chronology requires much more attention, given that historical chronologies play such a crucial role in configuring historical time. The following chapter will therefore examine the temporal dynamics of historical chronologies and timelines in more detail, as I turn to the question of *calendar time*.

CHAPTER 4

Calendar Time

Calendar time organizes histories into chronologies and timelines through temporal markers such as days, months, years, decades, and centuries. It interweaves and intersects with the time of the trace, and with narrative time; indeed, what the trace or narrative signifies often depends to a considerable extent upon the markers inscribed in calendar time (Ricoeur 1988, 108). Calendars, therefore, can be described as "time maps" that orient and anchor historical understanding and imagination. Despite its practical utility, however, calendar time is often viewed as an obstacle to developing creative and nuanced approaches to history. This is because the calendrical grid or timeline seems to flatten historical time into a framework of measurable intervals and periods, and thus appears incapable of capturing the complex, qualitative dynamics of historical events and trajectories. Consequently, feminist writings on time and temporality may often imply that while dates and decades may be necessary to historians, philosophy should be getting beyond them to reflect on more meaningful, vibrant temporalities.

The problem, however, with dismissing calendar time as a "vulgar" or mundane kind of time is that, in doing so, we overlook its significance as both a practical and a public time. The task for feminist historiography, therefore, is to engage more deeply with calendar time, and to consider how it might be deployed to map out feminist histories *without* producing bland chronologies, or swallowing up different temporalities that are irreducible to its numerical points and ordinal positions. As such, the key aim of this chapter is to make the case for a *qualitative* approach to calendar time: an approach that subverts the idea that calendar time is a neutral and straightforwardly chronological or "linear" time, and which generates more critically reflexive, and creative calendrical practices.

The first section is devoted to challenging reified understandings of calendar time, and establishing that calendar time is a tool

for coordinating and managing social, economic, and political life. The rest of the chapter then seeks to explore the complex temporal dynamics and sociopolitical processes underpinning calendar time. To this end, I make use of the distinction that Heidegger draws between "time-measuring" and "time-reckoning" in *Being and Time*, and also Hannah Arendt's pluralistic concept of the "public" as a basis for developing a "deepened" account of calendar time as a public time. Such an account is not premised upon assumptions about neutrality, universality, and uniformity, but rather, upon the need and desire for temporal coordination within and across diversity. Finally, I bring these theoretical discussions to bear more directly on the problem of constructing feminist chronologies and temporal reference frameworks.

The Reification of Calendar Time

The arguments in this chapter rest upon a base claim, which is that calendar time is a socially and culturally specific creation: a mechanism for organizing and coordinating time, which is mediated through the temporalities of lived experience and the regulatory practices of social and cultural life (Osborne 1995, 66). The claim that calendar time is a "social construct" may initially seem rather far-fetched, given that calendar time does appear to be the most natural and universal of temporal reference frameworks, governed as it is by solar, or lunar, rotation. Even though technological changes and mechanization have led to increasingly abstract ways of telling the time (such that marking a day has become possible without any reference to the position of the sun in the sky), the "day," nevertheless, can seem to be the most natural of measures. Yet, as sociologist Eviatar Zerubavel insists, a day is *always* at root an "artificial" segmentation of time, whether measured by a sundial, a mechanical timepiece such as a watch, or marked by a number in a calendrical grid (1981, 11).

In the first instance, the calendar "day," "month," and "year," can only ever be approximate representations of the "physiotemporal" relations between the earth and the sun, or in the case of lunar calendars, between earth and moon (Zerubavel 1997, 110). The key point, however, is not primarily about physiotemporal or astronomical *accuracy*.[1] The point, rather, is that temporal measures are not natural measures that simply exist; rather, they are *constructed* measures that are decided upon and utilized within specific sociocultural situations and arrangements. It must be established within an intersubjective, social context "what minimum planetary cycle has to be supposed

and recognized before it is possible to transform the temporalities of the stars into an astronomically rationalized, long-term, natural chronology" (Koselleck 2004, 95–6). In this sense, while calendar time may be *based* on cosmological time, calendar time does not belong to nature, in the sense of being "out there," waiting to be discovered. Rather, as Peter Osborne suggests, calendar time can be construed as a "*calendarization* of cosmological time" (Osborne 1995, 67). This does not mean that calendar time is somehow "unreal," but more precisely, that calendar time is a temporal order that belongs to social, lived reality. It is a temporal system devised to regulate the way we reckon with, coordinate, and share time.

There is a wide range of sociological, anthropological, and historical scholarship demonstrating this theoretical point that calendars are socially and culturally specific "versions" of cosmological time, rather than being straightforwardly natural or universal measures. Such studies, for example, show that certain societies and cultural communities may use several calendars at once, for different social, economic, agricultural, cultural, or religious purposes (Adams 1995; Greenhouse 1996; Mughal 2008). They demonstrate, further, that the institutionalization of a particular calendar depends upon a certain level of political authority to regulate social, cultural, and economic life according to specific calendrical arrangements. Calendars can be used to facilitate social coordination, to promote and enforce a new political regime, or to establish social or cultural boundaries, through marking out one community or society's difference from another (Zerubavel 1982a; 1982b). Key examples of this include the Gregorian reform of the Julian calendar in 1582; the implementation of the French Revolutionary calendar in 1793; and Stalin's introduction of five- and six-day weeks between 1929 and 1940, as a means of disrupting church-attendance (Zerubavel 1982b).

Calendrical "temporal reference frameworks" must therefore be understood not only as socially and culturally specific, but further, as deeply enmeshed in power relations (ibid.). This is well illustrated by considering the rise of modern Western temporal reference frameworks—including the Gregorian calendar, the Christian Era, and International Standard Time (based on GMT)—which have attained a nigh-on global hegemony in conjunction with changing economic and communicative practices, colonial expansion and domination, and the rise of global capitalism.[2] Historical sketches of the ascendancy of modern "clock time," for example, chart its ascendancy in tandem with the rise of the factory and the advent of modern market relations and wage labor in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe,

railway transportation and shipping, and telegraphic and telephonic communication (Giddens 1990; Kern 1983; Toulmin and Goodfield 1977). The expansion and institutionalization of the Gregorian calendar and the seven-day week has been similarly entangled with geopolitical processes of modernization, colonialism, and globalization. Accordingly, the increased levels of temporal coordination enabled by modern clock time and calendar time have been integral to securing the "edifice of political modernity" (Hom 2010).

It is often "forgotten," however, that modern standardized frameworks of calendar time and clock time have been actively forged as a response to the logistical need for temporal coordination within changing socioeconomic circumstances and shifting cultural dominions. Such forgetting can be understood as a process of *reification*, whereby universalized calendar time and clock time has come to be taken for granted, and presumed to be natural or simply "there": a given backdrop to changing political, economic, and social conditions. This can be linked to the common presumption, as discussed the previous chapter, that "real" historical time is *essentially* calendrical or chronological: a "mere sequence" or series of successive instants. The idea of a mundanely chronological or "chronotic" time as a homogenous backdrop against which the diverse lives of individuals and societies can be plotted is not, it must be stressed, a conception unique to Western modernity (Hutchings 2008). Yet, within Western modernity, chronotic time has become deeply entrenched, not only through conceptions and theories such as Newton's "absolute" measurable time,[3] but further, through the thorough institutionalization and standardization of calendar and clock time, which have become integral to how modern social and economic relations are organized (Osborne 1995, 35; Thompson 1974).[4]

The entrenchment of the modern notion of chronotic time, therefore, might best be grasped in terms of a two-way process, whereby the Newtonian scientific conception has provided the basic conceptual foundation for conceiving time as a homogenous medium that can be divided up and counted and, in turn, the thorough institutionalization of this way of organizing time—via standardized calendars and clocks—fully ingrains the idea that this is how time "really" is. On the one hand, the Newtonian conception of time "conditions the possibility of counting time by means of the technologies of calendars, clocks and timetables," because it presumes time *is* something that is essentially measurable and countable (Hutchings 2008, 4–5). Chronotic time is therefore "not reducible to the way it is accessed via calendars or clocks" (ibid., 6). Yet on the other hand, the implementation of

increasingly universalized and standardized systems of clock and calendar time has reinforced the chronotic understanding of time to such an extent that the presumption that this is how historical time "*really is*" persists today, in a world in which Newtonian science has been largely abandoned. The grand-scale efforts that have gone into the institutionalization of modern clock time and calendar time have been "forgotten" or "concealed," such that this rationalized, even homogenous, time appears as natural, simply "there," even without scientific theoretical support.

This reified conception of calendar time is problematic because it covers over the constructed character of calendar time and its role as a socially devised coordinating system. Though hegemonic calendrical arrangements may have begun as a proposition among alternatives, once they become reified and taken for granted, it becomes difficult to challenge them and argue for a different kind of temporal coordination (Hom 2010, 1149). The reified conception of calendar time is also problematic in light of its intimate connection with progressive constructions of "world history." At first glance, the progressive conception of history seems to be at odds with a quantitative, calendrical conception of historical time, given that any conception of "progress" involves *qualitative* judgments, as history is divided "according to principles of comparative value, in which some times become seen as more significant, better or worse, than others" (Hutchings 2008, 7). In fact, however, several theorists have argued that progressive theories and narratives of history go "hand in hand" with the "dated grid of a homogenous empty time" (Chandler 1999, 131; see also Benjamin 2007; Chakrabarty 2000; Hutchings 2008).

In the first instance, Kimberly Hutchings claims, the capacity to compare and rank different periods or stages ultimately relies on the presumption of a *transparent* or homogenous time "through which one can see the difference between stasis, progress and regress, and may identify the principles governing change" (Hutchings 2008, 7). Moreover, the idea of a total "world history" relies upon the idea that diverse histories and temporalities can all be encompassed "within" the same homogenous historical time. As Chakrabarty explains it, this time is homogenous because "it is not affected by any particular events; its existence is independent of such events and in a sense it exists prior to them. Events happen in time but time is not affected by them" (Chakrabarty 2000, 73). The reified calendrical chronology thereby functions as the medium in or through which different times and temporalities can be merged, in a "higher-order calculus that can calibrate uneven and diffuse temporalities" (Chandler 1999,

132). In this sense, the idea of a single, progressive human history is thoroughly dependent upon a "homogenous, secular, calendrical time," with its implication that "irrespective of a society's own understanding of temporality, a historian will always be able to produce a time line for the globe, in which for any span of time, the events in areas X, Y and Z can be named" (Chakrabarty 2000, 74).

The imperative for the rest of the chapter is to overturn the reified conception of calendar time, due to its complicity in securing progressivist and universalizing approaches to "world history," and its concealment of the constructed character of calendar time as a devised system for coordinating social life and mapping out histories. Challenging reified, naturalized understandings of calendar time does not entail a claim that historical time can or does exist independently of physical or cosmological dynamics and patterns, or of scientific theories, which always condition historical knowledge and experience.[5] The point, rather, of distancing my discussion of calendar time from conceptions of "natural time" and scientific theories, is to foreground the social, political, and cultural *work* that goes into constructing and using calendar time, and its role in configuring certain kinds of time concepts and historical narratives. The rest of this chapter thus gives priority of focus to the complex temporal and sociopolitical dynamics that underpin calendar time, pushing us to probe further than the seemingly indifferent face of the calendrical grid. In effect, this will entail a *reversal* of the model whereby the quantitative underlies the qualitative, positing instead that the qualitative underpins and produces the quantitative. One way of developing such an approach is to draw a distinction between the quantitative process of time-measuring and the qualitative process of time-reckoning: a distinction made by Heidegger in Division II of *Being and Time*.

Time-reckoning and Time-measuring

In Division I of *Being and Time*, Heidegger describes the basic structure of *Dasein*'s[6] everyday "Being-in-the-world" as "Care" or "Concern," which can be defined as a condition of social and material embeddedness, and of practical engagement with the phenomena and entities around us. In Division II, in a chapter entitled "Temporality and Everydayness," Heidegger claims that "time is first discovered" in this structure of Care or Concern. Indeed, "reckoning with time is constitutive for Being-in-the-world" (2009, 382). Practical, materially situated existence, or "Concernful Being," he explains, is all about "reckoning up, planning, preventing, or taking precautions,"

all of which are grounded in temporality. Concern expresses itself through the "*then*" as "awaiting," through the "*now*" as "making present," and through the "*on that former occasion*" as "retaining" (ibid., 459).

These concernful temporal orientations—awaiting, making-present, and retaining—are not to be taken in isolation from one another, Heidegger argues, as they are interconnected and mutually constitutive. This can be understood as a version of the basic phenomenological idea that within the "then" lies the "now-not-yet," and within the "on that former occasion" lurks the "now no longer" (ibid). But Heidegger takes this phenomenological temporality in an interesting direction when he characterizes the interrelated framework of the "now," "then," and "on that former occasion" as a framework of "datability." Datability, he stresses, is not to be confused with the practice of assigning a formal numerical date using an actual or "factical"[7] calendar. "Even without 'dates' of this sort," Heidegger stresses, "the 'now', the 'then' and the 'on that former occasion' have been dated more or less definitely" (ibid., 459). In other words, an event is "datable" by virtue of its relation to a *lived* "now," a "then," and an "on that former occasion," prior to its being formally dated as a numerical instant. "Datability," for Heidegger, therefore takes ontological priority over the formal, numerical "date," in the sense that the assignation of a date to an event depends upon an event's initial grounding in the everyday temporality of Concern. Moreover, the temporal structure of datability is qualitatively different from the succession of isolated instants or ordinal now-points that constitute actual, numerical calendars, because it is a fundamentally *relational* temporality, where the "now," the "then," and the "on that former occasion" are interconnected and mutually determining. As we have seen in the previous chapter, these phenomenological modes of temporal orientation are not reducible to a serial succession of instants in relation to a "before" and "after."

Another reason that datability does not entail a sense of time as a succession of instants or moments, claims Heidegger, is that every "now," "then," and "on that former occasion" has, along with its relational datability-structure, its own "spanned character" (Heidegger 2009, 462). This "spannedness" is understood as something that endures across any series of "points," because everyday time is a time *for* something, in relation to a "for which," or "for the sake of which" (ibid., 467). Accordingly, Heidegger writes, "we say 'now'—in the intermission, while one is eating, in the evening, in summer; 'then'—at breakfast, when one is taking a climb, and so forth" (ibid., 462). This

immersion in the event means that "when Dasein is 'living along' in an everyday, Concernful manner, it just never understands itself as running along in a Continuously enduring sequence of pure 'nows'" (ibid., 462). Furthermore, the "now" is datable because it has "the character of appropriateness or inappropriateness": a "*significance*" in terms of the relation it has to the "for which" or "for the sake of which." In the everyday mode of Concernful Being, then, *Dasein*'s way of "reckoning time" is fundamentally relational in two senses: first, in the sense that a "now" is only "now" in relation to a "then" and an "on that former occasion"; and second, in relation to encountered entities, situations, and tasks to be undertaken, which is what gives everyday time its "spanned" character and its "significance."

Heidegger thereby depicts time-reckoning as a complex temporal process that occurs within specific, materially embedded situations. "What remains decisive," Heidegger insists, is *Dasein*'s way of "reckoning with its time": a way of reckoning that must be differentiated from the practice of quantitative time-measurement (ibid., 456). He goes on to argue, however, that the fundamental work of time-reckoning gets "forgotten" or "covered over" within the "everyday" or "ordinary" mode of interpretation. In the "ordinary understanding of time," he contends, the "nows" are shorn of their relations and "leveled off," such that time comes to be understood as something that is essentially countable: "time shows itself as a sequence of 'nows' that are constantly 'present-at-hand,'" simultaneously passing away and coming along (ibid., 474). "In obtaining the measurement, we, as it were, forget what has been measured as such, so that nothing is to be found except a number and stretch" (ibid., 471). When time is characterized as pure succession, "datability," "spannedness," and "significance" are "missing" or "covered over." That is, we become so engaged with the (quantitative) product that we overlook the (qualitative) process and what it *means* to measure time in a specific way. Or as Ricoeur explains it:

> When we speak of time as a system of dates . . . we quite simply forget the work of interpretation by which we moved from making-present, including all that it awaits and it retains, to the idea of an indifferent 'now'. (Ricoeur 1988, 82)

While his polemic against the "ordinary concept of time" is not without flaws,[8] it is possible to read Heidegger's critique of the "forgetting" of the interpretative work of time-reckoning as a philosophical critique of the reification of calendar time and clock time.

Moreover, his account of the process of time-reckoninggestures toward an alternative, qualitative conception of calendar time. In the first instance, Heidegger's account of "datability" recovers traces of the phenomenological and interpretative dynamics underpinning calendar time, which can often be obscured by the "linear" configuration of its structure. In so doing, the Heideggerian account implicitly gestures toward a more complex understanding of the temporality of the calendar. On the one hand, the calendar orders historical time along chronological lines by assigning a singular moment to a specific event, positioning it within a "before-and-after" relation. But at the same time, the calendar makes events "available all at once to memory and interpretation," which oscillate between past, present, and future (Lampert 2006, 71). That is, calendars are readable and usable only because we look backward and look ahead, to distinguish "today," "*this* year," "*that* decade," or "*this* century" (Ricoeur 1988, 107).

As well as helping to recover the more complex temporal dynamics underpinning calendar time, Heidegger's concepts of "datability," "spannedness," and "significance" also help to articulate the date's function as a kind of "material anchor" that locates an event or text within the conditions of its occurrence. "Every 'then', Heidegger writes, "is a 'then, *when*…'; every 'on that former occasion', is an 'on that former occasion, *when*…'; every 'now' is a 'now *that*…'" (2009, 467, emphasis added). A numerical calendar date is premised upon a "reckoning" that is always already embedded in a socio-material context. Further, in Heidegger's account, dating frameworks arise because time is reckoned with *collectively*. Alongside "datability," "significance," and "spannedness," Heidegger cites "publicness" as one of the key features of *Dasein*'s everyday "within-time-ness." "In the most intimate Being-with-one-another of several people," he writes, "they can say *'now'* and say it 'together'…The 'now' which anyone expresses is always said in the publicness of Being-in-the-world with one another" (ibid., 411). This is because "*Mitsein*" or "Being-with-others," is a fundamental aspect of *Dasein*'s "Being-in-the-world." The creation of a calendar or the assignation of a date marks the interpretative act of "reckoning time," and also the fact that to be a temporal being is to be with others.

In some respects, there is a commonality between Heidegger's philosophical method of hermeneutical phenomenology, which seeks to reactivate the work of interpretation, and sociological and anthropological theories of calendar time, which emphasize its social, material basis and the need for a qualitative approach. Clifford Geertz, for example, claims that a social calendar "cuts time up into bounded

units not in order to count and total them but to describe and characterize them, to formulate their differential social, intellectual and religious significance" (Geertz 1966, 45). Zerubavel makes a similar case: "The social equalization of mathematically unequal durations and the unequalization of equal ones," he contends, "certainly presupposes the ability to view time from a perspective other than the traditional physicomathematical one. It involves conceiving of time as a qualitative, and not merely a quantitative, dimension" (Zerubavel 1979, 4–5). Yet, when it comes to considering the question of calendar time as a social, public time in more detail, the Heideggerian approach is ultimately insufficient, due to Heidegger's "thin" conception of public life and public time.

As discussed, Heidegger claims that "time is first discovered" in the mode of Care or Concern, that is, within everyday embeddedness in the material and social world (Heidegger 2009, 382). However, the overall aim in Division II of *Being and Time* is in fact to argue for the ontological primacy of the "ecstatic temporality" of the individual *Dasein* as the "*source*" of all other kinds of temporality, including the time that seems to belong to the "world" or to the "public." While the social, practical temporality of everydayness does have an existential or ontological significance for Heidegger, the guiding idea of *Being and Time* is that the individual *Dasein* progressively clarifies its understanding of itself by working *away* from the "everyday" world of Concern and Being-with-Others in search of a more "originary" form and a more "authentic" experience of time (2009, 277–8).[9] A key aspect of Heidegger's argument here is that public time is essentially "inauthentic."

The public time of everyday Concern is positioned at the bottom of Heidegger's hierarchical organization of temporal levels, because, according to Heidegger, it is the most likely to become "snared in the present" and "leveled out" in the "ordinary" conception of time, due to its practical nature. The immersion of everyday temporality in the "ready-to-hand," and the "present-to-hand,"[10] Heidegger argues, means that the accent is often placed on the "making-present" at the expense of "awaiting" and "retaining," such that the "now" gains a prominence and easily slides into a homogenous conception of time as a series of "now-points" (ibid., 278). This propensity of practical, everyday time to slide into the ordinary conception of time is exacerbated, as Heidegger explains it, by the fact that public life is itself a realm of inauthenticity, uniformity, and homogeneity, where individuality, nuance, and meaning become swallowed up by the dictatorship of the "they" (Heidegger 2009, 163–8):

> Publicly, time is something which everyone takes and can take . . . The only time one knows is the public time which has been leveled off and which belongs to everyone—and that means, to nobody. (ibid., 477)

This notion of public time as a meaningless, homogenous, anonymous time, however, is highly reductive. It is true that public time always precedes and exceeds us: we are born into, and live according to, time structures that are not of our own making. "The world is always given to me from the first as an organized one" (Schutz 1971, 9). In this sense, time-measuring frameworks always preexist and shape how different groups and individuals experience and think about time; they themselves are part of the temporal circumstances to be reckoned with. But this does not mean that all of the individuals or groups within the orbit of organized public time structures experience them in the same way, or that they have a uniform or universal meaning. Indeed, Heidegger's own characterization of the time of everyday Concern demonstrates that the intersubjective, qualitative process of time-reckoning is always rooted within the specificities of situation.

Arguably, then, Heidegger does not make enough of his own distinction between time-reckoning and time-measuring in his account of public time. While the practical, public temporality of everyday Concern may have a *propensity* to become "levelled out" in the ordinary conception of time, Heidegger's own method of "tracing back" shows that time-reckoning is always "prior" to the quantitative temporal reference frameworks that are used as public-reckoning instruments. "What remains decisive," Heidegger has claimed, is "*Dasein*'s way of reckoning with its time": a way of reckoning which, at the level of everyday Concern, draws its significance from our immersion in a particular event and context, and depends upon a complex interconnection between past, present, and future. Heidegger's quickness to conflate public time with the "ordinary" conception of time thus seems rather simplistic in light of his own careful analysis of reckoning and measuring and the difference between them.

Consequently, while Heidegger's distinction between time-measuring and time-reckoning can serve as an initial basis for developing a qualitative approach to calendar time, this depends upon a *selective* appropriation that takes on three key points. First, Heidegger's analysis of "datability" implies that the temporality of calendar time is not reducible to the straightforward chronology of the timeline or calendrical grid, but rather, is rooted in the interconnectedness of "awaiting," "making present," and "retaining." Second, he stresses

that that calendar time is materially embedded and related to things or phenomena we are "concerned" with, and is therefore interested and "significant." Third, he shows that calendar time is a social, public time, grounded in a "being-with." However, while he underscores the fundamentally social and public character of calendar time, Heidegger in fact falls back on a "thin" and reductive conception of public time that undoes his insightful analysis of "time-reckoning." Accordingly, we must reject the reductive content of Heidegger's analysis of everydayness, his dubious quest for an "originary" temporality, and his hierarchical designation of different modes of living as more or less "authentic." Instead, we need to formulate a "deepened" conception of public time (Leland 2001) to further develop the qualitative understanding of calendar time.

Public Time and Coordination

Considering the publicness of calendar time requires the balancing of two equally important points. The first of these is the importance of standardization as a coordinating mechanism, given that standardizing temporal reference is an integral component of social life. "Time could not be a major parameter of the social world if it could not be related to in a standard way which is shared by a collectivity" (Zerubavel 1982a, 85). History as a public discourse requires the creation of standardized time frames, in order for historical materials and narratives to be accessible and sharable. Dating frameworks enable us to map and follow traces of the past, and to share and coordinate diverse narratives, by providing common temporal references. The problem, therefore, is not with standardness *per se,* because the creation of temporal reference points and frameworks is an important means of attaining temporal coordination. The problem, rather, emerges when common, standard temporal reference frameworks become reified, or are presumed to have the same meaning or value for every individual or group whose lives are affected by them. While people share public or standard time measures as an integral component of social life, they often attribute completely different meanings to these measures, or indeed, discern a "lack of fit" between their own experience of a particular time span and its public measure (Hutchings 2008, 5; Weiss 2011, 171). The second key point, then, alongside the importance of coordination, is the inevitability of social diversity, which means that people do not necessarily experience or live time in the same way, including public time (Weiss 2011, 171–2).

As we have seen, Heidegger's "thin" conception of public time takes for granted that public time frames and measuring devices are encountered and lived in the same way by everyone within a "public." This thin conception of public time is informed by Heidegger's thin conception of the "public" more generally as a "uniform mass," which rules out any detailed consideration of significant differences between individuals within a public, and obscures the way in which groups can be differently situated within a given social and cultural realm (Leland 2001, 112).[11] In turn, the "thin" understanding of publicness precludes any consideration of how public time serves different interests, and how it impacts differently according to specific social positions and situations. What is required, then, is an alternative "deepened" conception of the "public" itself upon which to base a conception of public time: a conception that can register the importance of standardized public reference frameworks in terms of enabling shared communication, but which can also register that these frameworks do not have the same meaning or effects for everyone.

To this end, I suggest that we can fruitfully draw upon Hannah Arendt's pluralistic conception of the public, which manages to balance the importance of public institutions, frameworks, and structures, with a recognition of the inevitable diversity among those who constitute a public. This is articulated, for example, in *The Human Condition* (1998), where Arendt affirms the profound importance of the public realm, which "gathers us together" and relates us to one another. The term "public," she explains, means that "everything that appears in public can be seen and heard by everybody," and the presence of others who see what we see and hear what we hear assures us of the reality of our world (Arendt 1998, 50). As such, the public can be construed as "the common world" itself, as constructed through human activity and conceptual frameworks (ibid., 52). Yet, while affirming the value and necessity of the public, here and throughout her work, Arendt expresses a keen awareness of the dangers inherent in conceiving of the common world as a "mass society" and presuming a "'common nature' of all men who constitute it" (ibid., 57). She therefore places a vehement emphasis on the fundamental *plurality* of the public realm, or common world:

> The reality of the public realm relies on the simultaneous presence of innumerable aspects and perspectives in which the common world presents itself…For though the common world is the common meeting ground of all, those who are present have different locations in it, and the location of one can no more coincide with the location of

> another than the location of two objects. Being seen and being heard by others derive their significance from the fact that everybody sees and hears from a different position. (ibid., 57)

For Arendt, then, the common world is fundamentally dependent upon plurality, as without a plurality of perspectives, the diversity of this common world could never "appear" and be shared. The first key lesson to be learnt from Arendt, therefore, is the need to affirm and protect the heterogeneity of communities and societies. Attempts to overcome that plurality and multiplicity, Arendt warns, must result in "the abolition of the public realm itself" (Honig 1998, 114). The second key lesson is the importance of cultivating spontaneity, openness, imagination, and creativity within public political life (ibid., 103). This emerges from Arendt's "agonistic" conception of politics that again depends upon a plurality of perspectives and voices within a common public context. The example of a truly "political" public realm that Arendt repeatedly returns to throughout her work is that of the Ancient Greek *polis*. Arendt's writings on the *polis* envisage public, political space not only as a competitive space in which "moral and political greatness, heroism and preeminence are revealed, displayed and shared with others," but more fundamentally, as a "space of exposure," where different subjects offer themselves up to others, exposing their uniqueness yet also their dependence upon the others with whom they communicate (Benhabib 1998, 69; Cavarero 2000). Though Arendt has been criticized for what has been interpreted as her nostalgic lionization of Greek political culture (and moreover for her insistence on a public/private dualism[12]), many feminist theorists of the public have used her pluralistic, "agonistic" conception of public, political life as a way of contesting liberal or cosmopolitan ideals of universality and neutrality, and emphasizing instead the "contestatory and power-laden" dimension of the public (Benhabib 1998; Fraser 1990).[13] In this sense, Arendt enables publicness to "navigate through wider and wilder territory" than usual within political theory (Ryan 1998, 8).

Arendt's conception of public life thereby offers a way of registering the importance of the public or common world in "gathering us together," while at the same time affirming the inevitability and value of plurality. Although Arendt is all too aware that public life can so easily collapse into a "dictatorship of the 'they'", her solution is not to follow Heidegger and seek a more "authentic" way of life for the individual. Instead, she seeks to develop a more adequate conception of public life itself: a conception of publicness without concomitant

presumptions about uniformity, universality, or neutrality, which is rooted in the value and necessity of plural perspectives and positions. This is one reason her work has been of such inspiration within feminist political theory. While feminists have been sharply critical of models of the public sphere premised upon ideals of universality or neutrality, feminism nevertheless implicitly *values* publicness, in the sense that publicity enables critical communication, collective practices, and the sharing of time. A crucial task for feminist political theory is therefore not to simply critique or abandon the ideal of publicness, but rather to *reconstruct* a notion of the public that does not "masquerade" behind universality and neutrality, and can take differences and diversity into account (Landes 1998, 143; see also Fraser 1990; Young 1987).[14]

Further to this, I suggest that Arendt's pluralistic conception of the public can be redeployed as we seek to develop a deepened account of public *time*: an account that is not premised upon assumptions about neutrality, universality, and uniformity, but rather, upon the desire for temporal coordination and time-sharing within and across diversity. It must be acknowledged that Arendt's theorization of the public and the political categorically privileges the spatial over the temporal. She posits the concept of public or "political *space*" as a means of defending and protecting the distinctiveness of specific fields of political discourse and activity, against the generalized understanding of a universal, "infinite" historical time. Yet, in fact, we can find nascent seeds for developing a deepened, qualitative account of calendar time in Arendt's writings. In her essay on the "Concept of History," for instance, Arendt is highly critical of the emphasis upon quantitative "time-sequence," and the "modern computation of historical dates," which presents the adoption of a uniform dating system centered around the "CE" marker as a "mere technical improvement" to facilitate the "exact fixing of dates . . . without referring to a maze of different time-reckonings" (Arendt 2006, 65–7). The adoption of a neutralized, uniform dating system, she argues, has been deeply complicit in the rise of a sense of a general historical "process." This means that the singularity of specific phenomena, and the uniqueness of different perspectives and experiences, is lost within universalizing frameworks and grand historical narratives (ibid).[15] What looks like a "Christianization of world history," Arendt writes, is in fact the establishment of a homogenizing time-framework that eliminates or subsumes all qualitative time-concepts and temporalities within its all-encompassing reach, or "twofold extension toward infinity" (ibid., 68, 81).

Consequently, while Arendt's primary solution is to reclaim the *spatial* as a means of restoring the "political," her strong critique of reified conceptions of homogenous calendrical time does offer critical tools for developing a qualitative notion of calendar time that can register its constructed character. Moreover, Arendt's pluralistic conception of the public can inaugurate a different orientation toward public time. The pluralistic conception of publicness helps us to explain and affirm the significance and value of public dating frameworks in enabling the sharing, co-creation, and "co-exposure" of historical experiences and narratives; yet it also requires an acute attentiveness to the variety of meanings and values that temporal reference frameworks can carry.

Reconsidering Feminist Timelines

Calendar time plays an important historiographical role as a temporal coordinator and connector. Dating frameworks arise through the process of "reckoning" time within shared situations, and make it possible for "mnemonic communities" to correlate pasts, presents, and futures (Zerubavel 1997, 101). Yet, as deepened accounts of publicness and public time indicate, reckoning time is not a smooth or even process, and public temporal reference frameworks do not have the same value or significance for all in their orbit. Feminist historiography therefore requires a qualitative approach and a critical reflexivity when it comes to the dating frameworks and timelines through which we organize and construct feminist histories. This final section will extrapolate from the theorization of time-reckoning and public time above to consider how a qualitative approach might influence the way that feminist historians and theorists use dating frameworks and configure feminist timelines.

First of all, this approach means regarding the practice of dating and periodizing as not simply a *descriptive* practice, but further as an interpretative, *normative* practice. The choice of significant dates to serve as beginnings, turning points, or cut-off points, is always selective and interested, motivated by a specific interpretation of the conditions and events being marked out. The dates and periodizations that we employ are not a neutral backdrop to our historical narratives, rather, they are deeply embroiled and complicit in securing them. We thus need to enquire into the associative dimensions that specific dates and periods have, and ask "what could explain the choosing of a date or a date period," as well as what it could explain (Chandler 1999, 32–3). To argue that demarcating periods and timelines is an

interpretative, normative practice is not to diminish or dismiss the work that calendar time does in anchoring historical happenings and ideas within the contexts in which they occur, thereby aiding efforts to understand the specific socioeconomic and cultural conditions of their emergence (Fraser 2008, 106–8). However, the defense that calendrical periodization marks out an "objective" context or situation is problematic if unaccompanied by a reflexivity around the temporal framing of the context or situation that demands to be reckoned with. Temporal framing is never a neutrally "descriptive" act, because the way we frame an object makes us read the object differently (Chandler 1999, 77).

Building on Heidegger's point about the "significance" of dating, I suggest that dates can be understood not only as material anchors, which locate an event or text within the conditions of its occurrence, but also, borrowing from Sara Ahmed, as "sticky signs." Ahmed describes "sticky signs" in terms of the resonances and affective value they accumulate through repeated associations (Ahmed 2004, 90–1). "The sign," she explains, becomes a "sticky sign as an effect of a history of articulation, which allows the sign to accumulate value" (ibid., 92). A paradigmatic example of a "sticky" date would be "1968," which carries a plethora of associations, "standing for a moment of genuine revolution and inspiration as much as standing for a moment of 'undercooked' idealism and failure" (Berlant 1995, 300–1). "1968" therefore functions as both a material anchor and a sticky sign. A text dated "Paris 1968" anchors it in its specific conditions of production, in a time and place. But the date-sign "1968," *in itself* carries resonances and affects. Thus, the date assigned to an event or a text does *more* than simply contextualize it, or "insert it within a state of affairs" (Lampert 2006). The date-sign carries a value that will guide and shape historical inquiry. "1968," "the 1970s," or "the twenty-first century" conjure different associations, according not only to geographical location, but further to particular histories of articulation and repetition, and to one's distinct social and cultural location. Indeed, certain signs become so sticky that it becomes difficult to determine what makes something sticky in the first place, because "stickiness involves such a chain of effects" (Ahmed 2004, 91).

Ahmed's notion of sticky signs thereby helps to demonstrate that the date is not an indifferent instant or a neutral sign. This is not to say, however, that dates are value-laden or "sticky" in the same way for all interpretative communities. "1968" might have little significance as a temporal reference point within certain contexts.

Lévi-Strauss' conception of "hot" and "cold" chronologies offers a useful way of considering this:

> We use a large number of dates to code some periods of history; and fewer for others. This variable quantity of dates applied to periods of equal duration becomes a gauge of what might be called the pressure of history: there are 'hot chronologies' which are those of periods where in the eyes of the historian numerous events appear as differential elements; others, on the contrary, where for him (although not of course for the men who lived through them) very little or nothing took place. (Lévi-Strauss 1966, 259)[16]

To illustrate, the usual "hot chronologies" within hegemonic accounts of Western feminism periodize the "boom times" of the "second wave" as occurring between the mid-1960s and the late 1970s, with the 1980s being treated as a period of decline and backlash (see, e.g., Faludi 1992). Yet, Becky Thompson argues that retelling the story of "second wave" US feminism from the vantage point of multiracial feminism compels us to rethink some of the usual periodizations of Western feminism. "The 1982 defeat of the ERA," she contends, "did not signal a period of abeyance for multiracial feminism. In fact it flourished during the 1980s, despite the country's turn to the right" (Thompson 2010, 48). From this perspective, the 1980s is not such a "cold chronology" after all. Marisela Chávez similarly throws the usual feminist timelines off-kilter, by retelling the story of US feminism in the twentieth century from the Chicana perspective, citing the 1940s and 1950s (usually regarded as fallow feminist periods), as particularly "hot chronologies" for Chicana women's activism (Chávez 2010, 8). Unsettling feminism's "great hegemonic model" therefore requires us to reconsider what have been presumed to be the "hot" and "cold" chronologies of feminism, and generate alternative and multiple timelines.

In this respect, it is helpful to delve deeper into the complex temporality of the date, as a way of enabling not only a critical reflexivity around the normative practice of dating, but further, a more constructive and strategic use of dates. The temporal logics of the dated timeline are more complex than simple chronology, as dates can have temporal resonances and logics that exceed, and can even contradict, their position on a chronological, calendrical timeline. Consider how, for instance, "1970s" feminism is frequently coded within feminist discourse as "out-of-date," with texts such as Kate Millet's *Sexual Politics* or Shulamith Firestone's *Dialectic of Sex*—both published in

1970—being dismissed without necessarily being read. Yet, at the same time, a text whose publication date comes *before* these feminist texts, such as Gilles Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition*—published in 1968—is frequently coded within feminist theory as "cutting-edge" and "contemporary."

This example shows how anachronistic logic can work *against* feminism, when the temporality of feminism *itself* is value-coded as anachronistic, outdated, and outmoded, "behind the times." Yet, the example also highlights the potential of the date to disrupt the dominant timelines and their coding. In this example, the fact that "1970" comes *after* "1968" works to jolt and disturb the usual narratives about "contemporary" post-structuralist theory coming along *after* supposedly "outdated" radical feminists like Millett or Firestone. As another example: "women's suffrage rights were only granted in Switzerland in 1973" is frequently cited as a "shock statement," because it disturbs the usual paradigm of "first the West, then the rest." On one level, this is problematic because it is presumed that the response *will* be one of surprise (i.e., that we all *do* think that the West is "ahead" of the rest, hence the "*only*"). But it does illustrate the potentially subversive purposes to which dating can be put, when dates are used to *disorient*, to engender surprise, and initiate a thinking-again.

Conclusion

This chapter has outlined a qualitative approach to calendar time, which does not take calendar time at face value as a neutral or straightforwardly "linear" time. Once we register that the quantitative, dated grid is the outcome of a more complex process of time-reckoning, we see that calendar time is in fact just as "significant" and indeed, as temporally complex as other strands or aspects of historical time. The qualitative conception of calendar time can also be enhanced by a "deepened" account of public time, which recognizes its value in enabling temporal and historical coordination, while also recognizing that dating frameworks and timelines are diverse in their meanings and effects. This implies that our use of dates and timelines requires as much care as our use of language. Moreover, in uncovering the more complex temporal dynamics "underpinning" calendar time, the qualitative approach opens up some potentially creative and constructive ways of using calendar time to remap feminist histories.

Above all, foregrounding the process of "time-reckoning" requires an acknowledgement that calendar time emerges as just *one way* of reckoning and coordinating historical time. Indeed, as Bastian argues,

one of the most crucial tasks for theorists of time and temporality is to displace the idea that quantitative "linear time" is the only means of attaining temporal coordination and belonging (Bastian 2011). Many temporalities and time-measurement frameworks are not reducible or even convertible into generalized calendar time units. For example, as Zerubavel points out, we designate the life expectancy of running shoes in terms of mileage rather than years; and we often use milestones and memories rather than dates as temporal reference points: "when I was living in Liverpool," or "after I started learning about feminist theory…" (Zerubavel 1982b, 2–3). To take a qualitative approach, then, is to consider a variety of temporal reference frameworks that may overlap and entangle with dated grids and timelines, but cannot be subsumed by them. This will be clearly demonstrated in the next chapter, with reference to generational temporalities.

CHAPTER 5

Generational Time

Generational time is a relational time, enabling sociocultural and political transmission through, or across, different historical eras. It is manifest not only in the quantitative charting of births, ageing, and deaths, but also in the construction of symbolic generational orders and metaphors. The idea of "predecessors," for example, instills a connection to those who lived before one's own lifetime, while "successors" denotes those likely to outlive us and those yet to be born, thus stretching out futural horizons (Mannheim 1997; Ricoeur 1988; Stiegler 2010). Generational time is also figured through explicitly familial metaphors, such as "foremothers" or "forefathers." This is often the case within feminism where metaphors of "feminist foremothers," "mothers," and "daughters" are frequently deployed to convey relationships between feminists of different ages and eras.[1] Such terms, however, have been subject to serious feminist criticism of late. This is because the familial imagery is so closely associated with Oedipal models of relationality, which revolve around rivalry, prohibition, repression, and rebellion. Moreover, the idea of a "generational succession" can conjure images of feminism as a singular, one-way journey, where feminism is "passed on" or "handed down" from one generation to the next. As such, generational paradigms can seem inevitably aligned with linear, patriarchal concepts of historical time, steeped in logics of endowment and debt.

Female-to-female inheritance has always been problematic within patriarchal societies and cultures in which "the legacy passed from male to male is understood as natural and of central importance" (Spencer 2004, 10). However, while linear and patriarchal determinations of generational time may be dominant, this does not mean they are the only determinations that exist or are possible. Indeed, to dismiss generational paradigms as *wholly* linear, patriarchal, or Oedipal is to miss the multiple meanings and temporalities that they can express and establish within feminist discourse. As such, this

chapter will be arguing for a nuanced, situated approach to generational time, showing that generational orders can be temporalized in various ways, according to specific contexts and historical trajectories. My key point will be that if generational time is a relational time, then different ways of relating will produce different kinds of temporalization. To elaborate, I draw primarily on Luce Irigaray's writings on female genealogies, and on the work of Judith Butler, Hortense Spillers, and Madhu Dubey on shifting configurations of kinship. Ultimately, these studies gesture toward a more complex understanding of generational time, which moves beyond simplistic ideas of linear succession, continuity and discontinuity, and grasps the complex temporal logics of negotiation, repetition, appropriation, and reinvention. First, however, I will attend to some of the concerns and anxieties that generational thinking can produce.

Generational Anxieties

"Sisterhood" is the familial metaphor most often associated with feminist discourse. Yet the use of generational or maternal metaphors has become increasingly prevalent within Western feminist discourse over the past forty years, as tracing feminist genealogies has itself become a historical tradition (Scott 1996, 1).[2] Such projects are fuelled by the desire to build constructive intellectual and emotional connections between feminisms of the past and present, and to combat the persistent erasure of feminism's political and historical pasts: an erasure that "makes each new generation of feminists appear as an abnormal excrescence on the face of time" (Rich 1995, 9–10). Nonetheless, there is a growing concern that the generational paradigm is in fact having divisive effects; and since the 1990s, various articles and books have emerged that call generational thinking and imagery into question (see, e.g., Looser and Kaplan 1997; Henry 2004).

Criticisms of the generational paradigm focus upon the related tropes of anxiety, authority, and rejection. In the first instance, those who cast themselves in the role of feminist "mothers" have been criticized for adopting an authoritarian position in relation to younger feminists. To illustrate, Astrid Henry refers to Phyllis Chesler's book *Letters to a Young Feminist* (1998), where she "envisions her epistolary collection as passing down some of the wisdom she has gained from her 30-plus years in the feminist movement" (Henry 2004, 8–9). Chesler's "presumptuousness," Henry argues, is typical of a patriarchal model of authority "in which it is the duty of the sage old ones to pass on knowledge," and the duty of the younger ones to listen

and take instruction. Indeed, the very format of the book as a series of letters *to* an unspecified "young feminist" posits "the exchange of knowledge as instruction rather than dialogue" (ibid.).

In this kind of authoritarian attitude, Judith Roof detects an acute "parental" anxiety over contingency and influence. In her influential essay "Generational Difficulties" (1997), Roof describes such anxiety in terms of a "fear of a barren history": a fear that the next generation will refuse to follow in the footsteps of their foremothers, or will "[reject] their mother's model entirely and [commence] a new and different battle" (Roof 1997, 70). And perhaps ironically, the more that maternal authority is asserted, the more likely it seems that younger feminists will experience the burden of legacy in negative terms and refuse to follow in those footsteps. Jennifer Baumgardner and Amy Richards, for example, emphatically declare: "You're not our mothers . . . You have to stop treating us like daughters. You don't have the authority to treat us like babies or acolytes who need to be moulded" (2000, 233).

On the other hand, however, younger feminists have themselves been criticized for engaging in a "matricidal" enterprise, whereby older forms of feminism and older feminists are dismissed and rejected for being outdated or obsolete (Henry 2004, 6). Henry describes this as a form of "disidentification," when assertions of a new identity are achieved through evoking a maternal figure—the "bad mother"—to rebel and identify *against*. That is, feminism is maternalized for "the 'daughter' generation to have a movement of its own" (ibid., 14). As a consequence, older feminists and forms of feminisms are cast as negative role models—puritanical, sexless, humorless—and productive dialogue between older and younger feminists is blocked. Gloria Steinem, for example, speaks of feeling "like a sitting dog being told to sit," in response to some of the writing emerging from the self-declared "third wave" (Steinem 1995, xxii).

The generational matrix can thus fuel a sense of resentment and anxiety among both older and younger feminists, giving rise to a conception of feminist history as a struggle between competing generations (Howie 2010b, 4; Roof 1997, 71–2;). While the sisterhood trope creates problems through its implication that "we're the same," the mother–daughter trope seems "hopelessly fixated on the notion of difference" (Henry 2004, 182). This is not to say that without familial or generational paradigms, feminism would be an entirely harmonious field. The point, rather, is that such paradigms have exacerbated tensions, and can prevent feminists from exploring the more complex intellectual reasons for inter-feminist conflicts,

because such conflicts are attributed to an unavoidable, naturalized tension between "overbearing mothers" and "undutiful daughters" (Roof 1997, 71). Moreover, the idea of generational conflict can deflect attention from the wider institutional and cultural forces that "perpetuate sexism, foster rivalry and undervalue women's work" (ibid., 85).

The question, then, is how these kinds of effects can be minimized or eliminated. Can we cultivate a different kind of generational dynamic or paradigm? Or should generational thinking simply be abandoned altogether? Roof's argument is that generational paradigms are irredeemable: they are inextricably bound up in "the metaphor of the patriarchal family in the throes of its illusory battle with mortality," and import the "full force of Oedipal rivalry, recrimination, and debt" into relations between feminists (ibid., 71).[3] Even when the familial symbolism is not explicit, she contends, the concept of generations is implicitly dependent upon a biologistic "reproductive logic" of historical change. Roof acknowledges that this may seem to be "obliged by the physics of human existence," but insists the idea of generations is not "an innocent empirical model." It relies upon a linear, monocausal model of historical time that presumes "the past produces the future as parents produce children," and preludes the thought of a multidirectional time or causality where the present produces the past as much as the past produces the present and future (ibid.). The linear, reproductive logic of generational thinking thereby fosters a patrimonial understanding of the past's products as "property" that is not shared but "endowed" upon the next generation (ibid.).

Roof's arguments here are provocative, inviting not only a critical interrogation of the way that generational paradigms operate within feminist discourse but, moreover, an investigation into the very concept of historical "generations" itself. In its most basic sense, the idea of "generations" refers to several "brute facts" about human reproduction and the life of the species: birth, aging, and death. And the reproductive process is indeed linear or one-way in the sense that my children cannot give birth to me. Nevertheless, while it connects the idea of history to the life of the species, the concept of "generations" is in fact a sociocultural formulation, or a "sociological projection," of the biological process of reproduction (Ricoeur 1988, 109). As such, Roof's claim that the "generations" paradigm is not an "innocent empirical model" is astute, and chimes with sociologist Karl Mannheim's arguments against the positivistic or naturalistic approach to "the problem of generations" (Mannheim 1997).

Mannheim admits that "biological data constitute the most basic stratum of factors determining generational phenomena"; and that there is an inherent kind of continuity to the generational process in that "new participants in the cultural process are [continually] emerging while former participants in that process are continually disappearing" (ibid., 292). Yet, he emphasizes that "any biological rhythm must work itself out through the medium of social events" (ibid., 286); and that "if we speak simply of 'generations' without any further differentiation, we risk jumbling together purely biological phenomena and others which are the product of social and cultural forces" (ibid., 311).

To grasp the meanings and effects of generational orders, therefore, we must ask qualitative questions about the social dynamics of constituting a diverse group of people as a distinct "generation"; of interconnecting generations with one another; and endowing this process with cultural values and temporal structuration. Otherwise, warns Mannheim, "we arrive at a sort of sociology of chronological tables which uses its 'bird's-eye perspective' to 'discover' fictitious generation movements to correspond to the crucial turning points in historical chronology" (ibid.). Our date of birth does of course make a difference to the way we view the world and engage in relations: to be "contemporaries" with others is to be subject, to an extent, to common determining influences (ibid., 282). But it is not the case that those shared influences will provoke a common *response* or a unified "generational geist"; nor that the interests of one "generation" will necessarily be at odds or in competition with those of another (Heller 1997, 209; McDaniel 2002, 91–2). A generation is not an internally coherent "unit," and generational time is not simply a quantitative order of measurable years and decades (Mannheim 1997, 281–2). Thus, instead of regarding generational orders as "natural," or taking the reductive approach of boxing and labeling generational cohorts, we need to take a critical, qualitative approach, and consider generational orders in terms of sociocultural "system[s] of relations" (Alanen 1994, 37).[4]

This approach enables us to investigate in more detail the kinds of relations and temporalities that operate within generational orders, and to further consider Roof's claim that the concept of generations is inherently bound to a linear, monocausal understanding of historical time. On the conservative, traditionalist model of history that Roof has in mind, "generations" provide the conduit for the "handing down" of tradition, and hence for a straight, one-way line of transmission from past to present to future. In other words,

the continuity of species reproduction is translated into political continuity at the level of social and kinship structures (Mannheim 1997, 277; Osborne 1995, 127–35).[5] But is this the only possible generational temporality? In the first instance, the phenomenon of generations is not merely one of succession, but also of *coexistence* (Mannheim 1997, 282). And further, while relations between overlapping "generations" *can* be the medium of historical continuity, they can also bring rupture and discontinuity, due to the disruptive potential of demarcating a new "generation" and the fact that "new generations" do not always do what they are told or expected to do (Osborne 1995, 127). With the advent of "fresh contacts" or new cultural participants, a change of attitude occurs toward the heritage that is "handed down," and this attitudinal change "facilitates re-evaluation of our inventory and teaches us both to forget that which is no longer useful and to covet that which has yet to be won" (Mannheim 1997, 294). Moreover, the practice of establishing generational connections and traditions often occurs within scenes of struggle "between competing and often incommensurable desires" (Dubey 1995, 247). For example, within feminist writings, we may find expressions of a desire for posterity and control alongside an equally potent desire for others to take the lead. Similarly, the desire to begin again and "move forward" can be present alongside a yearning for connections with the past.

My suggestion is that the particular mix of desires, and the way that they are relationally played out, will result in different temporalizations of generational time, with varying degrees of continuity and discontinuity, connection, and rupture. In this sense, there is a fundamental ambiguity and malleability at the core of generational time, as its temporalization depends upon the ways that we relate to one another and negotiate our political heritage. I agree with Roof that the idea of "generations" must be denaturalized, and that it is vital to critically interrogate our assumptions around, and reliance upon, generational, patriarchal, or Oedipal paradigms. But it is too much of a generalization to equate any kind of familial or generational symbolism with patriarchal orders and Oedipality. The rest of the chapter, therefore, will seek to further explore the temporal ambiguities and possibilities of generational time, and the variety of ways that generational time can be configured and understood. In this I am aligned with Devoney Looser and Astrid Henry, who argue that we must try to think through the various significations of the generational metaphor, "rather than abandoning it at the outset" (Henry 2004, 11; Looser 1997, 35–6).

Interrupting the Oedipal

To explore the possibility of a different generational dynamic between feminists, and hence, a different generational temporality, Luce Irigaray's work on female genealogies offers many promising routes.[6] Irigaray, like Roof, is critical of the dissipation of debate among women into hierarchies of social power "tied to a prevalence of genealogical familial authority" (Irigaray 1996, 13–14). But unlike Roof, Irigaray argues that the problem is with patriarchal monopolization and colonization of the genealogical, rather than with the practice of genealogy or concept of "generations" *per se*. Indeed, she insists that female genealogies and a sense of "verticality," or diachronic connection through time, are crucial components in building strong female identities and relations between women (Irigaray 1993a, 94).[7] As such, she seeks to subvert and challenge the dominance of patriarchal genealogical models.

In *je, tu, nous* (1993b) and *Sexes and Genealogies* (1993c), Irigaray argues that relations between women are stifled, even impossible, within patriarchal culture and society, because its kinship structures separate women from one another and subordinate them to male authority. "It must be made apparent," she writes, "that we live in accordance with exclusively male genealogical systems . . . Patriarchal power is organised by submitting one genealogy to the other . . . Mother–daughter relations in patrilinear societies are subordinated to relations between men" (Irigaray 1993b, 16). In a culture structured upon patriliny and patrimony, women's own genealogies are severed and lost, as they are "abducted from their ancestors," "torn away" from their mothers, and transplanted into the genealogies of male partners (1993c). The Oedipal paradigm is the emblem and mechanism of this genealogical and reproductive order, because of its division of genealogy into "one or two family triangles, all sired by the male." The patriarchal family serves the interest of male power and property, and the female is reduced to the realm of raw "nature" and "uncultured" reproduction (ibid.).

For Irigaray, therefore, the "between-men culture" of patriarchy can provide no suitable ways of symbolizing and cultivating "between-women" cultures, socialities, and genealogies. Accordingly, the "political matricide"[8] that sets younger feminists against older feminists arises because there is no adequate cultural alternative to the patriarchal rules and meanings governing genealogical and intergenerational relations. That is, to conduct themselves in social and cultural life, women are forced to mimic patriarchal kinship relationships

modeled on patrilineal descent, Oedipal rivalry, and debt. Women adopt these patterns and paradigms, Irigaray contends, because "we lack values of our own" (1993c, 4). However, despite painting this seemingly bleak picture of genealogical relations between women under patriarchy, Irigaray goes on to make an enticing claim, which is that "the Oedipal paradigm only seems like the only order possible because it refuses to regard itself as myth" (1993c, 23). Granted, the Oedipal myth is not simply a fantasy, but rather has a "symbolic logic that accounts for a real mode of functioning, a real structure of relations" (Felman 1987, 151). Nevertheless, Irigaray's claim here dramatizes the vital idea that Oedipal relational patterns can, in principle, be interrupted and unsettled.

Irigaray's work undertakes such an interruption of the Oedipal in two key ways. The first is through a psychoanalytic intervention. One of her guiding ideas is that if social relations between women are to improve, we must look at psychic determinations of the social, rather than taking a purely socioeconomic perspective.[9] In fact, for Irigaray, feminism "fails" precisely because it has not adequately investigated and unraveled the symbolic structures, imaginary identifications, and psychic attachments that underpin social organization (1993b, 4–5). From Irigaray's perspective, if intergenerational relations between feminists are manifesting Oedipal tendencies, we can read this as symptomatic of the deeper problem of women's relationship to the "symbolic": that is, the set of linguistic, sociocultural rules and norms that order, support, and regulate our sense of reality and cultural intelligibility, including gendered relations and kinship structures. "How can we govern the world as women," she asks, "if we have not defined our identity, the rules governing our genealogical relations, our social, linguistic, cultural order?" (1993b, 51) Her argument is that women's repositioning of themselves as symbolic subjects must first take place by questioning our relation to the maternal or the mother. This, above all, requires us to challenge the psychoanalytic idea, entrenched by both Freud and Lacan, that entry into the symbolic order of language and culture depends upon the paternal intervention, and the concomitant transcendence or forgetting of the maternal.

In Lacan's account, the mother and child initially exist in a relation of fusion and undifferentiation: a state that needs to be broken up by the "Paternal Metaphor" and the "Law of the Father" if the child is to become individuated and enter into the cultural order of language.[10] Lacan insists that it is the father's *name* or "Paternal Metaphor" that is the fundamental support of the symbolic system, rather than the

literal father. This marks a decisive shift away from the biologistic orientation of Freud's account of Oedipalization, where it is the literal father that prohibits the desire for the mother and ensures entry into the cultural order of prohibitions and taboos.[11] However, feminist theorists have argued that the Lacanian account is equally problematic, because it still depends upon the idea that the mother–child relation has to be mediated via a third term if the child is to successfully enter cultural life. That is, although Lacan shifts the grounds of our understanding of patriarchal power relations and their social reproduction away from the biologistic orientation of Freud toward sociolinguistic processes, he nevertheless formulates this structure on the basis of a universal or inevitable law that the maternal relation must always be sacrificed and left behind. Thus, in Lacan's work, as Elizabeth Grosz argues, "patriarchal dominance is not so much challenged as displaced, from biology to the equally unchangeable sociolinguistic law of the father" (Grosz 1990, 15).

For Irigaray, Lacan's psychoanalytic theory is useful in that it helps to demonstrate the fundamentally "matricidal" foundations of Western culture. "What is now termed the Oedipal structure as access to the cultural order is already structured within a single, masculine line of filiation which doesn't symbolize the woman's relationship to her mother" (Irigaray 1993b, 16). However, she argues, although psychoanalysis has propped up the patriarchal symbolic order by making it seem inevitable, we must consider the prospect of a transformed symbolic order, and challenge the "erasure of the maternal" within psychoanalytic theory. Instead of simply accepting the story of originary mother–child fusion, and the need for separation from the mother,[12] Irigaray tries to find a place for maternal genealogy within the symbolic and affirm that "there is a genealogy of women" (1993c, 19).

One example is Irigaray's proposal in *je tu nous* of a "maternal order" founded upon a "placental economy" (1993b). While the relation between mother and child *in utero* has been represented in terms of a fusion that needs to be broken up and regulated by the paternal function, Irigaray suggests that by paying attention to the mediating role played by the placenta, we can formulate an alternative psychoanalytic account where the mother and child are understood to be already separate, though conjoined. Irigaray draws here on the work of biologist Helène Rouch, who likens pregnancy to a "natural transplant." The difference between pregnancy and an organ transplant, she explains, is that the placenta stops the defense mechanism against the (half-foreign) fetus. It thereby facilitates "regulating exchanges"

between mother and fetus, negotiating between the mother and the "other within." The "placental economy," Irigaray states, is thus an organized economy "which respects the one and the other." While Lacan claims that genuine exchange depends upon the intervention of the paternal third term, the placental economy implies that the "third term" is already there. This may seem like a form of biological essentialism, but it is the *figure* of the placenta that interests Irigaray, and the ways it might be interpreted at the level of culture and theory. "Culture," she claims, is yet to give "interpretation to the model of tolerance of the other within and with a self that this relationship manifests," and as such we have failed to recognize or appreciate the "almost ethical character" of the fetal relation and the placental economy. But this economy implies a "maternal order" that does not need to be transcended to make cultural relations possible, but rather contains the seeds of communication and psychic relations already within. As Elizabeth Weed explains:

> Were there a way for a child to symbolize its relations to the mother's body, and were that relationship imagined as always already separate and at the same time life sustaining, the whole fantasy of fusion, triangulation, law, loss, and refusal of loss would be interrupted. . . . (Weed 2010, 27)

The idea of a "maternal order" and "placental economy" is not developed in much detail in Irigaray's work; but its value lies in gesturing toward a psychoanalytic theory that is not rooted in the "forgetting" or transcendence of the maternal. Through interventions such as these, which open up alternative models of relationality, individuation, and enculturation, Irigaray begins to interrupt and unsettle the Oedipal narrative, showing that it is one possible account among other alternatives.[13] Further, suggests Howie, Irigaray's "maternal order" could help reorient and introduce a different ethical sensibility into intergenerational relations, initiating new "pathways through feminisms and between feminists" (Howie 2010b). By removing the necessity for daughters to become individuated through leaving the maternal relation behind, she proposes, the notion of a maternal order invites a relational and communicational model that has a different logic and temporality: a "new covenant" for a woman-to-woman sociality that "offers a way to hear the past in light of the new without anxious displacement" (ibid., 8–10).

This is not to say that we must "embrace the truth of the placenta" as a feminist emblem, or that all forms of relations between

women should be reduced or assimilated to an idealized version of the maternal relation, uncontaminated by Oedipal or patriarchal logics (Stone 2011; Weed 2010, 27).[14] It is also not to say that Oedipal narratives and models have no place in our analytic or imaginary repertoire.[15] The point, rather, is that Irigaray shows that psychoanalysis can detach itself from reactionary, patriarchal theories, and rethink relations of kinship and "verticality" beyond the Law and the Name of the Father, and the exchange of women. For example, if Oedipus were interpreted in much broader terms as "a name for the triangularity of desire," then we can begin to ask: "What forms does that triangularity take?" And is the triangular structure really a universal? (Butler 2002, 38–40).

Alongside Irigaray's interventions into psychoanalytic theory, she also works at the level of the "cultural imaginary," exploring how female genealogies have been culturally represented within Ancient myths.[16] The term "imaginary" is used by Lacan to describe the realm of identification and imagistic representation of relations, in which the ego is primitively established through fantasized identification with others. The "cultural imaginary" is an extension of this term to designate the cultural realm of identification and representation through social and cultural systems of image, narrative, and fantasy (Roof 1996b, 10). The relationship between the symbolic order and the cultural imaginary is complex, given their deep intertwinement, but the cultural imaginary can be essentially understood as a "symptom" or expression of the symbolic order which, in turn, gives structure to the imaginary and makes it intelligible (ibid.; see also Ragland Sullivan 1987, 156). A key component of the cultural imaginary is myth, which Irigaray describes as a "historical expression" of the sociocultural rules and psychic structures that permeate the dominant symbolic order at a given time.[17]

Given that Irigaray understands myths to be expressions of symbolic rules and psychic structures, much of her work on Ancient myths takes place in a diagnostic vein. She reads certain myths as symptomatic of a patriarchal symbolic, using them to demonstrate that "western culture and civilization" is fundamentally built upon an "originary matricide."[18] For example, in Irigaray's reading of Aeschylus's *Oresteia*, the murder of Clytemnestra by Orestes is a mythic expression of the symbolic rule that matricide is the "originary" of patriarchy: the sacrifice of the mother and the "severing of the genealogical link between women" (Schwab 2010, 80; Irigaray 1993a, 78). Some of Irigaray's readings, however, are recuperative, as she turns to prominent myths that do

give adequate cultural expression to the mother–daughter relation: a relation that is ordinarily the "least cultured space of our societies" (1993b, 47). Although patriarchal traditions have "wiped out" traces of mother–daughter genealogies, Irigaray insists, repressed "gynocratic" orders nevertheless resurface in myth. For example, she reads the myth of Demeter and Persephone as not only a story of destruction and loss, but also as an affirmation of the powerful vibrant bond between mother and daughter. The myth, Gail Schwab argues, shows this bond to be "indispensible to the survival of the earth, the human race and the gods . . . [When] the intergenerational link between women . . . is lost, life does not flourish" (Schwab 2010, 85).[19]

It can be objected that Irigaray's recuperative readings depict myths as repositories for timeless truths, or project idealized images of the female or feminine. Indeed, given that the mythic characters Irigaray takes up, such as Demeter and Persephone, are supposed to be projections of the patriarchal imaginary, it can be difficult to see her mythic reclamations as an especially radical move (Green 2012, 6). Yet, Irigaray's defenders argue that her positing of "mythic origins" is intended as a provocation to think through unrealized conditions of possibility, rather than a claim to a lost truth (see, e.g., Athanasiou and Tzelepis 2010; Haigh 1994). Moreover, through emphasizing the psychoanalytic underpinnings of her work, we can draw a parallel between Irigaray's performative engagement with myth and the psychoanalytic scene of transference, where the point is "less to construct the precise details of the story than to establish another possibility for communication" (Butler 2005, 57). Psychoanalysis is not about recovering the "origin" of neuroses, or simply reproducing the past, but rather aims to *rework* past and present through an encounter and relationship with another. As La Capra explains it, "transference" refers to a "repetition-displacement of the past into the present": an unconscious redirection of desires or feelings toward a new "object" or "other" (La Capra 2004, 72). Transference, therefore, is bound up with a notion of time not as simple continuity or discontinuity, but as "repetition with variation or change" (ibid.).[20] In the clinical context, the aim is for the analyst and the analysand to work through transferential displacement in a productive manner that does not "blindly replicate debilitating aspects of the past." This means facing up to fears of possession by the past, but also resisting the temptation to try and assert full control over the "object" (ibid.).[21] Irigaray's "return" to Ancient mythology, argues Samantha Haigh, can be interpreted in precisely these terms: not as a bid to "recover

a lost, authentic, feminocentric 'origin'," but an attempt to rework, reinvent, and reappropriate:

> This move . . . parallels exactly the psychoanalytic move of return and reworking, the way in which, during the transference relation, it is not the 'narrative's forgotten origin' which is primary but the 'active process of constructing a text'. (Haigh 1994, 63)

In the sense that Irigaray's "return" to Greek myths can be interpreted as a process of reworking and reinvention, it loosens the hold of the Oedipal, and enacts a temporality of "working through," which offers a promising way of thinking about generational time, legacy, and exchange.[22] Admittedly, this kind of cultural reworking is not the final answer to bringing about radical social transformation (Deutscher 2002, 58). Yet, Irigaray's work on myth and the cultural imaginary is valuable in its affirmation that a different model of "woman-to-woman sociality" and generational temporality is possible:

> There is a difference in subjective economy between the hierarchical transmission of an already established discourse and language, order and law, and the exchange of a meaning between us here and now. The first model of transmission or instruction is more parental, more genealogical, more hierarchical; the second more horizontal and intersubjective. The first model risks enslavement to the past, the second opens up a present in order to construct a future. The first model operates by way of transmitted dependency, the second by way of reciprocal listening . . . The first model is not, strictly speaking, a model of communication. It is, at best, an information model, constituting knowledge as an aggregate of information . . . The second model offers itself as an opening to a field of communication, as a world of the creation and exchange of thought and culture. . . . (Irigaray 1996, 46)

That said, however, the project of uncovering and building alternative genealogical and generational temporalities does remain undeveloped in Irigaray's work. I suggest that this is due to her rather totalizing treatment of Western culture, which means that she leaves herself little to work with. For example, she insists that "with a few additions and subtractions, our imaginary still works according to the schema set in place by Greek mythology and tragedy . . . The mythology that underlies patriarchy has not changed" (1993c, 12).[23] Her evocations of history are similarly totalizing, abounding with sweeping references to historical "stages" and "eras" that are often

reminiscent of Hegel's division of history into epochs that can be summed up by a single theme or idea. Indeed, at times her words seem to reinscribe the Hegelian *telos*: "Perhaps we needed to go this far, in order to understand that we must go back to the origins of the decline of our culture" (Irigaray 1993c, 122).[24]

It is possible to read Irigaray's authoritarian style and grand narratives of history as a rhetorical strategy deployed to enforce her key point that sexual difference is yet to be really *thought* (Irigaray 1993a, 5). Similarly, we can interpret Irigaray's claim that "our imaginary still works according to the schema set in place by Greek mythology and tragedy" as a "mimetic" strategy that "lets the myth recount its own interruptions" (Athanasiou and Tzelepis 2010, 5). Yet, as Battersby argues, Irigaray's generalizing claims about Western culture and history in fact result in a restriction of her own radical project. Her monolithic overview blocks out the transformative potential of alternative, "minor" cultural representations, forcing her to push the transformative potential of female creativity and expressivity toward a future "still to come (or to come again?)" via a repressed gynocratic prehistory (Battersby 1998, 101–2; see also Battersby 2007, 157–9). As Elena Varikas writes of Irigaray's work: "there is no place . . . for the particular histories of others to emerge . . . no place for the plurality of representations of difference: for the foreign, the ecstatis, the enslaved, and the colonized which are always there, haunting the imaginary of the tragics and our own" (Varikas 2010, 243; see also Deutscher 2010).

Consequently, while Irigaray opens up and affirms the possibility of a different kind of genealogical order and temporality, she ultimately grants too much to the dominant patriarchal paradigms and allows them to overdetermine her analysis. Her insightful critique of Lacanian psychoanalysis is essentially that it remains complicit in maintaining the patriarchal symbolic order by not fully examining its own historical determinants, or seriously considering the prospect of a transformed symbolic (Weed 2010, 18).[25] This line of critique points to the radical possibilities opened up by taking a historiographical perspective, and helps us to register that the Oedipal scenario is "not the only way of being in the world" (Eng 2010, 89).[26] Yet, Irigaray does not take this approach far enough, as she consistently equates Western history with the history of a certain kind of patriarchy, and Western culture with a monolithic set of myths. Even if we interpret Irigaray's grand historicizing and mythologizing as a deliberate rhetorical strategy, the effect is the same: narratives and histories that do not fit into the master narratives are once again overlooked. As I have

argued previously, it is not enough to interrupt and trouble already-dominant narratives. We need to find and tell different ones.

Shifting Symbolics and Historical Resonances

To further explore the contingency and variability of generational/genealogical orders, the discussion will now move away from psychoanalytic models, and pay greater attention to changing sociocultural conditions and specific historical legacies. Indeed, as Butler argues, while psychoanalysis potentially has much to offer in terms of thinking through alternative kinship arrangements and genealogical paradigms, psychoanalytic theory is often rather out of step with social science subjects like sociology and anthropology, where the idea of a fixed, "quasi-timeless" symbolic order that "lurks behind any actual social arrangement" has been thoroughly and decisively challenged (2002, 34–8). The target here is not only Freud and Lacan, but also the structuralist anthropologist Lévi-Strauss, for whom the Oedipal drama is "a prohibition that is at work in the inception of language, one that works at all times to facilitate the transition from nature to culture for all emerging subjects" (ibid., 30; see Lévi-Strauss 1969).[27] Lévi-Strauss's use of Oedipus, contends Butler, instills a static, ahistorical view of kinship, and has narrow implications for formations of gender and sexual arrangements, because entry into the cultural realm is conceived in terms of a compulsory heterosexuality:

> The hypostatized heterosexuality, construed by some to be 'symbolic' rather than social and so to operate as a structure that founds the field of kinship itself—and that informs social arrangements no matter how they appear, no matter what they do—has been the basis of the claim that kinship is always already heterosexual. According to its precept, those who enter kinship terms as nonheterosexual will only make sense if they assume the position of Mother or Father. The social variability of kinship has little or no efficacy in rewriting the founding and pervasive symbolic law. (Butler 2002, 34)[28]

Sociologists and anthropologists such as Marilyn Strathern or David Schneider, however, have long contested the universalism of the structuralist approach, and explored kinship systems and relations that do not conform to the Oedipal model. The key theoretical idea here is that kinship is a kind of *doing*, which does not reflect a prior structure and can only be understood as enacted practice (Schneider

1984). As Sarah Franklin and Susan McKinnon explain, kinship should not be theorized as being grounded in a singular and fixed idea of "natural" relation, nor as being underwritten by a prior structure of relations (Franklin and McKinnon 2000, 278). Instead, kinship is a practice that enacts a specific assemblage of significations as it takes place: a "mobile classificatory technology," which generates, and responds to, particular material, relational, and cultural worlds (ibid.; Butler 2002, 34–6).

This mobile, performative understanding of kinship that has emerged within the social sciences gives the notion of a "symbolic order" much more substance and historical determination than it often receives within Lacanian theory. For instance, the cultural "rules" of kinship are determined today in relation to phenomena such as transnational migration, transnational adoption, and assisted reproductive technologies,[29] as well as legal and political battles around gay marriage and civil partnership (see, e.g., Eng 2010; Howell 2006).[30] Indeed, by foregrounding changing sociopolitical conditions, Butler suggests, "post-kinship" theorists like Schneider, Franklin, and McKinnon effectively undermine or "relax" the distinction between the symbolic and the social. The presumption that social relations and practices have the power to undermine and transform the symbolic order of "rules" governing those social relations, she argues, implies that "the symbolic does not precede the social and . . . has no independence from it" (Butler 2002, 38).[31] Importantly for Butler, this approach gives us much more scope for resistance and transformation, because it implies that hegemony is "eminently challengeable at the level of social, political and historical practice" (ibid., 35). Of course we must always contend with the persistent "undertow" of accumulated traditions and norms, which makes efforts at social change so difficult (Butler 2012, 153). Yet, "there is no reason to take that recalcitrance or countercurrent as a sign of the invariant laws of society," of a fixed symbolic logic (ibid.).

The "post-kinship" approach advocated by Butler underscores the contingency and fluidity of kinship configurations, and also emphasizes the wide range of meanings that kinship terms can hold. For example, through exploring different kinship configurations, we see that "kinship" is not simply reducible to "family," as kin terms are frequently extended to nonbiological and nonfamilial relations, including community members, friends, lovers, ex-lovers, and "other-mothers." This is well documented within studies of "queer kinship" that explore the "prospect of and possibility for kinship beyond the normative boundaries of the Oedipal" (Eng 2010, 139). Although

lesbian, gay, or queer people have been consistently excluded from Anglo-American discourses of "the family," there is nevertheless a "redemptive discourse of families of choice" that has emerged "in recognition of generative, alternative queer kinship practices" (Pidduck 2009, 442). In *Families We Choose* (1997), for instance, Kath Weston gives ethnographic descriptions of lesbian and gay kinship practices and relations, which partially approximate the traditional family form, while at the same time representing a more radical departure from conventional understandings of kinship and the privileged construction of the heterosexual "nuclear family" (ibid., 6).

It must be acknowledged that "chosen" families are not simply "freely chosen," but rather are determined by constrained choices, and often subject to nonrecognition and censure (ibid., xvi–xviii). Moreover, queer theorists do not always embrace the "redemptive model" and may express oppositional, critical, or ambivalent attitudes (see, e.g., Edelman 2004; Walters 2012).[32] Yet, what studies of queer kinship consistently demonstrate is that metaphors of kinship do not necessarily take us back to the site of heteronormative couplings or heterosexual reproduction. As Esther Newton argues in her classic study *Mother Camp* (1972), the queer or camp humor expressed through the persona of "mother" in drag performances "grows out of the incongruities and absurdities of the patriarchal nuclear family; for example, the incongruity between the sacred, idealized mother, and the profane, obscene Woman . . . " (ibid., ix). The meanings of "mother" are capacious and flexible, as is the language and structure of kinship more generally (Eng 2010, 198).

Ultimately, then, the shift to such a mobile and fluid definition of kinship means that kinship loses its specificity, and becomes difficult to separate out from other social systems and practices. That is, if kinship is characterized loosely as "modes of enduring relationship" or affiliation, rather than as the "basis of culture," we can regard kinship as one sociocultural phenomenon among many, with which it is closely related and interlinked (Butler 2002, 37). For example, the "dispossession of kin relations by slavery," as Butler points out, demonstrates that "it is not possible to separate questions of kinship from property relations (and conceiving persons as property) . . . as well as the national and racial interests by which these lines are sustained" (ibid., 15). This is well illustrated by Hortense Spillers in her illuminating essay "Mama's Baby, Papa's Maybe" (1987), which explores the complex relationship between genealogical and racial symbolics under the Atlantic slave trade. Spillers' core argument here is that the *intertwinement* of kinship relations and property relations under slavery demonstrates that structures

of kinship "adhere to no symbolic integrity" (ibid., 66). Indeed, she writes, if "kinship" were possible among captive persons, the property relations and rules of slavery would be undermined, because the children of enslaved persons would then "belong" to a mother and father (ibid., 74). The claim here is not that African peoples in the New World did not maintain emotional connections and imagined continuities (which are what make blood relations meaningful in the first place) (ibid.). Spillers' point, rather, is that the histories and legacies of slavery reveal that the meanings of "family," "genealogy," and "kinship" are fundamentally unstable, and determined through property relations and racialized systems of domination:

> 'Family' as we understand it 'in the West'—the *vertical* transfer of a bloodline, or a patronymic, of titles and entitlements, of real estate . . . from fathers to sons in the supposedly free exchange of affectional ties between a male and a female of *his* choice—becomes the mythically revered privilege of a free and freed community . . . The point remains that captive persons were *forced* into patterns of *dispersal*, beginning with the Trade itself, into the *horizontal* relatedness of language groups, discourse formations, bloodlines, names, and properties by the legal arrangements of enslavement . . . We might choose to call this connectedness 'family' or 'support structure', but that is a rather different case from the moves of a dominant symbolic order, pledged to maintain the supremacy of race. It is that order that forces 'family' to modify itself when it does not mean family of the 'master', or dominant enclave. (ibid., 74–5)

There is an interesting point of comparison here between Spillers' analysis and Irigaray's account of female genealogies and "woman-to-woman sociality" within western patriarchal structures. Irigaray, we can recall, claims that women's genealogical links are severed by patriarchy because they are "abducted from their ancestors" and exchanged between patriarchal family units. Yet, she fails to consider the brutal severing of genealogical links through enslavement: a systematic separation of individuals from their kin described by Orlando Patterson as a process of "natal alienation":

> Not only was the slave denied all claims on, and obligations to, his parents and living blood relations but, by extension, all such claims and obligations on his more remote ancestors and on his descendents. He was truly a genealogical isolate. Formally isolated in his social relations with those who lived, he was also culturally isolated from the social heritage of his ancestors. He had a past, to be sure. But a past is

> not a heritage . . . Slaves differed from other human beings in that they were not allowed to freely integrate the experience of their ancestors into their lives, to inform their understanding of social reality with the inherited meanings of their natural forbears, or to anchor the living present in any conscious community of memory. That they reached back for the past, as they reached out for the related living, there can be no doubt. Unlike other persons, doing so meant struggling with and penetrating the iron curtain of the master, his community, his laws, his policemen or patrollers, and his heritage. (1982, 5)

Irigaray may claim that women have also not been allowed to "freely integrate the experience of their ancestors into their lives" under patriarchal conditions. However, as Ewa Ziarek argues, by failing to register the symbolic disarticulation of kinship wrought by slavery, Irigaray does not appreciate the very different ways in which women in "the West" can be positioned within kinship structures (Ziarek 2010, 210). Spillers, for instance, contends that the symbolic history of slavery has resulted in a unique position for African-American women which is "out of the traditional symbolics of the female gender." Legal enslavement, she explains, removed the African-American male from the prevailing social function of the Name and Law of the Father, therefore setting a "dual fatherhood" in motion: comprised of "the African father's *banished* name and body and the captor father's mocking presence." Under such conditions, a "dual motherhood" was also established, whereby "motherhood as female bloodrite is outraged, is denied, at the *very same time* that it becomes the founding term of a human and social enactment" (ibid., 80). On the one hand, Spillers argues, the perceived absence of the Father's symbolic mark upon the African-American family has resulted in persistent pathologization of the African-American family and its supposedly "matriarchal" structure.[33] Yet, on the other hand, the unsettling of the Law and the Name of the Father within the context of enslavement has given way to a potentially "monstrous" and empowering symbolic position: "a female with the potential to 'name'." Her point is that "this different cultural text actually reconfigures . . . certain *representational* potentialities for African-Americans . . . and it is our task to make a place for this different social subject (Spillers 1987, 80). Hazel Carby makes a similar case in her essay "White Woman Listen! Black Feminism and the Boundaries of Sisterhood":

> In concentrating solely upon the isolated position of white women in the Western nuclear family structure, feminist theory has necessarily neglected the very strong female support networks that exist in

> many black sex/gender systems . . . It is important not to romanticize the existence of such female support networks but they do provide a startling contrast to the isolated position of women in the Euro-American nuclear structure . . . Female networks mean that black women are key figures in the development of survival strategies, both in the past, through periods of slavery and colonialism, and now, facing a racist and authoritarian state . . . Cultures of resistance are not simply adaptive mechanisms; they embody important alternative ways of organizing production and reproduction and value systems critical of the oppressor. Recognition of the special position of families in these cultures and social structures can lead to new forms of struggle, new goals. (Carby 1997, 51–2)

What we learn, then, from reading a wider range of work on kinship and family, is that there is no universal, fixed set of meanings or cultural rules governing familial or generational paradigms. Thus, as critical feminist attention turns toward the use of generational or familial metaphors within feminist discourse, we need to consider the variety of histories and contexts that yield different problematics and potentialities for different groups and individuals. For example, Madhu Dubey proposes that the history of black motherhood in the United States gives the use of generational or matrilineal metaphors within contemporary black feminist literary criticism a "special resonance," that needs to be taken into account (Dubey 1995, 245). Since Alice Walker's *In Search of Our Mother's Gardens* (1974),[34] she contends, black feminist literary critics have consistently deployed the metaphor of matrilineage "to authorize their construction of a black feminine literary tradition" and overcome a brutal history of dislocation and disinheritance by means of fictional familial and cultural connection (ibid.).[35] "Neither a cultural nor a familial lineage was available as a seemingly natural given" for black women in the United States; hence it is "precisely this lack of a naturalized tradition that motivates the impulse to naturalize tradition, and that paradoxically exposes the constructed status of the natural in black feminist discourse" (ibid., 247).

Being sensitive to "special resonances," it must be emphasized, does not require suspension of a critical perspective.[36] Indeed, Dubey suggests that in the "fiction of tradition" within black feminist discourse, we can identify an acute reflexive awareness of itself *as* a "necessary fiction" (ibid., 248).[37] And such reflexive awareness can bring with it a real ambivalence toward the unifying gestures made by matrilineal symbolism. For instance, in her essay "Black Matrilineage" (1985), Diane Sadoff traces the historical conditions

that validate Alice Walker's celebration of black matrilineage, while at the same time highlighting the risks of idealizing the maternal figure as a guarantor of historical continuity, and of imposing a forced unity upon a "recalcitrant and heterogeneous body of texts." Indeed, Sadoff highlights the ambivalence toward the maternal figure in some of Walker's own texts, contrasting "the disjunctions between the idealized recovery of the mother in Walker's womanist prose and her ambivalent depiction in Walker's fiction" (Dubey 1995, 248). For Dubey, essays like Sadoff's exemplify a "double strategy" that enables texts to be productively interconnected, but also keeps alive the "critical edge" of black feminist theory. "Whilst insisting on the necessity of tradition building," she writes, "these critics caution against the construction of a homogenous, definitive canon," which might in fact foreclose the radical possibilities of a black feminist literary tradition, and silence the questions and differences raised by those who do not fit the mould (ibid., 265).

To further explore this problematic, Dubey offers a reading of Gayl Jones' novel *Corregidora* (Jones 1988),[38] which recounts the experiences of blues singer Ursa Corregidora and the relationships of three generations of her maternal ancestors with their Portuguese slave owner, Corregidora. Jones is a writer who is often left out of the feminist canon of modern black female novelists because her work, Dubey suggests, "consistently poses seriously disquieting questions about the very process of tradition building," and "interrogates the means by which a matrilineal or any other tradition achieves its cohesion and authority" (ibid., 249). Yet in her novel *Corregidora*, Jones does not simply reject the matrilineal matrix within which the lead character and narrator Ursa is positioned. Instead, she performs a kind of "double gesture," by retaining the maternal tradition as a structuring frame, even as she discloses "the contradictions and breaks that are as necessary to the development of a tradition as are its continuities" (ibid., 250).[39] Written as a blues novel, the text does not attempt to "transcend the contingencies of time and place," nor "resolve the contradictions of historical experience." Rather, it "foregrounds the history of loss and dispossession that both activates and impedes the black feminist effort to reconstitute an uninterrupted matrilineal continuum" (ibid., 250). As such, the novel serves to elucidate the hazards as well as the possibilities of using generational metaphors, and the complexities of generational temporalities (ibid., 245).

For example, Dubey's critical analysis highlights in structural terms how the novel oscillates between passages where the narrator Ursa reflects on her present situation, and passages that depict the

flood of memories passed on to her by her mother, grandmother, and great-grandmother. This flood of inherited memory constantly interrupts Ursa's present and shapes her orientations toward the future. As Dubey describes it: "the novel's structure so thoroughly fuses Ursa's story with the history of her foremothers that any distinction between past and present becomes inoperative" (Dubey 1995, 251). Jones thereby demonstrates the intricate imbrication of past and present, and overturns any simplistic idea of a neatly bounded generational perspective, or a step-by-step generational succession. Moreover, in many respects, Jones depicts matrilineal legacy as a debilitating burden, as "Ursa's fragmented memories of the stories told to her by her maternal ancestors repeatedly erupt into her narrative, stalling her attempt to transcend history and to create a new story for herself" (ibid., 252). Accordingly, "*Corregidora* not only multiplies the past in a manner that infinitely complicates the project of tradition building but also challenges the very assumption . . . [that] the mother's past should provide the ground for the daughter's utterance" (ibid., 253).

Nevertheless, Dubey argues, even as she emphasizes the onerous and potentially dangerous aspects of generational legacy, Jones does not fall into "the trap of privileging sheer contradiction" and discontinuity. Rather, her novel manages to negotiate the interplay between continuity and discontinuity within intergenerational relationships, through its structural reliance on the "blues method" of "repetition with variation" (ibid., 264). The idea of repetitive temporality, as discussed earlier, is bound up with the logic of "working through," and "directs inquiry toward the specific and variable articulations of repetition and change or 'continuity and discontinuity' over time" (La Capra 1994, 174).[40] In Jones' novel, the structuring technique of "repetition of variation" does not accede to the linear order of succession, but equally does not set up a juxtaposition between "continuity" on the one hand, and "discontinuity" on the other. It thereby enables Jones to capture the complexities and ambiguities of generational time:

> Always articulating contradiction within a structure of relation, this method engages the past in a manner different from both an Oedipal model of tradition based on generational rivalry and the matrilineal model with its affirmation of generational unity. In a complicated double move, the blues voice at least partially breaks free from the collective feminine tradition represented by the Corregidora women's narrative, but it does not thereby achieve an absolute break from the past, for the blues voice always carries the traces of prior history and tradition. The novel's structure of repetition with difference denies an

> exclusive privileging of either generational conflict or continuity and offers instead a model of tradition that holds the past and the present in a state of creative disequilibrium. (Dubey 1995, 264)

Conclusion

This chapter has explored the dynamics and determinations of generational time. Though the idea of "feminist generations" has become rather discredited within certain strands of recent feminist theory, I have argued that we cannot simply dismiss generational paradigms for being "Oedipal," "patriarchal," or "linear," because different historical legacies and relational practices produce different generational meanings and temporalities. To illustrate, I have referred to work on "queer kinship" in queer theory, and to work by feminist theorists considering the impact of slavery upon the meanings and possibilities of generational configurations. Of course, there is no singular way of negotiating or interpreting the legacies of slavery and homophobia, and there is a wide array of perspectives on kinship and generations within black feminist theory and queer theory, ranging from the affirmative to the suspicious to the oppositional. But at the very least, the theorists referred to demonstrate that the cultural "rules" governing generational and kinship configurations are shifting, and adhere to "no symbolic integrity," as Spillers puts it. Moreover, their work suggests that simple ideas of "linearity," "succession," "continuity," and "discontinuity" are inadequate to capture the complex temporal relations that can inhere within generational orders, as demonstrated so beautifully in *Corregidora*.

It is of course interesting and important to find ways of conceptualizing and theorizing feminist relationships that do not rely upon familial and maternal tropes, and to continue to interrogate the problematic effects that can ensue from their deployment. But it is also important to take account of ambiguities, and of situations where generational models and metaphors are not necessarily experienced or regarded as divisive or stifling. As implied by the idea of "repetition with variation," the way that we take up or repeat the past in the present the present is variable, and does not conform to a fixed pattern. Generational orders have flexible and complex meanings and temporalities, operating within the orbit of multiple symbolic logics, cultural imaginaries, and historical resonances.

CONCLUSION

The Politics of Feminist Time

Time is complicated and multifaceted, existing and operating at many different levels. "The time of our lives," as Keith Ansell-Pearson observes, "is not only an existential issue but also, amongst other things, a political one, a task for phenomenology to work through, a task for genealogy to complicate, and a problem for hermeneutics to decipher and interpret" (Ansell-Pearson 2011, 1). Through the course of the book, I have drawn on all of these different approaches, investigating some of the different layers and strands of historical time. Historical time, I have argued, is operated through the practice of tracing the past, configuring historical narratives, mapping timelines, and constructing generational affiliations. These historical practices allow us to connect diffuse presents, pasts, and futures, and thus enable concepts and cultures of historical time to come into being. They are ways of both "making" time, and "reckoning" with time.

The key idea of the book has been that there is no single determination of historical time within feminist discourse and practice. Though certain time-concepts or temporal practices may become dominant, there are many different ways of formulating historical time and the "time of feminism." To give detail to this argument, I have sought to demonstrate that the temporalities of feminist traces, narratives, timelines, and generations are irreducible to one temporal order, or one mode of temporal relations. However, it is not enough to simply demonstrate or gesture toward temporal plurality and leave it at that. Temporal concepts and orders are not neutral or incidental, but rather are inextricably tied to the way that political change and processes are understood, and to the way that politics *works*. Moreover, the coexistence of times and temporalities takes place in contexts of power and domination (Mignolo 1995, 15). Hence, the articulation and appreciation of heterogeneous times and temporalities is an important step; but it is valuable inasmuch as it enables insight into the *politics of*

time within feminism. Not only do feminists contest and negotiate time-regimes and temporalities they encounter in the wider political and social contexts in which they operate; there are also competing articulations and "struggles over the experience of time" *within* feminist spaces and communities (Osborne 1995, 200).

A "polytemporal" approach therefore needs to be attuned to the ways in which certain concepts or practices of historical time come to dominate over others, and the effect that this has on feminist relations and politics. It also forces us to become aware of the limitations and situatedness of our own understandings of historical time: the archives we turn to, the kinds of narratives we construct, the timelines we rely upon, and the generational orders we perpetuate and participate in. These temporal reference frameworks vitally shape our understandings of where feminism has been and where it is "at"; what its role is within specific societies and on the "world stage"; what its problems are and where its promise lies. As Kimberly Hutchings writes: "If the 'our' is to have any meaning in the normative judgment of 'our times' in the world-political present, then explanation and normative judgment of 'our times' has to become sensitive to a multiplicity of times and temporalities. This requires a willingness to bracket what theorists already think they know, based on their interpretation of their own present . . . " (Hutchings 2008, 157). We cannot presume that a particular timeline or date is necessarily significant for all, that a certain kind of narrative structure is mutually intelligible or universally appropriate, that all generational orders have the same temporal logics or patterns, or that we are all oriented and affected by the traces of feminist pasts in the same way.

Shumei Shih argues that one of the key factors propping up the hegemony of Western feminism is the presumption that universalizing concepts and categories are necessary "mediators" (Shih 2002, 114). As the mainstream's "need to translate" is so often based on a desire to simplify unfamiliar ideas, arguments, and histories into shorthands and summaries, the result is often (quoting Spivak) "uncaring translations that transcode in the interest of dominant feminist knowledge" (ibid.; Spivak 2009, 96). Or conversely, given that a "caring" and sensitive translation takes time and effort, an unfamiliar idea, practice, or history can be deemed as simply "untranslatable" or "incommensurable." This is the consequence "not of difference made essential or absolute," but of "asymmetrical ignorance" (Shih 2002, 97), which results in highly reductive and arbitrary assignations of "difference" and "similarity."[1] The challenge before us, Shih claims, is therefore to imagine and practice an "ethics of encounter" and a

mode of translation that does not seek to assimilate and contain, but equally, does not set up insurmountable barriers to communication and collective action (ibid., 92).

Chakrabarty suggests something similar when he argues for an alternative model of temporal translation, which does not elevate any one temporal concept or framework as a universal. On this model, he explains, codes are switched without going through a universal logic or set of rules, and there is no overarching, empty "historical time" that remains unaffected by the temporal practices and configurations it supposedly contains" (Chakrabarty 2000, 86). We would proceed through "barter-like," term-for-term exchanges, becoming attentive to the specific "poetic requirements" of rhetoric and rhythm. Instead of trying to hide falterings and stutterings, translations would be conducted so as to make visible the problems of translation, marking them with an ambiguity and "uncanniness" (ibid., 88).

Following along these lines, I suggest, feminist historiography needs to resist the habit of reducing heterogeneous historical temporalities to a predetermined order of "waves" or "phases," which presumes to speak for an "already given whole" (ibid., 107). There may, as Chakrabarty warns, be "violent jolts" the imagination "has to suffer from the experience of traveling across temporalities," as the different ways of thinking and living time come up against each other (ibid., 94). Yet, if feminist history and historiography is to become a "site where pluralities will contend," it has to be taken to its limits, "to make its workings visible" (ibid., 96). We need to take account of different ways of experiencing, configuring, and reckoning historical time, and consider how these different temporal experiences and configuration both enable, and impede, certain kinds of political engagement.

In this regard, the polytemporal approach has much in common with the coalitional model of feminist politics, with its recognition that "feminism" itself is a shifting and contestable term, which calls for "barter-like" translations, and cannot be taken for granted. To join forces as "feminists" is to name a shared set of problems and desire for change; not a unified experience or perspective. From a coalitional perspective, therefore, feminist thought and practice needs to be mobile in response to shifting conditions, and open to a variety of approaches that collide within specific sites for political action. Instead of teleological ideals and the "non-repeatable moment," coalitional politics requires a flexible temporal orientation that can bring together different modes of acting rather than dividing them across time (Bastian 2011, 162).

Chandra Talpade Mohanty describes this kind of politics in terms of a "temporality of struggle," which challenges the logics of linearity, development, and progress, and the "law of identical temporality." Rather than a search for origins and endings, a temporality of struggle implies an "insistent, simultaneous, non-synchronous process characterized by multiple locations, rather than a search for origins and endings" (2003, 120).[2] Or as Lisa Diedrich and Victoria Hesford explain it, to engage in a temporality of struggle entails a recognition that "one's struggle must be articulated as a means of going beyond oneself, not only physically but temporally as well: the struggle is to go beyond one's place in the world and one's moment in time . . . It requires taking the time to ask questions and to make space for elective affinities that can disturb or interrupt the teleological thrust of . . . homogenizing empty time . . . " (2008, 15). This inherently encapsulates what I have termed a "polytemporal" approach or perspective. As Mohanty writes:

> The year 2000 was the end of the Christian millennium, and Christianity is certainly an indelible part of postcolonial history. But we cannot afford to forget those alternative, resistance spaces occupied by oppositional histories and memories. For instance, the year 2000 was also the year 5760 in the Hebrew calendar and year 1420 in the Arabic calendar. It was 6240 according to the Egyptian calendar, and 4677 according to the Chinese calendar. And it was 'just another day' according to Oren Lyons, the Faithkeeper of the Onondaga Nation in New York. By not insisting on a history or a geography but focusing on a temporality of struggle, I create the historical ground from which I can define myself in the United States of the twenty-first century, a place from which I can speak to the future – not the end of an era but the promise of many. (Mohanty 2003, 120–1)

We are constantly being told that feminism is over: it has "failed," it is a "spent force," or it is "no longer relevant in the twenty-first century." But thinking about feminism in terms of a "temporality of struggle" encourages us to take up the unfinishedness and continuing promise of past feminisms, while also critically engaging with the more problematic ways in which the past continues to repeat itself in the present. It can help us to understand feminism as polytemporal, nonlinear, and internally complex, and to develop a historiography that does justice to the vibrancy and variation of feminist histories and temporalities. By unlocking our feminist pasts and presents, we may yet bring about feminist futures.

Notes

Introduction: Feminism and Historical Time

1. The examples of recent feminist work on time and history cited here are: *Politics Out of History* by Wendy Brown (2001); *The Nick of Time* (2004) and *Time Travels* (2005) by Elizabeth Grosz; "Feminism's Apocalyptic Futures" (2000) and "On Being in Time with Feminism" (2004) by Robyn Wiegman; *In a Queer Time and Place* by Judith Halberstam (2005); and *Time Binds: Queer Temporalities and Queer Histories* by Elizabeth Freeman (2010).
2. My conception of "polytemporality" is primarily inspired by Dipesh Chakrabarty's conception of "heterotemporality" in *Provincializing Europe* (2000). However, due to the potentially heteronormative connotations of this term, particularly within the field of feminist studies, I have elected to use "polytemporality" instead.
3. This typology is predominantly inspired by Ricoeur's *Time and Narrative* (most notably the fourth chapter in volume three titled "Historical Time"), where he gives focus to all of these times as crucial in configuring historical time (1988). Yet, while Ricoeur provides the basic architecture for the polytemporal typology deployed in this book, I reject his ultimate conclusion in favor of historico-temporal totality as a regulative idea (for reasons discussed in chapter 1).
4. Alongside the eclecticism of this list, another aspect that may call for comment is its omissions, perhaps most notably the absence of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Gilles Deleuze. With most projects, there are several possible routes and interlocutors, and this triumvirate may seem like the obvious choice for a study such as this. They have all been extremely influential within contemporary feminist theory (see, e.g., Colebrook and Buchanan 2000; Rooney et al. 2005; Taylor and Vintges 2004), and each offers promising ways of developing internally complex, nonlinear understandings of history and time: for example, via notions of genealogy or archaeology (Foucault 1979, 1984, 1990, 2002), becoming and the virtual (Deleuze 1990, 1994), or the trace and the archive (Derrida 1988a, 1988b, 2006). Yet, while their work is certainly relevant, what I have been seeking in this project is a focused, detailed articulation of "historical time" as a specific concept, distinct from simply "time," "temporality," "history," or "becoming," and this

is not a preoccupation that these three thinkers share. Moreover, each moves in directions that significantly depart from the broadly phenomenological framework of *lived time* that I have found indispensable for framing and exploring the particular meanings and reality of historical time. Thus, to consider the lived, relational dimensions of historical time, and to try and grasp what historical time actually "is," I have found more germane material in the work of other theorists, perhaps chiefly in Chakrabarty, Ricoeur, and Koselleck.

5. "Western" is a complicated and contentious term. In the context of "Western feminism,, it usually refers to Anglo-American, Western European, or "Continental" strands of feminism. It is retained in this book as a form of shorthand for denoting these strands of feminism, and more generally, cultural fields and configurations that position themselves, and are positioned, as inheritors of intellectual histories including Greco-Roman philosophy and myth, European Christianity, and influential intellectual movements such as the Renaissance or the Enlightenment. It must also be understood in relation to political and cultural colonialism from the fifteenth century to the present day. For a historical and geographical sketch of the "idea of the West," see Bonnett (2004). For more on "Western feminism" and it's "others," see Mohanty's classic essay "Under Western Eyes"(1991b).
6. The term "womanism" was coined by Alice Walker, who defines a "womanist" as a "black feminist or feminist of color," and writes that "womanist is to feminist as purple is to lavender" (Walker 1983, p. xi). Chela Sandoval (2000) uses the term "US third world feminism" to refer to work by US women of color that created "a new feminist and internationalist consciousness": a "deliberate politics organized to point out the so-called third world *in* the first world". To illustrate, she refers to Cherríe Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa's collection *This Bridge Called My Back* (1981) and Chandra Talpade Mohanty's essay "Cartographies of Struggle" (1991a). For a discussion of the terms "third world feminism," "black feminism," "Mestiza feminism," see, for example, Heng (1997), Mirza (1997), or Gillman (2010). To consider the problem of appropriation of political action by women in the name of "feminism" see De Groot on the case of Iran (2010)
7. For more on "negotiating the status of the 'we,'" see Lyotard's essay "Universal History and Cultural Difference," (1989).
8. For more on the various definitions and classifications of a social, political, or cultural "movement," see Cathcart (1980) or McGee (1980), both of whom argue that a "movement" can be defined through its discursive or rhetorical form, as opposed to a more traditional historical materialist approach that defines a "movement" as a social phenomenon, that is, an organized series of coordinated, collective actions in the public sphere.

9. At a time when feminism is being appropriated in this way, Butler argues, it is surely "more crucial than ever to disengage feminism from its First World presumption and to use the resources of feminist theory, and activism, to rethink the meaning of the tie, the bond, the alliance, the relation, as they are imagined and lived in the horizon of a counterimperialist egalitarianism" (ibid., 41–2).
10. For more on critiques of hegemonic representations of feminist history, see these special issues of feminist journals: *Women: a Cultural Review* (ed. Calvini-Lefebvre et al., 2010); *Feminist Studies* (ed. Hewitt and Liu, 2002; ed. Raitt and Phillips, 2008); *Australian Feminist Studies* (ed. Spongeberg, 2009); and *Tulsa Studies in Women's Literature* (ed. Laird 2002).
11. The term "Enlightenment" or *Aufklärung* became widespread in eighteenth-century Germany particularly. It was transferred from German into English in the second half of the nineteenth century, and became common only in the latter half of the twentieth century (Burns 2000a). For elaborations on the meaning of "Enlightenment," see the collection *What is Enlightenment?* (ed. Schmidt 1996), which presents a variety of perspectives from both the late eighteenth and the twentieth centuries, including Kant's famous essay "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" In this essay, Kant defines *Aufklärung* as a continuous process leading to emancipation from prejudice and superstition, and a capacity for independent thought and "mature" judgment, rather than an already enlightened "age" (Kant 1996).
12. Herder, in his 1774 text *Yet Another Philosophy of History*, criticizes the idea that one can "group into one mass the people and periods which succeed each other eternally like the waves of the sea" (Herder 1969, 181). Hamaan, in his 1784 letter to Christian Jacob Kraus, offers a political critique of Enlightenment philosophy that argues that the so–called enlightened state simply replaces one politically dominant group with another, that is, the "Enlighteners" (1996a). Moreover, in his 1784 "Metacritique on the Purism of Reason," Hamaan takes issue with Kant's universalistic approach to philosophy, claiming that Kant imagines he can simply "invent" a "universal philosophical language," whereas in fact, words have meaning only in relation to the time and place where they are appropriate (1996b). Because of these challenges to the ideas of progress and universality, Herder and Hamaan are often described as "counter-Enlightenment" thinkers, a term popularized by Isaiah Berlin (Berlin 1997).
13. See particularly Kant's "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose" (1991), Hegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History* (1975), or Condorcet's *Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind* (1955) for influential and striking examples.

14. For more on the idea of progress in "Enlightenment" philosophy, see Nisbet's *History of the Idea of Progress* (1980). The first half of the book surveys the idea of progress within the classical world, the early Christians, the Medieval era, and the Renaissance, but his key argument is that the idea of progress "triumphs" within western philosophy between 1750 and 1900. Nisbet discusses various formulations of "progress" during this period, including the influential writings of Turgot, Edward Gibbon, Adam Smith, Condorcet, William Godwin, Thomas Malthus, John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, Saint-Simon, August Comte, Karl Marx, and of course, Kant and Hegel.For more on the impact of Hegelian thought upon contemporary philosophy more generally see Butler (1999), or Rockmore (2003).
15. To be clear: we must distinguish between Hegel's philosophy overall, which covers a huge range of philosophical topics and concerns, and Hegel's philosophy of history. For example, Hegel's accounts of morality and politics, the relationship between freedom and the state, and the relationship between particularity and universality have informed feminist philosophy in many important ways. For investigations into feminist philosophy's relationship to Hegelian philosophy more widely conceived, see Hutchings (2003), Mills (1996), or Sandford and Stone (1999). It is also important to recognize the plethora of Hegelianisms that have emerged within western philosophy over the past two centuries, many of which reject or attempt to rework the philosophy of "world history" that Hegel presents in his *Lectures*. Such revisionist readings approach the *Lectures* selectively, or turn to other works of Hegel's to reconstruct a "weaker" philosophy of history that abandons any overarching teleology or final synthesis (see, e.g., Houlgate 2005, Malabou 2005, or Nancy 2002).
16. Hegel explains that the realm of the "spirit," as opposed to the realm of "nature," is that realm "created by man himself" and "encompasses everything that has concerned mankind down to the present day" (Hegel 1975, 44; see also Hegel 1977). "Spirit" is a complex term, but it is best understood as the world of intersubjectivity that is self-determining and self-changing. "Subjective spirit" refers to individual self-conscious existence and experience, while "objective spirit" refers to all that self-conscious existence has produced in terms of culture (including art, religion, and philosophy), law, institutions, habits, and the "second nature" of an environment produced though human labor (Hutchings 2003, 39–40). In fact, as Hutchings explains, objective and subjective spirit may be analytically distinguishable, but they are in fact inseparable and mutually constitutive in an ongoing process. Thus for Hegel, self-determination is "the truth of a complex, mediated and self-reflective whole rather than that of an individual agency" (ibid.).

17. Hegel writes that in the "Oriental world"—an extremely broad category stretching from Ancient Egypt to China—the "Orientals" knew that only *one* person (the monarch) was free; the Greco-Roman world knew that *some* people are free; and in contrast, "our own" knowledge, that is, the modern Germanic world of Christian Europe, is that *all* people are free, in terms of the spiritual identity accorded to all individuals, which means all have the capacity for self-determination (Hegel 1975, 54–5).
18. This constitutes a significant difference from Kant who theorizes the relation between empirical and philosophical history in much more ambiguous terms. Indeed, Kant writes in his "ninth proposition" in his "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose" (Kant 1991) that "it is admittedly a strange and at first sight absurd proposition to write a history according to how world events must develop if they are to conform to certain rational ends" (ibid., 51). In light of this tension between empirical and philosophical history, he casts the idea of progress as a regulative idea, rather than a guaranteed outcome. Nevertheless, elsewhere in the essay, he does tentatively make the claim that civil freedom is in fact "gradually increasing," that enlightenment is "gradually arising," and a universalistic, cosmopolitan "feeling is beginning to stir" (ibid., 50–1). I discuss the Kantian approach of postulating historical progress and unity as a regulative idea further in chapter 1, in relation to its endorsement by Ricoeur in the third volume of *Time and Narrative* (1988).
19. Examples of relatively recent speculative approaches to history include the writings of Reinhard Niebhur, who proposes a theological defense of the idea that history has meaning and direction. This meaning or story may not be exhibited or manifested by the course of historical events as they actually occur; indeed, argues Niebhur, empirically observed history does *not* display an overarching significant pattern, and more often than not appears meaningless. For Niebhur, then, meaning is a question of faith in providence rather than observation of a pattern: there is a fundamental gap between the actual events of history and divine meaning. Other examples of relatively recent speculative philosophies of history include the work of Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee< who claim that the course of history exhibits an overarching pattern, characterizing the process of history as "the rise and fall of civilizations." Toynbee moves from the empirical study of the events themselves to the postulation of a general principle of "challenge and response," presenting his speculative system as "a conclusion forced upon him by an empirical survey" (Dray 1964, 62–3).
20. As Adorno famously declared, after Auschwitz it is impossible to claim that "the real is rational and the rational is real" (1973, 206).

21. For more on postcolonial historiography from South Asian perspectives, see *Selected Subaltern Studies* edited by Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1988), which contains essays by members of the Subaltern Studies group including Guha, Spivak, Gyanenda Pandey, Guatam Bhadra, Dipesh Chakrabarty, Shahid Amin, Parta Chatterjee, and David Arnold.
22. Dussel associates the Eurocentric perspective on modernity with theorists including Charles Taylor and Jürgen Habermas.
23. In *The Invention of the Americas* (1995), Dussel highlights Hegel's exclusion of Latin America, and also Africa, from "world history." The direction of "world history" in Hegel's account has a course, East to West, with Asia as the "beginning" with Spirit in its immature infancy. But America's degree of civilization in Hegel's view is so inferior and undeveloped that it is in fact the "land of the future," which only becomes significant to world history when it is discovered by the Europeans: "its culture expires the moment the Spirit draws near" (quoted in Dussel 1995, 20–1). Similarly, Africa is deemed unworthy of inclusion in the development of world history. Hegel writes: "Africa is in general a closed land . . . It is characteristic of the blacks that their consciousness has not yet even arrived at the intuition of any objectivity, as for example, of God or the law, in which humanity relates to the world and intuits its essence . . . For this reason, we abandon Africa, we will mention it *no more*. It is not part of the historical world; it does not present movement or historical development . . . What we understand properly of Africa is something isolated and lacking in history, submerged completely in the natural spirit, and mentionable only as the threshold of universal history" (ibid., 22).
24. Firestone's historical narrative, presented in *The Dialectic of Sex*, postulates that "the biological division of the sexes for the purpose of reproduction, which lies at the origins of class" is the mechanism driving the course of historical development (Firestone 1971, 13). Firestone rewrites Engels' formulation of historical materialism to claim that "the sexual-reproductive organization of society always furnishes the real basis, starting from which we can alone work out the ultimate explanation of the whole superstructure of economic, juridical and political institutions as well as of the religious, philosophical and other ideas of a given historical period" (ibid., 13–14). For recent feminist re-engagements with Firestone, see *Further Adventures in the Dialectic of Sex*, edited by Mandy Merck and Stella Sandford (2010).
25. I use the term "temporal logics" in the sense that "logic" refers to a means of working out, organizing, and ordering thought and phenomena.
26. "*Les temps des femmes*" appears in 1979 in *33/44: cahiers de recherché de sciences des textes et documents*, volume 5, 5–19. It was translated

as "Women's Time" in *Signs*, volume 7(1), in 1981, and is reprinted in *The Kristeva Reader*, edited by Toril Moi, in 1986. I refer here to this latter reprinted version of the essay.

27. I will pay more attention to the temporal/historical aspect of Kristeva's analysis than the spatial. For more on the relationship between history and geography, time and space, see Osborne (1995, 17–20), or Young (1990).
28. I describe Kristeva's "avant-garde" feminism here as a (post)feminism, because while on the one hand she presents her avant-garde approach in "Women's Time" as a continuation of feminist thought, the essay also implies that the avant-garde attitude is a *departure* from the feminist project, which she equates with naïve egalitarianism or radical separatism, and the fabrication of a universal female subject.
29. "Hegemony," in the sense proposed by Antonio Gramsci (1971), refers to the phenomenon whereby dominant groups maintain their dominance through "the negotiated construction of a political and ideological consensus which incorporates both dominant and dominated groups" (Strinati 1995, 165). The intention behind Gramsci's theory of hegemony is to try and explain why the majority continue to uphold the values of the dominant group and the status quo, even when these values reflect the interests and lives of just a small minority. "Hegemony" is therefore an apt term to describe the dominant model of feminist history, as feminists consistently subscribe to this model, even when we recognize that it corresponds to only a very specific trajectory of feminism.
30. Alongside Kristeva's essay, Sandoval cites texts by Alison Jaggar (1983), Gayle Greene and Coppélia Kahn (1985), Hester Eisenstein and Alice Jardine (1980), Elaine Showalter (1985b), Cora Kaplan (1985), and Lydia Sargent (1981) as examples that have given rise to feminism's "great hegemonic model."
31. Hemmings' research is based upon a range of extracts taken from feminist journal editions from the 1990s and 2000s, including: *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society; Feminist Review*; *Feminist Theory*; *Nora: Nordic Journal of Women's Studies*; *European Journal of Women's Studies*; and *Australian Feminist Studies*. All of these extracts are in English (including articles that have been translated into English), though there is a range in the geographical location of the journals, including the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, and Western Europe. Hemmings' method for this research was to analyze a series of extracts from these journals, which give "common sense glosses" of the development of western feminist theory. She deliberately highlights extracts that are tangential to the author's main argument such as introductions or segue paragraphs. She also cites the *source* of the extracts she analyzes—the journal and the year—rather than the individual author, a tactic that is intended

to emphasize the role of "journal communities" in establishing dominant feminist knowledge practices (2011, 22).

32. For examples of feminist "new materialism," see the collection *New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics,* which includes essays by prominent "new materialist" theorists Jane Bennett, Rosi Braidotti, and Elizabeth Grosz (ed. Coole and Frost, 2010).
33. In her article "Imaginary Prohibitions" (2008), Sara Ahmed makes a similar argument to Hemmings. While affirming that there is much useful and insightful work being done under the name of feminist "new materialism," Ahmed calls into question its "founding gesture," which is to point to feminism as being routinely anti-biological, or habitually "social constructionist": a gesture that has been taken for granted and in turn offers a false and reductive history of feminist engagements with biology, science, and materialism: "You can only argue for a return to biology by forgetting the feminist work on the biological, including the work of feminists trained in the biological sciences. In other words, you can only claim that feminism has forgotten the biological if you forget this feminist work" (2008, 24–7).
34. For an example of a forceful proclamation of a second wave of feminism, see Greer's *The Female Eunuch* (1970), which will be discussed in chapter 3. For examples of third wave writings see Walker (1995), Heywood and Drake (1997), Dicker and Piepmeier (2003), and Baumgardner and Richards (2000).
35. It is significant, for example, that the coining of the term "second wave" is generally traced not to an academic text but to a 1968 article written by journalist Martha Weinman Lears for the *New York Times* magazine on the rise of "The Second Feminist Wave" (Hewitt 2010, 1). Similarly, the term third wave feminism first gained attention when it was used in an article written for *Ms* magazine by Rebecca Walker, entitled "Becoming the Third Wave" in 1992 (Henry 2004, 23). Henry points out that the term "third wave" was in fact used in the academic journal *Feminist Studies* five years earlier, by Deborah Rosenfelt and Judith Stacey in an article entitled "Second Thoughts on the Second Wave." However, the fact that it is Walker that is generally credited with coining the term perhaps corroborates the argument that the term "third wave" feminism is associated with feminist activism more generally speaking, rather than with a primarily academic approach.
36. According to Megill's taxonomy, a "master narrative" claims to offer the authoritative account of a particular segment of history and a "grand narrative" claims to offer the authoritative account of history generally, while a "metanarrative" (most commonly belief in God or an immanent rationality) is what serves to justify the grand narrative (Megill 1995, 152–3).

37. To be sure, the triumphant tone is missing in the case of "loss" narratives, given that they are laments (Hemmings 2005; 2011). Nevertheless, the *logic* of teleological totalization is still apparent in the loss narratives. That is, the author performs a retrospective totalization of feminist history from a position of wisdom and superior knowledge in the present, charting feminism's supposed decline and descent into theoretical impasse. Indeed, as Hemmings observes, many loss narratives not only perform totalizing diagnoses of the past and present, but further, orient themselves toward future *prediction* when they suggest that the only hope for the future is a return to feminism's glorious past.
38. This evolutionary logic is further fuelled by the "inclusion paradigm," which positions non-Western women as *outside* feminism, in need of the "recognition" or "inclusion" of the "third wave's embrace" (Fernandes 2010). The presupposition, as Fernandes argues, is that feminism is a phenomenon and product of white western society that is "imported" to the non-Western world (ibid.).
39. To consider the way that historicist logics are deployed within feminist theory, Jennifer Fleissner gives a survey of the critical treatment of white American female writers of the 1880s such as Sarah Orne Jewett, Edith Wharton, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, and Kate Chopin, over the past forty years of feminist criticism (Fleissner 2002). The first approach Fleissner identifies can be described as "affirmative," as it aims to build affinitive bridges between the past and present, and concentrates wholly on appropriating the "good bits" of these texts in line with feminist thought in the present. The second can be described as a "historicist" approach that aims at a "critical distance," "locating" the texts within their particular historical moment or context, and interpreting them according to the norms and practices of their day. The affirmative approach constructs a continuity between (certain aspects of) the 1880s texts and feminist ideas of the present, while the historicist approach sets up a break, as the writings are fixed or located in their historical "moment." In the historicist readings, "the authors are made to represent their era's worst excesses of class snobbery, racism, cultural imperialism–all the things that the scholars who uncovered them would wish only to leave behind" (Fleissner 2002, 46–7). Yet in fact, Fleissner argues that while the affirmative approach posits an affinity between past and present, it still presumes that the present has "transcended" and essentially overcome the problems of the past: "looking back, we are able to construct a better perspective that keeps the good while rejecting the bad" (ibid., 49).
40. For compelling depictions of the technique of "othering," see Edward Said's *Orientalism* (1978) or Genevieve Lloyd's *Man of Reason* (1993b).

41. In an essay "Double Jeopardy" published in 1970, Francis Beale was already describing the second wave of US feminism as a "white women's movement," because of its insistence on organizing around the division of male/female alone, and widespread refusal to grasp the significance of racial and class divisions for the theorization of sexual politics (Beale 1970).
42. This gloss by Kristina Sheryl Wong in Piepmeier and Dicker's anthology serves as a good example: "First and second wave feminisms sought to empower women as a united front. Although they offered a political voice for women as a whole, they didn't acknowledge the varying agendas and experiences of individual women. Third wave feminism was a response by women of color and others who felt homogenized by a movement defined by the goals of middle-class, white women" (Wong 2003, 295).
43. Leslie Heywood and Jennifer Drake, for example, introduce their anthology on third wave feminism by asserting that "the definitional moment of third wave feminism has been theorized as proceeding from critiques of the white women's movement that were initiated by women of color, as well as from the many instances of coalition work undertaken by U.S. third world feminists" (Heywood and Drake 1997, 2).
44. Further, it leads to a frequent typecasting of the work of black feminists as "identity politics," an approach that is usually characterized within feminist theory as an improvement on the universalizing tendencies of "1970s feminism," but which nevertheless remains grounded in rigid and static identity categories (Fernandes 2010, 110). While it is often acknowledged that black feminism and poststructuralist feminism share a common concern with difference, argues Hemmings, the two camps are frequently imagined to be composed of "different writing subjects," and it is ultimately poststructuralism that is credited with the move away from essentialist notions of universal womanhood and treated as "contemporary" (Hemmings 2011, 46). Yet in fact, as Fernandes argues, much of the work produced by black feminists and feminists of color in the 1980s, such as Anzaldúa, represents a theoretical challenge to the "logic of identification" that supposedly characterizes black feminist "identity politics" (Fernandes 2010, 110).
45. Problems have also arisen from the way in which "women's time" has consistently been depicted as "cyclical" in opposition to the "phallocentrically structured, forward moving time" of men (Forman and Sowton 1989). This dualistic approach has come under critical fire, not only for its essentialist overtones (in equating "women's time" with the time of "nature" or "biology"), but further, for its failure to acknowledge the ways that "linear time" is lived by women as well as men. Felski draws parallels between the way that the temporality of non-Western societies and cultures is portrayed as "cyclical" and

closer to nature, in juxtaposition to the "linear" time of the post-industrial West (Felski 2000). See also Gupta on this issue (1992).

1 Lived Time and Polytemporality

1. For more on metaphysical and physical theories of time and their interrelation, see *Time and Space* by Barry Dainton (2001); *The Metaphysics within Physics* by Tim Maudlin (2007); *Time's Arrow and Archimedes' Point by* Huw Price (1996); or *The Philosophy of Time* ed. Robin Le Poidevin and Murray MacBeath (1993).
2. Thereby presupposing a backdrop of stable substances or permanent bodies in space. For further exegesis of Kant's "Transcendental Aesthetic'" see, for example, Bird (2006), Ward (2006), Strawson (1995).
3. From a Husserlian perspective, then, Kant fails in his "Transcendental Aesthetic" to bracket the "natural attitude," and simply imports Newtonian ideas about time into his transcendental analysis of time and space as functions of the mind when he privileges persistence/duration, simultaneity, and succession as the key modes of time as form. He fails to adequately attend to how "temporal objects," such as a melody, are actually perceived by a hearing or listening subject, and hence to grasp the structures of consciousness that make this perception possible. For more on the relation between Kant and Husserl, see "Husserl confronts Kant" in Volume 3 of Ricoeur's *Time and Narrative* (1988).
4. As Robert Sokolowski explains, we can distinguish three phenomenological levels of temporal structure: "world time" or objective time; "subjective time"; and the consciousness of "internal time." We can measure the length of time something takes using a clock at the level of worldly time, and this duration may be experienced as slow or fast by a particular subject, but these apprehensions or experiences are made possible only because of the structure of internal time consciousness (Sokolowski 2000, 130–45).
5. It is a common criticism that Husserl pays much more attention to "retention" than to "protention." Indeed, this is one of the fundamental points of Heidegger's critique of Husserl, along with his claim that retention and protention are not symmetrical counterparts, but rather are fundamentally asymmetrical (Heidegger 2009). For further critical accounts of Husserl's analysis of time-consciousness, see *The New Husserl: a Critical Reader* (ed. Welton 2003), particularly the essays by Lanei Rodemeyer and Dan Zahavi. See also Lawlor (2002).
6. I referred in the previous chapter to Hemmings' and Ahmed's criticisms of the way in which new materialist theorists have tended to present feminist theory as "routinely anti-biological." As Ahmed argues, "you can only argue for a return to biology by forgetting the feminist work on the biological" (Ahmed 2008, 24–7; Hemmings 2011).

7. Grosz has also drawn on the idea of the "virtual" via Deleuze's reading of Bergson. Focusing particularly on *Creative Evolution* (1954) and *Matter and Memory* (2004), she argues that Bergson comes close to Darwin in the idea that "mind or life are not special—or vital—substances, different in nature to matter. Rather, mind or life partake of and live in and as matter. Matter is organized differently in its organic or inorganic forms: this organization is dependent on the degree of indeterminacy, the degree of freedom, that life exhibits relative to the inertia of matter . . . The 'zones of indetermination' introduced into the universe by all living forms produce a kind of sieve or filter, which diminishes the full extent of the object's real effects in the world in order to let through its virtual effects, in other words, enables objects to enter unexpected connections, to make something new" (Grosz 2004, 98–100).
8. Another important figure here is Fernand Braudel, a pioneer of the "Annales" school of historiography, which studies long-term historical structures or *la longue durée*, combining geographical and sociological approaches with historical studies, and downplaying the importance of specific events and individuals. Braudel's study of *The Mediterranean* (1995), for example, is organized according to three different levels of time. The first level is slow, almost imperceptible geological time; the second level is the long-term time of social, economic, and cultural history; the third level of time is the history of individuals and specific events, which for Braudel is the most superficial.
9. For more on the "arrow of time" and the second law of thermodynamics, see *Time's Arrow and Archimedes' Point by* Huw Price (1996).
10. Indeed, in an age of climate change, it has become extremely important to consider the interrelation between human history and climatological time. This is the subject of Dipesh Chakrabarty's essay "The Climate of History" (2009) where he takes the geological aspects of historical time more seriously than in *Provincializing Europe*, and considers the historiographical implications of human beings making the transition from being merely "biological agents" to being "geological agents" in the sense of being a "force of nature.".
11. This is the important lesson encapsulated by Adorno's concept of "natural history," that is, the mutual imbrication and interdependence between the "historical" and the "natural," or rather, the material "excess of the object," which exceeds the conceptual schemas that would try to contain it (Cook 2011).
12. Indeed, scientific theory itself is a discursive field, and the way that the natural sciences are being taken up in the humanities is a complex process of reinterpretation that in itself would make for an interesting analysis.

13. One of the basic tenets of "post-positivist realism" is that what is "real" stretches beyond the empirical world of objects, or the physical world of forces, to include the reality of ideas, relations, and other things of an abstract character (see, e.g., Gillman 2010, 6–7).
14. This kind of understanding of lived reality as co-relational or interactive can be drawn not only from the phenomenological tradition, but also the pragmatist tradition. As William James argues, reality is always "in the making," because our constructed conceptual schemas affect the way we live or experience reality, and moreover, because experience is always "boiling over" such schemas of truth and knowledge, which means that our understandings of "reality" must be continuously remade (James 2000, 87; 123). Accordingly, reality is not ready-made and complete, and truth or knowledge is "not simply out there in the world waiting to be apprehended": rather, it is always derived through embodied, socially and culturally mediated experience (ibid.). I follow James' formulation of pragmatism here, rather than its more rationalistic "systematic" versions, as developed by Charles Peirce, for example. For an overview of different pragmatisms, their histories, and current manifestations, see Bernstein (2010), or Malachowski (2004). For more on feminism and pragmatism, see Haddock Siegfried (1996), or Hamington and Bardwell-Jones (2012).
15. Indeed, as we will see in chapter 3, not only does the phenomenological account fundamentally differentiate experiential temporality from the serial temporality of simple chronology; it also raises the question of whether a "mere sequence" of events, while thinkable or conceivable in an abstract sense, is in fact *experiencable* at all (Carr 1986, 24).
16. I want to acknowledge here that in using spatial metaphors and speaking in terms of "models" of historical time, I will perhaps invite the Bergsonian criticism that in figuring or "spatializing" time, we are not "thinking in time" at all (Bergson 2004, 2005; see also Guerlac 2006). However, the idea that "pure flux" is a "truer" conception of time than those informed by spatial metaphors is problematic from the perspective of lived time, in that time as it is known and felt is often "configured" in some respect. Indeed, as Adorno argues, the Bergsonian "flux" operates as a kind of regulative ideal that implicitly retains a split between the conceptual (operating in terms of space-time grids), and the "real" of pure flux or becoming (Adorno 1973). I would also question whether it is possible to separate the spatial from the temporal in the manner that Bergson and neo-Bergsonians imply. Doreen Massey, for example, has insisted on the "inseparability of time and space," on their "joint constitution through the interrelations between phenomena." As such, she argues, "neither can be conceptualized as the absence of the other" (Massey 1992). Rather

than seeing space and time as oppositional, then, and regarding the presence of spatial metaphors as the mark of a failure to "think in time," my view is that we can quite legitimately turn to spatial metaphors and models as useful tools for conceptualizing and articulating historical time.

17. The idea of time being "out of joint" comes from Derrida in *Spectres of Marx* (2006), where he takes up the line "the time is out of joint" from Shakespeare's *Hamlet* to express the idea of disjuncture: between different world orders and temporal modes, between justice and the present.
18. I discuss the question of narrative and its totalizing properties further in chapter 3.
19. I will be discussing Heidegger in more detail in chapter 4.
20. Chakrabarty focuses particularly upon the problem that "enchanted" temporalities pose to the empty, secular time of historicism. As an example, he discusses Ranajit Guha's essay "The Prose of Counter-Insurgency" on the 1855 Santal rebellion (Guha 1988), which has to deal with the Santal leaders' account of the rebellion in supernatural terms, "as an act carried out at the behest of the Santal God Thakur." The historian, Chakrabarty claims, can speak of "religious consciousness," but "cannot offer Thakur the same place of agency in the story of the rebellion that the Sandals' statements had given him" (Chakrabarty 2000, 104). He refers here to Rudolf Bultmann's argument that the presupposition of the "historical process" as a "whole" means that "the continuum of historical happenings cannot be rent by the interference of supernatural, transcendent powers and therefore that there is no 'miracle' in this sense of the word" (Bultmann quoted in Chakrabarty 2000, 105). The supernatural temporality of divine intervention is therefore neutralized and suppressed as the Santal rebellion is assimilated and "translated" into the language and time of modern historicism.
21. As Rita Felski writes of physical synchronicity: "If at some future moment a comet comes crashing into the earth, we will all be killed at more or less the same time" (2000, 23).
22. For this reason, I find Fabian's idea of coevalness more helpful than other frameworks proposed for thinking "different times at the same time" such as Louis Althusser's concept of the "conjunction" that attempts to formulate a concept of historical time on the basis of the Marxist conception of the social totality as a "complex structural unity." Osborne argues, in fact, that Althusser's concept of the conjuncture suffers from the basic problems of any structuralist concept of temporality, which "excludes the actively constitutive phenomenological present," such that he is left "without a temporal standpoint from which to unify his multiple social times. The concept of the conjuncture stands in for such a standpoint, but it does not, and cannot

provide one" (Osborne 1995, 28). Ernst Bloch is another theorist who attempts to grapple with the multiple, complex temporalities of different groups and individuals from a Marxist perspective, via his idea of "synchronous nonsynchronicity" (Bloch 2009). Yet, as Felski argues, his prior commitment to a Marxist understanding of historical progress means that he ranks these different temporal experiences according to the "presuppositions of evolutionary thought" (Felski, 2000, 24).

23. I have written elsewhere in more detail on Battersby's interpretation of Kierkegaard (Browne 2013).
24. Leela Fernandes makes a similar argument, contending that the "new Mestiza consciousness" that Anzaldúa constructs in *Borderlands* radically transforms how we think about historical periodizations and temporality (Fernandes 2010).
25. Chakrabarty is inspired here by Heidegger's hermeneutical ontology of historical existence. Though Heidegger himself is concerned to theorize temporality in terms of totality, Chakrabarty reads him in a way that helps him to "think about the past and the future in a nontotalizing manner" (2000, 249). Again, there will be more on Heidegger in chapter 4.
26. I should point out here that Fabian himself might not agree with this argument against totality, given that at the very end of *Time and the Other*, he tentatively proposes that the concept of "totality" might be the solution to the problem of "denying coevalness" (1983, 156–8).
27. Chakrabarty refers here to Franz Fanon's struggle to hold on to the Enlightenment idea of the human, "even when he knew that European imperialism had reduced that idea to the figure of the settler-colonial white man." This struggle is "now itself a part of the global heritage of all postcolonial thinkers" (2000, 5).
28. The term "minor" is taken from Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus*, where they explain that the difference between "minor" and "major" is not simply quantitative. Rather "minor" indicates a subversive language or literature that "*send[s] the major language racing*" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 116).
29. Once we understand historical time as an outcome of various temporalizations of history, it becomes difficult to separate the term "time" from "temporality" and "temporalization." In what follows, I use the term "time" primarily to denote a particular type, kind, or order of time, and "temporality" to refer to rhythm, direction, and pace, and the particular way that pasts, presents, and futures are interrelated and inscribed within certain orders of time.
30. This is a particularly important point with regards to how non-Western cultures are so often described as not having a "sense of history" because certain ways of conceiving or dealing with time that are presumed to be "essential" to historical consciousness are

observed to be missing. For these kinds of reasons, anthropologist Carol Greenhouse argues for an approach to time that does not presume in advance what "time" is (Greenhouse 1996).

31. On the one hand, contemporary digital culture is often associated with the *waning* of historical consciousness via the "outsourcing" of memory that can lead to a kind of "mass amnesia" (Huyssen 1995). On the other hand, however, new technologies are having a profound impact upon the ways in which historical information is disseminated and organized, including, for example, mechanisms facilitating cross-referencing such as hyper-text, or the capacity of a database to assemble and produce fragments and narratives based on different search criteria. These technologies not only transform the ways in which events are understood and organized retrospectively, but moreover, the ways in which events unfold at the time of their occurrence and the moment of recording. As Derrida has insightfully argued: "The technical structure of the archiving archive also determines the structure of the archivable content even in its very coming into existence and in its relationship to the future. The archivization produces as much as records the event" (Derrida 1998a, 16–17). Further, the field of digital and media studies itself is generating approaches and paradigms that can shape how we understand and configure historical time. Through their paradigm of "remediation" for example, Bolter and Grusin propose a temporal model that challenges the model of a historical progression whereby newer media simply subsume and replace their predecessors. Instead, they claim, "ours is a genealogy of affiliations, not a linear history, and in this genealogy, older media can also remediate newer ones" (1999, 55; see also Murray 1998). Vicki Callahan similarly refers to digital practice in terms of a "deep time methodology" that engages with a nonlinear, multidirectional flow of information, rather than a single evolutionary stream of data. Online archives, interactive media, and "improvisatory live remixes of found footage," she claims, offer myriad opportunities to displace homogenous, linear histories. The work of history thus becomes "a discovery process with open-ended results and multiple points of entry" (Callahan 2010, 4–5).
32. As noted above, one of Chakrabarty's key interests is the problem that "enchanted" temporalities pose to the empty, secular time of historicism, and this also gives rise to some vital questions for feminist historiography to address, especially in light of recent debates within feminist theory concerning the emergence of the "post-secular" and its challenge to secularist feminist hegemonies (see, e.g., Reilly 2011; Ahmed 2002; Mani 2009). To what extent can we discern an implicit secularist bias within Western feminist historiography and feminist conceptions of historical time? And what kinds of insights and temporal models can religious and spiritual feminisms bring to the project of rethinking historical time? (see, e.g., Gross 2010). I will be pursuing these questions in future research.

2 The Time of the Trace

1. The naïve or direct realist view is commonly associated with Leopold von Ranke, who famously incited historians to reconstruct the past "*wie es eigentlich gewesen*" (as it really was). Von Ranke's aim was to avoid injecting histories of past events with the "spirit of the present," and his empiricist method consisted in relying as far as possible on the most "immediate documents" such as eye-witness accounts. He was entirely opposed to the Hegelian philosophy of history with its *a priori* projections of rationality or "spiritual" determinations. This is not to say that Ranke was opposed to the idea of constructing a "world history"; but for Ranke, empirical study must always takes precedent. We "must always inquire into *what really happened*" and only then can we discern if there is a development of unity and progress (Burns 2000b; Ranke 2000, 90–1).
2. In fact, as Judith Lowder Newton points out, the role of feminist theory as a progenitor of this kind of thinking is often overlooked within the historiographical field. For example, accounts of the "New Historicism" usually give the impression that postmodernism or poststructuralism came up with these kinds of ideas, and feminism has "responded" (Newton 1989, 153).
3. In this chapter, I will be referring to the "continental" school of narrativism associated with structuralist theorists such as Roland Barthes and Hayden White, as opposed to the narrativist theory that has emerged within analytic philosophy of history. Within the analytical school, the turn toward a "narrativist" view of historical practice is predominantly associated with the work of Arthur Danto and W. B. Gallie. The analytical philosophers of history had hitherto focused primarily upon the nature of causal judgment and explanation in historical analysis, considering whether historical enquiry can be properly considered "scientific." Danto and Gallie, however, foregrounded the question of historical narration, taking seriously the storytelling role of history, as opposed to seeing it as a secondary or incidental aspect of historical practice. Danto went so far as to challenge the very idea of an objective historical "event," arguing that "there *are* no events except under some description" (1962). The "narrativist" turn of Danto and Gallie caused consternation among those who felt that emphasizing the narrative character of history placed its "scientific" ambitions in serious jeopardy. Yet both Danto and Gallie argue that to regard the historical exercise as essentially "narrative" does not compromise the epistemological status of historical knowledge, because historical narratives are nevertheless based on empirical record and subject to techniques of verification and disconfirmation. As such, they leave room for epistemological debates regarding historical truth claims, alongside their own treatment of history as a narrative art (see Danto 1965; Dray 1964; Gallie 1964). In contrast, the "narrativist" approach taken by Roland Barthes and Hayden White takes its influence from literary

theory. It is therefore less concerned with preserving a connection between epistemology and narratology than with exploring the literary forms or "tropes" of history as a genre of writing.

4. One of the most consistent examples referred to here is the Holocaust, as critics of narrativism worry about the extent to which the bracketing of "what really happened" plays into the hands of those who would insist that a historical account that denies the Holocaust ever happened has equal validity to those who attest to its horrors. As Dan Stone writes, the Holocaust is often regarded as an "event at the limits," and can be used as a "kind of 'trump card'" in debates around history and postmodernism (Stone 2012, 10).
5. The term "event" has accumulated many different meanings and articulations within various philosophies of time and history. Bearing in mind Fernand Braudel's criticism of "event-based" historiography—that it conceives of historical change in terms of point-like, exceptional, individual acts (Braudel 1995)—this chapter adopts a very broad sense of "event." An "event," as I use the term here, refers simply to lived events or material "happenings" of the past that can include short bursts of activity, such as an organized or spontaneous act or performance, but also more sustained periods of activity and intellectual endeavor. The advantage of retaining the term "event" is that it conveys a strong sense of the actual *happening* of the past, even as we recognize that our knowledges and reconstructions of past events and conditions will always be mediated by the linguistic and interpretative schemas permeating our present contexts. To further clarify: in speaking of past events, I differ from theorists who treat "the event" as a radical break in historical time, or as the virtual "event": an opening on to a "nonhistorical past" (Colebrook 2009a), or the "immanent feature of all actualization" (Boundas, 2006, 82; see also Grosz (1999), or Colebrook (2009b)). I undertake an analysis of the "virtual" approach to historiography elsewhere (Browne 2011).
6. Gillian Howie, borrowing from Thomas Nagel, uses the term "objectivism" to refer to the "ideology of objectivity," as distinct from "objectivity": a term to describe the "thing-ness" of the mind-independent material world (Howie 2010a, 5–7).
7. Hemmings is referring here to White's 1966 essay "The Burden of History" that Spivak cites in *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason* (1999). In this essay, White attacks the "bad faith" of historians who hide behind disciplinary or methodological ambiguity, refusing to interrogate the outmoded conceptions of objectivity with which history so often operates.
8. Spivak is indeed very suspicious of revisionist histories that present themselves as neutral and "innocent," but this does not mean she turns away from archival research. For example, in *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason* (1999), Spivak embarks upon an archival quest to learn something of the life of the Rani of Sirmur, of whom there are scarce archival records or traces, writing that "I pray . . . to be haunted by her slight ghost" (Spivak 1999, 207).

9. Terry refers to Nietzsche's characterization of "antiquarian" historians in "On the Utility and Liability of History for Life" as "jaded idlers in the garden of knowledge," arguing that history is valuable to the extent that it makes us aware of power relations at work in the past and present (Terry 1999, 25). In this essay, Nietzsche distinguishes between three types of history: the "antiquarian," which seeks to preserve the past; the "monumental," which seeks to emulate the past; and the "critical," which seeks to emancipate the present from the past (see Nietzsche 2006b).
10. The celebratory tone of narratives of feminist progress, for instance, is achieved through the deployment of adjectives such as "interesting," "exciting," "far-reaching," "generative," and "creative," and provides "little room for dissent" (Hemmings 2011, 20–1).
11. The extract Hemmings is analyzing is taken from the feminist journal *Gender, Place and Culture*: "Two related intellectual debates provided the impetus for critical reflection on 'the subject' of feminist thinking. First, women of color and Third World women feminists *critiqued* 'the subject' implicit within most feminist thought at the time, a subject that normalized the experience of white, middle-class, first-world women . . . (which) *stimulated* greater interest in the multiplicity of oppression and fractured the notion of 'woman' and her experience(s). Second, a *growing interest* in post-structural psychoanalytical perspectives . . . Feminist appreciated post-structural attempts to *deploy* an anti-essentialist world-view, *reject* totalizing 'grand' theory, and *embrace* multiplicity, difference and the 'de-centred subject'" (*Gender, Place and Culture*, 1999, my emphases, cited in Hemmings 2011, 123).
12. One example is a tactic Hemmings describes as "recitation" (2011, 180), where we explore how citation of prominent theorists such as Judith Butler might signify different feminist histories. Hemmings notes that Butler is "consistently credited in Western feminist stories with being the 'first' to challenge the category 'woman' . . . (and) overwhelmingly cited as representative of the 1990s, whether celebrated or demonized" (ibid., 181). She also notes that Butler is frequently cited in conjunction with Michel Foucault: a textual practice that can be regarded as "heterocitational," in that it "utilizes the opposite sex couple form to mark the shift away from feminism, (whether positively or negatively viewed), while also marking poststructuralism itself as male" (ibid.,167). She suggests that this citational tendency can be overturned by revisiting and reinstating Butler's own citational thread and interlocutors, such as Irigaray or Wittig, to overturn the usual "heterocitational" coupling of Butler with Foucault.
13. Using Hemmings' texts in this way, as representative of a certain theoretical position, admittedly risks overlooking the subtleties and singularities of Hemmings' work. But as Hemmings provides such a

lucid account of her reasoning, her texts help us to examine the steps that can lead from textual reflexivism to a "refusal" of revisionism, and to be clear about what is at stake in such a move.

14. This reading of Hemmings can be supported by her more recent research project that she describes as "Part II" of *Why Stories Matter*. This has involved extensive research into the Emma Goldman archive, as she considers the significance of Goldman for contemporary feminist theory and politics (see Hemmings 2014).
15. Indeed, as Kate Eichhorn argues, archives and archiving have a crucial role to play in the project of learning to tell feminist stories differently (Eichhorn 2013).
16. The term is Alain Badiou's. The philosophical debate concerning the scope of Badiou's conception of the event, and the relation between the determinate and indeterminate, is highly complex, but to give a brief account: Badiou's claim is that an "event" has no objective or verifiable content; its "happening" cannot be "proved" but only affirmed or proclaimed through a "fidelity" to the event (Badiou 2000). "Fidelity" means a commitment to pursuing an event's "truth," to sustaining its consequences. This, in turn, constitutes us as "subjects" because we pledge ourselves to sustain a consistency or continuity of thought and action. As Peter Hallward explains, truth, event, and subject are all aspects of a single process of affirmation. The logic of truth is the logic of being true or holding true to something, and the ethical prescription is encapsulated in the imperative "keep going!" or "continue!" (Hallward 2000, x–xi).
17. To use a common example, there is an arbitrary connection between the signifier "dog" and the barking creature running through the field. To analyze how the signifier "dog" operates and produces meaning, we can consider its relation to other signifiers within the linguistic system within which it operates, without making any reference to the barking creature at all. For more on Saussure's *Course in General Linguistics*, see Culler (1976) or Harris (1987).
18. Barthes does not attribute this quotation.
19. The extent to which Barthes' "structuralist analysis of narrative" ought to be understood as definitive is a contested issue. Some commentators argue that by the end of the 1960s there is a significant shift in Barthes' work, from the desire for all-encompassing structural models toward an affirmation of multiple structural possibilities in a text. Sanford Freedman and Carole Anne Taylor, for example, look to *S/Z*, where Barthes' conception of "*différance*" attempts to reconcile evaluative criticism with plural readings of a text, drawing us "aesthetically towards the extension of meaning," and "narrative flux." As such, they argue, "Barthes' interest is no longer in fixing the meaning of texts but instead mapping their movement," and *différance*, an idea that Derrida also takes up, "underlies all discussion"

(1983, xx–xxiii). Susan Sontag also emphasizes this shift from textual system to textual play (1983). What is unequivocal, however, is the radical epistemological challenge Barthes' work poses for historiographers in his disconnection of the historical narrative from the "referent" or past event.

20. White defines "trope" as "manner," "mood," or "style"; and "tropics" as the process by which language constitutes fields of experience within a specific mode of identification and description.
21. White refers here to Marx's claim that every historical account presupposes a specific set of ideological commitments in the very notions of "objectivity" and "explanation" that inform it. Or to put it in a slightly different way, following Lucien Goldman, "the human sciences are inevitably impelled towards the adoption of ideological positions by the 'epistemological wagers' their practitioners are forced to make among contending ideas of what an 'objective' science might look like." If we became more "tropologically astute," White argues, we could interpret historical writing through "explicating the tropological wager" buried at the heart of historical narratives (1973, xii).
22. Indeed, the structuralist idea of historical "reality" at times veers close to the Lacanian Real. In Lacan's account, the order of the "Real" (into which we are born) has no differentiation, no boundaries, or borders, no "lack." It is outside language and the order of the Symbolic, which in contrast, is constituted in terms of oppositions, for example, presence/absence, and a differentiated set of signifying elements. The "Real" is impossible to integrate into the "Symbolic order," utterly resisting signification (Evans 1996).
23. The difference between White's and Ricoeur's theories of metaphor can be explained in terms of the difference between the *literary* approach to metaphor and the *philosophical* approach. "The *via philosophica*," Jonathan Culler explains, "locates metaphor in the gap between sense and reference," whereas "*the via rhetorica*... situates metaphor in the space between one meaning and another" (Culler 1974, 219). It must be stressed here that my discussion bears no pretension to offering a thorough philosophical or linguistic treatment of the nature of metaphor. The intention, rather, is to demonstrate that reflexive attentiveness to language does not require an "agnostic" or "anti-realist" approach, and to offer a richer historiographical understanding of historical reality as a symbolically mediated reality.
24. At the figurative level in which the historical narrative is constructed, White identifies a formal typology of interpretative modes: (1) Emplotment, (2) Explanation, and (3) Ideological Implication. The aesthetic mode of Emplotment determines the *kind of story* that is told, through the choice of a meaningful plot structure, for example Romance or Tragedy. The epistemological mode of Explanation governs the

choice of an explanatory paradigm to determine the syntactical relationship between the different elements, and the overall direction or shape of the narrative, for example, the Mechanistic mode, which offers a part-by-part model of history as the operation of laws, or the Organicist mode, which offers a complete model of history as the subsumption of parts into the whole. The ethical mode of Ideological Implication determines the set of prescriptions that emerge as the "lesson" within the present world of social praxis, for example, Conservative or Radical. Yet further, these figurative, interpretative modes are determined by a more fundamental interpretative choice that takes place at the prefigurative tropological level. According to White, certain prefigurative tropes and interpretative modes tend to come together, for example the Metonymic, the Tragic, and the Mechanistic. Yet, as his analysis of various historians and philosophers of history shows, the mixture of tropes and modes varies from case to case. For example, he claims, Hegel's philosophy of history is unequivocally Organicist, but moves between the Comic and Tragic modes and is open to both Conservative and Radical implications (White 1973).

25. I will be explaining Ricoeur's ontologically oriented hermeneutics in more detail in the following chapter.
26. One of Ricoeur's key influences here is the linguistic theorist Èmile Beneviste, which differentiates him from theorists such as Barthes who follow Saussure. Beneviste preserves the referential function of language, whereas Saussure, as we have seen, insists on the arbitrariness of the sign and focuses on the signifier and signified, treating language as effectively a self-contained, enclosed system (Ricoeur 1984, 77–8).
27. The notion of "split reference" is taken from Roman Jakobson who claims that "the supremacy of poetic function over referential function does not obliterate the reference but makes it ambiguous" (quoted in La Capra 1985, 126). La Capra in fact questions Ricoeur's reading of Jakobson, but my argument pertains to the historiographical adaptation of the notion, which I find to be a useful means of preserving the referential function of historical narratives.
28. For Gadamer, the "distanciation" of the text is a disturbing aspect of historicity, but for Ricoeur it is a positive aspect, reminding us of our historical situatedness.
29. Ricoeur defines "archive" as an "authorized deposit," an organized "body of documents"; while "document" takes on the role of a warrant, "nourishing history's claim to be based on facts," and enlarging the scope of our collective memory (Ricoeur 1988, 116–17).
30. In fact, as I have indicated, the idea of the archive as a "house of preservation" or "repository" has been consistently challenged within archival studies in the humanities and social sciences in recent years, which focus on the archive's role in *producing* rather than simply housing or preserving knowledge (Eichhorn 2013, 3–4).

31. Ricoeur acknowledges his debt to Levinas' essay on "La Trace" here (1972). For both philosophers, the trace is distinguished from all the signs that get organized into systems because it "signifies something without making it appear," and therefore disarranges some "order." It is always a *passage* that it indicates, rather than a possible presence. As such, both philosophers "underline the strangeness of the trace." Despite the influence of Levinas, however, Ricoeur's concept of the trace in fact differs somewhat from Levinas', as the Levinasian discussion of the trace is an enquiry into the possibility of an ethics, whereas Ricoeur is enquiring into the conditions of historical knowledge and the reality of the historical past. Moreover, Levinas' "past of the Other" is an "absolute past," whereas Ricoeur does not place the absent in an immemorial past, outside of any memory (Ricoeur 1988, 125). In this respect, Ricoeur's conception of the trace also differs from that of Derrida, who like Levinas, speaks of the trace as a *condition* of the empirical, while Ricoeur speaks of the trace in historiographical terms as both an existential condition *and* an empirical mark. For Derrida, the trace does not appear as such, but can be understood rather as an "opaque energy" that propels the chains of traces: the trace is the aporia or slippage between absence and presence that is the condition of all appearing (Derrida 1998b, 65).
32. Indeed, White goes so far as to suggest that historical events in themselves are "value-neutral": "No historical event is intrinsically tragic . . . Considered as potential elements of a story, historical events are value-neutral. Whether they find their place finally in a story that is tragic, comic, romantic or ironic . . . depends upon the historian's decision to configure them according to the imperatives of one plot structure or mythos rather than another" (White 2009, 353).
33. Battersby focuses specifically upon this passage on concept-formation: "Just as it is certain that one leaf is never totally the same as another, so it is certain that the concept 'leaf' is formed by arbitrarily discarding these individual differences and by forgetting the distinguishing aspects . . . We obtain the concept, as we do the form, by overlooking what is individual and actual" (Nietzsche 2006c, 117).
34. Battersby points out that Nietzsche uses the term "*Geshlechter*," which can mean "generations," "sexes," *and* "races." She uses the 1966 Walter Kaufman translation, but for a slightly different translation of this passage, see the more recent *Nietzsche Reader*, edited by Ansell Pearson and Large (2006).
35. I discuss Battersby's reading of Nietzsche elsewhere, in conjunction with her reading of Kierkegaard (Browne 2013).
36. In *History, Memory and Forgetting*, Ricoeur focuses more upon oral testimony, as well as upon the written documents and artifacts of the archive. Testimony, he argues, "gives a narrative follow-up to declarative memory," whose security depends upon a level of

"trustworthiness" and upon an audience that is capable of listening to a witness and hearing what they have to say. In contrast, the written source can be detached from its narrator; but this does not mean that there cannot be a continuity between the event and the historical account that draws upon the written source (2004, 161–80).

37. First, Heller claims, there is the tendency to "repudiate feminism by 'othering', or by embodying feminist meanings and aspirations in negative figures and disturbing forms that are positioned outside the desirable, reproducible norm, a position that has been subsumed by conciliatory mass cultural 'figures' such as Ally McBeal and Erin Brokovich." Second, she refers to the tendency to "periodize feminist figures and images so as to suggest that feminism itself is not an is but a was, an object of historical curiosity, perhaps, but no longer necessary or relevant since it has achieved all of its goals and exists nowhere but in the past" (Heller 2002, 96).
38. This implies a pluralistic model of historical knowledge rather than an aggregative model. On an aggregative model, the sum of different perspectives and narratives add up to give a fuller, more complete account (Joyce et al. 1995, 257). In *Telling the Truth About History*, Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacobs, for example, defend a "practical realism" and a "qualified objectivity" that depends upon a distinction between "interpretation" and "perspective." Interpretations, they claim, can be mutually exclusive because they can rest on different assumptions. But different *perspectives* should be distinguished from different interpretations. "Perspective" refers to a "point of view," literally: a point from which something, an "object," is viewed. The sum of different vantage points, they claim, gives a fuller picture, but the object is not changed. "Objectivity remains with the object" (1995, 257). Thus, narrative multiplicity need not cause the historian to "give up the effort to aim for accuracy and completeness" and construct comprehensive historical accounts that are as "objective as possible" (1995, 248–9). This aggregative perspectivism, or consensus-based "qualified objectivism," however, is in my view unpromising. The distinction between interpretation and perspective implies that perspectives are somehow free from interpretative biases or predilections, whereas I would argue that perspectives and interpretations cannot be separated out so neatly. Moreover, their notion of a historical "object" seems to presuppose a past event that is fixed and frozen in time, upon which we can look back, and decide once and for all what its "truth" is.
39. *Sistershow* was a "situationist-feminist cabaret," which included a wide breadth of creative expressions such as song, film, dance, events, sketches, and parodies (Withers 2011).
40. The exhibition Withers is referring to is Susan Croft and Irene Cockroft's 2010 exhibition, *How the Vote Was Won: Art, Theatre and Womens Suffrage:* http://www.thesuffragettes.org/

3 Narrative Time

1. Within narratology, it is common to draw a distinction between the "time of the thing told" and the "time of the signifier," yet it is a contested issue whether narrative time is meaningful because it depends upon and reflects the structures of "real" time, or because of an "atemporal logic lying behind the temporality of narrative." Vladimir Propp, for example, pays heed to the "irreducibility of the chronological," arguing that time is reality and so for this reason, the tale is necessarily "rooted in temporality" (see Barthes 1982, 270). In contrast, Barthes concurs with Levi-Strauss' claim that "the order of chronological succession is absorbed in an atemporal matrix of structure." He argues that temporality in narrative is only a *structural category,* and is unequivocal in his insistence that narrative time is autonomous, and must be considered in its own terms, without reference to "real time": "Both narrative and language know only a semiotic time, 'true' time being a 'realist', referential illusion . . . It is as such that structural analysis must deal with it" (ibid., 270–1). In his "Historical Discourse" essay, Barthes describes the "time of history" as a simple "chronological sequence," which the "time of the history book" disrupts, through "organizational shifters" that reconfigure the "chronologically ordered subject matter" within a complex, nonlinear matrix of semiotic temporal "structure." Examples of such "organizational shifters" include "performative openings" where the historian's voice interrupts the sequence being narrated, or the preface, which operates as either a prospective or retrospective meta-statement. "Transposition into the mode of sui-referential meta-statement," Barthes argues, "serves not so much to enable the historian to express his subjectivity, as is commonly supposed, but rather to de-simplify the chronological Time of history by contrasting it with the different time-scale of the discourse itself" (1970, 148).
2. In fact, White does tend to switch in his writings between characterizing historical "reality" in terms of simple sequence, and elsewhere, in terms of "chaos" and discontinuity. However, the key point he is making is that sequences of events "in themselves" do not have a meaningful structure. This leads to the idea of "either random activity and collision of blind forces, devoid of order or significance, or alternatively, a reality totally ordered along rigorous causal lines without flaw or gap in its mechanism" (Carr 1986, 19). These notions may seem incompatible, Carr notes, but in both cases, the implication is that "real" historical time is somehow removed from or indifferent to social concerns and cultural meaning.
3. For example, Carr attempts to extend his account "outwards" by adopting the viewpoint of a "common subject" or "*we-subject*": a viewpoint "which is still first person but is plural" (Carr 1986, 133–4). Carr insists that the "we–subject" is not simply "a larger–scale I," yet he claims that "the 'we-subject' displays *the same temporal structure* of 'experience, action and life' that is associated with the individual

subject" (ibid., 149). The "inside→out" move "from I to we" is rendered even more problematic by Carr's depiction of temporal phenomenological structure in terms of coherence and unity, because his entire method rests on using the "original temporal coherence of the most basic phenomena" as an "ideal standard of measurement" for deriving an understanding of historical time (ibid., 44). "There is" he claims, "a narrative social time which bears the same relation to social experience and action as does individual temporality to the experiences, actions and lives of individuals" (ibid., 149). He thus theorizes outwards from a holistic Husserlian phenomenology of individual time-consciousness, through to a Hegelian analysis of group temporality in terms of a collective narrative journey that he explicitly describes in terms of Hegel's concept of *Geist*: "an I that is We, a We that is I." Just as individual experience is configured as a temporal whole, Carr writes, "the communal 'we' projects a future before us and a past behind us which is being organized prospectively and retrospectively in a narrative fashion" (ibid., 168). "Without narrative consensus at this very deep level," Carr concludes, "a community is on the brink of fragmentation" (ibid., 170). Ultimately, then, Carr takes us back to the "master narrative" model of history, rather than "histories in the plural." He replaces the structuralist depiction of historical time in terms of *mundane* linearity with a *narrative* linearity, based on unified collective temporal frameworks, secure origins, and purposive direction.

4. Many feminist phenomenologists have turned to the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty as a means of exploring the intersubjective determinations of individual experience and consciousness, as Merleau-Ponty stresses that subjectivity is grounded within a fundamentally intersubjective experience (see, e.g., Weiss 2011). This is not, however, to suggest that feminist phenomenologists have uniformly abandoned Husserl. For examples of feminist re-workings of the Husserlian framework, see, for example, essays by Heinämaa and Schües in the edited collection *Time in Feminist Phenomenology* (2011), or work by Alia Al-Saji, who argues that Husserl's phenomenology of touch can be stretched beyond its initial "methodologically solipsistic frame," to be of use to feminist phenomenologies of embodiment (2010).
5. Indeed, the concept of "experience" has come in for such heavy criticism that it has become rather "discredited" within feminist theory (Martìn Alcoff 2000, 44). Joan Scott, for example, concludes that historians and historiographers should change our object of study from historical "reality" to the discursive systems that shape, codify, and configure experience (1991). However, as I have argued previously, disengaging from "events," "reality," and historical "experience" can make it difficult to make claims about historical happenings as the basis for political claims. Moreover, the concept of "experience" is fundamental to any theory of "lived time," which requires that we modify and broaden our approach to experience, rather than disengaging from it as a theoretical category

6. For Husserl, it is possible to avoid the need for this kind of interpretation by adopting the correct "transcendental" or "reductionist" method. One can then bracket out prejudices and misconceptions, and so the meaning or nature of things would be self-evident.
7. Ricoeur uses "mimesis" in the Aristotelian sense of "imitation of action . . . and of life" (Aristotle 1996, 11), or as Ricoeur explains it, the "refiguring of the order of action" (1984, 54).
8. Mignolo's conception of "pluritopic hermeneutics" is developed from Raimundo Panikkar's concept of "diatopical hermeneutics," which he describes thus: "Diatopical hermeneutics is the required method of interpretation when the distance to overcome, needed for any understanding, is not just a distance within one single culture . . . or a temporal one . . . but rather the distance between two (or more) cultures, which have independently developed in different spaces (topoi) their own methods of philosophizing and ways of reaching intelligibility along with their proper categories" (quoted in Mignolo 1995, 16).
9. This relates to Habermas' criticism of Gadamer: he does not register that the patterns of communication in western intellectual history have been fundamentally shaped by power relations and changes in the mode of production; and further, does not adequately grasp the transcending power of reflection and reason in post-Enlightenment societies: "Gadamer fails to appreciate the power of reflection that is developed in understanding" (Habermas 1986, 268). Ricoeur, however, suggests that the implied conservatism of Gadamer's hermeneutics stems from Gadamer's unqualified concept of "tradition," which incorporates different elements that ought to be differentiated. Ricoeur distinguishes between "traditionality" to refer to the dynamic interplay between reception and innovation within the transmission and construction of knowledge and culture; "traditions" to refer to particular sets of practices and beliefs; and "tradition" in the singular to refer to a legitimation of a claim to truth, for example, when the practice of a woman taking a husband's surname is defended because it is "traditional" (Ricoeur 1988, 219–24). It is the third sense, Ricoeur argues, that has provided the opportunity for confrontation between hermeneutics and ideology critique: the conflation within Gadamerian hermeneutics between tradition, traditions, and traditionality results in a shift "from the consideration of traditions to an apology for tradition" (ibid., 222).
10. For more on the question of feminism and hermeneutics, see the edited collection of *Feminist Interpretations of Hans Georg Gadamer* (ed. Code 2003).
11. To illustrate the pluritopic approach, Mignolo refers to the work of Gloria Anzaldúa, who has articulated a "powerful alternative aesthetic and political hermeneutic by placing herself at the crossroads of three traditions (Spanish American, Nahuatl, and Anglo-American) and

carving a locus of enunciation where different ways of knowing and of individual and collective expressions meet" (Mignolo 1995, 13).

12. While the imagery of "pluritopic" hermeneutics is indeed spatial, rather than temporal, I believe that spatial metaphors and imagery such as "horizons" and "spaces" are indispensably useful tools for thinking and articulating historical time. As such, pluritopic hermeneutics can be enlisted for a polytemporal historiography.
13. This makes an interesting point of comparison to Shulamith Firestone's account of the history of feminism in *The Dialectic of Sex* (1971), where she divides US feminist history into three strands: "conservatives," "politicos," and "radicals." "Conservative feminists," represented by Betty Friedan's 1965 National Organization of Women (NOW), are positioned as the descendents of the suffragist movement at the turn of the century, especially the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA) (ibid., 37). The "politicos" of the contemporary Left are like the "politicos of the Progressive era . . . see[ing] feminism as only tangent to 'real' radical politics" (ibid., 37–8). Finally, radical feminism is framed as "the direct descendent of the radical feminist line in the old movement, notably that championed by [Elizabeth Cady] Stanton and [Susan B.] Anthony" (ibid., 42). Although the narrow focus on suffrage stripped the early movement of its radical potential and "killed the WLM" (ibid., 20–4), Firestone claims, radical feminists of today are reclaiming and reviving the militant tradition of the old radicals.
14. In *Relating Narratives* (2000), Cavarero draws on Hannah Arendt's concept of "natality" to underscore the relational underpinning of narrativity. I am dependent on others for my "life story," Caverero insists, most importantly because I am not a witness to the beginnings of my life, of which I have no reflexive cognition at the time, and cannot subsequently remember. Moreover, throughout my life I am not necessarily in the best position to judge what the meaning of my life and actions has been or will be (Cavarero 2000, 80).
15. From a linguistic perspective, we can understand the distinction between the formal, structuralist analysis of "narrative," and the performative paradigm of "narrativity," in terms of the Saussurean distinction between "*langue*" and "*parole*," wherein "*langue*" refers to the linguistic system of signs and grammatical rules, and "*parol*e" refers to the series of speech acts that make use of this grammatical and semiotic system to communicate (Smith 2000). Privileging the performative paradigm of "narrativity" over a formalist analysis of the "narrative text" does perhaps invite the Derridean criticism of perpetuating the "metaphysics of presence," by apparently entrenching a model of communication founded on the immediacy of the spoken word and the face-to-face presence of a speaker and listener to one another. In response to such possible objections, however, I

would argue that the paradigm of "narrativity" can stretch the historiographical imagination far beyond a simple communicative model based on a face-to-face encounter in the here-and-now, because it points us toward webs of interconnected lives and stories that always exceed and precede the purview of any individual subject, or groups of subjects, at a given moment.

16. Segal is quoting from Alison Fell's *Every Move You Make* (Fell 1984, 22).
17. Hemmings refers here to Mary Daly's "African Genital Mutilation" and Fran Hosken's 1984 "Report," which underscore the author's horror with vivid examples that "teach horror to the reader, even if they did not already experience it" (Hemmings 2011, 218). She also refers to Sheila Jeffreys' work on transsexual mutilation and Germaine Greer's account of her "horror" when expected to shake a transsexual woman's hand (2011, 218).
18. On the other hand, feminism has in many ways bolstered the authority of the narrative voice, and in particular the autobiographical voice, given that personal testimony and the "confessional" style have been so prominent in feminist writing.
19. See, for example, *Disrupting the Narrative: Gender, Sexuality and Fractured Form* (ed. Carr 2011).
20. Another issue for consideration, as pointed out previously, is how changing technologies are altering the ways in which historical narratives are configured. As well as transforming narrative, technological changes may also be unsettling its privileged position with regards to history, as new visual media challenge the dominance of older linguistic media (Bolter and Grusin 1999, 57). This book does not deal with digital culture, but there are many interesting feminist books and articles that do: for example, Callahan (2010); Everett (2004); Garrison (2010).

4 Calendar Time

1. For interesting historical accounts of calendar customs and the quest to determine an "accurate" calendrical year and month, see, for example, Blackburn and Holford-Stevens (1999), or Duncan (1998).
2. By 1855, 98 percent of all public clocks in Great Britain were set to GMT; in 1883, "standard railway time" in the United States (based on GMT), was put into effect; and in 1884 the "International Meridian Conference" was held, which inaugurated the international standardization of "International Standard time," based on GMT, though it is still not universally observed (Zerubavel 1982b).
3. Newton proposed an "absolute time," which, as Stephen Hawking explains it, means that he believed in time's absolute separation from space, and that "one could unambiguously measure the interval of time between two events, and that this time would be the same whoever measured it, provided they used a good clock" (Hawking 1988, 18).

4. E.P. Thompson's essay on "Time, Work Discipline and Industrial Capitalism" is the classic text on this point that standardized clock and calendar time is fundamental to modern capitalism, as it enables the coordination of complex systems of production, distribution, and exchange (Thompson 1974).
5. Indeed, one way to refute the understanding of calendrical time as a homogenous all-encompassing "backdrop" to lived history would be to demonstrate how the ideal of homogenous or absolute time entertained by Newtonian science breaks down in light of Einsteinian theory (Chakrabarty 2000). My key point here, however, is not simply that the Newtonian understanding of time is *wrong*. It is rather that calendar time needs to be understood as a socially specific creation or "version" of cosmological time.
6. "*Dasein*" means literally "there-being," or oriented being, and is Heidegger's term for "the being of humans," and also the "entity or person who has this being" (Inwood 1999, 42).
7. "Factical" is a term Heidegger uses for "being-already-in-a-world"; "factical" calendars by implication are those actually existing calendars that we use as "equipment" on a day-to-day basis (Inwood 1999, 58).
8. Heidegger's polemic against the "ordinary" conception of time is flawed in several respects, not least because it reductively equates scientific conceptions of time with the Aristotelian concept of time, as expressed in Book IV of *Physics*, where Aristotle defines time as the "number of change in respect of the before and after" (Aristotle 1987, 125). The reason for Heidegger's dismissive treatment of science, Ricoeur explains, is that he "takes for granted that science has nothing original to say that has not been borrowed tacitly from metaphysics," which in turn, is a highly reductive conception of Western metaphysics as essentially Aristotelian (Ricoeur 1988, 88). This conflation is disingenuous: not only is it a reductive treatment of Western metaphysical accounts of time, but it is also a reductive treatment of the complex and diverse scientific theories of the multiple "times of nature," including quantum time, thermodynamic time, the time of galactic transformations, and the evolution of the species. It is important, therefore, to read the "ordinary conception of time" as exactly that: a reified understanding of what time is "really" or "objectively" like, which may have *affinities* with certain scientific or metaphysical perspectives—such as Newtonian physics or Aristotelian metaphysics—but is not to be confused with "the scientific conception" or the "metaphysical conception" *per se*. As Ricoeur argues: "the very expression 'ordinary conception of time' appears ridiculous compared to the scope of problems posed to science by the orientation, continuity and measurability of time" (1988, 89).

9. Indeed, Heidegger reserves the term "temporality" exclusively for "ecstatic" temporality: the "temporality which interprets itself" (2009, 460). It would be tangential to delve too deeply here into Heidegger's intricate and flawed arguments regarding the "originary" nature of "ecstatic temporality," and the "authentic" mode of "Being-towards-death," given that this chapter is about calendar time. Suffice to say that they are two basic problems: the first concerns the argument that all kinds of temporality are "derived" from ecstatic temporality, including the sense of an independent nature-time or "world-time." On both an intuitive and a theoretical level, the argument that the notion of a natural or cosmological time is simply a "flattened out" version of the "temporality which interprets itself" is hardly a credible thesis. As noted in the previous chapter, the Husserlian attempt to entirely "bracket" the naturalistic standpoint runs into similar difficulties. To turn again to Ricoeur: "If we say that time flies, is this simply because we are fleeing the idea of our Being-towards-the-end? Is it not also because we observe in the course of things a passage that flees us, in the sense that it escapes our hold, to the point of being unaware, as it were, even of our resolution to pay no attention to the fact that we have to die? Would we speak of the shortness of life if it did not stand out against the immensity of time?" (1988, 93) The second key problem with Heidegger's project lies with the distinction he draws between "authenticity" and "inauthenticity," which, in turn, rests upon the problematic distinction between "existential" and "existentiell." 'Existentiell,' as Heidegger uses it, refers to the concrete choice of a way of being in the world, while "existential" refers to any analysis that aims at explicating the structures that differentiate Dasein from all other beings. Yet, as Tina Chanter argues, there is a series of normative presumptions and biases built into Heidegger's "ontological" method that cover over its own prejudices (Chanter 2001, 73–4). From this critical perspective, we can legitimately ask "whether the entire analysis of temporality is not tied to the personal conception Heidegger has of authenticity, on a level where it competes with other existentiell conceptions" (Ricoeur 1988, 67).
10. The "ready-to-hand" and the "present-to-hand" can be understood as two modes of being or types of entity. "Present-to-hand" is the term Heidegger uses for neutral or natural entities, while "ready-to-hand" refers to artifacts or things that serve human purposes in some way. In fact, in Heidegger's account, we are disposed to see things as "ready-to-hand" before we regard them as "present-to-hand" or neutral. Both modes of being, however, are to be distinguished from the mode of being of Dasein (Inwood 1999, 128–9).
11. This interpretation of Heidegger's notion of "*Mitsein*" and publicness, it must be noted, is contested within Heidegger scholarship. Charles

Guignon, for example, claims that the concepts of "authenticity" and "inauthenticity" refer to the ways in which one takes up one's cultural heritage, and thus that "authenticity" is not an individualistic conception in Heidegger's work. "Authentic Dasein," he writes, "remembers" its rootedness in the wider unfolding of its culture and shared history (Guignon 1993). Yet, while there is some textual support for this reading, much of Heidegger's own language and assertions in *Being and Time* contradicts the picture that Guignon paints. For example, he clearly states that "the Self of the everyday Dasein is the they-self, which we distinguish from the authentic Self…As *they-self*, the particular Dasein has been dispersed into the 'they,' and must first find itself" (Heidegger 2009, 167). As a *re*-interpretation of the concept of *Mitsein*, Guignon's account is more convincing.

12. In fact, Bonnie Honig argues that the Arendtian emphasis on resistibility, openness, creativity, and incompleteness—the "*sine qua non* of Arendt's politics"—means reading Arendt against Arendt and resisting any *a priori* determination of a public/private distinction (Honig1998).
13. Seyla Benhabib, for example, argues that Arendt's "agonistic" conception of the public offers an alternative to the liberal model of publicness, which is premised upon certain kinds of conversational constraints, with the fundamental constraint being *neutrality* (Benhabib 1998; see also Barber 1988, 151). She further contends that it offers an alternative to Habermas' Kantian cosmopolitanism. While Habermas moves away from the liberal criteria of *neutrality* toward the criteria represented by the idea of a "practical discourse," feminist theorists have seriously challenged the presuppositions of Habermas' abstract, universal, rationalistic model of the public sphere. Nancy Fraser, for instance, challenges the occlusion of nonliberal, non-bourgeois, and competing public spheres within Habermas' historical sketch of the rise of the public sphere, which means that he overlooks the ways in which counter-publics have always contested the exclusionary norms of the bourgeois public sphere. Ultimately, he ends up idealizing the Enlightenment ideal of a unified, single public sphere, at the expense of a "multiplicity of publics" (Fraser 1990; see also Young 1987).
14. For further feminist readings of Arendt, see *Feminist Interpretations of Hannah Arendt* (ed. Honig 1995).
15. This forms part of Arendt's wider argument concerning the reifying imbrication of the "social" and the "natural" within modern social and political science, such that social and historical sciences become conflated with the natural sciences which leads to totalizing efforts to "manage" human relations through "treating man as an entirely natural being whose life processes can be handled the same way as all other processes" (Arendt 2006, 59).

16. To clarify, while Lévi-Strauss' notion of "hot" and "cold chronologies" is helpful, I do not accede to his structuralist approach to history and historical time more generally, for reasons outlined in chapters 2 and 3.

5 Generational Time

1. Mary Spongeberg contends that in Europe, the "desire to trace genealogies of women who changed the world for other women," goes back at least as far as the time of Mary Wollstonecraft and her followers, who attempted to generate a genealogy of "exceptional but marginal" female scholars in which to frame their achievements (2009, 1). We also find Virginia Woolf claiming in *A Room of One's Own* that "women writers think back through [their] mothers"…(1957, 79).
2. Judith Roof argues that the idea of feminist "generations" became particularly entrenched through influential feminist texts in the 1970s such as Firestone's *Dialectic of Sex* and Kate Millett's *Sexual Politics,* both of which begin by offering an account of feminist history reaching back at least one century. Roof also gives the example of Alice Rossi's *The Feminist Papers* (1973) —"fully devoted to the project of describing a feminist history"—and Jane Rule's *Lesbian Images* (1975), which is "primarily about foremothers" (Roof 1997, 70). Astrid Henry has argued that the mother-daughter trope has now become *the* central means of figuring relationships between so-called second-wave and third-wave feminists in the United States (Henry 2004, 2).
3. For an interesting historical overview of the changing instantiations of the Oedipus myth, see Edmunds (2006). For example, Edmunds demonstrates that while the Oedipal myth is two-generational in Freud, it was in fact four-generational in the earliest sources.
4. Alanen's suggestion is that we can draw an analogy between the feminist understanding of the "gender system" and the "generational system": just as gender pervades all social relations, so does the generational system. "Parallel to a 'gender agenda', she writes, we can also imagine a "generational agenda" being at work: "a particular social order that organizes children's relations to the world in a systematic way, allocates them positions from which to act and a view and knowledge about themselves and their social relations." Social phenomena are not just "gendered"; they are also "generationed" (Alanen 1994, 37).
5. "Tradition" comes from the Latin *tradere:* to "hand over" or "give over." But interestingly, the other root meaning of *tradere* means to "hand over" or "give over" in the sense of surrender or betrayal. For Osborne, this suggests that the "continuity of tradition requires a constant exercise of authority to combat the threat of betrayal inherent in its temporal structure" (Osborne 1995, 127).

6. In drawing on Irigaray's work on female genealogies, I do want to acknowledge the problem of conflating "female" and "feminist." Addressing the issue of "between-women sociality" is a crucial dimension of the feminist project to rethink generational communication; yet, depicting the "receiver" of feminist legacies as *de facto* female does run the risk of capitulating to the notion that feminism is a women-only affair. I should also point out here that Irigaray uses the term "genealogies" in the sense of tracing kinship connections through time, rather than in the Foucauldian sense.
7. See also Drucilla Cornell's *Between Women and Generations* (2002), in which she proposes a understanding of "intergenerational" as not simply "relations between living women," but as "women's respect for each other's dignity" (ibid., xviii).
8. Madeline Detloff attributes the term "political matricide" to Louise Bernikow (Detloff 1997).
9. Friedrich Engels, for example, argues that patriarchal kinship systems are determined by economic shifts and the introduction of private property, and therefore that patriarchal cultural norms and genealogical systems based on patrimony and patriliny are an effect of this economic organization (Engels 2010).
10. The child, Lacan claims, is born into the order of the Real, a realm of "pure plentitude" and fullness, a continuum in which there are no boundaries and no lack. The child has no sense of its own corporeal boundaries, and no sense of inside and outside, subject and object, self and other. In this phase, the child exists in a syncretic unity, a joyous fusion, with the mother. This "hermetically sealed unit" of fullness and completeness begins its dissolution with the onset of the "mirror stage," in which the child begins to recognize lack or absence (of the mother or gratification of needs) and concurrently, to recognize its distinction from the mother and its environment. This is the realm of the Imaginary, in which the ego is primitively established through fantasized identification with others. Lacan associates this dyadic, mutually defining, identificatory structure primarily with the mother–child relation in the mirror stage, which, if left to itself, "would entail a vicious cycle of imaginary projections, identifications, internalisations, fantasies and demands that leave no room for development or growth" (Grosz 1990, 50). Exchange is impossible because there is no third term, hence the equation of entry into the symbolic order of language and culture through the paternal.
11. In Freud's account, the Oedipal complex describes a transition in the (boy) child's life whereby his primary attachment to, and desire for, the mother must be regulated and re-directed. It is the father that prohibits the boy's (sexual) access to the mother, and thus the boy perceives the father as an unbeatable rival, and moreover, construes the father's prohibitions as castration threats. In the (successful)

resolution of this complex, the boy represses his primal desire for the mother, deferring or redirecting his desire toward the future when he will be rewarded, by having a woman of his own. In *Totem and Taboo*, Freud attempts to account for the origins of this "patriarchal pact," through reference to the "primal myth" of parricide: the killing of the father figure by the fraternal horde (Freud 1950, 141). This "original sin" founds an inexorable law of debt "through which the subject binds himself for life to the Law," as founded on the Oedipal incest taboo and patriarchal kinship structures that regulate desire and familial relationships. As Lacan points out therefore, the power of the Oedipus complex in Freud's system rests not so much upon the personage of the father figure, but rather on the authority of the dead or absent father (Grosz 1990, 69). Indeed, Lacan stresses that paternal authority is always already symbolic, because paternity (at least traditionally) is uncertain and thus requires representation through the *naming* of the father. The "Law-of-the-Father" refers to the kinship systems that forbid sexual access to those who have been *named* as family. It is the "Name-of-the-Father" that therefore becomes central to Lacan's reinterpretation of Freud's psycho-biological Oedipus model in linguistic and sociocultural terms.

12. As, for example, does Ellie Ragland Sullivan (1987).
13. We might also turn to the pioneering work done by Bracha Ettinger in psychoanalytic theory. Like Irigaray, Ettinger considers the role of intrauterine relations in the final stages of pregnancy in enabling the formation of a partial subjectivity prior to entry into the symbolic order identified by Lacan. Ettinger describes this as a "matrixial time and space," which provides the conditions for both the "*becoming*-mother (the mother-to-be)" and the "*becoming*-subject (the baby-to-be)" to turn into partial subjects, or "*I(s)* and *non-I(s)*" (Ettinger 2006).
14. Battersby, for example, points to the potential pitfalls of uncritically adopting maternal emblems, using the case of "*affidamento*" ("entrustment" or "matronage") as an example: a system of female networking within the Italian feminist communities of "Diotima" based in Verona. *Affidamento* is structured around a mentor-guide relationship between a "symbolic" (rather than literal) mother and daughter, intended to facilitate the "vertical" transmission of knowledge and experience from woman to woman. Not only does this practice risk reinstalling a hierarchical, linear model of communication, argues Battersby, it also "operates as if patriarchy were a closed system. It valorizes 'woman' as a symbolic mother without giving due weight to the ways in which issues of race, class, history, sexuality and upbringing contribute to power differentials between women . . . *affidamento* can offer little to those (many) immigrant women who act as domestic workers in Italy – and who would be ill advised to position

themselves either as the symbolic 'mothers' or 'daughters' of their female/feminist employers" (Battersby 1998, 119).

15. As Judith Butler argues: "If Oedipus is not the *sine qua non* of culture, that does not mean there is no place for Oedipus. It simply means that the complex that goes by that name may take a variety of cultural forms and that it will no longer be able to function as a normative condition of culture itself. Oedipus may or may not function universally, but even those who claim that it does would have to find out in what ways it figures and would not be able to maintain that it always figures in the same way. For it to be a universal—and I confess to being agnostic on this point—in no way confirms the thesis that it is the condition of culture: that latter thesis purports to know that it always functions in the same way, namely, as a condition of culture itself" (Butler 2002, 39).
16. There are similarities here with Adriana Cavarero's arguments in her book *In Spite of Plato* (1995), where she argues that "the mythic figure has the power to express in a concentrated way the symbolic order that shapes it . . . it has an incomparable ability to adapt to the twists and turns of the inner development of the symbolic order itself . . . " (1995, 1–2).
17. This treatment of myth is arguably reminiscent of Jung's notion of "archetypes" and the "collective unconscious" (Jung 1981).
18. "Originary" is a Heideggerian concept that Joanna Hodge deploys to clarify the status of "matricide" in Irigaray's thought. For Heidegger, Hodge explains, an originary event does not take place at the beginning of a sequence of events, from which the sequence then proceeds. Rather, "the originary from which a particular discursive formation emerges has to be repeatedly enacted and reinscribed if the formation is to stay in place . . . (it) articulates itself as an omnipresent and recurrently affirmed set of parameters that open up certain lines of possibility while closing off others" (Hodge 1994,192).
19. Irigaray's reconstructive mythologizing also takes place through her evocations of a gynocratic "prehistory." She refers particularly to the work of nineteenth-century mythologist Johann Bachofen, which draws on classical Greek sources to postulate an era of matriarchy ending in classical times with the rise of male rule and the "male principle." Though Irigaray uses the term "gynocracy" rather than "matriarchy," to stress that a "gynocentric" symbolic structure would not simply be an inversion of patriarchy, she accedes to Bachofen's method of reading prehistory in myth. It should be acknowledged, however, that the myth of matriarchal or "gynocratic" prehistory is not widely regarded as a credible historical thesis. The end of the nineteenth century saw a brief flourishing of the myth, with anthropologist Herbert Spencer among its more famous proponents, and it is taken up by Engels in *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (2010). But most anthropologists dropped the idea

at the turn of the century due to sketchy evidence (though Soviet anthropologists stuck close to the myth until at least the 1950s) (Eller 2000). Nevertheless, Irigarayan scholars argue that Irigaray embraces the myth *as myth*, using it to emphasize that patriarchy need not be regarded as universal or inevitable, and to imagine how Western cultures might have developed differently. Indeed, Irigaray claims that skeptical attitudes and disregard for "prehistory" proliferate precisely because "patriarchy is mistaken for the only history possible" (Irigaray 1993b, 24).

20. Freud described this temporality as "*Nachträglichkeit*," which translates as "afterwardsness," or "deferredness," referring to the way in which a repressed memory only becomes a trauma after the event, through forms of repetition and restaging. These repetitions indicate the trauma's disturbing sway over the present, thereby problematizing the idea of a clean break from the past, and showing that the past is always "unfinished" (La Capra 1994).
21. La Capra's argument here is that the idea of "transference" has purchase beyond the psychoanalytic field and clinical context, and is highly pertinent to the historiographical question of how to conduct an "exchange" with the past as an "other" (ibid., 75). There is always, he contends, a "transferential" relation between practices of the past and historical accounts of them, as the problems at issue in the "object" of study reappear or are "repeated with variations" in the work of the historian or historiographer (La Capra 1985, 72–3). Indeed, we are often attracted to certain aspects or events of the past precisely because they trouble us or disturb through an eerie sense of familiarity. Accordingly, if repetition and displacement of this kind is simply a structural determinant of historical work, then it is crucial that historians and historiographers are able to critically negotiate this "transferential" relation to the past.
22. From a purely psychoanalytic perspective, it must be noted, Irigaray's engagements with myth and the cultural imaginary alone are unsatisfactory, as they do little to intervene into psychoanalytic theory, or the theory of the symbolic order of which the cultural imaginary is supposedly a "symptom" (Weed 2010). As Laura Green writes, "we need to be clear about the maternal contribution to subjectivity *first* if we are to repair what Irigaray calls the female *genre*" (Green 2012, 6). Green also argues that Irigaray's call to use symbolic archetypes as "identificatory supports" is actually a kind of projection theory in which women are expected to consciously project ideals of femininity onto "ego ideals." This is problematic because projection is primarily a *defence mechanism*. "What Irigaray identifies as a problem relating to the infant's failure to *introject* the maternal other – rather than incorporating her as a Symbolic figure . . . – cannot be solved by means of 'projection'" (Green 2012, 6).

23. Again, we can compare Irigaray's approach to Western mythology with Cavarero's: "The symbolic framework that supports the hermeneutical system remains the same, despite the representational polyvalence of the mythic figures deployed within in *ad infinitum*... the unchanging symbolic framework determines that all feminine representations are based on the central position of the masculine, so that, inevitably, the roles played by female figures have their meaning in the patriarchal codes that constructed them. For men, therefore, one can observe a whole parade of figures in which masculine subjectivity expects recognition. For women, on the other hand, one finds the selfsame parade of figures imposed by a masculine subject" (Cavarero 1995, 2).
24. Indeed, we might attribute Irigaray's big-sweep approach to history to an *excess* of mythic thinking, such that she renders history itself in mythic or epic dramatic terms, as an eternal struggle between maternal and paternal, feminine and masculine, female and male.
25. In fact, Lacan himself does intimate that he does not intend his psychoanalytic model as a timeless theory, affirming that when something new comes to light that forces a complete rethink, "another structural order emerges" (quoted in Weed 2010, 18). Nevertheless, the presentation of his theory of Oedipalization as *the* condition for entry into order of language, society, and culture is difficult to reconcile with this apparent affirmation of historical determinants.
26. For example, Irigaray does affirm at one point in *Sexes and Genealogies* that "certain women, despite all the cultural obstacles, have made their mark upon History and all too often been forgotten by us" (1993c, 13).
27. The prohibition is that of sexual union with the mother, which is simply "*there*" in the Lévi-Straussian account as a precondition or founding structure of individuation and cultural intelligibility. The mother is prohibited because she belongs to the father; hence the father and the mother exist as necessary structural figures within the inaugural Oedipal condition for enculturation (ibid.).
28. Lévi-Strauss himself, it should be noted, amended the theories he expounded in the 1940s in his later work.
29. For instance, with new technologies, the question of who is a "mother" becomes more complicated. Stacy Hammons suggests that assisted reproductive technologies have fragmented motherhood into "social," "genetic," and "gestational" (Hammons 2008).
30. In *The Kinning of Foreigners* (2006), for example, anthropologist Signe Howell discusses how notions of child, childhood, and relatedness differ in various social and cultural contexts, and uses the term "kinning" to describe the process through which diverse persons are "made kin" (ibid., xii).

31. For more on Butler's critique of the "quasi-timeless character" of the Lacanian notion of the symbolic order, see *Antigone's Claim* (2000).
32. Lee Edelman, for example, understands queerness as a "pulsating force of negativity" that unravels the identity networks promoted by heteronormative "family values" (2004, 13–7). Moreover, as Suzanna Danuta Walters argues, representations of queer or gay kinship often simply replicate heteronormative ideals of the family, "[painting the traditional picket fence in rainbow hues]." The media-friendly version of the gay family is thus emerging as a "sanitizing counterpart" to gay sexual liberationist images (Walters 2012, 919). It is rare, she argues, for queer lives to be shown as their own stories, "not as assigns of hetero hipness or the decline of western civilization." Those stories do exist, but they have been ghettoized to gay film festivals or gay cable programming. "Gay families," she concludes, exist in a "complicated *context* and we need representations of these multilayered communities: we need images that depict the work that goes into making communities happen" (ibid., 930).
33. As Spillers shows in her analysis of Moynihan's 1965 "Report on the 'Negro family'". In fact, claims Spillers, when the power of the African-American female is described as "matriarchal," it is misnamed, because historically, a captive mother had no right to claim her child, and further, motherhood is a subjugated form of cultural inheritance.
34. In this collection of essays, Walker discusses her "need to know and assimilate the experiences of earlier black women writers" such as Zora Neale Hurston (Walker 1983).
35. Following Angela Davies, Dubey argues that enslaved women were reduced to "compulsory maternity," but the experience of reproduction under these conditions was highly contradictory, as enslaved women's "economic value as a breeder of slaves only reinforced the ideological devaluation of her desire to mother her children" (ibid., 246).
36. Saidiya Hartman, for example, in *Lose Your Mother* (2007), cautions against a romanticized idea of trying to "overcome" the rupture through trying to reassert or re-imagine kin relations. She argues that the quest should be for solidarity and affiliation, rather than "blood or kinship" (ibid., 204).
37. To demonstrate, Dubey quotes Patricia Williams, who writes: "claiming for myself a heritage the weft of whose genesis is my own disinheritance is a profoundly troubling paradox" (Williams 1990, 21).
38. In the essay, Dubey also discusses Jones' poem *Song for Anninho*, published in 1981.

39. Another example of a novel that challenges Oedipal paradigms of generational relations is of course Toni Morrison's *Beloved* (2005). As Marianne Hirsch writes: "In a slave economy in which even one's own body is not one's property, the white masters can rob Sethe of everything, including her mother's milk. It is no surprise, then, that the inhabitants of 124 Bluestone Road do not constitute a nuclear family that might fit Freudian paradigms…Triangles are repeatedly broken up as a fourth term either supplements or replaces the third…In Morrison's novel, the economy of slavery circumscribes not only the process of individuation and subject-formation, but also heightens and intensifies the experience of motherhood – of connection and separation. It raises questions about what it means to have a self and to give that self away. It raises questions about what *family* means and about the ways in which nuclear configurations (dominant in the master culture) prevail as points of reference even in economies in which they are thoroughly distorted and disrupted" (Hirsch1989, 6). For more on maternal genealogies and literature, see Rye (2006).
40. I have discussed the idea of productive repetition, or "repetition with variation" in more detail elsewhere (Browne 2013).

Conclusion: The Politics of Feminist Time

1. Dipesh Chakrabarty similarly argues that modern Western historicism has relied upon a "higher ideal of translatability." On this model, a translation is enabled by the generality or universality of a third term of exchange, which functions as a "supervening, general construction mediating between all particulars on the ground" (ibid., 76). As such, the particulars in question can in principle be rendered commensurate and mutually intelligible, thanks to the universal, mediating language or category. This higher ideal of translatability, Chakrabarty argues, depends ultimately upon a Newtonian ideal of objectivity in which "translation between different languages is mediated by the language of science itself." For example, "*pani*" in Hindi and "water" in English can both be mediated by the universal third term "H20" (ibid., 75). This "third term" of translation is not a category that belongs only to the natural sciences, however, as the scientific model of translation has predominated in the modern social and historical sciences as well. Indeed, Chakrabarty's key argument here is that the homogenous "time of historicism" fulfills a "third term" function within modern historiography and social science that is analogous to that of "H20" in the natural sciences: "The idea of a godless, continuous, empty, and homogenous time, which history shares with the other social sciences and modern political philosophy as a basic building block, belongs to this model of a higher

overarching language. It represents a structure of generality, an aspiration towards the scientific, that is built into conversations that take the modern historical consciousness for granted" (2000, 75–6).

2. Judith Butler builds on this idea, arguing that "such a coalition would have to be modeled on new modes of cultural translation and would be different from appreciating this or that position or asking for recognition in ways that assume that we are all fixed and frozen in our various locations and 'subject-positions'" (2004, 47).

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