

Differentiation in Protest Politics

Participation by Political Insiders and Outsiders

Endre Borbáth^{1,2*}

^{1*}Institute of Sociology, Freie Universität Berlin, Garystraße 55, Berlin, 14195, Germany.

^{2*}Center for Civil Society Research, WZB Berlin Social Science Center, Reichpietschufer 50, Berlin, 10785, Germany.

Corresponding author(s). E-mail(s): endre.borbath@wzb.eu;

Abstract

The political participation literature has documented a long-term trend of the normalization of noninstitutional participation that is often equated with the conventionalization of engagement in protest politics. Less is known on the extent to which noninstitutional forms are differentiated by their mobilization context. Population surveys find it difficult to contextualize individual engagement, and on-site surveys point to effects that are hard to generalize. This study fills this gap by emphasizing differentiation and distinguishing participation according to the issue of engagement. It introduces a conceptual distinction between political insiders and outsiders, defined based on the extent to which they are embedded in the organizational landscape of the dominant cleavage dimension. Using an original survey conducted in Germany during the Covid-19 crisis, the analysis demonstrates that general-population surveys are fit to examine issue-specific participation patterns. The results expose an insider and outsider divide, captured by the effect of attitudinal and behavioral indicators, and demonstrates that the two groups are equally likely to participate in noninstitutional forms. However, insiders engage on the established issues of climate and anti-racism, whereas outsiders engage on the new issues of Covid-19 related economic assistance and civil liberties restrictions. In addition, dynamic models reveal that noninstitutional participation is rooted in volatile issue preferences. Overall, the paper argues that participation during the Covid-19 crisis has furthered the trend towards a differentiated protest arena.

Keywords: Political Participation, Covid-19, Protest, Germany, Political issues, Surveys

1 Introduction

In a seminal contribution published more than forty years ago, Barnes and Kaase (1979) methodologically and substantively initiated the study of European protest with general-population surveys. They coined the term “unconventional” participation to describe various forms of participation outside of voting. However, the label “unconventional” became the most contested part of the study, particularly because participation rates were high across all the forms of protest they examined. In addition, a series of later findings demonstrated that people who protest are politically interested and tend to also vote or otherwise participate in representative channels (Aelst and Walgrave, 2001; Norris et al., 2005; Saunders, 2014; Lahusen and Bleckmann, 2015). As a result, the subsequent literature largely abandoned the label “unconventional” in favor of alternatives such as “noninstitutional” participation (e.g. Hooghe and Marien, 2013). This literature shows that, in advanced democracies, noninstitutional participation by and large became normalized, available in the participation repertoire of a great number of citizens (Meyer and Tarrow, 1998; Borbáth and Gessler, 2020; Oser, 2017, 2021; Jeroense and Spierings, 2022).

Research on the normalization of protest has mostly focused on the extent to which noninstitutional forms became conventionalized, referring to their availability in the participation repertoire of citizens with diverse socio-demographic, ideological and attitudinal backgrounds. Driven by the assumption that people who participate are more likely to see their issue preferences represented in decision-making processes, this perspective focuses on socio-demographic inequalities in participation (e.g. Dalton et al., 2010; Verba et al., 1995). Notwithstanding the importance of conventionalization, another important component of normalization refers to differentiation, namely to the idea that *“protest behavior is employed with greater frequency, by more diverse constituencies, and is used to represent a wider range of claims than ever before”* (Meyer and Tarrow, 1998, p. 4, also see: Rucht & Neidhardt 2002). However, empirical research with general-population surveys has largely abandoned the idea of individual-level differences being a function of the meso-level context of mobilization, leading Kriesi (2008, p. 148) to diagnose an “individualistic bias” in the study of noninstitutional participation. This is not simply a historical oversight: when they describe most of the survey items general-population surveys (still) rely on to measure noninstitutional participation, Barnes and Kaase (1979) explicitly argue that the mobilization context plays little to no role in respondents’ decision to participate (p. 67).

The current paper studies the differentiation of noninstitutional forms of participation by highlighting issue-specific engagement. Asking *to what extent and how do individuals who participate on various issues differ*, the paper makes a substantive and a methodological contribution. Substantively, it introduces the distinction between political insiders and outsiders to show that both groups participate in noninstitutional forms. Methodologically, it illustrates the importance of differentiating participation by the issue context of

engagement using a general-population survey. For this reason, the paper introduces a novel survey item on issues of participation that allows me to examine how individuals who participate in various meso-level mobilization contexts differ. The paper bridges two scholarly traditions: the noninstitutional participation research strand, which uses general-population survey, and the social movement studies tradition that uses on-site surveys. As the analysis demonstrates, the variation both between and within protesting “crowds” can be modeled using general-population surveys. This approach has the advantage that it avoids sampling on the dependent variable and by design includes non-participants, without resorting to additional samples or empirical corrections (Saunders and Shlomo, 2021).

To examine the differentiation of noninstitutional forms of participation, an equally important aspect is leveraging the context in which the survey took place. Societies rarely experience such a radical shift in the issue agenda as the one brought by the Covid-19 pandemic, allowing me to observe how existing participation patterns are altered under the influence of a mostly exogenous stimulus. Taking up noninstitutional participation during the first phase of the crisis (2020-2021) in the case of Germany, the paper benefits from testing the proposed framework in a context in which the issues of participation transform. The new, crisis-related issues are less embedded in the agenda of existing mobilizing actors or partisan identities (e.g. Lehmann and Zehnter, 2022). Therefore, differences in citizens’ participation can capture an issue effect that is less contingent on habitual participation behavior.

As the results show, during the crisis period, the protest arena played a central role in political mobilization. The paper zooms in on the variation between individual participants with various profiles and argues that an insider-outsider divide characterizes participation in non-institutional forms. Issues that have long been mobilized attract “political insiders” who are embedded in the organizational landscape of the dominant cleavage dimension. In contrast, participants on newly mobilized Covid-19 related issues resemble the image of “political outsiders” who exist at the periphery of this organizational landscape. In this regard, the issue of engagement affects the level of participation and explains differences in the profile of participants.

2 Theoretical framework

2.1 Political insiders and outsiders

The study of noninstitutional participation draws on two research traditions. The first uses general-population surveys and emphasizes conventionalization as a key component of normalization. This research tradition shows that those who participate in noninstitutional forms are on average younger, more likely to be male, better educated, more politically interested, somewhat less trusting towards the state than voters, and more ideologically left-wing (e.g. Saunders, 2014; Norris et al., 2005; Lahusen and Bleckmann, 2015; Dalton et al.,

2010; Hooghe and Marien, 2013; Borbáth and Gessler, 2020). The conventionalization literature suggests that some of these differences – particularly the socio-demographic ones – shrink or even disappear over time, as protest becomes normalized and part of the action repertoire of a broad segment of society. As far back as twenty years ago, Aelst and Walgrave (2001) showed that demonstrations had become a form of political participation that is increasingly available to a wide variety of groups. In this context, they introduced the idea of the normalization of protesters and observe that with the partial exception of less affluent people with low education, all social groups were increasingly present in public demonstrations. Looking at Germany, Lahusen and Bleckmann (2015) compared the predictors of participation in lawful demonstrations in 1974/75 using the Barnes and Kaase (1979) dataset with the European Values Study (EVS 1981, 1990, 1999, 2008). In line with the normalization of the protesters hypothesis, they found that educational and class-based inequalities in participation considerably shrunk over time.

The second strand of literature uses on-site surveys and emphasizes differentiation as a key component of normalization. Notwithstanding a trend of conventionalization, the differentiation literature documents how features of the meso-level mobilization context, typically of demonstrations, are associated with enduring attitudinal differences both between (e.g. Daphi et al., 2021; Grasso and Giugni, 2019) and within “crowds” (e.g. Saunders and Shlomo, 2021; Saunders, 2014). The largest effort to comparatively survey demonstration participants has been the “Caught in the act of protest: Contextualizing contestation” research project (CCC, van Stekelenburg et al., 2012). CCC analyzed participation in 71 leftwing demonstrations in Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. Focusing on the distinction between old and new left events, Giugni and Grasso (2019) show that those who demonstrated about old-left (economic) “bread and butter” issues were more likely to come from a working-class background than those who demonstrated about new-left (cultural) issues. The latter group was more likely to be from a more privileged socio-economic background, had a different set of values (Grasso and Giugni, 2019) and was closer to party politics than their old-left counterparts. Exploring the variation within participants in the CCC data, Saunders (2014) showed that participants can be distinguished based on their frequency of participation in demonstrations according to the extent to which they trust and participate in formal institutions and electoral politics. The results demonstrated that – with the partial exception of “stalwarts”, the group that most regularly participated in demonstrations – all others were likely to combine noninstitutional and electoral engagement. In the context of Germany, Daphi et al. (2021) showed variation between crowds of participants in nine different demonstrations, organized from 2003 to 2020. They found two clusters of participants, distinguished by governmental trust, satisfaction with democracy, efficacy, perception of nonrepresented, and nonresponsiveness. Although they do not interpreted their results along

a political insider and outsider divide, these studies showed that politically under-represented groups also participate in noninstitutional forms.

In examining the extent to which there is an emerging insider and outsider divide much depends on how the terms are defined. There are two dominant conceptualizations in the scholarly literature.¹ On the one hand, the political economy tradition uses the insider-outsider distinction to differentiate those in secure employment from the ones who are unemployed, or employed in atypical or precarious jobs (Schwander and Häusermann, 2013). On the other hand, without using the exact terms, the political mobilization literature relies on a similar dichotomous distinction between dominant and challenger parties, depending on whether they have previously been in government or not (de Vries and Hobolt, 2020). Both traditions have in common the focus on the positionality of actors vis-à-vis broader power-dynamics. In the case of individuals' labor market position, the distinction is used to examine the link to established institutions, be that trade unions or political parties, that shield insiders by representing the interests of the group they belong to. In the case of parties, the distinction is used to map the programmatic strategies newcomers employ to innovate and challenge the center (de Vries and Hobolt, 2020, p. 53-58). Newcomers become dominant actors by 'issue-entrepreneurship', introducing new lines of conflict, and transforming existing cleavage structures (also see: Kriesi et al., 2012).

Taking up the idea that actors' positionality vis-à-vis established institutions, and broader societal lines of conflict is a key dimension in protest politics as well (e.g. Hutter, 2014), I propose to distinguish insiders and outsiders on a continuum, according to the extent to which they are embedded in the organizational landscape of the dominant cleavage dimension. "Embedded in" refers to an attitudinal and a behavioral element. In terms of the attitudinal element, I define political insiders as individuals who trust state institutions, and take a moderate position on the primary ideological dimension, away from the extremes. In terms of the behavioral element, I define political insiders as individuals who are being represented by dominant parties, that have previously been in government. I also consider being a member in a dominant civil society organization a component of the behavioral element of being a political insider. Political outsiders are defined in opposition to insiders; they are a group that is typically associated with "exit" instead of "voice" (e.g. Verba et al., 1995).²

Building on the political mobilization literature, I examine the potential of outsiders to challenge the status quo. In the case of political parties, as key agents of conflict mobilization, their outsider potential is manifested in

¹In participation research the terms are sometimes also used to characterize action forms, as a synonym of institutional and noninstitutional participation (e.g. Jeroense and Spierings, 2022). I use them as socio-political attributes of micro-level actors, not as a synonym of their form of participation.

²I employ these terms to capture an empirical distinction, not a normative ideal. Accordingly, I conceptualize the insider-outsider status as context-dependent and acknowledge that in some cases, groups that are from a normative standpoint ideologically radical, might become political insiders.

challenger mobilization. In contrast, individuals, who resemble outsiders, only challenge the system when they are politically mobilized. It is an open empirical question whether outsiders participate as challengers or become politically alienated, with an unmobilized ‘challenger potential’. Following the perspective of differentiation in protest politics, I expect that political outsiders rely on noninstitutional forms to voice their grievances on issues important to them. This challenges the dominant view of normalization as conventionalization, and emphasizes the diversity of protest participants, where next to insiders, outsiders also participate. Accordingly, I formulate the first hypothesis as:

Hypothesis 1

Political outsiders participate in forms of noninstitutional participation to a similar extent as political insiders.

2.2 The Covid-19 crisis and issue-specific engagement as the missing link

The dominant perspective of activity-, instead of actor-centered participation research (Oser, 2017, 2021), shifts the focus away from variation in the profile of protest participants. Re-focusing on the issue on which individuals participate enables formulating expectations on differentiated participation by political insiders and outsiders. In this regard, the current section introduces and applies the distinction between established and new issues to Germany’s protest arena. While the set of issues that emerge as established or new is specific to this context, the underlying logic travels to other arenas of participation (e.g. electoral or institutional forms), as well as to alternative geographical, or temporal contexts. Issues of mobilization provide the missing link between micro and meso level features, and give an opportunity to integrate some of the insights of the literature on protest event analysis in individual participation research (e.g. Fisher et al., 2019; Hutter, 2014; Hutter and Borbáth, 2019; Kriesi et al., 2012).

From a long-term perspective, protest in Western Europe went through a transformation when new social movements rose in the second half of the 1970s and has since been the home arena of progressive mobilization on cultural issues (Hutter, 2014; Hutter and Borbáth, 2019). Germany is a case that is emblematic of the transformation, with the overwhelming majority of protest events being organized on so-called “cultural” issues (Hutter, 2014, p. 102). In particular, mobilization on two issues stands out. The first of these is climate protection, which goes back to the anti-nuclear movement in Western Germany (Rucht, 1990), and the second is anti-racism/ immigration, the main issue in protest after re-unification (Hutter, 2014, p. 107). These two issues – climate protection and anti-racism – are established issues, with continuing mobilization during the pandemic by contemporary movements such as Fridays for Future, or Black Lives Matter.

Notwithstanding this long-term perspective, the short-term dynamics of the Covid-19 crisis represent an apparent rupture. On the one hand, due to the institutional measures introduced to fight the pandemic and new social norms around contact restrictions, demonstrations in public spaces became difficult and not always allowed. In this regard, the crisis is expected to halt political participation. On the other hand, new and unprecedented rules regulating working from home, traveling, shopping, and many other areas of daily life were adopted to curb the rate of infections. The adoption of these rules led to a democratic dilemma (Engler et al., 2021) that created new types of grievances and allowed political entrepreneurs to mobilize in noninstitutional forms. From this perspective, rather than representing a halt in political participation, the crisis may have led to further conflict and mobilization.

The pandemic radically altered the issue agenda by bringing the twin issues of public health and economic assistance to the fore (Borbáth et al., 2021). There was a gradual shift in health-related engagement during the crisis, from an expression of solidarity with the medical community to engagement by those opposing the restrictions on civil liberties introduced to curb the infection rate. In Germany, the so-called Querdenker demos regularly made headlines with their opposition to restrictions on freedom and denial of the threat of the pandemic. Engagement related to economic assistance, resulting from the shutdown of the economy in the wake of the crisis, range from demanding direct financial support from the state to demands for a loosening of the lockdown rules to allow firms to re-open.

The two sets of issues – restrictions on freedom and economic assistance – are not equally new in the field of protest politics. As far as protection against the economic fallout is concerned, this represents a continuation of existing struggles against the separation of state and market. Similar connections are less clear-cut in the case of protest against the freedom restrictions mobilizing the grievances that the new rules of restrictions created. Freedom restriction protests are largely unprecedented, and mostly explained by the emergency rules adopted to curb the Covid-19 infection rates (Grande et al., 2021). Existing findings on participation in these protests show that participants are increasingly on the right and are differentiated by their strong belief in various conspiracy theories. At the same time, they often do not vote for radical right parties like the AfD or even do not vote at all (Grande et al., 2021). This points towards the importance of issues in explaining differential participation by political insiders/ outsiders. Accordingly, my second hypothesis concerns continuity of insider participation on established issues, and mobilized outsider participation on the new, Covid-19 related issues:

Hypothesis 2

Political insiders are more likely to participate in forms of noninstitutional participation on established issues such as anti-racism and environmental protection, whereas political outsiders are more likely to participate on new issues such as protests against the restrictions on freedom.

As a mechanism explaining differential participation, I highlight the role of issue preferences. In their comprehensive model of protest participation, Rucht and Neidhardt (2002) identify the formation of “movement milieus” brought about by a trend of individualization and modernization as the main driving force behind differentiation in protest politics. At the micro level, their model identifies issue preferences that stand for politically interpreted grievances. However, micro-level preferences and grievances are affected by context level features (Grasso and Giugni, 2016) and potentially change over time. By not linking participation to its meso-level context of mobilization, existing studies generally miss the dynamic of within-individual change over time, and instead assume that the individual-level propensity to protest stays constant (with some exceptions, e.g.: Finkel and Muller, 1998).

Yet, if we wish to disentangle the mechanism behind issue-specific participation, change over time may be important. Participation is potentially driven by both the changing dynamic of issue-specific preferences/discontent and by the fact that certain issues are particularly mobilizing because they resonate with the identity of a specific milieu (Rucht and Neidhardt, 2002). The normative and political implications of the difference are considerable: if noninstitutional participation is also rooted in issue preferences, in addition to group identities, protest can potentially act as a retrospective accountability mechanism that develops in reaction to governmental decisions (Altiparmakis and Lorenzini, 2018; Grasso and Giugni, 2016).

The latter interpretation is consistent with an instrumental, rational choice model, where one of the central components of the individual level calculus of participation is grievances related to the provision of collective goods. However, grievances are assumed to not carry much explanatory power due to their relative over time stability (Jenkins, 1983, p. 530). Part of the reason why grievances appear constant might be explained by their operationalization, that often relies on encompassing indicators, such as satisfaction with the government, democracy, or a scale of multiple policy preferences (e.g. Bäck et al., 2011; Finkel and Muller, 1998). Compared to earlier studies, the Covid-19 crisis, during which a combination of lockdowns and easing of restrictions followed each other in quick succession and unprecedented policies were implemented, provides the ideal context to leverage the dynamic of volatile preferences on specific issues and examine the extent to which they result in varying levels of noninstitutional participation. Contrary to discourses that often exclusively associate protest participation during the Covid-19 crisis with citizens being embedded in a specific milieu, I hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 3

Issue preferences explain noninstitutional participation by the same individual over time.

3 Methodological approaches and data sources

3.1 Methodological challenges in studying noninstitutional participation

In the previous section, I reviewed the main substantive results of studying non-institutional participation with general-population surveys and social movement mobilization with on-site surveys. The current section systematically compares them from a methodological perspective.

In their *empirical scope*, the two are complementary: General-population surveys are best fit to study the distinction between participants and nonparticipants, whereas on-site surveys are designed to capture differences between participants. In general-population surveys, those who participate in noninstitutional forms are “rare cases”. For instance, only three European countries report shares of people who demonstrated in the last 12 months of above 10 percent (Italy, France, and Spain; on average across the 1-9 European Social Survey—ESS waves). With a typical sample size of around 1000, this leaves a sample of 100 demonstrators, a number too small to reliably capture differences among participants. As a partial solution, researchers often construct a scale of noninstitutional participation and lump together participation across different forms (e.g. Hooghe and Marien, 2013). However, forms that vary in contentiousness might have different predictors that potentially undermine the estimation strategy. On-site surveys solve this by sampling only those who participate in demonstrations. While such samples reflect the diversity of demonstrating crowds, they are not fit to compare between participants with nonparticipants and between participants in different forms.

The two approaches differ in their sampling frame: general-population surveys aim to represent the socio-demographic characteristics of the society from which respondents are sampled, while on-site surveys aim to represent participants of the demonstration during which respondents are sampled. The demonstrations studied are not randomly selected: They are larger events in bigger cities that are easier to access for research purposes. In addition, on-site surveys face the problem of differential nonresponse—participants in right-wing rallies are less likely to answer the survey (Daphi et al., 2015). Given these biases, on-site surveys are limited in their capacity to represent the dynamic in the protest arena as a whole.

The two approaches also differ in how data is collected and the *context of the interview*. Whereas in on-site surveys, respondents are interviewed during a political act (demonstration), interviews in general-population surveys are undertaken outside of such a context. As Saunders (2014, p. 586-587) argues, the different contextuality might result in over-reporting of some of the political variables in on-site surveys, for instance, correlates of political interest.

In general-population surveys, the *time horizon* of individual survey items plays a crucial role. These surveys offer no direct information on the mobilization context, the temporal anchor in the survey item is the only way to

match individual behavior to its context of mobilization. However, the main comparative general-population surveys make different choices in this regard. While some include a time reference – they ask respondents whether they have engaged in various noninstitutional participation forms – others include no time reference and thus render it impossible to include contextual factors based on the time of the reported behavior. These are highly influential choices, since as Robison et al. (2018) demonstrates, large comparative surveys set the agenda of participation research for decades. On-site surveys only face a similar issue when they ask respondents to recall how often they had participated in previous demonstrations. While similar recall items are to some extent biased, they allow researchers to compare first-time, regular, and occasional participants (e.g. Saunders, 2014; Giugni and Grasso, 2019; Verhulst and Walgrave, 2009), and zoom in on an empirical dimension that is difficult to capture with general-population surveys.

In general-population surveys, one can only indirectly infer what networks respondents are most likely embedded in and what type of issues they are likely to get engaged in based on individual-level features. In this regard, left-right self-placement and organizational membership might serve as valid proxies. In contrast, on-site surveys have the critical advantage of directly observing features such as the issue or the mobilization network, even if they have difficulty surveying right-wing events. As the discussion shows, the two approaches make different methodological choices with distinct advantages and disadvantages. To summarize, Table 1 lists how the two differ along the dimensions discussed above.

Table 1 Two methodological approaches in the study of political participation

	General-population surveys	On-site surveys
Empirical scope	Distinction between participants and nonparticipants	Distinction between participants
Unit of analysis	Survey respondents, nested in a country/year context	Survey respondents, nested in an event in a country/year context
Sampling frame	General population	Participants in a particular event
Context of the interview	Devoid of context	Context of a political act
Time-horizon	Specified (e.g. last 12 months) or unspecified (throughout the life course)	Recall of retrospective participation (in previous events)
Issue of mobilization	Typically indirectly inferred: e.g. left-right self-placement of the respondent	Directly observed from meso and event-level features
Network of mobilization	Typically indirectly inferred: e.g. organizational membership of respondents	Directly observed from meso and event-level features
Form of participation	Extensive lists of various forms	Public demonstrations

3.2 Combining the best of both worlds: a novel survey item

In the current section, I introduce my methodological approach and the survey items I rely on. The questionnaire aims to bring the advantages of onsite surveys to a representative general-population survey to bridge the two methodological traditions of political participation research. The survey has been designed and implemented in the context of the research project Civil Society Potentials: Solidarity in Crisis Management (SolZiv),³ funded by the Berlin University Alliance.

The survey was conducted among members in an online access panel in Germany between October 14 and November 4, 2020 with respondents recruited by the survey company *Respondi*. The data was collected with quotas for age, gender, education, and region (east-west), based on official statistics from Eurostat for 2020 and is representative of 18- to 69-year-old German residents.⁴ We aimed to collect a large sample to be able to study differences both between nonparticipants and participants, as well as among participants. In total, the sample includes 3330 respondents. Four months later, between March 2 and March 11, 2021, 1004 respondents were re-interviewed in a panel design.⁵ We applied the same quotas to ensure that the re-interviewed respondents were representative in terms of age, gender, education, and region. In addition, I relied on nonresponse weights to ensure that the re-interviewed sub-sample did not significantly differ from the original sample. Appendix D includes further information on the weighing procedure.

Early on in the survey, respondents were asked to recall the time frame between the first lockdown in March 2020 and the survey interview.⁶ Then, they were asked to indicate their frequency of engagement using a five-point scale: 1) Never; 2) Rarely; 3) Sometimes; 4) Often; 5) Very often. Appendix C presents the exact formulation of all survey items, but the listed forms of political engagement were: 1) public protest activity; 2) illegal public protest activity; 3) online protest activity (i.e., digital protest); 4) posting about politics online; 5) signing a petition; 6) contacting a politician; 7) activities of political parties; or 8) other forms.

I follow the definition of noninstitutional participation as set out by Hooghe and Marien (2013, p. 139, also see Barnes and Kaase 1979), according to which these forms are “*used predominantly by nonelite actors, in order to challenge the political elite or to gain access to the political agenda*”. In contrast, institutional forms are “*defined and organized by members of the political*

³Potenziale der Zivilgesellschaft: Solidarisches Verhalten bei der Krisenbewältigung - <https://solziv.blog/>

⁴I additionally also weight the analysis for these variables since not all quotas were perfectly matched during data collection.

⁵In the second round of data collection we aimed to collect a random sample of about a thousand respondents, thus the reduction in the size of the sample is by design, not only due to panel attrition.

⁶In the second round of data collection, both items are repeated in a slightly modified form. Instead of asking respondents to recall the period from March to October 2020, they are asked to indicate their level of engagement from November 2020 up to the interview in March 2021.

elite (most notably political parties)". Although, institutional and noninstitutional forms are often combined (e.g. Jeroense and Spierings, 2022; Oser, 2017, 2021), numerous empirical analysis (among others by Hooghe and Marien, 2013) demonstrates that they are associated with different predictors and as van Deth (2014) argues, represent theoretically distinct modes of participation. Following the Hooghe and Marien (2013) operationalization, I rely on the first five forms as indicators and exclude "contacting a politician", "party activities", and "other forms". Figure 1 in Appendix A shows the level of participation in noninstitutional forms.

In a second follow-up question, respondents were asked to indicate the issue on which they got politically engaged. The question was posed to all respondents who answered that they took part in any of the above forms. The respondents could select issues on which they got engaged from a closed list of the ones that dominated protest during this period: 1) against racism; 2) for climate protection; 3) against limitations to freedom due to the coronavirus crisis; 4) for governmental economic help due to the coronavirus crisis; 5) other issues.⁷ The item allowed selecting multiple issues. The handful of issues do not aim to be representative of all issues that potentially motivate noninstitutional participation. They were selected to represent the most prominent issues on which the highest number of participants were engaged in protest in Germany right before and during the Covid-19 crisis. Figure 1 shows its distribution both in the overall sample and among participants in noninstitutional forms.

In line with the normalization perspective, engagement levels between March and October 2020 were relatively high: 44 percent of German society was politically engaged in some form. The most prevalent is engagement for climate protection, followed by engagement against racism. The share of the latter reflected recurring engagement on immigration as well as on the Black Lives Matter protests. Beyond these two established issues, there was relatively high engagement on the two new issues related to the Covid-19 pandemic. Roughly a fifth of those who participated were engaged in protesting against restrictions on civil liberties or for economic assistance.

From this data structure I constructed three dependent variables that I relied on in the different types of analysis. Firstly, to test H_1 , I focused on the driving forces of participation. I took up the idea from the literature using on-site surveys on structural differences between participants based on the frequency of their participation and distinguished between overall participants and regular participants. Overall participation was a dichotomous measure, distinguishing those who participate in at least one of the five noninstitutional forms, whereas regular participation distinguished those who "often" or "very often" participated in any of these five forms. Secondly, to test H_2 , I moved away from the forms of participation and relied on latent class analysis of the different issues of participation (for recent applications of LCA in political participation research in Europe see: Jeroense and Spierings, 2022, and Oser,

⁷Other issues are excluded from the analysis, since they constitute a "class" of their own, outside of the focus of the current paper.




Fig. 1 Issues of noninstitutional participation

Note: Issues of engagement are not mutually exclusive – a respondent could indicate participation on more than one issue. Results are based on the first wave, weighted by the socio-demographic weight.

2021 in the US). Following a one-step approach, I estimated a latent class model with covariates (Bolck et al., 2004). Thirdly, to test H_3 , I utilized the second wave of the data collection and conducted a series of logistic regression models with individual fixed effects, where the dependent variable is dichotomous issue-specific participation, estimated for noninstitutional participation for climate protection, against racism, against limitations on freedom, and for governmental economic help.

The key independent variables referred to the operationalization of the insider-outsider status, distinguished according to the extent to which they are embedded in the organizational landscape of the dominant cleavage dimension. For the attitudinal dimension, I rely on two indicators: 1. trust in state institutions (5 points), and 2. extremism of the left-right position. I rely on left-right as a heuristic, super-issue which summarizes positions on multiple dimensions (Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976).⁸ The indicator for extremism is the squared term of the mean-centered left-right scale.⁹ For the behavioral dimension, I also rely on two indicators: 1. vote choice (CDU/CSU as the reference category); 2. membership of civil society organizations (9 points). Based

⁸As appendix B demonstrates, attitudes on the economic and on the cultural dimensions are similarly important in driving the ideological effects that the analysis uncovers.

⁹Centering is applied for conceptual and empirical reasons. Conceptually, it reflects the context-dependent nature of ideological positioning, and extremism. Empirically, it is necessary to have similarly high values for extremism for those on the right (positive values), and on the left (negative values).

on the vote choice question, in which respondents were asked to identify a party he/she would vote for if national elections were taking place next Sunday, I construct a dichotomous indicator for being represented by a dominant party. The indicator takes the value of one for parties that have previously been part of the federal government, such as CDU/CSU, SPD, B90/Grüne, FDP; and a value of zero for challenger parties, such as the AfD, die Linke, another party, or nonvoting.¹⁰ For membership of dominant civil society organizations, I calculated the number of organizations the respondents indicates that they have been a member of, from a list of nine organizations, excluding “patriotic alliances” and “other types of organizations” (also see Appendix C).¹¹

A second set of independent variables refers to issue preferences. Respondents were asked to indicate how concerned they are about the protection of the environment (3 points scale) and how much they agreed with the statement “Increasing diversity is threatening life in Germany in general” (5 points scale). They were also asked two positional questions to indicate to what extent the policies implemented 1) to overcome the health risks of the Covid-19 crisis and 2) to overcome the economic consequences of the Covid-19 crisis were insufficient or too extreme (5 points scale).¹² As control variables I included factors that the literature identified as potentially important in distinguishing protesters, such as political interest (4 points), left-right position (11 points), and socio-demographic characteristics. The latter includes age, age squared, having gone through higher education (2 points), subjective income (4 points), the type of residence (reference category: big cities) Depending on the model, I also controlled for the forms of participation.

Since the general-population survey the analysis relies on has both the form as well as the issue of participation, with a large-N, it allowed me to overcome some of the methodological challenges identified in the previous section. It combines the advantages of on-site surveys with those of general-population surveys by: 1) including information on the issues on which respondents are mobilized; 2) including a specified time horizon during which engagement takes place; 3) providing a scale of the frequency of participation. At the same time, some of the drawbacks of on-site surveys are avoided: 1) the results are generalizable to the protest arena during this period; 2) the interview takes place in a nonpoliticized context; 3) the forms of participation are allowed to vary beyond public demonstrations.

¹⁰The results are also presented with a differentiated vote choice indicator, see appendix B.

¹¹The empirical results are robust to the inclusion of these two types of organizations, they are excluded for not being dominant civil society organizations in Germany, during this period.

¹²I reverse the scale of climate concerns, attitude towards diversity, and the economic measures.

4 Empirical results

4.1 Participation by political insiders and outsiders

To test the extent to which political insiders and outsiders participate (H_1), I construct two logistic regression models where overall and regular participation are the dependent variables. The key independent variables are the indicators of insider/ outsider status. The model also controls for political interest and the socio-demographic factors previously listed. Figure 2 shows the results, with coefficients presented as odds ratios.




Fig. 2 Participation in noninstitutional forms during the Covid-19 crisis in Germany
Note: Dependent variables: overall participation & regular (often/ very often) participation. See the corresponding regression model included in Appendix A, Table 1. The thicker error bars represent 90 percent confidence intervals, the thinner error bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Results are based on the first wave, weighted by the socio-demographic weight.

As the results show, the four different indicators of political insider and outsider status vary in their effect on noninstitutional participation. Those who trust the state less and identify with more extreme left-right positions appear to be more likely to participate, indicating a presence of political outsiders in noninstitutional participation. At the same time, the effect of organizational membership points towards the prevalence of political insiders in noninstitutional forms: the probability to participate significantly increases the more organizations the respondent belongs to. Being represented by a dominant

party has no identifiable effect on overall participation, voters of these parties as well as nonvoters or voters of challenger parties are equally likely to participate. At the same time, this is the main difference between overall and regular participants: among regular participants there is a higher share of outsiders, in terms of nonvoters or voters of all challenger parties (see appendix B, table & figure 7). In line with the conventionalization perspective, socio-demographic factors play little to no role in explaining participation in noninstitutional forms or in differentiating regular participants.¹³

Based on this model, the predicted probability to participate for a political insider who trusts the state (90th percentile), takes a moderate ideological position (10th percentile), is represented by a dominant party, and is a member in two civil organizations (90th percentile) is 52.8 percent.¹⁴ In contrast, the predicted probability to participate for a political outsider who does not trust the state (10th percentile), identifies with the extremes on the left-right scale (90th percentile), is not represented by a dominant party, and is not a member of a civil society organizations (10th percentile) is 49.8 percent. These results show that both groups participate to a similar extent in noninstitutional forms, which I take as evidence for H₁.

4.2 Issue specific engagement

As I argued in the previous sections, to the extent that political insiders and outsiders participate on different issues, issue-specific engagement provides the missing link in explaining their presence in noninstitutional forms. To examine differentiation in terms of issue-specific engagement and test H₂, I constructed a latent class model based on the four issues that the survey distinguishes. In this analysis, I exclude nonparticipants and narrow the sample to those who have participated in noninstitutional forms. I select a model with two classes following the Bayesian Information Criterion and other indicators of model fit, as shown by Figure 5, Appendix A. Figure 3 shows the probability of participation on the different issues, conditional on the class the respondent belongs to.

As the figure shows, participation for climate protection clusters together with participation against racism. At the same time, participation on the Covid-19 related economic assistance clusters together with participation against restrictions on freedom. There is little overlap between the issues on which the two groups participates, with the partial exception of participation for Covid-19 related economic assistance. Those who participate on the established issues of climate protection and against racism to a limited extent also protest for economic assistance. However, to a lower extent than those who participate against the restrictions on freedom. In this regard, the results

¹³I also ran the analysis by differentiating between participants in the five noninstitutional forms, included in Appendix B. Although the effect sizes differ, they mostly show a similar pattern to the one presented here. Those who participate in what they themselves consider illegal protests are the most different and the least “normalized”: in their case, socio-demographic differences are also observed (older, men without higher education and a lower income), they are right-wing and trust the state more.

¹⁴With all other control variables at their mean/ reference category




Fig. 3 Conditional probabilities of the two-class LCA model

Note: Issue specific engagement as a function of the class respondents' belong to. See the LCA model fit information with various classes in Appendix A, Figure 5.

underscore the distinction between established and new issues. Based on the model predictions for the sample, 58.8 percent of noninstitutional participants engaged on the established issues (class 1), and 41.2 percent of noninstitutional participants engaged on new issues (class 2).

In the next step, I include covariates for membership in the two different classes, and re-estimate the model. To test H_2 , I include the indicators of political insider/ outsider status, issue preferences, forms of participation, political interest and socio-demographic controls. The dependent variable is belonging to the class of new issue participants, as compared to belonging to the class of established issue participants. I ran two logistic regression models, the first one with the dichotomous measure of being represented by a dominant party, the second one with a differentiated vote choice indicator. Figure 4 shows the results.

In line with my expectations and H_2 , political insiders, with a higher degree of trust in the state, moderate left-right positions, membership in civil society organizations, and preference for dominant parties – in particular the Greens and the SPD – are more likely to participate on established issues. In contrast, political outsiders, with a lower level of trust in the state, more extreme left-right positions, lack of membership in civil society organizations, and preference for nonvoting or for voting for challengers like the AfD/ Linke are more likely to participate on new issues. These results indicate that in line with H_2 political insiders and outsiders engage on different issues.¹⁵

¹⁵ As Appendix B shows, the hypothesis test is robust to specifying separate logit models per issue of participation instead of a latent class model.




Fig. 4 Latent class analysis of individual differences in issue-specific participation

Note: Dependent variable: membership in the class of new issue participants (ref: established issue participants). Controls for the form of engagement. See the full regression in Appendix A, Table 2. The error bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals.

Beyond the political insider/ outsider divide, the cross-individual variance confirms that noninstitutional participation is rooted in issue preferences. The corresponding issues preferences are significant predictors of class membership: climate concerns and diversity for participation on established issues, health measures and economic concerns for participation on the new issues. Socio-demographic differences do not differentiate between the two classes, except those who engage on the established issues of climate protection and against racism tend to be somewhat younger, than those who engage on the new Covid-19 related issues. The forms of participation are by and large balanced across the different issues (also see Figure 2, Appendix A) and equally present in the participation repertoire of the two classes, although those who engage on the established issues are more likely to sign petitions than the ones who engage on the new issues.

4.3 The dynamic of engagement

To examine the extent to which engagement is rooted in more volatile issue preferences in addition to long-standing identities, I turn to the dynamic component of the analysis. Figure 5 shows that on the aggregate level in the two waves of data collection, the level of engagement in noninstitutional forms stays remarkably stable, despite more stringent rules being introduced between November 2020 and March 2021 than they were in place during the late spring and summer in 2020.




Fig. 5 Issue-specific engagement over time in noninstitutional forms

Note: The shares reflect the level of engagement in the overall sample. Results are based on the first & second waves, weighted by the socio-demographic and nonresponse weights.

Only against restrictions on freedom there is a slight increase in political engagement. The most significant decline is in engagement against racism, and for climate protection reflecting the shift in the protest agenda that the Covid-19 crisis brought. Nevertheless, the level of change on all issues is minimal, and overall political participation only marginally declines, from 44 percent in the first wave to 41 percent in the second wave.

However, the aggregate level of stability does not necessarily imply the lack of individual-level change. To examine changing levels of participation and test H_3 , I model issue-specific engagement with individual fixed effects. The fixed-effects model accounts for observed and unobserved cross-individual heterogeneity and allows me to isolate the role of change in issue preferences

in driving engagement, net of differences in long-standing political identities and organizational embeddedness. To do so, the model only considers individuals with over time change and controls for the time changing factors of political interest, left-right self-placement, and trust in the state. The model is separately estimated for engagement on the four different issues. Figure 6 presents the results.




Fig. 6 Fixed effects model of issue-specific engagement

Note: Dependent variables: noninstitutional participation on specific issues. Controls for political interest, left-right self-placement, and trust in the state. See the corresponding regression model included in Appendix A, Table 3. The thicker error bars represent 90 percent confidence intervals, the thinner error bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals.

As the results show, issue preferences – particularly regarding the policies implemented in the context of the Covid-19 crisis – play an essential role in explaining within-individual change over time. A shift in the direction of seeing the rules to protect public health as too extreme is associated with engagement against the restrictions on freedom. A shift in the other direction, towards seeing these rules as not going far enough, is associated with increased

engagement against racism. Preferences regarding economic issues shows a similar effect on engagement: those who shift towards seeing them as not going far enough are increasingly engaged for economic assistance. A shift towards seeing them as too restrictive is associated with engagement against racism. Although, preferences on diversity and the climate are more stable over time (see Appendix A, Figure 4), a shift towards a stronger disagreement with the idea that diversity is threatening life in Germany is associated with higher engagement with climate protection and being more worried about the climate leads to lower engagement against racism. This result highlights once more the strong inter-relationship between engagement on climate protection and against racism. I take the overall pattern as evidence for H₃ on the role of issue preferences in driving political engagement, especially on Covid-19 specific issues.

5 Conclusions

The paper bridges the noninstitutional participation research strand with the social movement studies tradition by examining individual-level participation as a function of the issue of engagement, using a representative general-population survey. It makes a substantive and a methodological innovation. Substantively, the paper introduces the conceptual distinction between political insiders and outsiders, differentiated by the extent to which they are embedded in the organizational landscape of the dominant cleavage dimension. Using the dichotomy, it shows that outsiders participate in protest politics, but on different issues than insiders. I consider the analytical distinction between political insiders and outsiders to travel beyond the protest arena, and allow to examine electoral or other forms of participation as well. Methodologically, it utilizes a new survey item to examine issue-specific engagement and to link individual-level behavior with the meso-level supply of mobilization. The context of the Covid-19 crisis allows me to map engagement on previously nonexistent issues, where habitual participation behavior linked to partisan identities and membership in networks of mobilization play a less clear-cut role.

The results show that political insiders – who trust the state institutions, take moderate ideological positions, are represented by dominant parties with government experience, and belong to civil society organizations – participate on the established issues of climate protection and anti-racism. Political outsiders – who trust the state less, take more extreme ideological positions, are nonvoters or voters of challenger parties, and are less embedded in civil society organizations – are particularly likely to engage on the new Covid-19-related issues, especially against restrictions on civil liberties. The paper demonstrates that noninstitutional engagement is rooted in the dynamic of issue preferences. In this regard, protest participation serves as an accountability mechanism in time periods between elections, and it also allows nonvoters to voice their concerns.

The perspective on the protest arena presented in this paper, namely that differentiated groups of individuals participate as a result of issue-specific mobilization, challenges a narrow understanding of normalization equated with conventionalization (e.g. Aelst and Walgrave, 2001; Lahusen and Bleckmann, 2015). At the same time, seen more generally, the Covid-19 crisis furthers the trend of normalization by providing an opportunity for political outsiders to participate in noninstitutional forms. The increasing differentiation between insiders and outsiders drives normalization to the extent that it encourages new, previously less involved participants to protest (e.g., supporters of challenger/ populist parties). However, future research should examine whether the protest arena can integrate participants with vastly different profiles and demands, or if a deep political-insider and outsider divide will emerge, resulting in “bubbles of engagement” with little interaction between participants on different issues. The empirical finding that those who protest on the new issues are often driven by grievances that are directly opposed with the grievances of those protesting established issues suggests that Covid-19-related opposition feeds into the broader dynamic of transformation of cleavage structures in Germany. In that regard, one could expect the identities formed in opposition to Covid-19 policies to structure political participation in years to come.

Supplementary information. The replication material for the empirical analysis is available at: <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/IBZAOJ>

Acknowledgments. I would like to thank Gesine Höltnann, Swen Hutter, Heike Klüver, Raphaël Létourneau, members of the SolZiv project, members of the Civil Society Research Center of the WZB Berlin Social Science Center, members of the OSI Brown Bag colloquium of the Freie Universität Berlin, members of the Berlin-Brandenburg Political Behavior colloquium, and the three anonymous reviewers who improved the manuscript with their valuable feedback. I would also like to acknowledge financial support from the Volkswagen Foundation and the Berlin University Alliance.

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Appendix - Differentiation in Protest Politics Participation by Political Insiders and Outsiders


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The replication material is available at: <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/IBZAOJ>

Appendix A: Additional figures and tables


Descriptive figures

Figure 1: Forms of participation in Germany




Note: Forms of engagement are not mutually exclusive – a respondent could indicate participation in more than one form. Regular engagement shows the share of those who indicate that they participated in the respective form 'often' or 'very often'. Results are based on the first wave, weighted by the socio-demographic weight.

Figure 2: Relative share of issues within different forms of participation




Note: The different issues do not add up to 100% within engagement forms because issues and forms of engagement are not mutually exclusive – the same respondent could indicate participation on more than one issue and in more than one form. Results are based on the first wave, weighted by the socio-demographic weight.

Figure 3: Membership in civil society organizations



Note: The arrows show the percentage of members in civil society organizations among those who get engaged on the various issues. The reference value is the overall percentage of members among those who are politically engaged. Results are based on the first wave, weighted by the socio-demographic weight.

Figure 4: Distribution of policy evaluations in the two waves. Results are based on the first & second waves, weighted by the socio-demographic and nonresponse weights.



Other tables and figures referenced in the main text

Table 1: Individual-level differences in participation in noninstitutional forms

	Participation	Regular Participation
Intercept	0.41 (0.42)	−2.03 (0.60)***
Insiders - outsiders		
Trust in state	−0.15 (0.04)***	−0.13 (0.06)*
Sq(L-R scale)	0.03 (0.01)***	0.04 (0.01)***
Dominant party	−0.09 (0.08)	−0.34 (0.12)**
Organisational membership	0.46 (0.05)***	0.42 (0.05)***
Pol. controls		
Political interest	0.53 (0.05)***	0.70 (0.07)***
L-R scale	−0.05 (0.02)*	0.07 (0.03)**
Socio-demographics		
Age	−0.07 (0.02)***	−0.05 (0.03)*
Sq(Age)	0.00 (0.00)*	0.00 (0.00)
High education	−0.03 (0.09)	0.16 (0.13)
Female	0.08 (0.08)	0.07 (0.12)
Income	0.08 (0.05)	−0.01 (0.08)
Mid. town (ref: big city)	−0.13 (0.10)	0.16 (0.14)
Small town	−0.26 (0.10)*	−0.34 (0.16)*
Countryside	−0.30 (0.11)**	−0.27 (0.16)
McFadden Sq(R)	0.09	0.14
AIC	4115.83	2248.42
BIC	4207.47	2340.06
Num. obs.	3325	3325

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$. Results are based on the first wave, weighted by the socio-demographic weight.

Figure 5: LCA model fit with various classes




Table 2: Logistic Coefficient Estimates for Latent Class Analysis

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coef	SE	Coef	SE
Intercept	-0.04**	(0.01)	-0.01	(0.02)
Insiders - outsiders				
Trust in state	-0.83***	(0.19)	-0.85***	(0.18)
Sq(L-R scale)	-0.07**	(0.03)	-0.05*	(0.02)
Org. Membership	-0.4**	(0.15)	-0.41**	(0.15)
Dominant party	-1.54***	(0.31)		
Parties (ref: CDU/CSU)				
NA/DK			1.17***	(0.33)
SPD			-1.35***	(0.25)
B90/Grüne			-0.95***	(0.05)
Linke			0.76*	(0.34)
FDP			0.01	(0.24)
AfD			0.82*	(0.38)
Other party			-0.19**	(0.06)
Issue preferences				
Climate concerns	-1.68***	(0.26)	-1.69***	(0.25)
Diversity	-0.56***	(0.15)	-0.61***	(0.15)
Health measures	0.87***	(0.17)	0.80***	(0.17)
Economic measures	0.39**	(0.15)	0.35*	(0.15)
Forms of participation				
Public demo.	0.29	(0.27)	0.35	(0.27)
Online demo.	0.05	(0.21)	-0.04	(0.21)
Posting online	0.13	(0.16)	0.18	(0.16)
Petitions	-0.58***	(0.17)	-0.51**	(0.16)
Illegal demo.	-0.2	(0.20)	-0.18	(0.21)
Socio-demographics and controls				
Political interest	0.36	(0.19)	0.32	(0.20)
L-R scale	0.48***	(0.10)	0.36***	(0.09)
Age	0.16***	(0.05)	0.12**	(0.05)
Sq(Age)	0.01**	(0.01)	0.01*	(0.01)
High educ.	0.40	(0.30)	0.36	(0.30)
Female	0.27	(0.30)	0.29	(0.30)
Income	0.23	(0.18)	0.24	(0.18)
Mid. town (ref: big city)	-0.48	(0.26)	-0.43	(0.28)
Small town	0.20	(0.26)	0.30	(0.26)
Countryside	0.30	(0.25)	0.44	(0.27)

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table 3: Fixed effects model of issue specific participation

	Climate Protection	Against Racism	COVID-19 Economy	COVID-19 Freedom
Issue positions				
Climate worries	0.24 (0.37)	-1.23 (0.51)*	-0.08 (0.49)	0.73 (0.43)
Diversity	0.65 (0.29)*	-0.23 (0.36)	0.39 (0.30)	-0.15 (0.33)
Health measures	-0.62 (0.31)	-0.63 (0.33)	-0.37 (0.28)	0.54 (0.27)*
Econ. measures	-0.39 (0.30)	-1.29 (0.34)***	0.88 (0.29)**	0.07 (0.25)
Attitudes (controls)				
Pol. interest	-0.43 (0.43)	-1.39 (0.55)*	-1.10 (0.63)	1.13 (0.59)
L-R position	-0.16 (0.21)	-0.06 (0.23)	0.61 (0.30)*	0.74 (0.29)*
Trust in state	0.20 (0.31)	-0.50 (0.40)	0.80 (0.50)	-0.34 (0.40)
Log Likelihood	-17619	-12642	-10378	-10028
Deviance	352.38	252.84	207.55	200.57
Num. obs.	264	202	168	158
Num. pers.	132	101	84	79

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Appendix B: Robustness checks

Normalization across noninstitutional forms of participation


taken part in a lawful public protest activity (i.e. demonstration, human chain)?

Table 1: Individual-level differences in participation in a specific form

	Participation	Regular Participation
Intercept	−1.28 (0.62)*	−3.97 (1.27)**
Insiders - outsiders		
Trust in state	−0.01 (0.06)	0.18 (0.12)
Sq(L-R scale)	0.04 (0.01)***	0.05 (0.02)**
Dominant party	−0.10 (0.12)	0.14 (0.26)
Organisational membership	0.44 (0.06)***	0.57 (0.10)***
Pol. controls		
Political interest	0.35 (0.07)***	0.73 (0.16)***
L-R scale	0.12 (0.03)***	0.20 (0.05)***
Socio-demographics		
Age	−0.00 (0.03)	−0.04 (0.06)
Sq(Age)	−0.00 (0.00)*	−0.00 (0.00)
High education	−0.29 (0.13)*	−0.38 (0.26)
Female	−0.33 (0.12)**	−0.26 (0.26)
Income	−0.19 (0.08)*	−0.43 (0.18)*
Mid. town (ref: big city)	0.28 (0.15)	0.09 (0.27)
Small town	−0.15 (0.16)	−1.31 (0.42)**
Countryside	−0.43 (0.18)*	−1.06 (0.41)**
McFadden Sq(R)	0.15	0.22
AIC	2128.60	666.28
BIC	2220.21	757.89
Num. obs.	3319	3319

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$. Results are based on the first wave, weighted by the socio-demographic weight.

Figure 1: Individual-level differences in participation in noninstitutional forms



Note: Coefficients are presented as odds ratios. Results are based on the first wave, weighted by the socio-demographic weight.


taken part in an illegal public protest activity (i.e. demonstration, blockade)

Table 2: Individual-level differences in participation in a specific form

	Participation	Regular Participation
Intercept	−2.99 (0.74)***	−5.76 (1.20)***
Insiders - outsiders		
Trust in state	0.15 (0.07)*	0.45 (0.11)***
Sq(L-R scale)	0.04 (0.01)***	0.04 (0.02)*
Dominant party	0.06 (0.14)	0.25 (0.22)
Organisational membership	0.49 (0.06)***	0.64 (0.09)***
Pol. controls		
Political interest	0.18 (0.08)*	0.27 (0.13)*
L-R scale	0.17 (0.03)***	0.31 (0.06)***
Socio-demographics		
Age	0.08 (0.04)*	0.11 (0.06)*
Sq(Age)	−0.00 (0.00)***	−0.00 (0.00)**
High education	−0.47 (0.15)**	−0.37 (0.23)
Female	−0.65 (0.14)***	−0.46 (0.22)*
Income	−0.11 (0.09)	−0.35 (0.15)*
Mid. town (ref: big city)	0.40 (0.16)*	0.37 (0.24)
Small town	−0.31 (0.19)	−0.60 (0.31)
Countryside	−0.45 (0.21)*	−0.94 (0.36)**
McFadden Sq(R)	0.19	0.27
AIC	1658.12	812.80
BIC	1749.73	904.41
Num. obs.	3319	3319

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$. Results are based on the first wave, weighted by the socio-demographic weight.

Figure 2: Individual-level differences in participation in noninstitutional forms



Note: Coefficients are presented as odds ratios. Results are based on the first wave, weighted by the socio-demographic weight.


taken part in a protest activity on the Internet (i.e. digital protest)?

Table 3: Individual-level differences in participation in a specific form

	Participation	Regular Participation
Intercept	−1.06 (0.57)	−5.52 (1.21)***
Insiders - outsiders		
Trust in state	−0.06 (0.06)	0.15 (0.11)
Sq(L-R scale)	0.03 (0.01)***	0.05 (0.01)**
Dominant party	−0.06 (0.12)	0.07 (0.24)
Organisational membership	0.41 (0.05)***	0.43 (0.09)***
Pol. controls		
Political interest	0.35 (0.07)***	0.72 (0.15)***
L-R scale	0.08 (0.03)**	0.12 (0.05)*
Socio-demographics		
Age	−0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.05)
Sq(Age)	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)
High education	−0.07 (0.12)	0.14 (0.24)
Female	−0.28 (0.12)*	0.03 (0.23)
Income	−0.02 (0.07)	−0.12 (0.15)
Mid. town (ref: big city)	0.31 (0.14)*	−0.22 (0.27)
Small town	−0.31 (0.15)*	−0.78 (0.33)*
Countryside	−0.26 (0.16)	−0.78 (0.35)*
McFadden Sq(R)	0.11	0.15
AIC	2392.74	797.98
BIC	2484.35	889.59
Num. obs.	3319	3319

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$. Results are based on the first wave, weighted by the socio-demographic weight.

Figure 3: Individual-level differences in participation in noninstitutional forms



Note: Coefficients are presented as odds ratios. Results are based on the first wave, weighted by the socio-demographic weight.


posted about politics online, for example on blogs, via email or on social media such as Facebook or Twitter?

Table 4: Individual-level differences in participation in a specific form

	Participation	Regular Participation
Intercept	−0.39 (0.45)	−4.21 (0.82)***
Insiders - outsiders		
Trust in state	−0.20 (0.04)***	−0.13 (0.07)
Sq(L-R scale)	0.03 (0.01)***	0.05 (0.01)***
Dominant party	−0.09 (0.09)	−0.36 (0.16)*
Organisational membership	0.35 (0.05)***	0.27 (0.07)***
Pol. controls		
Political interest	0.49 (0.05)***	0.90 (0.10)***
L-R scale	−0.00 (0.02)	0.06 (0.03)
Socio-demographics		
Age	−0.04 (0.02)	−0.00 (0.04)
Sq(Age)	0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)
High education	−0.02 (0.10)	0.05 (0.17)
Female	−0.07 (0.09)	0.17 (0.16)
Income	0.04 (0.06)	−0.06 (0.10)
Mid. town (ref: big city)	0.01 (0.11)	0.22 (0.19)
Small town	−0.24 (0.11)*	−0.45 (0.22)*
Countryside	−0.23 (0.12)	−0.21 (0.22)
McFadden Sq(R)	0.09	0.13
AIC	3626.32	1446.38
BIC	3717.93	1537.99
Num. obs.	3319	3319

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$. Results are based on the first wave, weighted by the socio-demographic weight.

Figure 4: Individual-level differences in participation in noninstitutional forms



Note: Coefficients are presented as odds ratios. Results are based on the first wave, weighted by the socio-demographic weight.


signed a petition?

Table 5: Individual-level differences in participation in a specific form

	Participation	Regular Participation
Intercept	−0.18 (0.44)	−2.91 (0.73)***
Insiders - outsiders		
Trust in state	−0.12 (0.04)**	−0.08 (0.07)
Sq(L-R scale)	0.02 (0.01)**	0.04 (0.01)***
Dominant party	−0.10 (0.09)	−0.31 (0.15)*
Organisational membership	0.43 (0.05)***	0.44 (0.06)***
Pol. controls		
Political interest	0.55 (0.05)***	0.74 (0.09)***
L-R scale	−0.07 (0.02)**	0.04 (0.03)
Socio-demographics		
Age	−0.07 (0.02)***	−0.06 (0.03)*
Sq(Age)	0.00 (0.00)*	0.00 (0.00)
High education	−0.04 (0.09)	0.10 (0.15)
Female	0.12 (0.09)	0.37 (0.15)*
Income	0.09 (0.05)	0.02 (0.09)
Mid. town (ref: big city)	−0.08 (0.11)	−0.08 (0.18)
Small town	−0.33 (0.11)**	−0.36 (0.19)
Countryside	−0.23 (0.11)*	−0.31 (0.20)
McFadden Sq(R)	0.09	0.12
AIC	3759.98	1669.32
BIC	3851.59	1760.93
Num. obs.	3319	3319

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$. Results are based on the first wave, weighted by the socio-demographic weight.

Figure 5: Individual-level differences in participation in noninstitutional forms



Note: Coefficients are presented as odds ratios. Results are based on the first wave, weighted by the socio-demographic weight.


Logit replication of the LCA model

Table 6: Logit models: issue specific participation

	Climate	Against rac.	Cov. Econ.	Cov. Freed.
Intercept	−3.02 (0.89)***	−1.78 (0.90)*	−3.70 (0.94)***	−5.84 (1.08)***
Insiders - outsiders				
Trust in state	0.19 (0.08)*	0.09 (0.08)	0.03 (0.08)	−0.35 (0.09)***
Sq(L-R scale)	−0.02 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)*	−0.00 (0.01)	−0.02 (0.01)
Org. Membership	0.16 (0.07)*	0.23 (0.07)**	0.21 (0.07)**	0.17 (0.08)*
Parties (ref: CDU/CSU)				
NA/DK	−0.65 (0.23)**	−0.25 (0.24)	−0.02 (0.24)	0.61 (0.27)*
SPD	−0.36 (0.24)	0.72 (0.24)**	−0.31 (0.27)	−0.21 (0.34)
B90/Grüne	0.46 (0.23)*	−0.05 (0.23)	0.07 (0.25)	−0.24 (0.35)
Linke	−0.12 (0.27)	−0.10 (0.28)	0.02 (0.30)	0.46 (0.35)
FDP	−0.67 (0.35)	0.46 (0.33)	0.39 (0.33)	0.44 (0.38)
AfD	−0.45 (0.28)	−1.11 (0.36)**	−0.61 (0.30)*	0.90 (0.30)***
Other party	−0.20 (0.30)	−0.08 (0.31)	−0.56 (0.35)	0.07 (0.39)
Issue preferences				
Climate concerns	1.01 (0.11)***	0.24 (0.11)*	−0.14 (0.11)	−0.24 (0.12)
Diversity	0.09 (0.07)	0.47 (0.07)***	−0.05 (0.07)	−0.09 (0.08)
Health measures	−0.24 (0.08)**	−0.02 (0.08)	0.08 (0.07)	0.68 (0.08)***
Econ. measures	−0.11 (0.08)	0.06 (0.08)	0.24 (0.07)***	0.16 (0.08)*
Forms of participation				
Public demo.	−0.21 (0.12)	−0.08 (0.13)	−0.18 (0.12)	0.15 (0.12)
Online demo.	0.11 (0.10)	0.12 (0.10)	0.23 (0.10)*	0.22 (0.11)*
Posting online	−0.03 (0.07)	0.39 (0.07)***	0.17 (0.07)*	0.43 (0.08)***
Petitions	0.31 (0.07)***	0.07 (0.07)	−0.03 (0.07)	−0.03 (0.08)
Illegal demo.	0.29 (0.10)**	−0.22 (0.11)*	−0.05 (0.11)	−0.05 (0.11)
Socio-demog. & controls				
Pol. interest	−0.09 (0.09)	−0.05 (0.10)	0.01 (0.10)	0.06 (0.11)
L-R scale	−0.02 (0.04)	−0.17 (0.05)***	0.03 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)
Age	0.00 (0.03)	−0.10 (0.03)***	0.05 (0.03)	0.08 (0.04)
Sq(Age)	−0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)**	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)
High educ.	0.11 (0.16)	−0.45 (0.16)**	−0.02 (0.17)	−0.01 (0.19)
Female	−0.21 (0.14)	0.09 (0.15)	0.26 (0.15)	−0.20 (0.18)
Income	−0.04 (0.09)	−0.10 (0.09)	0.02 (0.09)	0.11 (0.11)
Mid. town (ref: big c.)	0.40 (0.18)*	0.27 (0.18)	−0.03 (0.18)	0.16 (0.21)
Small town	0.22 (0.18)	−0.23 (0.19)	−0.37 (0.20)	0.15 (0.22)
Countryside	−0.01 (0.19)	−0.24 (0.20)	−0.03 (0.20)	−0.02 (0.23)
Part. on other iss.				
Climate prot.		0.51 (0.15)***	−0.28 (0.16)	−0.47 (0.19)*
Against racism	0.51 (0.15)***		0.22 (0.16)	−0.20 (0.20)
Corona econ.	−0.26 (0.17)	0.22 (0.17)		−0.06 (0.19)
Corona freedom	−0.55 (0.19)**	−0.32 (0.20)	−0.07 (0.19)	
McFadden Sq(R)	0.24	0.23	0.05	0.31
AIC	1488.56	1440.56	1408.35	1085.40
BIC	1660.72	1612.71	1580.50	1257.55
Num. obs.	1362	1362	1362	1362

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$. Results are based on the first wave, weighted by the socio-demographic weight.

Figure 6: Issue specific participation



Note: Coefficients are presented as odds ratios. See the full regression table in Appendix B, table 6. The thicker error bars represent 90 percent confidence intervals, the thinner error bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Results are based on the first wave, weighted by the socio-demographic weight.


The effect of differentiated partisanship on participation

Table 7: Individual-level differences in participation in noninstitutional forms

	Participation	Regular Participation
Intercept	0.09 (0.44)	−2.66 (0.63)***
Insiders - outsiders		
Trust in state	−0.12 (0.04)**	−0.11 (0.06)
Sq(L-R scale)	0.02 (0.01)*	0.03 (0.01)***
Organisational membership	0.46 (0.05)***	0.41 (0.06)***
Parties (ref: CDU/CSU)		
NA/DK	0.08 (0.12)	0.31 (0.21)
SPD	0.31 (0.14)*	0.37 (0.23)
B90/Grüne	0.42 (0.14)**	0.61 (0.21)**
Linke	0.49 (0.17)**	0.94 (0.25)***
FDP	0.36 (0.20)	0.68 (0.28)*
AfD	0.70 (0.15)***	0.90 (0.22)***
Other party	0.30 (0.18)	0.91 (0.26)***
Pol. controls		
Political interest	0.48 (0.05)***	0.65 (0.08)***
L-R scale	−0.05 (0.02)*	0.09 (0.03)**
Socio-demographics		
Age	−0.06 (0.02)***	−0.05 (0.03)
Sq(Age)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
High education	−0.06 (0.09)	0.12 (0.13)
Female	0.11 (0.08)	0.10 (0.12)
Income	0.08 (0.05)	−0.01 (0.08)
Mid. town (ref: big city)	−0.13 (0.10)	0.14 (0.14)
Small town	−0.26 (0.10)*	−0.34 (0.16)*
Countryside	−0.29 (0.11)**	−0.27 (0.16)
McFadden Sq(R)	0.10	0.15
AIC	4090.66	2234.44
BIC	4218.96	2362.73
Num. obs.	3325	3325

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$. Results are based on the first wave, weighted by the socio-demographic weight.

Figure 7: Participation in noninstitutional forms with differentiated partisanship



Note: See the corresponding regression model included above, table 7, Appendix B. The thicker error bars represent 90 percent confidence intervals, the thinner error bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Results are based on the first wave, weighted by the socio-demographic weight.

Replication with differentiated ideological scales


In this part of the analysis the left-right scale is exchanged with an economic and a cultural left-right ideological scale. For the economic scale, I rely on the responses to the item ‘The state should take measures to reduce income inequality’. For the cultural scale, I rely on the responses to the item ‘Germany is becoming a worse place to live because of immigration.’ Both are measured on a five points scale (see appendix C). I reversed the economic scale, so that positive values represent more right-wing positions.

Table 8: Individual-level differences in participation in noninstitutional forms

	Participation	Regular Participation
Intercept	0.33 (0.43)	−2.05 (0.60)***
Insiders - outsiders		
Trust in state	−0.16 (0.04)***	−0.13 (0.06)*
Sq(gov. intervention)	−0.00 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)
Sq(migration)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)
Organisational membership	0.46 (0.05)***	0.43 (0.05)***
Dominant party	−0.15 (0.08)	−0.39 (0.12)**
Pol. controls		
Political interest	0.54 (0.05)***	0.73 (0.07)***
Gov. intervention	0.04 (0.05)	0.00 (0.07)
Migration	−0.07 (0.03)*	0.03 (0.04)
Socio-demographics		
Age	−0.06 (0.02)***	−0.04 (0.03)
Sq(Age)	0.00 (0.00)*	0.00 (0.00)
High education	−0.06 (0.09)	0.11 (0.13)
Female	0.09 (0.08)	0.05 (0.12)
Income	0.10 (0.05)	−0.02 (0.08)
Mid. town (ref: big city)	−0.14 (0.10)	0.14 (0.14)
Small town	−0.29 (0.10)**	−0.36 (0.16)*
Countryside	−0.32 (0.11)**	−0.30 (0.16)
McFadden Sq(R)	0.09	0.13
AIC	4136.14	2288.09
BIC	4240.01	2391.96
Num. obs.	3327	3327

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$. Results are based on the first wave, weighted by the socio-demographic weight.

Figure 8: Participation in noninstitutional forms with differentiated ideological scales




Note: See the corresponding regression model included above, table 8, Appendix B. The thicker error bars represent 90 percent confidence intervals, the thinner error bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Results are based on the first wave, weighted by the socio-demographic weight.

Table 9: Logistic Coefficient Estimates for Latent Class Analysis

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coef	SE	Coef	SE
Intercept	-0.04***	(0.01)	-0.01	(0.02)
Insiders - outsiders				
Trust in state	-0.77***	(0.18)	-0.78***	(0.17)
Sq(gov. intervention)	0.01	(0.13)	0.01	(0.13)
Sq(migration)	-0.02	(0.11)	-0.02	(0.11)
Org. Membership	-0.51***	(0.15)	-0.5***	(0.15)
Dominant party	-1.48***	(0.31)		
Parties (ref: CDU/CSU)				
NA/DK			1.33***	(0.31)
SPD			-1.05**	(0.41)
B90/Grüne			-0.98***	(0.11)
Linke			0.38	(0.36)
FDP			-0.17	(0.36)
AfD			1.17***	(0.34)
Other party			-0.33***	(0.07)
Issue preferences				
Climate concerns	-1.53***	(0.25)	-1.51***	(0.23)
Diversity	-0.5**	(0.18)	-0.49**	(0.18)
Health measures	0.80***	(0.17)	0.70***	(0.17)
Economic measures	0.38*	(0.15)	0.33*	(0.15)
Forms of participation				
Public demo.	0.30	(0.25)	0.37	(0.26)
Online demo.	0.01	(0.21)	-0.04	(0.22)
Posting online	0.04	(0.15)	0.05	(0.16)
Petitions	-0.55***	(0.16)	-0.53***	(0.16)
Illegal demo.	-0.14	(0.19)	-0.15	(0.19)
Socio-demographics and controls				
Political interest	0.37	(0.19)	0.41*	(0.20)
Gov. intervention	0.58**	(0.19)	0.46*	(0.19)
Migration	0.67***	(0.17)	0.57***	(0.17)
Age	0.14**	(0.05)	0.10*	(0.05)
Sq(Age)	0.01*	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)
High educ.	0.35	(0.30)	0.41	(0.29)
Female	0.26	(0.29)	0.27	(0.29)
Income	0.18	(0.18)	0.17	(0.18)
Mid. town (ref: big city)	-0.53*	(0.25)	-0.47	(0.28)
Small town	0.12	(0.25)	0.21	(0.26)
Countryside	0.40	(0.25)	0.55*	(0.28)

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Figure 9: Latent class analysis with differentiated ideological scales



The model predict membership in latent classes with covariates. It also include controls for the form of engagement. See the full regression above, table 9, appendix B. The error bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals.

Appendix C: Survey items

Dependent variables

We are initially interested in societal engagement in the time since public life was restricted in many European countries in March due to the Corona Pandemic. This posed a great challenge for many people and made traditional forms of engagement difficult. [Wir interessieren uns zunächst für soziales Engagement in der Zeit seitdem in vielen europäischen Ländern im März das öffentliche Leben aufgrund der Corona-Pandemie eingeschränkt wurde. Dies stellte eine große Herausforderung für viele Menschen dar und erschwerte herkömmliche Formen des Engagements.]

[Civic engagement block]

There are other possibilities to engage socially or politically. Since the beginning of the corona crisis until today: How often did you...

[Es gibt noch weitere Möglichkeiten, sich gesellschaftlich oder politisch zu engagieren. Seit Beginn der Corona-Krise bis heute: Wie oft haben Sie ...?]

	Never [Nie]	Rarely [Selten]	Sometimes [Manchmal]	Often [Oft]	Very often [Sehr oft]
taken part in a lawful public protest activity (i.e. demonstration, human chain)? [an einer genehmigten Protestaktion im öffentlichen Raum teilgenommen (z.B. Demonstration, Menschenkette)?]					
taken part in an illegal public protest activity (i.e. demonstration, blockade)? [an einer nicht genehmigten Protestaktion im öffentlichen Raum teilgenommen (z.B. Demonstration, Blockade)?]					
taken part in a protest activity on the Internet (i.e. digital protest)? [an einer Protestaktion im Internet teilgenommen (z.B. Netzstreik)?]					
posted about politics online, for example on blogs, via email or on social media such as Facebook or Twitter? [politische Inhalte Im Internet gepostet oder geteilt, zum Beispiel auf Blogs, per E-Mail oder in sozialen Medien wie Facebook oder Twitter?]					
signed a petition? [sich an einer Petition oder Unterschriftensammlung beteiligt?]					
contacted a politician, government or local government official? [Kontakt zu einer*inem Politiker*in oder einer Amtsperson auf Bundes-, Landes- oder Kommunalebene aufgenommen?]					
taken part in activities of political parties? [sich an Aktivitäten politischer Parteien beteiligt?]					
other forms of political participation? sich in anderer Form politisch beteiligt?					

You have indicated that you have been politically engaged since the beginning of the Corona Pandemic. On what issue have you been engaged?

[Sie haben angegeben, sich seit Beginn der Corona-Pandemie politisch engagiert zu haben. Zu welchem Thema haben Sie sich engagiert?]

against racism [Gegen Rassismus]	<input type="checkbox"/>
for climate protection [Für Klimaschutz]	<input type="checkbox"/>
against limitations to freedom due to the corona crisis [Gegen Freiheitseinschränkungen aufgrund der Corona-Krise]	<input type="checkbox"/>
for governmental economic help related to the corona crisis [Für staatliche Wirtschaftshilfen aufgrund der Corona-Krise]	<input type="checkbox"/>
other issues [Andere Forderungen]	<input type="checkbox"/>

Independent variables

Overall, how do you rate the political measures... [Wie beurteilen Sie insgesamt die von der Politik ergriffenen Maßnahmen...]

	Not at all sufficient [überhaupt nicht ausreichend]	rather not sufficient [eher nicht ausreichend]	appropriate [angemessen]	rather too strong [eher zu stark]	too extreme [zu extrem]
...to address the health risks of the Corona crisis? [...zur Bewältigung der gesundheitlichen Risiken der Corona-Krise?]					
...to deal with the economic consequences of the Corona crisis? [...zur Bewältigung der wirtschaftlichen Folgen der Corona-Krise?]					

How about the following areas - are you concerned about them? [Wie ist es mit den folgenden Gebieten – machen Sie sich da Sorgen?]

	Very concerned [Große Sorgen]	Somewhat concerned [Einige Sorgen]	Not concerned [Keine Sorgen]	NA [KA]
To protect the environment [Um den Schutz der Umwelt]				

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? [Wie sehr stimmen Sie den folgenden Aussagen zu oder wie sehr lehnen Sie diese ab?]

	Completely disagree [Lehne stark ab]	Disagree [Lehne ab]	Either or [Weder noch]	Agree [Stimme zu]	Completely agree [Stimme stark zu]
Increasing diversity is threatening life in Germany in general [Durch zunehmende Vielfalt wird das Leben in Deutschland im Allgemeinen bedroht.]					

How interested are you in politics? Are you... [Wie sehr interessieren Sie sich für Politik? Sind Sie...]

not interested at all [überhaupt nicht interessiert]	little interested [wenig interessiert]	quite interested [ziemlich interessiert]	very interested [sehr interessiert]

In politics, people sometimes talk about "left" and "right". Where on the scale would you classify yourself if 0 is left and 10 is right? [In der Politik spricht man manchmal von "links" und "rechts". Wo auf der Skala würden Sie sich selbst einstufen, wenn 0 für links steht und 10 für rechts?]

Left [Links]											Right [Rechts]
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? [Wie sehr stimmen Sie den folgenden Aussagen zu oder wie sehr lehnen Sie diese ab?]

	Completely disagree [Lehne stark ab]	Disagree [Lehne ab]	Either or [Weder noch]	Agree [Stimme zu]	Completely agree [Stimme stark zu]
The state should take measures to reduce income inequality [Der Staat sollte Maßnahmen ergreifen, um Einkommensunterschiede zu verringern]					
Germany is becoming a worse place to live because of immigration. [Deutschland wird durch Zuwanderung zu einem schlechteren Ort zum Leben.]					

What is your view on the following statements? [Wie ist Ihre Meinung zu den folgenden Aussagen?]

	completely disagree [stimmt gar nicht]	mostly disagree [stimmt wenig]	So, so [teils, teils]	mostly agree [stimmt ziemlich]	completely agree [stimmt völlig]
In general, the state institutions in Germany can be trusted. [Im Allgemeinen kann man den staatlichen Institutionen in Deutschland vertrauen.]					

Are you a member of one or more of the following organisations? Please tick all that apply. [Sind Sie Mitglied in einer oder mehreren der folgenden Organisationen? Bitte kreuzen Sie alle zutreffenden Organisationen an.]

Trade union or professional association [Gewerkschaft oder Berufsverband]	
Political party [Politische Partei]	
Ecclesiastical or religious association [Kirchliche oder religiöse Vereinigung]	
Sports club [Sportverein]	
Leisure time organization (e.g. music, art) [Freizeitorganisation (z.B. Musik, Kunst)]	
Environmental organisation or animal welfare association [Umweltorganisation oder Tierschutzverein]	
Neighbourhood association [Nachbarschaftsverein]	
Human rights organisation [Menschenrechtsorganisation]	
Charity [Wohlfahrtsorganisation]	
Patriotic Alliance [Patriotisches Bündnis]	
In another civil society organisation [In einer anderen zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisation]	
None of them [Keine davon]	

Which party would you vote for if there were a federal election next Sunday?
 [Welche Partei würden Sie wählen, wenn am nächsten Sonntag Bundestagswahl wäre?]

CDU/ CSU	
SPD	
Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen	
AfD	
Die Linke	
FDP	
Another party [Andere Partei]	
Don't know [Weiß nicht]	
I would not participate [Ich würde nicht teilnehmen]	

How old are you? [Wie alt sind Sie?]

What is your gender? [Was ist Ihr Geschlecht?]

Male [Männlich]	
Female [Weiblich]	
Other [Divers]	

What is the highest general school-leaving qualification you have achieved? [Was ist der höchste allgemeinbildende Schulabschluss, den Sie erreicht haben?]

Grundschule nicht beendet	
(Noch) kein Schulabschluss, aber Grundschule beendet	
Abschluss einer Förderschule (Sonderschule, Hilfsschule)	
Volks- oder Hauptschule / Polytechn. Oberschule (8./9. Klasse)	
Mittlere Reife, Realschule / MSA / Polytechn. Oberschule (10. Klasse)	
Fachhochschulreife	
Abitur, fachgebundene Hochschulreife / Erweiterte Oberschule (12. Klasse)	
Zwischenprüfung, Vordiplom	
Diplom einer Berufsakademie (BA)	
Bachelor einer Verwaltungs-/Fachhochschule (FH), Berufsakademie	
Bachelor einer Universität	
Diplom einer Verwaltungs-/Fachhochschule (FH, auch frühere Ingenieurschule)	
Master einer Verwaltungs-/Fachhochschule (FH) (auch duale Hochschule BW)	
Master/Aufbaustudium Universität	
Diplom, M.A., 1. StEx Universität	
Promotion oder Habilitation	

How would you describe your current household income? With the current income I/we can... [Wie würden Sie Ihr gegenwärtiges Haushaltseinkommen beschreiben? Mit dem gegenwärtigen Einkommen kann ich/können wir...]

live comfortably [bequem leben]	
cope [zurechtkommen]	
find it difficult to cope [nur schwer zurechtkommen]	
very difficult to cope with [nur sehr schwer zurechtkommen]	

Which is most applicable to the residential area where you live? [Was trifft am ehesten auf das Wohngebiet zu, in dem Sie leben?](1)

Big city [Großstadt]	
Middle-sized city [Mittlere Stadt]	
Small town [Kleinstadt]	
Countryside [Auf dem Land]	

Appendix D: Survey weights

We construct two different types of weights: socio-demographic and nonresponse. The socio-demographic weight is applied for age, gender, education, region, and are based on official statistics from Eurostat for 2020. These weights are calculated using entropy balancing as implemented by the ‘ebal’ package in R (Hainmueller and Xu, 2013). Non-response weight is calculated, as described by Lohr (2019, p. 340-346), in three steps.

First, using a dichotomized version of all variables in the first wave of the survey, I set up a logistic regression model that predicts being included in the second wave. From these 381 independent variables in a stepwise fashion all are excluded that at a $p < 0.05$ threshold have no identifiable effect. The procedure leaves 32 dichotomized variables that have an identifiable effect on being included in the second wave. In a second step these are used to construct a logistic regression model, with the results presented by table 1.

As the table shows, the model only explains 6 percent of the variation, confirming that, at least in terms of their observable characteristics, individuals are to a great extent randomly included/ missing at random in the second wave of the survey. The two largest effects are for: 1. often contacting a politician in the year prior to the COVID-19 crisis (odds ratio = 1.72); and 2. having a centrist position on the question of being someone who can forgive (odds ratio = 0.56).

In a third step, I use the model to predict the inverse probability of being included in the second wave of data collection for each individual in the first wave. The inverse probability is then multiplied with the socio-demographic weight calculated for the first wave. The product of the two weights becomes the nonresponse weight for the second wave.

Table 2 shows the final set of weights that are used in the paper. As the table shows, with the quotas having been by and large met during both waves of the data collection, the two types of weight only implement minimal correction. The two largest corrections are implemented for education and region. The first wave of the data collection included roughly seven percent more highly educated individuals, and about five percent less eastern German respondents than Eurostat recorded. These two are the only deviations that are statistically significant at the $p < 0.05$ level.

References

- Jens Hainmueller and Yiqing Xu. ebalance: A stata package for entropy balancing. *Journal of Statistical Software*, 54(7):1–18, 2013. URL <https://web.stanford.edu/~jhain/Paper/JSS2013.pdf>.
- Sharon L. Lohr. *Sampling Design and Analysis (Second Edition)*. CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group, Boca Raton, London, New York, 2019. ISBN 978-0-3672-7346-0.

Table 1: Logistic regression model: Predicting inclusion in the second wave

	Model 1
Intercept	0.41 (0.22)***
During corona: How often financial support for others? Sometimes	0.76 (0.09)**
Most state institutions can be trusted in country? Is quite/ completely true	1.46 (0.10)***
Which best describes the area you live in? Big or middle size town	1.26 (0.08)**
Which emotions did you feel in relation others' behaviour? Grief	0.60 (0.15)***
Age category? <35 years	0.78 (0.09)**
I am someone who can forgive? <= 3 (7 points)	0.65 (0.11)***
Social differences in country are broadly fair? Is not/ a little true	0.68 (0.14)**
Worries about medical care? No worries	0.83 (0.08)*
What sensations do you associate with government? >= 7 (10 points)	0.77 (0.12)*
I am someone who can go out of himself, is sociable == 4 (7 points)	0.81 (0.10)*
How large is your circle of people you could count on? Rather/very large	1.26 (0.11)*
Self placement left/right scale? 5-8 center-right	1.21 (0.09)*
Worries about social cohesion? No worries	1.29 (0.11)*
Gay/lesbians free to live life as they wish? Disagree	1.49 (0.11)***
Education High	0.69 (0.09)***
Before Corona: How often contacted a politician? Often/ very often	1.72 (0.24)*
I am someone who has a vivid? imagination/ideas ==4 (7 points)	1.40 (0.12)**
I am someone who can forgive? ==4 (7 points)	0.56 (0.14)***
I am someone who is communicative/talkative? >= 5 (7 points)	0.78 (0.09)**
I am someone who is often worried? ==4 (7 points)	1.34 (0.10)**
I am someone who has a vivid imagination/ideas? >= 5 (7 points)	1.25 (0.11)*
None applies: home office/ children at home/ cared for relatives at home	1.20 (0.09)*
Berlin	1.50 (0.14)**
Hamburg	0.69 (0.18)*
What sensations do you associate with family? >= 7 (10 points)	1.22 (0.09)*
What sensations do you associate with government? 4, 5, 6 (10 points)	0.80 (0.10)*
How do you feel during corona? 4, 5 Determined	1.31 (0.10)**
Membership sports club	1.38 (0.13)*
No organisation membership	1.37 (0.11)**
Did your emotions target family and friends? Yes, pride	0.81 (0.09)*
Did your emotions target other groups? Yes, joy	0.65 (0.16)**
Support of relatives or friends	1.28 (0.10)*
Support of neighbours	0.83 (0.10)*
Support of unknown people	0.76 (0.14)*
How satisfied are you? >= 8 (11 points)	0.84 (0.09)*
Received support from neighbours	1.32 (0.11)*
Interested in politics? Not at all/ hardly interested	0.78 (0.09)**
McFadden Sq(R)	0.06
AIC	3858.74
BIC	4090.96
Num. obs.	3331

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$. Coefficients are included as odds ratios.

Table 2: Weights overview

	First wave Observed	Second wave Observed	First wave SocDem weight	Second wave SocDem (F1) + non- response weight
Age				
18-29	21.20	22.03	20.16	21.06
30-39	18.89	17.48	19.17	17.95
40-49	16.61	19.03	18.12	18.37
50-59	24.98	24.92	23.92	24.71
60-69	18.32	16.44	18.63	17.76
Gender				
Men	50.42	49.84	50.46	49.89
Women	49.58	50.05	49.54	49.97
Education				
High	36.94	31.64	29.37	28.59
Low/Middle	63.06	68.25	70.63	71.27
Region				
West	79.97	80.04	84.96	84.96
East	20.03	19.86	15.04	14.90

The values show percentage points.