

Framework and Regret.

Ref: Chap 4, Bandit Algorithms.

1. Basic setting

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unstructured
2. Regret

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frequentist

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Bayesian
3. Regret decomposition.

Notation: 1. A is the set of arms (aka actions)

a. Choose any $a \in A$

b. Receive reward drawn from an (unknown) distribution P_a .

2. ν = joint distribution across arms.

e.g: arms are independent $\Rightarrow \nu$ is a product

$$= P_{a_1} \times P_{a_2} \times \dots$$

if arms are discrete.

i.e., $\nu = (P_a, a \in A)$ notation for product dist.

Name	Symbol	Definition
Bernoulli	\mathcal{E}_B^k	$\{(\mathcal{B}(\mu_i))_i : \mu \in [0, 1]^k\}$
Uniform	\mathcal{E}_U^k	$\{(\mathcal{U}(a_i, b_i))_i : a, b \in \mathbb{R}^k \text{ with } a_i \leq b_i \text{ for all } i\}$
Gaussian (known var.)	$\mathcal{E}_N^k(\sigma^2)$	$\{(\mathcal{N}(\mu_i, \sigma^2))_i : \mu \in \mathbb{R}^k\}$
Gaussian (unknown var.)	\mathcal{E}_N^k	$\{(\mathcal{N}(\mu_i, \sigma_i^2))_i : \mu \in \mathbb{R}^k \text{ and } \sigma^2 \in [0, \infty)^k\}$
Finite variance	$\mathcal{E}_V^k(\sigma^2)$	$\{(P_i)_i : \mathbb{V}_{X \sim P_i}[X] \leq \sigma^2 \text{ for all } i\}$
Finite kurtosis	$\mathcal{E}_{\text{Kurt}}^k(\kappa)$	$\{(P_i)_i : \text{Kurt}_{X \sim P_i}[X] \leq \kappa \text{ for all } i\}$
Bounded support	$\mathcal{E}_{[a,b]}^k$	$\{(P_i)_i : \text{Supp}(P_i) \subseteq [a, b]\}$
Subgaussian	$\mathcal{E}_{\text{SG}}^k(\sigma^2)$	$\{(P_i)_i : P_i \text{ is } \sigma\text{-subgaussian for all } i\}$

Table 4.1 Typical environment classes for stochastic bandits. $\text{Supp}(P)$ is the (topological) support of distribution P . The kurtosis of a random variable X is a measure of its tail behavior and is defined by $\mathbb{E}[(X - \mathbb{E}[X])^4] / \mathbb{V}[X]^2$. Subgaussian distributions have similar properties to the Gaussian and will be defined in Chapter 5.

Bandit Algorithms, Lattimore and Szepesvari, 2019 (pp. 58)

3. \mathcal{E} = environment = set of possible distributions

i.e., $v \in \mathcal{E}$

Stochastic Bandit Problem:

* Nature/adversary chooses a fixed $v \in \mathcal{E}$

→ this is unknown to the player.

* At each (discrete) time t , player chooses

arm $A_t \in A$. Nature then uses predetermined v to determine arm dist P_{A_t} , and draws a sample $X_t \sim P_{A_t}$

* $X_t =$ reward at time t

* Player thus observes (A_t, X_t) at time t .

* Player uses all causal information:

$$\{(A_s, X_s), s=1, 2, \dots, t\}$$

to determine action $A_{t+1} \in A$.

Two settings:

① Unstructured environment \mathcal{E} : v is a product measure, i.e., arms do not provide any information about each other.

$$v = (P_a, a \in A) = P_{a_1} \times P_{a_2} \dots \text{ (discrete arms)}$$

② Structured environment \mathcal{E} : arms "leak" information.

e.g.: linear bandits: $\theta \in \mathbb{R}^d$ fixed but unknown

$$\mathcal{E} = \{v_\theta, \theta \in \mathbb{R}^d\}$$

where $v_\theta = \{P_{a,\theta}, a \in \mathcal{A}\}$.

with $P_{a,\theta} = N(\langle a, \theta \rangle, \sigma^2)$

or Bernoulli($\langle a, \theta \rangle$)

Here, given θ , arm distributions are known for all arms.

Since $\theta \in \mathbb{R}^d$, there are efficient ways to estimate θ from $\tilde{O}(d)$ samples under suitable assumptions.

Regret: The performance metric.

① Frequentist viewpoint: $v \in \mathcal{E}$ picked by nature.

A genie is given this information. Then, the genie uses this to determine best action/arm.

Define $\{X_t^*, t=1, 2, \dots\}$ the associated reward for the genie.

e.g.: finite K arms, unstructured environment, with $v = P_{a_1} \times P_{a_2} \dots \times P_{a_K}$

with $P_{a_i} \sim \text{Bernoulli}(\mu_i)$, $\mu_i \in [0, 1]$.

Then, WLOG, let $\mu_1 \geq \mu_2 \geq \mu_3 \dots$

In this case, genie is given knowledge of $\{\mu_1, \dots, \mu_K\}$ and the arm dist. (Bernoulli).

Thus, $X_t^* \sim \text{Bernoulli}(\mu_1)$.

The PLAYER does not have knowledge of $\mu_i, i=1, 2, \dots, K$.

Plays action A_s at time s , and observes $X_s \sim P_{A_s}, s=1, 2, \dots, t$.

$$\text{Regret} = R_t(\pi, v) = E \left[\underbrace{\sum_{s=1}^t X_s^*}_{\text{genie expected reward until time } t} \right] - E \left[\underbrace{\sum_{s=1}^t X_s}_{\text{player expected reward until time } t} \right]$$

Annotations:
- t : time horizon
- π : player policy
- v : environment

e.g.:

Continuing our example,

$$E \left[\sum_{s=1}^t X_s^* \right] = \mu_1 t$$

Notation: $\mu^*(v) = E[X_1^*]$ under genie policy that knows v .

Sub-optimality gap:

$$\Delta_a(v) = \mu^*(v) - \mu_a(v)$$

where $\mu_a(v) = E_{P_a}[z]$ $z \sim P_a$

$T_a(t)$ = Number of times arm a has been played until time t under policy π .

$$= \sum_{s=1}^t \chi_{\{A_s=a\}}$$

indicator function

Lemma (Regret Decomposition)

Suppose that A is countable. Then:


$$R_t(\pi, v) = \sum_{a \in A} \Delta_a(v) \cdot T_a(t).$$

Bayesian Regret: Average regret when we have some prior knowledge on how $v \in \mathcal{E}$ is chosen by the environment.

More specifically, suppose $v \in \mathcal{E}$ is chosen using some distribution Q with support over \mathcal{E} .

Then, for some player policy π ,

$BR_t(\pi, Q)$ = Bayesian regret using prior Q

$$= \mathbb{E}_{v \sim Q} [R_t(\pi, v)]$$


From now on (until towards end of semester),
we will focus on FREQUENTIST REGRET.

Notation abuse: We will use R_t and hide
the dependence on (π, v) in most cases