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# Chain-key signatures

*Chain-key signatures* extend chain-key technology to allow transactions targeted at other blockchains to be computed fully on-chain using the Internet Computer Protocol. Using chain-key signatures, the IC can integrate with other blockchains in a completely trustless manner. Indeed, using chain-key signatures is the strongest, most decentralized way of integrating blockchains as no additional trust assumptions besides that of the two blockchains are required, particularly no additional parties that manage signature keys or their shares.

Just like chain-key technology, a key component of chain-key signatures is threshold cryptography. The [threshold signature scheme](#) used to implement chain-key cryptography is based on BLS signatures. While BLS signatures have distinct advantages, they are simply not compatible with other blockchains. In order to work with other blockchains, the IC must use threshold signatures that are compatible with the digital signature schemes of those other blockchains. By far, the most commonly used signature scheme used on other blockchains (including Bitcoin and Ethereum) is the [ECDSA signature scheme](#). Because of this, *threshold ECDSA* signatures are currently supported on the IC, with implementations of other threshold signature schemes in the planning stages.

ECDSA signatures are widely used in the blockchain industry. This feature will enable canister smart contracts to have an ECDSA public key and to sign with regard to it. The corresponding secret key is threshold-shared among the nodes of the subnet holding the canister smart contract. This is a prerequisite for the direct integration between the Internet Computer and Bitcoin and Ethereum.

Implementing a secure and efficient threshold signing protocol for ECDSA is much more challenging than for BLS signatures. While there has been a flurry of [research on threshold ECDSA in recent years](#), none of these protocols meet the demanding requirements of the Internet Computer: they all either assume a *synchronous network* (meaning that the protocols will fail or become insecure if messages are unexpectedly delayed) or provide *no robustness* (meaning that the ability to produce signatures is completely lost if a *single* node should crash) or *both*. Neither of these assumptions are acceptable on the IC: security and liveness must hold even in an *asynchronous network* with many faulty nodes.

DFINITY has designed, analyzed, and implemented a new threshold ECDSA signing protocol that works over an *asynchronous network* and is quite *robust* (it will still produce signatures if up to a third of the nodes in a subnet are crashed or corrupt) while still delivering acceptable performance. Papers written by DFINITY's researchers [describe the protocol in detail](#) and [prove the key elements of its security](#).

[ECDSA White Paper](#)

[ECDSA GitHub](#)

[Motion Proposal 21340](#)

[The Internet Computer Community Adopts Threshold ECDSA Signatures Motion Proposal](#)