

**Blockchain Security | Smart Contract Audits | KYC** 

MADE IN GERMANY

# vEmpire

# Audit

Security Assessment 20. March, 2022

For



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Version	Date	Description
1.0	20. March 2022	<ul><li>Layout project</li><li>Automated-/Manual-Security Testing</li><li>Summary</li></ul>

### **Network**

Ethereum (ERC20)

### Website

https://v-empire.io/

### **Telegram**

https://t.me/vempirediscussion

### **Twitter**

http://twitter.com/vempiredigital

### Medium

https://medium.com/@v-empire.digital

### **Discord**

https://discord.gg/Wk3aF3PNKM

## **Youtube**

https://youtube.com/c/vEmpireDDAO

# **Description**

vEmpire DDAO is the world's largest Decentralized Metaverse Investment Organization. The official vEmpire protocol incorporates different strategies to incentivize Metaverse token staking to fund the battle against centralisation.

vEmpire is entirely focused on protecting decentralized technologies through virtual property and Metaversal asset acquisition.

# **Project Engagement**

During the 16th of March 2022, **vEmpire Team** engaged Solidproof.io to audit smart contracts that they created. The engagement was technical in nature and focused on identifying security flaws in the design and implementation of the contracts. They provided Solidproof.io with access to their code repository and whitepaper.

## Logo

# Contract Link v1.0

- · Github
  - https://github.com/v-Empire/vEmpire/tree/ b57ad1c065431751ceb3c2c9f7d47647293592c5
  - Commit: b57ad1c065431751ceb3c2c9f7d47647293592c5

# **Vulnerability & Risk Level**

Risk represents the probability that a certain source-threat will exploit vulnerability, and the impact of that event on the organization or system. Risk Level is computed based on CVSS version 3.0.

Level	Value	Vulnerability	Risk (Required Action)
Critical	9 - 10	A vulnerability that can disrupt the contract functioning in a number of scenarios, or creates a risk that the contract may be broken.	Immediate action to reduce risk level.
High	7 – 8.9	A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.	Implementation of corrective actions as soon aspossible.
Medium	4 – 6.9	A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.	Implementation of corrective actions in a certain period.
Low	2 – 3.9	A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.	Implementation of certain corrective actions or accepting the risk.
Informational	0 – 1.9	A vulnerability that have informational character but is not effecting any of the code.	An observation that does not determine a level of risk

# Auditing Strategy and Techniques Applied

Throughout the review process, care was taken to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specification and best practices. To do so, reviewed line-by-line by our team of expert pentesters and smart contract developers, documenting any issues as there were discovered.

# Methodology

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

- 1. Code review that includes the following:
  - i) Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof to make sure we understand the size, scope, and functionality of the smart contract.
  - ii) Manual review of code, which is the process of reading source code line-byline in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
  - iii) Comparison to specification, which is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof describe.
- 2. Testing and automated analysis that includes the following:
  - i) Test coverage analysis, which is the process of determining whether the test cases are actually covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run those test cases.
  - ii) Symbolic execution, which is analysing a program to determine what inputs causes each part of a program to execute.
- 3. Best practices review, which is a review of the smart contracts to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarify, maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices, recommendations, and research.
- 4. Specific, itemized, actionable recommendations to help you take steps to secure your smart contracts.

# **Used Code from other Frameworks/Smart Contracts (direct imports)**

### Imported packages:

Dependency / Import Path	Count
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/access/AccessControlUpgradeable.sol	3
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/access/OwnableUpgradeable.sol	3
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/proxy/utils/Initializable.sol	3
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/proxy/utils/UUPSUpgradeable.sol	3
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/security/PausableUpgradeable.sol	2
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC20/IERC20Upgradeable.sol	1
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC721/ERC721Upgradeable.sol	1
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC721/IERC721ReceiverUpgradeable.sol	1
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC721/IERC721Upgradeable.sol	1
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC721/extensions/ERC721EnumerableUpgradeable.sol	1
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/CountersUpgradeable.sol	1
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/cryptography/MerkleProofUpgradeable.sol	1
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/math/SafeMathUpgradeable.sol	3
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/structs/EnumerableSetUpgradeable.sol	1

## **Tested Contract Files**

This audit covered the following files listed below with a SHA-1 Hash.


A file with a different Hash has been modified, intentionally or otherwise, after the security review. A different Hash could be (but not necessarily) an indication of a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.

### **v1.0**

File Name	SHA-1 Hash
contracts/Staking.sol	cee40419664a8fb1bedb6cfa50dbaae80f004ec1
contracts/NFT.sol	c4e176032c3954ad9fcf83972802e0019cb3eb50
contracts/Sale.sol	145a29f7ef4dfcb2916fa691a7d471432a556b89

# **Metrics**

# Source Lines v1.0



# **Capabilities**

## Components

Version	Contracts Libraries Interfaces		Interfaces	Abstract	
1.0	4	0	0	0	

# **Exposed Functions**

This section lists functions that are explicitly declared public or payable. Please note that getter methods for public stateVars are not included.

Vei	rsion	Public	Payable
1.0		36	2

Version	External	Internal	Private	Pure	View
1.0	23	43	0	1	6

### **State Variables**

Version	Total	Public
1.0	33	30

# **Capabilities**


Version	Solidity Versions observed	Experim ental Features	Can Receive Funds	Uses Assembl Y	Has Destroya ble Contract s
1.0	0.8.11		yes		

Version	Transfer s ETH	Low- Level Calls	Deleg ateCa II	Uses Hash Function s	EC Rec ove r	New/ Create/ Create2
1.0	yes			yes		

# Inheritance Graph v1.0



# CallGraph v1.0



# **Scope of Work/Verify Claims**

The above token Team provided us with the files that needs to be tested (Github, Bscscan, Etherscan, files, etc.). The scope of the audit is the main contract (usual the same name as team appended with .sol).

We will verify the following claims:

- 1. Correct implementation of Token standard
- 2. Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)



# **Correct implementation of Token standard**

ERC721							
Function	Description	Exist	Tested	Verified			
BalanceOf	Count all NFTs assigned to an owner	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$			
OwnerOf	Find the owner of an NFT	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$			
SafeTransferFrom	Transfers the ownership of an NFT from one address to another address	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>			
SafeTransferFrom	See above - Difference is that this function has an extra data parameter	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>			
TransferFrom	Transfer ownership of an NFT	$\checkmark$	<b>√</b>	$\checkmark$			
Approve	Change or reaffirm the approved address for an NFT	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>			
SetApprovalForAll	Enable or disable approval for a third party ("operator") to manage all of `msg.sender`'s assets	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>			
GetApproved	Get the approved address for a single NFT	$\checkmark$	<b>√</b>	$\checkmark$			
IsApprovedForAll	Query if an address is an authorized operator for another address	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>			
SupportsInterface	Query if a contract implements an interface	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>			
Name	Name Provides information about the name		1	<b>√</b>			
Symbol	Provides information about the symbol	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>			
TokenURI	Provides information about the TokenUri	<b>√</b>	1	<b>√</b>			

# Write functions of contract v1.0



# **Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)**



### Legend

Attribute	Symbol
Verfified / Checked	$\checkmark$
Partly Verified	<b>P</b>
Unverified / Not checked	X
Not available	-

# Modifiers and public functions v1.0

Sale



Information: Not listed functions are directly imported functions from library (openzeppelin)

### **Comments**

- · Deployer can set following state variables without any limitations
  - NFT
    - MAX SUPPLY
      - · Can be set only above total supply
  - · Sale

- maxSupply
- maxSupplyPhaseOne
- · limit
- phaseOnePrice
- phaseTwoPrice
- phaseThreePrice
- phaseOneStartTime
- phaseOneDuration
- phaseTwoStartTime
- phaseTwoDuration
- phaseThreeStartTime
- · Deployer can enable/disable following state variables
  - \_paused
- Deployer can set following addresses/urls
  - \_baseURIValue
- mintTokens can only be called from minter\_role, if contract is not paused
- Owner can set
  - merkleRootPhaseOne
  - merkleRootPhaseTwo

Please check if an OnlyOwner or similar restrictive modifier has been forgotten.

# **Source Units in Scope**

## v1.0

Type	File	Logic Contracts	Interfaces	Lines	nLines	nSLOC	Comment Lines	Complex. Score	Capabilities
2	contracts/Staking.sol	1		235	219	143	49	120	<b>.</b>
2	contracts/NFT.sol	1		197	171	94	53	80	iii
<b>9</b>	contracts/Sale.sol	2		416	398	223	129	145	. Š 📤 🎹
2	Totals	4		848	788	460	231	345	. <u>Š</u> .

### Legend

Attribute	Description
Lines	total lines of the source unit
nLines	normalized lines of the source unit (e.g. normalizes functions spanning multiple lines)
nSLOC	normalized source lines of code (only source-code lines; no comments, no blank lines)
Comment Lines	lines containing single or block comments
Complexity Score	a custom complexity score derived from code statements that are known to introduce code complexity (branches, loops, calls, external interfaces,)

# **Audit Results**

# **AUDIT PASSED**

### **Critical issues**

### No critical issues

# **High issues**

# No high issues

# **Medium issues**

### No medium issues

### Low issues

Issue	File	Type	Line	Description
#1	Staking	Missing Zero Address Validation (missing- zero-check)	58	Check that the address is not zero
#2	NFT	Local variables shadowing	122, 123, 126, 52, 53, 56	Rename the local variables that shadow another component

# Informational issues

Issue	File	Type	Line	Description
#1	NFT	Functions that are not used	168	Remove unused functions
#2	Staking	Unused state variables	37	Remove unused state variables

#3	Staking	Misspelling	Change following words: - deposte to deposited L26
	NFT	Misspelling	<ul><li>Change following words:</li><li>miniting to minting L88</li><li>miniting to minting L95</li></ul>

### **Test Protocol**

Contract: ERC721

Contract interface

**ERC165** 

ERC165's supportsInterface(bytes4)

- ✓ uses less than 30k gas [skip-on-coverage]
- ✓ claims support

supportsInterface(bytes4)

✓ has to be implemented

**ERC721** 

ERC165's supportsInterface(bytes4)

- ✓ uses less than 30k gas [skip-on-coverage]
- ✓ claims support

balanceOf(address)

- ✓ has to be implemented
- ownerOf(uint256)
- ✓ has to be implemented approve(address, uint256)
- ✓ has to be implemented getApproved(uint256)
- ✓ has to be implemented setApprovalForAll(address,bool)
- ✓ has to be implemented

isApprovedForAll(address,address)

✓ has to be implemented

transferFrom(address,address,uint256)

✓ has to be implemented

safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256)

✓ has to be implemented

safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256,bytes)

✓ has to be implemented

with minted tokens

balanceOf

when the given address owns some tokens

- ✓ returns the amount of tokens owned by the given address when the given address does not own any tokens
  - ✓ returns 0

when querying the zero address

✓ throws

ownerOf

when the given token ID was tracked by this token

✓ returns the owner of the given token ID

when the given token ID was not tracked by this token

✓ reverts

transfers

via transferFrom

when called by the owner

✓ transfers the ownership of the given token ID to the given address

✓ emits a Transfer event

(node:47847) DeprecationWarning: expectEvent.inLogs() is deprecated. Use expectEvent() instead.

- ✓ clears the approval for the token ID
- ✓ emits an Approval event
- ✓ adjusts owners balances
- ✓ adjusts owners tokens by index

when called by the approved individual

✓ transfers the ownership of the given token ID to the given address

- ✓ emits a Transfer event
- ✓ clears the approval for the token ID
- ✓ emits an Approval event
- ✓ adjusts owners balances
- ✓ adjusts owners tokens by index

when called by the operator

✓ transfers the ownership of the given token ID to the given address

- ✓ emits a Transfer event
- ✓ clears the approval for the token ID
- ✓ emits an Approval event
- ✓ adjusts owners balances
- ✓ adjusts owners tokens by index

when called by the owner without an approved user

✓ transfers the ownership of the given token ID to the given address

- ✓ emits a Transfer event
- ✓ clears the approval for the token ID
- ✓ emits an Approval event

- ✓ adjusts owners balances
- ✓ adjusts owners tokens by index

when sent to the owner

- ✓ keeps ownership of the token
- ✓ clears the approval for the token ID
- ✓ emits only a transfer event
- ✓ keeps the owner balance
- ✓ keeps same tokens by index

when the address of the previous owner is incorrect

✓ reverts

when the sender is not authorized for the token id

✓ reverts

when the given token ID does not exist

✓ reverts

when the address to transfer the token to is the zero address

✓ reverts

via safeTransferFrom

with data

to a user account

when called by the owner

✓ transfers the ownership of the given token ID to the given

#### address

- ✓ emits a Transfer event
- ✓ clears the approval for the token ID
- ✓ emits an Approval event✓ adjusts owners balances
- ✓ adjusts owners tokens by index

when called by the approved individual

✓ transfers the ownership of the given token ID to the given

#### address

- ✓ emits a Transfer event
- ✓ clears the approval for the token ID
- ✓ emits an Approval event
- ✓ adjusts owners balances
- ✓ adjusts owners tokens by index

when called by the operator

✓ transfers the ownership of the given token ID to the given

#### address

- ✓ emits a Transfer event
- ✓ clears the approval for the token ID
- ✓ emits an Approval event
- ✓ adjusts owners balances
- ✓ adjusts owners tokens by index

when called by the owner without an approved user

- ✓ transfers the ownership of the given token ID to the given address
  - ✓ emits a Transfer event
  - ✓ clears the approval for the token ID
  - ✓ emits an Approval event
  - ✓ adjusts owners balances
  - ✓ adjusts owners tokens by index

when sent to the owner

- ✓ keeps ownership of the token
- ✓ clears the approval for the token ID
- ✓ emits only a transfer event
- ✓ keeps the owner balance
- ✓ keeps same tokens by index

when the address of the previous owner is incorrect

✓ reverts

when the sender is not authorized for the token id

✓ reverts

when the given token ID does not exist

✓ reverts

when the address to transfer the token to is the zero address

✓ reverts

to a valid receiver contract

- ✓ calls on ERC721Received
- ✓ calls on ERC721Received from approved

when called by the owner

✓ transfers the ownership of the given token ID to the given

#### address

- ✓ emits a Transfer event
- ✓ clears the approval for the token ID
- ✓ emits an Approval event
- ✓ adjusts owners balances
- ✓ adjusts owners tokens by index

when called by the approved individual

✓ transfers the ownership of the given token ID to the given

#### address

- ✓ emits a Transfer event
- ✓ clears the approval for the token ID
- ✓ emits an Approval event
- ✓ adjusts owners balances
- ✓ adjusts owners tokens by index

when called by the operator

✓ transfers the ownership of the given token ID to the given address

- ✓ emits a Transfer event
- ✓ clears the approval for the token ID

- ✓ emits an Approval event
- ✓ adjusts owners balances
- ✓ adjusts owners tokens by index

when called by the owner without an approved user

✓ transfers the ownership of the given token ID to the given address

- ✓ emits a Transfer event
- ✓ clears the approval for the token ID
- ✓ emits an Approval event
- ✓ adjusts owners balances
- ✓ adjusts owners tokens by index

when sent to the owner

- ✓ keeps ownership of the token
- ✓ clears the approval for the token ID
- ✓ emits only a transfer event
- ✓ keeps the owner balance
- ✓ keeps same tokens by index

when the address of the previous owner is incorrect

✓ reverts

when the sender is not authorized for the token id

✓ reverts

when the given token ID does not exist

✓ reverts

when the address to transfer the token to is the zero address

✓ reverts

with an invalid token id

✓ reverts

without data

to a user account

when called by the owner

✓ transfers the ownership of the given token ID to the given

### address

- ✓ emits a Transfer event
- ✓ clears the approval for the token ID
- ✓ emits an Approval event
- ✓ adjusts owners balances
- ✓ adjusts owners tokens by index

when called by the approved individual

✓ transfers the ownership of the given token ID to the given

#### address

- ✓ emits a Transfer event
- ✓ clears the approval for the token ID
- ✓ emits an Approval event
- ✓ adjusts owners balances
- ✓ adjusts owners tokens by index

when called by the operator

✓ transfers the ownership of the given token ID to the given address

- ✓ emits a Transfer event.
- ✓ clears the approval for the token ID
- ✓ emits an Approval event
- ✓ adjusts owners balances
- ✓ adjusts owners tokens by index

when called by the owner without an approved user

✓ transfers the ownership of the given token ID to the given address (60ms)

- ✓ emits a Transfer event
- ✓ clears the approval for the token ID
- ✓ emits an Approval event
- ✓ adjusts owners balances
- ✓ adjusts owners tokens by index

when sent to the owner

- ✓ keeps ownership of the token
- ✓ clears the approval for the token ID
- ✓ emits only a transfer event
- ✓ keeps the owner balance
- ✓ keeps same tokens by index

when the address of the previous owner is incorrect

✓ reverts

when the sender is not authorized for the token id

✓ reverts

when the given token ID does not exist

✓ reverts

when the address to transfer the token to is the zero address

✓ reverts

to a valid receiver contract

- ✓ calls on ERC721Received
- ✓ calls on ERC721Received from approved

when called by the owner

✓ transfers the ownership of the given token ID to the given address

- ✓ emits a Transfer event
- ✓ clears the approval for the token ID
- ✓ emits an Approval event
- ✓ adjusts owners balances
- ✓ adjusts owners tokens by index

when called by the approved individual

✓ transfers the ownership of the given token ID to the given

#### address

✓ emits a Transfer event

- ✓ clears the approval for the token ID
- ✓ emits an Approval event
- ✓ adjusts owners balances
- ✓ adjusts owners tokens by index

when called by the operator

- ✓ transfers the ownership of the given token ID to the given address
  - ✓ emits a Transfer event
  - ✓ clears the approval for the token ID
  - ✓ emits an Approval event
  - ✓ adjusts owners balances
  - ✓ adjusts owners tokens by index

when called by the owner without an approved user

✓ transfers the ownership of the given token ID to the given

### address

- ✓ emits a Transfer event
- ✓ clears the approval for the token ID
- ✓ emits an Approval event
- ✓ adjusts owners balances
- ✓ adjusts owners tokens by index

when sent to the owner

- ✓ keeps ownership of the token
- ✓ clears the approval for the token ID
- ✓ emits only a transfer event
- ✓ keeps the owner balance✓ keeps same tokens by index

when the address of the previous owner is incorrect

✓ reverts

when the sender is not authorized for the token id

✓ reverts

when the given token ID does not exist

✓ reverts

when the address to transfer the token to is the zero address

✓ reverts

with an invalid token id

✓ reverts

to a receiver contract returning unexpected value

✓ reverts

to a receiver contract that reverts with message

✓ reverts

to a receiver contract that reverts without message

✓ reverts

to a receiver contract that panics

✓ reverts

to a contract that does not implement the required function

✓ reverts

approve

when clearing approval

when there was no prior approval

- ✓ clears approval for the token
- ✓ emits an approval event

when there was a prior approval

- ✓ clears approval for the token
- ✓ emits an approval event

when approving a non-zero address

when there was no prior approval

- ✓ sets the approval for the target address
- ✓ emits an approval event

when there was a prior approval to the same address

- ✓ sets the approval for the target address
- ✓ emits an approval event

when there was a prior approval to a different address

- ✓ sets the approval for the target address
- ✓ emits an approval event

when the address that receives the approval is the owner

✓ reverts

when the sender does not own the given token ID

✓ reverts

when the sender is approved for the given token ID

✓ reverts

when the sender is an operator

- ✓ sets the approval for the target address
- ✓ emits an approval event

when the given token ID does not exist

✓ reverts

setApprovalForAll

when the operator willing to approve is not the owner when there is no operator approval set by the sender

- ✓ approves the operator
- ✓ emits an approval event

when the operator was set as not approved

- ✓ approves the operator
- ✓ emits an approval event
- can unset the operator approval

when the operator was already approved

- $lap{\prime}$  keeps the approval to the given address
- emits an approval event

when the operator is the owner

✓ reverts

getApproved

#### when token is not minted

- ✓ reverts
- when token has been minted
- ✓ should return the zero address
- when account has been approved
  - ✓ returns approved account

#### Sale contract

### Initial configuration

- ✓ Should set the right owner NFT
- ✓ Should set the right owner of sale
- ✓ Total supply of NFT should be 0

### Check owner condition

- ✓ Should non owner tries to call setMaxSupply
- ✓ Should non owner tries to call setMaxSupplyPhaseOne
- ✓ Should non owner tries to call setLimit
- ✓ Should non owner tries to call setPricePhaseOne
- ✓ Should non owner tries to call setPricePhaseTwo
- ✓ Should non owner tries to call setPricePhaseThree
- ✓ Should non owner tries to call setPhaseOneStartTime
- ✓ Should non owner tries to call setPhaseOneDuration
- ✓ Should non owner tries to call setPhaseTwoStartTime
- ✓ Should non owner tries to call setPhaseTwoDuration
- ✓ Should non owner tries to call setPhaseThreeStartTime
- ✓ Should non owner tries to call setMerkleRootPhaseOne
- ✓ Should non owner tries to call setMerkleRootPhaseTwo

# Phase one minting

- ✔ Buy single NFT
- ✓ Claim with single NFTs

✓ Buy Multiple NFTs

- ✓ Claim with multiple NFTs (40ms)
- ✓ Set new purchase amount
- ✓ Should revert if user tries to claim more than alloted
- ✓ Should revert if user tries to buy more than alloted (45ms)
- ✓ Should revert if user tries to buy 0 tokens
- ✓ Should revert if user tries to buy after sale time
- ✓ Should revert if user tries to buy before sale time
- ✓ Should revert if user tries to buy after Phase max supply reached
- ✓ Should revert if another user tries to buy
- ✓ Should revert if user tries to buy with less amount
- ✓ Should revert if user tries to buy multiple tokens with less amount Phase Two minting

## ✓ Buy single NFT

- ✓ Buy Multiple NFTs
- Claim with single NFTs

- ✓ Claim with multiple NFTs (39ms)
- ✓ Set new purchase amount
- ✓ Should revert if user tries to claim more than alloted
- ✓ Should revert if user tries to buy 0 tokens
- ✓ Should revert if user tries to buy after sale time
- ✓ Should revert if user tries to buy before sale time
- ✓ Should revert if another user tries to buy
- ✓ Should revert if user tries to buy with less amount
- ✓ Should revert if user tries to buy multiple tokens with less amount Phase Three minting
  - ✓ Buy single NFT
  - ✓ Buy Multiple NFTs
  - ✓ Claim with single NFTs
  - ✓ Claim with multiple NFTs (43ms)
- ✓ Set new purchase amount
- ✓ Should revert if user tries to claim more than alloted (38ms)
- ✓ Should revert if user tries to buy 0 tokens
- ✓ Should revert if user tries to buy before sale time
- ✓ Should revert if user tries to buy after Phase max supply reached
- ✓ Should revert if another user tries to buy
- ✓ Should revert if user tries to buy with less amount
- ✓ Should revert if user tries to buy multiple tokens with less amount

### Staking contract

### Initial configuration

- ✓ Should set the right owner NFT token
- ✓ Should set the right owner of stake contract
- ✓ Should check the total supply of NFT

#### Stake token

- ✓ Should stake the token in staking contract
- ✓ Should stake the multiple token in staking contract

#### Rewards

- ✔ Reward should be divided among multiple staker (94ms)
- ✔ Reward should not not get the tokens from previous rewards (85ms)
- ✓ User should get the correct tokens on claim (92ms)
- ✓ User should get the correct tokens on claim when multiple users stake (154ms)

### Claim rewards after multiple stake/claim

- ✓ User should get the correct tokens on deposit again (140ms)
- ✓ User should get the correct tokens on multiple deposit/withdraw too (320ms)

### **Audit Comments**

We recommend you to use the special form of comments (NatSpec Format, Follow link for more information <a href="https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.5.10/natspec-format.html">https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.5.10/natspec-format.html</a>) for your contracts to provide rich documentation for functions, return variables and more. This helps investors to make clear what that variables, functions etc. do.

### 20. March 2022:

· Read whole report for more information



# **SWC Attacks**

ID	Title	Relationships	Status
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>36</u>	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	CWE-767: Access to Critical Private Variable via Public Method	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>35</u>	Code With No Effects	CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>34</u>	Message call with hardcoded gas amount	CWE-655: Improper Initialization	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>33</u>	Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments	CWE-294: Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>32</u>	Unexpected Ether balance	CWE-667: Improper Locking	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>31</u>	Presence of unused variables	CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>30</u>	Right-To-Left- Override control character (U+202E)	CWE-451: User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>29</u>	Typographical Error	CWE-480: Use of Incorrect Operator	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>28</u>	DoS With Block Gas Limit	CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption	PASSED

<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>27</u>	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	CWE-695: Use of Low-Level Functionality	PASSED
SW C-1 25	Incorrect Inheritance Order	CWE-696: Incorrect Behavior Order	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>24</u>	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	CWE-123: Write-what-where Condition	PASSED
SW C-1 23	Requirement Violation	CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>22</u>	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity	PASSED
SW C-1 21	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature	PASSED
SW C-1 20	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>9</u>	Shadowing State Variables	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>8</u>	Incorrect Constructor Name	CWE-665: Improper Initialization	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>7</u>	Signature Malleability	CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature	PASSED

<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>6</u>	Timestamp Dependence	CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>5</u>	Authorization through tx.origin	CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>4</u>	Transaction Order Dependence	CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>3</u>	DoS with Failed Call	CWE-703: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>2</u>	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>1</u>	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>O</u>	Assert Violation	CWE-670: Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation	PASSED
SW C-1 09	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	CWE-824: Access of Uninitialized Pointer	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>08</u>	State Variable Default Visibility	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	PASSED
SW C-1 07	Reentrancy	CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>06</u>	Unprotected SELFDESTRUC T Instruction	CWE-284: Improper Access Control	PASSED

<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>05</u>	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	CWE-284: Improper Access Control	PASSED
SW C-1 04	Unchecked Call Return Value	CWE-252: Unchecked Return Value	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>03</u>	Floating Pragma	CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime	NOT PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>02</u>	Outdated Compiler Version	CWE-937: Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>01</u>	Integer Overflow and Underflow	CWE-682: Incorrect Calculation	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>00</u>	Function Default Visibility	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	PASSED



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