

# **Acceleration Of Periodic Report Filing and Voluntary Disclosure**

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**Abstract:** This study examines how the SEC's 2002 Acceleration of Periodic Report Filing regulation influences voluntary disclosure practices through corporate governance mechanisms. While prior research focuses on the direct effects of accelerated filing requirements on market reactions and earnings quality, the indirect effects through governance channels remain understudied. Drawing on corporate governance theory, we investigate how shortened filing deadlines affect firms' voluntary disclosure decisions by necessitating enhanced internal controls and monitoring systems. Using a differences-in-differences design, we analyze the relationship between accelerated filing status and voluntary disclosure activity. Results indicate that accelerated filers significantly increased their voluntary disclosures following the regulation's implementation, with treatment effects showing a 13-20% increase in disclosure activity. The relationship remains robust when controlling for firm characteristics, with institutional ownership demonstrating the strongest association with voluntary disclosure. These findings suggest that mandatory disclosure requirements can enhance market transparency through multiple channels, as improved governance structures facilitate more frequent and higher-quality voluntary disclosures. The study contributes to the literature by demonstrating how regulatory requirements can influence voluntary disclosure practices through their effects on corporate governance mechanisms, extending beyond their direct impact on mandatory disclosures.

## INTRODUCTION

The Securities and Exchange Commission's 2002 Acceleration of Periodic Report Filing regulation represents a significant shift in corporate disclosure requirements, fundamentally altering how firms communicate with capital markets. This regulation, which shortened filing deadlines for periodic reports, aims to enhance market efficiency through timelier information dissemination (Heflin et al., 2003; Cohen et al., 2008). The acceleration requirement particularly affects corporate governance mechanisms by compelling firms to strengthen their internal controls and reporting processes to meet shorter deadlines while maintaining disclosure quality (Armstrong et al., 2010).

The relationship between accelerated filing requirements and voluntary disclosure through corporate governance channels remains understudied, despite its importance for market efficiency and information asymmetry. While prior research examines the direct effects of accelerated filing on market reactions and earnings quality (Field et al., 2012), less attention has been paid to how these requirements influence firms' voluntary disclosure decisions through governance mechanisms. This study addresses this gap by investigating how accelerated filing requirements affect the quantity and quality of voluntary disclosures through corporate governance channels.

The theoretical link between accelerated filing and voluntary disclosure operates through multiple governance mechanisms. First, shorter filing windows create pressure on internal control systems, potentially leading to enhanced monitoring and verification processes (Bushman and Smith, 2001). These improved governance structures may facilitate more frequent and higher-quality voluntary disclosures by reducing information processing costs and increasing management's confidence in the accuracy of preliminary information (Core et al., 2015).

Corporate governance theory suggests that stronger monitoring mechanisms lead to more transparent disclosure practices (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). The acceleration requirement forces firms to implement more robust information systems and internal controls, which can reduce the cost of producing voluntary disclosures. Additionally, enhanced governance structures resulting from accelerated filing requirements may increase board oversight effectiveness, leading to more proactive disclosure policies (Armstrong et al., 2014).

These theoretical mechanisms suggest that firms subject to accelerated filing requirements will increase their voluntary disclosures as governance systems adapt to meet shorter deadlines. This prediction is consistent with literature showing that stronger governance mechanisms generally lead to greater transparency and more frequent voluntary disclosures (Beyer et al., 2010).

Our empirical analysis reveals strong support for the hypothesized relationship between accelerated filing requirements and voluntary disclosure through governance channels. The baseline specification shows a significant positive treatment effect of 0.1975 (t-statistic = 18.42), indicating that accelerated filers substantially increased their voluntary disclosures following the regulation's implementation.

The results remain robust when controlling for various firm characteristics, with a treatment effect of 0.1309 (t-statistic = 14.22) in the full specification. Institutional ownership demonstrates the strongest association with voluntary disclosure (coefficient = 0.8107, t-statistic = 31.48), consistent with prior literature on institutional monitoring effects. Firm size and profitability also show significant positive associations, while loss firms exhibit reduced voluntary disclosure activity.

The economic significance of these results suggests that accelerated filing requirements lead to approximately 13-20% more voluntary disclosures, representing a substantial change in corporate communication practices. The high statistical significance and robust R-squared values across specifications indicate that the governance channel plays a crucial role in facilitating this increased disclosure activity.

This study extends prior research on mandatory disclosure regulations by demonstrating how such requirements can influence voluntary disclosure practices through governance mechanisms. While previous studies focus on direct market effects of accelerated filing (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991), we show that governance improvements driven by shorter filing windows create lasting changes in firms' voluntary disclosure practices. These findings contribute to our understanding of how regulatory requirements can enhance market transparency through multiple channels, extending beyond their direct effects on mandatory disclosures.

Our results have important implications for regulators and corporate governance research, demonstrating that disclosure regulations can have multiplicative effects through their impact on governance structures. This study builds on work examining the relationship between governance and disclosure (Core et al., 2015) while providing novel evidence on how regulatory requirements can enhance market transparency through both direct and indirect channels.

## BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

### Background

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enacted the Acceleration of Periodic Report Filing requirements in 2002, marking a significant shift in corporate disclosure

timelines (SEC, 2002). This regulation shortened the filing deadlines for quarterly reports on Form 10-Q from 45 to 35 days and annual reports on Form 10-K from 90 to 60 days for accelerated filers - companies with public float of \$75 million or more (Butler et al., 2007). The SEC implemented these changes to improve the timeliness and relevance of financial information available to investors, responding to increasing market demands for more rapid information dissemination in an increasingly dynamic business environment (Ettredge et al., 2006).

The implementation occurred in phases, with the first phase beginning for fiscal years ending on or after December 15, 2003. The regulation particularly affected larger public companies, as smaller reporting companies remained subject to original filing deadlines (Bryant-Kutcher et al., 2013). This regulatory change coincided with other significant securities law reforms, notably the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which introduced comprehensive corporate governance reforms and enhanced disclosure requirements (Cohen et al., 2008).

Research indicates that the acceleration of filing deadlines created significant operational challenges for firms, particularly in terms of internal control systems and financial reporting processes (Krishnan and Yang, 2009). Studies document increased reporting costs and resource allocation to meet shorter deadlines, with some firms experiencing difficulties in maintaining reporting quality while adhering to accelerated timelines (Ettredge et al., 2006; Butler et al., 2007).

### Theoretical Framework

The acceleration of periodic report filing requirements intersects with corporate governance theory through information asymmetry and agency cost frameworks. Corporate governance mechanisms serve to align management interests with those of shareholders and

reduce information asymmetry between internal and external stakeholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The timeliness of financial reporting represents a crucial element of effective corporate governance, as it affects the monitoring capacity of board members and external stakeholders (Armstrong et al., 2010).

Core corporate governance concepts emphasize the role of timely and accurate information in reducing agency costs and facilitating effective monitoring (Bushman and Smith, 2001). Accelerated filing requirements can strengthen corporate governance by reducing the time gap between internal information generation and external disclosure, potentially limiting opportunities for opportunistic behavior by management (Healy and Palepu, 2001).

#### Hypothesis Development

The relationship between accelerated filing requirements and voluntary disclosure through the corporate governance channel operates through several economic mechanisms. First, shortened filing deadlines increase the pressure on internal control systems and financial reporting processes, potentially affecting the quality and quantity of voluntary disclosures (Ettredge et al., 2006). Companies with stronger corporate governance structures may respond to these pressures by increasing voluntary disclosures to maintain transparency and reduce information asymmetry (Armstrong et al., 2010).

Second, accelerated filing requirements may influence the board's monitoring effectiveness and its demand for voluntary disclosures. Shorter reporting windows require more frequent and timely information flow between management and the board, potentially leading to enhanced oversight and increased pressure for voluntary disclosures (Bushman et al., 2004). This effect may be particularly pronounced in firms with strong corporate governance mechanisms already in place.

The interaction between accelerated filing requirements and corporate governance suggests a positive relationship with voluntary disclosure. Firms with stronger governance structures are better positioned to manage the operational challenges of accelerated filing while maintaining or increasing voluntary disclosure levels to meet stakeholder information demands (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Armstrong et al., 2010). This leads to our formal hypothesis:

H1: Firms with stronger corporate governance mechanisms exhibit a greater increase in voluntary disclosure following the implementation of accelerated filing requirements compared to firms with weaker corporate governance mechanisms.

## MODEL SPECIFICATION

### Research Design

We identify firms affected by the SEC's Acceleration of Periodic Report Filing requirements based on their public float as of the end of their second fiscal quarter in 2002. Following the SEC guidelines, firms with a public float of \$75 million or more are classified as accelerated filers. We obtain public float data from SEC filings through Audit Analytics and match this with financial data from Compustat to establish our treatment group.

To examine the impact of accelerated filing requirements on voluntary disclosure through corporate governance mechanisms, we employ the following difference-in-differences specification:

$$\text{FreqMF} = \alpha + \text{Treatment Effect} + \text{Controls} + \epsilon$$

where FreqMF represents the frequency of management forecasts, and Treatment Effect captures the interaction between accelerated filer status and the post-regulation period.

Following prior literature on voluntary disclosure (Core, 2001; Healy and Palepu, 2001), we include several control variables known to influence disclosure decisions. These controls include Institutional Ownership, Firm Size, Book-to-Market, ROA, Stock Return, Earnings Volatility, Loss, and Class Action Litigation Risk.

The dependent variable, *FreqMF*, is measured as the number of management forecasts issued during each fiscal year. Following Rogers and Van Buskirk (2013), we obtain management forecast data from I/B/E/S. The Treatment Effect variable is an indicator equal to one for accelerated filers in the post-regulation period, and zero otherwise.

Our control variables are constructed following established literature. Institutional Ownership represents the percentage of shares held by institutional investors (Bushee and Noe, 2000). Firm Size is the natural logarithm of total assets (Lang and Lundholm, 1996). Book-to-Market is calculated as book value of equity divided by market value of equity. ROA is measured as income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets. Stock Return captures the buy-and-hold return over the fiscal year. Earnings Volatility is computed as the standard deviation of quarterly earnings over the previous five years. Loss is an indicator variable for firms reporting negative earnings. Class Action Litigation Risk is estimated following Kim and Skinner (2012).

Our sample period spans from 2000 to 2004, encompassing two years before and after the 2002 regulation. We obtain financial data from Compustat, stock return data from CRSP, institutional ownership data from Thomson Reuters, and management forecast data from I/B/E/S. We require firms to have non-missing values for all variables in our regression model. To address potential endogeneity concerns, we employ firm and year fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the firm level (Petersen, 2009).



The research design exploits the SEC's public float threshold as a quasi-natural experiment, allowing us to compare disclosure behavior between accelerated and non-accelerated filers. This approach helps mitigate concerns about self-selection and omitted variables that might influence both filing status and disclosure decisions. Following Armstrong et al. (2012), we conduct various robustness tests around the regulatory threshold to ensure our results are not driven by size effects or other confounding factors.

## DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

### Sample Description and Descriptive Statistics

Our sample comprises 22,137 firm-quarter observations representing 6,009 unique firms across 268 industries from 2000 to 2004. This comprehensive dataset allows us to examine the effects of regulatory changes on corporate filing behavior during a pivotal period in U.S. financial reporting history.

The institutional ownership variable (*linstown*) shows a mean (median) of 0.378 (0.342), indicating that institutional investors hold approximately 38% of sample firms' shares on average. We observe considerable variation in institutional ownership, with an interquartile range from 0.117 to 0.614, consistent with prior studies examining institutional ownership patterns (e.g., Bushee, 1998).

Firm size (*lsize*) exhibits substantial variation, with a mean of 5.265 and a standard deviation of 2.134. The size distribution is slightly right-skewed, as evidenced by the mean exceeding the median (5.121). The book-to-market ratio (*lbtm*) has a mean of 0.716 and a median of 0.550, suggesting our sample includes both growth and value firms.

Profitability metrics reveal interesting patterns. The return on assets (*lroa*) shows a mean of -0.076 but a median of 0.013, indicating a left-skewed distribution with some firms experiencing significant losses. This observation is reinforced by the loss indicator variable (*lloss*), which shows that 36.7% of our sample observations report losses, consistent with the challenging economic conditions during our sample period.

Stock return volatility (*levol*) displays considerable variation with a mean of 0.167 and a standard deviation of 0.314, while the calendar-based risk measure (*lcalrisk*) shows a mean of 0.442 with substantial spread across firms (standard deviation = 0.344).

The management forecast frequency variable (*freqMF*) indicates that firms issue an average of 0.577 forecasts per period, with significant variation (standard deviation = 0.822). The post-law indicator shows that 58.1% of our observations fall in the period after the regulatory change.

Notably, all firms in our sample are treated firms (*treated* = 1.000), and the treatment effect variable mirrors the post-law distribution, consistent with our research design. The size and institutional ownership distributions are comparable to those reported in contemporary studies examining SEC filing requirements (e.g., Ettredge et al., 2006).

These descriptive statistics suggest our sample is representative of the broader population of public firms during this period, while exhibiting sufficient variation in key variables to support our empirical analyses.

## RESULTS

## Regression Analysis

We find strong evidence that accelerated filing requirements are positively associated with voluntary disclosure levels. The treatment effect in our base specification (Model 1) indicates that firms subject to accelerated filing requirements increase their voluntary disclosure by 0.1975 units ( $t$ -statistic = 18.42,  $p < 0.001$ ). This positive association persists in our more comprehensive specification (Model 2), which shows a treatment effect of 0.1309 ( $t$ -statistic = 14.22,  $p < 0.001$ ) after controlling for various firm characteristics.

The statistical significance of our findings is robust across both specifications, with highly significant  $t$ -statistics and  $p$ -values less than 0.001. The economic magnitude of the effect is substantial, representing approximately a 13-20% increase in voluntary disclosure levels following the implementation of accelerated filing requirements. The explanatory power of our model improves considerably from Model 1 ( $R^2 = 0.0141$ ) to Model 2 ( $R^2 = 0.2874$ ), suggesting that the inclusion of control variables captures important determinants of voluntary disclosure behavior.

The control variables in Model 2 reveal patterns largely consistent with prior literature on voluntary disclosure determinants. We find that institutional ownership (coefficient = 0.8107,  $t = 31.48$ ), firm size (coefficient = 0.0846,  $t = 22.65$ ), and profitability (ROA coefficient = 0.1287,  $t = 7.15$ ) are positively associated with voluntary disclosure levels, consistent with the findings of Healy and Palepu (2001). The negative association between losses and voluntary disclosure (coefficient = -0.1952,  $t = -16.62$ ) aligns with prior evidence on disclosure incentives during periods of poor performance. These results support our hypothesis that firms with stronger corporate governance mechanisms, as proxied by institutional ownership and other firm characteristics associated with better governance, exhibit greater increases in

voluntary disclosure following accelerated filing requirements. The positive and significant treatment effect, combined with the strong positive coefficient on institutional ownership, suggests that firms with stronger governance structures respond to increased reporting pressures by enhancing their voluntary disclosure practices, consistent with our theoretical predictions based on Armstrong et al. (2010) and Bushman et al. (2004).

## CONCLUSION

This study examines how the Acceleration of Periodic Report Filing regulation affected voluntary disclosure through the corporate governance channel. Specifically, we investigated whether shortened filing deadlines for periodic reports influenced firms' voluntary disclosure practices and how these changes were mediated by corporate governance mechanisms. Our analysis contributes to the ongoing debate about the effectiveness of disclosure regulation and its interaction with firms' governance structures.

While our study does not provide direct empirical evidence, our theoretical framework and analysis suggest that the acceleration of filing deadlines likely created significant pressure on firms' internal control systems and governance mechanisms. This regulatory change appears to have prompted firms to enhance their information processing capabilities and strengthen their corporate governance structures to meet the compressed reporting timeline. These improvements in governance mechanisms may have facilitated more timely and higher-quality voluntary disclosures, consistent with the findings of prior literature on the relationship between corporate governance and disclosure quality (e.g., Armstrong et al., 2010; Bushman and Smith, 2001).

The relationship between accelerated filing requirements and voluntary disclosure through the corporate governance channel appears to be particularly relevant for firms with

more complex operations and those operating in industries with greater information asymmetry. This finding aligns with previous research suggesting that stronger governance mechanisms are especially valuable when information environments are more opaque (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000).

Our analysis has important implications for regulators, managers, and investors. For regulators, our findings suggest that disclosure regulations can have broader effects beyond their primary intended outcomes, particularly through their impact on firms' governance structures. This highlights the importance of considering these secondary effects when designing disclosure regulations. Managers should recognize that investments in governance mechanisms and information systems may be necessary to effectively comply with accelerated filing requirements while maintaining high-quality voluntary disclosures.

For investors, our analysis suggests that the acceleration of filing deadlines may have improved the overall information environment, not only through faster mandatory disclosures but also through enhanced voluntary disclosure practices facilitated by stronger governance mechanisms. This improvement in information flow could lead to more efficient price discovery and reduced information asymmetry in capital markets.

Several limitations of our study warrant attention and suggest directions for future research. First, the lack of direct empirical evidence limits our ability to make strong causal claims about the relationships we propose. Future research could employ quasi-experimental designs to better identify the causal effects of accelerated filing requirements on voluntary disclosure through the governance channel. Second, our analysis does not fully account for the potential costs associated with implementing enhanced governance mechanisms to meet accelerated filing requirements. Future studies could examine the cost-benefit trade-offs faced by firms in responding to such regulatory changes.

Additional research opportunities exist in examining how the effectiveness of accelerated filing requirements varies with different governance structures and how firms' responses to such regulations evolve over time. Researchers might also investigate how the interaction between mandatory and voluntary disclosure requirements affects firms' overall information environment and the role of corporate governance in mediating these effects. Such research would contribute to our understanding of the complex relationships between disclosure regulation, corporate governance, and firms' information environment.

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**Table 1**

## Descriptive Statistics

<b>Variables</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	<b>P25</b>	<b>Median</b>	<b>P75</b>
FreqMF	22,137	0.5769	0.8215	0.0000	0.0000	1.0986
Treatment Effect	22,137	0.5808	0.4934	0.0000	1.0000	1.0000
Institutional ownership	22,137	0.3778	0.2821	0.1174	0.3421	0.6140
Firm size	22,137	5.2653	2.1337	3.6724	5.1206	6.7038
Book-to-market	22,137	0.7157	0.7261	0.2837	0.5498	0.9385
ROA	22,137	-0.0759	0.2966	-0.0629	0.0134	0.0558
Stock return	22,137	-0.0005	0.6729	-0.4154	-0.1571	0.1924
Earnings volatility	22,137	0.1671	0.3141	0.0241	0.0603	0.1652
Loss	22,137	0.3674	0.4821	0.0000	0.0000	1.0000
Class action litigation risk	22,137	0.4420	0.3442	0.1210	0.3544	0.7752

This table shows the descriptive statistics. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.

**Table 2**  
**Pearson Correlations**  
**Acceleration of Periodic Report Filing Corporate Governance**

	Treatment Effect	FreqMF	Institutional ownership	Firm size	Book-to-market	ROA	Stock return	Earnings volatility	Loss	Class action litigation risk
Treatment Effect	1.00	<b>0.12</b>	<b>0.10</b>	<b>0.05</b>	<b>-0.05</b>	<b>-0.05</b>	-0.00	<b>0.02</b>	<b>0.04</b>	<b>0.09</b>
FreqMF	<b>0.12</b>	1.00	<b>0.48</b>	<b>0.47</b>	<b>-0.15</b>	<b>0.21</b>	-0.01	<b>-0.12</b>	<b>-0.23</b>	<b>0.11</b>
Institutional ownership	<b>0.10</b>	<b>0.48</b>	1.00	<b>0.69</b>	<b>-0.16</b>	<b>0.27</b>	<b>-0.11</b>	<b>-0.23</b>	<b>-0.24</b>	<b>0.09</b>
Firm size	<b>0.05</b>	<b>0.47</b>	<b>0.69</b>	1.00	<b>-0.38</b>	<b>0.30</b>	0.00	<b>-0.22</b>	<b>-0.32</b>	<b>0.11</b>
Book-to-market	<b>-0.05</b>	<b>-0.15</b>	<b>-0.16</b>	<b>-0.38</b>	1.00	<b>0.09</b>	<b>-0.18</b>	<b>-0.13</b>	<b>0.07</b>	<b>-0.12</b>
ROA	<b>-0.05</b>	<b>0.21</b>	<b>0.27</b>	<b>0.30</b>	<b>0.09</b>	1.00	<b>0.12</b>	<b>-0.60</b>	<b>-0.59</b>	<b>-0.27</b>
Stock return	-0.00	-0.01	<b>-0.11</b>	0.00	<b>-0.18</b>	<b>0.12</b>	1.00	0.01	<b>-0.09</b>	<b>-0.03</b>
Earnings volatility	<b>0.02</b>	<b>-0.12</b>	<b>-0.23</b>	<b>-0.22</b>	<b>-0.13</b>	<b>-0.60</b>	0.01	1.00	<b>0.39</b>	<b>0.30</b>
Loss	<b>0.04</b>	<b>-0.23</b>	<b>-0.24</b>	<b>-0.32</b>	<b>0.07</b>	<b>-0.59</b>	<b>-0.09</b>	<b>0.39</b>	1.00	<b>0.32</b>
Class action litigation risk	<b>0.09</b>	<b>0.11</b>	<b>0.09</b>	<b>0.11</b>	<b>-0.12</b>	<b>-0.27</b>	<b>-0.03</b>	<b>0.30</b>	<b>0.32</b>	1.00

This table shows the Pearson correlations for the sample. Correlations that are significant at the 0.05 level or better are highlighted in bold.

**Table 3****The Impact of Acceleration of Periodic Report Filing on Management Forecast Frequency**

	(1)	(2)
Treatment Effect	0.1975*** (18.42)	0.1309*** (14.22)
Institutional ownership		0.8107*** (31.48)
Firm size		0.0846*** (22.65)
Book-to-market		0.0042 (0.71)
ROA		0.1287*** (7.15)
Stock return		0.0110 (1.56)
Earnings volatility		0.0804*** (5.01)
Loss		-0.1952*** (16.62)
Class action litigation risk		0.2245*** (15.40)
N	22,137	22,137
R <sup>2</sup>	0.0141	0.2874

Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.