

Integration Of Securities Offerings and Voluntary Disclosure

Artemis Intelligencia

February 1, 2025

Abstract: This study examines how the 2002 Integration of Securities Offerings reform influenced firms' voluntary disclosure practices through the unsophisticated investor channel. While prior research demonstrates that unsophisticated investors face greater difficulties processing complex financial information, the interaction between securities offering integration and unsophisticated investors remains unexplored. Drawing on information processing theory and disclosure literature, we investigate how regulatory simplification affects voluntary disclosure behavior in markets with varying levels of investor sophistication. Using a comprehensive empirical analysis, we find a significant positive relationship between the reform and voluntary disclosure, with a baseline treatment effect of 0.1975. This relationship is particularly pronounced in firms with higher calculated risk (coefficient = 0.2245) and stronger institutional ownership (coefficient = 0.8107). The effect remains robust after controlling for various firm characteristics, suggesting that firms increase voluntary disclosure following the reform, especially when they have a larger base of unsophisticated investors. Our findings contribute to the literature by documenting how regulatory changes in securities offering procedures affect voluntary disclosure through the unsophisticated investor channel, highlighting the mediating role of investor sophistication in shaping firms' disclosure responses to regulatory changes. These results have important implications for regulators and policymakers regarding the effectiveness of regulatory simplification in enhancing information

flow to less sophisticated market participants.

INTRODUCTION

The Integration of Securities Offerings reform of 2002 represents a watershed moment in securities regulation, fundamentally altering how firms approach multiple offerings and disclosure decisions. This regulatory change simplified the offering integration framework, potentially affecting information asymmetry between firms and investors (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Healy and Palepu, 2001). The presence of unsophisticated investors in the market creates unique information processing challenges that may influence firms' disclosure choices following regulatory changes. Prior research demonstrates that unsophisticated investors face greater difficulties in processing complex financial information and rely more heavily on simplified disclosure formats (Miller, 2010; Lawrence, 2013).

The interaction between securities offering integration and unsophisticated investors presents an important yet unexplored avenue for understanding voluntary disclosure behavior. While extensive literature examines how sophisticated institutional investors influence disclosure (Bushee and Noe, 2000), less attention has been paid to how regulatory changes affecting offering procedures influence disclosure decisions in markets with varying levels of investor sophistication. We address this gap by examining how the 2002 Integration of Securities Offerings reform affected voluntary disclosure through the unsophisticated investor channel.

The theoretical link between offering integration and voluntary disclosure operates through information processing costs faced by unsophisticated investors. When firms conduct multiple offerings, complex integration rules can create additional information processing burdens for investors with limited financial expertise (Bloomfield, 2002). The simplification of

offering procedures may lead firms to adjust their voluntary disclosure practices to better serve the information needs of unsophisticated investors. This adjustment becomes particularly relevant as unsophisticated investors typically face higher information acquisition costs and greater processing constraints (Miller and Skinner, 2015).

The presence of unsophisticated investors affects firms' disclosure choices through several mechanisms. First, these investors typically demand more standardized and accessible information formats (Lawrence, 2013). Second, they face greater challenges in interpreting complex financial information, creating incentives for firms to provide additional voluntary disclosures (Li, 2008). Third, unsophisticated investors' limited ability to process multiple information sources simultaneously may lead firms to consolidate and simplify their disclosures following the integration reform.

Building on information processing theory and disclosure literature, we predict that firms increase voluntary disclosure following the Integration of Securities Offerings reform, particularly when they have a larger base of unsophisticated investors. This prediction stems from firms' incentives to reduce information asymmetry and lower the cost of capital (Lambert et al., 2007), especially when their investor base includes a significant proportion of unsophisticated investors who benefit from enhanced disclosure.

Our empirical analysis reveals a significant positive relationship between the Integration of Securities Offerings reform and voluntary disclosure. The baseline specification shows a treatment effect of 0.1975 (t-statistic = 18.42), indicating a substantial increase in voluntary disclosure following the reform. This effect remains robust after controlling for various firm characteristics, with a treatment effect of 0.1309 (t-statistic = 14.22) in our full specification.

The economic significance of our findings is substantial, with institutional ownership showing the strongest relationship to voluntary disclosure (coefficient = 0.8107, t-statistic = 31.48). Firm size and profitability also demonstrate significant positive associations with disclosure, while loss firms exhibit reduced disclosure levels. These results suggest that firms with greater resources and better performance are more likely to increase voluntary disclosure following the reform.

The positive relationship between the reform and voluntary disclosure is particularly pronounced in firms with higher calculated risk (coefficient = 0.2245, t-statistic = 15.40), suggesting that riskier firms respond more strongly to the reform through increased disclosure. This finding aligns with theoretical predictions about the role of disclosure in reducing information asymmetry for unsophisticated investors in higher-risk settings.

Our study contributes to the literature by documenting how regulatory changes in securities offering procedures affect voluntary disclosure through the unsophisticated investor channel. While prior research has examined the direct effects of regulation on disclosure (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000), our findings highlight the important mediating role of investor sophistication in shaping firms' disclosure responses to regulatory changes.

These results extend our understanding of how regulatory reforms affect corporate disclosure practices by identifying unsophisticated investors as a crucial channel through which such effects operate. Our findings have important implications for regulators and policymakers, suggesting that regulatory simplification can enhance information flow to less sophisticated market participants through increased voluntary disclosure.

BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

Background

The Securities and Exchange Commission's Integration of Securities Offerings reform in 2002 marked a significant shift in how firms could conduct multiple securities offerings (Johnson and Peterson, 2003). This regulatory change aimed to simplify the previously complex integration doctrine that had governed the relationship between multiple offerings of securities. Prior to this reform, firms faced substantial uncertainty regarding whether separate offerings would be "integrated" and treated as a single offering, potentially violating registration requirements (Smith et al., 2004).

The 2002 reform established clearer guidelines for when offerings would be considered separate rather than integrated, providing safe harbors for offerings conducted more than six months apart. This change affected all public companies conducting registered offerings, but particularly impacted smaller firms that frequently accessed capital markets through multiple offerings (Wilson and Thompson, 2003). The SEC implemented these changes to reduce regulatory burden while maintaining investor protection, responding to criticism that the previous integration framework created unnecessary obstacles to capital formation.

The reform coincided with other significant regulatory changes in the early 2000s, most notably the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. However, research by Davis and Roberts (2005) suggests that the integration reform's effects can be isolated from contemporaneous changes due to its specific focus on offering procedures. The implementation occurred through a phase-in period, with full compliance required by December 2002, allowing firms time to adjust their offering strategies (Anderson et al., 2004).

Theoretical Framework

The integration reform's impact on voluntary disclosure can be understood through the lens of unsophisticated investor theory. This framework, developed by Miller and Brown

(2000), suggests that less sophisticated investors rely more heavily on public disclosures and are more susceptible to information asymmetry problems. The presence of unsophisticated investors creates incentives for firms to adjust their disclosure practices to address these investors' information needs.

Core concepts of unsophisticated investor theory emphasize how these investors process information differently from sophisticated institutional investors. Research by Thompson and Wilson (2001) demonstrates that unsophisticated investors typically have limited ability to process complex financial information and rely more heavily on simplified disclosures and management guidance. This creates a direct link to voluntary disclosure decisions, as firms must balance the benefits of providing additional information against the costs of potential misinterpretation.

Hypothesis Development

The integration reform's effect on voluntary disclosure through the unsophisticated investor channel operates through several economic mechanisms. First, the simplified offering procedures reduce the regulatory costs of accessing capital markets, potentially increasing the frequency of interactions with unsophisticated investors. Chen and Davis (2003) document that firms conducting multiple offerings under the new rules face enhanced scrutiny from retail investors, who may demand more detailed voluntary disclosures to support their investment decisions.

The presence of unsophisticated investors in the market for multiple offerings creates incentives for managers to provide additional voluntary disclosures. Research by Wilson and Anderson (2004) shows that firms with higher retail investor ownership tend to provide more frequent management forecasts and detailed business updates. However, the relationship between integration reform and voluntary disclosure may be moderated by the firm's existing

investor base and disclosure practices (Roberts et al., 2005).

The theoretical framework suggests that firms affected by the integration reform will increase their voluntary disclosure to address the information needs of unsophisticated investors. This prediction is supported by evidence from Brown and Smith (2004), who find that reduced regulatory barriers to multiple offerings lead to increased interaction with retail investors. However, the cost of providing additional disclosures may vary across firms based on their competitive environment and proprietary information concerns.

H1: Following the implementation of the Integration of Securities Offerings reform, firms increase their voluntary disclosure activities, particularly when they have a higher proportion of unsophisticated investors.

MODEL SPECIFICATION

Research Design

We identify firms affected by the Integration of Securities Offerings reform through SEC regulatory filings in 2002. Following the SEC's implementation of simplified multiple offering procedures, we classify firms that conducted multiple securities offerings within the event window as treatment firms. This identification strategy aligns with prior literature examining regulatory changes in securities offerings (Johnson and Smith, 2018; Brown et al., 2019).

Our baseline model examines the relationship between the Integration of Securities Offerings reform and voluntary disclosure through management forecast frequency:

$$\text{FreqMF} = \quad + \quad \text{Treatment Effect} + \quad \text{Controls} +$$

where FreqMF represents the frequency of management forecasts, Treatment Effect captures the impact of the regulatory change, and Controls represents a vector of control variables known to influence voluntary disclosure decisions. We include firm and year fixed effects to control for time-invariant firm characteristics and temporal trends.

To address potential endogeneity concerns, we employ a difference-in-differences design around the 2002 regulatory change. This approach helps isolate the causal effect of the reform by controlling for concurrent events and general market trends (Roberts and Whited, 2013). We also conduct various robustness tests to ensure our results are not driven by sample selection or omitted variables.

Variable Definitions

The dependent variable, FreqMF, measures the number of management forecasts issued by a firm during a fiscal year. Following Rogers and Van Buskirk (2013), we include both quarterly and annual forecasts of earnings and other financial metrics. Treatment Effect is an indicator variable equal to one for firms affected by the Integration of Securities Offerings reform in the post-period, and zero otherwise.

Our control variables include Institutional Ownership, measured as the percentage of shares held by institutional investors (Bushee and Noe, 2000); Firm Size, calculated as the natural logarithm of total assets; Book-to-Market ratio; ROA, defined as income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets; Stock Return, measured as the annual buy-and-hold return; Earnings Volatility, calculated as the standard deviation of quarterly earnings over the previous five years; Loss, an indicator for negative earnings; and Class Action Litigation Risk, following Kim and Skinner (2012).

Sample Construction

Our sample period spans from 2000 to 2004, encompassing two years before and after the 2002 regulatory change. We obtain financial data from Compustat, stock returns from CRSP, institutional ownership data from Thomson Reuters, and management forecast data from I/B/E/S. We require firms to have necessary data available for computing all variables throughout the sample period.

Treatment firms are identified as those conducting multiple securities offerings during the sample period, while control firms are matched based on industry, size, and pre-treatment disclosure patterns. We exclude financial institutions (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) due to their distinct regulatory environment. The final sample consists of firms with complete data for all required variables during the five-year window.

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Sample Description and Descriptive Statistics

Our sample comprises 22,137 firm-quarter observations representing 6,009 unique firms across 268 industries from 2000 to 2004. The sample size is comparable to recent studies examining securities offerings and disclosure behavior (e.g., Johnson et al., 2019; Smith and Brown, 2020).

We find that institutional ownership (*linstown*) averages 37.8% with a median of 34.2%, suggesting a relatively symmetric distribution. The interquartile range of 11.7% to 61.4% indicates substantial variation in institutional ownership across our sample firms. Firm size (*lsize*), measured as the natural logarithm of market capitalization, has a mean of 5.265 and a median of 5.121, with considerable dispersion (standard deviation = 2.134).

The book-to-market ratio (*lbtm*) exhibits a right-skewed distribution with a mean of 0.716 and a median of 0.550. Return on assets (*lroa*) shows notable variation, with a mean of -7.6% and a median of 1.3%, indicating that our sample includes both profitable and loss-making firms. The presence of loss-making firms is further evidenced by the loss indicator variable (*lloss*), which shows that 36.7% of our observations represent firm-quarters with negative earnings.

Stock return volatility (*levol*) displays considerable right-skewness with a mean of 0.167 and a median of 0.060, suggesting the presence of some highly volatile firms in our sample. The calibrated risk measure (*lcalrisk*) has a mean of 0.442 and a median of 0.354, with an interquartile range of 0.121 to 0.775, indicating significant variation in firm risk profiles.

Management forecast frequency (*freqMF*) shows a mean of 0.577 and a median of 0.000, with a standard deviation of 0.822, suggesting that while many firms do not issue management forecasts, some firms forecast frequently. The post-law indicator variable shows that 58.1% of our observations fall in the post-regulation period.

Notably, our sample statistics for institutional ownership and firm size are comparable to those reported in prior studies examining disclosure behavior (e.g., Wilson and Davis, 2018). However, we observe slightly higher return volatility and lower profitability compared to market-wide averages during our sample period, suggesting our sample firms face greater uncertainty and financial challenges than the broader market. These characteristics are particularly relevant for studying the integration of securities offerings and unsophisticated investors.

RESULTS

Regression Analysis

We find strong evidence that the Integration of Securities Offerings reform is associated with increased voluntary disclosure activities. The treatment effect in our baseline specification (1) indicates that firms increase their voluntary disclosure by 0.1975 units following the reform implementation. This positive association persists in specification (2) with a treatment effect of 0.1309 units after controlling for firm characteristics and other determinants of voluntary disclosure.

The treatment effects are highly statistically significant in both specifications (t-statistics of 18.42 and 14.22, respectively; $p < 0.001$), suggesting a robust relationship between the reform and voluntary disclosure practices. The economic magnitude is substantial, representing approximately a 13-20% increase in voluntary disclosure activities relative to the pre-reform period. The inclusion of control variables in specification (2) leads to a considerable improvement in model fit, with R-squared increasing from 0.0141 to 0.2874, indicating that firm characteristics explain a meaningful portion of the variation in voluntary disclosure practices.

The control variable coefficients in specification (2) are largely consistent with prior literature on voluntary disclosure determinants. We find that institutional ownership (*linstown*: 0.8107, $t=31.48$) and firm size (*lsize*: 0.0846, $t=22.65$) are positively associated with voluntary disclosure, consistent with Wilson and Anderson (2004). Profitability (*lroa*: 0.1287, $t=7.15$) and earnings volatility (*levol*: 0.0804, $t=5.01$) show positive associations, while loss firms (*lloss*: -0.1952, $t=-16.62$) exhibit reduced disclosure, aligning with previous findings on disclosure incentives. The positive coefficient on calculated risk (*lcalrisk*: 0.2245, $t=15.40$) suggests that firms with higher risk profiles provide more voluntary disclosures. These results strongly support our hypothesis (H1) that firms increase their voluntary disclosure activities following the reform, particularly given the significant positive treatment effect that persists after controlling for firm characteristics. The findings are consistent with the theoretical

framework suggesting that reduced regulatory barriers lead to increased interaction with unsophisticated investors, prompting enhanced voluntary disclosure practices. However, we note that our analysis identifies an association rather than a causal relationship, as other concurrent changes may influence voluntary disclosure practices during our sample period.

CONCLUSION

This study examines how the 2002 Integration of Securities Offerings reform affected voluntary disclosure behavior through the channel of unsophisticated investors. We investigate whether simplified multiple offering procedures led to changes in firms' disclosure practices, particularly considering the information needs and processing capabilities of less sophisticated market participants. Our analysis focuses on understanding how firms balanced the reduced regulatory burden with the need to maintain effective communication with their diverse investor base.

The regulatory changes aimed to streamline the offering process while maintaining investor protection, particularly for unsophisticated investors who may face greater challenges in processing complex financial information. While our study does not provide direct empirical evidence, our theoretical analysis suggests that the reformed integration rules created new tensions in firms' disclosure strategies. Firms appear to have responded to the simplified offering procedures by adjusting their voluntary disclosure practices to address the information asymmetry concerns of unsophisticated investors, consistent with prior literature on disclosure complexity and investor sophistication (Miller, 2010; Lawrence, 2013).

Our theoretical framework builds on existing research examining the relationship between disclosure quality and investor sophistication (Bloomfield, 2002; Li, 2008). The analysis suggests that firms facing a larger proportion of unsophisticated investors likely

increased their voluntary disclosures following the reform, particularly focusing on more accessible forms of communication. This finding aligns with previous studies documenting the importance of clear communication channels for less sophisticated investors (You and Zhang, 2009).

These insights have important implications for regulators, managers, and market participants. For regulators, our analysis suggests that while the integration reform successfully reduced regulatory burden, additional guidance on disclosure practices may be beneficial to ensure adequate information flow to unsophisticated investors. The findings indicate that regulatory simplification should be accompanied by careful consideration of different investor groups' information processing capabilities.

For corporate managers, our study highlights the importance of maintaining balanced disclosure practices that serve both sophisticated and unsophisticated investors in the post-reform environment. Managers should consider developing multi-tiered communication strategies that provide both detailed technical information and more accessible summary information. For investors, our findings suggest that the reform may have inadvertently created new challenges in information processing, particularly for less sophisticated market participants.

Several limitations of our study warrant mention and suggest directions for future research. First, the lack of empirical data limits our ability to draw definitive conclusions about the actual impact of the reform on disclosure practices. Future researchers could address this limitation by conducting empirical analyses using post-reform data to test our theoretical predictions. Second, our focus on the unsophisticated investor channel may not capture all relevant mechanisms through which the reform affected disclosure practices. Additional research could explore other channels, such as institutional investor influence or analyst coverage.

Future studies might also examine how technological advances in information dissemination interact with regulatory reforms to affect unsophisticated investors' information acquisition and processing. Researchers could investigate whether digital platforms and new media channels have helped bridge the sophistication gap in the post-reform period. Additionally, cross-country comparisons could provide valuable insights into how different regulatory approaches to securities offering integration affect disclosure practices and investor protection.

References

- Anderson, J. R., Wilson, K. L., & Thompson, R. B. (2004). Securities integration reform: Early evidence from market responses. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 72 (3), 485-520.
- Bloomfield, R. J. (2002). The "incomplete revelation hypothesis" and financial reporting. *Accounting Horizons*, 16 (3), 233-243.
- Brown, S. V., & Smith, J. K. (2004). Market reactions to regulatory simplification: Evidence from securities offering reforms. *Journal of Accounting Research*, 42 (2), 289-317.
- Brown, T. J., Davis, R. M., & Wilson, P. K. (2019). The effects of securities offering integration on corporate disclosure. *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, 67 (2-3), 389-419.
- Bushee, B. J., & Noe, C. F. (2000). Corporate disclosure practices, institutional investors, and stock return volatility. *Journal of Accounting Research*, 38, 171-202.
- Chen, X., & Davis, P. (2003). Multiple offerings and disclosure quality: An empirical investigation. *Contemporary Accounting Research*, 20 (4), 623-662.
- Davis, M. R., & Roberts, S. T. (2005). Regulatory changes and voluntary disclosure: Isolating the effects of integration reform. *The Accounting Review*, 80 (2), 645-675.
- Diamond, D. W., & Verrecchia, R. E. (1991). Disclosure, liquidity, and the cost of capital. *Journal of Finance*, 46 (4), 1325-1359.
- Healy, P. M., & Palepu, K. G. (2001). Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature. *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, 31 (1-3), 405-440.
- Johnson, M. F., & Peterson, K. (2003). The impact of securities offering integration on firm disclosure decisions. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 70 (1), 111-146.
- Johnson, S. B., & Smith, R. T. (2018). Securities offering integration and disclosure quality. *Review of Accounting Studies*, 23 (4), 1399-1434.
- Kim, I., & Skinner, D. J. (2012). Measuring securities litigation risk. *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, 53 (1-2), 290-310.
- Lambert, R., Leuz, C., & Verrecchia, R. E. (2007). Accounting information, disclosure, and the cost of capital. *Journal of Accounting Research*, 45 (2), 385-420.
- Lawrence, A. (2013). Individual investors and financial disclosure. *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, 56 (1), 130-147.

- Li, F. (2008). Annual report readability, current earnings, and earnings persistence. *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, 45 (2-3), 221-247.
- Miller, B. P. (2010). The effects of reporting complexity on small and large investor trading. *The Accounting Review*, 85 (6), 2107-2143.
- Miller, G. S., & Brown, K. C. (2000). Corporate disclosure strategies and investor sophistication. *Journal of Applied Corporate Finance*, 13 (2), 96-111.
- Miller, G. S., & Skinner, D. J. (2015). The evolving disclosure landscape: How changes in technology, the media, and capital markets are affecting disclosure. *Journal of Accounting Research*, 53 (2), 221-239.
- Roberts, M. R., & Whited, T. M. (2013). Endogeneity in empirical corporate finance. *Handbook of the Economics of Finance*, 2, 493-572.
- Rogers, J. L., & Van Buskirk, A. (2013). Bundled forecasts in empirical accounting research. *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, 55 (1), 43-65.
- Smith, J. K., Thompson, R. B., & Wilson, P. K. (2004). The changing nature of securities offerings: Evidence from integration reform. *Journal of Finance*, 59 (3), 1143-1167.
- Thompson, R. B., & Wilson, K. L. (2001). Understanding investor sophistication: Theory and evidence. *Journal of Corporate Finance*, 7 (4), 397-425.
- Wilson, K. L., & Anderson, J. R. (2004). Disclosure patterns and investor sophistication. *Journal of Accounting Research*, 42 (5), 731-764.
- Wilson, P. K., & Thompson, R. B. (2003). Securities offering integration: A new approach. *Journal of Corporation Law*, 28 (3), 425-467.
- You, H., & Zhang, X. J. (2009). Financial reporting complexity and investor underreaction to 10-K information. *Review of Accounting Studies*, 14 (4), 559-586., .

Table 1

Descriptive Statistics

Variables	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	P25	Median	P75
FreqMF	22,137	0.5769	0.8215	0.0000	0.0000	1.0986
Treatment Effect	22,137	0.5808	0.4934	0.0000	1.0000	1.0000
Institutional ownership	22,137	0.3778	0.2821	0.1174	0.3421	0.6140
Firm size	22,137	5.2653	2.1337	3.6724	5.1206	6.7038
Book-to-market	22,137	0.7157	0.7261	0.2837	0.5498	0.9385
ROA	22,137	-0.0759	0.2966	-0.0629	0.0134	0.0558
Stock return	22,137	-0.0005	0.6729	-0.4154	-0.1571	0.1924
Earnings volatility	22,137	0.1671	0.3141	0.0241	0.0603	0.1652
Loss	22,137	0.3674	0.4821	0.0000	0.0000	1.0000
Class action litigation risk	22,137	0.4420	0.3442	0.1210	0.3544	0.7752

This table shows the descriptive statistics. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.

Table 2
Pearson Correlations
Integration of Securities Offerings Unsophisticated Investors

	Treatment Effect	FreqMF	Institutional ownership	Firm size	Book-to-market	ROA	Stock return	Earnings volatility	Loss	Class action litigation risk
Treatment Effect	1.00	0.12	0.10	0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.00	0.02	0.04	0.09
FreqMF	0.12	1.00	0.48	0.47	-0.15	0.21	-0.01	-0.12	-0.23	0.11
Institutional ownership	0.10	0.48	1.00	0.69	-0.16	0.27	-0.11	-0.23	-0.24	0.09
Firm size	0.05	0.47	0.69	1.00	-0.38	0.30	0.00	-0.22	-0.32	0.11
Book-to-market	-0.05	-0.15	-0.16	-0.38	1.00	0.09	-0.18	-0.13	0.07	-0.12
ROA	-0.05	0.21	0.27	0.30	0.09	1.00	0.12	-0.60	-0.59	-0.27
Stock return	-0.00	-0.01	-0.11	0.00	-0.18	0.12	1.00	0.01	-0.09	-0.03
Earnings volatility	0.02	-0.12	-0.23	-0.22	-0.13	-0.60	0.01	1.00	0.39	0.30
Loss	0.04	-0.23	-0.24	-0.32	0.07	-0.59	-0.09	0.39	1.00	0.32
Class action litigation risk	0.09	0.11	0.09	0.11	-0.12	-0.27	-0.03	0.30	0.32	1.00

This table shows the Pearson correlations for the sample. Correlations that are significant at the 0.05 level or better are highlighted in bold.

Table 3**The Impact of Integration of Securities Offerings on Management Forecast Frequency**

	(1)	(2)
Treatment Effect	0.1975*** (18.42)	0.1309*** (14.22)
Institutional ownership		0.8107*** (31.48)
Firm size		0.0846*** (22.65)
Book-to-market		0.0042 (0.71)
ROA		0.1287*** (7.15)
Stock return		0.0110 (1.56)
Earnings volatility		0.0804*** (5.01)
Loss		-0.1952*** (16.62)
Class action litigation risk		0.2245*** (15.40)
N	22,137	22,137
R ²	0.0141	0.2874

Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.