## **Understanding Shapley Values**

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### **Presentation Covers:**

- Cooperative Games & Coalitions
- Fairness Axioms
- Shapley Value Formulations
- ► Three-Player Example
- ► Linear Regression Application



# **#1 Cooperative Games & Coalitions**

### Foundation of Shapley values

### **Cooperative Games:**

- Players work together toward shared goals
- Team success/failure affects all players

#### Coalitions:

- Players:  $N = \{1, 2, ..., n\}$
- Coalition (S): Any subset  $S \subseteq N$
- Grand Coalition: All players (N)
- Number of possible coalitions: 2<sup>n</sup>

#### **Characteristic Function:**

- $v: 2^N \to \mathbb{R}$  maps coalitions to payoffs
- v(S) = total payoff coalition S can achieve



## #2 Fairness Axioms I

## Mathematical principles of fair distribution

1. Symmetry: Equal contributors receive equal payoffs

If 
$$v(S \cup \{i\}) = v(S \cup \{j\})$$
 for all  $S \subseteq N \setminus \{i, j\}$   
 $\Longrightarrow \phi_i(v) = \phi_j(v)$ 

2. Null Player: Players adding no value receive nothing

If 
$$v(S \cup \{i\}) = v(S)$$
 for all  $S \subseteq N \setminus \{i\}$   
 $\Longrightarrow \phi_i(v) = 0$ 

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# **#3 Fairness Axioms II**

Mathematical principles of fair distribution

3. Efficiency: The entire value is fully distributed

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \phi_i(v) = v(N)$$

**4. Additivity:** Payoffs are additive across different games For any two characteristic functions *v* and *w*:

$$\phi_i(v+w) = \phi_i(v) + \phi_i(w)$$

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# **#4 Shapley Value Definitions**

Two equivalent mathematical formulations

#### **Permutation Form:**

$$\phi_i(v) = \frac{1}{N!} \sum_{\pi \in \Pi} [v(P_i^{\pi} \cup \{i\}) - v(P_i^{\pi})]$$

- Π: Set of all N! permutations of players
- $P_i^{\pi}$ : Players preceding *i* in ordering  $\pi$

### **Combinatorial Form:**

$$\phi_i(v) = \sum_{S \subseteq N \setminus \{i\}} \frac{|S|!(|N| - |S| - 1)!}{|N|!} [v(S \cup \{i\}) - v(S)]$$

- $\frac{|S|!(|N|-|S|-1)!}{|N|!}$  = Probability weight
- $[v(S \cup \{i\}) v(S)] = Marginal contribution$



# **#5 From Ordered to Unordered Sets**

### Converting permutations to combinations

### **Key Insights:**

- Players after *i* don't affect *i*'s marginal contribution
- For same unordered set preceding i, contribution is identical
- For coalition S before i (excluding i): |S|! ways to arrange players before i (|N|-|S|-1)! ways to arrange players after i
- Conversion factor from permutations to combinations:

$$\frac{|S|!(|N|-|S|-1)!}{|N|!}$$





# #6 Three-Player Example: Setup

Simple example illustrating Shapley value calculation

#### **Game Parameters:**

- Players: A, B, C (N = 3)
- Characteristic Function: v(S) = |S|(Coalition value = number of players in it)

#### **Coalition Values:**

$$v(\emptyset) = 0$$

$$v(\{A\}) = v(\{B\}) = v(\{C\}) = 1$$

$$v(\{A, B\}) = v(\{A, C\}) = v(\{B, C\}) = 2$$

$$v(\{A, B, C\}) = 3$$



# **#7** Example: Combinatorial Calculation

## Computing Shapley value for Player A

## For each subset $S \subseteq N \setminus \{A\}$ :

1.  $S = \emptyset$ :

Weight: 
$$\frac{0!(3-0-1)!}{3!} = \frac{2!}{6} = \frac{1}{3}$$

Marginal: 
$$v(\{A\}) - v(\emptyset) = 1 - 0 = 1$$

Term: 
$$\frac{1}{3} \cdot 1 = \frac{1}{3}$$

2. 
$$S = \{B\}$$
 and  $S = \{C\}$ :

Weight: 
$$\frac{1!(3-1-1)!}{3!} = \frac{1}{6}$$
 (each)

Marginal: 
$$v(S \cup \{A\}) - v(S) = 2 - 1 = 1$$

Terms: 
$$\frac{1}{6} \cdot 1 + \frac{1}{6} \cdot 1 = \frac{1}{3}$$

3.  $S = \{B, C\}$ :

Weight: 
$$\frac{2!(3-2-1)!}{3!} = \frac{1}{3}$$

Marginal: 
$$v({A, B, C}) - v({B, C}) = 3 - 2 = 1$$

Term: 
$$\frac{1}{3} \cdot 1 = \frac{1}{3}$$

**Result:** 
$$\phi_A = \frac{1}{3} + \frac{1}{3} + \frac{1}{3} = 1$$



# **#8 Linear Regression Application**

Shapley values for model explanation

## Multiple Linear Regression Model:

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{1i} + \beta_2 x_{2i} + \beta_3 x_{3i} + \epsilon_i$$

### Intercept Relationship:

$$\hat{\beta}_0 = \bar{y} - \hat{\beta}_1 \bar{x}_1 - \hat{\beta}_2 \bar{x}_2 - \hat{\beta}_3 \bar{x}_3$$

### **Prediction Difference from Mean:**

$$\hat{y}_i - \bar{y} = \hat{\beta}_1(x_{1i} - \bar{x}_1) + \hat{\beta}_2(x_{2i} - \bar{x}_2) + \hat{\beta}_3(x_{3i} - \bar{x}_3)$$



## **#9 SHAP Values for Features**

Feature importance as Shapley values

### Feature Shapley Value:

$$\mathsf{SHAP}_j(i) = \hat{\beta}_j(x_{ji} - \bar{x}_j)$$

### **Properties:**

- Each feature's marginal contribution (in all ordered sets) is constant
- Contribution depends on deviation from feature's mean
- Total prediction difference equals sum of SHAP values:

$$\hat{y}_i - \bar{y} = \sum_{j=1}^m \mathsf{SHAP}_j(i)$$

