

Crackmes.de – san01suke's SomeCrypto~02

Posted By [Johannes](#) On July 15, 2014 @ 18:33 In [information security](#) | [No Comments](#)

The author *san01suke* submitted three crackmes to www.crackmes.de ^[1] on July 1st. This is my attempt to solve the second one, called **SomeCrypto~02**. You can view and download the crackme [here](#) ^[2]. The short description simply says:


"Just write a valid keygen for this crackme."

– san01suke

Reverse Engineering the Crackme

Getting the Disassembly

The user interface looks exactly like the one from [SomeCrypto~01](#) ^[3]:



[4]

Let's open the code in OllyDbg. At the entry point we get the following picture:

004014B7	20	DB 20	CHAR ' '
004014B8	4A	DB 4A	CHAR 'J'
004014B9	20	DB 20	CHAR ' '
004014BA	48	DB 48	CHAR 'H'
004014BB	80	DB 80	
004014BC	32	DB 32	CHAR '2'
004014BD	60	DB 60	CHAR '0'
004014BE	20	DB 20	CHAR ' '
004014BF	4A	DB 4A	CHAR 'J'
004014C0	20	DB 20	CHAR ' '
004014C1	4A	DB 4A	CHAR 'J'
004014C2	45	DB 45	CHAR 'E'
004014C3	4A	DB 4A	CHAR 'J'
004014C4	20	DB 20	CHAR ' '
004014C5	83	DB 83	
004014C6	4C	DB 4C	CHAR 'L'
004014C7	12	DB 12	
004014C8	60	DB 60	CHAR '0'
004014C9	20	DB 20	CHAR ' '
004014CA	DF	DB DF	
004014CB	. 35 64 00	ASCII "5d",0	
004014CE	60	DB 60	CHAR '0'
004014CF	20	DB 20	CHAR ' '
004014D0	13	DB 13	
004014D1	E0	DB E0	
004014D2	E3	DB E3	
004014D3	§ B0 20	MOV AL,20	
004014D5	. B9 03040000	MOV ECX,4D3	
004014DA	. BB 00104000	MOV EBX,SomeCryp.00401000	
004014DF	> 3E:8A13	MOV DL,BYTE PTR DS:[EBX]	
004014E2	. 32D0	XOR DL,AL	
004014E4	. 3E:8813	MOV BYTE PTR DS:[EBX],DL	
004014E7	. 43	INC EBX	
004014E8	^E2 F5	LOOPE SHORT SomeCryp.004014DF	
004014EA	. B8 B0144000	MOV EAX,SomeCryp.004014B0	
004014EF	. FFD0	CALL EAX	
004014F1	. 0000	ADD BYTE PTR DS:[EAX],AL	
004014F3	. 0000	ADD BYTE PTR DS:[EAX],AL	
004014FC	. 0000	ADD BYTE PTR DS:[EAX],AL	

[5]

One can spot two interesting things:

- The code above 4014D3 could not be disassembled and looks obfuscated
- The code that follows the entry point clearly modifies the code. Starting at location 401000, the snippet XORs exactly 4D3h bytes with 20h.

Let's run the code up to 4014DA to get the changed code section. The bytes clearly changed

004014B7	00	DB 00	
004014B8	6A	DB 6A	CHAR 'j'
004014B9	00	DB 00	
004014BA	68	DB 68	CHAR 'h'
004014BB	A0	DB A0	
004014BC	12	DB 12	
004014BD	40	DB 40	CHAR '@'
004014BE	00	DB 00	
004014BF	6A	DB 6A	CHAR 'j'
004014C0	00	DB 00	
004014C1	6A	DB 6A	CHAR 'j'
004014C2	65	DB 65	CHAR 'e'
004014C3	6A	DB 6A	CHAR 'j'
004014C4	00	DB 00	
004014C5	A3	DB A3	
004014C6	6C	DB 6C	CHAR 'l'
004014C7	32	DB 32	CHAR '2'
004014C8	40	DB 40	CHAR '@'
004014C9	00	DB 00	
004014CA	FF	DB FF	
004014CB	. 15 44 20	ASCII "SD "	
004014CE	40	DB 40	CHAR '@'
004014CF	00	DB 00	
004014D0	33	DB 33	CHAR '3'
004014D1	C0	DB C0	
004014D2	C3	DB C3	
004014D3	§ B0 20	MOV AL,20	
004014D5	. B9 03040000	MOV ECX,4D3	
004014DA	. BB 00104000	MOV EBX,SomeCryp.00401000	
004014DF	> 3E:8A13	MOV DL,BYTE PTR DS:[EBX]	
004014E2	. 32D0	XOR DL,AL	
004014E4	. 3E:8813	MOV BYTE PTR DS:[EBX],DL	
004014E7	. 43	INC EBX	
004014E8	^E2 F5	LOOPE SHORT SomeCryp.004014DF	
004014EA	. B8 B0144000	MOV EAX,SomeCryp.004014B0	
004014EF	. FFD0	CALL EAX	SomeCryp.004014B0
004014F1	. 0000	ADD BYTE PTR DS:[EAX],AL	

[6]

but OllyDbg doesn't automatically reanalyze the section and still displays the section as data bytes. Hit CTRL+A to analyze the code again and now you should see meaningful disassembly:

304014A7	. 8BE5	MOV ESP,EBP	
304014A9	. 5D	POP EBP	
304014AA	. C2 1000	RETN 10	
304014AD	. CC	INT3	
304014AE	. CC	INT3	
304014AF	. CC	INT3	
304014B0	. 6A 00	PUSH 0	pModule = NULL
304014B2	. FF15 18204000	CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&KERNEL32.GetModule	GetModuleHandleA
304014B8	. 6A 00	PUSH 0	lParam = NULL
304014BA	. 68 A0124000	PUSH SomeCryp.004012A0	DlgProc = SomeCryp.004012A0
304014BF	. 6A 00	PUSH 0	hOwner = NULL
304014C1	. 6A 65	PUSH 65	pTemplate = 65
304014C3	. 6A 00	PUSH 0	hInst = NULL
304014C5	. A3 6C324000	MOV DWORD PTR DS:[40326C1],EAX	
304014CA	. FF15 44204000	CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&USER32.DialogBoxPa	DialogBoxParamA
304014D0	. 33C0	XOR EAX,EAX	
304014D2	. C3	RETN	
304014D3	. B0 20	MOV AL,20	
304014D5	. B9 D3040000	MOV ECX,4D3	
304014DA	. BB 00104000	MOV EBX,SomeCryp.00401000	
304014DF	> 3E:8A13	MOV DL,BYTE PTR DS:[EBX]	
304014E2	. 32D0	XOR DL,AL	
304014E4	. 3E:8813	MOV BYTE PTR DS:[EBX],DL	
304014E7	. 43	INC EBX	
304014E8	. ^E2 F5	LOOPD SHORT SomeCryp.004014DF	
304014EA	. B8 B0144000	MOV EAX,SomeCryp.004014B0	
304014EF	. FFD0	CALL EAX	SomeCryp.004014B0 [7]

I then created a patched version of *SomeCrypto-02* with the bytes from 401000 to 4014D2 XORed with 20h. This allowed me to get the correct disassembly in IDA Pro.

sub_4011E0 – Part 1

I then opened the patched executable in IDA Pro and went to the strings subview to follow the “Success” string (like in [SomeCrypto-01](#) ^[3]). The good boy message is produced here:

```

1 .text:00401475      call     sub_4011E0
2 .text:0040147A      add      esp, 8
3 .text:0040147D      mov      byte_403270, al
4 .text:00401482      test     al, al
5 .text:00401484      jz       short loc_4014A2
6 .text:00401486      mov      edx, [esp+0Ch]
7 .text:0040148A      push     0
8 .text:0040148C      push     offset aSuccess ; "Success"
9 .text:00401491      push     edx
10 .text:00401492     push     esi
11 .text:00401493     call     ds:MessageBoxA
12 .text:00401499     push     0

```

We will see the “Success”-message when sub_4011E0 returns a non zero value in eax. Let’s walk through subroutine sub_4011E0

```

1 .text:004011E0 ; ===== S U B R O U T I N E
2 =====
3 .text:004011E0
4 .text:004011E0 ; Attributes: bp-based frame
5 .text:004011E0
6 .text:004011E0 sub_4011E0      proc near          ; CODE XREF: .text:00401475p
7 .text:004011E0
8 .text:004011E0 var_1C          = byte ptr -1Ch
9 .text:004011E0 arg_0           = dword ptr  8
10 .text:004011E0 arg_4           = dword ptr  0Ch
11 .text:004011E0
12 .text:004011E0      push     ebp
13 .text:004011E1      mov      ebp, esp
14 .text:004011E3      xor      eax, eax
15 .text:004011E5      sub      esp, 1Ch
16 .text:004011E8      cmp      [edi], al
17 .text:004011EA      jz       loc_401296
18 .text:004011F0

```

In OllyDbg we see that edi contains the serial:

```

Registers (FPU)
EAX 0018FB64
ECX 0018FB08 ASCII "Enter your name..."
EDX 00000030
EBX 00000001
ESP 0018FB4C
EBP 0018FC58
ESI 00060452
EDI 0018FC18 ASCII "1234567"
EIP 004011E0 SomeCryp.004011E0 [8]

```

The snippet translate to the following pseudo code:

```

1 serial = edi
2 IF strlen(serial) == 0 THEN
3   RETURN 0 // loc_401296
4 END

```

This is the code at loc_401296 that returns 0:

```

86 .text:00401296 loc_401296:                ; CODE XREF: sub_4011E0+Aj
87 .text:00401296                        ; sub_4011E0+1Aj ...
88 .text:00401296      xor     al, al
89 .text:00401298      mov     esp, ebp
90 .text:0040129A      pop     ebp
91 .text:0040129B      retn
92 .text:0040129B sub_4011E0      endp

```

If the serial is not empty the next section is executed:

```

18 .text:004011F0 loc_4011F0:                ; CODE XREF: sub_4011E0+15j
19 .text:004011F0      inc     eax
20 .text:004011F1      cmp     byte ptr [eax+edi], 0
21 .text:004011F5      jnz     short loc_4011F0
22 .text:004011F7      cmp     eax, 7
23 .text:004011FA      jnz     loc_401296

```

The lines calculate the length of the serial and return 0 if the length is not 7:

```

1 serial_length = strlen(serial)
2 IF serial_length != 7 THEN
3   RETURN 0 // loc_401296
4 END

```

Next follows a call to another subroutine:

```

24 .text:00401200      mov     edx, [ebp+arg_0]
25 .text:00401203      lea     eax, [ebp+var_1C]
26 .text:00401206      call    sub_401000

```

eax is a local variable. The memory location ebp+arg_0 = ebp+8 points to the content of the name input box, as can be seen in OllyDbg:

```

$-8 0018FC58
$-4 00401461 RETURN to SomeCryp.00401461
$ ==> 0018FC58
$+4 0040147A RETURN to SomeCryp.0040147A from SomeCryp.004011E0
$+8 0018FB08 ASCII "Enter your name..."
$+C 0018FB64

```

So the call boils down to:

```

1 unknown_type var_1C;
2 sub_401000(&var_1C, name)

```

sub_401000

The subroutine sub_401000 looks as follows:

```

1 .text:00401000 ; ===== SUBROUTINE
2 =====
3 .text:00401000
4 .text:00401000

```

```

5 .text:00401000 sub_401000 proc near ; CODE XREF: sub_4011E0+26p
6 .text:00401000 ; DATA XREF: .text:004014DAo
7 .text:00401000 mov dword ptr [eax], 0
8 .text:00401006 mov dword ptr [eax+4], 1
9 .text:0040100D mov dword ptr [eax+8], 2
10 .text:00401014 mov dword ptr [eax+0Ch], 3
11 .text:0040101B mov dword ptr [eax+10h], 4
12 .text:00401022 mov dword ptr [eax+14h], 5
13 .text:00401029 mov dword ptr [eax+18h], 6
14 .text:00401030 mov cl, [edx]
15 .text:00401032 test cl, cl
16 .text:00401034 jz short locret_40108C
17 .text:00401036 push esi
18 .text:00401037 jmp short loc_401040
19 .text:00401037 ; -----
20 .text:00401039 align 10h
21 .text:00401040
22 .text:00401040 loc_401040: ; CODE XREF: sub_401000+37j
23 .text:00401040 ; sub_401000+89j
24 .text:00401040 movsx ecx, cl
25 .text:00401043 and ecx, 80000001h
26 .text:00401049 jns short loc_401050
27 .text:0040104B dec ecx
28 .text:0040104C or ecx, 0FFFFFFFEh
29 .text:0040104F inc ecx
30 .text:00401050
31 .text:00401050 loc_401050: ; CODE XREF: sub_401000+49j
32 .text:00401050 jz short loc_40105C
33 .text:00401052 mov esi, [eax+4]
34 .text:00401055 mov ecx, [eax]
35 .text:00401057 mov [eax], esi
36 .text:00401059 mov [eax+4], ecx
37 .text:0040105C
38 .text:0040105C loc_40105C: ; CODE XREF: sub_401000:loc_401050j
39 .text:0040105C mov ecx, [eax]
40 .text:0040105E mov esi, [eax+4]
41 .text:00401061 mov [eax], esi
42 .text:00401063 mov esi, [eax+8]
43 .text:00401066 mov [eax+4], esi
44 .text:00401069 mov esi, [eax+0Ch]
45 .text:0040106C mov [eax+8], esi
46 .text:0040106F mov esi, [eax+10h]
47 .text:00401072 mov [eax+0Ch], esi
48 .text:00401075 mov esi, [eax+14h]
49 .text:00401078 mov [eax+10h], esi
50 .text:0040107B mov esi, [eax+18h]
51 .text:0040107E mov [eax+14h], esi
52 .text:00401081 inc edx
53 .text:00401082 mov [eax+18h], ecx
54 .text:00401085 mov cl, [edx]
55 .text:00401087 test cl, cl
56 .text:00401089 jnz short loc_401040
57 .text:0040108B pop esi
58 .text:0040108C
59 .text:0040108C locret_40108C: ; CODE XREF: sub_401000+34j
60 .text:0040108C retn
61 .text:0040108C sub_401000 endp

```

The code translates to the following pseudo code:

```

1 FUNCTION sub_401000(mapping<var_1C>, name)
2   mapping = {0,1,2,3,4,5,6} // in eax = &var_1C
3   FOR character IN name DO
4     IF character % 2 != 0 DO
5       swap(mapping[0], mapping[1])
6     ENDIF
7     circular_left_shift(mapping)

```

```
8   ENDFOR
9   END
```

swap(mapping[0], mapping[1]) means {0,1,2,3,4,5,6} would become {1,0,2,3,4,5,6}.
circular_left_shift(mapping) means, {0,1,2,3,4,5,6} becomes {1,2,3,4,5,6,0}.

sub_4011E0 – Part 2

Let's go back to the caller where we continue with line 27:

```
27 .text:0040120B      xor    eax, eax
28 .text:0040120D      lea    ecx, [ecx+0]
29 .text:00401210
30 .text:00401210 loc_401210:          ; CODE XREF: sub_4011E0+3Fj
31 .text:00401210      mov    cl, byte_403010[eax]
32 .text:00401216      mov    byte_403140[eax], cl
33 .text:0040121C      inc    eax
34 .text:0040121D      test   cl, cl
35 .text:0040121F      jnz    short loc_401210
36 .text:00401221      push   esi
37 .text:00401222      xor    esi, esi
38 .text:00401224      cmp    byte_403140, 0
39 .text:0040122B      jz     short loc_40123A
```

These line simply copy the hard coded null-terminated string at byte_403010 to byte_403140 and check if the destination address is not null:

```
1  STRCPY(byte_403140, byte_403010) // copy string byte_403010 to byte_403140
2  IF byte_403140 == NULL THEN
3    GOTO loc_40123A \\ should never happen
4  ENDIF
```

Next up is another small loop:

```
40 .text:0040122D      lea    ecx, [ecx+0]
41 .text:00401230
42 .text:00401230 loc_401230:          ; CODE XREF: sub_4011E0+58j
43 .text:00401230      inc    esi
44 .text:00401231      cmp    byte_403140[esi], 0
45 .text:00401238      jnz    short loc_401230
46 .text:0040123A
```

The code searches the null-byte in string byte_403140. When the null byte is found, then the index in esi corresponds to the length of the string at byte_403140:

```
1  esi = strlen(byte_403140)
```

Another subroutine call follows:

```
47 .text:0040123A loc_40123A:          ; CODE XREF: sub_4011E0+4Bj
48 .text:0040123A      push   esi
49 .text:0040123B      lea    eax, [ebp+var_1C]
50 .text:0040123E      call   sub_401110
```

The only parameter is var_1C, which we know contains the scrambled sequence of numbers 0 to 7 that sub_401000 generated: sub_401110(mapping)

sub_401110

The subroutine is a little hard to read, because it uses a few local variables to shuffle characters. Here's the disassembly:

```

1 .text:00401110 sub_401110    proc near          ; CODE XREF: sub_4011E0+5Ep
2 .text:00401110                                ; sub_4011E0+71p
3 .text:00401110
4 .text:00401110 var_1C      = dword ptr -1Ch
5 .text:00401110 var_18      = word ptr -18h
6 .text:00401110 var_16      = byte ptr -16h
7 .text:00401110 var_14      = dword ptr -14h
8 .text:00401110 var_10      = dword ptr -10h
9 .text:00401110 var_C       = dword ptr -0Ch
10 .text:00401110 var_8       = dword ptr -8
11 .text:00401110 var_4       = dword ptr -4
12 .text:00401110 arg_0       = dword ptr 8
13 .text:00401110
14 .text:00401110          push    ebp
15 .text:00401111          mov     ebp, esp
16 .text:00401113          mov     ecx, 7
17 .text:00401118          sub     esp, 1Ch
18 .text:0040111B          cmp     [ebp+arg_0], ecx
19 .text:0040111E          jle     loc_4011CB
20 .text:00401124          mov     edx, [eax+8]
21 .text:00401127          lea     edx, [ebp+edx+var_1C]
22 .text:0040112B          mov     [ebp+var_4], edx
23 .text:0040112E          mov     edx, [eax+0Ch]
24 .text:00401131          lea     edx, [ebp+edx+var_1C]
25 .text:00401135          mov     [ebp+var_8], edx
26 .text:00401138          mov     edx, [eax+10h]
27 .text:0040113B          lea     edx, [ebp+edx+var_1C]
28 .text:0040113F          push    ebx
29 .text:00401140          push    esi
30 .text:00401141          mov     esi, [eax]
31 .text:00401143          mov     [ebp+var_C], edx
32 .text:00401146          mov     edx, [eax+14h]
33 .text:00401149          push    edi
34 .text:0040114A          mov     edi, [eax+4]
35 .text:0040114D          mov     eax, [eax+18h]
36 .text:00401150          lea     edx, [ebp+edx+var_1C]
37 .text:00401154          mov     [ebp+var_10], edx
38 .text:00401157          lea     edx, [ebp+eax+var_1C]
39 .text:0040115B          mov     eax, offset unk_403142
40 .text:00401160          lea     esi, [ebp+esi+var_1C]
41 .text:00401164          lea     edi, [ebp+edi+var_1C]
42 .text:00401168          mov     [ebp+var_14], edx
43 .text:0040116B          sub     ecx, eax
44 .text:0040116D          lea     ecx, [ecx+0]
45 .text:00401170
46 .text:00401170 loc_401170:                                ; CODE XREF: sub_401110+B6j
47 .text:00401170          movzx   edx, byte ptr [eax-2]
48 .text:00401174          mov     ebx, [ebp+var_4]
49 .text:00401177          mov     [esi], dl
50 .text:00401179          movzx   edx, byte ptr [eax-1]
51 .text:0040117D          mov     [edi], dl
52 .text:0040117F          movzx   edx, byte ptr [eax]
53 .text:00401182          mov     [ebx], dl
54 .text:00401184          movzx   edx, byte ptr [eax+1]
55 .text:00401188          mov     ebx, [ebp+var_8]
56 .text:0040118B          mov     [ebx], dl
57 .text:0040118D          movzx   edx, byte ptr [eax+2]
58 .text:00401191          mov     ebx, [ebp+var_C]
59 .text:00401194          mov     [ebx], dl
60 .text:00401196          movzx   edx, byte ptr [eax+3]
61 .text:0040119A          mov     ebx, [ebp+var_10]
62 .text:0040119D          mov     [ebx], dl
63 .text:0040119F          movzx   edx, byte ptr [eax+4]
64 .text:004011A3          mov     ebx, [ebp+var_14]
65 .text:004011A6          mov     [ebx], dl
66 .text:004011A8          mov     edx, [ebp+var_1C]
67 .text:004011AB          mov     [eax-2], edx
68 .text:004011AE          mov     dx, [ebp+var_18]

```

```

69 .text:004011B2      mov     [eax+2], dx
70 .text:004011B6      movzx   edx, [ebp+var_16]
71 .text:004011BA      mov     [eax+4], dl
72 .text:004011BD      add     eax, 7
73 .text:004011C0      lea     edx, [ecx+eax]
74 .text:004011C3      cmp     edx, [ebp+arg_0]
75 .text:004011C6      jl      short loc_401170
76 .text:004011C8      pop     edi
77 .text:004011C9      pop     esi
78 .text:004011CA      pop     ebx
79 .text:004011CB
80 .text:004011CB loc_4011CB:                ; CODE XREF: sub_401110+Ej
81 .text:004011CB      mov     esp, ebp
82 .text:004011CD      pop     ebp
83 .text:004011CE      retn    4
84 .text:004011CE sub_401110      endp

```


All the code does is shuffle the characters in the string `byte_403140` based on the mapping that `sub_401000` generated:

```

1  FUNCTION sub_401110(mapping)
2      i = 0
3      message = byte_403140
4      WHILE i+7 < strlen(mapping) DO
5          tmp[7]
6          FOR j=0 TO 6 DO:
7              tmp[j] = message[i + mapping[j]]
8          ENDFOR
9          FOR j=0 TO 6 DO:
10             message[j] = tmp[j]
11          ENDFOR
12      END
13 END

```

The subroutine applies a permutation to the message in `byte_403140`. It permutes blocks of 7 characters based on the mapping that the subroutine `sub_401000` generated. Let's say the mapping is {3, 1, 0, 2, 5, 6, 4}, then the characters inside a 7 letter group would change like this:



[10]

sub_4011E0 – Part 3

Back at caller we see yet another subroutine:

```

51 .text:00401243      mov     ecx, edi
52 .text:00401245      lea     eax, [ebp+var_1C]
53 .text:00401248      call   sub_401090

```

The subroutine operates on `[ebp+var_1C]` which we know contains the mapping, and on `ecx = edi` which holds

the text from the serial input box:

1 sub_401090(mapping, serial)

sub_401090

This is sub_401090:

```
1 .text:00401090 ; ===== S U B R O U T I N E
2 =====
3 .text:00401090
4 .text:00401090
5 .text:00401090 sub_401090 proc near ; CODE XREF: sub_4011E0+68p
6 .text:00401090 movsx edx, byte ptr [ecx]
7 .text:00401093 add edx, 0FFFFFFD0h
8 .text:00401096 push esi
9 .text:00401097 xor esi, esi
10 .text:00401099 mov [eax], edx
11 .text:0040109B cmp edx, 7
12 .text:0040109E jb short loc_4010A2
13 .text:004010A0 mov [eax], esi
14 .text:004010A2
15 .text:004010A2 loc_4010A2: ; CODE XREF: sub_401090+Ej
16 .text:004010A2 movsx edx, byte ptr [ecx+1]
17 .text:004010A6 add edx, 0FFFFFFD0h
18 .text:004010A9 mov [eax+4], edx
19 .text:004010AC cmp edx, 7
20 .text:004010AF jb short loc_4010B4
21 .text:004010B1 mov [eax+4], esi
22 .text:004010B4
23 .text:004010B4 loc_4010B4: ; CODE XREF: sub_401090+1Fj
24 .text:004010B4 movsx edx, byte ptr [ecx+2]
25 .text:004010B8 add edx, 0FFFFFFD0h
26 .text:004010BB mov [eax+8], edx
27 .text:004010BE cmp edx, 7
28 .text:004010C1 jb short loc_4010C6
29 .text:004010C3 mov [eax+8], esi
30 .text:004010C6
31 .text:004010C6 loc_4010C6: ; CODE XREF: sub_401090+31j
32 .text:004010C6 movsx edx, byte ptr [ecx+3]
33 .text:004010CA add edx, 0FFFFFFD0h
34 .text:004010CD mov [eax+0Ch], edx
35 .text:004010D0 cmp edx, 7
36 .text:004010D3 jb short loc_4010D8
37 .text:004010D5 mov [eax+0Ch], esi
38 .text:004010D8
39 .text:004010D8 loc_4010D8: ; CODE XREF: sub_401090+43j
40 .text:004010D8 movsx edx, byte ptr [ecx+4]
41 .text:004010DC add edx, 0FFFFFFD0h
42 .text:004010DF mov [eax+10h], edx
43 .text:004010E2 cmp edx, 7
44 .text:004010E5 jb short loc_4010EA
45 .text:004010E7 mov [eax+10h], esi
46 .text:004010EA
47 .text:004010EA loc_4010EA: ; CODE XREF: sub_401090+55j
48 .text:004010EA movsx edx, byte ptr [ecx+5]
49 .text:004010EE add edx, 0FFFFFFD0h
50 .text:004010F1 mov [eax+14h], edx
51 .text:004010F4 cmp edx, 7
52 .text:004010F7 jb short loc_4010FC
53 .text:004010F9 mov [eax+14h], esi
54 .text:004010FC
55 .text:004010FC loc_4010FC: ; CODE XREF: sub_401090+67j
56 .text:004010FC movsx ecx, byte ptr [ecx+6]
57 .text:00401100 add ecx, 0FFFFFFD0h
58 .text:00401103 mov [eax+18h], ecx
59 .text:00401106 cmp ecx, 7
```

```

60 .text:00401109      jb      short loc_40110E
61 .text:0040110B      mov     [eax+18h], esi
62 .text:0040110E
63 .text:0040110E loc_40110E:      ; CODE XREF: sub_401090+79j
64 .text:0040110E      pop     esi
65 .text:0040110F      retn
65 .text:0040110F sub_401090      endp

```

The code is quite long because the assembler did loop unwinding. The underlying algorithm is very simple though:

```

1  FUNCTION sub_401090(mapping, serial)
2      FOR i = 0 TO 6 DO
3          nr = serial[i] - '0'
4          IF nr >= 7 THEN
5              mapping[i] = 0
6          ELSE
7              mapping[i] = nr
8          ENDIF
9      ENDFOR
10 END

```

So the serial number (7 letters) is converted to 7 integers that are stored in mapping (as long as numbers are smaller than 7):

```

1  FUNCTION sub_401090(mapping, serial)
2      FOR i = 0 TO 6 DO
3          nr = serial[i] - '0'
4          IF nr >= 7 THEN
5              mapping[i] = 0
6          ELSE
7              mapping[i] = nr
8          ENDIF
9      ENDFOR
10 END

```

sub_4011E0 – Part 4

After sub_401090 loaded the serial into the mapping we find a second call to the permutation routine sub_401110

```

54 .text:0040124D      push    esi
55 .text:0040124E      lea     eax, [ebp+var_1C]
56 .text:00401251      call   sub_401110

```

The routine finishes up with some code that calculates a hash of byte_403140. If the hash matches 0B45D7873h we get the success message:

```

57 .text:00401256      or      eax, 0FFFFFFFFh
58 .text:00401259      mov     ecx, esi
59 .text:0040125B      mov     edx, offset byte_403140
60 .text:00401260      test    esi, esi
61 .text:00401262      jz      short loc_40127D
62 .text:00401264
63 .text:00401264 loc_401264:      ; CODE XREF: sub_4011E0+9Bj
64 .text:00401264      movzx   esi, byte ptr [edx]
65 .text:00401267      xor     esi, eax
66 .text:00401269      and     esi, 0FFh
67 .text:0040126F      shr     eax, 8
68 .text:00401272      xor     eax, ds:dword_402058[esi*4]
69 .text:00401279      inc     edx
70 .text:0040127A      dec     ecx
71 .text:0040127B      jnz     short loc_401264
72 .text:0040127D
73 .text:0040127D loc_40127D:      ; CODE XREF: sub_4011E0+82j
74 .text:0040127D      not     eax

```

```

75 .text:0040127F      pop     esi
76 .text:00401280      cmp     eax, 0B45D7873h
77 .text:00401285      jnz     short loc_401296
78 .text:00401287      mov     eax, [ebp+arg_4]
79 .text:0040128A      mov     dword ptr [eax], offset byte_403140
80 .text:00401290      mov     al, 1
81 .text:00401292      mov     esp, ebp
82 .text:00401294      pop     ebp
83 .text:00401295      retn
84 .text:00401296 ; -----
85 .text:00401296
86 .text:00401296 loc_401296:                ; CODE XREF: sub_4011E0+Aj
87 .text:00401296                ; sub_4011E0+1Aj ...
88 .text:00401296      xor     al, al
89 .text:00401298      mov     esp, ebp
90 .text:0040129A      pop     ebp
91 .text:0040129B      retn
92 .text:0040129B sub_4011E0      endp

```

In pseudo code:

```

1 some_hash = some_hash_routine(message)
2 IF some_hash = '0B45D7873h' THEN
3   RETURN 1 // success
4 ELSE
5   RETURN 0 // failure
6 ENDIF

```

Pseudo-Code

To summarize, here's the cleaned up pseudo code:

```

1  FUNCTION name_mapping(name)
2    mapping = {0,1,2,3,4,5,6} // in eax = &var_1C
3    FOR character IN name DO
4      IF character % 2 != 0 DO
5        swap(mapping[0], mapping[1])
6      ENDIF
7      circular_left_shift(mapping)
8    ENDFOR
9    RETURN mapping
10 END
11
12 FUNCTION serial_mapping(serial)
13   message[7]
14   FOR i = 0 TO 6 DO
15     nr = serial[i] - '0'
16     IF nr >= 7 THEN
17       mapping[i] = 0
18     ELSE
19       mapping[i] = nr
20     ENDIF
21   ENDFOR
22   RETURN message
23 END
24
25 FUNCTION permutation(message, mapping)
26   i = 0
27   message = byte_403140
28   WHILE i+7 < strlen(mapping) DO
29     tmp[7]
30     FOR j=0 TO 6 DO:
31       tmp[j] = message[i + mapping[j]]
32     ENDFOR
33     FOR j=0 TO 6 DO:
34       message[j] = tmp[j]

```

```

35     ENDFOR
36 END
37 RETURN message
38 END
39
40 FUNCTION CHECK_SERIAL(serial, name)
41     IF strlen(serial) != 7 THEN
42         RETURN 0
43     END
44     mapping = name_mapping(name)
45
46     STRCPY(message, byte_403010) // hard coded message
47     IF message == NULL THEN
48         GOTO loc_40123A \\ should never happen
49     ENDIF
50     message = permutation(message, mapping)
51     mapping = serial_mapping(serial)
52     message = permutation(message, mapping)
53     some_hash = some_hash_routine(message)
54     IF some_hash = '0B45D7873h' THEN
55         RETURN 1 // success
56     ELSE
57         RETURN 0 // failure
58     ENDIF
59 END
60
61 CHECK_SERIAL(serial, name)

```

Cracking the Code

Now that we know how the algorithm works, we need to first figure out which permutation would produce the correct plaintext message. The encrypted message in byte_403010 is:

prncyl In cryp haorptg e ,apy iamttru onbxo b Po -(r ix so)o t ehami fbdofu- hftss i gulnpod t e tr
ueemnr r tao bep s sorat cisbSs -osn xs ioer,us ptntii eauf if gdh inw soatl r ienssoi npg.

To crack the code, it is enough to find the permutation for one 7 letter block. The first 7 letters of the ciphertext are:

1 prncyl

(there's a space at the end). The capital letter I comes first, the rest isn't too hard to guess either:

1 In cryp

So the correct decryption mapping is: 6 4 1 3 5 0 2. (the first letter goes to the 6th position, the second letter to the 4th, etc.).

Keygen

The SomeCrypt~02 applies two permutations to the ciphertext. The first is based on the name, the second is given by the serial. To write a keygen for a given name we need to calculate the resulting mapping by running the name_mapping routine. Then we can determine which second mapping, when combined with the name mapping, results in the correct mapping 6 4 1 3 5 0 2:

```

1 import argparse
2 from collections import deque
3
4 parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="SomeCrypto~02 keygen")
5 parser.add_argument('name')
6 args = parser.parse_args()
7 name = args.name
8
9 correct_key = [6, 4, 1, 3, 5, 0, 2]
10 cypher = deque(list(range(7)))

```

```

11
12 for c in name:
13     if ord(c) % 2:
14         cypher[0], cypher[1] = cypher[1], cypher[0]
15     cypher.rotate(-1)
16
17 serial = 7*[None]
18 for c, k in zip(cypher, correct_key):
19     serial[c] = k
20
21 print('serial: ' + ".join(str(s) for s in serial))


```

Testing:

```

1 $ python keygen.py San01suke
2 serial: 2504613

```



[11]

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