

# Intelligent Thresholding

Alban Siffer November 20, 2018

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Providing better thresholds

Finding anomalies in streams

Application to intrusion detection

In a nutshell

# Context

→ Massive usage of the Internet



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  - More and more vulnerabilities





Hackers Infect Over 200,000 MikroTik Routers With Crypto Mining Malware



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- → Massive usage of the Internet
  - More and more vulnerabilities
  - · More and more threats
- → Awareness of the sensitive data and infrastructures
- Network security :a major concern





# **A SOLUTION**

- → IDS (Intrusion Detection System)
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- → IDS (Intrusion Detection System)
  - Monitor traffic
  - Detect attacks
- Current methods : rule-based
  - · Work fine on common and well-known attacks
  - · Cannot detect new attacks
- → Emerging methods : anomaly-based
  - · Use the network data to estimate a normal behavior
  - · Apply algorithms to detect abnormal events ( $\rightarrow$  attacks)







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- $\multimap$  ... mostly on KDD99 dataset
  - not really representative
  - encourage supervised algorithms

#### **BEHIND MAGIC**

- → Algorithms are not magic
  - They give some information about data (scores)




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
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  - · What does this threshold mean?


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#### RECENT EXAMPLES

- GANomaly: Semi-Supervised Anomaly Detection via Adversarial Training <sup>1</sup>
  → Hard-coded
- Unsupervised Anomaly Detection via Variational Auto-Encoder for Seasonal KPIs in Web Applications  $^2$   $\rightarrow$  Hard-coded
- — Kitsune: An Ensemble of Autoencoders for Online Network Intrusion Detection <sup>3</sup>
   → Distribution assumption (log-normal)


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Akcay, Samet, Amir Atapour-Abarghouei, and Toby P. Breckon. arXiv preprint (2018)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Xu, Haowen, et al. Proceedings of the 2018 World Wide Web Conference on World Wide Web


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Yisroel Mirsky, Tomer Doitshman, Yuval Elovici, and Asaf Shabtai (NDSS'18)

# Providing better thresholds

# MY PROBLEM




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


→ How to set  $z_q$  such that  $\mathbb{P}(X \in z_q) < q$ ?


# SOLUTION 1: EMPIRICAL APPROACH




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


# **SOLUTION 1: EMPIRICAL APPROACH**




→ Drawbacks: stuck in the interval, poor resolution











→ Drawbacks: manual step, distribution assumption

# **REALITIES**



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


→ Different behaviours, temporal drift


#### **RESULTS**

PROPERTIES	Empirical quantile	Standard model
statistical guarantees	Yes	Yes
easy to adapt	Yes	No
high resolution	No	Yes

### **INSPECTION OF EXTREME EVENTS**



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## EXTREME VALUE THEORY

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
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


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
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



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
(initial batch)


 $X_1, X_2 \dots X_n$ 





















(stream) 
$$X_{i>n}$$




















Application to intrusion detection

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- → KDD99 ? See [McHugh 2000] and [Mahoney & Chan 2003]
- → We rather use MAWI¹
  - 15 min a day of real traffic (.pcap file)
  - Anomaly patterns given by the MAWILab [Fontugne *et al.* 2010] with taxonomy [Mazel et al. 2014]


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#### AN EXAMPLE TO DETECT NETWORK SYN SCAN

─ The ratio of SYN packets : relevant feature to detect network scan [Fernandes & Owezarski 2009]


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
→ Goal: find peaks

### **SPOT RESULTS**

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


### Do we really flag scan attacks?

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
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→ 86% of scan flows detected with less than 4% of FP

In a nutshell

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- $\rightarrow$  A single main parameter q
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- → Wide number of applications
  - Back-end of scoring methods
  - $\cdot$  drifting contexts (with an additional parameter) o DSPOT

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  - · But a general tool to monitor online time series in a blind way