

Java Secure Native Interface

DSP-LAB 2016-17

By: Clindo Devassy and Subhadeep Manna

Guidance By: Marcel Blöcher and Malte Viering

Security and Computers



© Randy Glasbergen
www.glasbergen.com



**“I’m applying for the Information Security position.
Here is a copy of my resumé, encoded, encrypted and shredded.”**

Security: Primary Concern




Memory and OS security

Buffer overflow project

Vulnerabilities: control hijacking attacks,
fuzzing

Prevention: System design, robust coding,
isolation


OS, Application Security and Memory and Permissions



- Protected Mode protects OS from apps

Ref: <https://software.intel.com/en-us/documentation/sgx-sdk-developer-reference>

OS, Application Security and Memory and Permissions



- Protected Mode protects apps from other apps

Ref: <https://software.intel.com/en-us/documentation/sgx-sdk-developer-reference>

Example Privileged Code

Main.java:

```
public class Main
{
    public static void main(String []args) {
        LowLevel.executeLowLevelAction();
    }
}
```

LowLevel.java:

```
public class LowLevel
{
    public static void executeLowLevelAction() {
        System.out.println(System.getProperty("test"));
    }
}
```


Example Privileged Code(Software Based Measures)

```
C:> java -Dtest="Hello, World!" Main  
Hello, World!
```

```
C:> java -Dtest="Hello, World!" -Djava.security.manager Main  
Exception in thread "main" java.security.AccessControlException: access denied  
java.util.PropertyPermission test read)
```

```
    at java.security.AccessControlContext.checkPermission(AccessControlCont  
xt.java:195)  
    at java.security.AccessController.checkPermission(AccessController.java  
403)  
    at java.lang.SecurityManager.checkPermission(SecurityManager.java:549)  
    at java.lang.SecurityManager.checkPropertyAccess(SecurityManager.java:1  
43)  
    at java.lang.System.getProperty(System.java:539)  
    at LowLevel.executeLowLevelAction(LowLevel.java:6)  
    at Main.main(Main.java:4)
```



Well, we still cannot trust the Security



- A malicious app exploits a flaw to gain full privileges and then tampers with the OS or other apps and memory.

Ref: <https://software.intel.com/en-us/documentation/sgx-sdk-developer-reference>

Example: Hacking Asphalt 8 using CheatEngine v6.3



So, how to **Stop** the Attacks on memory, OS and Apps ?




Intel SGX- Software Guard Extensions



A brief Introduction to Intel- SGX


- Intel SGX is a *set of new instructions* from Intel.
- It was introduced in 2015 with the **sixth generation** Intel Processors.
- The introduction of SGX has a large impact on the security industry.
- It shifts how security is being achieved and lowers the attack surface area of projects

An SGX Capable CPU




Developing a more secure App – using Intel SGX

Attack surface today



Attack Surface



Attack surface with Enclaves




Attack Surface

- Application gains ability to defend its own secrets.
- Reduced Attack Surface.

An SGX Enabled Application




Snooping Attacks Disabled



Intel - SGX : Feature of Enclaves

- With its own code and data
- Provide Confidentiality
- Provide integrity
- With controlled entry points
- With full access to app memory




Currently libraries available for implementation in C/C++.

How do we implement it into our old friend Java ?

JNI in short

- At times, it is necessary to use native codes (C/C++) to overcome the memory management and performance constraints in Java.
- Java Native Interface (JNI) is a programming framework.

Our Current Objective: Using JNI




Problem Statement: How to make Java App more secure ?

- Java code running in a Java Virtual Machine (JVM) to call and be called by native libs.
- In the JNI framework, native functions are implemented in separate .c or .cpp files.

Our Objective : Security Approach

- Interpreter code written in Java must not be accessed by other applications.
- Should not be prone to attack by malicious apps and users.(Using SGX native C/C++ libraries).
- So we make the trusted code run in Enclave and not trusted code outside the enclave of the application.

Our Objective : Secure App using JNI



Thank You!