

# Formalization and Automation of Variants of Gödel's Ontological Proof of God's Existence

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Attempts to prove the existence (or non-existence) of God by means of abstract ontological arguments are an old tradition in philosophy and theology. Gödel's proof [12] is a modern culmination of this tradition, following particularly the footsteps of Leibniz. Gödel defines God as a being who possesses all *positive* properties. He does not extensively discuss what positive properties are, but instead he states a few reasonable but debatable axioms that they should satisfy. Various slightly different versions of axioms and definitions have been considered by Gödel and by several philosophers who commented on his proof (e.g. [17, 18, 2, 11, 1, 10]). Our formalization employs the following axioms and definitions<sup>3</sup>: ToDo: Include formulas too??

- (A1) Any property necessarily implied by a positive property is positive;
- (A2) A property is positive if and only if its negation is not positive;
- (A3) the property of being God-like is positive;
- (A4) positive properties are necessarily positive;
- (A5) necessary existence is a positive property.
- (D1) x is God-like if and only if x has every positive property,
- (D2) a property P is an essence of x if and only if P is a property of x and every property Q that x has is necessarily implied by P,
- (D3) x necessarily exists if and only if every essence of x is necessarily exemplified.

From these axioms and definitions we then infer: ToDo: Include formulas too??

- (L1) Positive properties are possibly exemplified.
- (L2) Possibly God exists.
- (L3) If x is God-like, then the property of being God-like is an essence of x.
- (T) Necessarily God exists.

The above variant of Gödel's proof has now been constructed for the first-time with an unprecedented degree of detail and formality; cf. [16]. The following has been done:

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<sup>3</sup> (A1), (A2), (A5), (D1), (D3) are logically equivalent to, respectively, axioms 5, 2 and 4 and definitions 1 and 3 in Gödel's manuscript [12]. (A3) was introduced by Scott [17] and could be derived from Gödel's axiom 1 and (D1) in a logic with infinitary conjunction. (A4) is a weaker form of Gödel's axiom 3. (D2) has an extra conjunct lacking in Gödel's definition 2; this lack is believed to have been an oversight by Gödel [13].

- A detailed natural deduction proof.
- A formalization of the axioms and theorems in the TPTP THF format [19].
- Automatic verification of the consistency of the axioms and definitions with Nitpick [8].
- Automatic demonstration of the theorems with the provers LEO-II [5] and Satallax [9].
- A step-by-step formalization using the Coq proof assistant [6].
- A formalization using the Isabelle proof assistant [15] partially automated with Sledgehammer [7] and Metis [14].

Gödel's proof is challenging to formalize and verify because it requires very expressive logical languages with modal operators (*possibly* and *necessarily*) and higher-order quantifiers. Our computer-assisted formalizations rely on an embedding of the modal logic S5 into classical higher-order logic with Henkin semantics [4, 3] and employed recently developed interactive and automated deduction tools designed for this logic.

This work attests the maturity of contemporary interactive and automated deduction tools and opens new perspectives for a computer-assisted theoretical philosophy. The critical discussion of the underlying concepts, definitions and axioms remains a human responsibility, but the computer can assist in building and checking rigorously correct logical arguments. In case of logico-philosophical disputes, the computer can check the disputing arguments and partially fulfill Leibniz' dictum: *Calculus* — Let us calculate!

Future work includes an extensive study of other formalizations of ontological arguments with our machinery. Variations of the distinctive features of the base logic S5 (e.g. non-rigid symbols, varying domains, etc.) are enabled in these studies due to the flexibility of the embeddings based approach.

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