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ALL PROPERTIES ARE DIVINE OR GOD EXISTS
An Ontological Argument with Apathiatheistic and Confidentialistic Remarks

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We develop an argument of a manuscript circulated some under the title **If Some Property is not Divine then God Exists** from 1998 which made it so dated to the discussion and bibliography of (Fuhrmann 2005). The result of said manuscript was indicated at the end of (Bjørdal 1999): "By making use of a result of Petr Hajek (see (Hajek1996)), which he made me aware of at the Liblice-conference, and presupposing certain recursive definition-clauses for *divine* (positive) and *Godly being*, we may show that even Ax. 2 is eliminable if we presuppose a reasonable second order comprehension principle for the predicate *Godly being*.... I hope to be able to publish this improved result, alongside with certain remarks, in a future paper."

   Recently (Bjørdal1999) received favorable attention from Christoph Benzmüller and Bruno Woltzenlogel-Paleo – see link from Benzmüller's home page. The manuscript evolved and I just found version (Bjørdal 2011) which with other work is superseded by considerations below and forthcoming.

   As pointed out in (Belnap & Gupta 1993) p. 194, seemingly circular definitions may be appropriately inductive and circularity (though not impredicativity, of course) avoided by higher order machinery; the particular definitional scheme referred to *loc.cit.* may as verified in (Gupta 2012) be simplified so that if H occurs positively in $A(x,H)$ we can define Jx by $\forall K(\forall y(A(y,K) \to Ky) \to Kx))$ and show that $\forall x(Jx \leftrightarrow A(x,J))$ under standards assumptions. Presuppose a second order modal logic and define *divine property* as $D(F) \triangleq \Box \forall x(Gx \to Fx)$ and *Godly being* as $Gx \triangleq \forall Y(D(Y) \to \Box Yx)$; by substitution, $Gy \leftrightarrow \forall Y(\Box(\forall x)(Gx \to Yx) \to \Box Yx)$. Following (Bjørdal 2012), the second order definition must be $Gx \leftrightarrow \forall H(\forall Y(\Box z(Hz \to Yz) \to \Box Yy) \to \Box Hy) \to Hx)$ and all *S5* principles used; if we disregard the modal operator the complexity is perhaps as low as $\Pi 1/1$ and at most $\Pi 1/3$ (for a discussion, see the recent A Question Related to the Formula Hierarchy on MathOverflow), so full second order modal logic is not needed. Given the induced definitions of *divine property* and *Godly being*, a theorem is that the following thesis is derivable in an appropriate second order modal logic *S5*:

The Divine Thesis $\forall X \mathbf{D}(X) \lor \exists x Gx$

Proofoutline: first derive the biconditionals as by the formal definitions of *divine property* and *Godly being* above from the second order definition of *Gx* above by adapting (Bjørdal 2012); then adapt the argument of (Bjørdal 2011).

   Note that a least fixed point is atheist, and that there may be theistic ones. If there is a God and *being identical with a God* is a divine property, monotheism is true. Gaunilo-like objections fade, here, as does the objection by (Oppy1996) that arbitrary properties may be substituted. Certainly there are niceties concerning the machinery which deserve more attention than can be given here, and I do not commit to its superiority. Nevertheless, standard model theoretic considerations apply and offer no obstacles.

   An apathiatheistic remark is that the best concepts of 'God' are such that the question as to whether there is a God or not is academic in a sense similar to the question as to whether there are holes or just holed things. The confidentialistic remarks are inter alia that the most important religious question is not whether there is a God rather whether something ultimately rectifies the unsayable sufferings of some (and others, for metaphysical parity), or not, and that the latter question has an affirmative answer.

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