

The Inconsistency in Gödel's Ontological Argument — A Success Story for AI in Metaphysics —

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Motivation

Vision of Leibniz (1646–1716): *Calculus*!



Quo facto, quando orientur controversiae, non magis disputatione opus erit inter duos philosophos, quam inter duos Computistas. Sufficiet enim calamos in manus sumere sedereque ad abacos, et sibi mutuo ... dicere: *calculus*. (Leibniz, 1684)




Required:
characteristica universalis and **calculus ratiocinator**

If controversies were to arise, there would be no more need of disputation between two philosophers than between two accountants. For it would suffice to take their pencils in their hands, to sit down to their slates, and to say to each other ...: Let us calculate.

(Translation by Russell)

Inconsistency


Gödel's Manuscript: Identifying the Inconsistent Axioms



Inconsistency

Inconsistency	Scott
$\forall \phi [P(\neg \phi) \rightarrow \neg P(\phi)]$	A1(\supset)
$\forall \phi \forall \psi [(P(\phi) \wedge \Box \forall x [\phi(x) \rightarrow \psi(x)]) \rightarrow P(\psi)]$	A2
$\phi \text{ ess. } x \leftrightarrow \forall \psi (\psi(x) \rightarrow \Box \forall y (\phi(y) \rightarrow \psi(y)))$	D2*
$NE(x) \leftrightarrow \forall \phi [\phi \text{ ess. } x \rightarrow \Box \exists y \phi(y)]$	D3
$P(NE)$	A5

HOL as a Universal (Meta-)Logic via Semantic Embeddings



Examples for **L** we have already studied:

Modal Logics, Conditional Logics, Intuitionistic Logics, Access Control Logics, Nominal Logics, Multivalued Logics (SIXTEEN), Logics based on Neighborhood Semantics, (Mathematical) Fuzzy Logics, Paraconsistent Logics, Free Logic ...

Works also for (first-order & higher-order) quantifiers