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**How Globalization Makes Inconsistency Unrecognizable**

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Properties, certainly many of the ones that interest logicians, come with what might be called ranges of application, whose members are those things to which the property in question could be intelligibly ascribed. (Provability can be intelligibly ascribed to statements but not, we may presume, to cabbages.) It is clear that some properties are valuable to theorists and others not. In large ranges of cases, the value a property has is lost if the set of its true instantiations exhausts its range of application. Provability and deducibility are such properties, as are sentence-validity and entailment (Lewis and Langford, 1932). These are properties that partition their ranges in telling ways, hence, as we may say, are P-properties. They are also valuable for the conduct of any knowledge-seeking theory.

It has long been known that in classical environments, a single instance of a system’s negation-inconsistency collapses the partition between correct and incorrect attributions of some of its P-properties, depriving them of their value, disabling them for gainful employment, drowning them in pathological over-instantiation, and dooming them to epistemic futility (Priest, 1999). The cause of the collapse is the classical equivalence between negation and absolute inconsistency, under the provisions of the ex falso quodlibet theorem, provable in turn by the Lewis-Langford proof. Ex falso provides that a local inconsistency in a system globalizes it there. It also globalizes the cream of its P-properties, notably the four mentioned above.

Many attempts have been made to annul the globalization effect by discrediting the Lewis-Langford proof. Unsuccessful would be a charitable word for them, some a good deal more so than others. The strongest of these failed efforts arises from dialethic logic. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the failure of the dialethic option. As a kind of bonus we will come to see what Quine actually meant when he said that the dialethism option made the concept of negation unrecognizable (Woods, 2005).

**References**

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