Discussions & Clarifications

Topics


- 6.1 Whether it will bring privacy issue? If yes, how to overcome?
- 6.2 Whether it will bring security issue? If yes, how to overcome?


Privacy Issues

- Scenarios
 - 1. No privacy issue: Operators run their own applications e.g. CMCC MIGU Music



- **2. No privacy issue**: App providers build and run their own networks e.g. Google B4
- 3. No privacy issue: APN works only within an operator's controlled limited domain no matter where the App-info is added and encapsulated.
- **4. No privacy issue**: If added at the edge device (i.e. an network operator-controlled device), e.g. Enterprise CPE or Home broadband RG or BNG or WiFi AP or 5GC UPF.
- **5. No privacy issue**: If added at the APP, the App-info is encrypted.
- **6. May have privacy issue**: If added at the APP, the explicit App-info is not encrypted.








- Google control
 applications
 - applications,
 Servers,
 - LANs, all the way to the edge of networ
 - Perform large-scale data copies from o
 - site to another;
 - Adapt transmission rate
 - Defer to higher priority interactive app during failure periods or resource constraints
 - No more than few dozen data center deployments, hence making central control bandwidth
 possible


Security Issues


- No Security Issue: Inter-DC scenario
- No Security Issue: Enterprise scenario, access through a controlled BNG interface
- APN only imposes security issues when users access from an untrusted domain, but
 - Home broadband scenario can be validated via BNG
 - Mobile broadband scenario can be validated via 5GC
- APN potentially imposes four types of security issues
 - 1. Within one terminal can be tackled via OS; blocked via BNG or 5GC
 - a) An application in one terminal (UE) adds arbitrary App-Info (incl. Request)
 - b) An application in one terminal adds the App-Info of the other App in the same terminal
 - 2. Once sent out it will be validated via Network-side security solutions
 - a) An application in one terminal forges the App-Info of the same App in another terminal
 - b) App-Info is tampered along the way between the App-Info creator and the Network Boundary




BNG as a gateway to provide user access, AAA, and value-added services.

Typical 5G MBB Network Deployments and Service Provisioning






APN Scope



The focus of APN is going to be within the Application-aware Network Domain in the scenarios with no privacy and security issues.

Work Items in APN



Shaping the APN Discussion

- Are the right use cases identified?
- What techniques are available to achieve the goals of the use cases?
- Can we ensure the scope of work to focus on a limited number of domains, and the network layer?
- How can we address security and privacy issues?
- If there is interest in continuing the work? If so, where would we do this work, RTG Area, or?
 - Encapsulation of application related information in MPLS, IPv6, SRv6, VXLAN, etc.
 - Distribute application related information through IGP/BGP/PCEP extensions.