# PLUS (and SPUD)

Brian Trammell — 30 July 2020

# A Path Layer for the Internet Enabling Network Operations on Encrypted Traffic

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#### measurement

#### architecture

### experimentation



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## **Increasing Deployment of Encryption**




































 No management function that needs cleartext access to application headers/payload will work on the new Internet.





### **Explicit Cooperation**



- The cleartext party is over, and DPI is dead.
  - Encryption for privacy, security, and protocol evolvability.

- A third way: replace use of cleartext by in-network functions with endpoint-controlled signaling.
  - Explicit cooperation based on declarative, advisory signals requiring no trust between endpoints and path can reduce disruption driven by increased encryption.





### **Introducing the Path Layer**



- The boundary between network (hop-by-hop, stateless) and transport (end-to-end, stateful) blurred by in-network state.
- Approach: add a layer to the stack to support these functions and use crypto to reinforce the boundary.

#### **Application**

(higher-level semantics)

#### **Transport**

(end to end streams/messages)

#### Network

(hop by hop forwarding)

#### Link

(medium access)



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#### **Application**

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#### Transport

(end to end streams/messages)

#### Path

Integrity and Confidentiality Protection (Privacy, Security, and Evolvability)

#### Path Communication

(Explicit Cooperation with On-Path Devices)

#### **UDP** Encapsulation

(NAT/middlebox Compatibility)

#### Network

(hop by hop forwarding)

#### Link

(medium access)





### **Path Layer Principles**



- An endpoint should be able to explicitly expose signals to be used by onpath devices. Everything not intended for use by the path should be encrypted.
- An endpoint should be able to request signals from devices on the path.
- An on-path device should not be able to forge, change, or remove a signal sent by an endpoint.
- The endpoint should control signaling between endpoints and the path, or from one on-path device to another.
- It should be possible for an endpoint to request and receive signals from a previously unknown on-path device.
- The mechanism should present no significant surface for amplification attacks.





### **Applications of the Path Layer**



- Transport-Independent On-Path State
- Latency Measurement
- Loss and Congestion Measurement
- Path Trace Accumulation
- Loss/Latency Tradeoff
- Path MTU Discovery

Generic mechanism to allow for future extensibility



# What happened?

# Coordinated Deployment is Difficult

- PLUS requires endpoint protocol changes as well as innetwork changes to see the majority of its benefit.
- Lack of first-mover advantage reduces deployment incentive.
- (See section 2.1.2 of RFC 5218, and basically all of RFC 8170).

# Advisory Signals are Weird (and all path signals are advisory)

- PLUS was intended to make the notional path layer explicit by separating end-to-end control from on-path signaling.
  - These are blended in TCP. See RFC 8546 for why this is interesting.
- Difficult to make the argument why an encrypted transport would expose signals without clear benefit to the endpoints (see previous slide on coordinated deployment).
- Difficult to make the argument why a network device would trust advisory signals from an endpoint pair it knows has an encrypted side channel to coordinate lying.
  - See also RFC 8558.

# Compulsion is Unfriendly

- A concern was raised that an adversarial network operator could compel endpoint-to-path signaling not in the end user's interest.
  - (e.g. "you must expose a cryptographic token proving you viewed some ad, or are authorized by an external authority, to get reasonable QoS.")
- Building a vector into the protocol to allow explicit exposure may add to the risk that such exposure will become mandatory; this runs counter to the philosophy of the Internet as a network of networks.

# Experiments are Scary

- SPUD was defined as a concept and an experimental implementation of that concept.
  - It wasn't a fully defined protocol, and not a WG-forming BoF.
  - People expected a fully-defined protocol, and a WGforming BoF.
  - The mismatch was a key ingredient in the failure of SPUD and its rebirth as PLUS.

# Comparing APN and PLUS

## Deployment incentives

- PLUS envisioned an end-to-end path layer, while APN provides path-layer like functionality with traffic encapsulation in restricted domains (a la IOAM).
  - Controller and APN domain are managed by a single entity, but...
  - ...questions about first mover advantage for application and access devices remain: why build APN into your app/platform?

## Signal trustworthiness

- PLUS signaling is network-focused but application- and protocol-agnostic (LoLa, reordering tolerance, bandwidth expectation, measurability).
- APN signaling has application IDs with more complicated semantics in addition to implementation- and protocolspecific network-focused signals
  - The advisory signaling questions apply: why should the path should trust the app? Why should the app should tell the truth?




# Backup: PLUS in Detail (also from the 2017 CNSM talk)






































































































































_	31 16	0 15		
0	UDP Source Port	UDP Destination Port		
4	UDP Length	UDP Checksum		
8	PLUS Magic 0	xd8007ff LRS0		
12	Connection and Ass	Connection and Association Token (CAT)		
20	Packet Serial Number (PSN)			
24	Packet Serial Echo (PSE)			
28	Encrypted			







### **Basic PLUS Header**

Recognize PLUS packets on path		16	15	0
		urce Port	UDP Destinatio	n Port
4	UDi	Length	UDP Checks	um
8	PLUS Magic 0xd8007ff LR			LRS0
12	Connection and Association Token (CAT)			
20	Packet Serial Number (PSN)			
24	Packet Serial Echo (PSE)			
28	28 Encrypted			









	31	16	15 0
0		UDP Source Port	UDP Destination Port
4		UDP Length	UDP Checksum
8		PLUS Magic 0x	d8007ff LRS0
Connection state establishment		Innection and Asso	ciation Token (CAT)
20	Packet Serial Number (PSN)		
24	24 Packet Serial Echo (PSE)		l Echo (PSE)
28	Encrypted		









_	31 16	16 15		
0	UDP Source Port	JDP Source Port UDP Destination Port		
4	UDP Length	UDP Length UDP Checksum		
8	PLUS Magic 0	PLUS Magic 0xd8007ff LRS0		
12	Connection and Asso	Connection and Association Token (C		
20	Packet Serial Number (PSN)			rdown
24	Packet Serial Echo (PSE)			
28		Encrypted		









31		16	15 0
0	UDP So	ource Port	UDP Destination Port
4	UDP	Length	UDP Checksum
8		PLUS Magic 0x	d8007ff LRS0
12	Connection and Association Token (CAT)		
20	Packet Serial Number (PSN)		
24	Packet Serial Echo (PSE)		
Loss and latency measurement		Encry	pted





### **Basic PLUS Header**

	Transport prefers 0		
0	UDP Source Por loss to latency nation Port		
4	UDP Length UDP Checksum		
8	PLUS Magic 0xd8007ff LRS0		
12	Connection and Association Token (CAT)		
20	Packet Serial Number (PSN)		
24	Packet Serial Echo (PSE)		
28	Encrypted		







31

0

4

8

12

20

24

28



16	15	reordering-t	oleran	t 0
UDP Source Port	UDP	Destinati	on P	rt
UDP Length		UDP Check	sum	
PLUS Magic 0x	d800	7ff	L	RS 0
Connection and Association Token (CAT)				
Packet Serial Number (PSN)				
Packet Serial Echo (PSE)				

Transport is

Encrypted










	31	16 15			
0		UDP Source Port	UDP Destination Port		
4		UDP Length UDP Checksum			
8		PLUS Magic 0xd8007ff LRS			
12		Connection and Association Token (CAT)			
20		Packet Serial Number (PSN)			
24		Packet Serial Echo (PSE)			
28	Encrypted				
















### **Transport-Independent On-Path State**











































































































































architecture


















































































## Path to Receiver Signaling with Feedback















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









































	16 15									
0	UDP Source Port	UDP Destination Port								
4	UDP Length	UDP Checksum								
8	PLUS Magic 0xd8007ff LRS1									
12	Connection and Association Token (CAT)									
20	Packet Serial Number (PSN)									
24	Packet Serial Echo (PSE)									
28	PCF Type PCF Len	PCF Value (varlen)								
		PCF value (varien)								
	Encrypted									









31		16	15 0				
0	UD	P Source Port	UDP Destination Port				
4		UDP Length	UDP Checksum				
8		PLUS Magic 0xd8007ff L					
Extensi signal ty		nnection and Association Token (CAT)					
20	Packet Serial Number (PSN)						
24	Packet Serial Echo (PSE)						
28	PCF	Type   PCF Len   II	PCF Value (varlen)				
	Encrypted						










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0	0 UDP Sourc			ce Port		UDP Destination Port	
4	UDP Length				UDP Checksum		
8 PL			LUS Magic 0xd8007ff			d8007ff	LRS1
Extensible signal type		TLV supports  1 unknown signal o handling		ciation Token	(CAT)		
20	20 Packe Seria		ial	Number (PSN)			
24		Packet Seria		1 Echo (PSE)			
28	PCF	Type	PCF	Len	II	PCF Value	(varlen)
	Encrypted						






























- PSN is serial, so sequence gaps can be used to estimate one-point upstream loss and loss between two points.
- Full-path loss requires signaling using extended header:

```
PCF type: 1 len:[2,4,8,16] II:
Cumulative Loss Count (uint[8,16,32,64])
Cumulative ECE Count (uint[8,16,32,64])
```

- Feed-forward of cumulative loss and ECE seen by sender allows accurate counting anywhere along the path.
- Sender-side sampling allows efficiency tradeoff.



## Path Tracing 303 27 877 sender 64 174

- Each PLUS-aware hop XORs random value per node to PCF type 4 value.
- Value at receiver indicates which path was taken without identifying path.



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  Orange path: 238



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- Red path: 1207
  Orange path: 238



# Path Tracing 303 27 877 sender 64 174

- Each PLUS-aware hop XORs random value per node to PCF type 4 value.
- Value at receiver indicates which path was taken without identifying path.
- Red path: 1207
- Orange path: 238
- Green path: 968




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














(a) receiver-side interfaces













(a) receiver-side interfaces













(a) receiver-side interfaces













(a) receiver-side interfaces













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(a) receiver-side interfaces










- <u>fd.io</u> VPP: framework for building userspace network devices on any DPDK platform, using packet vectors for scalability.
- PLUS middlebox support implemented as VPP nodes
  - Core node handles state machine and basic header flags
  - One extension node per PCF type
  - Modifications to UDP logic to recognize PLUS magic







### PLUS and QUIC



- Both PLUS and QUIC propose encryption and UDP encapsulation to enable transport evolution.
- PLUS proposes additional explicit signaling to replace information that encryption removes.
  - Declarative and advisory, but better than inference.
- Many basic PLUS features appear in QUIC in diminished form:
  - QUIC's PN is a PSN, but without echo
  - QUIC's CID is a CAT, but not on every packet
- Additional QUIC features proposed based on PLUS experience:
  - No PSE, but latency spin bit replaces it for passive RTT

