## **CrypTool**

#### A free software program

- for creating awareness of IT security issues
- for learning about and obtaining experience of cryptography
- for demonstrating encryption algorithms and analysis procedures

www.cryptool.de www.cryptool.com www.cryptool.org



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### Introduction

### 1. What is CrypTool?

- a freeware Program with graphical user interface
- a tool for applying and analysing cryptographic algorithms
- with extensive online help, understandable without deep crypto knowledge
- contains nearly all state of the art crypto algorithms
- "playful" introduction to modern and classical cryptography
- not a "hacker tool"

### 2. Why CrypTool?

- origin in Deutsche Bank's IT security awareness program
- developed in co-operation with universities
- improve IT security related courses in universities and companies

#### 3. Audience

- target group: students of computer science, commercial IT and mathematics
- also aimed at: interested computer users and application developers
- prerequisites: secondary school mathematics or programming skills



## CrypTool Overview 1. Features

## **Cryptography**

#### Classical algorithms

- Caesar
- Vigenère
- Hill
- Monoalphabetic substitution
- Homophonic substitution
- Playfair
- Permutation
- Addition
- XOR
- Vernam

## To facilitate performing text book examples with CrypTool

- alphabet can be configured
- treatment of white space etc. configurable

## **Cryptanalysis**

#### Attacks on classical algorithms

- ciphertext only
  - Caesar
  - Vigenère
  - Addition
  - XOR
- known plaintext
  - Hill
  - Playfair
- manual
  - mono-alphabetic substitution

#### Supporting analysis procedures

- entropy, floating frequency
- histogram, n-gram analysis
- auto-correlation
- ZIP compression test



## CrypTool Overview 1. Features

## **Cryptography**

#### Modern symmetric algorithms

- IDEA, RC2, RC4, DES, 3DES
- last round AES candidates
- AES (=Rijndael)

#### **Asymmetric algorithms**

- RSA with X.509 certificates
- RSA demonstration
  - to facilitate performing text book examples with CrypTool
  - alphabet and block length configurable

#### **Hybrid encryption**

- RSA combined with AES encryption
- visualised by an interactive data flow diagram

## **Cryptanalysis**

## Brute-force attack on symmetric algorithms

- implemented for all algorithms
- assumption: entropy of the plain text is small

#### Attack on RSA encryption

- factor RSA modulus
- workable for bit lengths <= 250</p>

#### Attack on hybrid encryption

- attack on RSA (see below) or
- attack on AES (see above)



## CrypTool Overview 1. Features

## **Cryptography**

#### **Digital Signature**

- RSA with X.509 certificates
  - signature procedure visualised by an interactive data flow diagram
- DSA with X.509 certificates
- Elliptic curve DSA, Nyberg-Rueppel

#### **Hash functions**

- MD2, MD4, MD5
- SHA, SHA-1, RIPEMD-160

#### Random generators

- SECUDE
- X^2 modulo N
- Linear Congruence Generator (LCG)
- Inverse Congruence Generator (ICG)

## **Cryptanalysis**

#### Attack on RSA Signature

- RSA modulus factorisation
- workable up to approx. 250 bit

#### Attack on hash function/digital signature

 Generation of hash collisions to ASCII texts

#### Random data analysis

- FIPS-PUB-140-1 test battery
- periodicity, Vitany, entropy
- histogram, n-gram analysis
- auto-correlation
- ZIP compression test



# **CrypTool Overview 2. Software package contents**

### CrypTool program

- all functions integrated in one program with uniform graphical user interface
- platforms: Win32 and Linux with WINE emulator
- cryptography based on Secude library (www.secude.com)
- arbitrary precision arithmetic: Miracl library (http://indigo.ie/~mscott/)

#### **AES-Tool**

standalone program for AES encryption (self extracting)

### **Extensive online help (Winhelp)**

- context sensitive online help for all program functions and all menu items
- detailed examples of usage for many program features

### Script (PDF) with background information on

- encryption algorithms prime numbers digital signature
- elliptic curves public key certification elementary number theory

## Short story "Dialogue of the Sisters" by Dr. C. Elsner



## CrypTool Overview 3. New in release 1.3.xx

### Most important changes (details: see ReadMe-en.txt):

### Release 1.3.00 published January 2002

- completely bilingual English/German
- improved dialog box consistency and comprehensibility
- Windows 9x file size limit removed
- homophonic and permutation encryption
- random generators, random data analysis (FIPS-140-1, periodicity, n-gram)
- AES-Tool: create self-decrypting files (AES)
- demonstration: number theory and RSA crypto system (further improved in 1.3.02)
- PKCS#12 export/import for PSEs

#### Release 1.3.02 published June 2002

- visualisation of hybrid encryption and decryption
- visualisation of signature creation and verification
- hash value calculation of large files (without loading them into memory)
- visualisation of the sensitivity of hash functions to changes in the hashed data
- short story "Dialogue of the Sisters" by Dr. C. Elsner included

## CrypTool Overview 3. New in release 1.3.xx

#### Release 1.3.04 published July 2003

- visualisation of Diffie-Hellman key exchange
- attack on digital signature using hash-collisions (birthday paradox)
- brute-force attack on symmetric ciphers improved
- script updated (primes, factorization) and extended (hash functions, ECC, CrypTool menu tree)
- many small improvements (especially online help) and bug fixes




## 1. Hybrid encryption visualised

### **Hybrid encryption**

- combines advantages of symmetric and asymmetric encryption
  - speed
  - simple and scalable key management
- widely used in practice
  - e-mail (S/MIME, PGP) and file encryption
  - SSL (https)


## Visualisation by an interactive data flow diagram

playful learning leads to deeper understanding






## 1. Hybrid encryption visualised: Preparation






## 1. Hybrid encryption visualised: Cryptography



## 1. Hybrid encryption visualised: Result






# Examples of use 2. Digital signature visualised

### **Digital signature**

- increasingly important
  - equivalence with manual signature (digital signature law)
  - increasingly used by industry, government and consumers
- few people know how it works


### Visualisation in CrypTool

- interactive data flow diagram
- similar to the visualisation of hybrid encryption






## 2. Digital signature visualised: Preparation






## 2. Digital signature visualised: Cryptography



## 2. Digital signature visualised: Result





## Examples of use 3. Attack on RSA encryption with short RSA modulus

### Example from Song Y. Yan, Number Theory for Computing, Springer, 2000

- public key
  - RSA modulus N = 63978486879527143858831415041 (95 bit, 29 decimal digits)
  - public exponent e = 17579
- cipher text (block length = 14):
  - $-C_1 = 45411667895024938209259253423$ 
    - $C_2 = 16597091621432020076311552201,$
    - $C_3 = 46468979279750354732637631044$ ,
    - $C_4 = 32870167545903741339819671379$
- the text shall be deciphered!


### Solution using CrypTool (more detailed in online help examples section):

- enter public parameters into "RSA cryptosystem" (menu indiv. procedures)
- button "factorise the RSA modulus" yields prime factors pq = N
- based on that information private exponent d=e-1 mod (p-1)(q-1) is determined
- decrypt the cipher text with d: M<sub>i</sub> = C<sub>i</sub><sup>d</sup> mod N


### The attack with CrypTool is workable for RSA moduli up to 250 bit



## 3. Short RSA modulus: enter public RSA parameters




## 3. Short RSA modulus: factorise RSA modulus




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## 3. Short RSA modulus: determine private key d



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
## 3. Short RSA modulus: adjust options







## 3. Short RSA modulus: decrypt cipher text





## 4. Analysis of encryption used in the PSION 5 PDA

Attack on the encryption option in the PSION 5 PDA word processing application



Starting point: an encrypted file on the PSION

#### Requirements

- encrypted English or German text
- depending on method and key length, 100 bytes up to several kB of text

probably classical


encryption algorithm

#### **Procedure**

- pre-analysis
  - entropy
  - floating entropy
  - compression test
- auto-correlation
- try out automatic analysis with classical methods




# Examples of use 4. PSION PDA: determine entropy, compression test



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## Examples of use 4. PSION PDA: determine auto-correlation







# **Examples of use 4. PSION PDA: automatic analysis**

Automatic analysis using XOR: does not work Automatic Analysis

**Automatic analysis using Binary Addition:** 

- CrypTool calculates the key length using auto-correlation: 32 bytes
- The user can choose which character is expected to occur most frequently: "e" = 0x65 (ASCII code)
- Analysis calculates the most likely key (based on the assumptions about distribution)
- Results: good, but not perfect







# **Examples of use 4. PSION PDA: results of automatic analysis**

### Results of automatic analysis with assumption "binary addition":

- results good, but not perfect: 24 out of 32 key bytes correct.
- the key length was correctly determined.
- the password entered was not 32 bytes long.
  - ⇒ PSION Word derives the actual key from the password.
- manual post-processing produces the encrypted text (not shown)

```
Automatic Addition Analysis of <psion-enc.hex>, key: <12 86 5B EF 14 98 87 2C 39 3E 43 74 13 ...
100000
                              74 7A 20 28
                                                                     ergisetz (UStG).
00010
                                                                     ...rstereAb, "hn®
00020
                                                                     tt..teuergegenst
        61 6E A9 20 75 6E 64 20 8C 65 6C
                                                                     an@ und .el10ng,
00030
00040
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                          20 55 6D B8 61 74 BF B8
00050
                                                                       .er Um.ati.teº
        65 72 20 BA 6E 74 65 72 6C 69 65 67 65 6E
69 65 65 66 6F 6C 67 65 B3 64 65 B3 65 55
                                                                     er onterliegen d
00060
00070
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                                 2E
00080
                                                                     ätza: .1. die Lie
        66 65 B7 75 6E 67 65 6E 65 75
00090
                                                                     fe ungeneun@eso?
        73 74 69 AC 65 6E 20 4C 65 69 73
000A0
                                                                     stiren Leistunge
        6E 2C 65 64 69 65 20 65 AE 6E 20 9A B3
6E 65 68 B2 65 72 20 69 6D 20 49 6E 6C
000B0
                                                                     n.edie e@n .3te.
000C0
                                                                     neh<sup>2</sup>er im Inland
                      65 6E
                             20 45 B3 74 67
000D0
                                                                      qaqen E3tqa±t ®
        6D 20 52 A6 68 6D 65 6E 20 73 65 69 6E 65
000E0
                                                                     m R¦hmen seines
000F0
                      72 6E 65 68 B2 65 6E B8
                                                                    Un¹erneh²en eau
```



## Examples of use 4. PSION PDA: determining the remaining key bytes

## Copy key to clipboard during automatic analysis In automatic analysis hexdump,

- determine incorrect byte positions, e.g. 0xAA at position 3
- guess and write down corresponding correct bytes: "e" = 0x65

### In encrypted initial file hexdump,


- determine initial bytes from the calculated byte positions: 0x99
- calculate correct key bytes with CALC.EXE: 0x99 0x65 = 0x34

### Correct key from the clipboard

12865B341498872C393E43741396A45670235E111E907AB7C0841...


### Decrypt encrypted initial document using binary addition


■ bytes at position 3, 3+32, 3+2\*32, ... are now correct





## **Examples of use 5. Weak DES keys**








# Examples of use 6. Locate key material

The function "Floating frequency" is suitable for locating key material and encrypted areas in files.

### **Background:**

- key data is "more random" than text or program code
- can be recognised as peaks in the "floating frequency"

example: the "NSAKEY" in advapi32.dll





# Examples of use 7. Attack on digital signature: idea


## Attack on the digital signature of an ASCII text based on hash collision search

#### Idea:

- ASCII-Texts can be modified by changing/inserting non-printable characters, without changing the visible content
- modify two texts in parallel until a hash collision is found
- exploit the birthday paradox (birthday attack)
- generic attack applicable to all hash functions
- can be run in parallel on many machines (not implemented)
- implemented in CrypTool by Jan Blumenstein as part of his bachelor thesis "Methods and tools for attacks on digital signatures" (German), 2003.



## 7. Attack on digital signature: idea (2)




- **1. Modification:** starting from a message M create N different messages  $M_1, ..., M_N$  with the same "content" as M.
- **2. Search:** find modified messages  $M_i^H$  und  $M_i^S$  with the same hash value.
- **3. Attack:** the signatures of those two documents  $M_i^H$  und  $M_i^S$  are the same.


## We know from the birthday paradox that for hash values of bit length n:

- search collision between  $M^H$  and  $M_1^S$ , ...,  $M_N^S$ :  $N \approx 2^n$
- search collision between  $M_1^H$ , ...,  $M_N^H$  and  $M_1^S$ , ...,  $M_N^S$ :  $N \approx 2^{n/2}$




## Examples of use 7. Attack on digital signature: attack







## Examples of use 7. Attack on digital signature: results



The first 32 bits of the hash values are identical.

#### **Experimental results**

- 72 Bit partial collision (equality of the first 72 hash value bits) were found in a couple of days on a single PC.
- Signatures using hash values of up to 128 bit can be attacked today using massive parallel search!



## **Further development**

#### Work in process

- visualisation of challenge-response authentication
- attack on single-sided authentication with CR and weak encryption
- mass pattern search

#### Planned for near future

- visualisation of SSL protocol
- visualisation of Man-in-the-Middle attack
- demonstration of a side-channel attack

#### Planned for remote future

- visualisation of different security protocols (e.g. Kerberos)
- visualisation of attacks on these different security protocols
- port to Linux or Java
- many more ideas can be found in the readme file, chapter 6



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