CrypTool

A free software program

- for creating awareness of IT security issues
- for learning about and obtaining experience of cryptography
- for demonstrating encryption algorithms and analysis procedures

www.cryptool.de www.cryptool.com www.cryptool.org



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Introduction

1. What is CrypTool?

- a freeware Program with graphical user interface
- a tool for applying and analysing cryptographic algorithms
- with extensible online help, understandable without deep crypto knowledge
- contains nearly all state of the art crypto algorithms
- "playful" introduction to modern and classical cryptography
- not a "hacker tool"

2. Why CrypTool?

- origin in Deutsche Bank's IT security awareness program
- developed in co-operation with universities
- improve IT security related courses in universities and companies

3. Audience

- target group: students of computer science, commercial IT and mathematics
- also for: interested computer users and application developers
- prerequisites: secondary school mathematics or programming skills



CrypTool Overview 1. Features

Cryptography

Classical algorithms

- Caesar
- Vigenère
- Hill
- Monoalphabetic substitution
- Homophonic substitution
- Playfair
- Permutation
- Addition
- XOR
- Vernam

To facilitate performing text book examples with CrypTool

- alphabet can be configured
- treatment of white space etc. configurable

Cryptoanalysis

Attacks on classical algorithms

- ciphertext only
 - Caesar
 - Vigenère
 - Addition
 - XOR
- known plaintext
 - Hill
 - Playfair
- manual
 - mono-alphabetic substitution

Supporting analysis procedures

- entropy, floating frequency
- histogram, n-gram analysis
- auto-correlation
- ZIP compression test



CrypTool Overview 1. Features

Cryptography

Modern symmetric algorithms

- IDEA, RC2, RC4, DES, 3DES
- last round AES candidates
- AES (=Rijndael)

Asymmetric algorithms

- RSA with X.509 certificates
- RSA demonstration
 - to facilitate performing text book examples with CrypTool
 - alphabet and block length configurable

Hybrid encryption

- RSA combined with AES encryption
- visualised by an interactive data flow diagram

Cryptoanalysis

Brute-force attack on symmetric algorithms

- implemented for all algorithms
- assumption: entropy of plain text small

Attack on RSA encryption

- factor RSA modulus
- workable for bit lengths <= 250</p>

Attack on hybrid encryption

- attack on RSA (see below) or
- attack on AES (see above)



CrypTool Overview 1. Features

Cryptography

Digital Signature

- RSA with X.509 certificates
 - signature procedure visualised by an interactive data flow diagram
- DSA with X.509 certificates
- Elliptic curve DSA, Nyberg-Rueppel

Hash functions

- MD2, MD4, MD5
- SHA, SHA-1, RIPEMD-160

Random generators

- SECUDE
- X^2 modulo N
- Linear Congruence Generator (LCG)
- Inverse Congruence Generator (ICG)

Cryptoanalysis

Attack on RSA Signature

- RSA modulus factorisation
- workable up to approx. 250 bit

Attack on hash function/digital signature

 Generation of hash collisions to ASCII texts

Random data analysis

- FIPS-PUB-140-1 test battery
- periodicity, Vitany, entropy
- histogram, n-gram analysis
- auto-correlation
- ZIP compression test



CrypTool Overview 2. Software package contents

CrypTool program

- all functions integrated in one program with uniform graphical user interface
- platforms: Win32 and Linux with WINE emulator
- cryptography based on Secude library (www.secude.com)
- arbitrary precision arithmetic: Miracl library (http://indigo.ie/~mscott/)

AES-Tool

standalone program for AES encryption (self extracting)

Extensive online help (Winhelp)

- context sensitive online help for all program functions and all menu items
- detailed usage examples for many program features

Script (PDF) with background information on

- encryption algorithms prime numbers digital signature
- elliptic curves public key certification elementary number theory

Short story "Dialogue of the Sisters" by Dr. C. Elsner



CrypTool Overview 3. New in release 1.3.xx

Most important changes (details: see ReadMe-en.txt):

Release 1.3.00 published January 2002

- completely bilingual English/German
- dialog box consistency and comprehensibility improved
- Windows 9x file size limit removed
- homophonic and permutation encryption
- random generators, random data analysis (FIPS-140-1, periodicity, n-gram)
- AES-Tool: create self-decrypting files (AES)
- demonstration: number theory and RSA crypto system (further improved in 1.3.02)
- PKCS#12 export/import for PSEs

Release 1.3.02 published June 2002

- visualisation of hybrid encryption and decryption
- visualisation of signature creation and verification
- hash value calculation of large files (without loading them into memory)
- visualisation of the sensitivity of hash functions to changes in the hashed data
- short story "Dialogue of the Sisters" by Dr. C. Elsner included



CrypTool Overview 3. New in release 1.3.xx

Release 1.3.04 published June 2003

- visualisation of Diffie-Hellman key exchange
- attack on digital signature using hash-collisions (birthday paradox)
- brute-force attack on symmetric ciphers improved
- script updated (primes, factorization) and extended (hash functions, ECC, CrypTool menu tree)
- many small improvements (especially online help) and bug fixes




1. Hybrid encryption visualised

Hybrid encryption

- combines advantages of symmetric and asymmetric encryption
 - speed
 - simple and scalable key management
- widely used in practice
 - e-mail (S/MIME, PGP) and file encryption
 - SSL (https)


Visualisation by an interactive data flow diagram

playful learning leads to deeper understanding






1. Hybrid encryption visualised: Preparation




1. Hybrid encryption visualised: Cryptography





1. Hybrid encryption visualised: Result






Examples of use 2. Digital signature visualised

Digital signature

- increasingly important
 - equivalence with manual signature (digital signature law)
 - more and more used by industry, government and consumers
- few people know how it works


Visualisation in CrypTool

- interactive data flow diagram
- similar to the visualisation of hybrid encryption







2. Digital signature visualised: Preparation



2. Digital signature visualised: Cryptography



2. Digital signature visualised: Result





Examples of use 3. Attack on RSA encryption with short RSA modulus

Example from Song Y. Yan, Number Theory for Computing, Springer, 2000

- public key
 - RSA modulus N = 63978486879527143858831415041 (95bit, 29 decimal digits)
 - public exponent e = 17579
- cipher text (block length = 14):
 - $-C_1 = 45411667895024938209259253423$
 - $C_2 = 16597091621432020076311552201,$
 - $C_3 = 46468979279750354732637631044$,
 - $C_4 = 32870167545903741339819671379$
- the text shall be deciphered!


Solution using CrypTool (more detailed in online help examples section):

- enter public parameters into "RSA cryptosystem" (menu indiv. procedures)
- button "factorise the RSA modulus" yields prime factors pq = N
- based on that information private exponent d=e⁻¹ mod (p-1)(q-1) is determined
- decrypt the cipher text with d: M_i = C_i^d mod N


The attack with CrypTool is workable for RSA moduli up to 250 bit



3. Short RSA modulus: enter public RSA parameters




3. Short RSA modulus: factorise RSA modulus




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3. Short RSA modulus: determine private key d



DARMSTADT


3. Short RSA modulus: adjust options







3. Short RSA modulus: decrypt cipher text





4. Analysis of encryption used in the PSION 5 PDA

Attack on the encryption option in the PSION 5 PDA word processing application



Starting point: an encrypted file on the PSION

Requirements

- encrypted English or German text
- depending on method and key length, 100 bytes up to several kB of text

probably classical


encryption algorithm

Procedure

- pre-analysis
 - entropy
 - floating entropy
 - compression test
- auto-correlation
- try out automatic analysis with classical methods




Examples of use 4. PSION PDA: determine entropy, compression test



DARMSTADT

Examples of use 4. PSION PDA: determine auto-correlation







Examples of use 4. PSION PDA: automatic analysis

Automatic analysis using XOR: does not work Automatic Analysis

Automatic analysis using Binary Addition:

- CrypTool calculates the key length using auto-correlation: 32 bytes
- The user can choose which character is expected to occur most frequently: "e" = 0x65 (ASCII code)
- Analysis calculates the most likely key (based on the assumptions about distribution)
- Results: good, but not perfect







Examples of use 4. PSION PDA: results of automatic analysis

Results of automatic analysis with assumption "binary addition":

- results good, but not perfect: 24 out of 32 key bytes correct.
- the key length was correctly determined.
- the password entered was not 32 bytes long.
 - ⇒ PSION Word derives the actual key from the password.
- manual post-processing produces the encrypted text (not shown)

```
Automatic Addition Analysis of <psion-enc.hex>, key: <12 86 5B EF 14 98 87 2C 39 3E 43 74 13 ...
100000
                              74 7A 20 28
                                                                     ergisetz (UStG).
00010
                                                                     ...rstereAb, "hn®
00020
                                                                     tt..teuergegenst
        61 6E A9 20 75 6E 64 20 8C 65 6C
                                                                     an@ und .el10ng,
00030
00040
                                                                     ber@ich.. S 1.. (1
                          20 55 6D B8 61 74 BF B8
00050
                                                                       .er Um.ati.teº
        65 72 20 BA 6E 74 65 72 6C 69 65 67 65 6E
69 65 65 66 6F 6C 67 65 B3 64 65 B3 65 55
                                                                     er onterliegen d
00060
00070
                                                                     ieefolge³de³eUm.
                                 2E
00080
                                                                     ätza: .1. die Lie
        66 65 B7 75 6E 67 65 6E 65 75
00090
                                                                     fe ungeneun@eso3
        73 74 69 AC 65 6E 20 4C 65 69 73
000A0
                                                                     stiren Leistunge
        6E 2C 65 64 69 65 20 65 AE 6E 20 9A B3
6E 65 68 B2 65 72 20 69 6D 20 49 6E 6C
000B0
                                                                     n.edie e@n .3te.
000C0
                                                                     neh<sup>2</sup>er im Inland
                      65 6E
                             20 45 B3 74 67
000D0
                                                                      qaqen E3tqa±t ®
        6D 20 52 A6 68 6D 65 6E 20 73 65 69 6E 65
000E0
                                                                     m R¦hmen seines
000F0
                      72 6E 65 68 B2 65 6E B8
                                                                    Un¹erneh²en eau
```



Examples of use 4. PSION PDA: determining the remaining key bytes

Copy key to clipboard during automatic analysis In automatic analysis hexdump,

- determine incorrect byte positions, e.g. 0xAA at position 3
- guess and write down corresponding correct bytes: "e" = 0x65

In encrypted initial file hexdump,


- determine initial bytes from the calculated byte positions: 0x99
- calculate correct key bytes with CALC.EXE: 0x99 0x65 = 0x34

Correct key from the clipboard

12865B341498872C393E43741396A45670235E111E907AB7C0841...


Decrypt encrypted initial document using binary addition


■ bytes at position 3, 3+32, 3+2*32, ... are now correct





Examples of use 5. Weak DES keys








Examples of use 6. Locate key material

The function "Floating frequency" is suitable for locating key material and encrypted areas in files.

Background:

- key data is "more random" than text or program code
- can be recognised as peaks in the "floating frequency"

example: the "NSAKEY" in advapi32.dll





Examples of use 7. Attack on digital signature: idea

Attack on digital signatures of printable ASCII-text based on hash collision Idea:

- An ASCII-text can be extended by an indefinite number of non-printable characters without changing the readable content
- Insert non-printable characters in an "evil" and a "harmless" text until you get a hash collision
- Attack uses the Birthday Paradoxon (birthday attack)
- Generic attack on any hash function
- Attack can be parallelized
- Implementation based on a work from Jan Blumenstein: Methoden und Werkzeuge für Angriffe auf die digitale Signatur, 2003



Examples of use 7. Attack on digital signature: idea


Attack on the digital signature of an ASCII text based on hash collision search

Idea:

- ASCII-Texts can be modified by changing/inserting non-printable characters, without changing the visible content
- modify two texts in parallel until a hash collision is found
- exploit the birthday paradox (birthday attack)
- generic attack applicable to all hash functions
- can be run in parallel on many machines (not implemented)
- implemented in CrypTool by Jan Blumenstein as part of his bachelor thesis "Methods and tools for attacks on digital signatures" (German), 2003.



7. Attack on digital signature: idea (2)




- **1. Modification:** starting from a message M create N different messages $M_1, ..., M_N$ with the same "content" as M.
- **2. Search:** find modified messages M_i^H und M_i^S with the same hash value.
- **3. Attack:** the signatures of those two documents M_i^H und M_i^S are the same.


We know from the birthday paradox that for hash values of bit length n:

- search collision between M^H and M_1^S , ..., M_N^S : $N \approx 2^n$
- search collision between M_1^H , ..., M_N^H and M_1^S , ..., M_N^S : $N \approx 2^{n/2}$




7. Attack on digital signature: attack







Examples of use 7. Attack on digital signature: results



The first 32 bits of the hash values are identical.

Experimental results

- 72 Bit partial collision (equality of the first 72 hash value bits) were found in a couple of days on a single PC.
- Signatures using hash values of up to 128 bit can be attacked today using massively parallel search!



Further development

Work in process

- visualisation of challenge-response authentication
- attack on single-sided authentication with CR and weak encryption
- mass pattern search

Planned for near future

- visualisation of SSL protocol
- visualisation of Man-in-the-Middle attack
- demonstration of a side-channel attack

Planned for remote future

- visualisation of different security protocols (e.g. Kerberos)
- visualisation of attacks on these different security protocols
- port to Linux or Java
- many more ideas can be found in the readme file, chapter 6



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