

International Institute of Information Technology, Hyderabad.  
Principles of Information Security

Mid Semester Examination

February 25, 2020

Time: 90 mins.

Max. Marks: 40.

There are eight questions, 5 marks each. Attempt all questions.

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1. Consider an improved version of the Vigenere cipher, where instead of using multiple shift ciphers, multiple mono-alphabetic substitution ciphers are used. That is, the key consists of  $t$  random permutations of the alphabet, and the plaintext characters in positions  $i$ ;  $t+i$ ;  $2t+i$  and so on are encrypted using the  $i$ th permutation. Show how to break this version of the cipher.
2. Prove or refute: For every encryption scheme that is perfectly secret it holds that for every distribution over the message space  $\mathcal{M}$  every  $m, m' \in \mathcal{M}$  and every  $c \in \mathcal{C}$

$$\Pr[M = m | C = c] = \Pr[M = m' | C = c]$$

3. Let  $f, g$  be negligible functions. Decide whether (a)  $H(n) = f(n) \times g(n)$  and (b)  $H(n) = f(n)/g(n)$  are necessarily negligible functions (for arbitrary  $f, g$ ) or not. If it is, prove it. If not, give a counterexample. Moreover, let  $f, g$  be length preserving one-way function (so, e.g.,  $|f(x)| = |x|$ ). For each of the following functions  $h$ , decide whether it is necessarily a one-way function (for arbitrary  $f, g$ ) or not. If it is, prove it. If not, show a counterexample.

(a)  $h(x) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} f(x) \oplus g(x)$ .

(b)  $h(x) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} f(f(x))$ .

(c)  $h(x_1 \parallel x_2) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} f(x_1) \parallel g(x_2)$ ; ( $\parallel$  means concatenation)

(d)  $h(x_1, x_2) = (f(x_1), x_2)$  where  $|x_1| = |x_2|$ .

4. Given an efficiently-computable function  $G : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^*$  with  $|G(x)| = l(|x|)$  consider the following experiment defined for an algorithm  $A$  and parameter  $n$ :

- (a) Choose random  $s \in \{0, 1\}^n$  and set  $y_0 = G(s)$ . Choose random  $y_1 = \{0, 1\}^{l(n)}$ .  
(b) Choose a random bit  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ .  
(c) Give  $y_b$  to  $A$ , who outputs a bit  $b'$ .

say  $G$  is an *indistinguishable* PRG if for all probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithms  $A$ , there exists a negligible function  $\epsilon$  such that

$$\Pr[b' = b] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon(n)$$

in the experiment above.

Prove that this definition is equivalent to the definition of a pseudorandom generator.

5. Give complete details (and if possible present an example illustrating the methods you describe) of how to use an instance of  $X$  to design an instance of  $Y$  where:

- (a)  $X = \text{One-way permutation}$ ,  $Y = \text{Pseudorandom generator}$ .
- (b)  $X = \text{Pseudorandom generator}$ ,  $Y = \text{Pseudorandom function}$ .
- (c)  $X = \text{Pseudorandom function}$ ,  $Y = \text{Invertible pseudorandom function}$ .
- (d)  $X = \text{Pseudorandom function}$ ,  $Y = \text{Message Authentication Code}$
- (e)  $X = \text{MAC and PRF}$ ,  $Y = \text{CCA-Secure Encryption Scheme}$

6. Show that the basic CBC-MAC as described in class is insecure if the sender authenticates messages of different lengths.

- ✓ 7. Describe and prove an improved version (that starts off with a collision resistant hash function with lesser compression ratio) of Merkle-Damgard Transform.
- ✓ 8. If A and B are connected by *two* insecure channels, where the adversary may choose to actively corrupt any one among them and passively eavesdrop on the other, design a secure key establishment protocol using the DDH assumption (or argue its impossibility if you so think).

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ALL THE BEST

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