

Fourteenth Session

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
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Multi-agent systems (MAS)

- A **multi-agent system** consists of **multiple decision-making agents** which interact in a **shared environment** to achieve common or conflicting goals.
- Additional complexity arises in such systems.
- In this example we have two kinds of agents with different skills:




Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL)


- **Multi-agent reinforcement learning** algorithms learn optimal policies for a set of agents in a multi-agent system.

MARL = Reinforcement Learning(**RL**) in Multi-Agent Systems(**MAS**)

- In last session, we saw how RL allows a single agent to learn a policy that maximizes a possibly delayed reward signal in its environment.
- However, when multiple agents apply RL in a shared environment, the optimal policy of an agent depends not only on the environment, but **on the policies of the other agents as well**.




MARL



Partial observability


- Agents observe the world through their local vision fields (shown as gray rectangles around the agents).

State \geq Observation



Cooperative & Competitive behavior

- In MAS, multiple agents are acting in the same environment to achieve **common** or **conflicting** goals.



- Reward Structure** heavily influences agents' behavior. A reward system that emphasizes collective success promotes cooperation.

Cooperative Behavior

- With cooperative behavior, **agents work together** to achieve a **common goal** that benefits everyone.
- By collaborating, agents can achieve more complex tasks, solve problems more efficiently, and potentially gain access to resources they couldn't obtain individually.
- Examples:
 - Swarm robots working together to build a structure.
 - Ants cooperating to find and transport food back to their colony.
 - Multi-Robot Warehouse Management




Competitive behavior

- Agents **compete** for **limited resources or rewards**, aiming to outperform each other.
- Examples:
 - Auction houses where bidders compete for items.
 - Predators competing for prey in an ecosystem.
 - Trading bots in a financial market trying to buy low and sell high.
- ✓ What other examples?



Communications

- A taxonomy of some of the different ways in which agents can coordinate their behavior and activities:
- Decentralized planning examples:
 - autonomous driving in urban environments
 - a team of mobile robots used in search-and-rescue



Game theory

Game theory

- **Game theory** provides a **theoretical basis** to the field of multi-agent systems.
- Games = Models of Multi-Agent Interaction
- Some examples:

| | R | P | S |
|---|------|------|------|
| R | 0,0 | -1,1 | 1,-1 |
| P | 1,-1 | 0,0 | -1,1 |
| S | -1,1 | 1,-1 | 0,0 |

(a) Rock-Paper-Scissors

| | A | B |
|---|----|----|
| A | 10 | 0 |
| B | 0 | 10 |

(b) Coordination Game

| | C | D |
|---|-------|-------|
| C | -1,-1 | -5,0 |
| D | 0,-5 | -3,-3 |

(c) Prisoner's Dilemma

Game theory

| Game theory | RL | Description |
|-----------------|-------------|---|
| game | environment | Model specifying the possible actions, observations, and rewards of agents, and the dynamics of how the state evolves over time and in response to actions. |
| player | agent | An entity which makes decisions. |
| payoff, utility | reward | Scalar value received by an agent/player after taking an action. |
| strategy | policy | Function used by an agent/player to assign probabilities to actions. |

Game theory

- **Game theory** is the study of mathematical models of **strategic interactions among rational agents**.
- **Strategic behavior** is basically decisions that consider the possible reactions of others. What the opponent does also depends upon what he thinks the first player will do.
- Recall that **rationality** is **doing the right thing**.
- We assume “**common knowledge**” of rationality. ←
- ✓ What implications does this common knowledge have for players?

Keynes Beauty Contest Game

- Each player names an integer between 1 and 100
- The player who names the **integer closest to two thirds of the average** integer wins a prize, the other players get nothing.
- ✓ What is your respond? ([Google forum link](#))

Keynes Beauty Contest Game


- Suppose a player believes the average play will be X (including his or her own integer)
- That player's optimal strategy is to say the closest integer to $\frac{2}{3}X$.

X must be less than 100, so the optimal strategy of any player must be no more than 67.

If X is no more than 67, then the optimal strategy of any player must be no more than $\frac{2}{3} \times 67$.


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✓ Optimal answer?



Keynes Beauty Contest Game


- Experiment results:



| Mean | Mode | Median | Winner |
|------|------|--------|--------|
| 34 | 50 | 33 | 23 |

Keynes Beauty Contest Game

- Experimenting again:



| Mean | Mode | Median | Winner |
|------|------|--------|--------|
| 6 | 1 | 2 | 4 |

Game

- A game has 3 components:
 1. **Players**
 2. **Actions**
 3. **Utilities** => The preferences of each player over outcomes
- In **normal-form games** (also called **matrix games**), we represent the payoffs each player receives as a function of the actions they **simultaneously** choose.
- **Extensive Form** includes timing of moves. Players move **sequentially**, represented as a tree
- ✓ Example?

Matrix representation form

- A 2-player game as a matrix form(normal form):

| | | Player B | |
|----------|----------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | | Action 1 | Action 2 |
| Player A | Action 1 | u_{11}^A, u_{11}^B | u_{12}^A, u_{12}^B |
| | Action 2 | u_{21}^A, u_{21}^B | u_{22}^A, u_{22}^B |

- Player A is row player and player B is column player.

Game theory

- Game theory is now a standard tool in **economics**.
- For example, Game theory is a way of modeling the economic activity of competitive firms as a simple game.

| | | Firm B | |
|--------|---------------|--------------|-----------|
| | | Stable price | Price war |
| Firm A | Stable prices | 40,40 | 0,60 |
| | Price war | 60,0 | 3,3 |

Zero-Sum vs. Non-Zero-Sum Games

- **Zero-sum** is a situation, in which one player's gain is equivalent to another's loss, so the **net change in utilities is zero**.
- **Non-Zero-Sum** means there's at least one outcome in which $u_{ij}^A + u_{ij}^B \neq 0$.
- A **zero-sum game** is also called a **strictly competitive game**, while **non-zero-sum games** can be **either competitive** or **non-competitive**.
- ✓ Examples:
 - Chess
 - Trade agreement
 - Financial derivatives

| | R | P | S |
|---|------|------|------|
| R | 0,0 | -1,1 | 1,-1 |
| P | 1,-1 | 0,0 | -1,1 |
| S | -1,1 | 1,-1 | 0,0 |

Rock-Paper-Scissors

Prisoner's Dilemma

- The **prisoner's dilemma** presents a situation where two parties, separated and **unable to communicate**, must each choose between cooperating with the other or not.

| | | B | |
|---|------------|--|--|
| | | Cooperates | Defects |
| A | Cooperates | -1 , -1 A's payoff B's payoff | -5 , 1 A's payoff B's payoff |
| | Defects | 1 , -5 A's payoff B's payoff | -2 , -2 A's payoff B's payoff |

Prisoner's Dilemma

- Every game in this form is a **Prisoner's Dilemma**:

| | | Player B | |
|----------|----|----------|--------|
| | | I | II |
| Player A | I | a, a | b, c |
| | II | c, b | d, d |

if $c > a > d > b$

- Prisoner's Dilemma** is a non-zero sum game.

Prisoner's Dilemma

- A **solution** for a game is a **joint strategy** that dictates the optimal actions for all players.
- ✓ What action do you think each player should choose in Prisoner's Dilemma?

| | | Player B | |
|----------|------------|------------|---------|
| | | Cooperates | Defects |
| Player A | Cooperates | -1,-1 | -5,1 |
| | Defects | 1,-5 | -2,-2 |

Infinitely repeated game

- An **infinitely repeated game** consists of **an infinite sequence of repetitions** of a game.
- Players observe each other's action choices in each period and have perfect recall.

| Iteration | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | ... |
|-----------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-----|
| A payoffs | p_1^A | p_2^A | p_3^A | p_4^A | ... |
| B payoffs | p_1^B | p_2^B | p_3^B | p_4^B | ... |

- The players discount payoffs with discount factor $\gamma \in (0,1)$.

$$R = \sum_t \gamma^t \times p(t)$$

Iterated prisoner's dilemma

- If two players play the prisoner's dilemma **more than once in succession**, remember their opponent's previous actions, and are allowed to change their strategy accordingly, the game is called the **iterated prisoner's dilemma**.

| | | Player B | |
|----------|------------|------------|---------|
| | | Cooperates | Defects |
| Player A | Cooperates | -1,-1 | -5,1 |
| | Defects | -5,1 | -2,-2 |



| Iteration | 1 | 2 | 3 | ... | M |
|-----------|---|---|---|-----|---|
| A payoff | | | | | |
| B payoff | | | | | |

- ✓ What strategy is most effective here?

Iterated prisoner's dilemma

- Some possible strategies:

- Defection
- Cooperation
- Tit for Tat
- Tit for Two Tats
- Trigger
- Random
- Tit for Tat with Occasional Surprise D
- ...

| | | Player B | |
|----------|------------|------------|---------|
| | | Cooperates | Defects |
| Player A | Cooperates | 0,0 | -1,0 |
| | Defects | 0,-1 | -3,-3 |


- ✓ Think about what happens to defectors in a society of cooperators or cooperators in a society of defectors. Who will be able to succeed?

Iterated prisoner's dilemma

- You can play this game [here](#).
- You can also see [here](#) for battle of residents and invaders


| Resident | | |
|-----------|---------------|--|
| Last Move | Last Opponent | Strategy |
| Cooperate | Cooperate | <input type="button" value="Cooperate"/> |
| Cooperate | Defect | <input type="button" value="Defect"/> |
| Defect | Cooperate | <input type="button" value="Cooperate"/> |
| Defect | Defect | <input type="button" value="Cooperate"/> |
| | Initial | <input type="button" value="Cooperate"/> |

| Invader | | |
|-----------|---------------|--|
| Last Move | Last Opponent | Strategy |
| Cooperate | Cooperate | <input type="button" value="Defect"/> |
| Cooperate | Defect | <input type="button" value="Defect"/> |
| Defect | Cooperate | <input type="button" value="Cooperate"/> |
| Defect | Defect | <input type="button" value="Defect"/> |
| | Initial | <input type="button" value="Defect"/> |




Stochastic Games

- ✓ What if we didn't always repeat back to the same game?
- A **stochastic game** is a generalization of repeated games. In a stochastic game, agents **repeatedly play games from a set of normal-form games**. The game played at any iteration depends on the previous game played and the actions taken by all agents in that game.




Extensive form Games

- The normal form game representation does not incorporate any notion of sequence, or time, of the actions of the players.
- The **extensive form** is an alternative representation that makes the **temporal structure** explicit.



Extensive form Games

- we can convert an extensive-form game into normal form:



AG
AH
BG
BH

| <i>CE</i> | <i>CF</i> | <i>DE</i> | <i>DF</i> |
|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| 3, 8 | 3, 8 | 8, 3 | 8, 3 |
| 3, 8 | 3, 8 | 8, 3 | 8, 3 |
| 5, 5 | 2, 10 | 5, 5 | 2, 10 |
| 5, 5 | 1, 0 | 5, 5 | 1, 0 |

Solution to a game

- A **solution** for a game is a **joint strategy**.
- There exists a series of **equilibrium solution** concepts:
 - Nash equilibrium
 - Minimax
 - Correlated equilibrium
 - ...
- These equilibrium solutions are all based on the idea that every agent is best-responding to all other agents under the equilibrium, and hence **no agent can unilaterally deviate from the equilibrium to increase its returns**.

Dominant and dominated strategy

- A **dominant strategy** is when one choice gives better result than other, no matter what the opponents do.
- If one of a player's strategies is never the right thing to do, no matter what the opponents do, then it is **strictly dominated**.

- Example:

| Game | | Player B | | |
|----------|-----|----------|-----|-----|
| | | I | II | III |
| Player A | I | 1,2 | 1,5 | 2,4 |
| | II | 2,3 | 3,7 | 1,1 |
| | III | 2,4 | 4,9 | 1,3 |

Nash equilibrium

- **Nash equilibrium** is a pattern of behavior, whereby everybody is **doing as well as they can**, given what everybody else is doing.
- The Nash equilibrium solution concept applies the idea of a mutual best response to general-sum games with two or more agents. That such a solution exists in **any general-sum non-repeated normal-form game** was first proven in the celebrated work of Nash (1950).
- **Nash equilibrium** \Rightarrow where each player has nothing to gain by changing
- Nash's theorem only applies to finite games.

| Game | | Player B | | |
|----------|-----|----------|----|-----|
| | | I | II | III |
| Player A | I | | | |
| | II | | | |
| | III | | | |

Nash equilibrium

- We can sometimes find Nash equilibrium with dominant strategies.
- What is the solution here?

| Game | | Player B | | |
|----------|-----|----------|-----|-----|
| | | I | II | III |
| Player A | I | 1,2 | 1,5 | 2,7 |
| | II | 2,3 | 3,7 | 1,1 |
| | III | 2,4 | 4,9 | 1,3 |

E-Nash equilibrium

- in many applications, reaching a strict equilibrium may be **too computationally costly**.
- Instead, it may be good enough to compute a solution that is **sufficiently close to a strict equilibrium**, meaning that agents could technically deviate to improve their returns, but any such gains are sufficiently small.
- The e-Nash equilibrium relaxes the strict Nash equilibrium by requiring that no agent can improve its expected returns by more than $\epsilon > 0$ when deviating from its policy in the equilibrium.
- This is basically a **trade off** between **computation** and **optimality**.


Minimax

- **Minimax** is a solution concept defined for **two-agent zero-sum games**, in which one agent's reward is the negative of the other agent's reward.
- **Minimax** is a decision rule used to **minimize the worst-case potential loss**.
- In other words, a player considers all the best opponent responses to his strategies and selects the strategy such that the opponent's best strategy gives a payoff as large as possible.
- [Stockfish](#) uses min-max as its core.



Minimax

- Example:



Minimax

- Another example:

