FRANCE
During World War II
from Defeat *to* Liberation



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

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From Defeat to Liberation

Thomas R. Christofferson with **Michael S. Christofferson**

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Abbreviations

BBC British Broadcasting Corporation CFLN Comite´ franc¸ais de la Libe´ration nationale CFTC Confe´de´ration franc¸aise des travailleurs chre´tiens CGT Confe´de´ration ge´ne´ral du travail CGQJ Commissariat ge´ne´ral aux questions juives FFI Forces franc¸aises de l'inte´rieur LVF Le´gion des volontaires franc¸ais contre le bolche´visme MUR Mouvements unis de la Re´sistance NRF Nouvelle Revue franc¸aise
OCM Organisation civile et militaire OSE Oeuvre de secours aux enfants OSS Office of Strategic Services PPF Parti populaire franc¸ais PQJ Police aux questions juives RNP Rassemblement national populaire SA Sturmabteilung SFIO Section franc¸aise de l'Internationale ouvrie`re SOL Service d'ordre le´gionnaire SS Schutzstaffel STO Service du travail obligatoire TC Te´moignage chre´tien UGIF Union ge´ne´rale des Israe´lites de France

Preface

This is a book about France during the Second World War, a subject that has been discussed and debated passionately by the French for the past sixty years, replacing the French Revolution as the event that most seriously divided the nation into warring factions. Today, how ever, it seems that the divisive debate on Vichy has reached a point of exhaustion, maybe even a conclusion of sorts. Maurice Papon's 1998 trial and conviction for crimes against humanity committed during

World War II seems to have ended a long, arduous period in which the French judicial system attempted—not always successfully—to bring the remaining French and German violators of human rights to justice. No more trials are in the offing, mainly because no one is left to be tried. The World War II generation is rapidly dying off in France and with it the memory of what occurred during that dark age.

In any case, the issues that divided France during the war are no longerrelevanttoday.The EuropeanUnion and theeconomicmodern ization of the past sixty years have put an end to the ‘‘True France’’ of peasants, folklore, rural values, and the like that produced Vichy’s nostalgic, vicious counterrevolution, better known at the time as the National Revolution. Vichy’s motto, ‘‘Work, Family, Fatherland’’ [Tra vail, Famille, Patrie] no longer applies to a France in which cohabita tion has replaced marriage, the thirty-five-hour week has redefined work, andthe broader European community haschanged themeaning of the nation state. Vichy’s total failure to impose its vision on France during World War II discredited its ideology, preparing the way for an urban nation with social, political, and economic structures radically different from those of the past. Today, the National Front is the only serious political remnant of the old regime in France. Its strength should neither be underestimated to encourage complacency in the face of extremism nor exaggerated to raise a false specter of fascism gaining power. Nevertheless, in the 2002 election, the French people rejected the Front’s candidate for president by a margin of 82 to 18 percent,proclaimingloudlyandclearly thattheextremist ideasupheld by the Front did not represent France.

Finally,thankstoadvancesinhistoricalscholarship,including care ful studies on collaboration, anti-Semitism, resistance, and the like, we can make judgments and reach conclusions with a complexity of perspective that historians did not possess until recently. As this book will show, France was a potpourri of resisters and collaborators, anti-Semites and philo-Semites. There was no French exceptionalism, no

shiningResistancemovementthatstoodheadandshouldersabovethother such movements in Europe. Nor was France notorious as a na tion of collaborators or anti-Semites. Put simply, France's record on these issues was no better or worse than that of other western Euro pean countries under Nazi rule, although it should be noted that such comparisons are difficult since each country faced unique situations, including moral dilemmas leading often to surprising outcomes.

Nevertheless, certain judgments can be made about this period of Frenchhistory.Weknow,forexample,thatinstitutionsfailedmiserabduring World War II, including the military, the political system, the Vichy government, the Church, and the educational system. As we pro ceed, we will see that France could have won the opening battles of World War II had it not been for the total failure of military and politi cal elites to act properly and decisively. In the Vichy regime and the National Revolution (which is the subject of the second chapter) elites offered the French little more than collaboration and exclusion as prin ciples of governance. As a result, millions of French men and women suffered severe hardship under the draconian terms of the armistice and collaboration, while Jews, Gypsies, Freemasons, and communists were excluded from French society, incarcerated in concentration camps, and—especially in the case of the Jews—even killed. Sadly, the French Catholic Church went along with much of this, although a few members of the hierarchy spoke out against Vichy and the Nazis.

The heroes in France during World War II were not institutions but individuals and communities that acted upon their convictions, whether secular, religious, ethical, or cultural in nature. Collaboration, as thethirdchapterargues,was popularamongonlya smallminorityof the French. Almost from the beginning—certainly from the Montoire meeting between Pe´tain and Hitler in late October 1940—the French people rejected collaboration between France and Germany. Regardless of public opinion, collaboration remained a French

government policy to the bitter end of the war. Nor did the French accept Vichy's anti-Semitic acts, even though the vast majority thought ill of the Jews, as numerous polls revealed during the 1930s and 1940s. As chapter 4 points out, although French gentiles were mostly unconcerned by the anti-Semitic legislation of 1940 and 1941, they overwhelmingly op posed the roundups of Jews and other anti-Semitic actions undertaken by the Vichy government beginning in 1942. Individual acts to protect the Jews helped save thousands from the Nazi extermination camps. Even Vichy listened to the outcry against the roundups of Jews and changed its policies after 1942 to thwart the Germans somewhat from achieving their goals. And finally, as the last two chapters argue, the Resistance providedthe means for French men and women of allpoliti cal cultures and backgrounds, from extreme right nationalists to ex treme left members of the Communist Party, to oppose collaboration and the Nazis and fight for France's independence. In the end, these individuals played a major role, with the support of General de Gaulle's Free French, in liberating France from Nazi occupation and creating a renewed republic under de Gaulle's leadership. They were tarnished, imperfectheroes who mademistakes. Some ofthem remainedideologi cally close to Vichy or Pe´tain while others seemed more like bandits than members of an idealistic political movement. Certainly, very few of them resembled the idealized Resistance figures that de Gaulle and the Communist Party depicted after the war ended.

Whether we historians realize it or not, we search for meaning in history. We make moral judgments about the past; we evaluate people and events; and we try to tell a story that holds together. These are the objectives that we have tried to realize in the essay that follows. It is not a comprehensive account of France during World War II. For that we direct the reader to other works in the bibliography and footnotes. Instead, we have tried to tell a complex morality tale for an audience of interestedlay readers and scholars who mightwant

asuccincthistorical account, although not one that oversimplifies what are difficult issues. What follows is based on the best and the most recent scholarship about the period. It is not primarily a summary of that scholarship, but rather an interpretation, one that does not deviate greatly from themainstream,butwhichassumes—whether rightlyorwrongly—that scholarship on Vichyhas come to an endpoint where we can say: ‘‘This history is over; its lessons can now be fully assimilated.’’ This is one minor attempt to understand what those lessons are, based on the mag nificent body of historical scholarship produced in the past forty years or so.

Finally, a note on the authorship of this book. This book is primar ily the intellectual product of Thomas R. Christofferson, but Michael S. Christofferson has been given some authorial credit in reflection of his significant contribution to it. Thomas researched and wrote a draft of this book that passed Fordham University Press’s peer review. At this point, Michael began to work on the project. In consultation with Thomas, Michael checked facts and revised the manuscript to reduce its size, improve its clarity, and address issues of fact and interpreta tion raised by Robert O. Paxton. He also researched and wrote a few additions to the text. The most important of these are discussions of interwar politics, diplomacy, and rearmament in the first chapter and the Epilogue’s paragraphs on contemporary France. He also shep herded the manuscript through the production process, including bringingit into conformitywiththe Press’sstylesheet, reviewing copy-edits and page proofs, and creating the index.

Lastbutnotleast,theauthors wouldliketothankRobertO. Paxton for his extensive and detailed comments on the manuscript. Although the authors have not always followed his expert advice, it has made this book significantly better. He, of course, is not responsible for any errors and shortcomings of this work.

This book is dedicated to Pablo and, with him, a brighter future.

France during World War II

Defeat of France In the spring of 1940 France suffered the most humiliating defeat in its modern history as the German military overran it in a few weeks, leading to a demoralizing armistice in June. No one had expected such a devastating outcome. The western democracies, England and the United States, were stunned. Nazi Germany was ecstatic. The long, defensive war that France and England had anticipated, in light of World War I, did not occur. Instead, blitzkrieg prevailed—at least in the short run.

The effort to understand why France fell so easily to the Germans has concentrated on specific French circumstances, ranging from the thesis of internal decay to the failure of the military to prepare for the right kind of war and to respond effectively to the German invasion. Today most historians place the primary blame on the military, but in 1940 the thesis of internal decay dominated interpretation. Marshal Philippe Pe ´tain, who became head of state in the summer of 1940, focusedattentiononnationaldecadence

asthecauseofdefeat,dismiss ing any criticism of the military for the national catastrophe. The so-called Vichy regime that the Marshal created in July 1940 was based solidly on the perceived necessity of rejuvenating traditional morality in order to realize national salvation.

On June 25, 1940, Marshal Pe´tain explained the harsh provisions of the armistice with Germany in terms of the need for a new order in France, one based on peasant values (‘‘The earth does not lie,’’ he exclaimed) and the rejection of the ‘‘spirit of pleasure,’’ which had un dermined the ‘‘spirit of sacrifice’’ during the interwar years. France’s leading intellectual, Andre´ Gide, supported Pe´tain on this, despite his having openly embraced homosexuality, which was considered deca dent at the time. Gide wrote in his diary that the Marshal’s statement was ‘‘simply admirable.’’ Others, more inclined to rightist views, such as the Catholic writer Paul Claudel, expressed open disdain for the discredited republic: ‘‘this foul parliamentary regime that for yearshas been eating away at France like a generalized cancer.’’ And Church leaders such as Cardinal Gerlier viewed defeat as an opportunity for spiritual renewal: ‘‘If France had been victorious it would have re mained the prisoner of its errors.’’ To most intellectuals on the Right and some on the Left the Third Republic and its apparent decadence were responsible for the debacle of 1940.[1]

How much truth is there tothisargument?Did Francelose the war in 1940 because of internal rot, which made it unprepared for battle? The answer is simple: Rot existed, but it explains more the reaction to defeat than defeat itself, which was due

primarily to the errors of the militaryhighcommand.To understandwhatthis meansrequiresmore detailed explanation.

France during the Interwar Years: An Interpretation of Some Reasons for Defeat in 1940

France came out of World War I a victorious but exhausted nation. The war had taken such a heavy toll that the vast majority of the Frenchhad no stomachforanother.Outof apopulationofslightlyless than40million, over1.3millionsoldiers werekilled,anaverageof890 per day for more than four years. Another 2.8 million—40 percent of all soldiers—were wounded one or more times. The dead soldiers left behind approximately 600,000 widows, 760,000 orphans, and 1.3 mil lion grieving parents. Nearly all of France mourned the loss of some one, a fact that contributed powerfully to interwar pacifism. Birth rates, already troublingly low before 1914, suffered greatly from men beingatthefront,creating ‘‘hollowyears’’ in the late1930swhenthose bornduringthe warreachedtheageofmilitary service.Concernabout population stagnation that continued into the interwar years contrib uted to a postwar backlash against women and laws repressing abor tion and contraception. To make up for wartime losses, France imported laborers to work in factories and mines in the prosperous 1920s such that France surpassed the United States as the industrial ized nation with the largest percentage of its population comprised of immigrants. Meanwhile, the native population was disproportionately made up of war veterans, widows, and old people. Youth comprised a definite minority in this gerontocratic society.[2]

The material costs of World War I were also important. The ten invaded departments of northern France, which had been the indus trial heartland of France before the war, were devastated and had to be rebuilt. France had paid for the war by massive borrowing, turning France from a creditor into a debtor nation and unleashing inflation. By October 1920 retail prices were more than four times higher than in July 1914. France’s bourgeois rentier class was devastated as its bonds

lost much of their value. Although inflation hit workers' wages less severely than bourgeois savings, workers felt exploited by arms manufacturers who had made huge wartime profits. Peasants, in turn, resented having paid a ''blood tax'' in casualties that workers in factor ies escaped. These resentments would fuel the fascist and communist political extremes, yet bridging class differences was the consensus that the Germans should pay for the war.[3]

Disillusionment with France's victory in 1918 eventually followed from the lack of proportion between the death and destruction and France's gains.[4] At first glance, the treaties that ended World War I were extremely favorable to France. France's empire expanded with the addition of mandates in Africa and the Middle East. Alsace and Lorraine, lost in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71, were returned to France, and the coal-rich Saar was given to France for fifteen years in compensation for damage to French coal mines. Substantial repara tions payments from Germany promised to finance reconstruction. The threat from Germany seemed much reduced due to its territorial losses, serious limits placed on its military's size and equipment, and the permanent demilitarization of the German Rhineland bordering France.

Despite these gains, the fact remains that France had won World War I only with the help of allies, and these allies were hard to find after the war. The alliance with Russia had collapsed following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. Great Britain became increasingly con vinced after the war that France was too harsh on Germany. France was, British Prime Minister Lloyd George remarked in March 1919, ''a poor winner'' that ''does not take her victories well.''[5] In the 1920s and 1930s France could not count on either Britain or the United States. The United States' failure to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and its re treat into isolation after the war effectively nullified an Anglo-Ameri can guarantee of French security made at the Paris peace conference. As France would learn in its unsuccessful attempt to force Germany to payreparations

byoccupying the Ruhr in 1923,without alliesFrance's victory of 1918 could easily be reversed. Given Germany's larger popu lation and stronger economy, the prospect of German revival was frightening.

Although social and political tensions abated in the prosperity of the mid 1920s, the Great Depression gave them new life. The impact of the depression in France was somewhat different from that in other industrialized countries. Itbecameserious in Franceonly beginning in 1931—later than elsewhere—was lesssharp,andresulted inlowerlev els of unemployment. Workers, whose real wages fared well as prices declined, werenot hit as hard as farmers and the lower middle class of artisans and small businessmen. The depression also lasted longer in Francethanitdidelsewhere.WhileBritainandGermany sawrecovery in the mid-1930s, France did not until the acceleration of rearmament in late 1938.[6]

The long duration of the depression in France was partially due to the political response to it. With the exception of the Popular Front period of 1936–37, the government followed a policy of deflation and refused to follow other countries in devaluing its currency, thereby rendering French exports uncompetitive. This orthodox remedy com forted a bourgeoisie fearful of a return to inflation, but only worsened an economy that needed demand stimulation. Political crisis resulted. Following the success of the Left in the 1932 elections a second wave of fascist agitation, after that of 1924–26, hit France. Older fascistic groups such as Action franc¸aise and the Jeunesses patriotes gained new support, and new ones emerged such as Solidarite´ franc¸aise, founded in 1933, and Croix de feu, a veterans organization turned into a politically ambitious fascist league by Colonel de La Rocque after he took charge of it in 1931. The mobilization of these and other protest groups against the left-center governments of 1932–34 culminated in the riots of February 6, 1934, in which seventeen people were killed, the most deaths in Parisian political violence since the 1871 Com mune.[7] The February 6 riots

intensified the political crisis. Although the violence resulted in the resignation of the government and the return of the Right to power, this did not diminish the strength of the extreme right, as the Right's return to government had in 1926. Croix de feu, in particular, grew dramatically from 35,000 members before the riots to 500,000 members in February 1936 to become the most important fascist movement in France.[8] On the Left, the riots were interpreted as an attempted fascist coup d'e´tat and created a dynamic favorable to a Popular Front coalition against fascism. This was given a crucial push forward by the Comintern and French Communist Party'sJune1934abandonmentof ''classagainstclass'' politics,which saw themainenemyas socialdemocracy,infavorofforging aUnitedFront against fascism. Ultimately bringing together the Communist, Social ist, and Radical parties, the Popular Front would win the May 1936 elections on a reformist and antifascist program, which notably called for an end to deflationary economic policies.[9]

The 1936–37 Popular Front government led by the socialist Le´on Blum was a mixture of successes and failures. Following massive June 1936 strikes by workers seeking to capitalize on the Left's electoral victory, workers gained a forty-hour work week, two weeks of paid vacation, union and collective bargaining rights, and significant pay raises. The Popular Front's dissolution of the fascist leagues and more generallyitscommitmenttothedefenseofdemocracy overthepromo tion of revolution helped prevent fascism from taking power in 1930s France. But the Popular Front was less successful in dealing with the depression. Its efforts to stimulate the economy were hindered by Blum's initial refusal to countenance a devaluation of the currency without which exports could not be revived. Further, the forty-hour week had the unintended consequence of hindering French industry from meeting domestic demand. Also, although the Popular Front had stymied fascism in the short term, it further polarized French politics. Manyinthemiddleclasssaw abreakdownofsocialorderinthestrikes and reforms of the

Popular Front. Anticommunism grew within both the Right and the Left in reaction to the Communist Party (PCF) elec toral breakthrough in the 1936 elections and out of fear that the com munistsmightpushFranceintoanantifascist war.Particularlynotable was the Radical Party's shift from Popular Front ally of the commu nists in 1936 to vehement anticommunism by 1938.[10] One beneficiary of the rise of anticommunism was Colonel de La Rocque's arguably fascist Parti social franc¸ais founded in 1936 after the Popular Front banned the fascist leagues including Croix de feu. Feeding on fear of the Popular Front, it became France's largest political party with per haps as many as 1 million members in 1938.[11]

ThePopularFrontgovernment,inthetrue senseoftheterm,lasted barely a year, as the Radicals deserted the cause and the Socialists under Le´on Blum squabbled among themselves over policy and gave up hope of continuing in office in the face of a financial crisis they could not resolve. The Popular Front came to a definite end when the radical Edouard Daladier formed a government without socialist members in April 1938, which proceeded to reverse key Popular Front reforms in late 1938. In the name of national defense, Daladier's Min ster of Finance Paul Reynaud issued decrees in November 1938 that restoredtheforty-eight-hourworkweekandincreasedtaxes onsalaried employees.Theunions'generalstrikeofNovember30,1930,toprote Reynaud's policies failed miserably and led to a massive decline in union membership: the largest union, the Confe´de ´ration ge´ne´rale du travail (CGT), lost 1 million members within a year.[12] Daladier's suc cessful assault on labor led capital, which had fled France during the Popular Front, to flow back into the country. This plus a massive in crease in rearmament spending helped pull France out of the depres sion in 1939.

EspeciallyontheRight,WorldWar I,theGreatDepression,andthe Popular Front fueled a critique of decadent France and a defense of ''True France''[13] that was key to defining the agenda

of the Vichy re gime that emerged from France's defeat in 1940. For many, this cri tiqueofdecadentFrancefocused ontheinterwarcrisisofruralFrance, which was quite real. Facing declining commodity prices and starved ofneededcapital,agriculturesuffered in theinterwaryears.Cultivated land declined by 1.7 million hectares in the 1920s and 1930s, and the agricultural workforce fell from 42 to 36 percent of all workers be tween 1921 and 1936. The rural commune lost its reason to be as rural industries shut down and schools and churches closed their doors. Vil lage festivals and customs, such as the evening social gatherings at home, known as the veille´e, faded away as only the old were left to carry on tradition. Radio, the press, the cinema, and other forces of modernity undermined peasant society and culture.[14]

To many, the decline of peasant France meant the decline of True France, of France itself. World War I had been won by the peasants whocomprisedhalfofthefrontlinetroopsby1918.Supernationalists such as Maurice Barre`s, marveled at the eternal spiritual traits that these men displayed and imagined the joy that they would experience in future commemorations of the war. Yet the interwar reality was quite different as joy turned to pacifism and the eternal values of the countryside, such as patriarchy, collapsed. Tradition-minded Catholics tried to counter this trend, creating the Catholic Agricultural Youth movement (JACistes) to preserve the traditional Catholic nature of the countryside.Variouscorporatistgroupsemerged,such astheSemaines sociales de France and the Union nationale des syndicats agricoles. They opposed both socialism and parliamentary government, favoring insteadaunionofpeasantsandlandownersin onecorporatebodythat wouldmake decisions forallrural interests.In a more radicalvein, the peasant party led by Henri Dorge`res used quasi-fascist violent direct action to achieve its objectives. The common thread running through all of these organizations was the failure of normal institutions to deal with

the crisis of agriculture. Political parties, parliamentary government, and the State were incapable of resolving this crisis, according to them. Only a rupture—a radical break from past practices—could preserve the values of True France.[15]

The peasant France that these groups projected as a model was a static France for the most part, opposed to capitalism, the Republic, andmodernity.TheydidnotunderstandthatWorldWar Iandinternational economic forces had irreparably damaged their model. But this blindness was not confined to the countryside. Many urban intellectuals also suffered from nostalgia for the archaic. Behind debates about the school system, the Americanization of French culture, immigration, and parliamentary government lurked a vision of utopian, rural France. Decadence was urban; authenticity was peasant and rural. Or at least this was true among those on the Right, the defenders of the old order against the new. In the 1920s and 1930s, however, it seemed that most were on the side of tradition and nostalgia.

The republican school system was a particular target of conservatives, who attacked it for undermining traditional values. Marshal Pe´tain complained that the schools had abandoned spirituality. Many, including Charles Maurras, the leader of the quasi-fascist Action franc¸aise, agreed with him.Others focused onwhatthe schoolstaught. The 1902 law that allowed secondary students to opt out of learning GreekandLatin became thefocusof conservativeswhofeared thatthe French language would atrophy without ties to the Latin mother tongue.Stillothers, like AbelBonnard,authorof InPraiseof Ignorance who became minister of education under the Vichy regime, linked the republican system of education with a ‘‘civilization of half-breeds.’’ Bonnard deplored the pernicious influence of primary school teachers who encouraged students to have high expectations. He wanted the schools to teach students to be content and accept their station in life in order to revive the pre-1789 hierarchical social order. Alexis Carrel, recipient of the Nobel Prize in biology, supported

Bonnard's views on education. Carrel believed in rule by a genetically selected scientific elite of which peasants and workers could never be part due to their biologicalinferiority.Onlytheelitecouldbeeducated,heclaimed.Carrel and the opponents of the republican school system believed that universal education was not only unnecessary but also destructive. To them egalitarianism was nothing but demagoguery; all societies needed educated, ruling elites to preserve the social order against the forces of egalitarianism and anarchy.[16]

The fear of modernity also prevailed among those who warned against the danger of Americanization, which emerged during the in terwar period as one of the main enemies of True France. The anti-Semitic novelist Louis-Ferdinand Ce´line found nothing but materialist vulgarity in Henry Ford's America. His virulent fictional attack was matched by such popular nonfiction works as Georges Duhamel's Sce`nes de la vie future (1930), which depicted the United States as a barbaric and soulless threat to French civilization, and Robert Aron and Arnaud Dandieu's Le Cancer ame´ricain (1931), which called for a French spiritual revolution to overcome the cancer of American cul ture. These writers and many others searched for some third way, be tween American capitalism and Soviet communism, beyond France's failed liberal parliamentary form of government. Spiritual renewal comprised a major part of their answer to the crisis of modernity, whether in the form of Emmanuel Mounier's personalism, which placed the individual before society, or Thierry Maulnier's corporat ism,which wasbasedonastrongstate. ''NeitherRightnor Left'' served as an appropriate slogan for many of the new intellectuals who emerged on the French scene in the early 1930s.[17]

Scapegoating became increasingly common in the 1930s to explain how and why the True France of the peasantry or the Church or social cohesionorthenationhadbeenundermined.Inthesimplisticanalysis ofsome,thenation'sillscouldbecuredonlyiftheJew,thecommunist,

orthecapitalist
wereeliminated.TheRepublicturnedfromwelcoming outsiders—especially if they were European in origin—in the 1920s, to virtually complete intolerance towardthem by the end ofthe 1930s. As early as 1927, the year in which the government passed a liberal naturalization law, the geographer Andre´ Siegfried published an aca demic work which warned that France risked becoming a decadent polyglot nation, like the United States, if it continued to allow immi gration.Oncethedepression began,the slogan ‘‘Franceforthe French’’ became common, and hundreds of thousands of immigrant workers were forced to leave to open up jobs for the native-born. The watch dogs of citizenship increasingly insisted that immigrants who wanted to be naturalized had to be assimilated into the culture. But they doubted this was possible in light of the failure of colonial subjects to do so. Beginning in 1933 the minister of the interior required prefects to keep detailed records on all foreigners, similar to those kept on criminals. By World War II, the French police possessed five times more dossiers on foreigners than Mussolini had on his political enemies.[18]

The nation’s elites were hardly immune to this anti-immigrant mood. During the 1930s, doctors and lawyers successfully lobbied for laws that prevented newly naturalized citizens from practicing medi cine or the law. French civil servants also succeeded in keeping immi grants out of jobs in the state bureaucracy. By the mid-1930s the naturalized French were effectively second-class citizens because the law excluded them from a large part of French life.[19]

As World War II approached immigrant Jews were singled out for harsh treatment. Although the nation had welcomed Jewish refugees in 1933, by 1938 this was no longer the case. Even French Jews went along with the new restrictive policies of the Daladier government, which created internment camps in November 1938 to handle those refugeeswho couldnotbedeported.Jews made upmanyof theintern ees, but

they were soon outnumbered by the flight of nearly 500,000 Spaniards into France after the end of the Spanish Civil War. In des peration, the Daladier government planned to settle thousands of refu gees in the colonies, notably in Madagascar and New Caledonia.[20] Although the vast majority of immigrants in France were Italians and Spanish—they were 2.2 million in 1936—the 60,000 Jews who ob tained asylum after the Nazis seized power became the focus of abuse bythelate1930s.Forone,most were German.As onejournalistnoted: ‘‘French Jews complain that the newcomers have brought with them the particular faults of the Germans. Too noisy, too convinced of the superiority of German civilization. In brief—veritable ‘Boches.’’’ For another, they were associated with the war party in France. In the late 1930s a number of pacifist philo-Semitic publications turned against theJews intheiradvocacyofpeaceatanyprice.Theradicalnewspaper L’E`re nouvelle, which had a Jewish editor, was one of the most promi nent of these. Even socialists espoused anti-Semitic views. The leader of the pacifist wing of the Socialist Party, Paul Faure, attacked the party’s Jewish leader, Le´on Blum, claiming that he ‘‘would have us all killed for his Jews.’’ In 1938, with France on the verge of war with Germany, mobs attacked Jewish communities in Rouen, Dijon, Lille, and Nancy. In this climate of growing pacifist anti-Semitism, Prime Minister Edouard Daladier refused to condemn the Nazi pogrom of Kristallnacht because his government valued good relations with Ger many above concerns for German Jews. Daladier’s foreign minister, Georges Bonnet, replied to press attacks on the government’s silence by accusing the Jews and the communists of trying to undermine him.[21]

The banality of anti-Semitism in the late 1930s meant that no one feared ostracism for expressing the most outlandish sentiments about Jews. Robert Brasillach, a leading intellectual, could write in the ex treme right journal Je suis partout that all Jews should be deprived of citizenship, yet remain respectable enough to be nominated, on the eve of

World War II, for the Goncourt literary prize for his pro-fascist novel Les Sept Couleurs. Sadly, French elites in the 1930s did not view anti-Semitism as a serious problem; in fact, most French leaders ac cepted, at a minimum, a mild form of it. Even a majority of non-Jews who supported Dreyfus in 1898 had become anti-Semitic out of paci fism by the late 1930s, revealing clearly that Vichy France cannot be understood adequately as the revenge of the anti-Dreyfusards.[22]

The mentality of an isolationist, peasant France infused these mis guided attitudes about Jews and immigrants during the 1930s, block ing out the inevitable reality that France was part of a broader world, one that included not only the rest of Europe but also the forces of modernization, industrialization, and urbanization. Although not everyone fell into the xenophobic, racist style of analysis, many ac cepted a fundamentalist form of pacifism, which was as much a part of the True France mentality as anti-Semitic or anti-immigrant atti tudes. In 1936 Roger Martin du Gard, the well-known and respected novelist, wrote: ‘‘Anything rather than war! Anything! . . . even Fas cism in Spain . . . even Fascism in France: Nothing, no trial, no servi tude can be compared to war: Anything, Hitler rather than war!’’[23]He was not alone. In the same year, the Provenc¸al novelist Jean Giono wrote: ‘‘For my part, I prefer being a living German to being a dead Frenchman.’’[24] For the pacifist philosopher Alain, whose ideas shaped the Radical Party, rearmament represented a form of fascism. For oth ers on the extreme right, such as Thierry Maulnier, war against Ger many was out of the question for it would weaken the one major bulwark against the spread of communism in Europe. Except for the Communist Party, no political party or major institutional force over came pacifist reservations before the Munich agreement of 1938 to assert unambiguously the need to stand up to fascism in Europe. Paci fism contributed to the shortcomings of French foreign policy in the run-up to war.

When France went to war in 1939it had only onemajor ally,

Great Britain. This was, in part, a reflection of the inherent difficulties of France's diplomatic position when Hitler began to threaten the peace in the mid-1930s. The Bolshevik Revolution had brought an end to the Russian alliance, which had been key to France's survival in World War I. ThealliancesFranceconstructedinthe1920swiththe successor states of the Habsburg Empire (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia) were of limited utility given these states' weaknesses and quarrels among themselves. Getting Great Britain to commit to an alli ance with France was itself a difficult chore and indeed a real accom plishment, but the nurturing of relations with Britain was clearly a drag on the rest of French foreign policy. Yet, if France entered World War II with too few allies, this was only partially due to the difficult constellation of international forces. In addition to pacifism, internal French political dynamics and military weakness in the early years of Hitler's foreign policy offensive contributed to France's deteriorating international position. We can see how French foreign policy came up short by looking at its failure to secure alliances with Italy and the Soviet Union and to resist both Germany's remilitarization of the Rhineland in March 1936 and Germany's demand to take the Sudeten land from Czechoslovakia in 1938.

Although Italy was the ''least of the great powers,''[25] it was a valu ablepotentialallyofFrance.IthadprovenhelpfulafterenteringWorld War I on the French side in May 1915. An alliance with Italy would allow France to move resources from protecting its southeastern bor der and North African empire to the front with Germany. It would also facilitate linkages with central European allies such as Yugoslavia. SharedconcernsaboutGermanrearmamentmadea Franco-Italianrap prochement seem possible in 1934–35. Talks in January 1935 between French Prime Minister Pierre Laval and Italy's fascist dictator Benito Mussolini resulted in a preliminary agreement that only the French communists

opposed. Germany's announcement of extensive rearma ment in March 1935 was met by France, Britain, and Italy uniting in the Stresa Front to condemn Germany's violation of the Treaty of Versailles and Franco-Italian discussions regarding military coopera tion. This progress in Franco-Italian relations was reversed by Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in October 1935. Although the French govern ment did not wish to oppose the invasion, Britain's importance as a potential ally compelled it to support the British initiative to impose League of Nations sanctions on Italy. The subsequent election of the Popular Front in France and Italy's intervention in the Spanish Civil War resulted in the collapse of Franco-Italian relations, after which an alliance was impossible. It may be that Mussolini's desire to inject dynamism into Italian fascism through external aggression made a Franco-Italian alliance unlikely, but what little chance there had been for it was clearly lost over the sanctions issue. In any event, the Ethio pian affair marked the beginning of a shift in the domestic politics of Frenchforeignpolicy.While someontheLeftwere movingawayfrom pacifism out of antifascism, a significant pacifist current emerged for the first time on the Right which rejected sanctions out of sympathy forfascismandfearthattheLeftwoulddriveFranceintoan antifascist war. Many on the Right would continue to push for an Italian alliance long after it had lost any prospect of success. This pacifist turn of right-wing opinion would remain important at least through 1938 and influence French foreign policy choices.[26]

This ideological dimension of French foreign policy contributed to France'sfailuretosecureanalliancewiththeSovietUnion.TheFrenc elite had many grievances against the Soviet regime: its refusal to honor Czarist bonds (which the French bourgeoisie had purchased in large quantities), its exit from World War I, and its advocacy of world revolution. Consequently, although France recognized the bolshevik re gime in 1924, the hostility of the Right and the issue of the bonds prevented a significant

improvement in relations during the 1920s. The rise of Hitler resulted in more serious Franco-Soviet discussions, espe cially under French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou in 1934. After Bar thou's assassination in October 1934, Laval concluded the negotiations and signed a Franco-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance in May 1935, but Laval,along withthemilitary and Quaid'Orsayforeign policy establish ment, did not follow up on it. Laval reportedly said that a further im provement of Franco-Soviet relations would bring ''the International and the red flag'' to France, a view echoed by the large right-wing vote against the pact when it came before the Senate in March 1936, just days after Hitlerhad remilitarizedthe Rhineland.The conservative mili tary's General Staff blocked staff talks out of fear of communist subver sion and a conviction that the Soviet military was weak and useless. The Popular Front, despite its antifascism and the Soviet Union's eager ness to secure a military alliance, did little to further it. The military and the Quai continued to obstruct it, and the cabinet was divided. Many on the Left, like the Popular Front Foreign Minister Yvon Delbos and Paul Faure, shared with the Right the fear that the Soviet Union sought to drag France into an antifascist war. Thus the progress of rela tions withtheSovietUnion stalled until Hitler's March1939 occupation of Prague led to new talks. Even then, Franco-British negotiations with the Soviets continued to be dilatory and marked by mistrust. They floundered on the issue of Red Army access to Poland. It was too little too late. In August the Nazi-Soviet Pact was signed.[27]

Germany's March 1936 remilitarization of the Rhineland was its first territorial revision of the Treaty of Versailles. France's failure to resist it was of enormous importance. Remilitarization deprived France of the ability to assist its central European allies by easily occu pying the Rhineland, and France's inaction cast doubt on its willing ness to resist German aggression. France's passive reaction was overdeterminedby aseriesofdiplomatic,political,economic,andmili tary factors. France was certainly weakened by lack of support from its

Stresa Front partners, Britain and Italy, but the tendency of French politicians to blame Britain disguised more profound domestic issues. France's pacifist population was firmly opposed to war in 1936. How could the caretaker government of the time risk going to war on the eve of the 1936 elections when, as the satirical Le Canard enchaine´ joked, the Germans had invadedGermany? Further, given the perilous state of French finances, mobilization for war would almost certainly have sparked a financial crisis. Military factors loomed large. The FrenchmilitarygrosslyoverestimatedthestrengthoftheinvadingGerman army and had a keen sense of France's lack of military prepared ness. Budget cuts in the deflationary early 1930s had resulted in the cancellation of weapons orders and field maneuvers as well as a reduc tion of personnel and their pay. Finally, the military lacked the capac ity to fight a limited war. Mobilization plans for total war called for active divisions to split in three to form the core of new divisions of citizen soldiers. If the active divisions were thrown into a limited war, this risked compromising any future general mobilization. Thus France's top general, General Gamelin, told the government that mili tary action could be taken against the Germans only if the reserves were called up first. Of course, this was not done. The remilitarization of the Rhineland was followed by Belgium's declaration of neutrality in October 1936, making 1936 a disastrous year for France's strategic position.[28]

Germany's annexation of Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland, which France and Great Britain accepted at the infamous Munich Conference on September 30, 1938, wasanevengreatersetback. In 1938Germany and Czechoslovakia had, we now know, roughly equivalent armies. The German tank divisions and air support that formed the basis of the blitzkrieg tactics of 1939 were not yet ready for combat, and Czechoslovakia's frontier fortifications were formidable. The Czechs were prepared to got to war, and the Soviet Union—like France—was bound by treaty to fight with them, but neither would fight without France. France's failure

to break with Britain and stand by Czechoslo vakia left it without important continental allies and alienated the Soviet Union, which was not consulted on the matter. It also strengthened Hitler domestically, effectively bringing an end to army coup plots against him. Finally, it allowed Germany to seize Czechoslovakia's substantial military and industrial resources, including tanks us against France in 1940.[29]

France's failure to support Czechoslovakia was due to many of the same factors that influenced its decision making in 1936: pacifist pub lic opinion, a sense of military weakness, and—more so than in 1936—deference to Britain. Only two deputies outside of the Commu nist Party voted against the Munich Accords in the Chamber of Depu ties. The rest followed public opinion, which initially favored Munich—57 percent approved and 37 percent disapproved of the agreement according to one poll. Prime Minister Daladier and his gov ernment were more conflicted than the Chamber of Deputies or the public. One faction led by Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet favored appeasement, and another led by Colonial Minister Georges Mandel and Justice Minister Paul Reynaud was ready to go to war. Daladier eventually sided with Bonnet in this case, but did not share his illu sions. He understood that Munich had only bought France time to prepare for war. Met by cheering crowds on his return from Munich, Daladier called them ''blind fools'' and said: ''This is only a respite, and if we don't make use of it, we will all be shot.''[30]

Daladier's acceptance of the Munich agreement was due in large part to military and strategic considerations. The French military told him that it was not ready for war, and that if war were declared, it would be two years before a serious offensive was possible. Particu larly troubling was the prediction of General Vuilleminthat the French air force he commanded would be wiped out in the first fifteen days. These grim reports only reinforced Daladier's conviction that France

could not go to war without Britain. Thus Daladier allowed British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain to take the lead in discussions with Hitler and accepted the capitulation to Hitler that resulted.[31]

After Munich, France's posture changed dramatically. Opinion im mediately began to shift against pacifist refusal of war. An October 1938 poll showed 70 percent in favor of resisting further German de mands. Most of those on the Right who had turned to pacifism out of anticommunism moved away from it after Daladier's government crushed the French labor movement. Hitler's seizure of Prague solidi fied this turn away from pacifism. In the course of 1939, veterans, school teachers, and peasants—all of whom had been overwhelmingly pacifist—mostly resigned themselves to the necessity of war. In July 1939, 76 percent of those polled believed that France should use force to stop a German seizure of Danzig. When Paul Faure proclaimed that Danzig was not worth ''the death of a single Macon vigneron'' and the fascist leader Marcel De´at rejected war in his famous article ''To Die for Danzig?'' they were in the minority. This turn in opinion mirrored a shift ingovernmentpolicy. Ahugeincreasein rearmament spending followed Munich. Finally, in the spring of 1939 the Franco-British alli ance came together. In late March, following Hitler's occupation of Prague, serious joint military planning began, and a joint Franco-British guarantee of Poland's security was issued. When warbroke out in September 1939 following Germany's invasion of Poland, France was reasonably well prepared for it. Its population was resigned to its necessity; no more dodged the draft than in 1914 (1.5 percent). France had secured an important ally, and its rearmament effort had, as we shall see, been largely successful. Nonetheless, France's pacifism, mili taryweakness,andforeignpolicyfailuresinthe1930shadleftit worse off going into war than it might have otherwise been.[32]

When the battle came to French soil in May 1940, fundamental shortcomings were exposed in France's military, but these shortcom ings were not those common in popular

contemporary American im ages of France. The Maginot Line fortifications neither made the French overconfident nor gave them a bunker mentality. The French were not deficient in courage after years of pacifism. Nor did the French fail to build tanks and otherwise modernize their weaponry and strengthen their military. The fundamental failing, as Marc Bloch recognized in his classic account of the defeat, was one of intelli gence.[33] The French high command failed to see how much new tech nology, notably the tank, changed warfare from what it was in World War I.[34]

Rearmament, although clearly inadequate at the time of the 1936 Rhineland and the 1938 Sudetenland crises, was an overall success by September 1939. In general, the French military was well funded in the interwar period. Between 1918 and 1935, France exceeded other great powers in the percentage of its GNP spent on the military. After cuts during the deflationary first years of the depression, serious rear mamentbegan underthe Popular Front,whichappropriated14 billion francs in September 1936 and nationalized armaments factories (nota bly tank and aircraft makers). Nationalization helped in the long run by rationalizing and modernizing production, but in the short run it slowed output. Indeed, between 1936 and 1938 tank production de clined despite greatly increased funding. Only in 1939 did arms pro duction hit its stride. The results were generally encouraging. In the battle of May–June 1940 France had slightly more tanks than the Ger mans, and French tanks were of higher quality. Indeed, the Germans lost the largest tank battle of the campaign, the battle of Hannut in Belgium, in which Germany's best tanks were simply outclassed. The French army was even more motorized than the German, which relied heavily on horses: hundreds of thousands of them. Finally, France had 45 percent more artillery pieces than the Germans, although it was deficient in antitank and antiaircraft guns.[35]

The only serious deficiency of French arms was its air force. Ger many had twice as many fighters and over six times as

many bombers as France did. Although British planes committed to the continent made up some of the difference, France had a clear—although by no means fatal—disadvantage in the skies. The shortage of military air craft followed largely from the difficulty reorganizing the artisanal French aircraft industry for mass production. Nationalization helped achieve this, but only in 1939 did the industry begin to produce large numbers of planes. In this sector an earlier commitment to rearma ment would have made a difference.[36]

The fundamental shortcoming of the French military lay in its be liefthatthenext warwouldbe verysimilarinnaturetothelast.France would fight a long defensive war in which it would prevail due to its superior resources: thus the importance placed on the British alliance. Defensive firepower would make the next war—like the last—one of attrition. Tanks, General Gamelin said in 1937, could be stopped by antitank guns ‘‘as the infantry had been by the machine gun.’’ Yet, France did not plan to simply hunker down and wait for the Germans. TheMaginotLinefortifications ontheFrenchborderbetweenSwitzer land and Belgium were built in order to channel the German offensive through Belgium and free up soldiers for active operations elsewhere. France’s plan in the event of a German attack on neutral Belgium was to speed motorized troops into Belgium to take up advanced positions and hopefully thereby avoid fighting on French soil. While committed to mechanization, the military did not believe that a decisive break through of enemy lines by motorized troops could be achieved. Conse quently, France’s seven motorized infantry divisions were to use their mobilitysolelytoadvancerapidlyintoBelgiumwheretheywouldfight like conventional infantry. French tanks were seen as a support for infantryandmostlyintegratedintoinfantrydivisions.Whenthebattle began in May 1940 France had only three light armored and three heavy armored divisions, which included only one-third of its tanks. Germany, by contrast, put all of its tanks in ten

panzer divisions.[37]

French military doctrine emphasized what it called bataille condu ite or methodical battle. Battles were supposed to be tightly controlled bythegeneralswithsoldiersfollowingtimetablespreparedinadvanc Improvisation was discouraged. It was assumed that this, rather than unpredictable encounter battles, would make the best use of France's inexperienced citizen soldiers. Because of this doctrine and a concern about information security, the French army failed to develop flexible communications, notably radio. Communications equipment ac counted for only 0.15 percent of military spending between 1923 and 1939. During the war General Gamelin communicated to his subordi natesby telephone and courier. This worked fine as long as plans were followed, but if the French army had to respond to a rapidly changing situation its command and control was liable to break down. In the end, the French military's poor use of modern technology and inflexi ble structure would be key factors in France's defeat.[38]

Strange Defeat, 1939–1940

When war broke out in September 1939 serious divisions existed in France. Despite hopes for patriotic unity in the face of national crisis, the Sacred Union of World War I did not reemerge to overcome political differences. The Daladier government continued to govern from the Right. It kept the socialists out of the government and took advantageoftheNazi-SovietPactsigned onAugust24,1939,tolaunch an anticommunist crusade. Although leading communists reaffirmed their loyalty to France on August 25, on August 26 the government issued a decree repressing the communist press and communist meet ings. On September 26 the PCF itself was outlawed despite the fact that its parliamentary delegation voted unanimously for war credits andhadcontinuedtosupportFrenchnationaldefensethroughoutSe

tember. Even after the PCF leadership adopted a revolutionary defeat ist position in October and the police began to arrest communists in largenumbers,thepartyposedlittlethreattonationalsecuritybecaus rank and file communists overwhelmingly supported the war effort. No organized communist movement existed in the ranks of the army, and communists did not sabotage the factories. Still, the military feared a communist plot to seize Paris to the very end of the war. As late as June 13, 1940, General Weygand informed the cabinet that the communists were taking over the capital, and Admiral Darlan main tained that the Germans had transported PCF leader Maurice Thorez from Moscow to Paris in order to make him president of France. Both were unfounded rumors.[39]

Foreignerswere alsofeared, especiallythe 400,000wholivedin the Paris region. Immediately after the war began the government trans formed the internment camps—originally created in November 1938 to house refugees—into prisons for male enemy aliens, most of whom had fled Nazi Germany. Soon almost 20,000 foreigners were crowded into eighty camps. As a result of massive criticism from abroad and complaintsfrommembersoftheFrenchparliament,allbut6,428 were released by February 1940. Approximately 9,000 of them joined the French Foreign Legion to fight against the Nazis, revealing the govern ment's failure to distinguish between friend and foe in this case. The unfounded fear of a fifth column seeking to sabotage French military efforts emerged effortlessly out of interwar anti-immigrant attitudes. It was a major factor behind the government's decision to allow the stripping of citizenship from naturalized individuals suspected of en dangering national security. It continued to influence government pol icy even after the 1939 roundups had been discredited: another 8,000 ''Greater Germans,'' 5,000 of whom were Jews, were interred when fighting began in May 1940. They were considered to be security risks by a government whose feelings of insecurity had become systemic.[40]

While the overwhelming majority of France's citizens,

immigrants, and refugees supported war against Germany despite everything the government did, the political and military elites failed to act forcefully to defeat the enemy. The French and British did nothing to help the Poles, maintaining in a September 12, 1939, communique´that the ‘‘war will be won on the western front.’’ Above all, the French government wanted security, as Daladier made clear in his response to Hitler’s peace proposals after the Polish campaign. In a radio address to the French nation, on October 10, 1939, Daladier revealed that he would not cease hostilities ‘‘without first having received sure guarantees of security.’’[41]Security was what Marshal Pe´tain had in mind in Septem ber 1939 when he wrote to General Gamelin, the head of the French military command: ‘‘I hope that you will not be foolish enough to take the offensive against the German army.’’[42] He did not have to worry, for Gamelin fully supported the Anglo-French strategy of fighting a long war of attrition. Since Allied prospects in such a war appeared to be excellent, the French were unwilling to risk a major offensive.

In retrospect, this strategy appears misguided. It put France on the defensive and deprived it of an early opportunity to defeat Germany. In the fall of 1939 the Germans deployed their best divisions on the Polish front, leaving thirty-three relatively weak ones, with virtually no tank or air support, to defend their western frontier. In contrast, the French had seventy divisions with 3,000 tanks and ample air sup port behind them. Furthermore, the Polish campaign was not as easy as it seemed: by the end of it the Germans had only six weeks of oil reserves and their tanks and planes were in no condition to turn around and fight in the west. The Wehrmacht’s military leaders told Hitler that they could not be prepared for war against France until the spring of1940. Yet Gamelindidnothingtotake advantageofthe situa tion, and virtually no one challenged him to pursue the offensive. It seems thatColonel CharlesdeGaulle, whoseideas were rejectedbythe elite, was the only significant military leader to speak out against this policy. In January 1940 he wrote: ‘‘In the

present conflict, as in those that have gone before it, being inert means being beaten.''[43]

As a result of French and British concerns about taking the offen sive, the ''phony war'' (droˆle de guerre in French) ensued, lasting until theGermansattacked onMay10,1940.TheFrenchandBritishgovern ments used this period to step up military production at home and supplementitwithpurchasesfromtheUnitedStates.ButtheGerman produced moredeployable tanksandplanes than the Frenchdid. They turned out over 600 tanks in the two months before fighting began in 1940, compared to about 560 for the French, and about three times more airplanes during the September 1939–May 1940 period. For whatever reason, approximately 20 percent of all French planes were not airworthy when the Germans invaded, while almost all of the Ger man planes were in flying condition. This was true even for planes recently delivered to the French air force from the factory; they often lacked crucial pieces of equipment. By June, 60 percent of French mili tary aircraft could not be used in fighting. If the war had lasted until July, nothing would have been left of the French air force. Waiting did not work for this aspect of the French war effort.[44]

Waiting was also detrimental to morale. In September 1939 the rank and file French soldier clearly believed that France would prevail despite Germany's larger population and greater resources. By Christ mas, however, both the troops and the civilian population began to have reservations about this ''phony war,'' and morale plummeted. It would only revive with the improvement of the weather in the spring. Daladier wassensitive tothisandattempted to overcomenegative atti tudes by enlarging the anticommunist crusade and committing France to support the popular cause of underdog Finland in its war against the Soviet Union. In a secret session of the Chamber of Deputies in February 1940, Daladier obtained enthusiastic, unanimous support for his plan to back the Finns. But he hesitated to act, partly because of British doubts, and by

the time he decided, the Finns had capitulated to the Soviets. Within a week after this, on March 19, 1940, Daladier resigned under a storm of criticism over his handling of the Finnish situation and other matters.[45]

During the winter of 1939–40, Daladier and Gamelin grasped at straws as they sought alternatives to direct confrontation with Nazi Germany.InadditiontothebungledFinnishcampaigntheyalsorelied heavily—too heavily—on French intelligence reports that Germany was on the verge of economic collapse due to the Anglo-French block ade and that war was so unpopular among the Germans that Hitler would be overthrown as soon as things went bad. Daladier attempted to stop the Germans from obtaining Swedish iron ore, which he as sumed was so vital for the war effort that lack of it would force the Nazis to capitulate by September 1940. But the surprise German inva sion of Norway and Denmark in April dashed all hopes for this sce nario. Similarly, plans to divert the war to the Balkans and to deny Germany access to Soviet oil from the Caucasus—both pie-in-the-sky schemes—came to naught in this winter of endless waiting.[46]

The lack of a coherent military strategy, other than the dubious strategies of waiting and defense, was matched by similar weaknesses inpolitics.Havingsolidifiedhisgovernmentwithanticommunisman having refused to reach out to the socialists, Daladier relied on the Right's support, but it was fickle. Pierre Laval criticized him for not pursuing an unlikely Italian alliance, which he believed was essential for French victory. Marshal Pe´tain helped undermine the French war effort by telling the Italian ambassador in November 1939 that the ''present conflict is not good for France, even if she succeeds in win ningaconclusivevictory.''
HelatersaidthesamethingtotheGermans. Pierre-E´tienne Flandin, with support from Laval and others on the Right, advocated French neutrality while the Germans and Soviets

fought over Central Europe. Meanwhile, Daladier found it increasingly difficult to govern his unruly cabinet. Paul Reynaud, the second in command, was an especially troublesome thorn in his side. When the DaladiergovernmentcollapsedinMarch1940,it wasreplacedimmedi ately by one with Reynaud as prime minister and Daladier as minister ofwar. TheReynaudgovernmentobtainedpowerwith only a one-vote margin of victory in the Chamber of Deputies, despite the fact that France was at war. Radicals, who believed Reynaud had engineered Daladier's fall, voted against it as did many on the Right upset with socialist participation in Reynaud's government.[47]

Daladier had ruled almost exclusively by decree; parliament was so divided thatnothing ofimportancecouldbe approvedthrough normal democraticmeans.Reynaudcontinuedthishigh-handedformofgover nance, with some new twists. For almost a month, from April 14 to May 9, Reynaud held no cabinet meetings. He communicated with Daladier in writing, never in person, even though Daladier was in charge of military policy and France was at war. In political circles Reynaud was viewed as a ''relatively dangerous marginal'' politician. Indeed, Reynaud, lacking a significant political base of his own, had to keep Daladier in the government in order to secure minimal radical support. On May 9, Reynaud tried to resolve the political deadlock by resigning with the intention of forming a new government without Daladier. Although the resignation was reversed the next day, France technically lacked a government when the German invasion began. In sum, the government that fought the battle of France was a politically precariousone,whosemembersdidnotspeaktoeachother,andwhicl acted only through decrees.[48]

Communication and intelligence were also lacking in military cir cles. Gamelin was notorious for keeping close counsel. From his office in Vincennes, just outside of Paris, he issued directives to the army without consulting his key officers or

venturing to the front lines. His relations with his subordinates were frayed at best; many of them lacked confidence in him. In January 1940, he decided on a military strategy of forward defense in the Netherlands, against the advice of his military staff, which preferred the Escaut Plan, which would have concentrated troops around Lille where they could have stopped the German offensive. The Dyle-Breda variant, as Gamelin's strategy was called,movedmotorizeddivisions,whichhadbeenpartofthestrategi reserve, forward into the Low Countries. This would lead the French military into a disastrous situation by the end of May as the reserve needed to stop the German breakthrough was inadequate and these forward troops were trapped by the German march to the English Channel.[49]

Gamelin's biggest mistake was to misjudge where the German of fensive would occur. De Gaulle said of Gamelin: ''He had persuaded himself that, at his level, the essential thing was to fix one's purpose, once for all, upon a well-defined plan and then not to let oneself be deflected from it by any avatar.''[50] Certainly this was true of how Ga melinreactedtotheintelligenceinformationhereceivedabout apossi ble German advance through the Ardennes. As early as April 12, 1940, the General Staff received a highly reliable intelligence document that indicated that the Germans were concentrating on breaking through LuxembourgandcrossingtheMeusearoundSedanin northernFrance rather than on a maneuver through Belgium similar to the Schlieffen Plan of World War I. But the General Staff did not take this seriously, even though war games in 1937–38 indicated that the German army could succeed in a rapid offensive through the Ardennes. Gamelin had rejected the results by saying ''That's total fiction.''[51] Instead, Gamelin was convinced that the documents retrieved from a German military planethat crashedinMechlen,Belgium, inJanuary1940containedthe key to a future attack. These documents outlined an offensive through the Low Countries

similar to the German strategy of August 1914. Re markably neither Gamelin nor anyone else in the military high com mand focused on forecasting the Germans'changing plans.It certainly did not help that they were distracted by plans for operations in Scan dinavia, the Balkans, and the Caucasus and by the political crisis of April–May 1940.[52]

Gamelin never doubted that he knew precisely what the shape of the war would be on the western front. The Germans did, however. Soon after the Mechlen incident serious debates occurred within the German General Staff over whether to invade through the Belgian plains or through the Ardennes. The German military had already car riedoutwar gamesontheArdennesgambit;theyrevealedthepossibil ity of victory if the offensive were fast enough, but also the distinct chance that the French could stop such a move at the Meuse River, if they recouped their forces in time. The Germans had to cross the Meuse within five days in order to be assured of success. Hitler be lieved this was possible, and he ordered the Ardennes offensive to be the focus of the German invasion, with a major feint into Belgium and the Netherlands to distract the enemy. His generals were far less cer tain of this plan, although Colonel Ulrich Liss, who played the role of Gamelin in the war games, thought it could work. Colonel Liss was convinced that the Allies ''would rush into Belgium, that the Allied highcommand wouldleave weakforcesbehind to cover theArdennes, andthat oncetheygraspedwhat wasgoingon,theywouldstillbeslow to redirect their efforts.''[53]

Hitler and Liss turned out to be right, but only because Gamelin and the French military ignored evidence of German intentions. As early as March, members of the French parliament observed that Sedan could be a key German objective, but General Huntziger who commanded the army there responded to their fears on April 5 by writing that he saw no reason to ''reinforce the Sedan sector.'' Later in the month French intelligence reported that German divisions were massing on the Luxembourg border and that German

reconnaissance flights had concentrated their attention almost exclusively on the Lux embourg-Northern France line from the Ardennes to Calais. For lack of analysis of this raw intelligence data, no one did anything to read just military strategy to meet this potential threat. Gamelin blithely continued planning for the war that he expected and ignored these hints about the coming German offensive.[54]

When fighting broke out on May 10, 1940, the Germans seemed to do exactly what Gamelin expected by advancing rapidly into the Low Countries. Gamelin responded with a massive French (and British) de ployment of troops along the Dyle-Breda line, which meant that the best French fighting units were deployed as far away as the Nether landsin ariskyforwarddefense operation.InFranceitself,thepoorest equippedandtrained units, some ofwhich wereSeries Binfantrydivi sions in which the soldiers were all at least thirty-five years old, were left behind to defend the sector from the Maginot Line—which termi nated where France's border with Belgium began—north along the Meuse River to where it flowed into Belgium. It was sheer madness.
Gamelin left no reserves and virtually no tanks along the Sedan-Ardennes-Meuse line.[55]

While the French military concentrated exclusively on the Dyle-Breda line, the Germans moved steadily through the Ardennes. They had only four roads available to transport massive amounts of equip ment and troops, but favorable weather allowed them to reach the Meuse River in good time. If the French had deployed only a handful of bombers to the area the German advance could have been stalled, as the German air force was initially engaged exclusively in the Low Countries in an effort to fool the Allies about the nature of the offen sive. But this did not happen. Instead, the Germans advanced with ease, crossing the Meuse at three locations on May 13. At the crucial Sedan crossing a Series B division fell

apart aftersuffering eight hours of continuous attack by Stuka dive bombers, which destroyed its mo rale. At the crossing at Houx, Belgium, the French troops fought well, butwerehandicappedbythefactthattheyreachedtheriveratapproximately the same time as the Germans commanded by General Rom mel. At the third crossing, Montherem e´, France, the Germans were prevented from making substantial progress until the breakthroughs at Houx and Sedan made the French position there untenable. Ga melin, who was told of the massive German advance through the Ar dennes on May 12, did nothing to counter it as he was convinced that it was not the main field of operations. Only on May 14 did Gamelin realize his mistake. The three French heavy-armored divisions were ordered to counterattack, but each was delayed for one reason or an otherandnever fullyengagedtheGermans.Furtherconfusionresulted from the French belief that the breakthrough aimed at surrounding the Maginot line. No one understood that the primary German objec tive was to cut off French and British troops in the Low Countries, disrupt their supply lines, deprive them of escape routes, and force them to surrender. As a consequence by the end of May 15 there was little to prevent the Germans from heading to the Channel.[56]

The war looked increasingly desperate for the French. As early as May 16 rumors circulated in Paris that the government was preparing to flee the capital for the provinces. The following day thousands of refugees from Belgium and Northern France flooded the Gare de l'Est railroadstation, inauguratingwhat would become a massive exodus of millionstothesouth.OnMay18ReynauddismissedGamelin,appointing General Weygand as head of the French Army. At the same time he brought Marshal Pe´tain into the cabinet and appointed Georges Mandel, Clemenceau's disciple, to the position of minister of the inte rior.Beforethe endofthemonthWeygandwouldsackfifteengenerals who had

been involved in the Meuse defeat, and Mandel would round up thousands of suspected fifth columnists in an effort to show that the government meant business. To hedge all possible bets, however, Reynaudtooktheunprecedentedstepofhavinghisgovernmentatten a mass at Notre Dame on May 19 at which the assembled multitude invoked Saints Genevie`ve, Michel, and Jeanne d'Arc to save France. Two dayslater, on May 21,Reynaud againbrokeprecedentby explain ing before the Senate more or less accurately why France had suffered serious setbacks in the early days of fighting. Reynaud promised the nation thatthere wouldbe nomore fiascos now thatGeneralWeygand and Marshal Pe´tain were in charge of the military.[57]

Unfortunately for Reynaud, and for France, Weygand and Pe ´tain were no improvement over Gamelin. Both men were tied to the past, to the defensive tactics that prevailed in French military circles during the interwar period. De Gaulle understood this clearly; on June 3 he wrote to Reynaud, protesting that they were ''men of former times'' and that Pe ´tain was a defeatist. At the time, de Gaulle still believed that France could prevail against Germany, but only if the military accepted his ideas on mechanized warfare, which had proven success ful in tank skirmishes with the Germans in northern France around Abbeville. This was not to be, but an attempt was made in the third and fourth weeks of May to organize an Allied attack on the German columns racing to the Channel. Indeed, a British attack with French armored support on Rommel's troops near Arras was very successful, but distrust between the Allies and a breakdown of communications in thecrisis fouled up plans. In onefamous incident General Weygand flew to Ypres to meet with General Gort, commander of the British Expeditionary Force, but was unable to find Gort who had not been notified of the meeting. With the collapse of the northern front on May 25, which led to the capitulation of Belgium and the Netherlands, the French and British armies were pushed back against the Channel, andallhopesof acounterattackdisappeared.TheBritishoptedto evac uate their

troops from the continent to fight another day in another place rather than lose them all in a futile last stand. Fortunately, the Germanarmypausedtoregroup,providingenoughtimefortheBritish to repatriate the vast majority of their soldiers, as well as a large num ber of French. In all, a total of 558,000 Allied soldiers were evacuated from Dunkirkbetween May27 and June 4 when theGermans tookthe port. The British had originally thought that only 100,000 could be saved.[58]

Dunkirk would go down in British history as a heroic event, but to the French military leaders it was an act of betrayal. Left on their own, Weygand and Pe´tain grew more bitter and defeatist after Dunkirk. Withlittleconfidenceinsuccess,Weygandmassedwhat wasleftofthe FrencharmyalongtheSommeRiver,which wasnotaveryformidable defensive barrier. Troops were brought in from Belfort in the east and Southern France tobolster the lines. Noretreat was possible, Weygand maintained. He could not envisage how or where another defensive line could be established to stop the Germans. A loss on the Somme, Weygand claimed, would require France ‘‘to negotiate with the enemy.’’ On June 5, 1940, the Germans attacked on two fronts, along the Somme and through Alsace. By June 6 the French were in serious trouble, lacking supplies, reserves, and munitions to confront the enemy. On the following day the French front began to disintegrate. Although French troops fought tenaciously and inflicted heavy losses on the Germans of nearly 5,000 troops a day over a seventeen-day period—almost twice the average German casualty level during fight inginMay1940—theGermansprevailed asFrancepleadedfor apeace in the midst of this final major battle.[59]

With defeat on the Somme imminent, the French government de cided to leave Paris for Tours on June 10. It communicated this act, without any explanation, through a very brief radio announcement: ‘‘The government must leave the capital due to compelling military considerations.’’ The following day, Parisians fled the city in record numbers; by June 13 almost no one was left. Possibly as many as 8 million French took to the

highways in June, fleeing the Germans, hopingtoavoidthe war.Chaosensued.The NewYorkTimes correspon dent,P.J.Philip,spentforty-eighthourstravelingby car betweenParis and Tours, a distance of 150 miles. When he arrivedin the new capital he discovered a government that was spread along about 100 miles of the Loire River. He noted that the minister of the interior, Georges Mandel,could communicatewith his subordinates in the field only via radio broadcasts at designated times of the day. The New York Times' expert military analyst, Hanson Baldwin, wondered how long the French government could last without the natural and industrial re sources of the north. He concluded in a June 16, 1940, article that it was''extremelydoubtfulthattheFrenchArmy canlongendure'' under such circumstances since it would have to be ''supplied largely from outside the country.''[60]

Within the government the Somme fiasco sparked a ferocious struggle over what to do next. Although French troops fared well against theItalians, who entered the war at the last minute, this minor success could not make up for massive losses in the north. Pe´tain and Weygand advocated capitulating to the Germans and hoping for the best. Pe´tain's main concern was to save the honor of the military. As earlyas May 26 hewrote Reynaud that ''It is essential thatthe people's admiration for the army be maintained. The army is the material and moral bastion of the nation.'' Pe´tain rejected schemes to unite France with Great Britain or to continue fighting the Germans from the colo nies. He doggedly insisted that France needed an armistice in order to survive. Weygand agreed, telling de Gaulle: ''When I'm beaten here, England won't wait a week before negotiating with the Reich.'' De Gaulle, on the other hand, schemed to continue fighting, arguing for moving the government to Brittany, where it could easily evacuate to Great Britain if necessary, or to North Africa, where the nation's colo nial resources could be exploited to carry on the war.[61]

Neither one of de Gaulle's alternatives to capitulation carried

much weight. A retreat to Brittany would have cut French troops off from vitalsuppliesneededtocontinuethe warwhiletheNorthAfricangam bit would have required an extraordinary effort to transport 500,000 troops and obtain far more support from the French empire than it could provide. Furthermore, de Gaulle's schemes met with near total opposition in the cabinet. Pe´tain refused to consider leaving France, telling members of the cabinet ''I shall stay among the French people to share their sorrow and afflictions. As I see it an armistice is neces saryforFrance'sfutureexistence.'' TheJune16meetingsofthecabinet were crucial in deciding what to do. In a desperate effort to keep France in the war, the British hastily proposed the creation of an Anglo-French union. This led to a heated debate. Pe´tain called the union''a marriagewith acorpse!'' Othersproclaimed, ''We donotwant to be a British dominion!'' and ''Better to be a Nazi province. At least we know what that means.'' Reynaud replied, ''I prefer to collaborate with my allies rather than with my enemies.'' The cabinet rejected the plan, and Reynaud resigned, hoping that his successor, Pe´tain, would fail to obtain an acceptable armistice and that he would become prime minister again at the head of a French government in exile in North Africa.[62]

On June 17, Marshal Pe´tain became prime minister. He immedi atelyaddressed thenationviaradio,proclaimingthathe hadcontacted the enemy to ask for the conditions of peace. He offered the nation ''the gift of my person to diminish its suffering'' and added his pro found regret ''that it is necessary to cease fighting.'' Immediately, troopslaiddowntheir arms.Overamillionwere takenprisonerby the Germans within the next few days. De Gaulle understood that any chance of continuing the war from France or North Africa was now hopeless. From London he prepared a talk for the BBC that placed blame for defeat on the French High Command; British intelligence prevented him from delivering it, as they hoped to win Pe´tain to Brit ain's cause. A few French politicians tried unsuccessfully to move the government fromBordeaux—to which it hadretreated after Tours—to Morocco. They were

accused of treason by the Pe´tain government and placed on trial for their acts.Only the French navy succeeded in avoid ing the total disgrace that afflicted all other national institutions in the spring of 1940. Under Admiral Darlan's leadership the navy prevented the Germans from taking over the fleet. On June 17 Darlan ordered all navy and commercial ships out of the metropolitan France's Atlantic ports to colonial destinations. Those ships unable to leave were to be destroyed. The navy's facilities at Brest, which equaled Toulon in im portance, were razed so the Germans could not use them. The French Atlantic ports were left in such disrepair that the Nazis could not rely on them for their planned invasion of England in the summer and fall of 1940. In a small but important way Darlan the Anglophobe and future collaborator helped to stop the Nazi war machine from achiev ing total victory in 1940.[63]

But the war was over. No one wanted to fight after the June 17 announcement of a possible armistice, even if the terms were not ac ceptable. And they were not. The Pe´tain government chose to collabo rate with the Germans rather than fight on and most French initially agreed with that decision. The nation had lost almost 100,000 men; another 200,000 had been wounded. German losses were also heavy, but only about half of the French totals. The Germans took 1.8 million prisoners, most of them in the waning days of the 1940 war, between June 17 and June 22. Until Pe´tain called for an end to hostilities, the average French soldier fought ferociously. Once capitulation became the only possibility, however, the army gave up the ghost. Many French soldiers would spend the rest of the war in German camps, paying a far higher price for defeat than they had expected.[64]

The phony war and its aftermath of May–June 1940 did not have to end this way. France could have won. The troops were ready to fight and mostly fought well. The French military was reasonably well equipped. The Nazi's blitzkrieg tactics were no secret to the French andcouldhavebeeneffectivelyneutralized.But,theFrenchHighCon

mand, Generals Gamelin, Weygand, and Pe´tain, failed miserably to connect the dots, to understand how to most effectively use modern military technology and counter German military tactics; and the Frenchpoliticalleaders,DaladierandReynaudinparticular, wereinca pable of challenging these officers to fight the kind of offensive war that mighthave brought victory. Thecolossaland tragicdefeatof 1940 cannot be explained by some generic concept of decadence, as many have argued. On the contrary, the failures of the French elite and French intelligence were to blame. American Ambassador Bullitt, in a July 1, 1940, telegram to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, summed up the situation: ‘‘The simple people have done well, as always. It is the elites, the upper classes, who have totally failed.’’[65]

2 National Revolution

With sudden defeat in June 1940, France was left with few options. Although a small minority, led by General Charles de Gaulle, chose to go into exile to continue the war from overseas, the vast majority ofthe French chose to remain at home and hope that the armistice pursued by Marshal Pe´tain would work out for the best. The armistice terms proved to be exceedingly burdensome and collaboration with the Ger mans, which the armistice mandated, soon became unacceptable to most of the French. Further, the Vichy regime, which emerged in the summer of 1940 as a temporary alternative to the Third Republic, pur sued a radical National Revolution that the population largely rejected. To be

sure, Vichy initiallyhad substantial supportfrom those disgusted with the Third Republic, happy to be out of the war, expecting a quick British capitulation to the Nazis, or hopeful that collaboration might bring tangible benefits or disguise a ‘‘double game,’’ but such support was short-lived. By the late fall of 1940, most Frenchmen favored an English victoryinthe war, rejectedthe policies ofthe new government, and opposed collaboration with Germany. Alone among the leaders at Vichy,Marshal Pe´tain remained popular throughout the war, due more to the role he played atVerdun duringWorldWar I than tohis political prowess in the 1940s. This chapter traces the contours of the National Revolution, its contradictions, and the reasons for its profound failure, both on its own terms and also with the French population.

The armistice inaugurated this revolutionary experiment by defin ing the relationship that the new order would have with Nazi Ger many. By its terms, Germany occupied two-thirds of the nation, including the entire Atlantic coast, Paris, and the north. Germany es sentially annexed Alsace and Lorraine while the departments of the Nord and Pas-de-Calais came under German military command in Brussels, and a large part of northeastern France was designated for German colonization. In these northern ‘‘Germanic’’ areas a form of ‘‘ethniccleansing’’oftheFrenchwouldtakeplaceduringtheNaziocc

pation. The armistice effectively dismembered France—broke it into at least two parts—with a demarcation line between the German-occu pied north and the so-called Free Zone in the south that could only be crossed with papers issued sparingly andsporadically by the Germans. This was a sort of BerlinWall, beforethe factand without the physical structure, policed with cruelty and brutality by the Nazi occupiers. In theory, the French state was considered sovereign over French terri tory on both sides of the demarcation line. In practice,the Germans all but controlled the north—especially the far north and the east—and had extensive influence over the south.[1]

The armistice required the French to reduce their military to 100,000 men in metropolitan France and to pay a massive indemnity to the Germans. As a result, the French army was dissolved and recon stituted as a smaller, armistice force, suitable only for domestic polic ing and the defense of the French empire, for which the Germans ultimately allowed a French North African army of 115,000 men. In the meantime, while France waited for a peace to be signed, well over one million French soldiers were deported to Germany as prisoners of war. Most of them would remain in German camps until 1945, despite the Vichy government's feeble and self-defeating attempts to free them. Meanwhile, the French were required to pay reparations and occupation costs that by some estimates equaled as much as one-half of the nation's revenue. The burden was so heavy that the French people were literally turned into slaves of the Third Reich, required to work for it, either directly or indirectly, for little or no recompense, and forced to consume less and less each year due to its claims on French resources. As a result, the French were compelled to adopt dra conian rationing policies for basic commodities.[2]

Atthetime,however, veryfewpeople wereaware ofthearmistice's terms and many of those who were depicted it as just, given the cir cumstances. On Tuesday, June 25, 1940, Marshal Pe´tain spoke to the French nation about the armistice, two days after Great Britain an nounced that it no

longer considered France to be a sovereign state since the armistice had reduced it to servitude. Pe´tain reassured his countrymen that, to the contrary, the agreement with Germany was the best that France could obtain. Rather than dwelling on the armi stice, he called upon the French to look to the future: ‘‘A new order begins,’’ he claimed, as he quickly referred to the past for hope: ‘‘The earth does not lie. It remains your recourse. It is the nation.’’ Pe´tain argued that France needed ‘‘an intellectual and moral revival’’ to over come defeat, which he attributed to the interwar dominance of the ‘‘spirit of pleasure’’ over ‘‘the spirit of sacrifice.’’[3]

The theme of sacrifice became a trope in the post-armistice period, as though sacrifice provided some expiatory solution to the nation’s problems. The Catholic Church, in particular, welcomed sacrifice, ac ceptingdefeat asaformofdivinepunishmentforFrance.TheCatholic hierarchy saw Pe´tain as a ‘‘providential man’’ whose idea of National Revolution coincided with its spiritual concepts. Cardinal Gerlier of Lyon spoke for many in the Church when he said, as late as 1941, ‘‘What an impressive coincidence betweentheteachings ofthe Church and the words of the Marshal.’’ Exactly what that meant can only be understood in terms of the Church’s rocky relations with the Third Republic and its high hopes for Pe´tain’snew order in which the values ofservice,discipline,andthefamilywouldprevail oversecularismand anti-Catholicism. Within the Church very few leaders understood the threat of Nazism to Christian values, as they emphasized the evils of communism and ignored the Nazis’ paganism.[4]

In order for Pe´tain to inaugurate this new order, the old one had to be done away with. This meant replacing the Third Republic with a constitutional order that was more conducive to Pe´tain’s ideas and those of his followers on the extreme Right. In July, after the armistice had been signed and France became more or less resigned to its fate withintheNaziorder,Pe´tainandLavalacted.InthespatownofVichy, where the government had finally settled after leaving Bordeaux, the

remaining senators and deputies from the Popular Front legislature elected in 1936 met and decided the republic's fate. For the most part, they chose freely. The only pressures were political.

Pierre Laval was Pe´tain's bulldog at Vichy. On June 23, Laval had enteredthePe´taingovernment asdeputypremier.Soonhebecamethe architect of the Vichy regime. He used his parliamentary skills to line up votes for a change of regime. On the one hand, he reassured the nation's representatives that he would preserve republican ideals, con vincing the vast majority that a vote for full powers for Pe´tain amountedto nomorethanwhatthelegislaturehadgrantedtoDaladier and Reynaud. The republic would be continued, they were led to be lieve. A new constitution would be drawn up in consultation with the legislature and voted upon by the nation in due course. Even a large majorityofsocialistlegislators believedthat thiswould be the case.On the other hand, Laval told the assembled representatives on July 6 that ''parliamentary democracy has lost the war; it must disappear, ceding its place to an authoritarian, hierarchical, national and social regime.''[5] But few seemed to listen to this or, more likely, the majority believed it unimportant since Pe´tain rather than Laval would be in control. Pe´tain had gained the support of politicians on both the Left and the Right: Le´on Blum called him ''the noblest, the most human of our military chiefs'' in March 1939 and expressed no reservations about his appointment to the government in 1940. Blum, like many others, had been fooled by Pe´tain's stature as the ''victor of Verdun.''[6]

The Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, meeting in a joint emer gency session, on July 9, voted 624 to 4 in favor of revising the consti tution and, on July 10, voted 569 to 80 (with 17 abstaining) to give Petain the power to revise the constitution. Only the Left presented any opposition to Laval's maneuver: 91 percent of the no vote was cast by leftists, primarily socialists (communist deputies having been removed from the parliament during the phoney war). Over half of those

who voted yes—321 members of the 1940 parliament—would be banned from political life after World War II, even though they pleaded that they had voted for the continuation of the republic. Le´on Blum, who voted no in 1940, clearly understood what his vote meant. WritingthreemonthsaftertheeventsofJuly11,BlumsaidthatLaval's ''obvious objective was to cut all the roots that bound France to its republican and revolutionary past. His 'national revolution' was to be acounterrevolutioneliminatingalltheprogressandhumanrights won in the last one hundred and fifty years.''[7]

The New York Times cut through the rhetoric and obfuscation as early as July 12, 1940, when it proclaimed: ''The Chamber approved a totalitarian regime on the fascist model.'' Given constitutional powers by the legislature, Petain proceeded on July 11 to abrogate the found ing laws of the Third Republic and give himself complete power over all aspects of government from the legislature to the executive, with one exception, the ability to declare war, for which he had to obtain the approval of parliament. Clearly, the Marshal was now in a position to implement virtually anything he desired, without fear of contradic tion from other governmental agencies. On July 12, therefore, he de cided on the line of succession, naming Pierre Laval as his Dauphin, despite the fact that the Constitutional Law had granted full powers to the Marshal alone and not to anyone else.[8]

Pe´tain had accepted power in order to protect France from total ruin and to implement the National Revolution, based on the new slogan ''Work, Family, Fatherland'' [Travail, Famille, Patrie]. To achieve thefirst requiredcompletecollaborationwiththe Germans,whocalled all the shots regarding the armistice and the degree to which France remained a sovereign state. As we will see in greater detail in the next chapter, collaboration proved to be a disastrous failure. The National Revolution, by contrast, was a peculiar French undertaking that had little to do with the

Germans, except for the fact that it could not have been implemented without their victory. Yet, it is not easy to define the National Revolution. Historians have spilled a lot of ink arguing whether it was fascist or authoritarian. Most agree that it was neither one, but some of both. It was a peculiar French development, steeped in the history of the country rather than in the mechanical reproduc tion of the extreme right elsewhere in Europe.

Central to this revolution was Marshal Pe´tain, who led it. Unlike Hitler orMussolini or even Franco,Pe´tain was nomilitarist or political leader. If anything, he was a pacifist who shunned political parties and grand political projects. During his years in power, he refused to implement a one-party state, such as existed in the rest of fascist Eu rope. In fact, he maintained many of the symbolic trappings of the republic, including the celebration of the national holiday on July 14, the flying of the tricolor flag, and the national anthem, ‘‘La Marseil laise.’’ Unlikemost on the far Right, he evidently believed that Captain Dreyfus was innocent. If Vichy was the revenge of the anti-Dreyfu sards,Pe´tainwas notone of them. Nor did he engagein theimperialis tic or expansionistic aspects of fascism. Indeed, lacking a real military, he had little choice in the matter. But the Marshal was far from being a liberal democrat. His politics included authoritarian and exclusionist principles that called for the elimination of democracy, the purging of the bureaucracy, and the exclusion of Jews, Masons, communists, and foreigners from the nation. Pe´tain understood the National Revolution toberelatedtothefascistexperienceinItalyandGermany,but ‘‘totally different from these two historic revolutions.’’ Or, as many at Vichy believed,the revolution wasathird way betweenMarxismandcapital ism aimed at establishing a particular French sense of community.[9]

This community did not include everyone. Indeed, exclusion of Jews and other groups such as the Gypsies, Masons, and communists has to be understood as the essence of Vichy. The National Revolution was based on this negative principle, one

that we will investigate in detail in chapter four. Here let us outline a few aspects of exclusion, in order to understand in general terms what Pe´tain sought to achieve through his National Revolution.

Vichy's exclusionary policies did not evolve out of the policies of the Third Republic, as some have maintained. They were qualitatively and quantitatively different. Immediately after assuming power, in July 1940, the new regime began stripping naturalized citizens of their citizenship. Eventually 15,000 had their citizenship rights revoked, 6,000 of whom were Jews. At the same time, the regime decreed that anyone who did not have a French father could not be employed in the public sector. By the end of the year this requirement had been extended to several professions in the private sector, including medi cine, dentistry, the law, and architecture. In August, the regime lashed out at secret societies, notably the Freemasons, prohibiting them and imposing heavy fines on anyone who adhered to them. Vichy, like other authoritarian regimes, feared the supposed international secret conspiracies of the Jews and the Masons, not to mention the communists.[10]

The regime was preoccupied by the pursuit of these and other un desirables in its first months in power. The law of July 17, 1940, stripped all state officials of immunity from dismissal, giving Vichy carte blanche to fire anyone deemed untrustworthy. Gaullists and oth ers who had left France between May 10 and June 30 were stripped of their nationality, unless they could prove that their mission had been officially sanctioned. The High Court of Justice was replaced by a Vichy-appointed Supreme Court that was instructed to try a broad spectrumofsuspiciousgovernmentofficials,while aspecialcourt mar tial was created to try those designated traitors by the regime. No ap peal was allowed for cases tried by the court martial, whose sentences had to be executed within twenty-four hours after a verdict. The rule of law as the republic had understood it was completely undermined by the creation of these courts.[11]

Vichy topped off its exclusionary laws by issuing a number of de crees affecting foreigners and Jews. On September 27 the regime im plemented a law on the status of ‘‘foreigners in excess in the national economy.’’ All male refugees between eighteen and fifty-five years of age who came under this vague appellation could be placed in work camps, where they would be required to labor without pay. Increas ingly, as we shall see later in more detail, Vichy used camps to deal withexcludedgroups.InearlyOctoberVichypromulgatedthreeexclu sionary laws regarding Jews. One stripped all North African Jews of their rights of citizenship, which had been granted in 1870. Another definedwho was a Jew andeither excluded totally orlimitedaccess for Jews to a vast array of government and private sector jobs. And a third madeitpossibletointernallforeignJewsincamps.AsMichaelMarrus and Robert Paxton have pointed out with emphasis, the Nazis forced none of these laws upon Vichy. The National Revolution did not in clude Jews in its concept of community and the new order of things.[12]

Once Vichy had excluded the impure elements that were assumed to have undermined France, it sought to renew the true national com munity. Of course, the issue of exclusion was never settled completely. Vichy lived in a Manichean world, one in which good and evil were absolutesinconstantstrugglefordominance.Thus,thegoodcouldno bedefinedwithout aconstantprocessofscapegoating theother,which undermined the good and could never be totally destroyed. The peas ant village, which Vichy upheld as its ideal, was always in peril due to the existenceof the urbanindustrial city, peopled by Jews and foreign ers and those French who had lost touch with their true roots. Vichy’s peasant ideal required the disciplining of the urban other.

Ideologically the National Revolution, as Pe´tain understood it, was an extension of the ideas of the Action franc¸aise.

Although Vichy's motto, ''Work, Family, Fatherland,'' came from Colonel de La Rocque's Croix de feu, the colonel, after a brief flirtation with the new order, broke with Vichy and eventually contributed to France's liberation by providing intelligence to the British. In contrast, Charles Maurras and the Action franc¸aise chose the Marshal, Vichy, and collaboration. Al though Maurras played no role in the Vichy government—he spoke with Pe´tain on only a few occasions—his political ideas seemed to dominate it.Paul Barlatier,the editor of the premierMarseille newspa per, the Se´maphore, placed confidence in Vichy because the Marshal acted and governed ''in a manner that is distinctly Maraussian.''[13] This included not only an exclusionary attitude toward Jews, Freemasons, andcommunists,butalsoanti-GermanattitudesthatMaurrasinpartic ular, and Pe´tain to a lesser degree, held dear. Collaboration and anti communism would eventually trump the anti-German nationalism of the two men, but they would never forsake their goal of creating a French national community based on a seemingly paradoxical combi nation of authoritarian political order at the center and regional social andcultural autonomy.Forbothmen,thenationrepresented thehigh est stage of political evolution. La France seule (''France alone''), motto of the Action franc¸aise differentiated them and the National Revolu tion from the collaborationist political leaders and parties in Paris. Rather than adhere to the model of German Nazism, Maurras and Pe´ tain chose what they thought was a unique French path, one that em phasized corporatist organizations, the family, and the enrooted peasant as the bases of community. The National Revolution would eliminate class struggle, alienation, even modernity in order to return to a primitive peasant and artisan community in which class coopera tion prevailed. Although some technocratic modernizers initially ad hered to Vichy in the hope that it would be more dynamic than the Third Republic, Vichy was above all a reactionary enterprise: an at tempt to reestablish the essence of French identity, a community in which the family was strong,

hierarchy prevailed, the paterfamilias dominated, and everyone knew his or her place. It sought la France profonde, theTrue Francethathadbeenlosttouprootedness,urbaniza tion, alien forces, and the like.Pe´tainand Maurras not only sharedthis vision of a new France but also believed in each other as uniquely destined by it. Pe´tain referred to Maurras as the ''most French of the French,'' and Maurras called Pe´tain's rise to power in 1940 a ''divine surprise.''[14]

Family and Gender in the National Revolution Prioritizing the goals of the National Revolution is difficult if not impossible to do, but no one doubts that family and gender ranked high on the agendas of those who took over power in 1940. They ar gued that the war had been lost because France had been feminized. One of them proclaimed that the National Revolution was a reaction ''to a feminized Republic.''[15] The nation's virile nature had disappeared during the interwar period as women had moved out of the private, familial sphere where they belonged to the public sphere where they didnot.On June20,MarshalPe´tain toldthenationthat Francelostthe war because it had ''too few children, too few arms, too few allies.''[16] A week later, General Weygand wrote Pe´tain that population decline meant that the army had to rely increasingly on colonial troops or naturalized Frenchmen. To correct this, he claimed emphatically: ''The family must be restored to a place of honor.''[17] Vichy's minister for the familyconcurredwhenhespokeofthe ''necessitytorestoretheFrench family, whose disintegration is the origin of our decadence and our defeat.''[18]Giventhisenvironment,itisnotsurprisingthatopinionpoll indicated that the French believed the decline in births and family values to bedirectlyrelated totheparticipationof women in the work force. Women had let France down and caused the crisis that required the military to shore up its ranks with undesirables, the outsiders that the National Revolution wanted to exclude from the French community.[19]

Natalism and racism went hand in hand, as Francine Muel-

Dreyfus has shown. Extreme natalists attacked feminism as a foreign import, identifying feminists as Jews, conflating antifeminism with anti-Semi tism. French women had to be protected from undesirable foreign ele ments in order to reproduce the French race. Not only were racial and anti-immigrant laws implemented to achieve this goal, but Vichy also acted to exclude women from the workforce. Laws promulgated in October 1940 prohibited married women from working in the public sector and gave married men with children a preference in hiring. State poster and radio propaganda campaigns deluged women with messages about the need to return home and have children for the good of France. The state offered monetary incentives to encourage women to stay home and have children. But it also reversed the 1907 lawthatgavewomen controlovertheincometheyearned,empowered husbands to prevent their wives from working, restricted severely the right to divorce, criminalized adultery, imposed prison terms on those who abandoned their children, and punished abortion with harsh criminal sentences that included the death penalty. As a result, some women left the workforce, the divorce rate plummeted, and the num ber of women sentenced to prison increased dramatically—1,500 men and women went to jail for abandonment in 1942, and those sent to prison for abortion—mainly women—almost quadrupled between 1938 and 1941.[20]

Of coursethefamilyhad been importanttolawmakersbefore 1940 but, as was the case with refugees, Vichy went much further than the republic in using women and the family to pursue national revival.

Thus the Vichy Constitution that was drawn up but never imple mented began with several articles on the family. Article one stated: ‘‘The State recognizes that the family, constituted by marriage and legitimate filiations, is the foundation of the socialedifice.’’ Article two recognized the superiority of the family to the state in regard to the ‘‘upbringing and education of children’’ and the ‘‘constitution and con servation of the

family patrimony.’’ And article three granted the fam ily the right of representation in Vichy assemblies and a vote—the family vote—in place of individual suffrage. All authority within the family resided with the male head who controlled the family vote, family finances, and the like.[21]

The reality, however, was quite different from these constitutional pipe dreams: the state, not the male head of the household, controlled the family under Vichy. Also, Vichy’s familial ideal was impossible to realize while the war continued. The wives of prisoners of war, for one, could not be dealt with in terms of the traditional family, no matter how much Vichy wanted to do so. Although the government tried to make them consult with their POW husbands on all issues, they made most decisions without them, including the decision to go to work. According to one estimate, 80 percent of the wives of POWs joined the workforce during the war. Some engaged in prostitution in order to survive. A government study carried out in July 1941 found that about 60 percent of Parisian prostitutes were POW wives. As much as the state tried to provide for these women, it did not have the resources to keep them out of poverty and in the home. As a conse quence women entered the workplace and began organizing groups, beyond Vichy’s grasp, to help cope with the problems they faced. Au tonomy, rather than dependency, was what these abandoned wives sought, out of necessity if nothing else, during the period in which Vichy was desperately trying to shore up the traditional family.[22]

The traditionalist family goals that Vichy promoted were also un dermined by the demands of the economy. Between October 1940 and October1942 the numberof unemployed droppedfrom one million to 77,000, partly because the Germans had imprisoned over one and a halfmillionFrenchsoldiers.Thetightlabormarketcreatedbythisand demand for French labor in German factories, made it impossible for Vichy to enforce the numerous laws that restricted women’s employ ment. In fact, the government did a

complete about-face in September 1942 when it suspended the 1940 law that prohibited women from working in state jobs and then, in August 1943, when it passed legisla tion requiring all women between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-five to work. Under German pressure, Vichy also decreed, in February 1944, that all women without children, between ages eighteen and forty-five, could be conscripted to work in Germany. Although only 44,000 French women ended up working in Germany, they attest to the bankruptcy of Vichy's position on women and the family.[23] Here, asinmost areas,theNationalRevolution wasasham,contingentupon German occupation and collaboration, incapable of establishing its own legitimate authority outside the sphere of Nazi power.

Still, on the level of symbolism, the revolution proceeded despite reality. The Feˆte des me`res (Mother's Day) was elevated to a major nationalholiday by MarshalPe´tain inMay1941. On thisfirst Mother's DayunderVichy ruleheaddressedthenation,proclaiming ''thefamily offers us the best guarantee of [national] recovery. A sterile nation is a nation whose existence is mortallyaffected. In orderfor France tolive, above all it must have families.'' To the old Marshal, the family was a ''spiritual community that saves man from egotism,'' and the mother was the key to its existence and perpetuation.[24] In order to reinforce the central role of the mother, Vichy granted awards to mothers of large families and required schoolchildren to write essays about the virtues of their mothers. Plays aboutideal mothers were performed on Mother's Day, and the cult of the Virgin was conjured up, especially in Catholic Church services to honor mothers. The radical alterity of the mother was inscribed in these events and ceremonies. As Marshal Pe´ tain informed all mothers on Mother'sDay in1942, through childbear ing ''you realize fully your destiny as a woman; you discover profound happiness by simply obeying the laws of nature.'' One year later the French Union for the Defense of the Race went further, linking Moth er's Day to the protection of the French race. To the union, mothers who gave birth to French children had performed a

sacrifice, which ‘‘multiplied shall without doubt be the salvation of our nation, which so many rootless, dishonorable scoundrels want to destroy.’’[25]

But Vichy did not trust mere rhetoric and symbolism to achieve its goal of the contented mother in the family. It also concentrated on reforming the nation’s educational system to emphasize the virtues of the family and motherhood. Pe´tain’s 1938 speech at Metz had estab lished the basis for the new educational order: ‘‘The souls of young Frenchmen must be shaped by the nation, by the narration of our history, by the love of our soil and our empire.’’[26] This meant purging theschoolsofundesirableteachers,such asFreemasons andJews, who taught false, ‘‘international’’ concepts, according to Vichyite educators, and purging the textbooks of the republican values of ‘‘liberty, equal ity, and fraternity’’ for those of the new order, ‘‘Work, Family, Father land.’’Butmoreimportantly,itmeantscrappingtherepublicanidealc equal educationforall. Now,peasants and workersshould beeducated according to their status in the hierarchy, not for the purpose of ad vancingbeyondtheirpositioninlife.Aprimaryeducationthatempha sized manual labor was sufficient for the lower classes. Likewise, women were not to face heady intellectual matters. Instead, they should be taught cooking, health care, gardening, and the like to pre pare them for life in the family. No woman should be allowed to pur sue secondary education. The baccalaureate exam for women, which the republic had created in 1924, was essentially eliminated under Vichy, which required women to take courses in family education and pursue a watered-down academic curriculum at the secondary level.[27] Womenwere meanttoreproduce,toraisefamilies,tocookandgarden, but never to infringe on the superior male world of virility and higher learning. Under Vichy everyone was supposed to know his or her place.

Vichy’sstrong senseofplaceandhierarchyemergedoutof

aCatho lic culture of deference that the republic had tried to crush. Vichy was the revenge of the Church, in many respects. Vichy's policies toward women were nothing more than what the Church had been preaching for at least seventy years. Catholic educational groups, such as the As sociation of Parents of Students of Independent Education, mimicked Vichy on the place of women in French life: ''The place of women is atthecenterandheart ofthehome[foyer],''itproclaimed.Inthe1930s, the Catholic Ligue de la femme au foyer was created for the purpose of reinvigorating traditional family values. Its concepts and slogans, developed before World War II, became the heart of Vichy's National Revolution:''To renewthenation through the family,themother must be in the foyer.''[28]

The Church was virtually unanimous in support of Vichy's ideol ogyonwomenandthefamilyandembracedenthusiasticallytheVichy motto of ''Work, Family, Fatherland.'' Cardinal Gerlier exclaimed, ''These words areours.'' The Vatican recognized Vichy almost immedi ately. The Assembly of Cardinals and Archbishops proclaimed that the Church venerated Pe´tain and demanded ''that the union of all French be realized around him.'' The National Revolution was, to most Catho lics, the salvation of France. Catholic journals, with only one or two exceptions, waxed enthusiastic about Vichy. Only a Christian revival, with a strong emphasis on the family, could restore France in their eyes.AndPe´tainandVichywere thekeystothe successofthatrestora tion. After World War II the Church would experience a steep decline inFrance,reflectinginpartthe close tiesit hadestablishedwith Pe´tain and the National Revolution.[29]

Despite the strong support of the Church and the strong convic tions of those at Vichy who supported a return to the family, Vichy's familypolicyfailedtoachieveitskeyobjectives.Women didnotreturn to the home; the traditional family was not revived; the paterfamilias did not gain absolute control over

family affairs; and women were not kept out of the public sphere. Although some historians have argued that Vichy's policies on women and the family were part of a contin uum that extended from the interwar period to the 1960s, the position of Vichy in this history is clearly an extreme one, which the postwar period corrected in the direction of greater autonomy for women. The National Revolution failed to stop the erosion of family values that the forces of modernity and the Republic had supposedly initiated.

Regionalism and Tradition One of the seeming paradoxes of authoritarian Vichy was its em phasis upon local culture and tradition. Pe´tain led the way in this area as well, celebrating the many diverse regions of France in his travels throughoutthe south. He wasespeciallyfond of Provenceand itsgreat Nobel Prize–winning poet, Fre´de´ric Mistral, whose legacy he thought heralded the National Revolution. On September 6, 1940, Mistral's 110thbirthday, Pe´tain proclaimed, ''I seein him thesublime evocation of the new France that we want to create, as well as the traditional France that we want to restore.'' Pe´tain praised Mistral for upholding the values of the family and the soil, for championing the ''Latin race'' and its ''spiritual treasures,'' and for his patriotism, which embraced both the ''petite patrie'' and the ''grande'' while ''posing an invincible resistance to anyone who tried to eliminate class, level society, and uproot us.''[30]

Celebrating the regions, local cultures, and folklore, Vichy estab lished itself as the enemy of Jacobin centralization and the republican tradition while maintaining the principle of the unity of the nation. Regionalism was synonymous with traditional values, the ones that Vichy wished to perpetuate. As a result, folklore studies flourished under Vichy, which supported ethnological works on peasants and local cultures. The folklorists reciprocated by creating a National Com mittee for Propaganda through Folklore, which published a journal, L'Echo des provinces, which extolled the National Revolution and the role of folklore in it. The journal was subsidized heavily

by the state, which also supported regional folklore museums, just as the Popular Front government had done. In addition, Vichy mobilized artists to paint idealized pictures of daily life among peasants and artisans, which wererivaled in Vichy-sponsored art only by depictions of saints andotherChristianthemesoutof alostmedievalworld.In someareas, such as Provence and Languedoc, Vichy also promoted the teaching of local languages, although never with the thought of substituting them for French—there were limits to Vichy's regionalist tendencies. The same could be said of the teaching of history: Vichy encouraged the teaching of local history, but made sure that the history of France was also taught, with certain changes to the curriculum, such as the elimination of the revolution of 1789 as a major event.[31]

Vichy's enthusiasm for local culture included a strong anti-Parisian element. Music, for example, had to be populist in nature, rooted in folklore, close to the concerns of the people rather than cosmopolitan and international (such as jazz). Folk songs, choral music, and folk dances were considered wholesome forms that could revitalize the French people. Classical music, in contrast, was acceptable only if it came close to the concerns of the people, as in the case of Gounod's Mireille, which was based on Mistral's famous poem, or Bizet's L'Arle´ sienne, which was inspired bythe Provenc¸al nationalist Alphonse Dau det's short story. Theater, too, had to adhere to a concept of didactic art. Foreign and avant-garde theater was unhealthy. Plays had to be basedonlocalcustoms,localhistory,andthelike.TheProvenc¸alpastral fit into this category as well as Languedocien plays based on local legends. In general, tradition ruled over the culture that Vichy wished to foster. But not too much tradition. Folklorists were watched in case they went too far in identifying with local cultures and the people. Traditionalfestivals,whichVichyencouraged, werecontrolledinorder to avoid popular excesses, such as Dionysian fits of passion or carni valesque reversals of the

order of things. Regulated tradition, seem ingly from the bottom up but actually from the top down, was Vichy's form of ''populist'' culture.[32]

Vichy's vision of culture was narrowly focused on the themes of the National Revolution, namely the return to the soil, to peasant and artisan cultural values and the village. The re-creation of True France was Vichy's primary objective, not the democratization of culture, which is why Vichy and Popular Front cultural policies were funda mentally different. Take, for example, Jeune France, which the regime created in 1940 for the purpose of rejuvenating French culture. All aspects of culture, from music to the cinema, were to be included in its jurisdiction. Although the Parisian branch of Jeune France concen trated on elite culture, the rest of the movement was concerned with decentralizing culture by creating cultural centers in places such as Bordeaux,Toulouse, and Marseille. Thesecenters concentrated primar ily on producing plays, many of which did not fit into the agenda of theNational Revolution. As a consequence, Jeune France soon ran into trouble with the authorities, who shut it down in March 1942. Much like Uriage, the elite school for training future leaders of Vichy that turned against the regime, Jeune France became too independent and too divorced from the Mauraussien values that Vichy wanted to incul cate in the name of ''popular'' culture.[33] Vichy's regionalist policies— which included culture—were, Christian Faure rightly contends, mythical in nature, existing only in the imagination, as a mental representation.[34]

Theresultof thesepolicies,incontrasttothemyth, wasmoreoften than not total confusion and hostility to the regime. The promises that Vichy made regarding local empowerment were hardly ever imple mented. For example, the promotion of regional languages never movedbeyondtokenism,forVichy had no intentionofcreating amul tilingual nation. More serious, the creation of regional governments raised hopes for increased local autonomy, but nothing of the sort occurred.ThesevenregionssetupbyVichyinthesouth

werecarefully controlled from the center. Any thought of decentralization faded as Vichy eliminated elected city governments, treated autonomist move ments with disdain, and even placed strict limits on the power of pre fects.Corporatismdidnotgivepowertothedecentralizedcorporatio but rather centralized it in the hands of Vichy bureaucrats. The end result was disillusion and alienation from the objectives of the Na tional Revolution by 1941, if not earlier.

Recent regional studies have revealed an almost uniform story of high hopes for regional autonomy and the goals of the National Revo lution in 1940, followed rapidly by disillusionment as Vichy or the Germans failed to allow any significant decentralization of power. In the most extreme cases, Alsace and the Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the Ger mans in control eliminated all signs of autonomy, including the use of the French language and religious freedom in Alsace. Significant opposition to the new order emerged immediately in these areas. But even where Vichy's more benign administration prevailed, such as the Dordogne, the new order was never popular because the armistice cut the region off from its natural outlet to the Atlantic and the regime dumped 50,000 refugees on it without warning or consultation. In the Alpes-
Maritimes,incontrast,Vichywasextremelypopularuntil March 1941, when the central government purged municipal councils and replaced their members with extreme right-wing party hacks. After that, support for the British and opposition to collaboration with the Germans increased rapidly. And the same can be said for numerous otherareas of Francewhere heavy-handed government controlcreated oppositiontobothVichyandtheGermans:Franche-Comte ´,whereGer man meddling in the local economy led to French opposition by 1941; Brittany, where hopes for autonomy were dashed by both Vichy and the Germans, leading the Bretons to back de Gaulle and the British by early 1941; and Ce´vennes, where historically powerful anti-Parisian sentiments led

Protestant and regionalist forces to oppose Vichy's au thoritarian policies by 1941.[35]

Of course regionalism and the appeal to tradition were not life and death issues for most people. Vichy's failure to make these myths real ity was not the sole or even primary factor in turning most people against the regime. Still, it is important to realize that the Maurraus sien agenda of the National Revolution included significant emphasis on local freedom and regional autonomy in the context of traditional values. When local freedom and regional autonomy were not imple mented but instead were transformed into further centralization of power under an authoritarian system, disillusionment quickly fol lowed. Freedom was a deeply held value that many refused to give up.

Peasants and Workers: The Corporate State The positive aspects of the National Revolution—if we can call them that—never bridged the gap between ideology and practice be causerealityalwaysintervenedtostymieideology.Thecorporatestat as it related to peasants and workers, was no exception to this rule. Despite Vichy's nauseating emphasis upon the values of rural life and the peasantry, the corporate state in practice did nothing to protect those traditional values. Quite the opposite: peasants, which the new regime promisedto protect, soon became the victimsof a brutal policy of exploiting rural France not seen since the Revolution of 1789. The reality for workers was just as bad, in fact worse. The corporate state, for both peasants and workers, was a complete, unmitigated disaster.

Pe´tain believed, as did many others, that France was still a peasant nation, self-sufficient in agriculture and capable of feeding both its own citizens and the rest of Europe. In August 1940, for example, he claimed that France ''will recover all her strength by renewed contact with the earth.''[36] To achieve this goal, his administration created a series of new rural

institutions that supposedly gave peasants control over their destiny. To revive the family farm, which Pe´tain believed was the ‘‘principle economic and social base of France,’’ Vichy inaugu ratedprograms toreturnpeasants tothesoil,providingthemwithfree land to cultivate. But this accomplished little, as only 1,566 families took up this proposition, of which 409 quickly terminated their ties to the soil. In contrast, Vichy’s policy of remembrement, by which small, economically marginal plots of land were exchanged to create contigu ous, more economically viable operations where previously subsis tence farming had been the case, succeeded in reducing the presence of the small peasant farmer and led eventually to the creation of a more capitalist form of agriculture, in direct contradiction with the stated values of the National Revolution. In April 1942, when Jacques Le Roy-Ladurie was appointed minister of agriculture, efficiency and modernization inagriculture won out over theideal ofthe family farm touted by Pe´tain.[37]

The same process of the transvaluation of rural values occurred with the Corporation paysanne created in December 1940. The stated aim of the corporation was to overcome class struggle and increase agricultural production. At the local level, virtually every agricultural interest group was represented in this new organization, but at the regional and national levels, where policy was supposed to be made, peasants and sharecroppers had no voice. In the national commission appointedbyVichyonlythemajorcapitalistagriculturalinterests were represented. Thenationalcommission’spropagandasupportedthe Na tional Revolution’s themes of the family farm, the village community, and traditional values, but as the fascist Marcel De´at pointed out, the commission actually protected the power of the rich property owners. Itbecameincreasinglyapparentwithtimethatthepeasantcorporatio had almost no influence on agricultural policy, despite the fact

that Pe´tain claimed in July 1941 that it must ‘‘be a durable undertaking, the foundation stone of the corporate edifice of the new France.’’[38] Increasingly the corporation lost control over rural France as groups such as the Communist Party capitalized on such issues as the requisi tioning of food at prices below cost and German attempts to control rural areas for their own economic interests. Even the Vichy govern ment realized that its corporate peasant policy had failed. At the end ofDecember1942 agovernmentreportclaimedthatthepeasantcorpo ration was too statist and not corporatist enough and that it lacked fundingto carryoutitsgoals.Itconcludedthat ‘‘itappearsthatinplace of using the corporation as a bridge between the peasants and itself, the government cut off all communication’’ with the peasants.[39] By early 1943 the message had reached Vichy that the peasants thought the corporation had been taken over by the state, which used it to impose excessive obligations on them. They wanted this ‘‘foundation stoneof the corporateedifice’’ dissolved before it did more damage. By May1943 even die-hardpeasantsupportersof theNational Revolution had lost confidence in the system, according to government reports. Meanwhile Pe´tain had gone from discussing peasants as saviors of the French race in 1940 to labeling them criminals for not selling their produce at below cost in early 1942.[40]

Themythofself-sufficientpeasantFrance ranupagainstthereality of German exploitation. France was not self-sufficient prior to the war but was forced to become so as the result of German policies after the armistice. The nation went from importing 15 percent of its agricul tural goods prior to 1940 to almost no imports during the German occupation. At the same time France was forced to export 700 million kilograms of cereals per year to Germany. This occurred even though fertilizer usage declined 50 percent, agricultural workers decreased by 13 percent, and the amount of land cultivated dropped by 2 million hectares under German occupation. Consequently, French agricultural production dipped to about 80 percent of what it had been in the period

1935–38, and average French caloric intake fell 50 percent or more, from about 2,400 calories a day to 1,200 or fewer by 1944. Con trary to whatmanybelievedatthetime,Frenchpeasants didnotbene fit greatly from the misery of urban dwellers: not only did agricultural production decline but the state forced peasants to sell their goods at prices below cost, as well.[41]

The working classbenefited even less from the corporate state. Not only were workers conscripted to work in Germany against their will, but their salaries declined in value as prices increased 300 percent during the war. By 1942 workers were spending 60 percent or more of theirincome forfood. TheGermansystem,towhich Vichyacquiesced, provided full employment but under conditions that bordered on slav ery. French workers were forced to provide goods for German con sumption and the Nazi war effort. Up to one-half of French revenue went to Germany during the war as the result of skewed exchange rates, the requisitioning of French goods, and the burdensome occupa tion costs imposed on Vichy. To a degree unknown in other western European countries under Nazi occupation, French workers refused to become part of this German system. Very few volunteered to work in Germany, and many joined the Resistance rather than be conscripted to work there.[42]

Vichy's form of corporatism never got off the ground as far as the working class was concerned. Pe´tain and the National Revolution had nothingbut contempt for the proletariat. Pe´tain believed that the ''true workers'' were village artisans, who, he asserted, accepted their social and economic inferiority as part of the natural order of things. In a 1942 May Day speech the Marshal totally overlooked the French prole tariat,whoseday thishad traditionallybeen, tospeakaboutthe special role of the artisan in French society. He praised the artisan as the upholder of ''social peace'' and added: ''Class struggle is impossible in the artisan's workshop.'' In a March 1941 speech to businessmen, workers, and their associates he specifically condemned the old working-class leaders for producing

‘‘misery, war and defeat,’’ weakening the nation through policies based on hatred and revolution. He re turned to this theme on May Day 1941, claiming: ‘‘May first has been, until now, a symbol of division and hatred. From now on it shall be a symbol of union and friendship.’’ But, he made clear, only the artisans had achieved this working-class utopia. The others must fall in step in order to realize the unlimited benefits of the corporate state.[43]

Pe´tain’s ultimate objective was toorganize the working class under the aegis of the corporate state. The Charte du Travail (Labor Charter) was his means of achieving this. On September 22, 1941, when Vichy issued the document, Pe´tain embraced it as the key to ending class struggle by bringing all groups together to share equally in the profits of capital, ‘‘aftercapitalinvestments hadbeenremunerated.’’ The char ter would restore among workers and their bosses ‘‘the close solidarity that existed in the past,’’ the Marshal maintained, and would help re vive the grandeur of France through the corporate state.[44]

But these were mere utopian dreams of an old man. The Labor Charter amounted to little in the end. Its drafting and implementation were slowed by divisions between traditionalists who shared Pe´tain’s vision and neosyndicalists led by Minister of Work Rene´ Belin, who soughtminimallytoprotectworkers’interestsbymaintainingsepara workerandemployerunionswithinthe newcorporatestructure.Some prewar labor leaders, notably from the CGT current associated with the journal Syndicats, followed Belin and took up positions in the new laborорder.In somecases,pacifist,anticommunist,andantiparliamen tarian sentiments combined with disappointment with the failure of Popular Front labor reforms led them to embrace the new order in the hope that a reformist, peaceful, and necessarily authoritarian social order would emerge from it. In other cases, cooperation was more circumspect, based on a pragmatic entrisme according to which it was important to be present

where decisions were being made that im pacted workers. But workers overwhelmingly repudiated the Labor Charter, seeing clearly that the outlawing of the right to strike and of independent unions made it little more than a tool of the employers. As a consequence, by Liberation only a fraction of the new unions called for by the Labor Charter had been created. As one historian observed, Vichy was a ‘‘veritable golden age for the French business class.’’ In the name of solidarity a sham corporate state was erected that reinforced big business at the expense of virtually every other group—peasants,artisans,workers, eventhemiddleclass.The concen tration of industry into larger, supposedly more efficient enterprises occurred at a rapid pace under Vichy, due more to the demands of the Germans and the economic penury of France during the war than to state planning, which was virtually nonexistent, or the work of Vichy technocrats. By 1945 laissez-faire liberalism would be superseded by a new world of state planning, in part because of Vichy’s stumbling interventionist concepts, but primarily due to France’s extraordinarily weak economic position after years of being exploited by the occupy ing German armies.[45]

The Vichy Constitution As we have already seen, Marshal Pe´tain was given the authority by the politicians of the Third Republic to draw up a new constitution that would be submitted to the French people for ratification. That document was to institutionalize, once and for all time, the ideals of the corporate state that Pe´tain,Maurras, and othersheld dear. But, like almost everything related to this so-called ‘‘revolution,’’ Vichy failed miserablyinachievingitsobjective.Thegapbetweenidealsandrealit was, once again, too difficult to bridge.

The role of Marshal Pe´tain in this failed attempt to create a consti tution should not be underestimated. Pe´tain was obsessed with the issue from June 1940 until the ultimate collapse of Vichy. In announc ing the terms of the armistice he

made clear that ‘‘a new order’’ had to be established to supersede the failed Third Republic, even though nothing in the armistice required such an outcome. On July 11, 1940, he addressed the nation on the need for a new constitution, arguing that national revival depended upon it. Rather than continuing the ways of parliamentary democracy, the new order would be based on ‘‘simple rules’’ and would rely on elites chosen ‘‘for their abilities and their merits,’’ the Marshal proclaimed. Both capitalism and socialism would be banned from this order, superseded by a society in which the reign of money would no longer prevail: ‘‘In the new order, which shall be based on justice, we will eliminate all dissension.’’ Instead: ‘‘Your work shall be defended, your family shall have the respect and the protectionof the nation.’’ Andeveryonewillbe proudtobe French again.[46]

Pe´tain returned to the theme in August 1940, in the course of re sponding to Gaullist attacks. He lashed out at the ‘‘gangrene’’ of the 1930s, which infested the French state ‘‘by interjecting laziness and incompetence into it, even sometimes systematic sabotage for the pur pose of social disorder and international revolution.’’ Pe´tain added: ‘‘Forseventy-fiveyears before the warbrokeout,the regimethatdomi natedthe French promoted a cultureof discontent.’’ Vichy, incontrast, would act only for the ‘‘public good’’ without the ‘‘lies and utopian dreams’’ of the republic. Two months later, in October, the Marshal crowed about the accomplishments of the new order, pointing to the massive legislative initiatives undertaken: ‘‘The revisions of the natu ralizationlaws,thelaw onaccesstocertainprofessions,thedissolution of secret societies, the search for those responsible for our disastrous defeat.’’Nothing,however,was donethatreflectedthepromisetounite the nation, unless unity were defined in terms of exclusion, which dominated this list of legislative accomplishments.[47]

Pe´tain repeatedly defined his new constitutional order in terms of the massive failures of the Republic. In a major speech

of October 10, 1940, he attacked the Third Republic once more for enslaving the French and allowing only special interests—especially the unions—to dominate. He went on to claim that he would build his new order on the ruins of the republic, interjecting for the first time the connection betweenitand Nazi Germany:the neworder wouldentail new foreign alliances,includingcollaboration withGermany under ajustpeace. On the domestic front the new regime would be based on ‘‘a social hierar chy’’ in which the ‘‘false idea of natural equality’’ would be replaced by the concept of ‘‘equality of chances.’’ Although liberty would exist in this regime, it would be tempered by a strong dose of order, especially inregardtotheeconomy,which ‘‘mustbeorganizedandcontrolled’’as individual interest must bow to ‘‘national interest.’’ All classes, Pe´tain concluded, would be part of a ‘‘true national fraternity’’ as a result of this new constitutional order.[48]

By July 1941, when Pe´tain addressed the Constitutional Commis sion of twenty that had been selected to draft a new constitution, the broad outlines of his concept of governance were widely known. He told the ‘‘founding fathers’’ that the idea of the ‘‘sovereign people’’ was dead; it had led to ‘‘total irresponsibility.’’ In its place he provided a new definition of ‘‘people’’: ‘‘A people is a hierarchy of families, of professions, of communes, of administrative responsibilities, of spiri tual groups.’’ Rather than governing, ‘‘a people’’ is led by elites, from the lowest government official all the way to Pe´tain at the top. But the essential key to constitution-making, he argued, was the National Revolution, which ‘‘signifies the will to be rejuvenated’’ that comes from the ‘‘being’’ of the French people. Circular logic? Tautologies? Certainly. But none of this bothered the Marshal, who argued that the constitution had to have the ‘‘virtue of education’’ in it. ‘‘In this re spect,’’ he continued, ‘‘the constitution crowns the work of the school.’’ By this he meant that the constitution must reveal the patrie in all of its glory and ‘‘teach . . . respect of religion and moral beliefs,

especially those professed in France since the origins of its national existence.'' The new order would be patriotic, hierarchical, authoritarian, and elit ist, ''organically uniting French society.'' Like Edmond Burke in his critique of the French Revolution, the Marshal conceived of his consti tution in terms of the ''sixty generations that have preceded us on our soil, for which you are the responsible heirs.''[49]

This was virtually worthless advice. No modern state could be based on such vagaries as fundamental constitutional principles. No wonder that the twenty ''sages'' found it almost impossible to draw up a constitution. Even if a document had been created and submitted to the people, it would have had no chance of gaining their approval. As much as the republic was despised, no one wanted a mystical, organic union based on order and hierarchy, with elites in total control and civil society relegated to the role of Spanish peasants under Franco. Yet, Pe ´tain continued to address the subject as though his vision were possible. In a speech on the constitution of October 14, 1941, Pe´tain attacked specifically the evils of individualism, which had created a ''false conception of liberty'' that subordinated duty to rights and insti tutions to individuals. The result was ''the disappearance of discipline, the neglect of hierarchy, the collapse of authority.'' The new constitu tion, he argued emphatically, would correct all of this, bolstering the state, shoring up the authority of its head.[50] The evils of individualism and class conflict continued to obsess Pe´tain, who insisted in his New Year's talk, for example, that the National Revolution would bring an end to them, but only if the people fully embraced its ideals.[51]

Although a constitution was drawn up for Vichy, one that incorpo rated most of Pe´tain's concerns, it was never implemented, in part because Pe´tain insisted that it be delayed until France was liberated from German occupation and Paris was once again its capital. The primaryauthorofthisdocument was theministerofjusticefrom1941 to 1943, Joseph Barthe´lemy, a

devout Catholic who had been a promi nentliberalrepublicanintheinterwarperiod.Barthe´lemyhad reserva tions about Pe´tain's right to rule, for he believed that the Third Republic's legislature had only given him the power to ''make a consti tution'' and then resign. For the most part, Barthe´lemy agreed with the idea that community took precedence over individual rights. His Catholiceducationalsoconvincedhimthat Vichywasnotatotalitarian state but rather ''constrained by the higher rules of morality and law, superior creations that impose themselves upon it.''[52] Thus, acting as a sort of modern-day Thomas Aquinas or Bishop Bossuet, Barthe´lemy settowork ona documentthatwouldbebased onlaw,asheconceived it, beginning with the principle that the nation was a community of ''traditions, memories, hopes, customs, attachment to the same soil, and aspirations.'' Race, or any other biological concept of the nation and citizenship, was not included in this definition, making it very difficult to square with the anti-Semitic laws passed by Vichy under the Marshal's leadership. Nor did Barthe´lemy opt for the Nazi concept of the unity of state and nation, which would have made this constitu tion a totalitarian one. On the contrary, in the first drafts of the consti tution, the family emerged as the primary institution upon which all else was to be based, with the father in control and all other members subordinatetohim.Women wereclearlyrelegatedtotheroleofhouse wives, with the duty to reproduce as well as to educate and discipline their children for the good of the community. But here, as elsewhere, concernsabout theauthority of thestate trumped the corporatist men tality that the National Revolution projected. The reality that prevailed in thefinaldraft gavethestate control overthefamily,which obtained no real rights in the new order. Vichy did not trust the family to be the primary institution, just as it did not trust regionalism or peasant and working-class corporatism. In all three cases the constitution un dermined what authority these entities were supposed to possess under the ideals of the National Revolution.[53]

What the constitution makers did trust, in the final analysis, were two seemingly contradictory concepts: the state and the individual. Article forty-six of this document contained the shocking revelation that individual effort was the key to all economic success. The state couldprotectthegeneralwelfareonlytotheextentthatitdidnotclash with individual initiative. In other words, the Vichy regime deferred to the intellectual heritage of the past to strongly back what many considered to be a discredited neoliberal concept. But the impact of individualismwasimmediatelycounteredbytheoverwhelmingpowe that the constitution gave to the head of state, who was made into a sort of French Caesar, according to Miche`le Cointet-Labrousse. Pe´tain andhissuccessors weregivenvirtuallyunlimitedlegislativeand execu tive powers. Only the moral law—Barthe´lemy's ultimate guide—and the Constitutional Court could restrict their actions.[54]

In the end, nothing came of this effort to write the constitution that would entrench the National Revolution in the hearts and minds oftheFrench.Noone reallywanteditanyway,exceptforPe´tain,Maur ras, and a few other nostalgic extremists. It did not resolve any of the outstanding issues that the Third Republic had supposedly failed to grapple with; on the contrary, it seemed to embrace the very individu alism that the National Revolution found so repugnant in the culture of the republic. Not surprisingly, in late 1943, when Vichy's demise was clearly visible on the horizon, some Vichy politicians sought to save their skins by adopting a constitution similar to that of the Third Republic. Yet, for a variety of reasons including Pe´tain's refusal to allow authority to emanate ''d'en bas'' (from below), this attempt at implementing a republican constitution came to naught.[55]

France was governed under Vichy not by corporate entities, which had no real power, or by the family, which had even less, but by tradi tional institutions that it inherited from the Republic. This did not include parliamentary government, although Vichy created a simula crum of it when it set up its

handpicked, carefully vetted National Council, which was heavily weighted toward the Right. It proved to be completely worthless at the job of providing information from constit uencies to the national government for use in making policy. For that purpose, and for most aspects of governance, Vichy relied heavily on the prefects, the officials that headed the eighty-odd departments into which France had been divided since the 1790s. In a superficial sense, this marked a return to the reliance on prefects to govern the nation in the nineteenth-century regimes preceding the creation of the Third Republic in the 1870s. The prefects represented everything that Vichy stood for: the State, authority, order, and hierarchy. Marcel Peyrouton, Vichy's first minister of the interior, understood this when he called upon them to help the State overcome ''twenty years of errors and follies,'' as he put it in an October 1940 circular. Through decrees is sued by Peyrouton, elected departmental and municipal bodies were eliminated, and the prefects were made the ''only representatives of the State'' in the departments. They could rule on virtually anything without having to compromise with elected officials or their constit uents. But, this did not make their lives easier. For one thing, Vichy did not trust the prefects; it circumscribed their powers by creating seven super regional prefects in the Free Zone, as well as by establish ing Commissaires du pouvoir who investigated abuses of power and corruption within the departments. Furthermore, every prefect was subjecttotheauthorityofVichy'squasi-militaryforces,firsttheLe ´gion franc¸aisedescombattantsandthentheMilice,whichhadtotalsuppo from the State even though the French almost unanimously con demned them as sadistic, Nazi-inspired organizations. In reality, there fore, the prefectoral corps suffered from enormous uncertainty under Vichy. Prefects discovered that they could be purged at any moment, that they had lost touch with the local community as the result of excessive centralization of power, that they were caught between the conflicting forces of the Resistance and the Germans, and that

no one atthelocallevelwantedtodotheirdirtyworkafter1942,ifnotbefore. In the Occupied Zone the prefects had additional problems. Vichy in structed them to obey the Germans, but this proved impossible, since Germanordersoftenconflictedviolentlywiththewishes oftheinhabi tants oftheirdepartments.Notsurprisingly,turnover was veryhighin the prefectoral corps, and the Germans deported a total of seventy-one members of it, over half ofwhom died inthe camps.Asthe experts on the subject of the prefects concluded, the Vichy model of government rested on ‘‘a misunderstanding of local political and administrative re alities.’’[56]LikeeverybodyelseVichytouched,theprefects soonyearned for the good old days of the Third Republic over the chaos, stupidity, and brutality of the National Revolution.

In trying to govern France, even the rump France that was called the Free Zone, Vichy faced a serious dilemma: How can a modern society, rooted in democratic values, be governed by a highly central ized state that rejects, even deplores, any form of consultation with its citizens? Of course the National Revolution, in theory, did not reject suchconsultation;thecorporatestateprovided aforumforlegally con stituted groups to speak out. But, as we have seen, this was a sham; the State’s agenda was never determined, or even greatly influenced, by any corporate body. An official political party would have offered the possibility of tapping public opinion, which even an authoritarian state needs to do in order to govern. However, Vichy failed to create a single-party state, due primarily to the inability of large sectors of the Right to agree on what such a party should be, or whether it should even exist. Fascists and other extremists in Paris could not agree with CatholicsandadvocatesoftheNational RevolutioninVichy.Lavaland Pe´tain were deeply suspicious of the Parisians, who were too close to Nazi ideas for their comfort. And the Parisians responded with suspi cions of their own: the Vichy crowd, they believed, was too soft, not fascist enough, too nostalgic and archaic in their political ideas. In

stead, Vichy decided to forget the idea of a one-party state, which did not appeal greatly to Pe´tain in any case, and base its power on the military and the police. In other words, rather than tapping public opinion for constructive purposes, Vichy decided to use coercion and militarism to keep the populace quiescent. It is the same old story of statism winning out over the ideals of the National Revolution, what ever they might be worth. And of course, like everything else, it did not work.

The bureaucracy mushroomed as a result of this statist solution to governance; the size of the civil service increased by 26 percent under Vichy.Bureaucrats hadtoenforce newregulationsthatrequired every one to have an identity card. They had to keep track of changes of address and keep watch over foreigners. Even the installation of a tele phone or the purchase of a bicycle came under the State's watchful eye. Proper papers were needed for all of these, plus much more. The result was a massive paper explosion. Everyone was considered poten tially guilty under the system until their papers proved that they were innocent. The bureaucracy's ultimate aim was to have a file on every one living in France. The Service de de´mographie set up under Vichy created 20 million dossiers that identified everyone with a number; after the war, it was transformed into the more benign national social security system. Special police forces were created to enforce surveil lance laws. The most notorious of these was the Police aux questions juives (PQJ), which enforced the anti-Semitic laws, but Vichy also cre ated the first national police force. The end result of these intrusive police state activities was a system of bureaucratic paperwork that equaled or surpassed what existed in European fascist states.[57]

Pe´tain was clearly aware of this vast extension of state power, but he was primarily interested in restoring the power of the military, makingitintothe mainpillarof sovereignty. Thus, he appointed more officers to key cabinet posts than any other head of state since 1832. The state of siege that the republic

had inaugurated in 1939 was main tained in force during the life of Vichy. It allowed Pe´tain to give mili tary courts extensive jurisdiction. But Pe´tain pinned his greatest hopes—or so it appears from his grandiloquent speeches—on the Le´ gion franc¸aise des combattants, which he created at the end of August 1940 by forcing the merger of the existing veterans' organizations into one vast organization whose purpose was to unite the nation behind the Marshal and the National Revolution. Its simplistic slogans, such as ''Thinkand act French,'' ''With theLegion,for France,'' and ''Neither right nor left, straight ahead with the Marshal,'' appealed to the hun dreds of thousands who joined it. On one occasion, in February 1942, he praised them for working hard to establish ''the primacy of the spiritof sacrifice over thespirit ofpleasure,thefecundity ofthe family over the sterility of the foyer, and social evangelism over bourgeois egoism.'' Duty was the key to the life of the legionnaire. He was to obey at all times, in order to ''guarantee the unity of the nation.'' No ''partisan discussions'' were permitted among legionnaires; they had to provide their leader, the Marshal, with ''unconditional support,'' servingthe''publicgoodbyblindlyfollowingtheirleader'' andpromot ing his doctrines—that is, the doctrines of the National Revolution— among the French people.[58]

Infact,theLegionwas atotallyPe´tainistorganization.Allmembers had to take an oath to Pe´tain based on fealty they owed him for his actions in World War I. They also had to follow narrowly the ideologi calandpoliticalagendalaiddownbytheMarshal.Their finalobjective was to make all of the French into true believers in the National Revo lution. To achieve this all political parties, even fascist ones, had to be eliminated, for parties divided the nation and undermined the at tempts to unite the French behind their leader. Although parties were not eliminated, in late 1941 the Legion tried to unite the nation by reaching beyond the ranks of the veterans and accepting anyone who

chose to be a so-called Volunteer of the National Revolution, whether he had served in the military or not. This resulted in the Legion mush rooming to almost a million members, all of whom were sworn to spread the ideals of the National Revolution as interpreted by Marshal Pe´tain.[59]

AlthoughtheLegionwassupposedtosubstituteforanationalpolitical party, it fared poorly in its role as a conduit for public opinion. Nor was it well liked by the French; prefects warned Vichy that the legionnaires alienated local citizens by their actions. By 1943, the Le gion was in a state of decline; collaboration with the Germans was not popular with the rank and file, who concluded that Vichy had abandonedtheprinciplesoftheNationalRevolution.Duringtheyear,possibly 10 percent of the Legion joined the fascist Milice, while a larger percentage went over to the Resistance and a significant number quit theorganization.Inthesummerof1943theformerheadoftheLegion, Franc¸ois Valentin, even called on its members to join theResistance in ordertoachievethegoalsoftheNationalRevolution.TheLegion never accomplished what Pe´tain wanted: it failed to rally the public behind Vichy, it did not carry out the National Revolution, and it rejected Pe´tainist collaboration. Characteristic of the ‘‘spiritual’’ nature of the Vichy regime, the Legion was probably most successful in carrying out elaborate ritualistic ceremonies, similar in spirit to Robespierre’s revolutionaryfestivals.In 1941thisinvolvedthe carryingofthesacred flame from theTomb of the Unknown Soldierin Paris to Vichy, where theMarshalpresided overaceremonythatledeventuallytothespread of the flame to every corner of the south and the Empire. One year later the legionnaires carried sacred soil from every part of France to a giant cenotaph that commemorated twenty centuries of the existence of the peasant nation. And then, in 1943, the sacred flame ceremony was repeated only this time without the empire as its last destination: at Marseille and Toulon torches were

thrown into the sea in defiance of the Allied takeover of North Africa, revealing the limits of spiritual renewal and the Legion.[60]

Inevitably, it seems, the military state that Pe´tain believed was the answer to France's decline was based on nothing less than brute force. To supplement the Legion, Pe´tain acquiesced in the creation of the Service d'ordre le´gionnaire (SOL), an elite quasi-fascistic group of around 10,000 veterans set up in 1941 under the leadership of Joseph Darnand. Eventually, this evolved into the fascistic Milice in early 1943. At the founding ceremony for the Milice, on January 30, 1943, its head, Darnand, stated that its goal was ''to install in France a na tionalsocialistauthoritarianregime,permittingFrancetobeintegra into the Europe of tomorrow.'' Pierre Laval, the second in command to the Marshal, responded by saying, ''I approve without reservation Darnand's declaration.'' By law, the Milice was empowered ''to take an active role in the political, social, economic, intellectual, and moral rejuvenation of France.'' Pe ´tain accepted all of this, without reserva tion. Although he supposedly complained about the Milice in private, he said nothing negative about this group of thugs in public. In the final analysis, the Marshal agreed with the main principles of the Mil-ice: anti-Semitism, anticommunism, anti-Gaullism, and authoritarian government. In April 1943 he defended vigorously the role of the Mil-ice in ''the establishment of the new regime.'' He granted this new organization control over ''all avant-garde missions, notably those rela tive to the maintenance of order, to the protection of sensitive parts of the nation, to the struggle against communism.'' Alongside the Legion, the Milice was ''to win over the hearts of the people'' through its example.[61]

To the bitter end, Pe´tain hoped that the Legion would achieve the unity of France. But this meant including only those who were ''ani mated by the same patriotism'' as the legionnaires were, he told the remaining handful of faithful members in August 1944! By then the total failure of Pe´tain and Vichy to construct a working, effective form of government

should have been evident to everyone. But Pe´tain still believed tenaciously, against all the facts, in the ideal of the National Revolution, as the Nazis took him from France to Sigmaringen, Germany.[62]

3 Collaboration With the signing of the armistice agreement in June 1940, the French state accepted collaboration with the Nazi occupying power. Hence forth the new order was contingent upon a German victory in World War II. During the history of Vichy, no leader who reached the top disagreed with this position. Only Marshal Weygand, who came close to being named Pe´tain's right-handman, dissented from it. Theothers, Laval, Flandin, Darlan, and Pe´tain, accepted subservience to Germany as the price of losing the war. They only disagreed over the extent and degree to which France should collaborate.

On a different level, that of civil society, collaboration was a fact of life after June 1940, and not something that was necessarily ac cepted or embraced. The French had no choice but to live cheek by jowlwith the Germans. This was especiallytruein the OccupiedZone, which comprised two-thirds of France. In the southern Free Zone, occupation was not directly experienced before the German invasion of it in

November 1942. But throughout France the economic impact of collaboration was felt very early. By the fall of 1940 food supplies were low, and rationing had to be implemented. Although the south was slower to reject collaboration, by 1941 the French overwhelm ingly opposedthe German presence andhopedthatthe English would win the war. The disconnect between French citizens and their gov ernment increased over time as Vichy pursued greater collaboration with the Nazis. Although public opinion was well known to Pe´tain and other government officials, Vichy did very little to appease the growing anticollaborationist sentiment. Once again, authoritarian principles of governance trumped listening to the people.

In this chapter, we will investigate collaboration from two perspec tives. The first, and most important, is state collaboration, which be came the central driving force of Vichy policy. The second is non-state collaboration. In some cases it was ideological and in other cases opportunistic in motivation. Finally, there is accommodation with the occupying Germans, something that few could avoid if they wished to live a relatively normal life after the defeat.

State Collaboration

StatecollaborationbeganinJune1940withthesigningofthearmi stice. Yet, no one in the French government openly discussed the mat ter at first. When Pe´tain appealed to the legislature for full powers in July, he referred vaguely to the need to integrate France into ‘‘the continental system of production and exchange.’’ Toward the end of the month the new minister of the interior, the neo-socialist Adrian Marquet,proclaimed: ‘‘A newdealwill beborninEurope.Francemust participate in it.’’[1] But no one concluded that this meant collaborating with the Germans to the exclusion of the British.

Pe´tain approached collaboration from a purely pragmatic perspec tive: the Germans had won the war and France could

gain a privileged economic place in the new world order only if it collaborated. Pierre Laval agreed with Pe´tain, but he was far more zealous in pursuing close relations with Germany. During July and August 1940, Laval went to Paris on three occasions to negotiate an agreement with the Germans. Even though Laval expressed pro-German sentiments, con demned de Gaulle, and called for the defeat of Great Britain in front of Nazi diplomats and generals, telling German Ambassador Otto Abetz on one occasion that he wanted France to ‘‘make her modest contribu tion to the final overthrow of Britain,’’ he did not convince the Ger mans of the benefits of total collaboration. The Germans did not want French military aid, which was Laval’s main offer in return for a privi leged position in the Nazi pantheon of nations, and had already re ceived in the armistice everything they wanted from France. Still, Pe´tain continued to believe that Laval could work out a deal with the Nazis.HedidnotknowthatHitlerhadno intentionofgranting conces sions to France, which he wanted to destroy after the war had been won.[2]

As Philippe Burrin has pointed out, Vichy’s leaders did not under stand Nazism, which they thought was a militaristic reincarnation of traditional Pan-Germanism. The Nazis had only contempt for France, both on racial grounds and because of its apparent lack of military prowess. Otto Abetz, the Nazi front man in Paris, seemed to be a typi calFrancophileGermanwhoofferedthe‘‘hopeofpossible entente with the Reich.’’ In reality, he was a staunch nationalist who aimed at total and permanent occupation of France and its dismemberment through the encouragement of separatist sentiments in Brittany, Flanders, Bur gundy, and Lorraine.[3]

Vichy, however, needed collaboration to survive; without close ties with Germany, Vichy’s brand of authoritarianism would crumble be fore the appeals of the Gaullist Resistance. As early as August 1940, Pe´tain revealed his acute awareness of this. He responded to Gaullist attacks on his government by addressing the French nation on the

problemscreatedbydefeat.Hepromised,firstofall,tofeedthenation but not without rationing and a massive effort to revive agriculture, whichheclaimedhadbeendevastatedby the war andyearsof neglect. He also promised to repatriate French prisoners of war, presumably by working with the Germans, although he did not say how it would be done. But above all he blamed the Third Republic for the situation in which France found itself, implying that a return to democratic government, which de Gaulle supported, was not the answer to the nation's problems. Instead, Pe´tain made collaboration central to solv ing the national crisis by striking a deal with Germany that would integrate France into the continental system and provide economic benefits for the nation. On October 10, 1940, he spoke openly on radio about this taboo subject, claiming that France was open to ''collabora tion in all fields and with all her neighbors,'' but especially with the Germans.TheNationalRevolution,heimplied,couldnotsucceedwitl out collaboration with Germany.[4]

Pe´tain returned to the subject of collaboration at the end of the month, after he had met with Hitler at Montoire on October 24. The Montoire meeting had not been successful; Hitler offered no conces sions in return for collaboration. Nevertheless, Pe´tain and Laval came out forcefully, in public, behind a policy of state collaboration with Germany. The communique´ issued by Pe´tain's office stated that ''the twointerlocutors cametoagreement ontheprincipleofcollaboration,'' but mentioned no details on what collaboration entailed. Pe´tain, in an October 30 radio address, claimed that he accepted the principle of collaboration between France and Germany, adding: ''This policy is mine. The Ministers are responsible to me alone. History will judge me alone.'' At the same time, Laval claimed that the fate of France depended on the success of collaboration, which he believed would work to the benefit of everyone involved.[5]

Although some hoped that Petain might get concessions from the Germans or was playing a double game with them, these

statements shocked the French people, most of whom rejected state collaboration.

P. J.Philip, writingforthe New YorkTimes, commentedinlate October 1940thattheFrenchoverwhelminglysupportedtheBritishinthe war. Vichy had lost favor by its attacks on Great Britain, he observed, even though many supported Vichy's National Revolution. He concluded: ''The great majority of the French people are on the side of General de Gaulle and the British.'' Philip's conclusion was corroborated by numerous witnesses from occupied France, including a pro-Franco re porter for the Madrid paper, Arriba, who claimed that ''a Frenchman growls when he sees Pe´tain shaking hands with Hitler,'' adding: ''Al most the whole of French public opinion . . . is on tiptoes for the London radio, and repeats its statements and falsehoods.'' Virtually everyone who fled France for New York in the fall of 1940 reported something similar to the New York Times. Leon Feuchtwanger, who arrived in New York in late November, claimed that 99 percent of the French opposed Vichy. Clearly, this was an exaggeration, but Vichy officials inchargeofopeningthe mail,listening totelephone conversa tions,andthelikereachedconclusionsthatapproximatedFeuchtwar er's claim: the vast majority of the French rejected the Montoire meeting between Hitler and Pe´tain, despised collaboration with Ger many, and sympathized with the British, they stated, despite lingering concernsaboutBritain'sroleinthedefeatofFranceanditsdestructio of the French fleet at Mers-el-Ke´bir in July 1940 to prevent it from falling into German hands.[6]

Pe´tain was aware of these pro-British sentiments. After October 30 he rarely spoke in public about collaboration, and then only briefly or cryptically. The unpopular Montoire meeting was followed in Novem ber1940bytheNaziexpulsionoftensofthousandsofFrenchspeakers from Lorraine in an effort to make the region permanently German. The Nazis sent them to southern France where the local population soon expressed its resentment that Vichy had

been complicit in their expulsion. The Lorraine refugees were a visible, tangible example of what collaboration meant. But this did not undermine Pe´tain's popu larity. The French assumed that he was opposed to collaboration, de spite his public utterances. Letters poured in to Vichy, imploring Pe´tain to beware of collaborators, to get rid of Laval, to support the British, and the like. The hero of Verdun was not tarnished with the brush of collaboration, but Pierre Laval became fixed in the public eye as a devious Germanophile, someone who could not be trusted to lead the nation. Pe´tain's popularity soared by the end of the year, reaching itshighestpointinthewinterof1940–41,aftertheDecember13,1940, dismissal of Laval. Wherever he went during the fall of 1940, large, enthusiasticcrowdsgreetedhim,burstingoutsinging''LaMarseillai and treating the Marshal as though he were the savior of France. In Lyon, where he appeared shortly after the Lorrainers had been ex pelled from their homes, he won over the crowd by responding to one Lorrainer's ''hope for better days'' by stating, simply, ''We must ever hope forbetterdays.'' In late 1940,the French believedthat Pe´tainwas the man of destiny who would bring ''better days.''[7]

The dismissal of Laval, which Pe´tain announced with the reassur ing conclusion that ''I remain at the helm, the National Revolution continues,'' broughtgreathopes that ''better days'' werenear. Butwhat followed was a crisis of the policy of collaboration, as the Germans concluded that Laval's dismissal represented a repudiation of it. So did the French public. Rumors spread rapidly that Laval had intended to overthrow Pe´tain and declare war on Great Britain. Nothing could have been further from the truth. Laval had most likely been dis missed because he failed to translate the Montoire meeting into con crete results. Furthermore, Pe´tain had reiterated his support for collaboration on December 14 and appointed asuccessor to Laval who was sympathetic to Nazi Germany, Pierre-E´tienne Flandin. Flandin had written Hitler in the fall of 1938 to congratulate him on the suc cess of the Munich

agreement. In 1939 he had come out against war with Germany, and in 1940 he had favored Vichy's anti-Semitic and anti-Masonic legislation.But, forreasons that areobscure,Washington and London thought Flandin was closer to their point of view than Laval had been, while Germany expressed total opposition to the new man.[8]

If anything, the dismissal of Laval and the German reaction to it ledPe ´taintoreinforcehispowerandtostrengthenthebondsofcollaboration. In January 1941, he created the National Council, which was a rubber-stamp, quasi-legislative body totally under the Marshal's con trol, established for the purpose of providing the regime legitimacy until the much-awaited constitution was promulgated. Pe´tain ap pointed the membersof the council, which possessedonly powers that hedelegatedtoit.In addition,atthe endofJanuary theMarshalissued Constitutional Act No. 7, which granted him total power over all judi cial proceedings, including the Riom trial of former Third Republic officials—Le´on Blum, Georges Mandel, and others. Henceforth, Pe´ tain's sovereign authority included legislative, executive, and judicial matters.Inessence,he wasthestate.Atthe sametime,duringJanuary, Pe´tain sought to patch up relations with Laval and the Germans by offering to restore the former deputy premier to the cabinet. Although this did not happen, in February 1941 the Marshal chose Admiral Dar lan to head the government. Darlan was more anti-British than Laval hadbeen.Hehopedto usehisnewposition,combinedwithhiscontrol overthe French Navy,to make Franceinto a majorpowerinthe Nazi's new European order, which he believed was inevitable. Although he was not an anti-Semite, he embraced anti-Semitic and other exclusion ary policies, while reinforcing the technocratic, modernizing forces in Vichy. To him, collaboration was the only path to take, since a British victory in the war would strip France of its empire and navy, leaving the nation a ''second-class Dominion, a continental Ireland.''[9]

One of Darlan's first acts was to appoint Paul Marion as minister of information, in charge of Vichy's propaganda. Up

until this point, Vichy had no effective propaganda system, even though Laval had ordered, in November 1940, that the news media support the policy of collaboration.Marion wasanex-communistwhohadralliedwithgreat enthusiasmto the fascistright inthe1930s, joiningranks with Jacques Doriot in 1936. He was totally acceptable to the Nazis; Abetz found him to be very pro-German. He also appealedto the Parisian collabora tionists; Marcel De´at called him ‘‘very collaborationist and very anti-English’’ when the two met in late February 1941. Indeed, Marion was a true believer in both the National Revolution and collaboration, al though he thought that the latter could succeed only if France were totally transformed. A new spirit and a new man were needed to achieve this, but they could not be created unless a single party and total state control over information were established. To this end, Mar ion ruthlessly pursued opponents of the National Revolution and pro moted collaboration in news media, which he controlled through censorship, subsidies,and the allocationof papersupplies.In addition, he began to create a corps of propagandists at the departmental level and attempted to unite the nation’s youth movements under Vichy’s control.ButMarion ranintoextensiveoppositiontohispolicieswithin Vichy. The traditionalists wanted propaganda aimed at promoting the NationalRevolution asPe´tainhaddefined itandmostlyopposedcreat ing a single party or a united youth movement. This was especially true of the Church, which feared that Marion’s measureswould under mine its powers. Even the Germans became disillusioned with Marion sincehispropagandamachinedidnotpreventtheFrenchfrombecom ing more anti-German and pro-British in 1941. By the end of the year, Marion’s vast scheme to promote collaboration and the National Revo lution had failed. When Pierre Laval returned to power in 1942, he ousted Marion and abandoned the ambitious program of a single party, united youth movement, and strict press controls, pursuing in stead a Third Republic system of propaganda through notables such as the

clergy and local elites. Vichywould never develop fully the kind of totalitarian propaganda apparatus that Marion dreamed of and the Nazis deployed throughout the war.[10]

The Darlangovernment's primary focus, however, was onreaching an agreement with the Germans so as to fulfill Pe ´tain's instruction ''to bring into operation the collaboration.'' An opportunity emerged with a rise in German interest in the Mediterranean in the spring of 1941, following Rommel's February arrival in North Africa and an April Iraqi revolt against the British, upon which the Germans hoped to capitalize. To entice the Germans, Darlan acceded to their request for the use of Syrian airbases and other support in Syria in return for purely verbal promises of concessions on occupation costs and POW releases. The result was the Protocols of Paris agreed to in late May 1941, which formalized the agreement over Syria in part one and pro vided for future German use of French basesin Tunisia and Senegal in exchange forunspecifiedGerman concessions in partstwo andthree.[11]

Beyond part one, the Protocols were never implemented, most fun damentally because French demands for concessions far exceeded what Hitler was willing to grant, especially after German attention shifted from the Mediterranean to the war against the Soviet Union in June 1941.[12] Opposition to the Protocols by General Weygand led the French to demand extensive concessions from the Germans in early June, including not only an end to the payment of occupation costs, but also economic aid from Germany, at a time when the Germans were taking as much out of the French economy as they could. The Germans rejected this and a subsequent attempt in July to fundamen tally transform the Franco-German relationship established by the ar mistice. For German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop the latter effort amounted to ''a naı¨ve French blackmail attempt.'' Undeterred by Ger many's rebuff, Darlan attempted on several more occasions to reopen negotiations for a Franco-German agreement, only to be told that the Germans were too busy or that a final Franco-German treaty would have to wait until total victory had been achieved.

EvenPe´tain entered into the fray, although without success. On December 1, 1941, he told Goering that Germany could not rule Europe without France as a part ner: ‘‘You cannot make peace without France,’’ he said. ‘‘By refusing to make peace on thebasis of collaboration,you risk losing the peace.’’ In January 1942 Pe´tain and Darlan unexpectedly received word from Abetz that Hitler would offer a favorable peace treaty if France were to enter the war on Germany’s side. Pe´tain and Darlan were open to exploringthepossibilitybutnothing morecameofit asHitler—whose willingnesstomake adealhadbeen exaggeratedbyAbetz—turnedhis backon it. Inthemeantime, Syriahad beenlost tothe Gaullists during 1941, and Vichy had become more isolated. Darlan fell from power in April 1942 without achieving his mission of total collaboration.[13]

Although military collaboration with Germany never worked out, in the narrow sense of the term, economic collaboration increased under Darlan. Early results include the ceding of major copper inter ests to Germany in April 1941 and a joint Franco-German aluminum venture agreed to in May 1941. In January 1942, the German chief economic delegate to the Armistice Commission proclaimed that France contributed more to German armaments than any other Euro pean nation. ‘‘German orders in France are the dominant factor in the French economy,’’ he claimed. Every major French firm collaborated tosomeextenteconomically,althoughveryfewdid sooutofsympathy with the Nazi cause. Renault was the major exception; after the war, it wouldbe oneofthefewenterprisesnationalizedforcollaboratingwith the enemy. In a few cases, such as that of the Michelin tire factory, collaborationwascarriedoutunderduress,notwillingly.Inmostsitua tions, however, firms went along reluctantly with the Nazis: Wendel, Peugeot, Rhoˆne-Poulenc, and Pechiney fit roughly into this broad cate gory of reluctant collaborators. Yet the Nazis were never short of com panions for their Paris roundtable lunches at which French heads of banks, chemical companies, automobile firms, and other enterprises

discussedeconomiccollaborationwiththeirGermancounterpartsoı
every three weeks.[14]

Darlan played a significant role in developing economic collabora tion. He brought into office technocrats who tried to make the French economy more efficient and centralized.Either consciously or inadver tently, they also contributed to economic collaboration with Germany. Some of them, such as PierrePucheu at the interior ministry and Yves Bouthillier at finances, openly advocated integrating Vichy into the new order by modernizing the French economy. Their collaborationist plans stoked the rumor of a massive conspiracy —the so-called synar chy—to concentrate the economy in the hands of a small elite. By the summerof1941 the rumorhadbecomerampant,leadingPe´tainto call vainly for decentralization of power.[15]

More important than the so-called synarchy were the Comite ´s d'or ganisation, which were inaugurated in 1940 to consolidate firms into larger, more competitive units and bring together industrialists and state officials to nationally manage the economy. These newly created unitscooperatedclosely—oftentotheirdetriment—withtheirGerman counterpartsin aEuropeaneconomythattheNazisincreasingly cartel ized. Thus, to take one example, Vichy and the Germans consolidated the French dyestuffs industry into one organization, Francolor, which was brought under German control in November 1941, effectively squeezing the French out of this sector, but accomplishing the goals of efficiency, centralization, and modernization—not to mention eco nomic collaboration. Although the French technocrats did not neces sarily welcome this outcome, it was a common result of Franco-German cooperation. French banks were also consolidated into larger units, with enormous benefits for the Nazis, who obtained easy access to cheap credit. The same was true of the requisitioning of raw materi als,which cameincreasinglyunderthe directcontrolofthe statetothe detriment of farmers and consumers but to the benefit of the German occupiers. In fact, one can safely conclude that these attempts to plan the French

economy were more often than not nothing more than blatant collaboration with the enemy, whether French technocrats knew so or not. As Henry Rousso has noted: ‘‘The leitmotif of the majority of Vichy technocrats was, in effect, the need to consolidate businesses, to eliminate the least profitable, to achieve economies of scale.’’ But this was contradicted totally by the disadvantages of collab oration, which most of these highly educated leaders did not compre hend until the end of 1941. Until then they believed that they were increasing their market share in Germany by exporting military goods and raw materials. The fact that they received little in return was not taken into consideration until it was too late. Still, many sectors of the French economy benefited from collaboration. These included autos, airplanes, steel, cement—in fact, most industries associated with the German war effort. In addition, those in charge of the economy were convinced that after the warFrance would bein a privileged economic position in the new Europe as a result of extensive collaboration. To achievethatend,theyexpandedthestatedebtfourtimesinfouryears, providing the German war effort ample support.[16]

In the spring of 1942, Darlan fell from grace after numerous failed efforts to sign an agreement with the Germans. By then, he had be come disillusioned with the Nazi cause, convinced that the Germans would lose the war to the Americans. Alone among the Vichy elite, Darlan took a geopolitical view of the war, similar to de Gaulle’s, al though not as prescient as that great leader’s analysis. His successor, Pierre Laval, had no such qualms. Returned to power in April 1942 as head of government, Laval pursued collaboration with vengeance. He had convinced Pe´tain to reappoint him by arguing that the Marshal had lost popular support because of Darlan’s weak government. In the words of Admiral Leahy, the United States representative at Vichy, Laval promised Pe´tain that he would prepare the nation for ‘‘the inevi table German victory’’ by establishing ‘‘close collaboration with Ger manyonevery matter.’’ On April20,1942,he informedthenationthat it was

involved in a life or death struggle led by Germany against bolshevism: ‘‘No threat will prevent me from pursuing agreement and reconciliation with Germany,’’ he added. A week later Laval informed Admiral Leahy, in private, that ‘‘a German victory . . . is preferable to a British and Soviet victory.’’ On June 22, in an infamous radio broad cast, he told the entire nation virtually the same thing: ‘‘I desire the victory of Germany, for without it bolshevism would tomorrow install itself everywhere.’’[17]

The French universally condemned Laval’s statement; they did not want a German victory or closer collaboration. Still Laval persisted. The most notorious of his policies was the so-called rele`ve, which was implemented in the summer of 1942. For public consumption, the re le`ve was advertised as an agreement with Germany to repatriate French prisoners of war. For every Frenchman who went to work in Germany, Laval hoped, one French prisoner would be returned. He also argued that the arrangement would aid the Germans in defeating the archenemies of western civilization, the Bolsheviks, as French workers would relieve Germans from factory work in order to fight on the eastern front. But the reality turned out to be quite different: for every three skilled workers sent to Germany only one French POW wasliberated,andsince veryfewwhodepartedhappenedtobeskilled, fewprisonersreturnedhomeduring thewar—only90,000 by one esti mate. Furthermore, very few French workers were attracted by this opportunity, despite misleading propaganda about it. Laval promised 350,000 workers would depart in the summer of 1942, but no more than 40,000 had left by the end of July and only 240,000 by the end of the year. This led the Germans to threaten to requisition labor, which Laval preempted by having Vichy do it beginning in September 1942. Eventually, in February 1943, the rele`ve was replaced by the Service du travail obligatoire (STO) which amounted to a form of conscription of French workers thatallowed for very few exceptions. Asmost histo rians have argued, the STO led to the creation of the Resistance move ment known as the Maquis, as

thousands of young Frenchmen fled from the cities to the countryside in order to avoid going to work in Germany. In short, this aspect of collaboration fed the fires of the Resistance and failed to achieve the objectives that Laval and the Ger mans had established for it.[18]

Laval also pursued collaboration with the Germans on police mat ters, continuing the efforts of Darlan who had created Special Sections or Courts to try dissidents such as communists and members of the Resistance—terrorists in the eyes of Vichy and the Nazis—without due legal process. Laval appointed as chief of police Rene´ Bousquet, a civil servant intent on collaborating closely with the Germans. Bous quetinformedhisNazicounterpart,Oberg,thattheFrenchpolice were committed to act with Germany ‘‘against terrorism, anarchism and communism, the common enemies of our two countries.’’[19] He could haveaddedtheJews tothislist,sincetheFrenchpoliceunderBousquet carried out extensive roundups of Jews during the summer of 1942. In the midst of these roundups, which we will investigate in detail in the next chapter, Bousquet and Oberg agreed to cooperate fully on all po lice matters. To Bousquet and Vichy this agreement was important because it appeared to give the French sovereign control over their territory. Neither seemed to mind that it required doing the Nazi’s dirty work, thereby freeing German soldiers to fight the allied forces.[20]

Pe´tain and Laval remained enthusiastic about collaboration throughout 1942, despite the German invasion of southern France in November. They both applauded the Nazi defeat of the Allied landing attempt at the channel port of Dieppe during August and assured the GermansthatallofFrancesupportedtheirefforts.This wasclearlynot the case. Although Pe´tain remained popular, his government’s policies were not. Laval, in particular, lost support, as a German army report of October 24, 1942, revealed: ‘‘The enactment of the compulsory la bour law and the anti-Jewish campaign, which is incomprehensible to the French mind . . . seem to be the major causes of the fall in

Laval's prestige.''[21] Still, Laval persisted in collaborating, even after the Allied invasion of France's North Africa empire on November 8 and the Ger mantakeoverofhithertounoccupiedsouthernFrance afew days later. When General Weygand informed him that his policy was opposed by 95 percent of the French, Laval snorted back that the figure was closer to 98 percent. Although Pe´tain protested the German takeover of Vichy, he did so only to appease French public opinion. Both Pe´tain and Laval opposed the Allied invasion of North Africa, called upon Admiral Darlan—who was in North Africa at the time—to resist it, and rejected Darlan's cease-fire agreement with the Allies, ordering him not to take ''any action in any circumstances against the Axis forces.'' Ifanything,Lavalbecame morecollaborationist astheresultof the events of November, during which he increased his governmental power, gaining the right to promulgate decrees. On November 20 he gave acarefully drafted radio talk on why France continued to collabo rate, arguing that if the Americans won the war, ''We would have to submit to the domination of communists and Jews. We do not want universal bolshevism to come in the wake of its Anglo-Saxon accom plices and extinguish the light of French civilization for ever.''[22]

Instead,LavalandPe ´tainchoseGermandominance.TheNovember German invasion of the Free Zone meant the end of whatever sover eignty Vichy possessed. Hitler, who mistrusted the French, immedi ately dissolved the minuscule armistice army, leaving Vichy with no effective armed force. The French military elite, which universally de spised the Germans, turned sour on collaboration and became disillu sioned withPe´tain and Vichy, although veryfew joinedthe Resistance as a result. Laval, however, believed that Germany would allow France to restore its military, but his appeals to Hitler on the matter went nowhere. Pe´tain, forever the stoic martyr, argued that adversity was the key to greatness, warning the nation that ''communist barbarism, if it triumphed, would destroy forever

our civilization and national independence.'' In short, the onlychoice wascollaboration—no matter what the cost—as far as these two men were concerned.[23]

The public face of collaboration changed after 1942. Pictures of workers marching off to Germany or of POWs coming home to he roes' welcomes disappeared from the newsreels, replaced by shots of the FrenchAnti-BolshevikLegion (theLVF)whose volunteer members fought against the Soviet Union on the eastern front beginning in 1941. Anticommunism was used in propaganda to justify collabora tion. By the summer of 1943, anticommunist meetings, anniversary celebrations of the German invasion of Russia, and commemorations of the founding of the LVF monopolized the news. In one clip of an anticommunist meeting, held in the Salle Wagram in Paris, Monsei gneur Mayol de Lupe´ appeared in a Nazi uniform to speak in favor of the LVF, warning the faithful against the dangers of ''the Anglo-Judeo Masonic'' ideology! In another, the news included images of a mass for the members of the LVF. By the end of the year, crazed fascists dominated the collaborationist message in the news. Images of a De cember anticommunist rally at the Ve´lodrome d'Hiver included the head of the fascist Milice, Joseph Darnand, who proclaimed: ''As for us, we prefer to die rather than to submit to the victory of Israel.'' This was the type of collaboration that Laval and Pe ´tain increasingly accepted and engaged in.[24]

At the end of October 1943, Pe´tain attempted to break out of the straitjacketthat he had created for himself.He confronted Laval on his unpopularity and the sorry state of the nation, asking him to resign. But the Marshal's scheme to get rid of Laval and one-up de Gaulle by recalling the Third Republic's legislature came to a dead end when the Germans delivered an ultimatum to him at the end of November. It required Pe´tain to submit all new laws to the Germans for approval, allow Laval to control the cabinet's composition, purge anti-Germans in the French administration, and appoint only collaborationists to governmentposts.Ineffect,theold manwas nowrequired,once

more, to write his obituary if he accepted the Germanconditions. After some hesitation, he capitulated. Within a month, the Vichy government was under the control of the Parisian thugs who were ‘‘more Catholic than the Pope’’ in their adoration of Nazism. Authoritarian Vichy gave way to the fascists, men such as Darnand, De´at, and Henriot. Although Laval opposed them, mainly because they undermined his power, he could not stop them from taking over as the Nazis insisted that they beincluded inthe government.Collaboration wasnow more than ever a one-way street; any hint of power sharing between Vichy and Ger many had totally disappeared.[25]

As Miche`le Cointet has argued, in 1944 Vichy became ‘‘l’E´tat mili cien.’’ DarnandandtheMilicetookover,undertheauspicesoftheNazi SS, which Darnand had sworn to support in August 1943. He had created the Milice, with the blessing of both Pe´tain and Laval, out of themembersoftheextremistServiced’ordrele´gionnaire(SOL),which he had helped found in January 1942 to provide paramilitary support to the National Revolution. Darnand neatly summed up the purposes of the SOL, which became those of the Milice, in a speech in Nice in February1942:‘‘AgainstGaullistdissidence,forFrenchunity,/Again Bolshevism, for nationalism,/Against the leprosy of the Jews, for French purity,/Against pagan Freemasons, for Christian civili zation. . . .’’[26] The Milice was Vichy’s effort to take on the growing Resistance and thereby satisfy the Germans. With it, the thugs came to power With Nazi backing, Darnand and the Milice—some 15,000 strong—created a police state, establishing a system of courts martial in January 1944 to circumvent the normal channels of justice. The miliciens sat as judges onthesecourts, guaranteeingthat justice would be quick—from trial to execution in twenty-four hours, with no right to appeal. Laval defended these tribunals, claiming that state lawyers had given him sound advice about their legality. Laval and Darnand both believed that the Bolshevik threat justified total collaboration with Germany in order to defend Western

civilization. The Milice's tactics were brutal, but they were necessary in the eyes of the collabo rators. The Milice drew up a list of suspects, mostly Gaullists and com munists, and pursued them through endless identity checks in the streets and occasional random roundups. It hunted down Jews and encouraged the French to inform on suspicious neighbors. These ac tions were legal under the new law of December 1943. Because there was no check on the Milice's actions, it ran wild, torturing, pillaging, stealing money, and pilfering food supplies from civilians in the name of ''law and order'' and the defense of Western values.[27]

Until August 1944, Marshal Pe´tain accepted this new form of col laboration without protest and with some enthusiasm. He repeatedly warned the nation that the Liberation of France was a sham, being carried out by terrorists who called themselves patriots. Their victory, heargued onApril28,1944,wouldleadtothetriumphofcommunism and the destruction of French civilization. Not until the Allies ap proached Paris in August 1944 did Pe´tain turn on his collaborationist supporters byattackingtheMilice forbeing anextremist organization, but even then he tempered his remarks by praising its record in com bating terrorism. Indeed, Pe´tain had said nothing when the Milice tor tured and massacred members of the Resistance in the spring. Laval hadevenpraiseditsactions,althoughhewas disturbedwhenmiliciens executed his Jewish political colleague Georges Mandel, who had been Clemenceau's right-hand man during World War I.[28]

From August 1944, the doomed fate of Pe´tain, Laval, andcollabora tion was realized. The Germans presented the Marshal and the Vichy government with an ultimatum on August 19: either go to Germany willingly or be forced to do so. Pe´tain responded with a protest to Hitler, but this accomplished nothing. Against his will, Pe´tain was es corted to Germany, where his government remained until the war's conclusion in 1945. Collaboration now assumed totally fascist

stripes, as the Parisian fascist leaders—Darnand, Doriot, De´at, and Brinon— took over. Although the fiction was maintained that Pe´tain exercised control over this rump government and remained ‘‘in sole possession of French legitimacy,’’ continuing the policy of collaboration with the Germans, by late 1944 the Marshal was focused on preparing for his postwar trial in the hope of clearing his name. Meanwhile, the motley fascist crew assembled in Germany planned to invade France to liber ate it from Gaullists and communists, using the Milice, the remains of theLVFandotherparamilitaryforces, aswellastheFrenchPOWsand workers in Germany. They soon discovered that the POWs and work ers had no desire to engage in civil war and collaboration. The fascists could count on only a few thousand loyal anticommunist and anti-Gaullist troops to achieve their goals. With the defeat of Germany in May 1945—but not until then—the collaborationist cause ended.[29]

Non-State Collaboration

When the war ended in 1945 the myth began that everyone in France, with the exception of a handful of traitors, resisted the Ger mans. Today we know from numerous historical monographs that this was not the case. French exceptionalism turned out to be a Resistance myth. Some people collaborated; some resisted; and most ended up betweenthetwoextremes.PhilippeBurrin’s FranceundertheGermans has provided us with a detailed statistical profile on who collaborated. AccordingtoBurrin, thetypicalmemberof acollaborationistorganiza tion in the early years of Vichy was male (85 percent), urban, and middle and upper middle class (71.4 percent versus only 27.5 percent workers and peasants, who comprised 63 percent of the workforce). Overtime, however,membershipshiftedto thelowermiddleclassand the working class, away from the elite. In the process, political ties changed too: in 1941, one-third of collaborationists had previously been involvedin politics,primarily onthefar Right (two-thirds, versus 22 percent

on the Left and 8 percent on the moderate Right), but by 1944only7percenthadpreviouspoliticalinvolvement.Thefirst mem bersof collaborationist organizationsrallied to the causeout of convic tion—four-fifths in 1941—but among those who joined in 1944 only 41percent weretruebelievers.Bythenthevastmajorityof newcollab orators were pragmatists: they cited self-interest or pressure from superiors or family members as the reason they adhered to collabora tionist groups. Furthermore, a large minority of them deserted the cause after a few months. Collaboration was not something they be lievedinstrongly.Inall,some250,000joinedcollaborationistorganiz tions, including the Milice, and probably about two million ‘‘leaned towards collaboration,’’ or around 5 percent of the population. Of these, about 20,000 fought for the Germans during the war, half for economicreasons, half for ideological ones. Inshort, collaboration was a minority phenomenon, just as membership in a Resistance organiza tion was.[30]

On one level, however, the argument can be made that all French collaborated with the Germans in some form or another. In order to get by, to obtain necessary documents and food, some contact or ac commodation with the Germans was necessary. In addition, tens of thousands of French worked for the Germans, in armament industries or for the Todt organization in charge of building the Atlantic Wall. Their livelihoods were interconnected with the German war effort. Any peasant who produced for the market was also implicated in col laboration, since German requisitioning of French agricultural prod ucts helped the Nazi war effort. In fact, there was almost nothing one could do to avoid collaboration, if we accept this line of argument. Collaboration was part of daily life for all French, from longshoremen to cabaret performers.[31]

But some forms of collaboration deserve more attention than the everyday ones that no one could avoid. For example, on an intimate level, sexual relations between Germans and the French were, for the most part, freely chosen. As many as

70,000 children were born as the result of liaisons between German men and French women during the war. Although some of these liaisons were purely mercenary, in the form of prostitution, most werenot: at theend of the war upto 20,000 of these collaborators would be punished for their acts. Far more com mon, however, were the everyday letters of denunciation that French men and women sent to the authorities or collaborationist publica tions. These numbered in the millions; in Paris alone the Germans received three million letters that informed on the activities of French citizens and foreigners. Jews were the focus of many of these letters. One letter from a World War I doctors' association with 1,500 mem berscomplainedaboutthelargenumber offoreignJews whopracticed medicine in France despite laws prohibiting this. Some members of the Milice wrote scores, even hundreds, of letters denouncing their fellow citizens, relaying to the Germans bits and pieces of conversa tions they had heard in cafes and on the streets.[32]

For the most part, however, collaboration has to be seen in terms of institutions and structures. Individuals definitely collaborated, but they usually did so within the confines of some broader entity, which helpeddeterminetheirdegreeofcollaboration.Forexample,collabo tion can be viewed in terms of regions. Certain regions seemed to be more susceptible to the appeal of collaboration than others. The west of France, along the Loire valley, is a case in point. The Vende´e had a longhistory of opposition toParis andto the Left. Notablesdominated the politics of the area, and they tended to opt for the Right, if not the far right, promoting the Church and traditional, hierarchical social values. The appeal of Pe´tain and the National Revolution was strong here. This seemingly made the west ripe for collaboration, especially outside of urban centers such as Nantes, but many small towns and rural areas opposed the Germans once food requisitioning began. Col laboration soon ran into strong local grassroots opposition that politi cal leaders in the area could not ignore. On the other hand, the nearby area of Brittany had an entirely different reaction to collaboration, de spite a similar historical experience. Autonomist and separatist move ments were strong in Brittany, although separatists were only a small minority.Inthe caseofthelatter,theGermansseemedtosupporttheir goal of an independent Brittany. Nothing came of this, however, nor did autonomists obtain anything of note from either the Germans or Vichy. In fact, Vichy proved to be as intent on centralizing power as the Jacobin Republic had been. Soon disillusioned with the new order, the Breton autonomists joined the pro-British and Gaullist forces that had emerged in maritime Brittany shortly after the defeat of 1940 and hadprovidedprobably athirdoftheGaullistmilitaryin theearlyyears oftheResistance.By1941,if wecan believepolicereports,the Bretons were solidly in the camp of the Gaullist Resistance. Only a handful of pro-Nazi separatists and peasants attracted to the corporate state remained loyal to Vichy and collaboration.[33]

A similar anti-German and anti-Vichy mentality existed in the far north of France, where memories of German atrocities during World War I were strong and pro-British sentiment deeply entrenched from yearsofcross-channelrelations.InboththePas-de-CalaisandtheNord, departments that the Germans detached from France and governed from Brussels, collaboration attracted only a small minority, although the Flemish independence movement initially provided some support for it. As in Brittany, however, the Germans did not support the sepa ratists, and their enthusiasm for collaboration faded. In contrast, Al sace proved to be more receptive to the Nazis, even though Nazi policies stripped the Alsatian Church of its rights, imposed heavy pen altiesfor speakingFrench,andconscripted German-speakingAlsatians intotheGermanarmy.Althoughmostofthe160,000conscripts served reluctantly, a significant minority served willingly, with patriotic zeal for the German cause; 2,100 volunteered for the German Army and Waffen-SS before conscription was introduced. They and some of the conscriptsfoughttenaciouslyon theEasternfront.Some,notablyAlsa tian SS troops party to the infamous Oradour massacre in June 1944, even participated in operations against French citizens. After the war, thirteen of theAlsatian SSat Oradour werefound guiltyof warcrimes and one—who, unlike the others, had volunteered for the SS—of treason.[34]

In the south of France, the so-called Free Zone, pro-Vichy and pro-Pe´tain sentiments were stronger than in the north. Yet this did not impactthedegreeofcollaborationistsentiments.Ifanything,thesou was more opposed to collaboration than the north. In the Gard, whose capital was Nıˆmes, collaborationist movements had no more than a few hundred members; a strong Protestant tradition mitigated against it and reinforced resistance. The same seems to be true of the Dor dogne, where anti-Vichy

sentiments emerged early and collaboration had little support. We can even add to this list the city of Clermont Ferrand,whosecollaborationistcredentials wereseeminglyestablished in the classic French documentary, The Sorrow and the Pity. Yet, John Sweets's monograph on the city persuasively concludes that collabora tionist movements were extremely weak there. Sweets warns us: ''If one were forced to choose a myth, the Gaullist myth of a 'nation of resisters' would be far more accurate than the new myth of a 'nation of collaborators.'''[35]

Other parts of the south were not as free from collaboration. Lyon, the undisputed center of the Resistance, should be placed in a special category, but Marseille and the area around Nice in the Alpes-Mari times look like centers of collaboration. In Marseille, the popularity of the Corsican politician, Simon Sabiani, played a significant role in legitimizing collaborationist organizations. As local head of Jacques Doriot's fascist Parti populaire franc¸ais (PPF), Sabiani used his talents as a city boss to herd supporters into pro-German groups such as the MiliceandtheTodtorganization.ButmostofthosewhofollowedSabi ani were desperate for jobs; they collaborated out of need, not ideol ogy. And, despite Sabiani's appeal as a quasi-fascist political leader—a sort of Marseille Mussolini—the number of collaborators remained very small, if we use Burrin's method of determining who they were. Only 1 to 2 percent of the city's population of 700,000 participated in a collaborationist organization. For Nice, on the other hand, we have lessspecificinformation,but it wasthehomeofthehead oftheMilice, Joseph Darnand, who began organizing his collaborationist movement in the fertile soil of the Alpes-Maritime during the early years of the war. Paul Marion and Jacques Doriot, two notorious collaborationists, were very popular in the region, drawing large crowds when they spoke. But, in May 1941 the postal censors who read people's mail reported that in the Alpes-Maritimes the majority opposed collabora tion with the Germans and Anglophile sentiments

were solid, includ ing the hope for an English victory.[36]

Ifthe evidence for collaboration isgenerallyweak inthe provinces, in Paris it is strong. Every important collaborationist in the nation ended up eventually in Paris, where the Germans established a re ceptive environment for them. Simone de Beauvoir heard constant praise of their kindness and general acceptance of their presence in thesummer of1940.TheGermanswereon theirbestbehaviorinParis, trying to win over the French. At first this meant plenty of food, but by the winter of 1940–41 scarcity became common, changing the meaning of collaboration for many. Occupation inevitably meant con trolbytheoccupyingpower,withtheFrenchgrantedpowerandacces to resources only if they contributed something of value to the Ger mans.TheParisianmunicipalgovernmentmeton onlyafewoccasions under the Germans, who preferred that the prefect of the Seine and the prefect of police exercise power in place of elected officials. The Germans also controlled what Parisians read. The ‘‘liste Otto’’ prohib ited the publication or sale of works by prominent Jews, leftists and anti-Nazis. Newspapers were censored; only collaborationist papers couldbepublished.RadioParisandthecinema werebothstrictlyregu lated. The radio became a tool for German propaganda that virtually no one believed. American and British films were banished from the screentothedismayof everyone;Germanfilms,such astherabidanti-Semitic The Jew Su¨ss, were promoted along with French collaboration ist ones. The Nazis pillaged works of art—at least 20,000 were confis cated—and took over control of Jewish property.[37]

Yet, Parisians participated in Nazi activities and even collaborated with their German occupiers. Although the 1941 anti-Semitic exhibit, The Jew and France, was seen by only 200,000, many of whom were Germans, Nazi-censored films had larger audiences than the prewar cinema: gross receipts doubled between 1938 and 1942, as Parisians went to the cinema for countless reasons, many of which had nothing to do with collaboration, including keeping warm in a city without

heating fuel. The theater flourished, even though Jews were excluded from it and censorship restricted what could be played. Prominent French playwrights such as Montherlant, Anouilh, Cocteau, and Gi raudoux presented their works before audiences that were often one-third or more German. Artists, such as Derain, Van Dongen, and Du noyer de Segonzac, participated willingly in Nazi-sponsored artistic events, including a trip to Berlin organized by Goebbels. And some Parisians eagerly helped the Nazis confiscate Jewish property through the so-called Aryanization policy.[38]

On a day-to-day level, Parisians collaborated just as provincials did wherever they faced a continuing German presence. Workers in the large Parisian suburban factories engaged in automobile or airplane production, had to work for the Germans or suffer the consequences ofunemployment,includingpossibleconscriptiontoworkinGerman under slavelike conditions. Small shopkeepers, such as bakers, arti sans, and cafe´ owners, faced a similar situation: they either had to serve Germans or endure the cost. The haute coutureindustry is a case in point that may allow us to understand the dilemmas that Parisians faced in confronting the Germans. In 1940, the Nazis took control of the French textile industry, and notably the production of wool, needed to clothe their troops. In the process, they also attempted to take over the haute couture industry, transferring it from Paris to Ber lin. Nothing came of this, primarily because the industry's leaders con vincedthe Germans to keep itin Paris wherethe industry's specialized workers were concentrated. The industry survived the war relatively intact, although in seeking to please the Nazis it eventually partici pated in their anti-Semitic culture: many haute couture houses shunned former Jewish customers and placed notices in newspapers to inform people that their business was not run by Jews. As much as possible, however, these houses tried to keep their Jewish artisans employed. They even successfully obtained the release of

Jewish furri ers from the Drancy camp in March 1943.[39]

The most vocal collaboration in Paris did not come from workers or industrialists, however, but rather from intellectuals who had been debating fascism for twenty years or more prior tothe German victory of June 1940. This was the so-called war of the writers, as Gise`le Sha piro has called it. It pitted two generations against one another: those over fifty were overwhelmingly on the side of collaboration, while those under fifty generally joined the Resistance camp. The collabora tors tended to come from the old notables who had lost out under the Third Republic. They also tended to be less well educated than the resisters. And they rallied around a traditional notion of France as the defenderofthevaluesofclassicalcivilizationandtheChurch.By1940 however, many who became collaborators had accepted Nazi pagan values over classicism. Henry de Montherlant, in his 1940 work enti tled The June Solstice, viewed the Nazi victory as inevitable, part of the alternation of the seasons, a pagan triumph of the sun over bourgeois, Christian morality. His views were supported and expanded on by the racist, pro-Hitler intellectuals of the time, led by such brilliant anti-Semitic writers as Drieu la Rochelle and Ce´line. During the war these writers dominated the Parisian press and intellectual scene. Extreme right newspapers such as Je suis partout flourished, printing anti-Se mitic articles by such talented writers as Robert Brasillach. In a Sep tember 1942 contribution to the paper, Brasillach wrote, ‘‘We must separate from the Jews en bloc and not keep any little ones.’’ Later, in November 1944, after he had learned about the horrors of the Holo caust, he proclaimed, ‘‘I am an anti-Semite, history has taught me the horrors of the Jewish dictatorship.’’ But, to his Parisian intellectual op ponents, Brasillach’s worst crimes were to call for the deaths of his enemies, from members of the Resistance to Gaullists. After the war he would be tried, convicted, and executed for these extremist pronouncements.[40]

Brasillach was an extreme example of this type of intellectual col laboration. More common were writers such as Jean

Cocteau and Jean Giono, who expressed some sympathy for Nazism and Hitler but had reservations about the German cause that increased as the war pro gressed.Ontheotherhand,DrieulaRochelleprovides uswiththe case of an intellectual who embraced collaboration completely but re mained close to many members of the intellectual Resistance. In 1940 Drieu and Otto Abetz approached the publisher Gaston Gallimard about reviving the noted avant-garde journal of French literature, the Nouvelle Revue franc¸aise (NRF). During the interwar period Drieu had shunned the NRF because it was, in his opinion, the hotbed of Jews, communists, surrealists, and other leftists. Now he became editor of it and reached out to try to include in the journal such notable writers as Andre´ Gide, Andre´ Malraux, and Jean Paulhan (its prewar editor). While Gide contributed to the first issues but then turned against Drieu, Malraux refused to publish in NRF or anywhere else during the occupation. Paulhan would not write for the NRF, but he gave his ap proval to Drieu's revival of the journal and encouraged others to write for it. Both Gallimard and Paulhan benefited directly from their associ ation with Drieu.Gallimard was able to continuehis publishing house, publishing his authors even though many were antifascist, while Paul han maintained a literary Resistance from his office in the same build ingwhere Drieupublishedthe NRF.Drieu evenhelpedPaulhan getout of jail when he was arrested for Resistance activities. These ties—and many others—with Resistance leaders of the French ''republic of let ters'' did not prevent Drieu from expressing rabid pro-Nazi views, but they reveal a blurred line between collaboration and Resistance that existed in many such relationships during the course of the war.[41]

Gaston Gallimard did not exactly collaborate, although he facili tated the publication of the NRF under fascist editorial direction. Oth ers in the publishing world were not as subtle or discreet. Bernard Grasset, the publisher of Proust and Malraux, created a series entitled ''In Search of France,'' to which such

noted fascists as Jacques Doriot and Drieu la Rochelle contributed books. Robert Denoe¨l received Ger man subsidies and published books such as How to Recognize a Jew. But he also published books by communists such as Elsa Triolet and Louis Aragon. Although Denoe¨l and Grasset went further than most, it seems that virtually no prominent Parisian publisher escaped the Nazi effort to control publishing. All agreed to print some piece of Nazi drivel.[42]

The line between intellectual collaboration and Resistance was neveras clear-cut as the postwar mythof ‘‘The Resistance’’ would have us believe. Simone de Beauvoir, for example, flirted with collaboration by doing a cultural program on Vichy radio, although she studiously avoided Radio Paris, which the Nazis controlled. More importantly, in order to keep her job as a teacher, she signed an oath that she was neither a Jew nor a Freemason. Jean-Paul Sartre criticized her for this, but his actions were no better: he accepted a post at the Lyce´e Condor cet in the fall of 1941, even though the post had come open due to the dismissal of a Jewish professor. And both Sartre and Camus engaged in minor forms of collaboration by publishing in collaborationist jour nals and having their plays and books performed and published with the approval of the German occupiers.[43] Clearly, collaboration in some form or another was hard to avoid, even by the ‘‘just.’’ More to the point, however, are the outright forms of collaboration that intellectu als such as Charles Maurras engaged in during the war. Although Maurras began as an opponent of Nazi Germany, he soon changed his mind.In ‘‘thewarofthewriters,’’Maurrasconcludedthatcollaboration was the only path to take in order to eliminate the decadent, individu alistic, amoral attitudes of the literary crowd assembled around the interwar NRF. He defended Pe´tain’s Montoire meeting with Hitler in 1940, arguing that the French had to rally behind the Marshal on col laboration. After 1942, when Vichy had become a satellite of Nazi Ger many, he decided that only a German victory over communism could prevent‘‘there-

emergenceofMasons,Jews,andallthepoliticalperson nel eliminated in 1940.'' As for the Resistance: ''if the death penalty is not sufficient to put a stop to the Gaullists, members of their families should be seized as hostages and executed.'' Like Drieu and Brasillach, Maurras became increasingly extremist, anticommunist, and anti-Se mitic,as the war wenton,sidingcompletely with the Nazi cause as the only solution to French decadence.[44]

In his trial after the war Maurras would make what many thought was a perceptive observation when he said, ''It is the revenge of Drey fus!'' The image of the supporters of the persecuted Jewish Captain Dreyfus rising up and slaying anti-Semites like Maurras seemed to capture the spirit of the Liberation. Yet, nothing could be further from the truth. The Dreyfusards who were still alive in 1940 were more likely to be collaborators and anti-Semites than members of the Resis tance. Many Dreyfusards who had become pacifists in the interwar period blamed the Jews for starting World War II: they believed that belligerent Jews, concerned narrowly about the fate of their compatri ots, had forced France to confront Hitler in 1939. These Dreyfusard pacifistfollowersofAristideBriand,thegreatFrenchadvocateofEur pean union and reconciliation with Germany, became leading advo cates of collaboration with belligerent Nazi Germany during the occupation. As Sartre pointed out in his essay on collaborators, the pacifists thought an alliance with the German warrior state could achieve the goal of a Europe united in peace.[45]

While intellectuals might differ and argue over collaboration, pur suingsomewhatambiguouspathsin somecases,theleadersofcollabo rationist political parties were clear in their political commitments. Mostleft Vichy in the summer of 1940, disgustedby the government's failure to implement the National Revolution, as they understood it, and its unwillingness to declare war on Britain and create a fascist state. In Paris, with the support of the Nazis, they hoped to

establish a true fascist form of collaboration by creating a single party, a united youth movement, and other trappings of the totalitarian state. The extreme fractionalization of the collaborationist cause and the petty personal squabbles that divided Parisian party leaders—each one con vinced that he alone could unite the faithful—undermined their ef forts. Their failure was an outcome that the Nazis more or less preferred because they did not want a powerful French fascist party capable of challenging their control.

In 1940, at least a dozen collaborationist parties existed in Paris, eachone enjoyingsomeGermanfinancial support.Mostof them,how ever, were small, insignificant, extremist groups with only a few hun dred members. The most important of them, in terms of membership, was Jacques Doriot's PPF, which at its peak had approximately 50,000 followers. Founded in 1936, in reaction to the Popular Front, the PPF was primarily an anticommunist party that attracted workers and the lower middle class to its ranks. Doriot was a man of the people who collaborated with Germany in order to build a new Europe free from Bolshevism and the influence of Jews and Freemasons. He despised PierreLaval,whomhethoughtof asafailedleaderoftheThirdRepub lic fainthearted in his support of Germany and the National Revolu tion. Nevertheless, when Laval returned to power in 1942, Doriot expected to be appointed to his government, as a check on Laval's supposedly moderate policies, but the Nazis were more interested in cooperating with Laval and Pe´tain to win the war and consequently backed Laval completely at Doriot's expense. Earlier, in 1941, Doriot had taken the lead among the Parisian collaborationists by volunteer ing for combat on the eastern front, an act of ideological commitment unmatched by any other political leader during the war. This cost him dearly in terms of the Parisian political game: he lost control of the PPF while he was out of the country and incurred the suspicion of the Nazis who feared that he was trying to build a paramilitary base. De spite Doriot's many attempts to unite with other

collaborationist lead ers, he failed to do so except for a brief period of time when he was in exile in Germany at the end of the war. His mysterious death—when his carwas strafedby an airplane of unknownnationality—in January 1945, shortly after being chosen to lead the powerless Vichy govern ment-in-exile, brought an end to that.[46]

As the war went on, Doriot's PPF lost membership, declining to no more than 20,000 in late 1942. The urban centers of Paris, Marseille, and Nice were its strongholds, but they faded in importance after Do riotstronglysupportedthe rele`veandtheSTO,whichtheFrenchwork ing class vigorously opposed. Clearly, Doriot's form of collaboration was not embraced by the French: the notion of sacrificing indefinitely, ad infinitum, for the German cause turned off even his most ardent supporters. Still, the anticommunism of ex-communists remained a potent force among the rank and file members of the PPF: in Novem ber 1942, almost one-fourth of the party's delegates to the national congress were former communists. But not even this base could save the party from further decline in 1943 and oblivion in the last year of the war.[47]

Doriot's most serious rival in Parisian collaborationist politics was another veteran of the interwar period, Marcel De´at. Both men were refugees from the Left: Doriot had been expelled from the Communist Party in the thirties, while De´at had been thrown out of the Socialist Party (SFIO). After his expulsion from the SFIO, De´at had created the Union socialiste re´publicaine in 1935. Influencedby the Belgian social ist De Man, it rejected class struggle in favor of a national revolution in which all social classes would participate and in which state plan ning would play a major role. Like Doriot, De´at opposed communism and parliamentary democracy, favoring a corporatist state and one party rule. He was extremely critical of Vichy for failing to carry out the National Revolution and for not collaborating closely enough with Germany. But he differed with Doriot regarding Laval: when Pe´tain dismissed Laval in December 1940, De´at rallied to his defense. This paid off in

February 1941 when Laval supported De´at's creation of the Rassemblement national populaire (RNP), a national socialist party, which intended to unite all fascists. It brought together everyone from extreme rightist thugs in the Cagoule to veterans, trade unionists, and pacifists, but it never accomplished its aim of representing all Parisian and French supporters of collaboration and National Socialism. The RNP failed to gain Doriot's support, increasingly supported extremist Nazi views on race that were unpopular in France, and developed a cultofDe´at asleaderthatalienatedmany ontheRight,especiallythose who thought that they should be the leader. Soon the groups that it had united either broke away or were expelled by the ambitious De´at, and the dream of a single party suffered another serious defeat.[48]

The RNP may have reached a total of 30,000 members at its peak, but that peak occurred early and included many who joined only for opportunistic reasons, to help repatriate POW relatives for example, rather than out of conviction. The failure of De´at to get along with his main partner, the anti-Semitic thug Deloncle, meant an early decline ofthe party. In September 1941 De´at, believing that Deloncle had plot ted to assassinate him, expelled him and his followers from its ranks. When Laval returned to power in 1942, De´at expected to be appointed toofficeinthe newgovernment.Instead,Laval,whobelievedthatDe´at was tooambitiousandextremist, deliberately shunnedhim.Only after De´at had lost virtually all of his followers as the result of his support for the highly unpopular rele`ve andSTO did he rise to powerin Vichy, due to his loyalty to the Nazis who imposed him on a reluctant Pe´tain and Laval in 1944. As minister of labor and national solidarity, De´at was called upon by the Nazis to provide more French workers for German industry. He also intrigued unsuccessfully in June and July to get Vichy to declare war on the Allies. Like Doriot and the other collaborationist Parisian leaders, De´at would end up in Germany in late 1944, squabbling over who should lead the Vichy government-in exile.

BeyondDoriotandDe´at,theultracollaborationistsinParishad very little power and influence. Deloncle was probably the most significant of the lot. He had become an extremist hit man after the February 6, 1934, riots, obtaining funds from fascist Italy to eliminate exiled ene mies of Mussolini. After the defeat of France he organized the Mouve ment social re´volutionnaire, which was nothing more than an anti-Semitic, antiresistance vigilante group. With support from the Ger mans it killed Jews and blew up a synagogue. In May 1942, however, Deloncle's subordinate, Georges Soule`s, who had Laval's backing, overthrew him. Soule`s did not deviate significantly from Deloncle's position. Although he scrapped vigilante tactics, he dedicated the movement to extreme forms of collaboration, including the elimina tion of the Jews from Europe. His followers were few, but they were trueNationalSocialists. In contrast,Bucard, thehead ofthe Francistes, was the Parisian leader closest to Vichy and its dream of becoming a leading state in a German-dominated Europe. His movement was fas cist to the core and backed by Vichy. Completing the list were a num ber of anticommunist leftists who had utter contempt for the liberal stateand parliamentarygovernment, but believed thatFranco-German reconciliation was possible. These included socialist pacifists of the PaulFaurevarietyaswellasformercommunistssuch asMarcelGitton, who founded the Parti ouvrier et paysan franc¸ais in 1941.

The collaborationist camp in France was extraordinarily diverse, more than in any other country in Nazi Europe. Its recruits originated from across the political spectrum, although few came from the Radi cal Party and the Christian Democrats. The collaborationists believed that they were working for the national interest, struggling against such enemies as Jews and communists, striving for peace and contrib uting to the creation of the new Europe. This last objective appealed in particulartonotables on boththe Left andRight.Theybelieved

that Germany had begun the unification of Europe and that they should help forward the cause. Flandin, for example, argued for European economic integration under German leadership. Alfred Fabre-Luce pointed out that Germany was reversing the decline of Europe, from which France could benefit by participating. The liberal notable Jac ques Chardonne claimed ‘‘we must learn from our conquerors’’ and accepted the challenge to remake France in light of the Nazi model. Thousands—maybe as many as 43,000—joined Groupe Collaboration, an organization that encouraged cultural exchanges between France and Germany. Itsleader was Alphonse deChateaubriant, an enthusias tic pro-Nazi intellectual, who thought that National Socialism embod ied true Christian values. In 1940, Otto Abetz chose Chateaubriant to be the editor of La Gerbe, a weekly that published essays by leading French pro-Nazi intellectuals.[49]

The Parisian collaborationists were a noisy, motley crew, whose monopoly overpaper,printingpresses,and the radiomade them seem far more powerful and important than they were. Most people bought and read the collaborationist press for the advertisements, not for the news, which was totally unreliable. From all indications, with the ex ception of a handful of programs, almost no one listened to Nazi-con trolled Radio Paris. The vast majority preferred the BBC because its programs were entertaining and informative—subtle rather than bla tant propaganda. For the most part, it seems, the French people never acceptedcollaboration.AmongthepopulationsunderNazioccupatio they were the least inclined to join collaborationist groups, according to Philippe Burrin.[50]Compared to the French people, the record of the Vichy state and many other French institutions is disappointing.

The French Catholic Church is an important case in point. As a general rule, the Catholic hierarchy collaborated with the Germans throughout most of the war, while the laity rallied to the Allied cause and,

inlimitednumbers,totheResistance.TheChurch viewedthe rise ofPe´taintopoweras amiracle,unitingChurchandStateinthepursuit of the same values (Work, Family, and Fatherland) and in opposition to the same enemies (notably communism). Only on the issue of anti-Semitism did they differ, and not always, as we shall see in the next chapter.TheChurch sawinVichy'sNationalRevolutionthepossibility of spiritual renewal and the reversal of years of adversarial relations with the republican state. It had little knowledge of Nazism and even lessconcernabout thepitfallsof collaboration.Unlike theFrenchProt estants, who mistrusted the State and had close ties with Swiss and German counterparts who depicted Nazism as a totalitarian menace to Christianity, the French Catholic hierarchy had a history of privilege andobediencetosecularauthority,disruptedbytheFrenchRevolutic but now restored by the events of 1940. Until late in the war, the Church counseled the faithful to obey the State, regardless of the cir cumstances. To the very end of hostilities, the hierarchy condemned the Resistance and refused to allow priests to say mass for its mem bers. By contrast, the Protestant elite, led by Pastor Boegner, moved rapidly toward resistance to the Germans, although many accepted Vichy as legitimate—at least in the beginning.[51]

The Catholic hierarchy's failure to recognize the evils of collabora tion was due to a great extent to the failure of the papacy to draw attention to them. Although Pius XI had condemned Nazism in the 1930s, the French Church paid more attention to his 1937 encyclical on communism, in which he claimed: ''Communism is intrinsically perverted and in no domain can anyone who wishes to save Christian civilizationallowanycollaborationwithit.'' Bycontrast,PiusXII,Pope during the war, made no public comments on Nazism. The French Church's Assembly of Cardinals and Archbishops strongly endorsed Vichy on July 24, 1941: ''We desire that . . . sincere and total loyalty be observed towards the established authority. We revere [ve´ne´rons] the

headofStateand wedemandthatallFrenchuniteimmediatelybehind him.'' Itis hardto imaginestronger support thanthatexpressedbythe word Ve´ne´rer (from the Latin venerari), which is used almost exclu sively in speaking of the veneration of saints.[52]

Although the Church hierarchy continued to venerate the Marshal until it was forced to recognize de Gaulle, this did not mean that it accepted everything that came out of Vichy. But as far as collaboration went, the Church had no major complaints until 1943, when Vichy adopted the STO. Radio Vatican, whose views were often critical of Vichy and the Nazis, but whose influence on the French Catholic hier archy was minimal, came out forcefully against the STO as early as February 16, 1943: ''The Church does not accept regimes built on forced labor or on collective or individual deportations of people.'' Rather than follow this advice, the French Church initially expressed only sympathy for those conscripted, advising them ''to obey and leave.'' Only one or two bishops were courageous enough to tell the faithful otherwise. Cardinal Lie´nart of Lille was one: he proclaimed on March 21 that Christians did not have to obey the STO, because they were being coerced against their will to go to Germany. That position was eventually endorsed, cautiously, by the hierarchy, which was deeply concerned that total freedom of conscience might supersede obedience to authority in the minds of the faithful. To ensure that this would not happen, in October 1943 the Assembly of Cardinals and Archbishops condemned those who opposed ''the authority and the legitimacy of the regime.'' This condemnation included those who joined the Maquis, the rural Resistance to which many workers es caped in order to avoid the STO. Not until the Pope personally called on the French Church, on June 13, 1944 (a week after D-Day), to aid the Maquis spiritually, did the hierarchy change its attitude and cease excommunicatingpriests whoperformed mass and other religious ser vices for these rebels. Still, some members of the hierarchy remained close to Vichy and collaboration at this late date: on June 16, 1944 the Bishop of Bordeaux claimed that the

real danger was bolshevism, not Nazism, andthat all Christians shouldremain obedient toVichy as the only legitimate government of France.[53]

Yet, the number of bishops, archbishops, and cardinals who collab orated enthusiastically with the Nazis was never large. Cardinal Bau drillart, who died in 1942, was one of these: he feared the Communist menace, despised the British for harboring de Gaulle, and embraced Hitler in 1940. Others, such as the Archbishop of Paris, Cardinal Su-hard, openly celebrated the founding of the collaborationist LVF in 1941. But most of those in the hierarchy who collaborated did not go beyond supporting the STO. This was true of Bishop Dutoit of Arras, who spent his last years hiding from the Nazis in Lille, as well as the Bishop of Mende, who was arrested in 1944, the Archbishop of Aix, the Archbishop of Reims, and the Bishops of Auch, Montpellier, Or le´ans, and Nancy.[54]

If almost all French had little choice but to collaborate in some form or another, some collaborated more than others. They tended to be Parisians—mainly intellectuals—and those who held positions of power. Clearly, state collaboration was far more prevalent and impor tant than the day-to-day collaboration of the average French man or womanwhooftenhad tocooperate withthe enemyin orderto survive or help a close friend or relative caught up in the Vichy-Nazi network of camps, forced labor, and the like. Gritting one’s teeth, smiling against one’s will, and accepting close relationships with those who occupied the country were part of the grim reality of the time.[55] But, beyond opportunistic collaboration and accomodation with the Ger mans, very few collaborated out of conviction. Philippe Burrin counts only 100,000 collaborationist party members in the period 1940–42, a tinypercentageofthetotalpopulationof40million.Yet,atthehighest levels of the state, collaboration was far more common. Over 10 per cent of the members of the Third Republic’s last

parliament collabo rated with the Germans, and as many as one-third were either Vichyites or collaborators between 1940 and 1942. Seventy-seven of them accepted appointment to Vichy's National Council, a pseudo-par liamentary body intended to give the regime a patina of legitimacy. In contrast, only twelve parliamentarians joined de Gaulle in London between 1940 and 1942.[56]

At the very top these important political figures collaborated in order to save France from a worse fate, or so they argued after the war was over. They did so out of conviction. Most of them were virulent anticommunists, anti-Semites, and Europeanists. They confused the German conquest of Europe for European unification. They believed that Nazi victory was inevitable and that France had to get on board theNazimonolithbeforeit wastoolate.Evenwhendefeat wasinevita ble, many remained convinced that they were right and the Resistance was wrong. Their prejudices were insurmountable obstacles to under standing reality. They believed against all evidence that France bene fited from collaboration with the Nazis. As Robert Paxton has argued convincingly,Francegained verylittle,ifanything,fromcollaboration; Germany was the only beneficiary in this marriage of inconvenience.[57]

When all is said and done, the French record on collaboration was no worse than that of other western European nations. The conquered Dutch and the Danes, for example, did no better than the French. Al most all Dutch bureaucrats—98 percent of them—signed the ''Aryan declaration'' form that the Nazis required of them, and hundreds of thousands of Dutch—800,000 in all—joined the collaborationist Neth erlandsUnionparty,whichaimedatnegotiatingaplacefortheNether lands in Nazi-dominated Europe. In Denmark, the government openly collaborated with the Nazis, authorizing the sending of a Danish free corps to fight the Soviet Union in 1941. Until mid-1943, the Danes supported collaboration, from which they —unlike the French— initially gained material benefits, with

considerable enthusiasm. Only after the Nazis placed pressure on Denmark did the population and the government turn against them. In other words, in similar situa tions the Dutch and the Danes acted on the basis of their perceived self-interest in order to obtain or maintain a privileged status in the new order of things. If anything, the French were quicker to perceive that collaboration would not work, rejecting it far before either the Danes or the Dutch did. What made collaboration in France especially uniqueincomparisonwitheitherDenmark ortheNetherlands wasthe Vichy government: Vichy stood by the Nazis to the bitter end, regard less of the consequences.[58]

4 Exclusion

From its first acts until its ignominious end in 1944, the Vichy regime excludedgroupsofpeoplefromsocial,cultural,economic,andpolitic life in France. The essence of the new order resided in the dichotomy of inclusion/exclusion as True France attempted to expel the other from its utopian dream of ‘‘Work, Family, Fatherland.’’ Jews, commu nists, Freemasons, and Gypsies were among those who suffered most fromthesepolicies.We aremuch moreawareofthistodaythanpeople were during the war. French men and women struggling to survive from day to day had little time to be concerned over the plight of others. Even such an astute observer of daily life as Franc¸ois Mitter rand failed to comprehend the significance of Vichy’s anti-Semitic leg islation.[1] In 1994 he claimed that he was so absorbed in his work at thetimethathedidnotnoticethefateoftheJews, eventhoughseveral of his close friends were Jewish. Great newspapers such as the New York Times also paid scant attention to these matters. In

July and Au gust 1942, when thousands of Jews were rounded up in France, the Times published only two relatively minor dispatches on the fate of the Jews in France. It focused overwhelmingly on military matters, reporting on the failed August raid on the French port of Dieppe in scores of prominently displayed articles over several weeks.

Human rights, genocide, and crimes against humanity were not prominent concepts in 1940. Prejudice dominated the world to a de gree foreign to us today. The United States not only excluded non Europeanimmigrants,itprohibitedthemfrombecomingcitizensunt the 1950s. When American statesmen were asked during the war to allow more Jews to enter the country, they refused to consider the proposal, arguing that the American public opposed it. As is evident from Studs Terkels's interviews with Americans who experienced the war years, prejudices against blacks, Jews, and other so-called undesir ables were widespread in the United States. Few Americans shrank from calling blacks ''niggers'' or Jews ''Yids.'' Such openly and vehe mently expressed sentiments were commonplace both in the military and on the home front, creating an atmosphere of fear among those subjected to them, since almost no one was willing to stand up for the rightsof minorities.One consequenceofprejudice was theinternment of Japanese Americans during World War II.[2]

TheFrench wereneitherbetter norworsethantheAmericans,only different. As we have already seen,during the1930s Frenchlaws grad ually restricted foreigners from engaging in certain professions and placedlimits onimmigration.When warbrokeoutin1939,theRepub lic incarcerated refugees and others who seemed to threaten national security. Foreigners in general, whether they were Germans, Jews, or Spaniards, came under suspicion of forming fifth columns and were often put in special camps for the duration of hostilities. Communists, Gypsies, and other questionable French citizens were also

restricted or confined. But the Republic did not exclude these groups totally, as Vichy would laterdo.Democracy inrepublicanFrancealwaysheld out the possibility that onerous laws might be modified or even reversed.[3]

With France's defeat in June 1940, the new Vichy regime pro ceeded to institutionalize a policy of exclusion, with little prodding from the Germans. Marshal Pe´tain led the way with speeches on the need to return to the earth, to adopt spiritual values in place of the materialist,hedonisticpursuitsoftheinterwarperiod.These werecode words for the exclusion of Jews and others from the national family: in March 1941 the Marshal told Grand Rabbi Schwartz that Jews were not French because they played no role in the nation's rural life.[4] But Pe´tain never came out openly against the Jews, although his advisers considered having him do so in October 1940; they concluded that the French would turn against him if he publicly supported the newly enacted anti-Semitic laws. As a result, in listing his government's ac complishments in his October 9, 1940, speech, the Marshal made only vague references to these laws that few would understand. ''The revi sion of naturalizations, the law on access to certain professions, the dissolution of secret societies, the search for those responsible for our disaster . . .'' were some of the allusions to policies directed against the Jews and other undesirables.[5]

By the time Pe´tain delivered his October radio address, the main lines of Vichy's exclusionary legislation had been established. As we saw in chapter two, these included the removal of Freemasons, Jews, and other enemies of the new order from public life. July 1940 legisla tion stripped more than 15,000 naturalized citizens, of whom over 6,000 were Jews, of their citizenship. At the same time, the law pro claimed that no one could be employed by the French government, at any level, who was not a French citizen born of a French father. Later in the year this law would be extended to veterinarians, doctors, den tists, pharmacists, lawyers, and architects. Although

exceptions were made for those who had served in the French military, the law effec tively excluded all naturalized citizens and foreigners, as well as many who were French citizens at birth, from these areas of public and pro fessional employment.[6]

Secret societies, especially the republican Freemasons, were also the object of Vichy's exclusionary legislation. The law of August 13, 1940, outlawed all secret associations and sequestered their properties. Protecting or perpetuating secret societies became a crime. Public offi cials had to take a written oath renouncing secret societies and pro claimingthattheydidnotbelongtoone.ToinsurethattheFreemasons could not circumvent the law, the government explicitly singled them out in an August 19, 1940, decree that dissolved their organizations in metropolitan France, Algeria, and the colonies.[7]

But the Jews were the ones who suffered most from the new order ofexclusionandscapegoatingbecauseofNazipoliciesanddeep-seated anti-Semitic attitudes within the Vichy regime and among its support ers. Jewish immigrants suffered from the law of July 1940, which re voked the citizenship of many naturalized Jews, and a law of October 4, 1940, which authorized the internment of foreign Jews in camps. Jews were also confronted with anti-Semitic legislation that applied to all of them, regardless of citizenship status. The Germans controlled theJews intheOccupiedZonethroughordersissuedinlateSeptember 1940, which required Jews to register with the local authorities and to identify their businesses publicly with signs that stated ''Jewish enter prise.'' Soon after this, on October 3, 1940, Vichy issuedits own Jewish law, in which a Jew was defined as anyone with three Jewish grand parents or, if married to a Jew, with two Jewish grandparents. Under the law, Jews were excluded from all major governmental offices and most minor ones. In the latter case, Jews who had served in either the First World

War or the 1939–40 conflict or who had received the mili tary Legion of Honor were allowed to maintain their government posts, but not if they were teachers. No Jew was allowed to teach in the French school system. Nor could any Jew hold a position in the communications industry. In regard to the liberal professions—law and medicine, for example—a numerus clausus was promised to limit the number of Jews in them.[8]

These laws dealt a devastating blow to the Jewish community in France. But they also caused enormous confusion. It was difficult to determinepreciselywhowas aJew.No censushadever identifiedJews, nor had the French government recognized Jews as a separate race, as the Germans did. To rectify this confusion and further exclude Jews, the government issued a new Jewish law on June 2, 1941, which estab lished two definitions of who was a Jew. In one, a Jew was defined as per the October 3, 1940, law but with the added proviso that this defi nition applied whether one adhered to the Jewish faith or not. The second definition stated that anyone who currently practiced the Jew ish religion or who did so on June 25, 1940, and had two grandparents who were Jewish was considered a Jew, but anyone with two Jewish grandparents who could prove that he or she adhered to another reli gion on or before June 25, 1940, was not Jewish under the law. The 1941 law also eliminated most of the exceptions for Jews who had served the French state, substituting a vague reference to exceptions based on ‘‘exceptional services’’ for the clauses in the 1940 law that recognized service in war and receipt of the military Legion of Honor. The new law also added a virtually meaningless clause that exempted Jews whose families had been present on French soil for five genera tions and had provided ‘‘exceptional services’’ to the State. On a more ominous note, the law threatened Jews with exclusion from all profes sions(and wasfollowedupbydecreesimplementingthe numerusclau sus promised in 1940), further prohibited Jewish employment in sensitive private sector jobs, imposed heavy penalties on anyone who tried to circumvent the new Jewish law, allowed the administrative internmentof French Jews, and

required all Jews to submit to a census within a month.[9]

The 1941 statute only made the law more difficult to interpret by confusing religion and race to the point where neither one was clear from a legal standpoint. Since Jewish communities did not have re cords on who belonged to the faith it was impossible to prove who was a Jew on the basis of lineage. Creative genealogists could easily provide evidence of almost anything one wanted. This led Vichy to changetherulesofthegameandrequireproofthatone'sgrandparent belonged to one of the accepted faiths according to the 1905 law on the matter. If such proof was not available, Vichy assumed that one was a Jew. But in the courts, some judges refused to accept Vichy's position and placed the burden of proof on the government to show that an individual was Jewish. As a result, many lawyers succeeded in establishing that their clients were not Jewish since the state seldom had enough evidence to support its case. Not until 1944, however, did thenation'shighestjudicialbody,theConseild'Etat,finallydecidetha the legal presumption was that a defendant's grandparents could not be considered Jewish unless the state could prove that they were.[10]

Unfortunately, not many Jews challenged Vichy on legal grounds, either because they lacked the resources or, more often, because they were proud of their heritage and refused to deny it. Most of them accepted the Jewish census and endured the brutality of the govern ment's anti-Semitic policies. During 1941, those policies became more stringent and totally excluded the vast majority of Jews from national life. The law of June 21, 1941, created a numerus clausus for higher education that limited Jews to 3 percent of all university students. On July 22,1941, thegovernmentpassed alawthat intended ''to eliminate all Jewish influence in the national economy.'' It stripped Jews of their property through a process of ''Aryanization,'' which created non-Jew ish administrators over everything that Jews owned. Here Vichy fol lowed the German lead, for the Nazis had already established a policy of Aryanization in the Occupied Zone and Vichy wanted its own

Aryanization policy to make sure that Aryanized properties remained in Frenchhands.To prevent Jews from circumventingAryanization by transferring property or changing their names, Vichy passed several other laws that forbade them from acquiring commercial and private property and that restricted their right to change their names or to use pseudonyms.[11]

None of these actions caused non-Jews to stand up in large num bers for the rights of their fellow citizens. Anti-Semitic attitudes were relatively strong in France; the public viewed Jews as excessively pow erful and rich. As late as 1946, an opinion poll revealed that about 40 percent of the French thought Jewish citizens were not truly French.[12] As a consequence, the sequestration of Jewish property did not arouse great concern among non-Jews; in fact, a number of ambitious French entrepreneurs hoped to benefit from it. Yet, the process of Aryaniza tionwasnotveryefficientinFrance,perhapsduetotheslow,methodi calways of the legal system. As late as1944 only 17,000properties out of a possible 45,000 had been either ‘‘aryanized or sold off,’’ according to one scholar. Although their rights were limited, French Jews had recoursetothe courtswhere somesuedsuccessfullyforneglectoftheir property. But these were the exceptions to a general rule of expropria tionandpillageofJewishproperties.ThoseappointedbyVichy’soffice for Jewish affairs to administer confiscated property were mostly viru lent anti-Semites who took their 10 percent fee, or more, from the accounts they controlled. In addition, the Germans periodically levied fines on the French Jewish community, collecting them from these funds. Meanwhile, the Jewish victims of Aryanization were restricted to withdrawing small sums from their accounts to pay for essentials.[13]

Lackof concernforthefateoftheFrenchJews wascommon during the war. No one in France took up the cause of the nation’s 100,000 Algerian Jews who were stripped of their citizenship in October 1940.

Thechildrenamongthem wereevenexpelledfromtheFrenchschools. A young, bewildered Jacques Derrida, the future deconstructionist phi losopher,was oneofthem.Hewould neverforgetthistraumaticevent, whichwould play a majorrolein thedevelopment ofhisphilosophical concepts. Nor did many French become concerned about the fate of Jewish lawyers who lost their positions in the legal system. The Paris bar, for example, refused to take an oath to Pe´tain, defended its auton omy fiercely, and defended lawyers who aided Gaullists or commu nists, but it stood by when 250 Jewish lawyers were excluded from practicing law by Vichy's numerus clausus.[14]

Lawyers were no exception; virtually every profession acquiesced or rejoiced when Jews were excluded from it. Finding its exclusionary anti-Semitic policies uncontested by the nation's elite, Vichy policy becameincreasinglyharshandcooperativewiththeGermans.In194 Admiral Darlan acquiesced to German demands for a French Commis sariat-General for Jewish Affairs (CGQJ), appointing a virulent anti-Semite, Xavier Vallat, to that post. This gave the Germans the means to organize anti-Semitic operations throughout France. Later in the year, in November, the Nazis successfully pressured Darlan to set up a French version of the Judenrat, the Union ge´ne´rale des Israe´lites de France (UGIF), headed by prominent French Jews and financed by dues levied on all Jews. Although the UGIF would also make positive contributions to the Jewish community during the war, the Nazis used it effectively to control French Jews and levy heavy fines on them, beginning in December 1941 with a fine of 1 billion francs. At the same time the liberal minister of justice, Joseph Barthe´lemy, created the Special Section courts to try enemies of the regime from Jews to communists and drafted a new constitution that excluded Jews from the French community, claiming that Jews comprised ''a race that con ducts itself as a distinct community that resists assimilation.''[15]

Those in charge of Vichy did virtually nothing to protect the

Jews. They were either anti-Semitic or opportunists who sacrificed the Jews to achieve otherobjectives. Admiral Darlan and Pierre Laval wanted to protect French Jews against German policies, but they were quite will ingtoroundupforeignJews andsubjectFrenchJews totheharshlegal regimen that Vichy imposed on them. Both men were opportunists on the Jewishquestion; they went along with anti-Semitic policies as long as they did not give rise to a popular backlash. When popular resis tance to these policies emerged in 1942, they tried to back away from the more extreme ones, but discovered that this was virtually impossi ble to do. In early 1942, for example, Darlan became nervous about stripping Jews of their property and deporting them: ‘‘The Jews are winding up as martyrs,’’ he complained. But Darlan, as second in com mand at Vichy, was ultimately responsible for these policies imple mented by Vallat, as well as for the actions of his minister of the interior, Pierre Pucheu, who established a separate Police for Jewish Affairs(PQJ)inlate1941topursueJewsthroughoutFrance.LikeLava Darlan willingly collaborated with the Germans in persecuting Jews andothermattersin order torestore sovereignty overoccupied territo ries, only to discover that sovereignty was elusive and collaboration was unproductive.[16]

Darlan’s fear that ‘‘the Jews are winding up as martyrs’’ was very real. France had not experienced the long period of racial reeducation duringthe1930s thathadconvincedthevastmajority ofGermansthat the Jews were to blame for their fate. Anti-Semitism was strong in France, as it was throughout Europe, but its advocates had not con vinced the French to call for the elimination of the Jews from the nation, as the Nazis had succeeded in doing in Germany.[17] Of course, there were attempts to convert the French to such a position. In Sep tember 1941 an exhibit entitled The Jew and France opened in Paris. It proved to be a major disappointment for the Nazis, as only 200,000 visited it, including a large number of German soldiers. Many of the Frenchwho saw it weresympatheticto the Jews and remained so after seeing it. The Nazi Propaganda-

Abteilung concluded that the French were not necessarily philosemitic, but that they did not approve of attacks on the Jews.[18]

In the spring and summer of 1942 the Jewish question came to a head as the Nazis moved from a policy of expulsion of the Jews to one of elimination. Before this switch occurred, the Nazi occupying force had used a variety of tactics against the Jews. They had dumped 8,000 German Jews on Vichy in 1940 in an effort to cleanse the Fatherland of them; most of them ended up in internment camps in southern France like that in Gurs, which was notorious for its unhealthy condi tions. The Nazis also rounded up foreign Jews in Paris on a number of occasions beginning in May 1941. In October 1941 they supported a mini-Kristalnacht in Paris by providing explosives to a group of Ca goulardswho bombed seven synagogues.Shortly afterthis, aswe have seen, the Nazis forced Vichy to create the UGIF, which they used to extract money from the French Jewish community.[19]

Persecution was radicalized and systematized during 1942. In March, the Nazis dispatched the first trainload of Jews to the Ausch witz extermination camp: 1,148 Jewish men selected from camps around Paris. In June1942 theGermans requiredJews in the Occupied Zone to wear the yellow star on their outer garments. In Paris this was unpopular among many non-Jews, who viewed it as debasing and humiliating. Some gentiles wore the Star of David as a sign of sympa thy with the Jews and were promptly arrested. Others gave up their seats on the metro to Jews, leading the Germans to require Jews to travel in the last train car. Police reports revealed that Parisians over whelmingly opposed these measures. Such blatant public discrimina tion offended Parisians' sense of equality in a way that earlier anti-Semiticpolicies didnot. GentileParisians maynothavelikedJews, but they did not want them to be debased and humiliated.[20]

As we now know, in late 1941 and early 1942 the Nazis changed their policies on the Jews from exclusionand

expulsionto elimination, the‘‘FinalSolutionoftheJewishQuestion.’’ In thelatespringandearly summer of 1942 the Nazis worked out an arrangement with Vichy on roundingupJews fordeportationtotheeastfortheostensiblepurpose of working in German war factories. Rene´ Bousquet, as head of the Vichy police, was called upon to provide police support in rounding up Jews. Bousquet offered total cooperation if he could retain control over the police. He refused, however, to round up French Jews. Pierre Laval,speakingforVichy,backedupthisposition.Eventually anagree ment was reached by which the French police would arrest foreign Jews only, with no German involvement in the process. Laval and Bousquet hadprotectedFrench sovereignty fromGerman police activi ties on national territory at the expense of these defenseless immi grants. On July 3, 1942, Laval informed the Council of Ministers that he was happy to round up foreign Jews, especially the ones that Ger many had dumped on French soil in 1940.[21]

The Germans wanted 100,000 Jews from France before the end of 1942 and limited their request to able-bodied men and women be tween the ages of sixteen and forty in order to fool the French into believing that deported Jews would work for German industry. At the lastminute, however, Laval insisted thatchildrenbe included, inorder to increase numbers and because he believed—wrongly; it turned out—that the French would accept roundups if families were kept intact.

The roundup of Jews in Paris during July and August 1942 cannot be described without sorrow and pain for these innocent victims who weresentofftoalmost certaindeathbytheFrenchpolicewhoarrested them. Fortunately, however, the roundups were not totally successful. The police were supposed to round up over 27,000 foreign Jews in July, but they detained only 12,884. Only 3,031 of these were men, while 5,802 were women. Clearly, in light of previous roundups in 1941, which had been aimed solely at Jewish men, families

had pre pared for the July police raids by hiding their adult males, not suspect ing that women and children would be included in them. We know, from countless records, that many Jews were warned about the July roundups. The UGIF learned about them beforehand and quickly told the foreign Jewish community that it was in danger. Government offi cials were also informed in advance, and some leaked what they knew totheirfriends orneighbors.AnnieKriegel,wholaterbecame apromi nent historian of French communism, found out about the roundup from workers at the Parisian prefecture. She hid in a house in the Marais district,where asympathetic French woman took inaboutfifty Jews that night. Others were warned by the police to leave before the roundupsbegan. Tragically, some Jews either didnotbelieve the warn ings or did not think that they would be victims of the police raids. One Parisian doctor claimed, after being warned: ‘‘But I am a doctor.
They won’t arrest a doctor.’’ In one typical case, which occurred in August in Toulouse, a Jewish family debated what to do after a neigh borwhoworkedatthepreferecureburstintotellthemtoleaveimmedi ately. The head of the family did not believe him, but his wife insisted on leaving since she trusted the informer, who had been kind to her. They left in fifteen minutes, barely ahead of the police, but their rela tives in the neighboring apartment building hesitated and were arrested.[22]

After the first roundup in July, a further roundup in August in cluded the unoccupied southern zone. Like the July roundup, the Au gust one did not succeed as well as planned. For one thing, the thousands of foreign Jews that the Germans and Vichy believed they could gather from southern camps did not materialize. At the main camp for Jews at Gurs, there were in July only 2,600 of an expected 20,000 Jews. In effect, Vichy, after interning foreign Jews and others through 1941, followed an aggressive policy of clearing the camps of inmates at the

end of 1941 and early 1942. As Denis Peschanski has pointed out, the camps were not permanent facilities, intended to housepeopleforlongperiodsoftime;infact,theFrenchcamps,unlike the German ones, were makeshift constructs in which inmates were encouraged to leave as soon as they could. As a consequence, by May 1942, credible independent reports counted in the camps of the Unoc cupied Zone only 11,211 inmates, down from a high of 54,800 in No vember 1940.[23]

When the roundups ended in the south, Vichy and the Germans had gathered up 7,100 Jews, far fewer than what they had expected. By the end of 1942, the Germans had deported 42,500 Jews from all parts ofFrance to exterminationcamps in the east. They had fallen far short of their quota of 100,000. In 1943 and 1944, the number of FrenchandforeignJews whoweresent toAuschwitzfrom Drancyand other transit camps did not equal the total for 1942. Out of approxi mately 330,000 Jews living in France in 1939, a little less than one-fourth were rounded up and sentto the eastern camps. Only ahandful ofthedeportedwouldreturntoFranceafterthe war.Thevastmajority of them were exterminated in Auschwitz, some in other camps—a total of around 75,000.

Thesearesomeofthe baldfigures, buttheymustbeputincontext. Michael Marrus and Robert Paxton argue that without the support of the French state the Germans would not have been able to round up so many Jews during the course of the war. They make this claim even though France’s record of saving Jews from extermination was one of the best of all European nations, far better, for example, than the Netherlands. But they have some key evidence to support their posi tion: if the pace of roundups of 1942 had persisted in 1943 and 1944, France’s record would have been among the worst in western Europe. Thisis the issue: What happenedto slowthe pace of Jew huntingafter the summer of 1942? Was Vichy the hero or the villain in this situa tion? Can we praise the French people for their bravery in saving Jews orcondemnthemfor their blatant

anti-Semitism? Did Jews save them selves from Nazi destruction or should we point our finger at compla cent French Jews for neglecting the fate of their foreign-born brothers and sisters? For the most part, these questions can only be answered by looking more closely at the complex relationships that existed be tween and among Jews and gentiles in 1940s France. From them, one conclusion emerges clearly: Vichy was not the hero. Its policies often put Jews in harm's way.

The French reaction to the roundup of Jews during the summer of 1942 was almost universally negative, even though virtually no one knew exactly what the fate of the Jews would be. Almost everyone criticizedthedeportationof women andchildren—especially children. Laval was off the mark when he urged the Germans to take children on the grounds that the French would not accept the breaking up of families. Most likely, however, the French would have rejected any formula arrived at by Laval and the Germans. In the summer and fall of 1942 government surveys of public opinion, based on millions of opened letters and thousands of tapped telephone conversations, indi cated enormous sympathy for Jews from a French public that had not objected to the earlier anti-Semitic laws. The prefect for the Marseille Aixareawrote:''Delivery offoreignIsraelitestotheGermansisconsid ered by many as a 'national disgrace.''' He added that most French believed that Jews should have less economic power, but they did not think that this gave the authorities the right to deport them. From Toulouse cameamore graphic protestfrom theprefect: ''Thespectacle of a train composed of boxcars in which women fainted from the heat and from the odors of straw soaked with urine strongly and unfavor ably impressed the French non-Jewish population which went to see them.''[24] Parisians expressed similar sentiments about the roundups, leading one German official in Paris to warn his superiors that the French were turned off by the detention of children and were, in general,sympatheticwiththeJews.

ThePrefectureofpolicesimilarly concluded on July 17, 1942, that the roundups had ‘‘rather profoundly troubled public opinion.’’[25] Only two government-appointed prefects in the Unoccupied Zone reported to Vichy that public opinion in their departments backed the government’s policies on the Jews. Five said feelings were mixed, while twenty-four stated that the public in their departmentsopposedit,aconclusionthatwouldhavenotpleasedtheir superiors. Perhaps the prefect of the department of Loir-et-Cher best expressed the conflicted mentality of many French toward the Jews in his August 8, 1942, report to Vichy: ‘‘Clearly the Jews do not benefit from any great sympathy. But the procedures used against them are judged to be inhumane and unacceptable. They have unquestionably provoked profound hatred against the occupying power.’’[26]

The rounding up and deportation of Jews marked a significant turning point for public opinion, on all levels, which condemned the regime for its complicity in these actions. Elite leaders of public opin ion in France and among French exiles in London immediately at tackedtheVichyregimeforitsanti-Semiticactions.OnAugust8,1942, on the popular BBC program Les Franc¸ais parlent aux Franc¸ais, Andre´ Labarthe condemned the roundups vehemently and called upon the Frenchtoopposethemandthepoliciesof Pierre Laval: ‘‘What is going on in France? Has it become the land of the pogrom, of humiliation? Are Jews being martyred, their families destroyed, arrested, deported, crushed? Are innocents being stomped on?’’[27] Although Labarthe was no Gaullist, he was merely following the path that Charles de Gaulle had outlined as early as November 1940 when he soundly condemned Vichy’s anti-Semitic laws, claiming that a victory for the Free French would once again make France ‘‘a protagonist of freedom and justice for all men, irrespective of race or religion.’’[28]

The Gaullist position was seconded by some leaders of the Protes tant and Catholic churches in France. Unlike de Gaulle, these men had more or less accepted Vichy as a legitimate government and, in most cases,wouldcontinuetotreatit

assuchaftertheeventsofthe summer of 1942. Timidity, acceptance of the powers that be, and even respect for the objectives of Vichy prevailed among them. This was particu larly the case with the Catholic hierarchy, which believed that Catholi cism had much to gain by embracing the new order. Protestants, on the other hand, were far more skeptical of government, especially of Vichy's fundamentalist Catholic position. Memories of persecution by the state made most Protestants reluctant to support any regime as authoritarianasVichy.TheSwisstheologianKarlBarthplayed amajor role in convincing French Protestant leaders of the evils of Nazism. Pastor Boegner, the head of the Protestant Federation and the key spokesperson for French Protestantism, adhered closely to Barth's ideas. While Boegner accepted Vichy's legitimacy, he protested early on against Vichy's anti-Semitic policies: on July 26, 1940, he came out against the armistice clause that required the return of German refu gees, many of whom were Jews, and in March 1941 he objected to Vichy's Statute on the Jews, writing to the Chief Rabbi about the ''countless trials andinjustices'' that the Jewishcommunity hadexperi enced. But Boegner failed to transcend completely the period's anti Semitism:Hesoftenedhis1941condemnationofVichybystatingthat he understood the serious difficulties created ''by the recent massive immigration of foreigners, Jews, and others, and by hasty and unjusti fied naturalizations.''[29]

When Vichy issued its Second Jewish Law in the summer of 1941, Pastor Boegner and Protestant ministers throughout France attacked it with such force that Pe´tain asked the Vatican to express its opinion on the law. Rome equivocated, but seemed to support Vichy with some reservations. The French Catholic Church did the same. Cardinal Ger lier of Lyon, thehead of the Church in theUnoccupied Zone,criticized some parts of the Jewish Laws but his public statements were cryptic rather than clear and forceful. However, Gerlier was never an anti-Semite: not only was he a close friend of the

president of the Central Jewish Consistory but also he approved the clandestine circulation of a text that hailed the Jews as the forerunners of Christianity—not the killers of Christ. Still, Gerlier did not speak out clearly on the Jewish question until the events of the summer of 1942 made his ambiguous position untenable.[30]

The first religious leader to denounce publicly Vichy's roundup of Jews was a Catholic prelate, Archbishop Salie`ge of Toulouse. During mass on August 23, 1942, he proclaimed that Jews were ''part of the human race'' and should be treated with dignity and not as animals or subhumans. The Bishop of Montauban followed up on this, proclaim ingon August28,1942,''thatallmen,Aryans ornon-Aryans,arebroth ers because created by the same God.'' He condemned the roundups as ''a violationofthemostsacredrightsofthepersonandofthefamily.''[31] These and other protests from the pulpit, combined with a number of private objectionsto the roundups byleading French clerics,including Cardinal Gerlier, made their mark on Vichy by late August or early September 1942. Shortly after this, the French Protestant clergy also attacked Vichy, reading from the pulpit a letter from Pastor Boegner that condemned Vichy's policies on the Jews. At the September 1942 annual meeting of the French Reformed Religion in the Ce´vennes MountainsnorthofNıˆmes,theseclergymenalsodecidedtoinaugura a network to hide Jews.[32]

Vichy reacted to these signs of disaffection with a two-pronged policy. On September 2, 1942, Laval told the Germans that he faced serious opposition to the roundups and could not allow them to con tinue at the same pace. He told Oberg, the Parisian-based head of the SS and German police, that Cardinal Gerlier had protested to him per sonally, in the name of the Catholic Church. Although Laval assured Oberg that he agreed with Nazi anti-Semitic policies, he wanted to back off from pursuing the Jews in order to mollify public opinion. In the fall of 1942 the roundups slowed to a trickle, although it seems

that not until mid-1943 did Laval try to stop them totally in order to revive Vichy's flagging support among the French. In the meantime, VichyalsotriedtosilencetheChurchbypublishing articles onmatters such as Thomas Aquinas's anti-Semitic statements and by promising to subsidize Catholic educational institutions. In private, however, Cardinal Gerlier of Lyon and Cardinal Suhard of Paris continued to protest Vichy's Jewish policies, although they never considered break ing off ties with the regime.[33]

For pragmatic and opportunistic reasons, therefore, Laval and the Vichy regime tried to stop or at least slow the roundup of Jews in France. By the late summer or early fall of 1942 Laval knew that de ported Jews were being sent to extermination camps, but this did not influence his policy. Public opinion, on the other hand, did have some influence.Vichywanted theGermanstobediscreteinregardtoJewish affairs in order to calm opinion, but it never asked for a complete end to roundups and deportations. In early 1943, for example, Vichy gave in to German demands to round up more foreign Jews, while stipulat ing that French Jews could not be included. Laval hoped that this ar rangement would assuage public opinion, but the results were not good for either Vichy or the Nazis: only a few thousand Jews were rounded up, mainly by the SS rather than by the French police, and many of them were French. In June 1943, in order to appease the Germans once more, Laval considered reversing the naturalization of 16,000Jews,therebymakingthemeligiblefordeportation.Hechang his mind at the last minute for purely pragmatic reasons: in trouble over his policy of forcing French laborers to work in Germany, Laval assumed that this measure would further undermine his government in its struggle to contain the Resistance. Due primarily to Vichy's amoral pragmatism, only 17,000 Jews were deported from France in 1943, considerably fewer than the 42,000 sent to the extermination camps in 1942, although possibly more than would have been the case if the French government had opposed German demands. But the

Nazis did not give up easily: in 1944 they imposed on Vichy a group of fascist ministers that gave carte blanche to the Milice, which roundedupJews—bothforeignandFrench—inlargenumbers,almost 7,000 in the first four months of the year. Laval might not have been directly responsible for these roundups, but his pragmatic, collabora tionist policies had led to—even encouraged—the creation of the Mil-ice and the rise of the fascists to power.[34]

Vichy's policies failed to protect the Jews, even the French Jews whom Laval and company claimed to have saved from the Nazis. Al most one-third (24,500) of the Jews deported were French. The point is that Jews were saved despite, rather than because of, Vichy. They were saved because of the actions of individuals, many of whom had strong religious convictions. The Church, as an institution, was not a major force in protecting Jews; its policies were often misguided or wrong on such issues as the anti-Semitic laws and the legitimacy of the Vichy regime. In general, institutions failed to help the Jews and other excluded individuals. For the most part, Jews in France had to relyon individualsandcommunitieswho helpedtheexcluded without any thought of recompense or even thanks, as an act of kindness toward others in need.

While only a handful in the Catholic hierarchy stood up for the Jews, many among the rank and file did. The Jesuit theologian Pierre Chaillet and the members ofthe Lyon-basedTe ´moignage chre´tien (TC) movement stand out in the effort to guide the Church toward a new understanding of relations between Catholics and Jews, Catholics and Protestants, and Catholics and unbelievers, establishing in the process the intellectual basis for what later became Vatican II. Influenced greatly by Jacques Maritain's 1936 work, Integral Humanism, Chaillet and his supporters adopted the revolutionary notion that conscience was primary to all Catholics. Regarding Jews, these thinkers followed closely the 1937 papal encyclical, Mit brennender Sorge, which con demned Nazism as a racist, pagan movement that the Church had to reject or lose its soul. A November 1941 article in the movement's clandestine journal

recalled Pope Pius XI's 1938 statement that all Christians are spiritual descendants of Abraham: ''We are spiritually Semites.'' In June 1942, TC published 20,000 copies of a thirty-two page brochure entitled ''Anti-Semitism,'' which argued that Hitler in tended to eliminate the Jews from Germany and Europe and pointed out that Vichy had implemented policies that deprived Jews of their rights and property, even imprisoning them in camps. These were gross injustices that violated the Christian and French revolutionary notions of the rights of man, the brochure stated. For Christians, in particular,therepudiationofJudaismcouldnotgounchallenged,sinc the Christian faith had Jewish foundations and Jewish ancestors. As Abbot Charles Journet put it: ''Anti-Semitism is more than anti-Semi tism, it is anti-Christianism.''[35]

Father Chaillet and his fellow Jesuits in TC continued their attacks on Vichy and Nazism until the end of the war, condemning Vichy for its role in the roundups and divulging that, contrary to its statements, Vichy allowed the Germans to deport French as well as foreign Jews. In early 1943, Father Chaillet reported in TC that Nazi firing squads and gas had killed hundreds of thousands of Jews—700,000 at least—in Poland and Eastern Europe. He concluded: ''there can be no doubt whatsoever concerning Hitler's plan to exterminate completely all Jews on European soil.'' TC rejected the Church's equivocal position on whether Nazism or communism was the greater evil, arguing in an August 1943 article that German neopaganism was a far greater threat to Christian civilization than Russian communism. If the Germans won, the article maintained, the ''historical existence of France and its spiritual tradition'' would be eliminated.[36]

WhileFatherChaillet andhisfollowersfocused onpublishingclan destine reports about Nazi and Vichy policy regarding Jews, they also helped Jews,especially children, escapedetention anddeportation.But other Catholic clerics and laymen put more energy into direct action than Chaillet and TC did. In Marseille, for example, several Dominican monks and nuns hid Jews from the authorities. The Capuchin Father Benoıˆt may have

personally helped as many as 4,000 Jews escape de tentionand certaindeath.He providedthem with shelter inthe homes of Marseille citizens—primarily, but not exclusively, Catholics—and obtained counterfeit papers for them. Armed with their new identities and provided with an extensive support network that stretched across southern France, Jews left the country for Spain or Switzerland or traveled to safer parts of the French interior, such as the Protestant redoubts in the Ce´vennes mountains or Chambon-sur-Lignon. Later, when Father Benoıˆt was forced to flee Marseille for Nice, he used his connections on the Coˆte-d'Azur to continue his activities until the Nazis took over the area in 1943 and Father Benoıˆt's superiors forced him to take refuge in Rome.[37]

The clerical elite was often indifferent or hostile to the Jews, while those lower in the hierarchy, like Father Benoıˆt, were often sympa thetic to their plight. In Marseille and neighboring Aix-en-Provence, for example, Church leaders had little interest in the fate of the Jews, although in Nice Bishop Re´mond actively supported them. The Ger mans concluded that the parish priests were more solidly opposed to roundups than the hierarchy was. Althoughitis hardto quantify what these priests did, a considerable amount of circumstantial evidence indicates that Jews were protected by rank-and-file members of holy orders. Many Jewish children were saved by clerics who took them in and gave them Christian identities. Despite parental fears that their children would be converted to Christianity, this happened only occa sionally. Ruth Kapp Hartz, known as Rene´eat the time, provides one example of how Catholics treated these children. In danger of arrest by the Nazis, she was whisked off to a convent in 1943. She soon discovered that many other Jewish children were hidden there, most of whom were French, not German as she was. They alllearnedCatho lic prayers, went to mass regularly, and assumedthe identityofCatho lic orphans. At no point, however, did the nuns try to convert her or the other Jewish children to Christianity.

In fact, the mother superior refused to let them take confession or communion, fending off all attempts to promote their spiritual development with assertions that they were not yet ready for it. After the war the children were re turned to what remained of their families with their Jewish identities intact.[38]

Protestants were disproportionately active in hiding Jews during the war. In the Ce´vennes mountains, where memories of persecution at the hands ofLouis XIV's armies lingered, the Protestant community opened its homes to Jews fleeing persecution. The region's Protestant ministers were acutely aware of the fate of Europe's Jews and had created a journal in the early 1930s that criticized Nazi and Christian anti-Semitism. They rejected all attempts to blame the Jews for the death of Christ and embraced Judaism as part of the Christian dispen sation. In 1940, the leaders of this movement organized a symposium in the Ce´venol city of Ganges to attack Vichy's anti-Semitic laws from the perspective of their philosemitic reading of the Bible. Beginning in September 1942, after they became aware of the seriousness of the persecution,virtuallyallCe ´venolProtestantministersbeganprotecting Jews from roundups, leading Jews throughout France to seek refuge in the Ce ´vennes. The vast majority of them were hidden safely in out-of the-way Ce´venol villages until the end of the war. Only in a handful of cases did disgruntled inhabitants of the region inform the authorities aboutsuspiciousoutsiders intheirmidst.By providingJews withiden tities as rural Protestants—obtaining fake baptismal certificates for them and integrating them into communal activities such as church services—the citizens of the Ce´vennes helped save at least 1,200 Jews from arrest and deportation.[39]

Closely associated with the Ce´vennes Protestants in the effort to shelter Jews was the town of Chambon-sur-Lignon, located in the de partment of Haute-Loire, on the northern edge of the Massif Central. Chambon had connections with all of the major centers of Resistance in southern France. Jews

from Marseille, Nıˆmes, Toulouse, the Ce´ven nes, and many other areas of the south found their way to Chambon, where they were sheltered and, often, taken to refuge in Switzerland. Like the Ce´vennes, Chambon was a Protestant stronghold, whose min istersandinhabitantswelcomedtheJewsandwere adamantlyopposed to Vichy and the anti-Jewish laws. Vichy and the Germans could not penetrate the wall of silence that existed in Chambon, even though its leaders were harassed and even imprisoned on occasion. Perhaps as many as 5,000 Jews were saved by this tiny community of no more than 3,500 inhabitants.[40]

In some cases Vichy itself aided the cause of protecting the Jews, althoughusually inadvertently orfor its ownexclusionary reasonsand prior to the concerted German policy of rounding up as many Jews as possible. In 1940 and 1941, for example, the regime encouraged the Jewstoemigrate.ThecampsinwhichJews wereheldinthesouth were relatively open; inmates could come and go without much trouble, especially if they had money. This meant that Jews who could obtain the proper papers from Vichy and the foreign consulates in Marseille could escape to the United States or elsewhere. By 1942, however, this became less possible as the Germans began demanding Jews. At the same time, Vichy created or allowed organizations to oversee condi tions in the camps. One of these, the so-called Nıˆmes Committee, which was made up of a number of refugee and charitable groups, played a major role in emptying the camps of Jews prior to the 1942 roundups. With the acquiescence of Vichy, the committee liberated virtually all children under fourteen from the camps by May of 1942, savingmost oftheJews among themfrombeingtransportedtoAusch witz later in the year.[41]

Jews werenot passive in the story of their salvation from the exter mination camps. Although they could not easily act on their own—for obvious reasons related to the oppressive Vichy and Nazi regimes— they often worked with Catholics and Protestants to protect them selves. For example, Georges

Garel, a Jewish engineer from Lyon, worked with Archbishop Salie`ge of Toulouse and the local branch of the Oeuvre de secours aux enfants (OSE) to hide almost 1,500 Jewish children in Christian institutions. Nationally, the OSE helped save be tween 7,500 and 9,000 Jewish children during the war, hiding them in the homes of Jews and gentiles and spiriting them off to Spain and Switzerland via Resistancenetworks. Its efforts werereinforced bythe Jewish Scouts, which sheltered Jewish children in its rural retreats. When the Scouts were forced to go underground in 1943, they called on Catholics and Protestants to take in some 250 children. Other Jew ish groups, such as the Mouvement des jeunesses sionistes, provided Jews with false papers. Thousands were aided by this organization. Evenseeminglycollaborationistorganizationssuch astheUGIF,which the Nazis forced Vichy to create for the purpose of controlling the French Jewish community, engaged in acts of resistance to the anti Semitic order, using its offices to help Jews escape roundups, at great risk to the leaders of the organization.[42]

When the war ended, possibly 30,000 Jews had survived as the result of rescue operations. Another 50,000 escaped the Holocaust by leaving France. This meant that the vast majority of Jews—about 150,000—survived within France without any significant help from others.Some survivors wereembittered bytheirexperience duringthe war. Gilbert Michlin is one example of this. He accused the French of being as anti-Semitic as the Germans, as his impoverished, foreign-born family received no help from the French, was rounded up by French police and sent to the death camps. He alone survived because of his skills as a mechanic. Michlin's family suffered from all of the disadvantages and prejudices that strangers encountered in 1930s and '40s Paris. Even Rene´e, the little Jewish girl who was protected by the nuns, had her doubts about Parisians after the war was over: her fam ily returned to Paris in 1945, where they encountered virulent anti-Semitism. Her schoolmates called Rene´e a ''dirty Jew,'' and the family discovered that their neighbors had denounced Jews to the

Germans during the war.[43]

Clearly there is no neat moral tale to tell about the exclusion of Jews in wartime France. There were heroes and villains, rescuers and denouncers.Themillion orsolettersdenouncingJews thatpouredinto Vichy and German government offices indicate that a significant anti-Semitic element existed in France at the grassroots level. For example, a Catholic militant lawyer from Avignon who was a member of the Action franc¸aise wrote to Xavier Vallat, Vichy's head of Jewish Affairs, to warn him about the Jewish presence in the former papal city. Jews were using all kinds of trickery, he claimed, to obtain certificates of patriotism, good moral behavior, and service to the Church. He called on Vallat to appoint individuals loyal to the National Revolution to investigate these matters in each department. In another letter, from the department of Tarn, a writer accused the local Jews of gluttony, sexual misconduct with their Christian maids, and involvement in a communist organization. He called on the authorities to lock up all Jews before they succeeded in starvingthe area's good French citizens. But few couldtop the writer who complained that a Jew had borrowed his name, leading him to fear that in the future his family would have Jewish physical features because of this interloper.[44]

Yet,thesedistortedviews ofrealitydid notdominateFrenchpublic opinion.Iftheyhad,thenumberofJews incarceratedwouldhavebeen far higher. Without doubt, the French were most successful in saving Jewish children from the camps. When the war ended less than 13 percent of all Jewish children had been deported from France, which was significantly below the 20 percent registered in Belgium, whose record was better than most on this score. The French also did much better at saving French Jews than they did at saving foreign Jews. Ac cording to one estimate, only 9 percent of French Jews died in the wartime camps as opposed to 45 percent of foreign Jews present in France in 1940. Whether this accomplishment should be celebrated or not is debatable. Clearly foreign Jews were far more vulnerable than their

French counterparts: they often did not speak French, lacked French friends or acquaintances, had little support from a French Jew ish community that was more concerned about the fate of its own kind, and lived in major urban centers, without significant resources to pay for visas, false documents, and the like that were essential for survival. And finally, they were actively pursued by Vichy and were often rounded up early in the war and placed in French camps where they became easy prey for anti-Semitic government officials. In con trast, most French Jews had sufficient support to evade the roundups, which did not specifically target them until late in the war. In short, French Jews did not experience the Holocaust in the same way or to the same extent that their foreign-born brethren did.[45]

In 1945, when the excluded came home to France, there were very fewJews intheirranks.Only3percent ofJews who hadbeendeported returned alive. Returning in much greater numbers were individuals deported for resistance activities and prisoners of war. They were the focus of national attention in 1945, not the returning Jews. Today, of course, the Jews are the main focus of attention in historical mono graphs and efforts at remembering, while resisters and prisoners re ceive less notice. Yet neither one of these scenarios should be viewed as perverse or a distortion of historical reality. In 1945, French Jews did not think of themselves as a special case. They did not question the priorities that prevailed at the time. As far as most of them were concerned they were French first and Jews second. RaymondAron, for example, said virtually nothing about Jews in his wartime articles in the London journal, La France libre. He did not want to feed enemy propaganda by concentrating on the issue. The same attitude existed within the internal Resistance: Jewish members of the Resistance fought for France, not for Jews, even to the point that they refused to discuss anti-Semitism among themselves. Marc Bloch, the famous medieval historian, consciously joined the Resistance as a French pa triot and not as a Jew. Even

predominantly Jewish units of the Resis tance had no particular Jewish character to them. Often these were communist units comprised primarily of party members who were communists first and Jews second. This was true even of the special Jewish unit of the communist Resistance, the Manouchian brigade. As onehistorianoftheperiodhasargued,mostJewishcommunistsproba bly accepted the communist daily L'Humanite´'s analysis of Vichy's anti-Semitic laws: expropriating the property of rich Jews was no sub stitutefor acommunist revolutionthatwouldendcapitalism. Commu nism and patriotism trumped the Jewish question in their eyes. Still, this does not mean that the Resistance neglected the fate of the Jews. De Gaulle condemned Vichy's anti-Semitic laws in November 1940, and as early as July 1940, he welcomed Jewish participation in the Resistance. Every major Resistance movement in France, with the pos sible exception of the Organisation civile et militaire, condemned anti-Semitism at some time during the war. The Resistance journal Franc-Tireur, for example, condemned the Nazi myth of a Jewish conspiracy in its first issue of December 1941.[46]

Moreneeds tobesaid,however,aboutwhy thefateof theJews was not a serious concern among the French from the end of World War II until at least the late 1960s, when the Holocaust became more central to historical understanding of these dark years. According to Annette Wieviorka, a complex web of factors made the Jewish question rela tively unimportant in France—even among French Jews—in the im mediateaftermathofthe war.As indicatedabove,whenthe warended the Jews comprised only a small portion of those who returned from the Nazi camps. Although almost 76,000 Jews were deported, only 2,500 returned alive. In comparison, out of 63,000 non-Jewish depor tees, 37,000 returned to France. In addition, approximately 900,000 prisoners of war and 700,000 workers came back to France from Ger many at approximately the same time. In the confusion and turmoil of these massive repatriations at the war's end, the small number of returning Jews received little attention. They were only one small part of

the German internment system in the eyes of contemporaries. Fur thermore, very few people were aware at the time that Jews had been sent to extermination camps while most other deportees were not. In fact, the French and most Europeans were unaware that the Germans hadcreateddifferenttypesofcamps,specializingin veryspecificactiv ities.Instead, almost everyone believed that prisoners weredumped in one kind of camp, under one broad designation. This conception of theGermansystemlasted along time;ithad a majorinfluence onhow the camps were depicted in Alain Resnais's classic 1956 film about them, Nuit et brouillard.

French Jews did not help clarify these matters in the postwar pe riod. Jews who returned from the camps were often not listened to, even by other Jews, when they told horrific stories of mass extermina tion.SimoneVeil,whowouldlaterbecome aprominentpoliticalfigure under the Fifth Republic, stated that no one in her family wanted to hear her tales about Auschwitz, except those who had also been there. Most returning Jewish deportees remained silent in the face of this kindofreception.Still, afewwroteandpublishedmemoirsabouttheir ordeals, although most of these were read as part of Resistance, not Holocaust, literature. The point is, most French Jews viewed their war experiences through the eyes of the French historical tradition —the Republic,theRevolution andthe Rights of Man—more than their Jew ishness. Unlike Polish Jews, for example, French Jews had no separate cultural tradition based on a language different from French, as Yid dish was different from Polish, or on a tight-knit community such as the ghetto or the shtetl. Zionism was virtually nonexistent in France, even after World War II, although it was a powerful force in Eastern Europe. The suffering that French Jews experienced during the war did not discredit the Republic or the Revolution in their eyes; instead, theyblamedVichy andtheNazisfortheirplight.Inshort,FrenchJews generally did not think that their France—as differentiated from the ''other'' France of Vichy—had participated in the Holocaust.

Vichy was an exceptional regime in the eyes of the overwhelming majority of French Jews. To combat Vichy and the Nazis, French Jews joined communist and republican Resistance groups, worked closely withFrenchChristians,andfoughtforthe sameidealsofliberty,equal ity, and fraternity that other opponents of collaboration did. They could do so because they and their fellow resisters adhered to the con cept that Judaism was a religion that accepted the republican secular tradition.TheydidnotthinkofJews asaraceor part of aculturebased on alterity (‘‘otherness’’) or difference. French Jews had no idea of multiculturalism; they were largely assimilated into French culture. For all of these reasons, and others, they generally did not feel threat ened or different after the war ended—unlike Polish Jews who felt totally deserted by everyone in a world that wanted to destroy them. VeryfewFrenchJews leftFrance forIsraelinthepostwarperiod.They saw no reason to go, for France was their nation too.[47]

While Jews suffered from exclusion more than others during the war, the communists succeeded in gaining the most publicity as martyrs of Nazipersecution.Afterthe warthecommunists werepopularlyknown as le parti des fusille ´s, so-called because supposedly the Nazis shot 75,000 party members in cold blood. Today, we know that this is pure fiction. At most, fewer than 30,000 French of all political stripes were shot by the Germans. Yet, there is no doubt that the communists suf fered from exclusion by both Vichy and the Nazis. In fact, because of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, communists were hounded and imprisoned at the end of the Third Republic, as their party was outlawed and its representatives excluded from parliament. Beginning in March 1940 a special police brigade was created for Paris and the department of the Seine to arrest and detain communists. About one hundred were apprehended before thedefeat of France in June.Vichy merely

contin ued the Republic's policy, stepping up police activities, arresting 2,560 communists and placing another 1,660 under administrative intern ment in the department of the Seine between July 1940 and March 1942. The Communist Party was virtually wiped out by Vichy in its Paris region stronghold. Only after the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 helped revive the party, did it become the leading forcein theinternal French Resistance. Still,thousandsof communists were arrested, placed in camps, and deported to Germany during the course of the war: during 1942 and 1943 Vichy arrested some 8,000 communists; for the entire war the number was over 10,000. The Nazis, in reprisal for assassinations of Germans by the Resistance, exe cuted many of these political prisoners, whom Vichy dutifully handed over to the occupying power. Often fifty or more communists were shot by firing squads for the death of a single German. Despite these horrificacts,itissafetoconcludethatthecommunistssufferedfarless fromexclusionthanJews,who were alsosubjecttoreprisalexecutions. Communistswereconsideredpolitical,notracial,enemiesbytheNaz and therefore, unlike the Jews, never slated for systematic extermina tion regardless of their actions.[48]

Homosexuals and Gypsies are usually prominently mentioned in the long list of persecuted outcasts under German occupation and Vichy rule. Yet they were not singled out in France to the extent that they were elsewhere in Europe. In the case of homosexuals the only known instances in which they were rounded up and deported to camps in the east occurred in German-occupied and controlled areas such as Alsace, where the Vichy authorities had no jurisdiction during the war. Under German law homosexuality had been severely pun ished since at least 1870, but French law did not penalize homosexual ity from 1791 until 1942 when Vichy made homosexual acts between adults and minors a crime. Consenting adults, however, remained ex empt from punishment. Roger Ste ´phane, who was a homosexual, a Jew, and a member of the

Resistance, claimed that the French police were interested only in his involvement in the Resistance, although they were aware of his other identifying traits. Admiral Darlan, who wanted to outlaw homosexuality in order to remove it from the navy, could not get Marshal Pe´tain's support for it. Therefore, the police spent no time arresting homosexuals in French-controlled territory, and they deported no one for being a homosexual.[49]

Regarding the Gypsies, however, the evidence is more complex. Prejudices against Gypsies in France were probably greater than those against the Jews. Beginning in1939, prefects throughout France began issuing orders to prohibit the movement of ''nomads,'' as they called the Gypsies. On April 6, 1940, a decree issued by the minister of the interior prevented nomads from moving around in France as long as the war lasted and required them to report to the local authorities in order to be assigned a place of residence. The state justified these ac tions by claiming that nomads were potential spies. Yet, nomads were not placed in camps at this point. When the Germans occupied the north, nomads were prohibited from living or traveling in the twenty-one Atlantic coast departments, but with the exception of a camp cre ated in the Coˆte d'Or, Vichy did not incarcerate them, although the Germans did, including hobos and traveling salesmen in the mix, and charged the expensesto theFrenchgovernment. Inthespring of 1942, amodelcamp—betterthanmost—forGypsies wassetupin thesouth, in the Camargue region of the delta of the Rhone River, an area well known to Gypsies who congregated annually in the town of Saintes Maries-de-la-Mer to celebrate their heritage. In contrast with other camps in the south the Camargue camp placed people in homes mod eled on the local architectural style. And the camp, if it can be called such, came under the jurisdiction of the Service social des e ´trangers rather than the Inspection ge´ne´rale des camps.[50]

This did not mean that all nomads enjoyed favorable handling by the authorities. For one, two-thirds of the 3,000 nomads put in camps ended up in German ones. Still, even the Germans

were not greatly concerned about Gypsies in France as they released many of them during the course of the war: at the Montreuil-Bellay camp in the west of France, for example, 800 were discharged between 1941 and 1943. Moreover, few French Gypsies lost their lives in the extermination camps of the east: the Auschwitz records indicate that 145 were killed there. For the most part, both the Germans and the French were pri marily interested in isolating the Gypsies for security reasons. The French, infact, were soconcernedabout their actions thatthey did not release most Gypsies from the camps until 1946, after everyone else but war criminals had been let go.[51]

The release of the Gypsies from French camps marked the end of a dark period in French history that began with the incarceration poli cies of the Third Republic and lasted until the Fourth Republic came into existence. Truly this period could be called ‘‘The Age of the Camps,’’ in France and in Europe in general. France, along with such discredited regimes as Nazi Germanyand the Soviet Union, set up and maintained an extensive network of camps from the late 1930s until the mid 1940s. As many as 600,000 people spent some time in French camps during these years. Of them, a little less than one-fourth ended up in Nazi camps. The majority of these—Jews mainly, but also com munists, Gypsies, Freemasons, and members of the Resistance—did not return alive. Vichy authorities willingly participated in the incar ceration and deportation of these human beings, without concern about their ultimate fate, despite the fact that many of them knew—Laval and Pe´tain among them—about the Final Solution as early as the late summer of 1942. Under these circumstances it seems morally malevolent to make the argument that the French camps were funda mentally different from the German ones. As Zev Sternhell has argued incessantly, contextualizing French fascism and excusing its excesses bypointingouthowmuch worsetheGermans wereisanunacceptable form of historical relativism and apologetics. But the fact remains that the French camps were

different, even though they ended up facilitat ing the Nazi extermination of the Jews. For one, very few inmates died in the camps, despite horrible conditions: while millions died in German and Soviet camps, only 3,000 lost their lives in French camps. For another,they werenotset upaccordingto anycarceral plan, as the otherswere:they weremakeshiftoperations,oftenintendedtobeused temporarily to solve a refugee problem or a problem of public order or,underVichy,toexcludegroupsofpeople.Furthermore,theinmates in these camps, more often than not, could come and go without re striction. This was especially true of the Spanish political refugees in the late 1930s, who were placed in the camps as a temporary housing and security measure, but it was also true under Vichy, at least during 1940 and 1941, when inmates ebbed and flowed in the camps. The overwhelming majority of the 600,000 individuals who spent time in the camps left after a few months. And finally, camp personnel often sympathized with the inmates and either looked the other way or pro vided them with opportunities to escape. There was no monolithic, totalitarian system in the camps, no kapos, and very few ideologically inspired guards. In short, like everything else about France in the dark years, the carceral system was a bundle of contradictions, exceptions, and brutalities. Yet, in the end, to return to Sternhell's warning about historical relativism, no matter how much the system lacked the sadis ticefficiencyoftheGermancampsit waspart ofthevastwebofcollab oration between Nazi Germany and Vichy France that led to the
extermination of tens of thousands of excluded people who were under the care and responsibility of the French State.[52]

One final, controversial comment needs to be made about the relative position of the French among western European nations in regard to the exclusion of the Jews. Were the French better or worse than other European countries in saving (or not saving) Jews? One mightbegin to answer thequestionby comparingFrance to the Neth erlands, a country in which anti-Semitism was supposedly nonexis tent and the Jews were

exterminated in large numbers: over 80 percent of all Jews in the Netherlands lost their lives during the war. In the past, historians and others exonerated the Dutch for this terri ble outcome, arguing that they could have done little or nothing to preventit, given the highly urban, compact geographyof the country and the lack of neutral neighbors such as Switzerland and Spain where Dutch Jews could have found refuge. But recently evidence has emerged to contradict the accepted story. The Dutch managed to hide hundreds of thousands of workers from German labor conscrip tion, but did very little to help the nation's approximately 160,000 Jews. There were plenty of places for the Jews to hide, but with a few notable exceptions, like Anne Frank, the Dutch were unwilling to take them in. Nor did they provide Jews with papers that could have helped them leave the country or obtain another identity, even though the Dutch were masters at counterfeiting government docu ments in large numbers for Dutch workers. Furthermore, anti-Se mitic rural orthodox Calvinist communities hid the largest number of Jews—one-fourth of those who survived—not the secular, urban population. And,theDutch state, whose leaders fledto London rather than remain behind as Vichy did, failed totally in preventing the Germans from rounding up the Jews. In fact, the bureaucracy that was leftin place to carry on day-to-day activities as normally as possi ble, collaborated with the Nazis at a level that went far beyond what Vichydid.Today,Dutchhistoriansargue thatiftheQueen had stayed in the Netherlands, many more Jews might have been saved. Which leaves us in a quandary regarding the French experience, where anti-Semitism clearly flourished and the government collaborated, but also wheremorethan75percent of allJewswereableto escapetheir Nazi antagonists and avoid being sent to Auschwitz. Why? What did the French do that the Dutch did not? Could it be that the existence of a functioning French government contributed to saving Jews, not because of ethical concerns or philosemitic policies—since neither existed in the heart of darkness that was Vichy—but for purely prag matic reasons, namely to appease the disgruntled French

population which totally opposed the roundups of Jews? And might it not also be the case that a nation with a revolutionary historical heritage that values the rights of all people, regardless of race or religion or other distinguishing characteristics, is better equipped to engage in the kind ness of strangers than a nation like the Netherlands, where no such universal concept of humanity existed? As Bob Moore and other Dutch historians have hinted, the major difference between France and the Netherlands was the French Revolution: Dutch political cul ture was one based on hierarchy, subservience, and loyalty to one's ethnic or religious group, while French republican political culture rested upon the universal Rights of Man and included the notion of rebellion against unjust authority, both born in the French Revolu tion. To quote Professor Moore: ''At a communal and individual level, there is no doubt that the traditions of deference to authority and a collective unwillingness to take risks meant that the majority of Dutch men and women were unlikely to become willingly involved in help ing Jews.''[53]

5 Resistance

For approximately three decades after the Liberation the official story of World War II in France was one of Resistance. The sixty children's books on the war published by 1948 emphasized the heroism of the Resistance while hardly mentioning the role of the Allies in liberating the nation and entirely avoiding discussing the camps or the fate of the Jews. In these books all of France, including children, takes part in expelling the Germans. De Gaulle assumes the heroic role that Pe´tain had played in Vichy literature, while Joan of Arc takes on the clothing of the Republic and the Resistance. The Marvelous Adventures of Gen eral de Gaulle as Told to the French Children became the model for this new type of

hagiography, which was based on the general's concept of himself as France's providential leader. De Gaulle, in turn, established the parameters for this mythical concept of the Resistance in his Au gust 1944 addressfrom the balcony of the ParisCity Hall: ''Paris! Paris outraged! Paris broken! But Paris liberated! Liberated by itself, liber atedbyitspeoplewiththesupportandthehelpofthewholeofFrance, ofFrance thatisfighting,ofFrancealone.'' Onlyas anafterthoughtdid he mention the Allies.[1]

In the early 1970s, notably following the publication of Robert Paxton's groundbreaking work on Vichy and the release of Marcel Ophuls's powerful documentary, The Sorrow and the Pity, the myth of a nation of resisters led by De Gaulle was exploded. As greater attention wasgiventothecamps,thefateoftheJews,collaboration,theNationa Revolution, and French fascism, a new understanding of them and appreciation of their importance emerged, reducing the Resistance to a less significant, even divisive element in the story. Yet, in recent years, the Resistance has experienced a minor revival as historians havediscovered its diversity, resilience, and magnitude.Not all French resisted, but neither did they all collaborate as some revisionism sug gested. The history of the Resistance deserves a place, once more, at the center of thestory ofFrance during the war, although a center that has been enriched and qualified by scholarship on the dark side of the war years.

The narrative of the Resistance is a complex one, not the simple heroic account that General de Gaulle provided in his memoirs. If one is to believe the general, the Resistance began with his famous BBC speech of June 18, 1940, in which he appealed to the French people to continue their struggle against the Germansrather than capitulate.But almostno oneinFranceheardthismessage,andiftheydidtheyproba bly discounted it, since de Gaulle had no authority upon which to base his appeal. In the weeks and months that followed, very few promi nent French politicians, businessmen, or military figures rallied to his side. Most members of the national elite were suspicious of him and many were hostile to his cause. At the time, given France's desperate circumstances, it seemed better to follow the Marshal and sue for peace,hopingthatFrenchsovereigntywouldbepreservedandreforn undertaken to revive the nation. Very few political figures understood, as de Gaulle did, that France's defeat was only the first skirmish in a war that would engulf the entire world before it was over.[2]

But de Gaulle did possess certain advantages in 1940 that allowed him to emerge eventually as the dominant figure in the external and, eventually, the internal Resistance. Most importantly, he had the sup port of British PrimeMinisterWinston Churchill, who recognized him as a soul brother, someone determined to fight the war to the bitter end.AlthoughChurchill'srelationswithdeGaulle wereturbulent,lead ing him at times to threaten to sever ties with the general, they sur vived the war intact, to the benefit of both of them and their causes. In the summer of 1940, Churchill's government gave de Gaulle's Free French movement the recognition it needed to begin to form a quasi government-in-exile, intent upon uniting the French behind a military movement that would eventually retake control of France. If Churchill hadnotencountereddeGaulleduringthelastdaysoftheThirdRepub lic,the externalResistancewould certainlyhavetaken adifferentpath. As it was, the relatively obscure de Gaulle, who had only become a general in the heat of battle in 1940 and who had been catapulted into politics at the last minute as under-secretary for national defense in thefinalgovernmentoftheThirdRepublic,emerged astheonlyviable and willing candidate to lead the Free French.

De Gaulle also benefited from his clear, distinct message about the reasons for the French defeat. He blamed it squarely on the highest ranks of the military. As a leading advocate of tank warfare and offen sive tactics during the 1930s, de Gaulle went against the prevailing wisdom of General Gamelin and others, including Marshal Pe´tain, that the best strategy was a defensive one in which tanks played only a minor, supporting role. He was a maverick who refused to accept the wisdom of his superiors and the hierarchical structure of the military. Instead, he spoke out loud and clear about the shortcomings of French strategy, to the point of insubordination. As a result, he was not well-liked by either his superiors or his peers, virtually none of which joined him in the summer of 1940. But, in the

long run his unpopular ity among officers helped more than hindered the Free French move ment: as the only general who did not blame the Republic for defeat, he offered the prospect of a revival of French democracy and was con sequently able to gain the support of France's leading political and trade union leaders. In this light, de Gaulle's June 18, 1940, message overtheBBCrepresented anactofmilitaryinsubordinationanddemo cratic Resistance virtually unknown in French military circles. He ac cused Marshal Pe´tain of failing to prepare the nation for war in 1940 and of submitting to the enemy. Only victory in battle and the revival of liberty in France, de Gaulle claimed, would overcome this dark heritage.[3]

At first, however, de Gaulle made little progress toward consolidat ing an external Resistance movement. Not only did very few French join his cause in the summer of 1940, but also the British had doubts abouthisleadershipabilities.AmongtheFrench,deGaullemadehead way primarily among northerners, especially Bretons who comprised over two-thirdsof the fighting men in his military by September 1940. Marginal types, such as members of the Foreign Legion, joined de Gaulle, but only one general rallied to his cause in 1940, General Ca troux in Indochina. He had similar problems with political figures: only two Third Republic politicians joined him in the first months; most prominent French exiles went to the United States because they believedEnglandwouldbedefeatedandtheyhadno faithindeGaulle. Compared to the Czechs, Dutch, Poles, and Norwegians in England, Free French forces were tiny by the end of 1940, numbering only a few thousand.[4] Yet, de Gaulle's decision to continue the war alongside Great Britain sat well with French opinion despite the July 3, 1940, British destruction of the French fleet at Mers-el-Ke´bir in Algeria to prevent it from falling into enemy hands. Pe´tain publicly accused the British of treachery, attempting to rally the deep-

seated forces of French Anglophobia in response to the attack, in which over a thou sand French sailors were killed. De Gaulle, in contrast, and despite his well-known interwar Anglophobia, supported the British on the BBC. Despite fears that the French would agree with Pe´tain on the issue, public opinion overwhelmingly sided with de Gaulle. Under the cir cumstances of German occupation, Anglophobia did not play well in France, where the only hope for defeating the Nazi enemy seemed to be British victory. The French people, for the most part, had chosen to side with the British as early as July 1940.[5]

DeGaulle'sprimaryobjectiveafterthearmistice wastogaincontrol over the French Empire in order to legitimate his claim to represent France. Churchill supported him in this, believing that Britain would benefit from friendly Free French territories. In August 1940, Camer oon and most of French Equatorial Africa rallied to de Gaulle. In an effort to consolidate his African holdings, in early September de Gaulle, with British military support, attempted to take Dakar. He failed, creating some consternation about his ability to displace Vichy. Still, by the end of the year he had rallied all of French Equatorial Africa,set up a FreeFrench radiostationinBrazzaville,andgained the support of colonial outposts in Asia and the Pacific, including French Polynesia,FrenchIndia,andNewCaledonia.DeGaullecould nolonger be considered a leader without land or followers, even though many of the latter were captive colonial peoples. Seizing the day, he traveled to French Equatorial Africa in the fall of 1940, where he delivered the Brazzaville manifesto on October 27. In it, he announced the creation of a Council for the Defense of the Empire, which was one of the first institutions created for the purpose of reviving the Republic, and he pledged''to account for hisactionsto the representativesof the French people as soon as it is possible to appoint them freely.''[6] At the same time that de Gaulle was making these important commitments to the revival of democracy and the Republic, Pe´tain was meeting Hitler at

Montoire. The contrast between the two could not have been more graphic.

Despitethese successesin1940,deGaullefailedtogaintheinterna tional recognition that he believed the Free French deserved. The United States, under Franklin D. Roosevelt, recognized Vichy as the legitimate government of France, sending Admiral Leahy to Vichy in December 1940 as United States ambassador. The British maintained contacts with Vichy. Lord Halifax, foreign minister until December 1940 and ambassador to Washington after that date, did not hide his hatred of de Gaulle and support of Vichy. Fortunately for de Gaulle, Anthony Eden took over from Halifax at the end of 1940. Eden would be the general's staunchest ally inthe British government, vetoing sev eral efforts by Churchill to cut ties with the irascible Frenchman. But theBritishmainly viewed deGaulleand the French Resistance inprac ticalterms: if they could advance theBritish cause, so much thebetter, but if they could not, Britain was willing to work with Pe´tain and Vichy to get things done. Of course, de Gaulle did not help matters any with his haughty concept of himself as the providential man. His obstreperous defense of French national honor, seemingly at all costs, became clear in 1941 when he and Churchill had a serious falling-out over the Middle East, an area of considerable interest to them both. Under the leadership of General Catroux, with significant British mili tary support, Free French forces took Syria and Lebanon from Vichy in June 1941. To secure the support of the indigenous citizens of the region,deGaullehadpromisedthemimmediatefreedomandindeper dence. But after Catroux's victory, de Gaulle violated his promise by appointing Catroux high commissioner, a position that he had agreed to abolish in a letter to Churchill. The British responded with the Acre agreement, which seemed to be an attempt to expel the French and incorporatethe territoryintotheBritishEmpire.Atanyrate,DeGaulle interpreted Acre as a hostile act and instructed Catroux to stop the British by taking control of Syria and Lebanon for France. This bold

move led the British to back down. At the end of July 1941, Great Britain recognized France's historical rights in the Middle East and its ''dominantandprivileged position'' in SyriaandLebanon.Butthemat ter did not end there, as de Gaulle publicly accused Great Britain of desiring the dismemberment of France. Incensed by these remarks, Churchill ordered the Cabinet to cease dealing with the general and to cut off Free French access to the BBC. Eventually, in September 1941, the two men patched up their differences. The Free French were al lowed to control Syria and Lebanon until the end of the war, at which time their fate would be decided through appropriate international agreements.[7]

To de Gaulle, such confrontations were necessary to maintain France's great power status and to bolster his credentials as leader of a FreeFranceindependentofBritishorAmericaninterests.IftheFrenc people saw him and Free France as puppets of the Anglo-Saxons, their denunciations of collaboration between Vichy and theGermans would lose credibility. Thus, de Gaulle maneuvered in the fall of 1941 to ob tain the recognition of the Soviet Union for his movement, convinced that this would provide him independence from and a degree of lever age with his western allies. Despite his conservative, anticommunist background, de Gaulle expressed his support for the Soviets soon after the German invasion of 1941, going so far as to offer to send troops to fight alongside them on the Eastern Front. He eagerly embraced the Soviets' demand for a second front, pressuring the Allies to open it as soon as possible. And, on January 20, 1942, he celebrated the Soviet victory in the siege of Moscow by proclaiming on the BBC that the Germanshad ''suffered oneofthe greatdefeatsofhistory,'' addingthat all good Frenchmen rejoiced over this. De Gaulle's wartime diplomacy shaped the future of France in Europe and the world, as well as his relationshipwiththeinternalFrenchResistance,whoseranksinclud many communists by 1942.[8]

De Gaulle's diplomatic juggling act became more complex as

the war progressed. In November1941, heobtained two major advantages for his Free French movement. The United States opened up the Lend-Lease funds to it, allowing it to purchase war materiel from American firms, while the British recognized de Gaulle as the head of the French internal Resistance. But one month later, on Christmas Eve 1941, de Gaulle's troops invaded the tiny Vichy-controlled islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, off the coast of Newfoundland, against the wishes of both Churchill and Roosevelt. Although the inhabitants of the islands rallied enthusiastically to Free France and American public opinion supported de Gaulle on the issue, Roosevelt's mistrust of the general increased. In 1942 de Gaulle would be kept out of the Atlantic Charter declaration agreed to by Roosevelt and Churchill and left in the dark about Allied plans to invade North Africa.[9]

Still,de Gaulleprovidedthe Allieswith enough reasonstogivehim grudging support. In November 1941, for example, he began using the republican slogan, Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, embracing democ racy more firmly in the process. He increasingly called the war a strug gle between democratic principles and their enemies. At Oxford, on November 25, 1941, he stated that ''France and England are the foyers and champions of human freedom.'' Free France, he added, is ''the party of liberty.''[10] But none of these lofty sentiments convinced the Americans that de Gaulle was anything more than an ''apprentice fas cist'' or, as one prominent figure in the American embassy at Vichy claimed, an ''apprenticeHitler.'' The mistrust was mutual. Although de Gaulle reached an agreement with the United States on February 28, 1942, which gave the Americans landing rights in New Caledonia in return for U.S. recognition of Free French rights there and elsewhere inthePacific,thegeneralbeganreferringtotheAmericansas imperial ists in May 1942 on the basis of faulty information that they were trying to take over New Caledonia for themselves. Of course, the Anglo-Saxons did not help matters any when they took over Madagas car—a French colony—in May, without

informing de Gaulle and with the accompanying U.S. State Department statement that the two allies would remain in control of the island until after the war. De Gaulle immediately sent a memo to his military commanders, warning them of an Allied effort to take over the French Empire in Africa. At the same time he opened discussions with the Soviet ambassador in Lon don, asking for access to Soviet territory for Free French forces when thefinalbreakwiththeAnglo-Saxonsoccurred.TheSovietsrecognized the Free French as representing France and promised to aid them in their efforts to regain control of Madagascar and Martinique. In Sep tember1942theSovietsfullyrecognizeddeGaulleandtheFreeFrenc as the legitimate governing authority of the French people, the first recognition of total sovereignty from a major power. In the meantime, the British quarreled with de Gaulle over Madagascar, leading the gen eraltomumblethathemightbreakwiththeAlliedpowers.InSeptem ber 1942, when Churchill and de Gaulle met to reconcile their differences, the two men reached the nadir of their stormy relation ship: Churchill accused de Gaulle of making war on England rather than on Germany and made clear to the general that he did not recog nize him as the legitimate head of the political Resistance in France. Unknown to de Gaulle, British intelligence had concluded by then that hehad no support in the ranksof the Vichy military and noreal politi cal support in France beyond symbolic recognition as the leader of the Resistance.TheBritish weresoeagertoreplacedeGaullethattheyhad latched onto an Antibes agent named Carte who claimed to have 100,000 men ready to fight when the Allies invaded France. Churchill based his September conversation with de Gaulle on these faulty bits of intelligence, insisting that France combattante (as Free France was now called) was not France, but a purely military operation and that othergroupsexisted thathad as muchclaimtogovernFrance asit did. De Gaulle replied, forcefully, that he was not fighting for England, as an auxiliary force, but rather for France, as its representative.[11]

In the wake of this stormy confrontation with Churchill, de Gaulle considered resigning as the head of the French Resistance, but he and others realized that no one else could fill the gap. By this point in the war—the fall of 1942—de Gaulle had become the linchpin of the French Resistance, without competition from internal or external ri vals. He had organized a fighting force that had distinguished itself, especially in North Africa in the summer of 1942, when the Free French stood up to the Germans under Rommel at the bloody battle of Bir Hakeim. With the support of Jean Moulin, the French prefect-turned-Resistance organizer, de Gaulle had also begun to unite the in ternal Resistance under his leadership, despite petty squabbles within its ranks. Yet, as he stated on numerous occasions during and after the war, the legitimacy of the Free French movement was constantly questioned. The November 1942 invasion of the French Empire in North Africa was carriedout by theBritishand the Americanswithout de Gaulle's knowledge. The Allies intended to appoint General Giraud as head of the external Resistance, bypassing de Gaulle completely in an attempt to marginalize him and his supporters. But this maneuver backfired, and during 1943 de Gaulle gradually marginalized Giraud despitethesupportGiraudobtainedfromtheUnitedStates.Butbefor we discuss the details of our hero's dramatic victory over Giraud we needto lookat theinternal Resistance,which hadbecome asignificant force by late 1942, both within France and in de Gaulle's bid for legitimacy.

To label the France of 1940 a nation of collaborators or resisters is misleading,ifnotinaccurate.ForthemostparttheFrenchpeople were like the characters in Samuel Beckett's Waiting for Godot, a play that is vaguely set in postwar France and in which the main characters are engaged inwaiting forthe titlefigureto appear.The French waited for the Germansto leave, for the British to winthe war,for Vichyto fulfill its promises, for the Resistance to prevail, for something to happen that would end the interminable waiting that defeat had produced. At first,

they hoped for the best from the terrible circumstances that de feat had brought. Many of them supported Vichy and, especially, Mar shal Pe´tain who provided a sense of security. His values were the values of True France, of a rural utopia that no longer existed but which resonated in the hearts and minds of many. Why not let him carry out his National Revolution, many said in 1940, without realiz ing—or caring, in many instances—that this involved the exclusion, even the incarceration, of large groups of so-called undesirables. But, by the year's end, reaction against collaboration and Pierre Laval, as the public face of Vichy's detested policies, had turned a significant minority—even a majority in some areas—against the revolutionary regime inpower. Out ofthisemerged asmallResistance movement by the end of 1940. It would gain increasing momentum as public opin ion, measured by opening millions of letters and tapping telephones, turned increasingly against Vichy and the German occupiers, in favor ofdeGaulleandtheEnglish.Francewentfrombeing a nationofreluc tant collaborators, in the wake of defeat, to a nation of reluctant resist ers, in the agony of waiting for Liberation from Nazi occupation.

The Resistancethat emergedwithinFrance, incontrast toits Gaull istcounterpartin London,wasextremelyfragmented.InGermanoccu pied France, Resistance was brutally repressed, which meant that it could not operate in the open. At the end of 1940, for example, the Germans acted without mercy against students involved in protest demonstrations commemorating Armistice Day on November 11 and against one of the first Parisian Resistance organizations, the Muse´e de l'homme group, which included a number of French intellectuals. In the south, by contrast, the Vichy regime had a more ambiguous attitude toward the Resistance—at least to begin with. Many anti-Ger man resisters were not initially anti-Vichy, and therefore could be sup ported by Vichy as a potential ally in the effort to free France from German occupation. As a result, the purity of the Resistance on which de Gaulle insisted must be taken with a grain of salt.

Later on, after Vichy was fully discredited, the complicated relationship between the Resistance and Vichy caused confusion about who really resisted and what the criteria were for determining whether one was a resister or a collaborator. A classic case of this confusion is that of Franc¸ois Mitter rand, who would be accused of collaboration and pro-Vichy senti ments, especially beginning in the 1990s. Another case, which still plagues historians, is that of the members of Uriage, a Vichy-financed schoolforfuture leadersofthe neworder.Bylooking at thesetwo case studies in ambiguity we can begin to understand what Resistance meant in the Free Zone, where Gaullism was much weaker than in occupied France.

In 1940, Franc¸ois Mitterrand fought in the French army and was captured by the Germans. At the end of 1941, after numerous failed attempts, he escaped prisoner-of-war camp and returned to France, whereheobtained ajobinVichyinMarch1942attheLe´gionfranc¸aise des combattants. As he later told Pierre Pe´an in a 1994 interview, his work involved creating files ‘‘on communists, Gaullists and those who were considered to be anti-French.’’[12] Although he claimed that he was a very minor figure at Vichy at the age of twenty-five, he moved quickly to the top, receiving one of the regime’s highest awards, the Francisque, which the Marshal granted only to his most loyal follow ers. Mitterrand denied that he took an oath to support Vichy or that he submitted a written statement that he had no Jewish relatives, but he may have done both since these were often required of Vichyoffice holders. It is certain, however, that Mitterrand was loyal to Pe´tain and thathealsoengagedinactsofresistanceduring1942afterheobtained a position at the Commissariat des prisonniers de guerre, a hotbed of opposition to the Germans, where he and his colleagues fabricated documentsforthemselvesandprisonersof war.Healsojoined aChris tian Resistance movement in June 1942 when he attended a meeting at Montmaur in the Hautes-

Alpes. There he encountered a charismatic movement that resembled a phalanstery of Boy Scouts, Christian monks, and militant patriots. It appealed to his conservative, Vichyite, Catholic principles. But these did not conflict with his anti-German attitude: by the end of the year he had played a major role in creating a new, important Resistance group, the Mouvement de re´sistance des prisonniers de guerre.[13]

Clearly, Mitterrand was a member of a Resistance movement that had strong ties to the National Revolution and the Marshal. Those ties were only broken when Mitterrand and his fellow conservative Catholicsrealizedthattheregime wascollaboratingwithGermany.For Mitterrand the turning point occurred in July 1943 when he publicly intervened at a meeting in the Salle Wagram in Paris to contradict the head of the official Vichy prisoners of war organization who claimed that for each French worker who went to Germany a POW was re leased.Mitterrandshoutedout acrossthehall,foralltohear,‘‘You area liar!’’ Still,heremainedskepticalofdeGaulleas headoftheResistance. Although Mitterrand denied vehemently that he supported General GiraudinhisstruggleagainstdeGaulleforcontrol overtheResistance, his politics were closer to Giraud’s than they were to de Gaulle’s. Only after de Gaulle had definitely triumphed over Giraud did Mitterrand grudgingly recognize his leadership. Still, as late as 1996, Mitterrand refused to identify where he stood in the Resistance, except to say that the Resistance was not ‘‘a homogeneous bloc’’ and that the real Resistance, in his opinion, was the internal, not the Gaullist one.[14]

The same confusions and ambiguities existed among the members of the Uriage school, which was established to train a new elite for Vichy’s National Revolution. Dunoyer de Segonzac, the head of Uriage in the early 1940s, was totally behind Pe´tain, believing, like many de vout Catholics, in the values of the National Revolution. He demanded that all who taught there be absolutely loyal to the Marshal, whose ideas formed the basis for the school’s pedagogy. He hoped to create

a spiritual elite that would replace the old, bankrupt republican one mired in materialism and individualism. For this purpose he attracted such Catholic idealists as Hubert Beuve-Me´ry, the future principle founder of France's greatest post–World War II newspaper, Le Monde, Emmanuel Mounier, director of the influential leftist Catholic journal Esprit, and Jean-Marie Domenach, who was the driving force behind Esprit afterMounier's death in1950. Inshort, some of themost impor tant figures in the postwar French intellectual universe would be at tracted, in the early 1940s, to this spiritualist, Pe´tainist venture to institutionalizetheprinciples of the National Revolution.Theywanted tocreatea ''communitarianorder'' opposedto ''anarchicindividualism'' and ''the reign of money,'' as Beuve-Me´ry put it in June 1941.[15]

Without question, Uriage was solidly entrenched in the interwar critique of the Republic that attacked the reign of capital and political parties and called for a spiritual and personal revolution in order to transcendthestatusquo.Mounier'sconceptofpersonalismwasclose connected with this, but so were the Resistance and Vichy's National Revolution, both of which were revolutionary in ideology and con temptuous of capitalism and politics as usual. When Jean-Paul Sartre told Denis de Rougemont, in 1944, that ''the personalists have won'' since ''everyone in France calls himself a personalist'' he was only half right for personalism was part of a greater national longing for a solu tion to the seemingly insuperable problems of the interwar period. Still,there aresignificantdifferencesbetweentheconceptsoftheCath olic spiritualists at Uriage and the ideology of the National Revolution. Uriage, under de Segonzac, rejected National Socialism as an anti-Christian movement. Mounier privately protested Vichy's anti-Semitic laws. Over time, the close ties between Uriage and Vichy, based on seemingly common objectives, were called into question. Mounier, who initially thought of Vichy as an authoritarian state in which some freedom existed, became increasingly more critical of it,

leading one Vichy official to label him a ‘‘Christian Bolshevik.’’ In January 1942 he was arrested for attacking the regime in his journal Esprit, although he was soon released for lack of evidence. Virtually everyone at Uriage turnedagainst Vichyinthespring of1942,whenPierre Lavalreturned to power, confirming that collaboration with the Germans rather than spiritual rebirth would dominate national politics. At that point, de Segonzac, for one, began to reach out to such Resistance groups as the Te´moignagechre ´tienmovementinLyon.Bytheendof1942,deSegon zac and his Uriage school had joined Henri Frenay’s Resistance move ment. In October 1942, the leaders of Uriage met and accepted a manifesto that rejected racism, embraced the equality of all men, em phasized liberty as the basis of spirituality, and called for a communi tarian solution to the age’s spiritual crisis. On November 3, 1942, on the eve of the German invasion of southern France, Hubert Beuve Me´ry condemned the National Revolution and Hitler’s national social ist revolution in a speech at Uriage. In February 1943 the Milice took over Uriage, kicking out the intellectuals who had deserted Pe´tain and the National Revolution by this time. Finally, in 1944 de Segonzac met de Gaulle in North Africa and accepted him as the head of the Resis tance. Uriage had come full circle.[16]

Franc¸ois Mitterrand and Uriage were not isolated examples of the ambiguities of Resistance. The internal Resistance, in contrast with De Gaulle’s Free French movement, contained countless examples like these. The French police, for instance, harbored a significant number of resisters whose duties required them to arrest and interrogate their comrades. If they did not show sufficient ruthlessness toward them they endangered their ability to convey informationaboutpolice activ ities to the Resistance. After the war it was often difficult to determine the Resistance credentials of these policemen, as those who had suf fered directly from their interrogations accused them of being collabo rators. Alfred Angelot wasone ofthese. Angelot was a Resistancemole in the antiterrorist

police. He used his position to warn the Resistance about police activities, but this required him to engage in occasional torture sessions against members of the Resistance in order to main tain his cover. When the war ended, Angelot spent a year trying to clear his name against accusations that he was a collaborator. Those who had been tortured by him could not believe that he was a leading figure in the police Resistance.[17]

Similar suspicions of duplicity or outright collaboration emerged about important Resistance figures that had close ties with Vichy. Henri Frenay is a prominent example of this. Frenay was close to the far right prior to and during the war. As a military man he had great respect for Marshal Pe´tain. To him, the National Revolution seemed to be the perfect response to the corrupt Third Republic. Although he objected to the armistice and collaboration, which he believed to be due to the influence of Pierre Laval, Frenay felt at home with Vichy's anti-Bolshevik, anti-Freemason, and anti-Semitic positions. Therefore, when Frenay organized a number of fellow military officers into a Resistance group in Marseille and established a network in southern France, he believed that the Marshal's government would support him against the German menace, which was the primary, if not the only, objectiveofhisorganization.HeopenlydiscussedhisResistanceobjetives with members of the Vichy government and was even invited by Vichy's head of intelligence, Colonel Rivet, to merge his movement with the intelligence organization in early 1941. But Frenay refused the offer. Over time he gravitated toward the Catholic left, away from the influence of Vichy, although in early 1942 he engaged in discus sions with Pierre Pucheu, the minister of the interior, about the role of Resistance movements such as his in Vichy's National Revolution. Those talks tainted Frenay as a collaborator in some Resistance circles, even though he rejected totally Pucheu's overtures and turned against Pe´tain and the National Revolution, convinced that Vichy was locked into collaboration with the Nazis.[18]

Out of this morally dubious beginning, Henri Frenay created one of the leading organizations in the internal French

Resistance, the Na tional Liberation Movement. In Lyon he encountered Mounier, Father Chaillet, and numerous other figures in the Catholic leftist Resistance. Like them, Frenay had a deep-seated hatred of Nazism as a barbaric threat to the Christian faith and the values of Western civilization. Although he despised bolshevism as much as Nazism, he maintained that the real enemy was Nazi Germany and was willing to ally with groups with which he disagreed as long as they focused on ridding France of the German occupiers. In 1941 and 1942 this meant creating a united Resistance movement with Lyon and eventually Paris as its headquarters. To achieve this, Frenay cooperated with Jean Moulin, whom he met in June 1941. He told Moulin at the time that only de Gaulle could possibly bring the numerous Resistance groups together, even though most people in the Resistance had only a vague idea of the general's position. Then, in the fall of 1941, Frenay's National Lib eration Movement engaged in discussions to merge with two other Resistance organizations in southern France. One of them, called Lib erte´ after the journal that it published, began as a network of Catholic law professors from Lyon, Montpellier, Clermont-Ferrand, and other university towns. They were acutely aware of the dangers of Nazism, which some of them had written about before the war. Like Frenay, they tended at first to believe in the virtues of Vichy, but this soon ended in disillusionment. Yet, Vichy did not pursue them. On the con trary, when one of their members, the Montpellier law professor Pierre-Henri Teitgen, openly called for an American victory over the Germans in December 1941, Vichy did nothing to silence him. Teitgen and his fellow law professors united with Frenay's movement in De cember 1941to form the Movement for French Liberation, which pub lished what became the greatest of the French Resistance newspapers, Combat.[19]

The merger of these two groups was relatively easy to accomplish, since Catholic religious values dominated both of them. Far more problematic, however, was the complete unification of the Resistance in southern France, although this

was the primary objective of de Gaulleandhisbrilliantpolitical agentJean Moulin.Two or three major Resistance organizations existed outside of the Combat nexus. They tended to lean more to the Left, including in their ranks members of trade unions and leftist political parties. A number of fellow travelers, sympathetic with the outlawed Communist Party, gravitated toward one of these, the FrontNational. It, like most of these movements, had very few members during the first years of the war. The southern Resistance organizations were noted more for their newspapers, which provided them with a sense of identity, than they were for their ability to recruit large numbers of resisters. Franc-Tireur and Libe´ration were among these newspaper/Resistance movements. Of the two, Libe ´ration was the most important organization. Under the leadership of Emmanuel d'Astier it recruited widely among trade un ionists and socialists, gaining the support of the SFIO leader Andre´ Philip as well as the backing of Le´on Morandat, the head of the Savoy branch of the Catholic union, the CFTC. D'Astier also recruited Ray mond and Lucie Aubrac, who organized a Resistance paramilitary group in Lyon, where Libe ´ration established its headquarters. In con trast, Franc-Tireur was known almost entirely in these early days for its newspaper, which circulated throughout the south from its Lyon base. Protestant and Jewish militants made up a considerable part of its leadership, which was in constant contact with members of both Combat and Libe´ration.[20]

These more or less organized groups do not exhaust the ranks of the Resistance, which was spread widely and thinly during the early years. A culture of Resistance existed in numerous parts of the south, fueled by memories of opposition to authoritarian governments that had preceded the Third Republic. In Marseille, where such memories were strong, the Resistance emerged rapidly among such diverse groups as Catholics, socialists, communists, and the police. The social istleadersoftheMarseilleResistance,GastonDefferreandFe ´lixGouin, essentially rebuilt the French Socialist Party during

the war. On July 14, 1942, thousands took to the streets in Marseille to protest the rule of Vichy as the police stood by, refusing to break up these illegal dem onstrations. In Grenoble, a similar urban Resistance emerged, fueled by a combination of refugees, intellectuals, and metallurgical workers. Duringthe courseofthe waritspilled overintothesurroundingmoun tains, creating some of the most tenacious Maquis Resistance units. Other groups of resistors emerged in southern cities such as Toulouse and Montpellier. They were not always connected to the larger move ments that have dominated the official story of the Resistance. The communists created a host of newspapers (L'Humanite´ de la femme and L'Humanite´ des paysans, for example, as well as scores of local papers) that attacked Vichy policies and, in some local cases, even the Nazisbeforethe invasionof theSoviet UnioninJune1941.In contrast to pro-Vichy Resistance movements, many of these communist jour nals were early opponents of the National Revolution, including its anti-Semitic policies. Communists and socialists combined to publish another prominent journal, L'Insurge´, in Lyon. With the Lyonnais ca nut's motto ''Live working or die fighting'' in its masthead, this inde pendent paper reached an impressive circulation of about 25,000 copies in southern France alone. Another leftist group, Libe´rer et fe´de´rer, emerged in Toulouse, where it had close connections with Arch bishop Salie`ge. At the local level leftist unions also succeeded in winning victories against Vichy. The miners' strike at Montceau-les MinesinJanuary1942endedin success asVichy agreedtoprovide the workers with extra rations. Later that year another small victory was won by the metalworkers of La Ciotat. Even Jews began to organize into small Resistance groups in the south: by 1942 they had created a group called the Jewish Army, as well as one or two communist news papersinYiddish.Andfinally,by1942,women hadtakenmattersinto their own hands in large parts of the south, by rioting against food shortages and demanding, sometimes successfully, their fair share of the food supplies.[21]

For the most part, the early Resistance in the south—and in the north as well—was urban in nature. Rural areas were

immune to it until they came into contact with Vichy's requisitioning of food at fixed prices and Nazi forms of governance later in the war. Peasant France experienced no significant modifications in the usual rhythm of life immediately after defeat in 1940. Village life did not change much either. Existing political divisions and quarrels continued in most small towns as though nothing had happened. In addition, Pe´ tain's reassertion of rural values appealed to these groups at first. As a result, very few peasants or rural workers joined the Resistance until the end of the war. Even after the Maquis was created in 1943, the peasants played a more or less passive role, aiding members of that organization but not joining it. Thus, throughout France the sociology of the Resistance was primarily urban (possibly two-thirds). With very few exceptions, overwhelmingly rural departments did not possess a strong Resistance movement at any time during the war.[22]

The local incidents of Resistance that historians value as evidence of opposition to Vichy and the Germans did not, however, impress de Gaulle and his agent Jean Moulin. They wanted a united movement that could be used to bolster the claims of theFree French torepresent Franceasasovereignstate.To achievethis,they werewillingtonegoti ate with the political extremes, as long as their interlocutors accepted afewfundamentalpoints:theimperativeneedtodefeatNaziGermany and the Vichy regime with the support of the Allies; the dominance of de Gaulle and the Free French movement over the internal Resistance; and the commitment to democratic values and institutions as the es sential framework for creating a new French Republic. Communists, members of the extreme right Action franc¸aise, former Vichyites, unionmembers,Freemasons,Jews,Protestants,andeven ThirdRepub lic politicians were all more or less welcomed into this large tent if they supported these points. On this basis, Jean Moulin proceeded in early 1943 to unite the southern Resistance, notably Combat, Libe´ra tion, Franc-Tireur, and the Front National into one umbrella organiza tion, the

Mouvements unis de la Re´sistance (MUR). No group completely lost its separate identity in the process, although everyone feared that this would happen. The net winners were the Free French anddeGaulle,which nowgainedsomecontroloverthesoutherninter nal Resistance and the support of a small, secret army within France that would eventually play a role in its Liberation.[23]

In the north, the Resistance emerged under the yoke of German occupation and became disillusioned early with Vichy, which seemed remote due to the demarcation line and German restrictions on Vichy propaganda. Henri Frenay's cautious support of the National Revolu tion was viewed poorly by the northern Resistance. As in the south, however,the Resistance wasfragmentedinto numerousgroups,which were mostly extremely small and limited in influence. Paris, like Lyon inthesouth,becametheircapital.Certainpartsofthe north,especially the Nord/Pas-de Calais region, which stretched across the Belgian bor der to the Channel, emerged early as centers of Resistance, based on local memories of German occupation during World War I and deep-seated Anglophile sympathies. By the end of 1940, acts of sabotage against the Germans, which numbered fifty-one in December, were commonplace in these northern departments. Nazi retaliation against the region's Resistance was brutal: when the coal miners of Nord/Pas de-Calais went on strike in 1941, the Germans executed nine and de ported 224 of them. Despite this devastating blow, the outlawed trade unions from the communist-dominated CGT to the Catholic CFTC unitedtoresisttheNazisthroughstrikes,productionslowdowns,sab tage operations, and the hiding of resisters in the mines.[24]

The Resistance in Paris dwarfed that of other parts of northern France. Yet during 1940 Resistance developed very slowly there. The first major act occurred on November 11 when a group of students protested the German occupation and heralded the Gaullist Resistance while commemorating the World War I armistice at the Arc de Triom phe. Clandestinely,

groups began to organize late in the year. One, centered around intellectuals and scholars at the Muse´e de l'Homme, was discovered and broken up by the occupiers in early 1941. Mean while, the Nazis executed several individuals for acts of sabotage and Resistance, driving home the point that these would not be tolerated. Although the communists continued to emphasize immediate, direct action, the northern, Parisian Resistance remained otherwise under ground throughoutmost of the war, waiting for the moment to rise up in support of the Allied forces. Attentisme prevailed in its ranks, not armed acts of resistance.[25]

Most of the early acts ofresistance in the north werecarried out by individuals, not organized groups. They hid soldiers in order to keep themfrombeingtaken asprisonersof war.Theyburiedweapons,with the hope that they could be used later to liberate France. They wrote anti-German graffiti on walls and attacked German soldiers. Although these isolated acts of resistance made little if any contribution to win ning the war, they advertised the existence of continued opposition, bolstering the morale of thousands who wanted to defy the Germans. Out of them eventually emerged organized groups that opposed the occupation more effectively.[26]

Themajor northernResistancegroupstendedtohavelinkstothose in the south. Thus, a Libe´ration-Nord developed, closely tied to its southern counterpart, with the prominent CGT trade union leader Christian Pineau in charge of it. It remained, primarily, a political and propaganda organization which played only a minor role in the armed Resistance.[27]Frenay'sResistanceorganizationalsohad anorthernrela tive, but it was almost completely destroyed by Nazi infiltrators. Even tually,in early 1943, it was replacedby aneworganization calledCeux de la Re´sistance, which refusedtotake apolitical standand committed itself to a military solution to the occupation. Similarly, the commu nists organizedthe Frontnationalinthe north.Itsinfluence was much

greater there than in the south, although both fronts were open to all who resisted the Nazis, regardless of political affiliation.

Two significant, independent Resistance movements emerged in the north that had no southern counterpart: De´fense de la France and the Organisation civile et militaire (OCM). De´fense de la France was the smaller of the two. It was founded in late 1940 by a number of conservative university students and professors who opposed German occupation, English influence over France, and Gaullism. At first, they believed that Pe´tain and the National Revolution were their best hope, but by late 1942 they began to rally to de Gaulle. Like the Catholics who resisted in the south, the members of De´fense de la France main tained a spiritual, attentiste position, rejecting armed Resistance, but emphasizing the barbarity of Nazism. Over time they gravitated toward a more confrontational attitude. In 1943, in the conflict be tween de Gaulle and Giraud for leadership of the Resistance, De´fense de la France initially chose Giraud. This doomed the movement's pros pects for gaining recognition as a part of the internal Resistance, even though scores of its members were executed or deported to German camps. De Gaulle and his close advisors did not trust it and kept it out of the inner circle of the National Council of the Resistance created in 1943. Despite the fact that De´fense de la France had become a devoted follower of de Gaulle by the end of the war and did not deviate from the mainstream Resistance on major issues, its last minute rallying to de Gaulle prevented it from gaining favor in Resistance circles, in con trast to Henri Frenay's equally conservative movement.[28]

The OCM was the largest and most important of the northern Re sistance movements. It was a catchall organization that included Pe´tai nists, Gaullists, pro-communist railroad workers, prominent military figures, and businessmen in its ranks. It began in the fall of 1940 as a small group of right-wing Parisian resisters who espoused anti-Semitic and pro-Vichy sentiments. In the course of 1941, however, the OCM shed most of its Pe´tainist sympathies for Gaullist ones and recruited broadly to create cells in virtually every part of the

Occupied Zone. Although its members yearned to undertake direct action against the Nazis, the organization maintained an attentiste position, engaging in espionage operations to determine German war plans and the railroad routes that transported German military supplies. Valuable informa tionwas relayed fromthe OCMto London through networksset up by Re´my and other agents of the Free French movement. By 1943 the OCM claimed to have at least 50,000 members, but this was clearly an exaggeration, since the Resistance in all of France probably had no more than 80,000 bona fide members by then. Still, it was probably the largest Resistance organization, the equal in the north of Frenay's Combatmovement in the south. Like Combat, the OCM waspolitically ecumenical, although it believed that the Resistance had to create a strongstateand executivetorevivethenationafter the war.TheOCM, whether it knew so or not, was similar to other Resistance movements in advocating a new French revolution at Liberation.[29]

As separate, independent organizations, these northern Resistance movements had very little influence or power. In fact, as individual units they were either worthless or dangerous rivals as far as the Free French were concerned. And in the eyes of the British and the Ameri cans they were unimportant to the war effort. To de Gaulle, however, the unification of these organizations would help the Free French gain legitimacy and achieve the rapid revival of France as a great power after the defeat of Germany. To accomplish those goals, de Gaulle met with leaders of the northern Resistance and dispatched emissaries to them for the purpose of uniting these disparate movements under his leadership. Pierre Brossolette, a dedicated socialist who became one of the general's most loyal and passionate supporters, organized the north behind de Gaulle in early 1943, just in time for Jean Moulin to complete the process of national union in May of that year by creating the National Council of the Resistance, a governing body which brought together all of the leading Resistance organizations—both north and south—plus the

major French trade unions and republican political parties under de Gaulle's leadership. Despite serious misgiv ings from Henri Frenay—and others—about the inclusion of discred ited political parties from the Third Republic, the council received enthusiastic, unanimous approval from the groups included. More im portantly, the council helped de Gaulle convince the skeptical British and Americans of his national legitimacyby creating a hegemonic Lib eration force that could instantly replace Vichy once the Nazis had been seriously challenged on French soil.[30]

Resistance was not confined exclusively to these relatively orga nized movements. Throughout France numerous networks (re´seaux) also emerged during the war. They were involved in countless activi ties that ranged from sabotaging war production to transporting downedBritishpilotsbacktoEngland.Thefirstnetworks werecreated in Brittany and Normandy, where fishermen took Free French fighters across the Channel as early as the summer of 1940. Others soon emerged in places like the Vosges Mountains, whose inhabitants helped thousands of French prisoners of war escaping German camps make it to unoccupied France. In the Pyrenees, hundreds of mountain guides formed networks to help refugees—most of them Jews—flee the Nazis. Under British direction the Special Operations Executive set up units throughout France to organize and carry out sabotage and intelligence activities. The radio operators among them undertook an especiallyriskytask;theiraveragelifeexpectancy onthejob wasabout sixmonths. Inall, asmanyas266 networks wereestablishedinFrance between 1940 and 1945, mobilizing about 150,000 French men and women over the course of the war. Whether they made a major differ ence or not is debatable. The great historian of the Resistance, Henri Michel, has argued that with proper Allied support they could have accomplished far more than the ineffective and inaccurate bombing

missionsthattheAlliescarriedoutinFrance.Asitwas,theAllies were highly skeptical of the military effectiveness and political reliability of the Resistance and refused to provide it with sufficient material to carry out sustained attacks.[31]

Alliedskepticismfollowedfrom alackofconfidenceinthemilitary effectiveness of irregular fighters and the slow development of mass Resistance to German occupation beyond minor acts of defiance such as the singingof the Marseillaise or shunning Germansoldiers incafes and other public places. Furthermore, when a more or less mass Resis tance developed in 1943, it seemed to be tainted with an anarchical, sometimes pro-communist political orientation that the Allies feared. The British and Americans did not want to defeat the Germans in order to see them replaced by an unruly leftist government. But Allied assessmentsofcommunistinfluenceintheResistance wereinaccurate. We now know that the Communist Party's role in the Resistance was never as great as it seemed during the war. The party of the so-called 75,000 fusille´s probablylostonly afewthousand mentoGermanfiring squads. The front organization, the Front National, was never very powerful and mainly comprised of non-communists, while the most important communist-led Resistance organization, the Franc-Tireurs Partisans, probably included no more than 20,000 fighters at its peak, manyofwhom werenotpartymembers.Furthermore,fromthebegin ning of the war the French Communist Party leadership, both in Mos cow and in France, proclaimed that the party was interested exclusively in national Liberation and not revolution. Maurice Thorez, the party's leader in exile in the Soviet Union, repeatedly called for ''unity of action,'' appealing to French communists to unite with other forces from theLeftto the extreme Right, including LaRocque and his followers, for the purpose of defeating the Nazis. At no point did Thorez and the party challenge de Gaulle's leadership of the Resis tance. They were clearly nationalists first and revolutionaries a distant second.[32]

Still, some observers have pointed to the Maquis as a

communist-led part ofthe Resistance that couldhave carried out asocialist revolu tionafterthe war.Butthereis noevidenceforthis:communistshelped individualsjointheMaquis,providingthemwithfalsepapersand con nections, but very few members of the Maquis were communists. Whatis certainisthatthemostimportantdevelopmentinthecreation of a mass Resistance movement was the Nazis' attempt to requisition French laborers, many of whom were on the Left politically, to work in Germany. When that happened, beginning in late 1942, French workersfledtothecountrysidetoescape,formingthelegendary,seem ingly anarchical ''Maquis,'' named after the shrubs that dominated the southern French rural landscape. In 1943, following the implementa tion of the STO (the compulsory labor service), the Maquis mush roomed. The Allies and the Free French now called on French workers tojoinit,in aneffortto channelthemintothis newformofResistance. RobertSchumann,speaking ontheBBCinthefallof1943,encouraged workers to desert the STO and hide out in small groups in the French countryside. He implied that the Allies would come to their aid, but this never materialized in any major way. At the same time some lead ers in the Church broke with long-standing theological positions on matters of conscience and faith, in light of this massive opposition to legal authority. They proclaimed that Catholics could decide according to their individual conscience whether or not to obey the call-up for the STO. Overnight, Catholic clerics grudgingly adopted a Protestant conception of conscience that had been anathema to them since the Reformation, if not before.[33]

The STO brought about a qualitative and quantitative change for the internal French Resistance: from a small, marginal movement that was basically urban and middle class, the Resistance suddenly became a mass movement that included workers and peasants in its ranks. By late 1943 or early 1944 it was a formidable force that could potentially challenge the

Germans in large parts of France, especially in the south where the Maquis was most solidly entrenched. But, as we shall see in thenext chapter,theMaquishad seriousproblemsof organizationand armament that limited its strength in the last year or two of the war. And it faced serious opposition from many in France who viewed its members as nothing more than bandits. In contrast to the myth of the Maquis, public opinion as measured by Vichy and the Germans was not always on its side in 1944. In order to survive, the Maquis often had to resort to robbery in the small towns of southern France that bordered its mountain redoubts. Banks, bakeries, grocery stores, and other providers of fundamentals were targeted by these ‘‘primitive re bels,’’ who believed that their cause transcended the normal rules of conduct and should be supported by all goodFrench men and women. Thepubliccondemnedmostoftheseacts,butgenerallyrefusedtotake action against the Maquis. Only when the Maquis attacked the Ger mans directly did the French support its activities, and even then Ger man reprisals against people unassociated with the Maquis turned some against it. Still, the Maquis was an enormous success overall. Largely because of it only 1.6 percent of the French went to Germany as laborers during the war, compared to 6.6 percent of Belgians. And, the Maquis also succeeded in pinning down German troops that could have been used to fight the invading Allied forces.[34]

By about the middle of 1943 the French Resistance had been brought together into one organization, led by General de Gaulle, de spite the efforts of the Americans and, to a lesserextent, the British, to prevent de Gaulle from gaining the upper hand. De Gaulle had been deliberately kept in the dark in late 1942 when the Allies launched the North African campaign, despite the fact that French territory in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia was involved. The Americans hoped to place their men in power, but the American choice, General Giraud, lacked legitimacy and soon lost out to de Gaulle in the struggle for control over the Resistance. Giraud was too close

to Vichy and too oblivious to politics, unlike de Gaulle whose solid anti-Vichy and pro-democratic credentials gained him solid support from French political leaders ranging from communists and socialists on the Left to mem bers of the Action franc¸aise on the Right. In the first half of 1943 de Gaulle outmaneuvered Giraud to gain the grudging acquiescence of even staunchly anti-Gaullist American diplomats.

DeGaulle prevailedbecause ofhis own strengthsandGiraud's glar ing weaknesses. In early 1943, de Gaulle gained the support of the great socialist leader, Le´on Blum, as well as the backing of the French Communist Party. With the creation of the National Council of the ResistanceinMay1943 everymajorparty,tradeunion,andResistance organization in France recognized de Gaulle as the leader of the na tional Resistance. Even before this, de Gaulle had gained the support of the National Committee, which had been set up early on for the purpose of broadening the legitimacy of the Free French movement. De Gaulle also had on his side a rising military star, General Leclerc, who had joined de Gaulle in London in 1940 and whose army played a significant role in the defeat of the Germans in North Africa. With Leclerc, the bulk of the French Empire, and the internal and external Resistance behind him, de Gaulle dominated the scene. Only Roose velt's obstinate support of General Giraud stood in his way.

Giraud had none of the advantages that de Gaulle possessed. In fact, General Leclerc, following significant victories in Libya and Tuni sia, wrote Giraud in April 1943 instructing him to rally behind de Gaulle: ''You have no other choice, and make sure you do it immedi ately.''GiraudlackedpoliticalcredentialstoleadtheResistance.He was a typical authoritarian officer, totally contemptuous of the democratic process and happy with the politics of Vichy and the National Revolu tion.He sawnoreasontochangetheVichy-imposedlegalorder,which had instituted anti-Semitic laws and incarcerated thousands of Jews in concentration camps. To

rescue Giraud from his worst political in stincts, Jean Monnet rushed from Washington to North Africa in Feb ruary 1943 to inform him that the Americans would not accept a reactionary, racist administration in the region. Monnet even wrote a speech that Giraud delivered on the virtues of democracy. But no one, not even Giraud, believed in his conversion.[35]

Totally outclassed by de Gaulle, Giraud eventually gave in to the general, and his most ardent backers, such as Monnet and Maurice Couve de Murville, accepted de Gaulle's leadership. By late May 1943, Giraud realized that de Gaulle had the upper hand, following the cre ation of the National Council of the Resistance, and he agreed to share power with de Gaulle in the French Committee of National Liberation (CFLN), which was to be the sovereign authority for France as long as the war lasted. Once more, Giraud's base of support was eroded by the exclusion of supporters ofthe National Revolutionfrom the CFLN and by the requirement that everyone pledge allegiance to the Republic and condemn the Pe´tainist ''arbitrary regime of personal power.'' Roo sevelt and the Americans triedto counter thissetback byinsisting that they would provide arms to the Fighting French only if Giraud was commander-in-chief of the military forces. Despite Giraud's resulting formal military leadership, de Gaulle remained in charge, since he was appointed to head the ''military committee'' that had jurisdiction over allfightingforces.Consequently,bytheendofJuly,deGaullehadtotal command of the civil and military powers of the French government-in-exile. He reinforced his authority by rallying important Vichy mili tary leaders such as General Juin to the Fighting French. And in the fall of1943 he consolidatedhispolitical powerwhenthe CFLN created a Consultative Assembly to meet in Algiers until a provisional govern mentcouldbeestablished onFrench soil.Itincluded abroadspectrum of representatives from both the internal and external Resistance, bringing together in one body all political parties and groups that op posed Vichy and Pe´tain. In a November 3, 1943, speech that inaugu rated the assembly, de

Gaulle proclaimed that it was ‘‘a first step in the resurrection of the French representative institutions upon which the future of our democracy depends.’’ Significantly, the Allied powers thought the same thing. De Gaulle had won their reluctant, grudging support by establishing that Fighting France was based on democratic political values and had the backing of the leading democratic forces within France.[36]

General de Gaulle, in his war memoirs, best captured the essence ofthisstrugglewithGiraud.To deGaulle,Giraud wasasuperbmilitary leader, but one who lacked political understanding. When the two met in Casablanca in January 1943, Giraud told de Gaulle that he had no interest in politics, ‘‘that, de Gaulle wrote, he never listened to anyone who tried to interest him in a theory or a program, that he never read a newspaper or turned on the radio.’’ He criticized Vichy only for its refusalto fighttheGermans.Hehad nousefor theinternalResistance, which hefound ‘‘incomprehensibleif notreprehensible’’ because of its ‘‘revolutionary character.’’ De Gaulle wascertainthat such a mancould never lead the Liberation of France, for the French, he correctly under stood, needed a government that would ‘‘condemn Vichy, proclaim that the armistice was always null and void, and identify itself with the Republic and, in the eyes of the world, with the independence of France.’’[37]

Were all French resisters? Or collaborators? Or neither? Or both? France was probably no better or worse than most European countries in resisting the Nazis. Nevertheless it is more accurate to call France a nation of resisters than one of collaborators, although neither appella tion is totally appropriate or accurate. Resistance was greatest among those groups that had a history of rebellion against authority, such as theProtestantsoftheCe
´vennesorvariousmarginalethnicgroupssuch as the Bretons and the Basques. It was also high among persecuted groups such as Jews, Spanish refugees, and communists. In addition, workers and peasants whose labor and products were demanded by the

Germans and Vichy joined the Resistance to escape forced mobili zation. Workers'adherence tothe Maquisin 1943 made theResistance a mass movement that vastly outstripped the forces of collaboration by the end of that year.

Of course there were many groups that did not eagerly or openly embrace Resistance. Among them were members of the extreme right political parties of the Third Republic, many of whom collaborated during the war. Less obvious were members of the Radical Party, which had been the backbone of the Third Republic, but deserted it in 1940 and mostly eschewed the Resistance movement. Catholics, too, were reluctant to resist. Catholic culture, in general, favored the status quo,whichinthis casewasPe´tainandVichy.The onemajorexception to this rule was the Catholic Left, which embraced the Republic and acceptedtheEnlightenment as asecularinterpretationoftheChristian dispensation. The military, too, found itself tied to a culture of obedi ence. Although there was a small military Resistance movement, the Organisation de Re´sistance de l'Arme´e, it was dwarfed by the large numbers of officers who adhered to Vichy and accepted without ques tiontheGermandissolutionoftheFrenchmilitaryinlate1942.Finally, bigbusinesstendedtocooperatewiththeGermans,themostnotoriou case being the Renault automobile company. Still, a number of busi nessestriedtoprotecttheirworkersfromtheSTOforcedlaborrequire ment, including the Michelin tire company.[38]

Intellectuals comprise a special category in the Resistance. In a sense, the Resistance was an intellectual movement. The main activity of most Resistance organizations was to publish clandestine newspa pers, which were intended to inform people of events unreported in the censored press and to bolster morale among the faithful. Perhaps the best known of these journals was Combat, which Albert Camus edited in the last years of the war. Beyond that, intellectuals formed numerous small Resistance groups, such as the communist-inspired Comite´ national des e´crivains, which oversaw the politics of

intellectu als. They also wrote and published novels, plays, and essays, some of which were subversive of the Nazi status quo. Without doubt, Jean-Paul Sartre's play, The Flies, which attacked the German occupation before hundreds if not thousands of theatergoers, was a cultural high point in the Parisian intellectual Resistance. But not all intellectuals sided with Sartre and the Resistance. Some, such as Drieu la Rochelle, backed the Nazis and collaborated openly. Under his editorship, the prestigious French intellectual journal, the Nouvelle Revue franc¸aise, was transformed into a collaborationist mouthpiece in which Resis tance intellectuals mostly refused to publish, choosing instead to use such journals as the Marseille-based Cahiers du sud and various clan destine Parisian publications. Probably the most successful of these Resistance presses was E´ditions de minuit, the publisher of the great Resistance novel by Vercors, The Silence of the Sea, which propagated the Manichean myth that the good French man or woman refused to carry on any sort of relationship with theoccupier, nomatterwhat the circumstances might be. Such purity never existed, not even among intellectuals,butthebook servedthepurposeofprojectingtheconcept ofanationunitedagainsttheenemy.Forthemostpart,theintellectual Resistance was a limited, Parisian phenomenon that very few people experienced firsthand.[39]

Yet, however limited, the impact of intellectuals' words in French life both during and immediately after the war should not be underes timated. Although not without wartime moral shortcomings himself, Jean-Paul Sartre, in particular, emerged out of the ranks of French intellectuals as the dominant voice of Resistance. He expressed the mentality, the spirit, of the war in his 1944 essay, ''La Re´publique du silence,'' when he proclaimed famously, ''We have never been so free as underGermanoccupation.'' He added:''We were onthebrink of the deepestknowledgethat mancanhaveofhimself.Becauseman'ssecret is not his Oedipus complex or his inferiority complex, it is the limit of his freedom,

it is his power to resist torture and death.’’[40] More than anyone else, Sartre captured the existential moment that the vast ma jority of French people had experienced, either firsthand or indirectly, during thesedismal yearsof occupation, collaboration,andResistance.

Women provide us with another aspect of the complexities of de termining who resisted. As we shall see in the next chapter, a signifi cantnumberof womencollaboratedwiththeenemyand wereseverely punished for it. The story of these collaborationist women has been told over and over, while the more important involvement of women in the Resistance has been muted, if not suppressed. On a day-to-day level, women both resisted and collaborated, just as men did. Life was too complex under Vichy and the Germans to follow a Manichean agenda. At least this was true for most people, including the Sartres, Camus, and Beauvoirs of the world.[41] The haute couture industry, which was dominated by women entrepreneurs and clients, provides a striking example of the fine line between Resistance and collabora tion.To survive,theheadsoftheParisianestablishmentshadtocollab orate with the Germans, but they resisted the Nazis in various subtle ways, among them producing whimsical hats that mocked the occupa tion. The jeweler, Cartier, created a piece called ‘‘The Bird in a Cage’’ that depicted the captivity of the French and their future Liberation, which occurred when the cage opened to free the imprisoned bird.[42]

Women also joined the Resistance to do the same things that men did. In most cases they were excluded from military matters and were relegated to clerical tasks and liaison operations. Yet, they often risked their lives in dangerous assignments such as transporting Resistance materials. Some women were involved in running the networks stretch ing from Belgium to the Pyrenees that smuggled downed British pilots and other important individuals out of the continent. Others rescued Jews. Jewish children, in particular, were protected by extensive net worksofwomen,manyofwhom

werenuns,aswesawintheprevious chapter.Ingeneral, womenwhojoinedtheResistancecamefromfami lies that had a history of activism. A disproportionate number of them wereJewish,socialist,communist,Catholicleftist,orProtestant.Inth sense, the composition of the female Resistance mirrored that of the male. But unlike the members of the male Resistance, the women who resisted never gained significant public recognition of their actions. Many women who returned from the German camps, where they had been interred for their Resistance activities, received no sympathy from their compatriots. In one case, a female teacher who asked for leave in order to restore her health was told that she had already had a vacation in Germany. For the most part, French men, whether they were Pe´tainists or Gaullists, believed that women belonged in the home. Basking in the glory of the Resistance was a man's job.[43]

Still, the moment of the Resistance remained for all to remember, no matter how much it would be tarnished in the years after the war.

By 1944, on the eve of the Allied invasion, the Resistance had become a formidable movement in France. By then there were 100 national Resistance newspapers and as many as 500 regional ones. Their total circulation was about 2 million; their readership was probably several times that number. Before the Allied landings in June, the Resistance had about 1 million more-or-less active members within France. Out sideofFrance,deGaulleandtheFightingFrenchhadamassed550,00 troops, of whom 250,000 were from the French colonies. In compari son, the forces of collaboration inFrance neversurpassed 250,000 dur ingthe courseofthe war.Yet,theoverwhelming concernoftheFrench in 1944 was not the Resistance but survival. Food was thenumber one topic discussed in the letters opened by Vichy and the Germans. If anything, the Resistance, at least in the form of the Maquis, was viewed with suspicion, if not hostility, by the majority. And yet the Resistance would soon sweep all before it as the French

joined the cause in massive numbers after D-Day. France may not have been the nation of resisters that de Gaulle believed it was, but it clearly was not a nation of collaborators. As one historian of the period has claimed, more French men and women participated in public affairs during the Liberation of France than at any other time in the history of the country.[44]

6 Liberation

By the end of 1943, the Resistance had become a powerful, united force, with Charles de Gaulle in charge of both the Fighting French headquartered in London and Algiers and the internal Resistance. No other Western European country under Nazi occupation had devel oped such an efficient, united movement to oppose it. The constituent members of this Resistance agreed that the new France must be a parliamentary democracy, with a strong state that provided for the generalwelfare of the people by reigningin theworst excesses of capi talism, nationalizing vital sectors of the economy, and extending health, unemployment, and old age insurance to all people. Socialists, communists, and Christian democrats all adhered to these principles, despite differences regarding their practical implementation. Both ad vocates of a market economy and of socialism generally believed that the French economic system needed some form of planning, although notthe heavy-handedkindthat Vichyadvocated.Outof their different positions wouldemerge thepostwar planningmechanisminaugurated byJeanMonnet:democraticplanningcenteredaround asetofnational priorities that allowed the state and the market, along with employers and workers, to play major roles in determining what should be done to achieve productive, equitable economic growth. Although many members of the Resistance were disillusioned by the failure to fully implement the Resistance Charter of social, political, and economic

objectives as the revival of Third Republic–style politics undermined the revolutionary e´lan of wartime politics, still the legacy of the Resis tance became an integral part of the Fourth and Fifth Republics, shap ing the role of the state, the welfare of French citizens, and the parameters of debate on crucial issues.[1]

In late 1943 and early 1944, however, the Resistance was not yet a hegemonic, mythical movement. On the contrary, its powers were greatly circumscribed by the reluctance of the United States to recog nize it as the legitimate representative of the French people and the related weakness of its military forces. At times, the United States at tempted to divide the Resistance and, it seems, conquer it. For exam ple, when Henri Frenay and Combat desperately needed financial resourcesinearly1943,theUnitedStateschanneledittothemthroug Geneva, without consulting de Gaulle or providing aid to the Free French in general. But most of the time the Americans refused any dealings with the Resistance. The State Department even refused to negotiate with de Gaulle and the CFLN on what the status of France would be after the D-Day invasion. The U.S. government.intended to set up a military government called AMGOT (Allied Military Govern ment for Occupied Territories) in liberated France as it had in Italy. Not until July 1944, after the massive popular support of the CFLN became evident, did Washington recognize it as ‘‘competent to ensure the administration of France.’’[2]

American reluctance to recognize de Gaulle and the CFLN contrib uted to the problem of military weakness. Neither the Americans nor the British were willing togive the French Resistance asignificant role in the war. De Gaulle was kept deliberately out of the planning for the invasion of France, although he was told that his troops would partici pate init.Allied weaponsthatcouldhaveaided theinternal Resistance in its struggle against Vichy and the Germans were not provided, or were insufficient for the task. As a result, the size of the Resistance was limited by lack of military supplies, if

nothing else. The promise made by the British to aid all Frenchmen who evaded German labor conscription was notfully kept. Consequently, the Maquislacked even basic necessities. Not until the very end of the German occupation, when the balance was tipping in favor of the Allies and the French were joining the Resistance in massive numbers, did the Allies begin to provide for this burgeoning, important anti-German movement, re inforcing its numbers in the process. But it would be wrong to assume that the weakness of the Resistance was due exclusively to the failure of the Allies to supply it. We should also keep in mind that General de Gaulle's Fighting French movement failed to obtain many recruits, despite years of pleading. Less than one-half of De Gaulle's Liberation army of about 575,000 came from metropolitan France. The rest came from the Empire mainly from the North African army formerly con trolled by Vichy.[3]

DespiteseriouslimitationsandthefactthattheAlliedforcesplayed the dominant role in liberating France, de Gaulle and the Resistance rehabilitatedFrenchhonorandglorythroughtheiractionsin1944an 1945. France emerged out of the ashes of the war as one of the four powers occupying Germany, with one of the five permanent seats in the United Nations Security Council, and with its citizens believing that thenation hadrisenup en massetooverthrowtheNazi occupiers. By December 1944, almost two-thirds of the French believed that the nation was once again a great power.[4]

This miraculous turnaround from pariah status among nations to the self-image as a great power occurred within the course of a year or less and was a consequence of the success of the Liberation of France from Nazi occupation. This success led the French to believe that, as a nation, they had stood up against the German occupation.[5] Only a small portion of them had collaborated, the French believed at the war's conclusion. And those who did collaborate were punished, in some cases severely, during the postwar purges. In every part of France, every region, every province, every major or even minor city,

Resistance forces had risen up to oppose the enemy and take control of matters in what most perceived to be a smooth transition from rule by Vichy to governance by the Fourth Republic. Paris,the greatest city in the French-speaking world, was liberated by French forces, not by the Allied powers. All the French knew this, they were all aware of what had happened in their community, and almost all of them be lieved that they had participated in the Resistance, however small a role they might have played. All of France, the French thought, had resisted the enemy, or at least opposed collaboration. It would take a long time—over twenty years—for this powerful myth of total Resis tance to be punctured.

The history of what happened in 1944 and 1945 is probably not as Manichean in nature as Resistance triumphing over collaboration. Although the overwhelming majority opposed collaboration, most were attentiste regarding the Resistance and the overthrow of German rule. In fact, as late as the summer of 1944, as Allied troops were flooding into France, the French were focused on food shortages and bombing raids. In the 2 million letters that the authorities opened and analyzed in July 1944, the Resistance ranked only sixth in importance, far behind the omnipresent subject of staying alive.[6] By that point, however, the Resistance had become a major player in the Liberation of France, gaining more recruits every day and taking open military action against the Germans. The attentiste phase of the Resistance had come to an end with D-Day if not before. Increasingly during the courseof1944theFrenchbecameinvolvedinfreeingthemselves,wit mixedresults.Thestory oftheirLiberationfromNazirule, seenalmost totally from their perspective, without the retelling of the Allied victo ries in 1944 and 1945, is what follows.

The struggle for Liberation began in 1943 with two major French offensives. General Giraud, in a maneuver that surprised everyone in cluding de Gaulle, invaded Corsica in September 1943, taking the is land from the Italians in a quick campaign with the support of the local communist Resistance. Despite the Corsican success, however, Giraud did not avoid

eventual disgrace. De Gaulle successfully used Giraud's supposedly duplicitous secrecy and pro-communist tactics against him to obtain from the CFLN his dismissal as commander-in chiefinApril1944.Alsoin1943,GeneralJuincommandedthe120,000 French troops who fought with the Allies in Italy, in which they performed remarkably well until they were redeployed in August 1944 for the invasion of southern France. Although the number of troops Juin commanded was small, the French military in Italy accom plished its main objective, which was to be a significant part of the Alliedcoalition on thecontinent inthe effort to restoreFrance togreat power status and gain complete sovereignty for the nation after the Liberation.[7]

Just as significant for regaining status and sovereignty were the actionsoftheinternalResistance.Herethedifficulties werefargreater. For one, after the German invasion and occupation of southern France in late 1942, the internal Resistance could no longer rely on the Vichy government to tolerate its activities. The Nazis now called the shots in the south, and they soon began infiltrating and breaking up the Resis tance. In the summer of 1943, the Lyon Resistance, which was the center of the movement in the south, was devastated by the arrest of leading figures, including de Gaulle's emissary to the internal Resis tance, Jean Moulin. Most of the Lyon leaders who escaped the Nazi roundup left for Paris, where they remained for the rest of the war. The Vichy administration, which had been infiltrated by numerous Resistance moles—as many as 2,000 by the end of 1943—still pro vided valuable information, but could offer little protection, especially after the fascist Milice began ruthlessly uprooting anyone who op posed collaboration with the Germans.[8]

With the Germans in control of the entire country, the Resistance faced serious obstacles to carrying out military actions without major Alliedsupport.Yet,priortoD-Day,Resistanceforcesundertook anum ber of actions, which made the Germans feel increasingly isolated and highly

suspicious of even friendly French. Acts of sabotage increased greatly in late 1943 and early 1944, as part of the campaign to destabi lize the Germans. In December 1943 and January 1944 the Resistance destroyed 111 railroad locomotives in an effort to undermine Nazi use of the French transportation system. From that point on, the railroads were seriously disrupted by the Resistance, culminating after D-Day in the massive destruction of rail lines and trains in a successful effort to delay if not prevent the deployment of German troops and equipment to the western front. But acts of sabotage were not limited to the rail roads, as can be seen in the examples of Marseille and Clermont-Ferrand. In Marseille, beginning in January 1943 with the Nazi destruction of the quarters around the Old Port, acts of sabotage be came a daily occurrence, even though the police arrested thousands of citizens. The Germans eventually discovered that their efforts to stop these acts were thwarted by the police intendant for Marseille and the regional prefect, both of whom belonged to the Resistance. Similarly, in Clermont-Ferrand and the surrounding Auvergne, confrontations between Germans and the Resistance increased dramatically during the last years of the war: between November 1943 and August 1944 over 2,400 incidents were recorded ranging from raids on city halls to sabotage of factories. After D-Day, the police in the area deserted their posts in large numbers to join the Resistance, while those who re mained in their jobs were reluctant to support the Germans against their compatriots.[9]

Beyond the cities a goodpart of thesouthern countryside had gone over to the Maquis by early 1944. As H. R. Kedward has pointed out, Vichy had lost the support of the rural areas in the south by 1944 through misguided policies of excessive taxation and requisitioning of food at prices below market value, while the Maquis had gained peas ant backing through attention to local concerns and support of re gional cultures. The Protestant culture of the Ce´vennes was openly antiauthoritarian,aswehaveseen,butthe samewastrueoftheHaute-Savoie where the memory of

Resistance to the Revolution and even, in some places, to Richelieu, fueled Resistance to Vichy and the Ger mans. Other areas, such as Quercy, had similar antistatist traditions, while the Aude modeled its Resistance after the Cathars. These local, cultural factors may not entirely explain why the Maquis took hold in the south, but they were often more important than allegiances to political movements such as the Popular Front. Most members of the Maquis did not join it to back political causes, such as the Communist Party'sconcept ofrevolutionary upheaval. Thereis noevidence tosup port the commonly accepted interpretation of the Maquis as a tool of the French communist cause. The number of communists in the Ma quis was never large and they were, above all, French patriots, fully supportiveof deGaulleand the Liberation of thenation. Whatever the reasons, by 1944 the rural areas of the south were solidly behind the Resistance. The subprefect of Le Vigan, in the Ce´vennes, informed his superiors in the spring of 1944 that many of the cantons in his part of the department of the Gard ''live in absolutely independent fashion, immune to all control.'' The Germans, who were aware of this, began toactinearly1944,movingintothemountainstobreakuptheopposi tion, massacring the local population and burning their homes in an effort to prevent sabotage. In the south the battle for the Liberation of France began well before D-Day.[10]

By this point, in early 1944, the Maquis was ready to confront the Germans openly, in pitched battle if necessary, but serious obstacles emerged to caution restraint. For one, de Gaulle did not trust the Ma quis to be loyal to his agenda; he feared that the communists would dominate it and use it for their own political purposes. He advocated restraint ratherthanconfrontation,hoping to unleash theMaquis only after D-Day and then for narrow military objectives that he would de termine. For that purpose, de Gaulle worked hard to centralize power in the hands of the CFLN, over which he presided. He parachuted his military delegates into France in September 1943 with orders to bring allparamilitary

Resistance organizationsundertheir control. By D-Day thesegroupswereтheoreticallyunderthecommandofGeneralKoeni the head of the French Forces of the Interior (FFI), and directly ac countable to de Gaulle. At the same time, de Gaulle worked with reli able elements of the internal Resistance to create a new administrative apparatus in liberated France, again under his control. By D-Day he had already selected half of the departmental prefects who would take over from Vichy. In short, de Gaulle restricted as much as possible the internal Resistance's influence over postwar government. And, on this point he was in total agreement with Churchill and the British. As a result, neither de Gaulle nor the British offered much support to the southern French freedom fighters when they battled Vichy and the Germans in early 1944.[11]

In the Hautes-Alpes, on the plateau of Glie`res, the Maquis chose to fight openly against Vichy in February and March 1944, after being harassed by the Milice for an extended period of time. The Allies had promised to parachute weapons and supplies into the area to support it, but little help materialized. Even so, the Resistance prevented Vi chy's forces from taking the plateau, making it necessary for the Ger mans to finish the job. After heavy bombardment of the Maquis's positions, 20,000 Wehrmacht troops stormed the plateau and subdued the Maquis in late March. The Germans lost 300 men in combat, while the Maquis suffered 250 deaths. Vichy courts martial added to the casualty total by sentencing numerous members of the Resistance to death, and the Germans shot survivors on the spot or hauled them off to concentration camps. Although this represented a major defeat for the guerillas, it also discredited Vichy totally in the eyes of the local populationandcontributedslightlytoAlliedvictorybydivertingthou sands of German troops that could have been used elsewhere. But Glie`res would also become one of the sacred places of the Resistance, where the French stood up alone, without Allied support, and fought heroically in a losing battle against all odds. In the French story of the war, Glie`res was the first

battle in the Liberation of southern France and facilitated the rapid success of the Allied invasion of Mediterra nean France in August 1944.[12]

After the Glie`res fiasco the Resistance chose to wait for the Allied invasion before confronting the Germans again. By this point, in the spring of 1944, everyone knew that D-Day was imminent. Allied bom bardments had been stepped up greatly. Major northern French cities such as Le Havre, Nantes, and Rouen were flattened by heavy bomb ing. Even Paris suffered from almost daily Allied bombing by the end of May 1944. As many as 5,000 Parisians died in such raids during the course of the war. Altogether, the Allies carried out 7,444 bombing raids that killed 36,000 French during 1944. Vichy reacted to these with a propaganda campaign that condemned the Allies for ‘‘aiding’’ France by killing her people and destroying her cities, but the French overwhelmingly blamed the Germans for their situation.[13]

The average French citizen who lived through these bombing raids inthespringof1944probablyknewas muchaboutD-Day asdeGaulle, who was kept out of the inner circle of military planning for the inva sion of France. The Allies had no intention of using the French army in Operation Overlord, as the invasion was called. Nor did they want to give de Gaulle’s provisional government any sort of recognition or authority onFrenchsoil. Theymerely wantedto usethe Resistancefor their own military purposes. This led to serious conflict between de Gaulle and Churchill over the issue of the recognition of the French government-in-exile just before the Normandy invasion. In a meeting between the two in early June, Churchill burst out in anger against de Gaulle’s obstinate refusal to accept the Allied plan: ‘‘Every time I have todecidebetween you andRoosevelt,I shallalwayschoose Roosevelt.’’ This led de Gaulle to refuse to speak on the BBC in support of the invasion. He claimed that he could not tell his countrymen to accept the ‘‘occupation’’ of their country. Churchill responded that he wanted de Gaulle locked up, adding, ‘‘He must not be allowed

to set foot in France!'' But de Gaulle gave in at the last moment and spoke on the radio on June 6,appealing to the French to coordinatetheir actions ''as closelyaspossiblewiththosecarriedoutatthe sametimebytheAllied and French armies.'' Still, Churchill fumed over their confrontation and did not allow de Gaulle to set foot on French soil until June 14. Shortly after this, the British government recognizedthe French provi sional government asthe government ofFrance. DeGaulle won Roose velt over to his position in July 1944 during a hastily arranged trip to Washington.[14]

What had happened after D-Day to change the attitudes of these reluctant allies? Simply put, as the U.S. intelligence service, the OSS, reported, the Fighting French and the internal Resistance quickly re vealedinbattlethatthey wereunitedbehindthegeneralandhisprovi sional government and that they were a formidable force in the Liberation of France. The careful, methodical preparation that de Gaulle and his supporters had undertaken for the invasion and defeat of the Germans and Vichy began to pay off within weeks, if not days, after June 6, 1944. After the war General Eisenhower would state that the French contributed greatly to the Allied victory. Although that claim has been used by the Resistance to inflate its importance, it is nevertheless true. Recently, it has been corroborated by evidence from the German archives, which indicates that the Wehrmacht viewed the French Resistance as a formidable force that had to be neutralized if the Germans were going to prevail after D-Day. As a result, consider able German troops were dispatched to western and southern France inanunsuccessfuleffortto eliminatetheMaquis.Clearly,theevidence indicates that without the serious involvement of the French in their Liberation, World War II in Europe would have lasted much longer. TheResistance wasnotaninsignificant movement,butrather onethat helped defeat the Nazis, forced Vichy to capitulate without a major struggle or civil war—such as occurred in Yugoslavia—and aided the nation in making the transition from

the disruptive, dangerous period of warfare in 1944 to the government of the Fourth Republic.[15]

By D-Day, therefore, the Resistance was ready to fight. Ithad devel opedcarefullythought-outplanstobeimplementedthroughoutFrance once the invasion began. Plan Vert, to which we have already alluded, aimed at incapacitating the railroads. Plan Tortue, later renamed Plan Bibendum, sought to disrupt German highway traffic in northern France. Plan Violet strove to stop German telephone and telegraph communications. And Plan Bleu aspired to sabotage the nation's elec trical system. All of them worked well. During the first days of the Alliedinvasion,theResistancecarriedout950actsofsabotage.InJun and July 1944, it derailed 600 trains and put 1,800 locomotives out of commission. It blocked roads and disrupted traffic, seriously delaying tanks and troops moving from the German border to Normandy. It routinely cut telephone and electrical lines, disturbing communica tions.ItalsoprovidedtheAllieswithsignificantintelligencedataabou German troop movements, weapons, and the like. By D-Day, an exten sive network of as many as 1,400 ''pianists'' (radio operators) located primarily in the north were transmitting essential intelligence infor mation to Britain.[16]

OnlyahandfulofFrenchsoldiers werepart oftheoriginalOverlord invasion, but others soonjoinedthe fight. In Brittany, for example, the local Maquis rose up to overthrow the German occupier. As many as 30,000 Resistance troops participated in that successful operation in the summer of 1944. Elsewhere, in the south, the ''Plan Montagnard'' that Jean Moulin and General Delestraint, the head of the Secret Army of the Resistance, had drawn up in the spring of 1943 was put into action.Under the leadership of ColonelGaspard, the Auvergne roseup inconjunctionwiththeAlliedinvasion.AtVercors,inJune1944,about 4,000 men gathered to fight the Germans in pitched battle, believing that the Allies would provide them with significant

aid. Unfortunately Vercors, while tying down the Nazis, turned out to be like Glie`res as not enough supplies materialized and the Germans massed enough troops to prevail. Around Toulouse, in the department of Tarn, the Maquis, joined by Vichy deserters in places such as Albi and Redon, was especially successful in usingguerrillatacticstokeep theGermans occupied for almost two months. Beyond the Tarn, guerrilla uprisings occurred in virtually every southern department. The Germans re sponded to them by destroying towns and massacring villagers. When they finished their operations in the south, the Nazis had massacred civiliansin over100 locations.InTulle,for example,they executed120 citizens for aiding the Resistance. The most notorious case took place in Oradour-sur-Glane, where SS troops en route to Normandy killed 642 of the town's 725 residents in cold blood on June 10, 1944. This brutal incident was the culmination of a series of attacks that the Ger mans had carried out in the Limousin region against thecivilian popu lation since March 1944 in an effort to eliminate the Maquis. Instead of success, however, the Germans discovered that every massacre bred more Resistance that tieddown more German troops. The huntfor the Maquis became a minor German obsession; the Nazis depicted these rebelsasillegalcombatantsinspiredby theJews,leadingHitler, inJuly 1944, to call for the elimination of the Maquis ''by all means possible.'' Nothing of the sort occurred as the Germans retreated from the inhos pitable south shortly thereafter. In what can only be called a compli ment to the tenacity of the Resistance, the Nazis called the Massif Central ''the little Ukraine'' in recognition of the stiff opposition they faced there.[17]

None of these vicious encounters between the Resistance and the Germans was typical, but that in Saint-Amand-Montrond in the Cher, a town of 10,000 that was located just north of the city of Vichy, can provide us with one powerful, complex example of what this nasty war entailed. On D-Day, the Resistance, with the support of the local gendarmerie, took over the city hall and the subprefecture, as well as the

headquarters of the local Milice. They took thirty-six miliciens, including women, as hostages against a possible counterattack by Vichy and German forces. They soon realized that they could not de fendSaint-Amand andleftto join their comrades inGue ´ret, the capital of Creuse, where a much larger uprising had put the Resistance in power and taken a number of German soldiers and Vichy miliciens prisoner. The Gue´ret Resistance even succeeded in fending off a Ger man attack on June 8, solidifying support for its cause. Meanwhile, however, the Germans took Saint-Amand without much effort, set fire to a number of houses, and rounded up 200 hostages, 8 of whom were executed immediately. By the end of the day, June 8, the Ger mans had killed 19 citizens and burned six houses. They handed over power to the Milice, which governed the city until the end of August 1944 with a reign of terror that included pillaging, arrests, and executions.

The Saint-Amand case was complicated by the fact that one of the hostages held by the Resistance was Simone Bout de l'An, the wife of the head of the Vichy Milice. He threatened to execute sixty hostages from the town and to bomb and set fire to what remained of Saint-Amand unless the Resistance released his wife. This set off a compli cated round of negotiations with the Archbishop of Bourges playing a key role in pleading with both the Germans and Vichy to spare the lives of these innocent citizens. Bout de l'An, who was convinced that the ''terrorists'' holding his wife hostage were atheistic communists, took the wives of the Resistance leaders hostage and proposed a swap as the solution to the problem. The swap was made, but the Maquis continued to hold twenty miliciens and the Nazis sent more troops to freethemandeliminatewhatremainedoftheopposition.Theyarrived around mid-July and immediately wiped out most of the Maquis, tak ing sixty-two Maquisards prisoner, sending them to camps in Ger many. Others, however, escaped capture and continued to fight until the Germans retreated from the department later in the summer.

In the midst of these skirmishes, the Nazis rounded up the Jews of Saint-Amand arresting about seventy of the 200 Jews who lived there. Thirty-six of them were executed on an isolated farm, their bodies thrownintothree deepwellsfromwhichthey were recoveredafterthe war. By the time that Saint-Amand was liberated, over 100 citizens of the city had lost their lives, mostly at the hands of the Germans, al though the Milice played a role in this bloody affair as well.

Did the citizens of Saint-Amand lose their lives invain? Shouldthe Resistance haveremained passive after D-Day,waiting for the Alliesto liberate their small city? Did they really accomplish anything in resist ing the Nazis? These are questions that have no easy answers, in part because we do not know the degree to which a relatively insignificant uprising in an isolated city such as this one contributed to the defeat of the Nazis and their Vichy allies. We only know that such incidents contributed greatly to the myth ofuniversalResistance that helpedthe French rehabilitate themselves after the ignominious defeat of 1940.[18]

Similar doubts could be raised concerning the sacrifices that many French made, either willingly or not after D-Day. For example, was the taking of the important Norman city of Caen worth the loss of lives andproperty? ThecityofWilliamtheConqueror wastotallydestroyed during the siege that lasted seventy-eight days from D-Day until mid-August, left only 400 out of 18,000 homes undamaged, and killed be tween 3,000 and 5,000 civilians. One French observer —from a distance—noted in her diary entry for June 22, 1944, ‘‘What a costly and terrible ‘liberation!’’’ After the war, the people of Caen came to a simi lar conclusion: the Liberation had cost too much. They had been will ing to endure a short struggle but not an endless destructive battle.[19]

On June 14, General de Gaulle landed in France. At Bayeux, not far from Caen, an enthusiastic crowd of supporters greeted him. He discovered that the liberated parts of Normandy had been brought under the control of the Free French, in what

seemed to be an effort less transition from Vichy's administration. On August 1, French troopsunderGeneralLeclerclandedintimetoparticipate intheAllied breakthroughoutofNormandybeguninlateJuly.TheyjoinedGeneral Patton's march eastward, south of Caen through theAvranches toward Paris and the north. Although Leclerc's army was quite small, only a little over 15,000 men, it was one of the best trained units in the war. Leclerc had spent nine months putting together a first-rate tank divi sion for the invasion and had the support of the French Forces of the Interior and most of the French Resistance. Leclerc was intent on tak ing Paris, which the British and Americans had chosen to bypass to pursue the Germans into northern France and beyond. With General Eisenhower's reluctant support the battle for Paris began in early Au gust. Paris would be liberated exclusively by the French, which was precisely what de Gaulle wanted.[20]

The battle for Paris offers a microcosm of how the united French Resistance worked in 1944. The battle began on August 10 when the railroad workers went on strike. They were soon followed by others, and by August 15 the city was paralyzed by a general strike. On that day the police joined the effort. By August 22, barricades had been erected throughout Paris, shutting the Germans out of the center. When General Leclerc's troops entered the city two days later the Ger mans were in retreat. One day later, on August 25, General von Chol titz, the commander of the German troops in Paris, surrendered. Among the French about 3,000 regular soldiers, French Forces of the Interior, Resistance members, and civilians were killed. The Germans suffered about the same, 2,800 deaths. General von Cholitz had totally misunderstood the extent of the Parisian Resistance and had missed his opportunity to nip it in the bud before the barricades went up. After that, Resistance mushroomed and his forces proved incapable of stopping it.[21]

In the midst of the fighting, which continued in the suburbs until late August, de Gaulle entered Paris, triumphant at having

accom plished the impossible task of restoring the republican government of France in its capital city against the opposition of the Germans, the Vichy regime, and even his Allied supporters. De Gaulle knew exactly what needed to be done, as he tells us in his memoirs: ‘‘I would mold all minds into a single national impulse, but also cause the figure and the authority of the state to appear at once.’’ He wanted to make sure that the more unruly elements of the Resistance did not gain power and undermine the State. Thus, he required that General von Choltitz capitulate to Leclerc and the army, not to the Resistance. Upon enter ing Paris de Gaulle demonstrated the continuity of the State by going to his old office in the Ministry of War where he had been under secretary for national defense. Only then did he visit city hall, from which provisional revolutionary governments had traditionally been proclaimed, where he gave his famous speech, congratulating the peo ple of Paris for liberating the city ‘‘with the help of the army and the support of allof France.’’ When he was goadedby Georges Bidault, the head of the internal Resistance, to proclaim the Republic, he replied in typical Gaullist fashion: ‘‘The Republic has never ceased. Free France, Fighting France, the French Committee of National Liberation have successively incorporated it. Vichy always was and still remains null and void.’’[22]

On Saturday, August 26, de Gaulle marched down the Champs d’E lyse´e, swarmed by hundreds of thousands of liberated Parisians. The mass that he attended at Notre Dame Cathedral was a first, rather ten tative step toward the reconciliation of Church and State, as de Gaulle shunned Archbishop Suhard and the Church showed its lukewarm support by having the choir sing ‘‘Magnificat’’ rather than ‘‘Te Deum.’’ On August 28, he integrated the French Forces of the Interior into the regular army and dissolved the National Council of the Resistance, whichhadbeen superseded bythe restoration of theRepublic in Paris. With these acts, de Gaulle had fulfilled his mission of 1940: ‘‘[a] call to honor from the

depths of history, as well as the instinct of the nation itself.'' This had provided him legitimacy to ''call the nation to war and tounity,imposeorder,lawandjustice,demandfromtheworldrespect for the rights of France.'' He concluded his memoirs for this period of the war with one of his most moving and messianic statements: ''Gradually,the call washeard. Slowly,severely, unity was forged. Now the people and the leader, helping each other, were to begin the jour ney to salvation.''[23]

Meanwhile, many mundane things remained to be done. On Au gust 15 the bulk of the French army—200,000 men, many of whom had fought in the Italian campaign—invaded the south along with several hundred thousand Allied troops. Under the leadership of Gen eral de Lattre de Tassigny they took both Toulon and Marseille with unanticipatedspeed.Marseillefellafteronlyfivedaysoffighting, com pared with a preinvasion estimate of thirty-one. This rapid advance took the Germans completely by surprise, since they expected to stop the Allied forces long enough for an orderly retreat up the Rhoˆne River. It alsoallowed the Allies to unload massive amounts of supplies throughthe port ofMarseille, morethanwentthroughany otherEuro pean port during the last months of 1944. By September 3, 1944, French troops had reached Lyon, disrupting the German plan to estab lish a line from Sens to Dijon and the Swiss border. Three weeks later the French had established a front from the northern Vosges Moun tains to the Swiss border. The German strategic retreat up the Rhoˆne valley thus failed to achieve its objective of preventing the southern Allied army from linking up with the Normandy forces. This was due not only to the rapid pursuit of the Germans by the French and Allied armies but also to the actions of the internal Resistance, which ha rassed the Germans, pecking away at them as they went through Gap and Grenoble, taking 3,500 of them prisoner in the Haute-Savoie area, and inflicting heavy losses on them at Monte´limar, where 11,000 Ger man casualties occurred. The Resistance and the FFI prevented about 40 percent of German troops in the south from joining forces with their compatriots in the north. By

September 12, 1944, the French had 120,000 German prisoners in custody, about one-third of the total numberthat theAllieshadtaken bythen.Inthe course ofthese trium phant events, the Resistance mushroomed in size, the FFI increasing from 100,000 in June to 500,000 in September. Nothing succeeds like success.[24]

By the end of 1944, the French had liberated almost the entire country, with a bit of help from the British and the Americans. After the Liberation of Paris and the quick triumph of the Mediterranean invasion, French troops under General de Lattre de Tassigny took Strasbourg and Alsace with Allied support in November 1944. In late December, however, Allied troops pulled out of Alsace to defend the Ardennes against the final, desperate German offensive, known as the Battle of the Bulge. De Gaulle refused to follow the Allied withdrawal and allow Strasbourg to be retaken for fear that French morale would plummet. He ordered General de Lattre to defend the city, against the wishes of the Allies, and informed General Eisenhower on January 3, 1944,that retreatfromAlsace ‘‘wouldbe anationaldisaster.ForAlsace is sacred ground.’’ Eisenhower finally accepted de Gaulle’s position, andStrasbourg wasdefendedsuccessfully.Fromthispoint,deGaulle’s primary objective was to obtain a de facto right to participate in the occupation of postwar Germany. To achieve this,he instructed General de Lattre to carve out a French sphere of influence in southwestern Germany.DeLattre’stroopscrossedtheRhine onMarch4,1945,estab lished themselves in the Black Forest-Baden-Wu¨rttemberg sector, and took Stuttgart before the Americans arrived. By the end of April they had accomplished their mission. On May 9, 1945, France joined the three Allied powers in signing the act that proclaimed the capitulation of Germany. Due largely to the contribution of the nation’s military forces and Resistance to the liberation of Europe, de Gaulle had adroitly restored France to the ranks of the great powers.[25]

While France was being liberated from Nazi control, the

collabora tionist Vichy government disintegrated completely and acquiesced in a cockamamie scheme to go into exile in Germany. Pe´tain, who had refused to leave France in 1940 to continue the war against the Nazis from North Africa, now left his native soil under very questionable circumstances. Beginning with D-Day, Pe´tain counseled the French to reject Liberation, although he also warned his supporters to avoid frat ricidal warfare. Nevertheless, the paramilitary Milice followed the bloody path of summary executions and torture that had become com monplace since early 1944 when its head, Joseph Darnand, had been elevated to Pe´tain's cabinet. Darnand believed that Pe´tain supported the Milice's actions, since he had proclaimed on April 28, 1944, ''Who ever participates in the Resistance compromises the future of the na tion.'' On that basis, Darnand instructed the Milice to carry out total war against the anti-France of the Resistance, which it did with a ven geance after D-Day. One incident, in particular, stands out among many. On June 28, the Resistance assassinated the Vichy radio com mentator, Philippe Henriot, whose virulent anticommunist, anti-Se mitic and anti-Resistance broadcastsappealed to a large audience. Paul Touvier, the head of the Lyon Milice, ordered the execution of seven Jewish hostages in reprisal. After the war Touvier would be protected from prosecution by Catholic clerics who hid him until he was finally apprehendedandtriedforcrimesagainsthumanityinthe1990s.Mor immediately, however, such summary actions were rewarded by Vichy, which on July 6, 1944, decorated the miliciens who had fought against the Maquis on the Glie`res plateau in March. They were also remembered by the Resistance, which in August 1944 executed sev enty-seven miliciens in the Haute-Savoie for treasonous collaboration with the Germans. With the Nazis retreating and Vichy collapsing in August1944,theMilice —6,000in number—revealeditstruecolorsby marching east to Germany.[26]

The beginning of the ignominious end of Vichy can be dated Au gust 19, 1944, when the Nazis gave Pe´tain an ultimatum to

either go toGermanywillinglyorbeforcedtodosoagainsthiswill.TheMarshal protested to Hitler, but once again this amounted to nothing. By Sep tember, Pe´tain and about 1,500 diehard collaborationist followers, including Laval and the French fascist leaders, had settled in Sigmar ingen. There, on September 6, Pe´tain's advisors created the De´le´gation gouvernementale franc¸aise pour la de´fense des inte´reˆts franc¸ais en Al lemagne, which replaced Vichy as the government of these collabora tionistfanatics. Pe´tainhimselfplayed nopublic role inthis new entity. He left everything to his subordinates, who created the illusion that theMarshal wasstillincharge.FernanddeBrinon,theVichyambassa dor to the German occupying forces in Paris, took over as head of the delegation, appointed theoretically by Pe´tain but in reality by Hitler's representative,Ribbentrop.Inthat capacity,de Brinonissuedan''Appeal to all French'' that challenged the authority of the Free French and the Resistance:''TheheadoftheFrenchState,MarshalPe´tain,hastraveled from Belfort to Germany in order to defend the true interests of the French against the Gaullist usurpers and the English and American exploiters of the people.'' He concluded by proclaiming that Pe´tain remained ''the only source of French legal authority.'' About a month later, in early October, the German Foreign Office issued a communi-que´thatstatedthatPe´tainstoodsolidlybehindapolicyof''collaboration with Germany in the attempt to reestablish peace on French soil.'' Al thoughhehadseriousdoubtsaboutcollaboration,theMarshalallowe his name to be used in support of this unproductive and treasonous policy until the end of the war.[27]

At Sigmaringen, the diehard collaborationists joined forces to con tinue the Vichy regime in exile, working to return eventually to a ''lib erated'' France in which communists, Gaullists, and other undesirable groups were eliminated. The

Parisian fascist leaders, De´at, Doriot, and company, led the way, with a handful of followers—not more than 15,000—accompanying them. They hoped to rally French prisoners of war and French workers in Germany to their crusade against Jews, Bolsheviks, and Gaullists, but the hundreds of thousands of French men and women in German camps wanted nothing to do with Vichy. Although at one point, early in the war, many of them had been pro-Pe´tain, by late 1944 the POW and labor camps were overwhelmingly pro-American and Gaullist. Even some of the fascist leaders, such as De´at, knew that the Sigmaringen crowd had little chance to win over the French. He told Ribbentrop that three-fourths of the French be lievedthattheAllieswouldwinthewar. Still,theystruggled onagainst all odds and with considerable opposition within their own ranks.[28]

When the Rundstedt offensive—better known as the Battle of the Bulge—occurred in December 1944 the fascists began packing their bagsfor the return toParis. Over the radio, de Brinoncalled on French soldiers under de Gaulle to resist and disobey: ‘‘Only if we are victori ouswillyou seetheendofyourtroubles,’’ he claimed.Pe´tain,however, wanted to return to France to face the high court that had been set up on November 18 to try him, while Laval was intent on fleeing to Sile sia. Others who were followers of Pe´tain and Laval wanted to return to France to unite with the right-wing resistance against the commu nists. They had no hope in the German cause despite the Rundstedt offensive.

Meanwhile, the fascists came increasingly under the control of their Nazi protectors. Possibly 2,500 members of the Milice joined the SSinNovember1944.Another2,000wenttoworkfortheReich,while others joined the Charlemagne division, which brought together mili ciens, legionnaires, and other collaborationist soldiers to fight for Ger many againstthe Soviets on the Easternfront. In all of these cases, the Sigmaringen government-in-exile lost command over its few remain ing military resources. Jacques Doriot wanted to reverse this by em ploying the 8,000 members of the Charlemagne division to fight for the Liberation of France. On January 8, 1945 he founded the Commit tee for the Liberation of France that called for a new ‘‘resistance’’ against bolshevism and the Anglo-American occupation of the nation, which he characterized as worse than the German one. Doriot, who conceived of himself as the de Gaulle of the new resistance, was killed on February 22, 1945. By then the French fascist cause had lost all hope.

Within France, in the waning months of the war, many feared that the Resistance would take power and carry out a revolution, purging all collaborationists and placing in control men who favored massive social, economic, and political change. Nothing of the sort happened. The Communist Party, which had emerged as a major element of the Resistance, cooperated completely with de Gaulle and the mainstream, opting for law and order rather than civil war. In fact, de Gaulle used the communists for his own political purposes, knowing that no com munist threat existed in 1944–45. The leaders of the Communist Party had assured him on several occasions that they supported the Free French without reservation. In Moscow, for example, the head of the French Communist Party in exile, Maurice Thorez, told de Gaulle’s ambassador that the party had no intention of seizing power. Beyond that, de Gaulle had ample evidence from events and individuals in France indicating that the communists would not stir up trouble. Yet, he scapegoated the communists as troublemakers in 1944 and 1945, claiming that they planned to take over Paris, had

established a dicta torship in Marseille, and had created a soviet form of government in Toulouse. If we can believe the letters written by the noted American historian of France, Crane Brinton, who traveled 1,600 miles across southern France between October 8 and 15, 1944, visiting major cities and rural hamlets, no evidence of revolution existed anywhere in the south, and de Gaulle was recognized by everyone as the leader of the liberated nation: ‘‘a symbol of continuity of France rather than as a potential or actual Fuhrer.’’[29]

Although revolution did not occur and no group of importance plotted to undermine the restoration of democracy and take over power, elements of civil war erupted in this period from D-Day to the final Liberation of France. Much of what occurred can be classified as spontaneous revenge by the Resistance and its fellow travelers against collaborators. The Milice, in particular, was hated for its execution of thousands of Resistance fighters in 1944. In retaliation, the Resistance targeted miliciens and other collaborators for execution, either with or without trial, killing 6,000 of them by the end of the year.[30]

Other examples of revenge, such as the shaving of the heads of collaborationists,seemed tobe morecomplicatedandlessrational.Ap proximately 20,000 women had their heads shaved for collaboration between 1943 and 1946, with the majority of these—about two thirds—punished during the Liberation period after D-Day. By con trast, only about thirty-five to fifty men suffered from this form of retribution. Almost half of the women shaved were found guilty of having sexual relations with the enemy, but none of the men were. Nor were prostitutes included among the guilty. Most of them were considered to be earning a living and not collaborating in any sexual sense. The courts thattried these more orless ordinary French women had a very traditional view of gender and sexual relations, viewing all females as naturally immoral and conceiving of sleeping with the enemy as a form of crossbreeding (me´tissage) that undermined the nation. In short, the courts believed that cohabitation with German males

was a form of treason that had to be punished by a public act of purification witnessed by the entire community. Thus, most shavings were performed by Resistance members in central places such as the town square, in patriotic acts of communion that united everyone, including the mayor, the police, and other local authorities, behind the Liberation of France and against the stain of collaboration with the Germans. Shavings were expiations of guilt at the expense of a female scapegoat, similar to the witch hunts of the late medieval period, but they were also festive occasions, carnivals, in which communities car ried out what might be their only act of violence—if it can be called that—against the defeated enemy in an attempt to make things right after years of living in an alien world. Often shavings were accompa nied by boisterous renditions of the Marseillaise, in celebration of this renewed national unity against the Germans.[31]

Of course this form of punishment and reconciliation excluded women from the ritual activities involved, unless they were willing to accept the terms established by ‘‘virile’’ France. Shavings represented an attempt to overcome the defeat of 1940 and to reconstruct French identity as one of male superiority and female inferiority. The female body was the source of evil, of immorality, that had to be chastised and marked. France had been liberated, in this version of history, through male combat, not through the acts of women. The picture of womanintheResistance was thepicture ofthegoodmother, someone who accepted traditional female roles and did not challenge male au thority, very similar to what Vichy had established in its propaganda. Female collaborators violated that image and had to be punished ac cordingly so that the gender order could be reestablished. Reverting to archaic medieval rituals for designating and punishing adulteresses, French males in every corner of the nation acted in almost identical, collective fashion, as though planned by a central committee! In as many as fifty cities women were not only shaved but also undressed and forced to walk around nude and in a few cases endure spankings.

Purging those who had collaborated was a major part of the Resistance mentality and the Liberation of France, as this massive out pouring of vengeance against horizontal collaborators demonstrates. Planning for the purges was methodical and among the first acts undertaken by the French government-in-exile. As early as mid-1943 the French government in Algeria established norms for trying high officials of the Vichy regime, including Marshal Pe´tain. The CFLN set up a Purge Commission for that purpose. Its first victim was the for mer Vichy Minister of the Interior Pierre Pucheu, who was tried and executed in March 1944, months before the Normandy invasion. De Gaulle refused to commute Pucheu's sentence, mainly because he wanted to set an example. But de Gaulle also wanted to place the au thority to purge collaborators in the hands of the State. He refused to sanction vigilante justice, carried out indiscriminately by members of the Resistance, just as he refused to grant local Resistance units sover eign governing authority. Still, despite de Gaulle's strict guidelines on the matter and numerous attempts by his government to crack down on vigilante justice, at least 8,000 suspected collaborators were exe cuted without a trial in the Liberation period.[32]

Like all purges in history, that of French collaborators was very uneven. Some groups were punishedfairly severely,while others were let off with minor penalties. Those who left a published paper trail often suffered more than economic collaborators or civil servants workinginanonymousbureaucracies.Ingeneral,thosewho weretried immediately after D-Day received harsher penalties than those who were tried later on. In turn, it seems that virulent anticommunist col laborators were given more severe sentences than others, probably be cause juries comprised of members of the Resistance thought of the communists as the mainstay of the internal Resistance. At first the purges targeted Vichy officials, especially the police and the judiciary. No French government, including Vichy, had ever carried out a major purge of the police. But French police collaboration with

the Germans during World War II made a purge necessary, even though 150 police men had died fighting to liberate Paris and almost all of the city's police force had gone out on strike against the Germans in August 1944. Surprisingly, however, the purge tribunals did not pursue the French police for the role they played in the arrest of approximately 90 percent of all Jews rounded up for deportation. For the reasons discussed in the chapter on exclusion, the fate of the Jews was not considered to be either unique or important in 1944–45. In addition, many policemen argued successfully that they arrested Jews as cover for their Resistance activities or that they were just following German orders. Onlytwo membersof the notorious Police auxquestionsjuives were sentencedto prisonfor arresting anddeporting Jews. In contrast, the anticommunist police were purged with a vengeance, largely be cause the communists had emerged from the war as a powerful politi cal force and used their position to act forcefully against collaborators. Of 230 police in the anticommunist Brigades Spe´ciales, 195 were put on trial and 163 were found guilty. The French Jewish community, which had been seriously weakened by the Final Solution, was not capable of launching a similar legal offensive at the time. Still, despite these uneven results, the French police force underwent the greatest purge in its history: possibly one-fifth of the police was affected in some way by the purges, although only about 5 percent were impris oned or dismissed from the force.[33]

When the purge trials ended, about 5,000 civil servants had been dismissed and 6,000 had been sanctioned for collaboration out of ap proximately 1 million state officials. The purge of the military may have affected another 5,000 individuals, although only a few hundred were dismissed without a pension or tried for collaboration. Among civil servants, the Vichy prefects suffered the most from the purges: well over half of them—sixty—were dismissed permanently and a handful was shot for collaborating with the Germans. In contrast, the tribunals generally ignored minor acts of collaboration committed by local officials, such as mayors and

city councilors. Judges, too, were treated leniently. A special commission suspended266from the bench in 1944, but most were eventually restored to office. However,those at the top of the judicial hierarchy were punished more severely: of fifty presidents and procureurs ge´ne´raux in France, only fifteen kept their posts after the war.[34]

The purgeof economic collaborators wasnotas extensiveorsevere as that of state officials and the military. Businessmen were often able to make credible arguments that exonerated them. For example, Mi chelin, which was forced to collaborate with the Germans or close its doors,pointedtotheroleitplayedinprotectingitsworkersfrombeing conscripted by the Nazis. Countless other vital war businesses, with less convincing records than Michelin's, made similar claims and were cleared of guilt. A few, such as Renault, pleaded extenuating circum stances but failed to convince anyone. In Renault's case, the company was nationalized by the French State for the role that Louis Renault played in support of the German cause during the war. But Renault was the exception, along with Berliet and Ace´ries du Nord (a Marseille firm). The CGT, the pro-communist trade union, wanted to purge all industrialistswhohadcollaboratedwiththeGermans,butonly ahand ful of individuals was found guilty.[35]

Other elite groups mostly escaped punishment. The Catholic Churchhierarchy,forexample,includedanumberofblatantcollabora tors. After the war the head of the National Council of the Resistance, the Christian Democratic politician Georges Bidault, wanted the resig nation of all three French cardinals, as well as four archbishops and sixteen bishops, but he ran into serious opposition from Rome. After considerable negotiation, the Church reluctantly agreed to dismiss three bishops and to promote a number of pro-Resistance clerics, the most prominent of whom was Archbishop Salie`ge of Toulouse, who became a cardinal in October 1945. Similar leniency existed in the ranks of the professions. Very few doctors and lawyers were purged, despite considerable evidence of collaboration.

Union leaders, how ever, were not as lucky. Several hundred of them were excluded from membership in a union, in some cases for life, because of their acts during the war.[36]

The most publicized and best-known purges occurred in those areas that were most subject to public scrutiny, such as politics and intellectual life. These were also areas in which a lengthy paper trail existed, documenting acts or statements of collaboration. In politics thetrials ofPe´tainandLavaltookcenter stage,whileintheintellectual arenathecaseofRobertBrasillachbecame amini-Dreyfusaffair,divid ingthenation'sthinkersintotwocamps.Otherpoliticiansandintellectuals were purged during the Liberation, but did not attract the same attention. Of the two groups, however, politicians suffered more for their actions during the war. Although several writers such as Ce´line, Drieu la Rochelle, and Charles Maurras had their books banned and four members ofthe Acade´mie franc¸aise were expelledfromthat orga nization after the war—Marshal Pe´tain being one of them—no major purge of university professors occurred. In contrast, political parties removed large numbers of collaborators from political life. The Social ist Party, at its November 1944 congress, expelled the eighty-four so cialist members of parliament who had voted full powers to Pe´tain in 1940. Although no other party went as far as this, a total of 321 mem bers of the 1940 parliament, 56 percent of those who voted for full powers, were eliminated from political life after the war. In addition, after the war the Liberation courts tried 8.5 percent of all living mem bers of the 1940 parliament, compared with only 1 percent of all French. As the result of these measures taken against the political elite of the defunct Third Republic, 80 percent of those elected to the Con stituent Assembly in 1945 had never sat in the national legislature before.[37]

The most discussed purges were the ones that raised moral and ethical questions about the entire process. Among intellectuals, the trial of Robert Brasillach did this, while among politicians the trial of Pe´tain divided the nation for

decades. Of the two, Brasillach's trial had themostimmediatedivisiveimpact.Atthetime,thenation wasunited against Pe´tain; only later did the French raise serious questions about hisguilt,althoughmostof these were brought up bythedefense inhis trial.

Brasillach was one of the most hated of French intellectuals by war's end, despite having been heralded as a literary genius in the 1930s, receiving a nomination for the Goncourt literary prize for his openlypro-fascistwork, LesSeptCouleurs. Duringthe warhisrepeated calls for the execution of Le´on Blum, Georges Mandel, and Paul Rey naud, along with his vicious anti-Semitic articles in Je suis partout, earned him the reputation as one of the most collaborationist of Pari sian intellectuals. In February 1944 he added considerable fuel to the fire when he stated publicly, ''Frenchmen given to reflection, during these years, will have more or less slept with Germany—not without quarrels—and the memory of it will remain sweet for them.'' Since Brasillach hadopenly expressed his homosexual orientation,this state ment took on a meaning that placed him in the company of collabora tionist women under the occupation. Like them, he was a traitor to male France. Of course his case was not helped by the fact that he had advocated the arrest of leading literary figures and the execution of all of his supposed Resistance enemies. The prosecution had no difficulty making Brasillach into a sort of ''horizontal collaborator.'' The subtext of homosexual submission to the dominant German occupier perme ated the case made by the chief prosecutor, who used forceful sexual metaphors of invasion, penetration, submission, and the like to make his points. Brasillach accepted German dominance, the prosecution maintained, and attackedanyonewho opposed theNazi yoke,denoun cing politicians, intellectuals, and others for refusing to collaborate. Since these denunciations were part of the public record, published in newspapers,journals, and books, the defense resorted to theargument that Brasillach wasaliterary genius. But thishad no appeal to thejury, which was made up of ordinary Frenchmen who had resisted the

Nazis.They wereunmovedwhenFranc¸oisMauriac, oneofthenation's greatest intellectuals with impeccable Resistance credentials, came to Brasillach's defense by writing: ''It will be a loss for French letters if this brilliant mind is forever extinguished.'' More to the point was Brasillach's claim that he had merely done what everyone else did dur ing the war, which was to cope with the German occupation, to get by the best he could in his chosen profession. He added to this the stan dard anticommunist argument that the Germans were better than the Soviets and the ideathat German atrocities were no worse than others. He went on to claim that he was 100 percent French in his ideas: his anti-Semitism was not inspired by the Germans, his fascism was homegrown, and his hatred of Gaullists, communists, Jews, and so-called Resistance leaders was inspired by patriotism. He concluded by arguing for the ambiguity of moral responsibility, claiming that one could be a resister or a collaborator in good faith.

But the crowning argument in Brasillach's defense was made by his lawyer, Jacques Isorni, who attacked the French judiciary—even the prosecution lawyers—for collaborating in the deaths of commu nists, Jews, and members of the Resistance by practicing law through out World War II, despite the ''illegality'' of Vichy. He asked pointedly whether Brasillach was guiltier than the lawyers and judges who had sent innocent victims of the Nazis to their deaths. Then Isorni turned to the chief prosecution lawyer and said: ''You did your duty as a mag istrate. You thought that if it wasn't you who was in the business of judging the communists, it would be the Germans who did it and that there would be more deaths. You were a collaborator in order to save what could be saved in the judiciary realm'' just as others collaborated elsewhere to save French lives and protect the nation.[38]

Isorni'spleafor aformofmoralrelativism,based onaquestionable historical understanding of events, did not convince many Frenchmen in the aftermath of the war. The court convicted Brasillach and sen tenced him to death. Even though a number of intellectuals, such as Mauriac, Albert

Camus, Jean Cocteau, and Paul Vale´ry petitioned de Gaulleto pardon him,the death penalty wascarried out. Perhaps more significantly,Brasillach'strialandexecutionraisedquestionsaboutt legitimacy of the purge trials. A large number of French intellectuals attacked the purges for being morally equivalent to the actions of the Vichy regime. Even though the courts sentenced only a handful of intellectuals to death, the impression emerged that the Resistance had turned on the intellectual class with a vengeance. The moral purity of the Resistance was tarnished bysuch impressions. WhenJean Paulhan proclaimed in 1952 that the purge trials were like the terror, only car ried out by communists, the myth of what these trials entailed had already been established. On both counts, Paulhan was completely wrong, but his words were not seriously questioned.[39]

ThetrialofMarshalPe ´tainprovidedanotheropportunitytomuddy the moral waters, much more so than that of Pierre Laval, who was universally detested. Over three-fourths of the French wanted Laval executed in 1945, even though his trial had been seriously flawed. Charles de Gaulle considered a retrial but decided against it. Laval was executed on October 15, with almost no one regretting his demise. To the end he defended his policy of collaboration with the Nazis as a great success for the French nation. He saw no merit in the charge of treason that the prosecution made against him, nor in the particulars of that charge, which included his implementation of the forced labor program and the exclusionary laws against the Jews.[40]

Pe´tain, however, was seen in a different light. In contrast to Laval, Pe´tain was the hero of Verdun, revered by millions for his role in World War I. By 1945, however, that glorious reputation had been seriously tarnished; polls indicated that a solid majority wanted him punished for his collaboration. Pe ´tain defended himself by claiming that the armistice had led eventually to Allied victory and that he had played the role of the leader of the French at home while de Gaulle had done the same for the French abroad. This idea of a double game of

collaborating and resisting at the same time gained him some sup port, for many French had done something similar. But the evidence against Pe´tain proved too great for this tendentious argument to hold. The prosecution convincingly and successfully depicted the Marshal as a defeatist who willing accepted collaboration and condemned his enemies to death, including de Gaulle. Against these charges, the de fense offered a picture of Vichy as total resistance to the Nazis. Pierre Laval tookthestandin defenseof Pe´tain, claiming thatthetwo leaders hadprotectedthenationfromfar worsescenarios.Whenhe wasasked directly about the Jews he responded that he had protected French Jews from the Nazis. The prosecution accepted none of these argu ments. In its summation of the charges, it accused Pe´tain of depriving France of its sovereignty by signing the armistice agreement and un dermining the Republic through the July 1940 ‘‘coup d’e ´tat.’’ At no point,itargued,didPe ´tainortheVichygovernmentsupporttheResis tance; absolutely no evidence existed for this. Furthermore, it main tained, after destroying the Republic, Pe´tain continued to act in a treasonable manner, giving up Alsace-Lorraine to the Germans, agree
ingtocollaboratewithHitlerattheMontoiremeetingofOctober1940 ceding the fleet to the Germans, implementing anti-Semitic policies that mimicked those pursued by the Nazis, and generally submitting and subordinating France to the enemy until the end of the war. The narrowfourteen-to-thirteenmarginbywhichthejurysentencedPe´tain to death revealed that the internal divisions still prevailed, at least in regard to the old Marshal. Even General de Gaulle was reluctant to punish a fellow soldier and World War I hero too severely. When Pe´ tain appealed for a pardon, de Gaulle exempted him from the death penalty, but not from a sentence of life imprisonment. Still, the trial had laid the foundations for the famous ‘‘shield’’ argument propagated by Colonel Re´my, one of de Gaulle’s closest wartime companions, a few years later when he claimed that Pe´tain acted as the shield that

protected de Gaulle and the Resistance from the Germans. It was an argument that flew in the face of the historical record, but one that many wanted to believe, especially those who collaborated openly or had flirted with collaboration before joining the Resistance at the last minute.[41]

One last point of importance regarding these trials needs to be mentioned. Henry Rousso has argued convincingly that the issue of anti-Semitism, which many believed was overlooked or swept under the carpet in the purges of 1944–45, played a role in a number of trials,includingthoseofPe´tainandLaval.Aswe haveseen,thecharges against both Pe´tain and Laval included the racial laws that they had implemented. Both men defended themselves with self-serving com ments about how many Jewish friends they had or how much they workedtoprotectFrenchJews.
Inaddition,bothBrasillachandCharles
Maurrasweretriedandconvicted,inpart,
onthebasisoftheirvirulent anti-Semitic positions. In the notorious case of Rene´ Bousquet the courts accepted his argument that not he, but Darquier de Pellepoix had been responsible for the 1942 roundups of Jews, but in the 1980s the evidence against him became so great that he was arrested on the charge of crimes against humanity, only to be assassinated before the trial could be held. And finally, in the trial of the guards at the notori ous Drancy camp, which served as the transit camp for Jews who were tobeexterminatedatAuschwitz, atotaloffifty-sixwitnessesdescribed in detail the inhuman conditions that existed there, leading to the im prisonment of several gendarmes and their superiors. The charge of anti-Semitism was clearly part of the purge trials, although at the time it was not considered to be as serious a crime as treason and collaboration.[42]

In gross numbers, in the purges 132,828 people were tried in civil courts, of whom 37,413 were acquitted. Of those found guilty, 7,037 were condemned to death (but only 791 were actually executed), 39,200 were sentenced to either prison or

hard labor, and 49,178 were subjectedto ‘‘nationaldegradation,’’ whichentailedlossofpoliticaland civil rights for a period of time. In addition, French military tribunals also carried out purges, trying 20,127, of whom 769 were executed, a far higher percentage of executions per case than in the civil courts. The grand total for all purges, whether carried out through the courts or through vigilante justice, was 8,000 to 9,000 executed in cold blood, 1,500 to 1,600 executed through the judicial process, 44,000 con demnedtoprison,50,000condemnedtonationaldegradation, asmany as 28,000 bureaucrats reprimanded in some fashion—half of whom lost their jobs—and 126,000 people imprisoned for some period of time, whether they were convicted of a crime or not. The French exe cuted more, per capita, than any other nation in Europe, with the ex ception of Yugoslavia and Greece, but they jailed a fairly low number. Overall, the purges were not as severe as the supporters of Vichy or Jean Paulhan would have us believe, nor as lenient as die-hard mem bers of the Resistance maintained. They neither disrupted economic and governmental activities nor created insuperable obstacles to na tional reconciliation. They were not perfect, by any means, but they did help settle, in a very minor but important way, the outstanding issues left over from the dark years of the 1930s and 1940s. After the purges, France was ready to move forward under a new republic, one that would be responsible for the trente glorieuses—the thirty years of unprecedentedeconomicprosperitythatfollowedthedebacleofWor War II.[43]

Epilogue

We can no longer view France as a nation of collaborators, any more thanwecansayit wasanationofresisters.Onthecontrary,thehistor ical narrative on the ‘‘dark years’’ has revealed a nation that opposed

collaboration virtually from the beginning and gradually accepted Re sistanceastheonlysolutiontoNazidomination,muchlikeotherWest ern European nations under the Nazi yoke. Although opposition to anti-Semitic measures came somewhat late in the day, the French peo ple'sresponsetotheHolocaust waslargelyexemplary:despitetheexis tence of widespread anti-Semitic attitudes in France, a culture of universalhumanitarianism,inspiredbyeithertheidealsoftheEnligh enment and the French Revolution or Christian compassion for the persecuted, helped save thousands of Jews from the Nazi camps and contributed to Vichy's less cooperative response to German roundups of Jews after 1942. French gentiles did not necessarily like the Jews in the abstract, but they came to their aid as much as if not more than any other European nation.

TheFrancethatfailedinWorldWar II wastheofficial,institutional France. The debacle of 1940 was not due to low morale or a lack of patriotism among the rank and file French soldiers. France could have defeated the Nazis in 1940 or earlier, but the military and political elite refused to take the initiative by attacking Germany when it was vulnerable in the fall of 1939 and then failed to interpret their own intelligence information properly in the spring of 1940. The French military elite was sclerotic, tied to antiquated policies of defense in an age of German blitzkrieg. Rather than accept their responsibility, most of these same military and political elites, led by Pe´tain and Laval, accepted an armistice that subjected France to Nazi Germany and then imposed upon the nation, with Catholic Church support, the so-called National Revolution, justified by a series of lies about French deca dence and the need to atone for the sins of the nation that had led to the defeat of 1940. The National Revolution was quickly rejected by the bulk of the population; neither it nor Vichy's collaborationist poli cieshadmuchlegitimacywiththe FrenchpeoplebythetimeGermany occupied the ''Free Zone'' in November 1942.

Out of thiscame, in time, the Resistance. Not the heroic movement depicted in postwar hagiography, it had many flaws. The Resistance was comprised of French menandwomen, some of whom, made com promises with Vichy, believed in some of the ideals of the National Revolution, expressed anti-Semitic attitudes, adhered to a narrow na tionalist agenda, or joined the cause for unworthy reasons to engage in despicable, criminal activities and so on and so forth, ad infinitum. But not everyone in the Resistance was a Lucien Lacombe, the anti hero of Louis Malle's film about Resistance and collaboration. The Ma quis was not the mirror image of the fascist Milice. For all of its faults, the Resistance adhered to a set of ideals that made it different from Vichy or the National Revolution. Those ideals, embodied in the Resis tanceCharter,aimedtocreatein France a democratic,egalitarian polit ical, economic, and social order in place of the authoritarian police statethat the Nazis and Vichyhad created. In thespiritof thatcharter, the Resistance fought the dual enemy of Vichy and Germany, succeed ing remarkably in liberating Paris, Brittany, the South of France, and a good part of Alsace. The republican and revolutionary values that formed the core of the Resistance, both internal and external, corres ponded with the goals and aspirations of the vast majority of the French people. Out of it and de Gaulle's extraordinary leadership abili ties came one of Europe's smoothest transitions to postwar govern ment. Vichy faded away and the French Resistance filled the gap, without serious disruption of governmental activities, civil war, or the need for an Allied government on French soil. Whatever its faults, the French Resistance enabled the French to play a major role in recover ing their freedom.

France suffered severely from World War II. The total loss of lives directly related to the war was roughly 600,000, most of whom were civilians. Only 210,000, including 40,000

conscripted from Alsace and Lorraine into the German military, lost their lives in combat opera tions.Asmany as5million or 12.5percent of thenation was displaced by the war, most to Germany and eastern Europe where they were prisoners of war for five long years or reluctant workers or political prisonersorracialundesirablesslatedforeliminationintheNaziexte minationcamps.Thephysicaldevastation was greaterthanin theFirst World War. One-quarter of all buildings were destroyed, compared with only 9 percent during World War I. Less than half of all railroad lines remained intact by 1945. The merchant fleet had shrunk to one-third of its prewar size. Coal production was 60 percent of its 1938 level. Industrial production totaled only 29 percent of its 1938 output. The cost of living had tripled, while salaries had lagged far behind. Public debt had almost quadrupled over six years and grew rapidly after the war, due to the high demand for state services. Food supplies had been devastated by the war and German requisitioning. In 1945 grain production was one-half of prewar output. Food rationing re mained in place well into the postwar period, although caloric intake per capita increased dramatically from 900 calories per day in 1944 to 1515 by May 1945.[1]

Yet, World War II did not kill France; it killed a certain idea of France. Vichy succeeded, through its massive failure as a government and an ideology, in discrediting the reactionary and fascist visions of France.Thedarkyearsendedwithsome lightshining,pointingtoward a way out from the stalemate society that France had been during the interwar period. Clearing away the debris from the past was an impor tant aspect of this process, Not that 1945 brought a republican utopia in the wake of such incompetence. Hardly. But the new Republic at least was given the opportunity to break through the cake of custom, in a moment that can be called a revolutionary epiphany. It would succeedwheretheveilofillusionhadbeentornbytheactionsofVichy and the Nazis. It would fail where the Resistance itself had

created illusions. European union, the welfare state, economic planning, and thelikewouldbethepositivecreationsofthisnew republic.Continued efforts to restore French grandeur combined with a blinkered attitude toward the rights of the colonized peoples who had helped liberate France had, on the other hand, the negative effect of making French decolonization reluctant, painful, and costly. Overall, though, a better France emerged, one in which Catholicism and communism were rec onciled with the republican tradition, anti-Semitism was relegated to the extreme of the political spectrum, and women were granted the beginnings of full citizenship.

France recovered rapidly from the war and enjoyed its greatest pe riod of economic expansion and social change in the thirty years that followed the war, the so-called trente glorieuses. While there was little reckoning with Vichy in the first postwar decades, it would come with a vengeance beginning in the early 1970s. Now, three decades later, the specter of Vichy no longer haunts the nation. The French have come to grips with their history, realizing that their sins and heroic acts were about par for the course during World War II, not much better or worse than those of their neighbors. As Franc¸ois Furet told the French in the late 1970s, the French Revolution is over; the same is true of Vichy. It is a history that has now passed to the point that the Resistance has regained some of the luster lost to the grand narra tive of collaboration during the course of the 1970s and 1980s.

Butisnotthethreatof areturntothedarkyearspalpableintoday's France? Does not France have fuel for fascism in high unemployment and a stagnant economy? Do not anti-immigrant sentiment, the out lawing of Muslim headscarves in French schools, French opposition to globalism led by the sheep farmer Jose´ Bove´, and the French vote against theEuropean Constitution in 2005 indicate that France is turn ing in on itself, seeking a return to ''True France''? And does not the second-place finishof the fascisticJean-Marie Le Pen in the

2002 presi dential election show that France is on the verge of fascism? Nothing could be further from the truth, the anti-French screeds in the Ameri can media since the second Gulf War notwithstanding.

Although the French economy, like that of other advanced econo mies, has grown at a slower rate since the oil shock of the mid 1970s thanduringthe trenteglorieuses, ithasshownconsiderabledynamism. Consumer purchasing power growth after the oil shock rivals that of the earlier period. Average family wealth grew more in the period 1970–2001 than in any other period in French history. The poverty rate has declined by over 50 percent since the early 1970s, and life expectancy has increased by an average of more than eleven years since1961.Although Francehaslowratesofparticipation inthework force, its workers are highly productive. French productivity per hour worked rivals all other nations and now exceeds that of the United States. If France has high unemployment this is not a consequence of a poor economy, but rather of public policy which has increased the cost of low-skilled labor through a high minimum wage and payroll taxes to the extent that it is priced out of the market. Unemployment is a serious problem, but unlike the 1930s, it is a problem that occurs in a generally prosperous economy. Although the French may express pessimism in public opinion polls, their behavior is generally optimis tic. The French birthrate, which was among the lowest in Europe be fore World War II, is now among the highest and is growing while that of other European countries is not.[2]

To see French opposition to globalism as a sign of French deca dence or proto-fascist xenophobia is likewise misleading. Despite the leading role that the French have taken in criticizing globalization, Franceisamongthemostsuccessfullyglobalizedadvancedeconomi There are eight French companies among the world's hundred largest industrial and service companies and seven French banks among the world's fifty largest banks. Many major French companies, such as Michelin, Alcatel, and Dassault, depend on international sales for their profits. France has had a positive trade balance every year but one since1993andis nowtheworld'sfourthlargestexporter. In1997total trade accounted for 49 percent of France's GDP, compared to 25 per

cent for the United States. In 2000 France was the second largest over seas investor. And foreign investment has come to France. Roughly 40 percentofthesharesonthe Frenchstockmarketareownedbyforeigners, far more than the United States where foreigners own only 7 per cent. Perhaps most striking is that the French, historically unwilling to emigrate,havebeguntoliveabroadinrecordnumbers;thenetoutflow is now 50,000 per year. France today is by many measures much more globalized than the United States. In no area is this more evident than in culture. Films made in languages other than English account for only 1 to 2 percent of films shown on U.S. movie screens. Despite government subsidies and quotas which have made the French film industry a comparative success within Europe, French movies account for only 38 percent of movie tickets sold in France. French opposition to globalization is generally not a refusal of it, not a sign of a return to an insular True France. Rather, the mainstream French critique of globalization emphasizesthe needfor ittobe managed so asto protect culture, the environment, the food supply, and the like. Even the cri tiqueof globalization ofthe rabblerousingBove´, whospentpart ofhis youth in California, stems less from a defense of True France than from the post-1968 ecological movement[3]

Perhaps what makes us most confident that a return to the dark years is unlikely is the enormous transformation of French society since the 1960s. Pe´tain's National Revolution hoped to build on the traditional family, the peasantry, and the institutions of the army and the Church, yet all of these have been completely transformed since World War II. The agricultural workforce declined from 6 million in 1946 to 1 million in 1986 by which time the uneducated, technologi cally conservative peasant had been replaced by the educated, techni cally savvy farmer who in modernizing his operations doubled French agricultural production and made France the world's second largest exporter of food. As the former homes of peasants became secondary residences for citydwellers

andfarmers adopted lifestyles increasingly similar to others, the differences between urban and rural France di minished and the sociological foundation of True France vanished. In the same time period the army became reconciled with the Republic and lost much of its prestige, and the Catholic Church declined in importance. Today, monthly Mass attendance is below 10 percent of the population, and the Catholic Church has limited its ambition to serving the remaining believers. More importantly, the rise of individ ualism and the move toward gender equality in French society have profoundly transformed authority relations and the most basic of so cial institutions, the family. Authority is now more negotiated and flexible than in the past. Families have become more diverse as they have adapted to the needs of individuals, particularly of women. Thus, between 1975 and 1990 the number of marriages declined by nearly 45percentwhilethenumberofdivorcesnearlydoubled.Today,Franc exceeds all European countries outside of Scandinavia in the percent age of births outside of marriage. Opinion polls indicate that French tolerance of difference has grown. For example, only 32 percent of the population considered homosexuality ‘‘unjustifiable’’ in 1999, whereas 62 percent considered it soin 1981. One1999 study ranked theFrench alongside the Dutch as the most permissive people in Europe. With the Church and the army diminished and transformed, the traditional patriarchalfamilyintatters,and apermissiveandindividualisticpopu lation,today’sFranceoffersbarrenground for arevivaloftheNational Revolution.[4]

To be sure, contemporary France has its share of problems. The political elite has become increasingly disconnected from and dis trustedbythepopulation.Highunemploymentiscreating anexcluded underclass. It, plus racism, has prevented non-European immigrants and their descendants from being fully integrated into French society as the unrest of the fall of 2005 revealed in spectacular fashion. Yet, these are limited, manageable, and potentially solvable problems. Dis content

with the political elite and concern about security may have gotten Le Pen to the second round of the 2002 presidential election, but he was still defeated in it by Jacques Chirac who received 82.2 percent of the vote. And the descendants of non-European immigrants are, despite the serious obstacles created by unemployment and rac ism, clearly being assimilated to the norms of French culture. The youthwhotooktothestreetsinthefallof2005didnotdo soflyingthe banners of Arabnationalism or Islamicjihad. Rather,they protested to demand full inclusion in French society with which they identified. If French politicians could muster the political courage to adopt both serious measures against discrimination and policies that reduce un employment,theintegrationofthispopulationwouldundoubtedlyim prove. Whatever boost the extreme Right might receive from a backlash against anti-discrimination measures would likely be offset by an improvement of the employment picture. In short, given France's prosperity and long democratic traditions, there is no reason to believe that either the exclusion of France's minority youth popula tion or the extreme Right's electoral success are insolvable problems leading France to a political meltdown.[5]

No one can say with total confidence that the dark years will never return, but the evidence is overwhelming that the conditions that helped create them have disappeared. As Pierre Birnbaum has argued, the old France of the imagined, unitary community has passed away, with the exception of such relatively marginal extremist groups as the NationalFront.Birnbaum, aprominentscholarofFrenchJudaismwho has been critical of the treatment of French Jews in the past, cites the German Jewish exile Heinrich Heine to make the point that France may be, for all of its horrendous faults, the best hope in Europe for Jews, immigrants, and refugees. ''Long live France! Despite every thing,'' Heine exclaimed, for France is like Penelope, engaged in the eternal process of spinning her fabric, ''making it and tearing it apart.'' To Heine, and to Birnbaum, France has the

potential to be the haven for peoples of all cultures and memories, a place that provides all citi zens equal rights and respect, in a civic space where no one individual or group is favored. Today, that potential is greater than ever, but it still must be tempered with the skepticism of those who have been blinded with sight by history.[6]

Further Reading in English General histories of the period include Julian Jackson's encyclopedic France: The Dark Years, 1940–1944, trans. Janet Lloyd (New York: Ox ford University Press, 2001) and Philippe Burrin's excellent France under the Germans: Collaboration and Compromise (New York: New Press, 1996). Older, but still useful is Jean-Pierre Aze´ma, From Munich to Liberation, 1938–1944, trans. Janet Lloyd (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress;Paris:EditionsdelaMaisondessciencesdel'homme 1984). Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order 1940–1944 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972) remains fun damental, especially for state collaboration. Collecting recent scholar ship are Sarah Fishman, Laura Lee Downs, and Ioannis Sinanoglou, eds., France at War: Vichy and the Historians (New York: Berg, 2000), a Festschrift for Robert O. Paxton, and Hanna Diamond and Simon Kitson, eds., Vichy, Resistance, and Liberation: New Perspectives on Wartime France (New York: Berg, 2005), a Festschrift for H. R. Kedward. Collaboration and Resistance: Images of Life in Vichy France, 1940–1944 (NewYork:HarryN. Abrams,2000)offers avisualperspec tive. On the French defeat of 1940 recent general histories include Julian Jackson, The Fall of France: The Nazi Invasion of 1940 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) and Andrew Shennan's brief The Fall of France (New York: Longman, 2000). Ernest R. May, Strange Victory: Hitler's Conquest of France (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000) focuses on France's intelligence failure and looks at both the German and French sides. Recent scholarship is collected in Joel Blatt, ed., The French Defeat of 1940: Reassessments (Providence, R.I.: Berghahn Books, 1998). Still important is Marc Bloch,

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Notes Chapter 1 Defeat of France

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5. Lloyd George quoted in John C. Cairns, ‘‘A Nation of Shopkeepers in Search of a Suitable France, 1919–40,’’ The American Historical Review 79, 3 (June 1974): 713.

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4. William D. Irvine, ‘‘Fascism in France and the Strange Case of the Croix de Feu,’’ The Journal of Modern History 63, 2 (June 1991): 280.

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31. May, Strange Victory, 167–68; Young, In Command of France, 209–12.

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1. MarcBloch, Strange Defeat,trans. GerardHopkins(New York:Norton, 1968), 134–70.

2. ThispointismostconvincinglymadebyDoughty, ''TheFrenchArmed Forces, 1918–40,'' 66.

3. Doughty, ''TheFrenchArmedForces,1918–40,'' 43,55;JulianJackson, The Fall of France: The Nazi Invasion of 1940 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 13–15; Ernest May, Strange Victory, 208–9, 403–4.

4. Jackson, The Fall of France, 17–21; Young, France and the Origins, 106–8.

5. Young, InCommand of France, 181 forthe quote; MartinS. Alexander, ''In Defence of the Maginot Line: Security Policy, Domestic Policy and the Economic Depression in France,'' in French Foreign and Defence Policy,

164–94; Doughty, ‘‘The French Armed Forces, 1918–1940,’’ 55–57; Jackson, The Fall of France, 21–24.

38. Doughty, ‘‘The French Armed Forces, 1918–1940,’’ 54–61.

1. Guy Rossi-Landi, La Droˆle de guerre: la vie politique en France 2 sep tembre 1939–10 mai 1940, Travaux et recherches de science politique, no. 14 (Paris:ArmandColin,1971),part2,chap.3;GeorgesVidal, ‘‘LeHautComman dement et la crainte de ‘l’ennemi inte´rieur’ en juin 1940: origines caracte´ris tiquesdelapeur ducomplot communistedanslahie´rarchie,’’ in LaCampagne de 1940, ed. Christine Levisse-Touze´ (Paris: Tallandier, 2001), 357–81.

2. VickiCaron, ‘‘TheMissedOpportunity:FrenchRefugeePolicyinWar time, 1939–1940,’’ in The French Defeat of 1940, 126–59. See also Peschanski, La France des camps, 72–77, which makes the point that France was no worse than other nations in handling refugees.

3. Both quotes can be found in Elisabeth du Re´au, ‘‘Edouard Daladier: The Conduct of the War and the Beginning of Defeat,’’ in The French Defeat of 1940, 107, 110.

4. Quoted in Franc¸ois Be´darida, ‘‘Huit mois d’attente et d’illusion: la ‘droˆle de guerre,’’’ in Aze´ma and Be´darida, eds., La France des anne´es noires, 1:52.

1. Thequote comesfromJean Lacouture, DeGaulletheRebel,1890–1944, trans. Patrick O’Brian (New York: Norton, 1993), 172; see also Charles de Gaulle, The War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle: The Call to Honour (1940– 1942), trans.JonathanGriffin(NewYork:VikingPress,1955),28–29;Calvocor essi, Wint, and Pritchard, The Penguin History of the Second World War, 118; and especially Stefan Martens, ‘‘La de´faite franc¸aise: Une heureuse surprise Allemande?’’ in La Campagne de 1940, 403–11; and Ernest R. May, Strange Victory, 275–78.

2. See Georges-Henri Soutou, ‘‘Introduction,’’ in La Campagne de 1940, 24; and

Patrick Facon, ‘‘L’Arme´e de l’air dans la bataille de 1940: mythes, le´gendes et re´alite´s,’’ in La Campagne de 1940, 210–20.

3. See du Re´au, ‘‘Edouard Daladier,’’ 113; and May, Strange Victory, 333–36.

46. May, Strange Victory, 286–87, 331, 341–45.

1. Warner, Pierre Laval, 149–51, 154–57, and 160 for the quote of Pe´tain; Rossi-Landi, La Droˆle de guerre, part 1, chap. 3.

2. Aze´ma, De Munich a` la Libe´ration, 51–53; Rossi-Landi, La Droˆle de guerre, part 1, chap. 4; Andrew Shennan, The Fall of France, 143–44.

1. Soutou, ‘‘Introduction,’’ inLaCampagnede1940, 29andNicoleJordan, ‘‘Strategy and Scapegoatism: Reflections on the French National Catastrophe of 1940,’’ in The French Defeat of 1940, 22–23 and 26, n. 32.

1. De Gaulle, The Call to Honour (1940–1942), 35.

2. According to General Jean Delmas in La Campagne de 1940, 184.

1. May, Strange Victory, 261–62, 368, 371. May is the source of much of what follows.

2. 53. Ibid., 268.

1. Ibid., 357–58, 371; Olivier Forcade, ‘‘Le Renseignement face a` l’Allem agne au printemps 1940 et au de´but de la campagne de France,’’ in La Cam pagne de 1940, 131 for the quote.

55. Jordan, ‘‘Strategy and Scapegoatism,’’ 28–29.

1. May, Strange Defeat, 392–95, 399, 407–12, 419–20, 429–31; Jackson, The Fall of France, 42–54.

2. Most of this paragraph is based on New York Times dispatches from Paris during the secondhalf of May 1940, but see also Jean-Paul Cointet, Paris 40–44 (Paris: Perrin, 2001), 16.

3. Lacouture, De Gaulle the Rebel, 188; de Gaulle, The Call to Honour (1940–1942), 48–49;Calvocoressi, Wint, andPritchard, The PenguinHistory of the Second World War, 136–37; Jackson, The Fall of France, 60–62 and 85–92.

1. See especially Colonel Jacques Vernet, ‘‘La Bataille de la Somme,’’ in La Campagne de 1940, 198–208.
2. 60. Cointet, Paris 40–44, 21–26; New York Times, June 13 and 16, 1940.

1. Jean-Pierre Aze´ma, ‘‘Le Choc arme´ et les de´bandades,’’ in Aze´ma and Be´darida, eds., La France des anne´es noires, 1: 123; de Gaulle, The Call to Honour (1940–1942), 55.
2. Jacques Marseille, ‘‘L’Empire,’’ in Aze´ma and Be´darida, eds., La France des anne´es noires, 1: 285–86 provides a strong case against the feasibility of the North African option. For the June 16 debate see Lacouture, De Gaulle the Rebel, 202–5, 209.
3. Pe´tain, Discours, 57–58.ForthedemoralizingimpactofPe´tain’sspeech on the troops see the memoir of Jean Dutourd, The Taxis of the Marne, trans. Harold King (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957). See also Philippe Last erle, ‘‘Autopsie d’un exode maritime: L’e´vacuation des ports par la marine,’’ in La Campagne de 1940, 265–85.
4. SarahFishman, We WillWait:WivesofFrenchPrisonersofWar,1940– 1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 26–27.
5. Quoted in Robert Frank, ‘‘Les Incidences nationales et internationales de la de´faite franc¸aise: le choc et le trauma et le syndrome de quarante,’’ in La Campagne de 1940, 527.

Chapter 2 The National Revolution

1. See Andrew Shennan, The Fall of France (New York: Longman, 2000), 49; Jean-Pierre Aze´ma, De Munich a` la Libe´ration 1938–1944 (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1979), 73–74.
2. Robert O. Paxton, Parades and Politics at Vichy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 48; Philippe Burrin, France under the Germans: Col

laboration and Compromise, trans. Janet Lloyd (New York: New Press, 1996), 140–42.

3. New York Times, June 24, 1940; Philippe Pe´tain, Discours aux franc¸ais, 17 juin 1940–20 aouˆt 1944 (Paris: Albin Michel, 1989), 66.

4. W. D. Halls, Politics, Society and Christianity in Vichy France (Oxford: Berg, 1995), 38–39, 48–49.

5. Olivier Wieviorka, Les Orphelins de la re´publique: Destine´es des de´pute´s et se´nateurs franc¸ais (1940–1945) (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 2001), 63.

6. For the quote see Joel Colton, Le´on Blum: Humanist in Politics (Cam bridge: MIT Press, 1974), 350. See also Miche`le Cointet, Pe´tain et les franc¸ais: 1940–1951 (Paris: Perrin, 2003), 38–40.

7. Colton, Le´on Blum, 383. See also Wieviorka, Les Orphelins, 407–9.

8. Dominique Re´my, Les Lois de Vichy (Paris: Romillat, 1992), 31–46.

1. An excellent analysis is Miche`le Cointet-Labrousse, Vichy et le fascisme (Paris: Complexe, 1987), 9–25. For Pe´tain's stand on Dreyfus see Simon Ep stein, Les Dreyfusards sous l'Occupation (Paris: Albin Michel, 2001), 187. The Pe´tain quote is from Henry Rousso, Vichy: l'e´ve´nement, la me´moire, l'histoire (Paris:Gallimard,2001),60.SeealsoJean-PierreAze´ma,''LeRe´gimedeVichy,'' in Jean-Pierre Aze´ma and Franc¸ois Be´darida, eds., La France des anne´es noires (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 2000), vol. 1, De la de´faite a` Vichy, 170–71.

1. Michael Marrus and Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 3–5; Re´my, Les Lois, 51–52, 55– 56, 68–70, 74.

1. See Re´my, Les Lois, 53, 57, 60–62, 82.

2. Ibid.,83–91;MarrusandPaxton, VichyFranceandthe Jews, 3–5,9–10.

1. Eugen Weber, Action Franc¸aise: Royalism and Reaction in Twentieth-

Century France (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), 442.

2. Michel Winock, Le Sie`cle des intellectuels (Paris: Seuil, 1999), 438–40. See also Eugen Weber, My France: Politics, Culture, Myth (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), especially the chapter entitled ‘‘Nationalism, Socialism, and National Socialism.’’

3. Miche`le Bordeaux, La Victoire de la famille dans la France de´faite, Vichy 1940–1944 (Paris: Flammarion, 2002), 126.

16. Pe´tain, Discours, 60.

1. Francine Muel-Dreyfus, Vichy et l’e´ternel fe´minin, contribution a` une sociologie politique de l’ordre des corps (Paris: Seuil, 1996), 106.

1. Bordeaux, La Victoire, 46.

2. Muel-Dreyfus, Vichy et l’e´ternel fe´minin, 101.

1. Ibid., 98–101, 111–15, 132–33; Bordeaux, La Victoire, 84–88, 96–97, 139–42, 179–80, 189, 197, 221–33.

21. Bordeaux, La Victoire, 58–60, 66, 74–75.

1. SarahFishman, We WillWait:WivesofFrenchPrisonersofWar,1940– 1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 46–54, 58–59, 99–100.

1. Bordeaux, La Victoire, 157–58, 161–64; Miranda Pollard, ‘‘La Politique du travail fe´minin,’’ 243–47, in Jean-Pierre Aze´ma and Franc¸ois Be´darrida, eds., Le Re´gime de Vichy et les franc¸ais (Paris: Fayard, 1992).

1. Pe´tain, Discours, 133.

2. Muel-Dreyfus, Vichy et l’e´ternel fe´minin, 136–42, 148, 356.

3. Re´my Handourtzel, Vichy et l’e´cole, 1940–1945 (Paris: Noeˆsis, 1997),

60.

1. Jean-Michel Barreau, Vichy contrel'e´cole de la Re´publique (Paris: Flam marion, 2000), 232–35, 265.

2. 28. Muel-Dreyfus, Vichy et l'e´ternel fe´minin, 163, 173–74, 185.

1. Rene´eBe´darida, Les Catholiques dans la guerre, 1939–1945 (Paris: Ha chette, 1998), 41, 49, 52, 64–67.

30. Pe´tain, Discours, 80–81.

1. Christian Faure, Le Projet culturel de Vichy (Lyon: Presses Universi taires de Lyon, 1989), 40–43, 67–68, 73–75, 164ff., 230–31.

2. 32. Ibid., 139, 144–49, 180–83.

1. Jean-Pierre Rioux, ed., La Vie culturelle sous Vichy (Brussels: E´ditions Complexe, 1990), 167–81.

34. Faure, Projet culturel, 103.

1. Studies of the Dordogne, Franche-Comte´, Brittany, and Alpes-Maritimes can be found in Aze´ma and Be´darida, eds., Le Re´gime de Vichy. See also Bernard and Ge´rard Le Maroc, L'Alsace dans la guerre 1939–1945 (Le Coteau:Horvath,1988)andPhilippeJoutard,JacquesPoujol,andPatrickCaba nel, eds., Ce´vennes terre de refuge, 1940–1944 (Montpellier: Presses de Lan guedoc, 1994).

2. 36. New York Times, Aug. 21, 1940.

1. Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order 1940–1944 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 205–9, 215. See also Aze´ma, De Munich, 98, n. 3.

1. Isabel Boussard, Vichy et la corporation paysanne (Paris: Presse de la fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1980), 135 for the quote. This paragraph relies almost exclusively on this monograph.

1. Ibid., 204.

2. Pe´tain, Discours, Mar. 7, 1942.

1. Georges Duby and Armand Wallon, eds., Histoire de la France rurale (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1977), vol. 4, La Fin de la France paysanne depuis 1914, 94–95, 98–99, 101, 103.

2. 42. Burrin, France under the Germans, 140–41, 284.

1. Pe´tain, Discours, 111–13, 127–30, 249–51. See also Henry Rousso, ‘‘L’Impact du re´gime sur la socie´te´: ses dimensions et ses limites,’’ in Aze´ma and Be´darida, eds., Le Re´gime de Vichy, 577–80, who points out that artisans received nothing from Vichy.

44. Pe´tain, Discours, 188–89.

45. Jean-Pierre le Crom, Syndicats Nous Voila`! Vichy et le corporatisme (Paris: Les E´ditions de l’Atelier/E´ditions ouvrie`res, 1995). Henry Ehrmann is quoted by Rousso, Vichy: l’e´ve´nement, 97.On questions of economic planning and modernization see Rousso, ‘‘L’impact du re´gime ,’’ 581–82 and Richard Kuisel, Capitalism and the State in Modern France: Renovation and Economic Management in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Burrin, France under the Germans, 215–17.

1 Pe´tain, Discours, 66, 68–71.

2 Ibid., 73–78, 81–82.

3 Ibid., 86–94.

4 Ibid., 150–55.

5 Ibid., 197–200.

6 Ibid., 212–15.

1. Richard H. Weisberg, Vichy Law and the Holocaust in France (New York: New York University Press, 1996), 8–9, 19, 132.

1. Cointet-Labrousse, Vichy et le fascisme, 177–96; Bordeaux, La Victoire, 58–60, 74–75.

1 Cointet-Labrousse, Vichy et le fascisme, 185–96.

2 Cointet, Pe´tain et les franc¸ais, 248.

1. This paragraph is based on the excellent article by Sonia Mazey and Vincent Wright, ‘‘LesPre´fets,’’ 267–86inAze´maandBe´darida,eds., LeRe´gime de

Vichy.

2. Ge´rard Noiriel, Les Origines re´publicaines de Vichy (Paris: Hachette, 1999), 163–204. Noiriel emphasizes the continuity between the Republic and Vichy probably more than is warranted by the evidence.

3. RobertO. Paxton, ParadesandPoliticsatVichy,146–47,152–53;Pierre Giolitto, Histoirede la Milice (Paris: Perrin2002), 32; Pe´tain, Discours, 218–21.

4. Jean-Paul Cointet, La Le´gion franc¸aise des combattants, 1940–1944: La tentation du fascisme (Paris: Albin Michel, 1995), 40, 54–55, 60, 64, 101, 110.

5. Giolitto, HistoiredelaMilice, 46–55.Onthespiritualfestivals see Coin tet, La Le´gion franc¸aise, 340–48.

61. Ibid., 127, 129; Pe´tain, Discours, 304–5.

62. Henry Rousso, Pe´tain et la fin de la collaboration: Sigmaringen 1944– 1945 (Bruxelles: E´ditions Complexes, 1984).

Chapter 3 Collaboration 1. New York Times, July 11 and 25, 1940.

2. For the quote see Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order 1940–1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 71. See also Jean-Pierre Aze´ma, De Munich a` la Libe´ration 1938–1944 (Paris: E´ditions du Seuil, 1979), 110–11, 114; Geoffrey Warner, Pierre Laval and the Eclipse of France1931–1945(NewYork:Macmillan,1968),218,222–24;PhilippeBurrin, France under the Germans: Collaboration and Compromise, trans. Janet Lloyd (New York: New Press, 1996), 96–97.

1. Burrin, France under the Germans, 79–93. The quote, from Abetz, is on page 93.

2. PhilippePe´tain, Discoursauxfranc¸ais, 17juin1940–20 aouˆt1944 (Paris: Albin Michel, 1989), 73–78,86–89. See also the report in New York Times, Oct. 11, 1940 and Warner, Pierre Laval, 231–32.

3. New York Times, Oct. 31, 1940 and Nov. 1, 1940; Paxton, Vichy France, 72, 80; Pe´tain, Discours, 95.

4. New York Times, Oct. 22, 1940 and Nov. 22, 23, and 25, 1940; Pierre Laborie, L'Opinion franc¸aise sous Vichy (Paris: Seuil, 1990), 239–40.

5. Miche`le Cointet, Pe´tain et les Franc¸ais, 1940–1945 (Paris: Perrin, 2002), 219–21, 224–26; Laborie, L'Opinion franc¸aise, 244; New York Times, Nov. 19, 1940.

6. Pe´tain, Discours, 101; Paxton, Vichy France, 100–5; New York Times, Dec. 16, 1940.

7. Dominique Re´my, Les Lois de Vichy (Paris: Romillat, 1992), 105–11; RobertFrank,''Pe´tain,Laval,Darlan,''inJean-PierreAze´maandFranc¸oisBe´dar ida, eds., La France des anne´es noires (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 2000), vol. 1, De la de´faite a` Vichy, 324–36; Paxton, Vichy France, 110–12.

8. Denis Peschanski, Vichy 1940–1944: Controˆle et exclusion (Brussels: E´ditions complexes, 1997), 42–50; Laurent Gervereau and Denis Peschanski, eds., La Propagande sous Vichy (Nanterre: BDIC, 1990), 16–27.

9. New York Times, Feb. 10 and 18, 1941; Paxton, Vichy France, 114–18; Burrin, France under the Germans, 116–17, 120–21.

10. Historians disagree about the precise reasons for the failure of the Protocols. Some believe that French officials had sought to scuttle them by making unacceptable demands. Others hold that the Germans simply lost interest in them. For a summary of the debate see Julian Jackson, France: The Dark Years, 1940–1944 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 180–81.

11. Paxton, Vichy France, 122–26, 387–90 and 123 for the Ribbentrop quote; Burrin, France under the Germans, 121–27; Aze´ma, De Munich, 118 for the Pe´tain quote; Jackson, France: The Dark Years, 183–84.

12. Paxton, Vichy France, 114 and 144 for the quote; Burrin, France under the Germans, 249–58.

1. RichardKuisel, Capitalismandthe StateinModern France:Renovation and Economic Management in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1981), 131–32, 141–42.

2. Burrin, France under the Germans, 252, 263–67; Henry Rousso, Vichy: l'e ´ve´nement, la me´moire, l'histoire (Paris: Gallimard, 2001), 80–93, 201 (for the quote), 219–24, 228; Aze´ma, De Munich, 218–19.

3. The quotes are from Warner, Pierre Laval, 285, 292, 300–1; Frank, ''Pe ´tain, Laval, Darlan,'' 337–39.

4. Warner, Pierre Laval, 299; Burrin, France under the Germans, 142. See alsoRobertGildea, MarianneinChains:DailyLifeintheHeartofFranceduring the German Occupation (New York: Henry Holt, 2003), 273, 277. Gildea is one of the only historians who does not believe that the STO helped create the Resistance: ''This is a myth that dies hard,'' (285).

19. Quoted in Burrin, France under the Germans, 155.

1. Michael Marrus and Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 244.

2. Warner, Pierre Laval, 310–11 for the quote. See also, Burrin, France under the Germans, 150.

22. Warner, Pierre Laval, 322–24, 329–34, 337–38, 343, 347, 351.

1. Robert O. Paxton, Parades and Politics at Vichy: The French Officer Corps under Marshal Pe´tain (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 396–99; Pe´tain, Discours, 302.

2. Jean-Pierre Aze´ma, Les Archives de guerre 1940–1944 (Paris: La Docu mentation Franc¸aise, 1996). See the newsreels for the summer of 1943, espe cially those for June 25, July 2 and 9, and Sept. 3. See also the newsreel for Dec. 24.

3. Warner, Pierre Laval, 380–86; Henry Rousso, Pe´tain et la fin de la col laboration: Sigmaringen 1944–1945 (Bruxelles: E´ditions Complexes, 1984), 72–74.

26. Cointet, Pe´tain et les franc¸ais, 71.

1. Miche`le Cointet, Vichy et le fascisme (Paris: Complexe, 1987), 224–26, 235–39; Pierre Giolitto, Histoire de la Milice (Paris: Perrin, 2002), 203–5, 210– 13, 235–41, 245, 249.
2. Giolitto, Histoire de la Milice, 382–83, 448–49; Pe´tain, Discours, 325–26.
3. The long, and futile, history of collaboration after August 1944 is de tailed in Rousso, Pe´tain et la fin de la collaboration.

30. Burrin, France under the Germans, 427–36.

1. Thisdefinitionofcollaborationis, moreorless,the oneusedbyGildea in Marianne in Chains.
2. Burrin, FranceundertheGermans, 207;Andre´Halimi, LaDe´lationsous l'occupation (Paris: Alain Moreau, 1983), 24, 33–34, 87–88, 119.
    1. On the west of France see Gildea, Marianne in Chains. For Brittany see Jacqueline Sainclivier, ''La France de l'Ouest,'' 381–98 in Jean-Pierre Aze´ma and Franc¸ois Be´darida, eds., La France des anne´es noires (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 2000), vol. 2, De l'Occupation a` la Libe´ration and Herve´ le Boterf, La Bretagne sous le gouvernement de Vichy: une tentative de re´gionalisation?
    2. (Paris: E´ditions France-Empire, 1982).
3. Burrin, France under the Germans, 362–65; Sarah Farmer, Martyred Village: Commemorating the 1944 Massacre at Oradour-sur-Glane (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 136–57; Pascal Ory, Les Collaborateurs, 1940–1945 (Paris: Seuil, 1980), 184–90.
4. Robert Zaretsky, Nıˆmes at War: Religion, Politics and Public Opinion in the Gard, 1938–1944 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995),145–50;Jean-PierreAze´maandRe´ne´Be´darida,eds., LeRe´gime deVichy et les franc¸ais (Paris: Fayard, 1992), 545–51; John F. Sweets, Choices in Vichy France: The French under Nazi Occupation (New York:

Oxford University Press, 1994), 84.

5. Paul Jankowski, Communism and Collaboration: Simon Sabiani and Politics in Marseille, 1919–1944 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), chaps. 7 and 8; Aze´ma and Be´darida, eds., Le Re´gime de Vichy, 556–59.

6. Germaine Bre´e and George Bernauer, eds., Defeat and Beyond: An An thology of French Wartime Writing, 1940–1945 (New York: Random House, 1970), 147–58; Jean-Paul Cointet, Paris 40–44 (Paris: Perrin, 2001), 33, 49–53, 67, 70, 95.

38. Cointet, Paris 40–44, 97, 157–61, 174–75.

1. Dominique Veillon, La Mode sous l'Occupation (Paris: Payot, 2001), 119–20, 142–44, 153, 162, 166–70.

2. Gise`le Sapiro, La Guerre des ´ecrivains 1940–1953 (Paris: Fayard, 1999), 82–83, 100, 159–60; Alice Kaplan, The Collaborator: The Trial and Execution of Robert Brasillach (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 82–91.

3. Herbert Lottman, The Left Bank: Writers, Artists, and Politics from the Popular Front to the Cold War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), 142–47; Mi chel Winock, Le Sie`cle des intellectuels (Paris: Seuil, 1999), 450–52; Julian Jackson, France: The Dark Years, 1940–1944 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 205, 313, 316.

42. Lottman, The Left Bank, 160–62.

1. On the roles of Sartre and Beauvoir see Ingrid Galster, Sartre, Vichy et les intellectuals (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2001) especially 85–87.

2. Lottman, The Left Bank, 168; Bre´e and Bernauer, eds., Defeat and Be yond, 97–99,101,342–45; EugenWeber, ActionFranc¸aise:RoyalismandReac tion in Twentieth-Century France (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), 468, 479 for the quotes from Maurras.

3. Simon Epstein, Les Dreyfusards sous l'Occupation (Paris: Albin Michel, 2001), 300–1, 332–38.

4. The discussion of Doriot and other political leaders is based on the following

secondary sources: Burrin, France under the Germans; Ory, Les Col laborateurs; and Bertram Gordon, Collaborationism in France during the Sec ond World War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980).

47. See especially Gordon, Collaborationism in France, 145–50.

1. In addition to the sources above, see Zeev Sternhell, Neither Left nor Right:FascistIdeologyinFrance (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1996), 174–83.

1 See especially Burrin, France under the Germans, 384, 400–10.

2 Ibid., 466.

1. Thissectionisbased onRene´eBe´darida, LesCatholiquesdanslaguerre 1939–1945 (Paris: Hachette, 1998) and W. D. Halls, Politics, Society and Chris tianity in Vichy France (Berg: Oxford, 1995).

2. The quotes are from Halls, Politics, Society and Christianity, 20, and Be´darida, Les Catholiques, 52. See also the Petit Robert entry for ve´ne´rer.

3. The quotes are from Be´darida, Les Catholiques, 188, 191 and Halls, Politics, Society and Christianity, 325.

54. See Halls, Politics, Society and Christianity, 350ff.

1. But, see Gildea, Marianne in Chains, who seems to believe that the many close ties between the French and the Germans were based on genuine friendship, at least in the west of France. The evidence is not totally convincing.

2. Philippe Burrin, ‘‘Le Collaborationisme,’’ in Aze´ma and Be´darida, eds., La France des anne´es noires, 1:402–3; Olivier Wieviorka, Les Orphelins de la Re´publique:Destine´es desde´pute´setse´nateursfranc¸ais(1940–1945), 177,194–95, 293.

1. InadditiontoPaxton’s VichyFrance, seehissuccinctcontribution, ‘‘La collaboration d’E´tat,’’ to Aze´ma and Be´darida, eds., La France des anne´es noires, 1: 349–83.

2. See the important articles by Dick van Galen Last, ‘‘The Netherlands,’’ and Hans Kirchhoff. ‘‘Denmark’’ in Bob Moore, ed., Resistance in Western Eu rope (Oxford: Berg, 2000).

Chapter 4 Exclusion

1. Pierre Pe´an, Une Jeunesse franc¸aise: Franc¸ois Mitterrand, 1934–1947 (Paris: Fayard,1994), 210. In a later conversation with Elie Wiesel, Mitterrand claimed that he was far more affected bythe defeat of France than by the fate of the Jews because that defeat was a very personal one for him: ‘‘It has left an indelible mark on my life, and every time I have had occasion to protect France’s sense of itself as a nation I think about this time. Never again will the country find itself in that situation.’’ See Franc¸ois Mitterrand and Elie Wiesel, Memoir in Two Voices, trans. Richard Seaver and Timothy Bent (New York: Arcade, 1996), 111.
2. Studs Terkel, ‘‘The Good War’’: An Oral History of World War Two (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984).
3. Vicky Caron, Uneasy Asylum: France and the Jewish Refugee Crisis, 1933–1942 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).
4. Miche`le Cointet, Pe´tain et les franc¸ais, 1940–1951 (Paris: Perrin, 2002),

138.

1. PhilippePe´tain, DiscoursauxFranc¸ais,17juin1940–29 aouˆt1944(Paris: Albin Michel, 1989), 81–82. The section in which he referred openly to the anti-Semitic laws was removed at the last minute.
2. Dominique Re´my, Les Lois de Vichy (Paris: E´ditions Romillat, 1992), 48–56.
7. Ibid., 68–70, 74.
1. Ibid., 87–90; Andre´ Kaspi, Les Juifs pendant l’Occupation (Paris: Seuil,

1997), 66.

2. Re´my, Les Lois, 116–23; Michael Marrus and Robert O. Paxton, Vichy Franceandthe Jews (Stanford:Stanford UniversityPress,1995),98–99;Susan Zuccotti, The Holocaust, the French, and the Jews (New York: Basic Books, 1993), 61.

3. Richard H. Weisburg, Vichy Law and the Holocaust in France (New York:NewYorkUniversityPress,1996),69,76–78,164–69,186–89. Weisburg has little patience for the law under Vichy, but his account indicates clearly that the law did provide some recourse for Jews, despite the anti-Semitism of many who were involved with the legal process.

11. Re´my, Les Lois, 126–29, 148–60, 178–82.

1. AccordingtoPierreLaborieinRichardJ.Golsan,ed., Memory,theHolo caust, and French Justice: The Bousquet and Touvier Affairs (Hanover: Univer sity Press of New England, 1996), 94–96.

2. Weisberg, Vichy Law, 281. Donna F. Ryan, The Holocaust and the Jews of Marseille:The Enforcement ofanti-Semitic Policies in VichyFrance (Urbana: UniversityofIllinoisPress,1996),72–73,pointsoutthatonlyhalfofallJewish businesses in Marseille were Aryanized. She believes that this was due to the low value of many of them.

3. Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, 191–93; Weisberg, Vichy Law, 300, 307, 317–19.

4. Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, 82–83, 108–10; Weis berg, Vichy Law, 8–10, 13 for the quote.

5. Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, 84–85, 116 for the quote, 135–36.

6. ClaudiaKoonz, TheNaziConscience (Cambridge,Mass.:BelknapPress, 2003) on this phenomenon in Germany.

18. Kaspi, Les Juifs pendant l'Occupation, 108–9.

1. Jean-Paul Cointet, Paris 40–44 (Paris: Perrin, 2001), 227–28; Zuccotti,

The Holocaust, the French, and the Jews, 81–89.

2. 20. Zuccotti, The Holocaust, the French, and the Jews, 90–94.

1. Denis Peschanski, La France des camps: l'internement, 1938–1946 (Paris: Gallimard, 2002), 322, 346–47.

2. OnAnnieKriegel, seeMargaretCollinsWeitz, SistersintheResistance: How Women Fought to Free France, 1940–1945 (New York: Wiley, 1995), 33. On the Toulouse case, see Stacy Cretzmeyer, Your Name is Rene´e: Ruth Kapp Hartz's Story as a Hidden Child in Nazi-Occupied France (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 37–40. The doctor quote comes from Cointet, Paris, 40–44, 235–36. The figures, quoted in this and the previous paragraph, are now common knowledge, used by everyone involved with the issue.

3. Peschanski, LaFrancedescamps, 108–16,250–55;MarrusandPaxton, Vichy France and the Jews, 256.

4. Both quotes are from Zuccotti, TheHolocaust, the French, and the Jews, 155–56.

1. Kaspi, Les Juifs, 232–33. The French Red Cross made a similar com ment about public opinion.

2. Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, 276. The quote is from Denis Peschanski, Vichy 1940–1944: Controˆle et exclusion (Brussels: E´ditions complexes, 1997), 188.

3. Pierre Laborie, ''1942 et le sort des juifs: Quel tournant dans l'opi nion?'' Annales ESC 48, 3 (May–June 1993): 661.

28. Quoted in New York Times, Nov.14, 1940.

1. W. D. Halls, Politics, Society and Christianity in Vichy France (Oxford: Berg, 1995), 27, 98, 104 for the quotes.

2. Ibid., 106–9; Bernard Comte, ''Conscience Catholique et perse´cution antise´mite: L'engagement de the´ologiens lyonnais en 1941–1942,'' Annales ESC 48,

3 (May–June 1993): 642–43, 652–53. For a more robust defense of the Church see Henri de Lubac, Christian Resistance to Anti-Semitism: Memories from 1940–1944 (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1990).

31. Halls, Politics, Society and Christianity, 118–20.

1. Philippe Joutard, Jacques Poujol, and Patrick Cabanel, eds., Ce´vennes terrederefuge, 1940–1944 (Montpellier:PressesdeLanguedoc,1994),138–39, 236–37.

2. There is some disagreement about the effect of Laval's protest to Oberg. Serge Klarsfeld seems to believe that it had an immediate impact on French policies toward the Jews, while Robert Paxton believes that not until mid-1943 did Laval try to stop the roundups. See their respective articles in Annales ESC 48, 3 (May–June 1993). See also Halls, Politics, Society and Chris tianity, 131–33.

3. Zuccotti, The Holocaust, the French, and the Jews, 169–70, 175–78, 190–93.

4. Franc¸ois and Rene´eBe´darida, eds., La Re´sistance spirituelle 1941– 1944: Les Cahiers du Te´moignage chre´tien (Paris: Albin Michel, 2001), espe cially the articles of Nov. 1941 and Mar.–Apr. 1942, in addition to the June 1942 brochure.

36. Ibid. for the quotes, 212, 228.

1. Ryan, The Holocaust and the Jews of Marseille, chap. 5; Fernande Leb oucher, Incredible Mission (New York: Doubleday, 1969), which details the network established by Father Benoıˆt. Ryan cites the 4,000 figure.

2. 38. Cretzmeyer, Your Name Is Rene´e, 130–34, 141–44.

1. Joutard,Poujol,andCabanel,eds., Ce´vennesterrederefuge isthe essen tial source for the Protestant effort to protect the Jews in this area.

1. Philip Hallie, Lest Innocent Blood be Shed (New York: Harper, 1978), 190 for Pastor Trocme´'s estimate that 2,500 Jews passed through the town. Zuccotti, The Holocaust, the French and the Jews, 228–29 gives the figure of

5,000.

2. Peschanski, La France des camps, 156, 250–51, 255. The number of children in the camps dropped from 2,700 in Oct. 1941 to 661 in May 1942, due mainly to the actions of the Nıˆmes Committee.

3. Zucotti, TheHolocaust,theFrenchandtheJews, 213–14,221–22;Rene´e Poznanski, ‘‘Re´sistance juive, re´sistants juifs: retour a` l’Histoire,’’ in Me´moire et histoire:laRe´sistance, eds. Jean-Marie GuillonandPierreLaborie(Toulouse: Privat, 1995), 240–42; Caron, Uneasy Asylum, 350.

4. Gilbert Michlin, Aucun inte´reˆt au point de vue national: la grande illu siond’unefamillejuiveen France(Paris:AlbinMichel,2001);Cretzmeyer, Your Name is Rene´e, 191.

5. Andre´ Halimi, La De´lation sous l’occupation (Paris: Alain Moreau, 1983), 42–43, 87–90.

6. Zuccotti, TheHolocaust, the French andthe Jews, 207–8;and Kaspi, Les Juifs pendant l’occupation, 339, for the statistics.

7. Kaspi, Les Juifs pendant l’occupation, 300–18; Poznanski, ‘‘Re´sistance juive,’’ 235, 238–39.

8. The preceeding three paragraphs are based on Annette Wieviorka, De´portation et genocide: Entre la me´moire et l’oubli (Paris: Plon, 1992).

9. Peschanski, Vichy 1940–1944, 76, 108, 122, 133–34. See also Edward Mortimer, The Rise of the French Communist Party 1920–1947 (London: Faber and Faber, 1984), 307.

10. Jean Le Bitoux, Les Oublie´sdelame´moire (Paris: Hachettes Litte´ra tures, 2002), an intemperate work that contains the evidence regarding homo sexuality in Franceduring the war.The authormaintains on page221 thatthe French were complicit in the detention of Alsatian homosexuals

because the police in Alsace had drawn up lists of suspected homosexuals, which the Ger mans used.

1. Denis Peschanski, Les Tsiganes en France, 1939–1946 (Paris: CNRS, 1994), 21–34.

51. Ibid., 37–40, 45, 105–6.

52. Peschanski, Vichy 1940–1945, 487, points out that under Vichy the camps were never used ‘‘to reeducate the prisoner or to destroy his personal ity, not to mention exterminating him.’’ This is true, but it does not make up for the terrible fate that so many encountered as the result of Vichy’s total collaboration with the Nazis.

53. For the quote see Bob Moore, Victims and Survivors: The Nazi Persecu tionoftheJewsintheNetherlands 1940–1945 (London: Arnold,1997),257–58. See also Jose´ Gotovitch and Pieter Lagrou, ‘‘La Re´sistance franc¸aise dans le paysage europe´en,’’ in La Re´sistance et les franc¸ais: nouvelles approches, Les Cahiers de l’Institut d’Histoire du Temps Pre´sent, no. 37 (1997): 156–58.

Chapter 5 Resistance

1. QuotedinJean Lacouture, DeGaulletheRebel,1890–1944, trans.Patrick O’Brian (New York: Norton, 1993), 575; see also Gilles Ragache, Les Enfants de la guerre: Vivre, survivre, lire et jouer en France, 1939–1949 (Paris: Perrin, 1997), 197–99, 226.

2. On this see Charles de Gaulle, The War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle: The Call to Honour (1940–1942), trans. Jonathan Griffin (New York: Viking Press, 1955), 73.

3. Jean-Louis Cre´mieux-Brilhac, La France Libre: De l’appel du 18 juin a` la libe´ration (Paris: Gallimard, 2001), 68; see also Robert Paxton, Parades and Politics at Vichy: The French Officer Corps under Marshal Pe´tain (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 34, on the inability of French military offi cers to go against the chain of command, as de Gaulle did in 1940.

4. Cre´mieux-Brilhac, La France Libre, 109–10, 114–16, 122–23.

1. Pierre Laborie, L’Opinion franc¸aise sous Vichy (Paris: Seuil, 1990), 239, who is cautious on the matter of French support for the British after Mers-el Ke´bir, although he states that a majority supported a British victory. In

con trast, see the report of the chief Paris reporter for the New York Times, Sept. 25, 1940, who claimed that everywhere he went in France he discovered sup port for the British and de Gaulle.

2. 6. Lacouture, De Gaulle the Rebel, 280.

1. The account is based on Lacoutre, De Gaulle the Rebel, 300–7 and on Cre ´mieux, La France Libre, 210–21. See also Robert Frank, ‘‘Identite´sre´sis tantes etlogiques allie´es,’’ in LaRe´sistance etles franc¸ais:nouvelles approches, Les Cahiers de l’Institut d’Histoire du Temps Pre´sent, no. 37 (1997), 80.

2. Lacouture, De Gaulle the Rebel, 324 for the quote. See also de Gaulle, The Call to Honour, 225–29.

3. Lacouture, De Gaulle the Rebel, 316–17, 328; Cre´mieux-Brilhac, La France Libre, 334, 377–81.

4. The quotes are from Cre´mieux-Brilhac, La France Libre, 275–76.

1. This paragraph is based mainly on the excellent account in Cremieux-Brilhac, La France Libre. But see also Frank, ‘‘Identite´sre´sistantes,’’ 82–83, which claimsthat Anthony Eden wastelling Churchill that deGaulle was very popular among members of the French internal Resistance. Churchill did not believe thisinformation,despite thefactthatit camefromBritishintelligence.

2. Pierre Pe´an, Une Jeunesse franc¸aise: Franc¸ois Mitterrand, 1934–1947 (Paris: Fayard, 1994), 175.

3. Theaboveaccountisbased onPe´anandonFranc¸oisMitterrand, Me´m oires interrompus (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1996) in which Mitterrand attempted to correct Pe´an. The correct account may never be established but the general outlines are clear enough.

4. The Salle Wagram statement can be found in Pe´an, Une Jeunesse franc¸aise, 281. For Mitterrand’s denial that he was a Giraudist and his 1996 statement on

the Resistance, see his account in his Me´moires interrompus, 133–34, 142–44.

5. This paragraph is based on John Hellman, The KnightMonks of Vichy France: Uriage, 1940–1945 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997), who is somewhat hostile to the members of the school. More apologetic is Bernard Comte, Une Utopie combattante: l'E´cole des cadres d'Uriage, 1940– 1942 (Paris: Fayard, 1999) and Michel Winock, Esprit: Des intellectuels dans la cite´ (Paris: Seuil, 1996). The quote is from Hellman, The Knight Monks, 56–57.

6. The Sartre quote is from Jean-Louis Loubet del Bayle, Les Non conformistes des anne´es 30: une tentative de renouvellement de la pense´e poli tique franc¸aise (Paris: Seuil, 2001), 457. Most of this paragraph is based on Hellman, TheKnightMonks,butseealsoRoderickKedwardandRoger Austin, Vichy France and the Resistance: Culture and Ideology (London: Crown Helm, 1985), 173–75, 183–85 for a balanced treatment of Mounier and his gradual disillusionment with Vichy.

7. Jean-Marc Berlie`re and Laurent Chabrun, Les Policiers franc¸ais sous l'Occupation (Paris: Perrin, 2001), 165–66.

8. This paragraph is based primarily on Henri Frenay, The Night Will End, trans. Dan Hofstadter (New York: McGraw Hill, 1976).

9. In addition to Frenay, The Night Will End, see also H. R. Kedward, Resistance in Vichy France: A Study of Ideas and Motivation in the Southern Zone 1940–1942 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 29–34, 46, 145–46.

1. Franc¸ois-Georges Dreyfus, Histoire de la Re´sistance 1940–1945 (Paris: Fallois, 1996), 100–5.

2. Kedward, Resistance in Vichy France, 56–63, 92–94, 155–58, 171–75, 220–22, 241–42. On Marseille see Simon Kitson, ''L'e´volution de la Re´sistance danslapolicemarseillaise,'' in LaRe´sistanceetlesEurope´ens dusud, eds.,Jean-Marie Guillon and Robert Mencherini (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1999), 259–60. See

also Ollivier Vallade, ‘‘L’Enrancinement de la Re´sistance ise´roise,’’ in the same book.

3. See the articles in Jacqueline Sainclivier and Christian Bougeard, eds., La Re´sistance et les franc¸ais: Enjeux strate´giques et environnement social (Ren nes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 1995) on the sociology of the Resis tance, villages, and peasants.

4. Among many accounts of the unification process see Claude Bourdet, L’Aventure incertaine (Paris: Stock, 1975), 164ff.

5. Jean-Pierre Aze´ma, De Munich a` la Libe´ration 1938–1945 (Paris: Seuil, 1979),126–27.SeealsoDianaCooper-Richet, ‘‘LesOuvriers,l’E´gliseetla Re´sistance,’’ in Sainclivier and Bougeard, eds., La Re´sistance et les franc¸ais,138.

25. Jean-Paul Cointet, Paris 40–44 (Paris: Perrin, 2001), 102–7.

1. See Jacqueline Sainclivier, ‘‘Les De´buts de la Re´sistance en zone occ upe´e:essaidetypologie,’’ in Me´moireethistoire:laRe´sistance, eds.,Jean-Marie Guillon and Pierre Laborie (Toulouse: Privat, 1995), 161–70.

2. Franc¸ois Marcot, ed., La Re´sistance et les Franc¸ais: Lutte arme´e et Ma quis (Paris: Annales litte´raires de l’Universite´ de Franche-Comte´, 1996), 113–15.

3. Olivier Wieviorka, Une Certaine Ide´edelaRe´sistance: De´fense de la France (Paris: Seuil, 1995).

4. Dreyfus, Histoire de la Re´sistance, 59–61, 106–8. For the OCM’s anti-Semitism andpro-Vichy sentiments see Jacqueline Sainclivier and Dominique Veillon, ‘‘Sens et formes de la Re´sistance franc¸aise,’’ in La Re´sistance et les franc¸ais: nouvelles approches, 97.

5. Pierre Brossolette, Re´sistance (1927–1943) (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1998). See also Cre´mieux-Brilhac, La France Libre, 684–87.

6. See Dominique Veillon, ‘‘Les Re´seaux de Re´sistance,’’ in Jean-Pierre Aze

´ma and Franc¸ois Be´darida, eds., La France des anne´es noires (Paris: E´di tions du Seuil, 2000), vol. 2, De la de´faite a` Vichy, 407–37; Henri Michel, The Shadow War: European Resistance, 1939–1945, trans. Richard Barry (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 216–17.

1. The evidence for this paragraph is extensive and old. See Alfred J. Rieber, Stalin and the French Communist Party 1941–1947 (New York: Colum bia University Press, 1962), 27–28, 32, 53, 58–60, 100–2. See also more recent studies such as Serge Wolikow, ‘‘Les Communistes face a` la lutte arme´e,’’ in Marcot, ed., La Re´sistance et les Franc¸ais: Lutte arme´e et Maquis.
2. Cre´mieux-Brilhac, LaFranceLibre,1050,1060;W.D.Halls, Societyand Christianity in Vichy France (Oxford: Berg, 1995), 314–17.
3. H. R. Kedward, In Search of the Maquis: Rural Resistance in Southern France 1942–1944 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 56, 63, and 113 for the salient points in this paragraph. See also Georges Fournier, ‘‘Contestations collectives, re´sistances et Re´sistance: quelles continuite´s?’’ in Guillon and La borie, ed., Me´moire et histoire for the reference to ‘‘primitive rebels.’’
4. This and the previous paragraph are based substantially on Lacouture, De Gaulle the Rebel, and Cre´mieux-Brilhac, La France Libre. The Leclerc quote is from the latter, 651.
5. ThequoteisfromLacouture, DeGaulletheRebel, 493.Seealso,Charles de Gaulle, The Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle: Unity, 1942–1944, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959), 79–150.

37. De Gaulle, Memoirs: Unity, 1942–1944, 85, 91.

1. See Paxton, Parades and Politics for the military and Resistance. On Michelin see John S. Sweets, Choices in Vichy France: The French under Nazi Occupation (New York: Oxford, 1994), 27.
2. See James D. Wilkinson, The Intellectual Resistance in Europe (Cam bridge,

Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), 25–106 and Michel Winock, Le Sie`cle des intellectuels (Paris: Seuil, 1999), 475ff.

3. Quoted in Germaine Bre´e and George Bernauer, eds., Defeat and Be yond: An Anthology of French Wartime Writing, 1940–1945 (New York: Ran dom House, 1970), 331–32.

4. See, among others, the criticism of Herbert Lottman, The Left Bank: Writers, Artists, and Politics from the Popular Front to the Cold War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), 168.

5. Dominique Veillon, La Mode sous l'Occupation (Paris: Payot, 2001), 112–15, 218.

6. See Margaret Collins Weitz, Sisters in the Resistance: How Women Fought to Free France 1940–1945 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1995); Margaret L. Rossiter, Women in the Resistance (New York: Praeger, 1986); Claire Chevillon, Code Name Christiane Clouet, A Woman in the French Resis tance (College Station: Texas A & M Press, 1995).

44. Philippe Buton, ''La France atomise´e,'' in Aze´ma and Be´darida, eds., La France des anne´es noires, 2: 420–23, 441. See Franc¸ois Marcot, ''Les Paysans et la Re´sistance: proble`mes d'une approche sociologique,'' in Sainclivier and Bougeard, eds., La Re´sistance et les franc¸ais, 255.

Chapter 6 Liberation

1. See the discussion of economic planning in Richard Kuisel, Capitalism and the State in Modern France: Renovation and Economic Management in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 159–86. See also Henri Michel's pioneering work on the ideology of the Resistance, Les Courants de pense´edelaRe´sistance (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1962).

2. Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle the Rebel, 1890–1944, trans. Patrick O'Brian (New York: Norton, 1993), 546 for the quote.

3. The figures on the Liberation army are for the period before D-Day. After D-Day the numbers increased greatly. See Jean-Louis Cre´mieux-Brilhac, La France Libre (Paris: Gallimard, 2001), 953–54.

4. Jean-Pierre Rioux, The Fourth Republic 1944–1958, trans. Godfrey Rod gers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 10–11.

5. See Maurice Kriegel-Valrimont, Me´moires rebelles (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1999),62–63,whomaintained aslateas1999thattheResistancehadliberated France on its own, without much help from the Allied powers.

6. Miche`le Cointet, Pe´tain et les franc¸ais, 1940–1945 (Paris: Perrin, 2002),

273.

1. See Charles de Gaulle, The War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle: Unity, 1942–1944, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959), 159–66, 189–90, 304–5.

2. 8. Cre´mieux-Brilhac, La France Libre, 1087–89.

1. Ibid., 1100. See also Donna F. Ryan, The Holocaust and the Jews of Mar seille: The Enforcement of Anti-Semitic Politics in Vichy France (Urbana: Uni versity of Illinois Press, 1996), 179ff., 203–4 and John F. Sweets, Choices in Vichy France: The French under Nazi Occupation (New York: Oxford Univer sity Press, 1994), 214–17.

2. Most of this account is based on H. R. Kedward, In Search of the Ma quis: Rural Resistance in Southern France 1942–1944 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 144–57. For the quote see Robert Zaretsky, Nıˆmes at War: Reli gion, Politics, and Public Opinion in the Gard, 1938–1944 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 240. See also the evaluation of the Frenchhistorians,Christian Bougeard andJean-MarieGuillon in LaRe´sistance et les franc¸ais: nouvelles approches, Les Cahiers de l’Institut d’Histoire du Temps Pre´sent, no. 37 (1997), who see the Resistance in terms of historical memory, whether

it be the Camisards, the Cathars, the Breton peasants, the Varois republicans in 1851, or communist workers. To them the Resistance relegitimized ‘‘the republican tradition in its popular and revolutionary as pects (if only on a symbolic level).’’ See page 44.

1. See Cre´mieux-Brilhac, La France Libre, 1119–42.
2. Ibid., 1179–91; Kedward, In Search of the Maquis, 134–38.

1. Cointet, Pe´tain et les franc¸ais, 257–62; Jean-Paul Cointet, Paris 40–44 (Paris: Perrin, 2001), 243–46, 267. In May 1944 the Allies carried out 1,284 bombing raids and, during a two-day period, killed 6,000 French. See Philippe Buton,‘‘LaFranceatomise´e,’’inJean-PierreAze´ma andFranc¸oisBe´darida,eds., La France des anne´es noires (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 2000), vol. 2, De la de´ faite a` Vichy, 424–25.
2. 14. Thisisbased ontheaccountinLacouture, De Gaullethe Rebel, 521–32.

1. See Hans Umbreit, ‘‘Les Allemands face a` la lutte arme´e,’’ in Franc¸ois Marcot, ed., La Re´sistance et les franc¸ais: Lutte arme´e et Maquis (Paris: An nales litte´raires de l’Universite´ de Franche-Comte´, 1996), 205–7.
2. See Cre´mieux-Brilhac, La France Libre, 1150–54, 1250–51. See also de Gaulle, War Memoirs: Unity, 1942–1944, 316, and Henri Michel, The Shadow War: European Resistance, 1939–1945, trans. Richard Barry (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 123.
3. See Kedward, In Search of the Maquis, 162–201 for the details of a number of these uprisings against the Germans. See also Sarah Farmer, Mar tyredVillage:Commemoratingthe1944MassacreatOradour-sur-Glane (Berke ley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1999),24–25, 38–39,44–45,andJean-Pierre Aze´ma and Olivier Wieviorka, Les Libe´rations de la France (Paris: E´ditions de la Martinie`re, 1993). But see especiallytheimportant article byHansUmbreit, ‘‘Les Allemands face a` la lutte arme´e,’’ in Marcot, ed., La Re´sistance et les franc¸ais, 205–8.

4. This account is based on Tzvetan Todorov, Une Trage´die franc¸aise, e´te´ 1944: sce`nes de guerre civile (Paris: Seuil, 1994), who sees this incident as totally unnecessary and has little good to say about the Resistance.

5. Marie-Louise Osmont, The Normandy Diary of Marie-Louise Osmont: 1940–1944 (New York:Random House, 1994),67.See also H. R. Kedward and Nancy Wood, eds., The Liberation of France: Image and Event (Oxford: Berg, 1995), 297–303 for the statistics and the conclusion that Liberation had not been worth the price. The same criticism of the war occurred in other cities such as nearby St-Loˆ that were heavily bombed in a futile and counterproduc tiveeffortto defeattheGermans.Theauthor(Thomas)personallyexperienced similar hatred of the Allies in Le Havre in 1969, where the loss of life was also considerable.

1. Lacouture, De Gaulle the Rebel, 531–32, 549–51. See also Christine Levisse-Touze´, Du Capitaine de Hauteclocque au ge´ne´ral Leclerc (Paris: E´di tions Complexe, 2001), 180–83, 198.

2. This account is based primarily on Jean-Pierre Aze´ma, De Munich a` la Libe´ration 1938–1944 (Paris: Seuil, 1979), 345–49.

3. This paragraph is based mainly on De Gaulle, War Memoirs: Unity, 1942–1944, 341–46.

4. Ibid., 355–57, 360–62. On the mass, see Michael Kelly, The Cultural and Intellectual Rebuilding of France after the Second World War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 79–80.

5. Most of this is based on Cre´mieux-Brilhac, La France Libre, 1275–80, 1288–91. See also Charles de Gaulle, The War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle: Salvation, 1944–1946, trans. Joyce Murchie and Hamish Erskine (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), 29–30. Some of the statistics may not be totally accurate. Different sources quote different figures on the same subject. I have not tried to reconcile them. See Umbreit, ‘‘Les Allemands face a` la lutte arme´e,’’ in Marcot, ed., La Re´sistance et les Franc¸ais, 210, for the German evaluation that the French played a major role in defeating them in Marseille

and Toulon.

25. De Gaulle, War Memoirs: Salvation, 1944–1946, 156–78.

1. Most of this is based on Pierre Giolitto, Histoire de la Milice (Paris: Perrin, 2002; originally published in 1997), 370–71, 420–22, 453–44, 465–66. See also Philippe Pe´tain, Discours aux Franc¸ais, 17 juin 1940–29 aouˆt 1944 (Paris: Albin Michel, 1989), 325–26, 336.

2. This paragraph and the following two are based primarily on Henry Rousso, Pe´tain et la fin de la collaboration: Sigmaringen 1944–1945 (Brussels: E´ditions Complexes, 1984).

3. In addition to Rousso see Philippe Burrin, France under the Germans: Collaboration and Compromise, trans. Janet Lloyd (New York: New Press, 1996), 435–36, 455.

1. See de Gaulle, War Memoirs: Unity, 1942–1944, 329–30, and Salvation, 1944–1946, 12–15;CraneBrinton, ‘‘LettersfromLiberatedFrance,’’FrenchHis torical Studies 2, 2 (Fall 1961): 140–47.

2. 30. Burrin, France under the Germans, 452–53.

1. This paragraph and the next one are based on Fabrice Virgili, La France ‘‘virile’’: Les femmes tondues a` la libe´ration (Paris: Payot, 2000).

2. The primary source for the purges is Peter Novick, The Resistance ver sus Vichy: The Purge of Collaborators in Liberated France (New York: Colum bia University Press, 1968).

3. Jean-Marc Berlie`re and Laurent Chabrun, Les Policiers franc¸ais sous l’Occupation (Paris: Perrin, 2001), 16, 25–26, 40, 247–49, 272–74, 281, 285, 321, 330, 334–35.

4. Novick, The Resistance versus Vichy, 79–91; Robert Paxton, Parades and Politics at Vichy: The French Officer Corps under Marshal Pe´tain (Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1966), 410–11; Henry Rousso, Vichy: L'E´ve´nement, la me´moire, l'histoire (Paris: Gallimard, 2001), 626.

35. Rousso, Vichy: L'E´ve´nement, 562ff.

1. W. D. Halls, Politics, Society and Christianity in Vichy France (Oxford: Berg, 1995), 369–71, 377–78; Novick, The Resistance versus Vichy, 134–36, 138–39.

2. Olivier Wieviorka, Les Orphelins de la Re´publique: Destine´es des de´ pute´setse´nateurs franc¸ais (1940–1945) (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 2001), 397–412.

38Alice Kaplan, The Collaborator: The Trial and Execution of Robert Brasil lach (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000). The quotes are on pages 58, 173, and 181.

1. Ibid., 122–24. Only one of the four jurors in the Brasillach trial was a communist. The far right maintained that all of the jurors were members of the Communist Party. In reality, two of the jurors favored leniency for Brasil lach before the trial took place. See 138, 140–42.

2. On Laval see Geoffrey Warner, Pierre Laval and the Eclipse of France, 1931–1945 (New York: Macmillan , 1968), 409ff. and also Jean-Paul Cointet, Pierre Laval (Paris: Fayard, 1993), 511–33.

3. Le´on Werth, Impressions d'audience: Le Proce`sPe´tain (Paris, 1995), for an eyewitness account of the trial plus a transcript of the proceedings. See also de Gaulle, Salvation, 1944–1946 and Novick, The Resistance versus Vichy, 169–74.

1Rousso, Vichy: L'E´ve´nement, 637–73.

2Ibid., 500–46.

Epilogue

1. Jean-Pierre Rioux, The Fourth Republic, 1944–1958, trans. Godfrey Rod gers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 13–25.

2. Jacques Marseille, La Guerre des deux France (Paris: Perin, 2005), 21, 35–37,

46–52, 67–68, 77, 89–92; Henri Mendras, La France que je vois (Paris: L'Aube, 2005), 15; Paul Krugman, ''French Family Values,'' New York Times, July 29, 2005; Timothy B. Smith, France in Crisis: Welfare, Inequality and Globalization since 1980 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

3. Marseille, La Guerre des deux France, 116–17, 136–37, 145–46, 149; Philip H. Gordon and Sophie Meunier, The French Challenge: Adapting to Globalization (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 24, 26, 31, 49, 83–84.

4. Henri Mendras with Alistair Cole, Social Change in Modern France: Towards a Cultural Anthropology of the Fifth Republic (Cambridge and Paris: Cambridge University Press and E´ditions de la maison des sciences de l'homme, 1991), 15–22, 51–72; Mendras, La France que je vois, 88, 122, 131, 138, 161, 254, 263.

5. On the 2005 unrest see Alec G. Hargreaves, ''An Emperor with No Clothes?'' 28 November 2005, http://riotsfrance.ssrc.org/Hargreaves/pf/ and the other papers posted at http://riotsfrance.ssrc.org.

6. Pierre Birnbaum, La France imagine´e: De´clin des reˆves unitaires (Paris: Gallimard, 1998), 359, notably.

Index

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