

### Welcome to

# **IPv6 Security Workshop**

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### **Contact information**





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- Email: hlk@solido.net Mobile: +45 2026 6000
- Educated from the Computer Science Department at the University of Copenhagen, DIKU
- CISSP certified
- 2003 2010 Independent security consultant
- 2010 owner and partner in Solido Networks ApS

### Planen idag





KI 12-15

Mindre foredrag mere snak

Mindre enetale, mere foredrag 2.0 med socialt medie, informationsdeling og interaktion Send gerne spørgsmål senere

### Kursusmateriale





### Dette materiale består af flere dele:


- Kursusmaterialet præsentationen til undervisning dette sæt
- Øvelseshæfte med øvelser

Hertil kommer diverse ressourcer fra internet

Boot DVD'er baseret på BackTrack Linux - image udleveres

### Formål: netværkssikkerhed for TCP/IP netværk





TCP/IP-baserede netværk - internet er overalt

# Formål: mere specifikt





At introducere TCP/IP version 6

Introducere specifikke sikkerhedsproblemer ved brug af IPv6

### **Forudsætninger**



Dette er en workshop og fuldt udbytte kræver at deltagerne udfører praktiske øvelser

Kurset anvender Unix til øvelser, men Unix kendskab er ikke nødvendigt

De fleste øvelser kan udføres fra Windows 7

Øvelserne foregår via

- Login til Unix maskinen
- Direkte fra jeres systemer Windows eller Linux boot DVD/Virtuel server

### Kursusfaciliteter



Der er opbygget et kursusnetværk med følgende primære systemer:

- Unix server Fiona med HTTP server og værktøjer
- Unix boot DVD'er eller VMware images jeres systemer

På Unix serveren tillades login diverse kursusbrugere - kursus1, kursus2, kursus3, ... kodeordet er **kursus** 

Login: kursus1

Password: kursus

Det er en fordel at benytte hver sin bruger, så man kan gemme scripts

På de resterende systemer kan benyttes brugeren kursus

Login: kursus

Password: kursus42 el kursus

### Hackerværktøjer



### Der benyttes en del værktøjer:

- Nmap, Nping tester porte, godt til firewall admins http://nmap.org
- Metasploit Framework gratis på http://www.metasploit.com/
- Wireshark avanceret netværkssniffer http://http://www.wireshark.org/
- Burpsuite http://portswigger.net/burp/
- Skipfish http://code.google.com/p/skipfish/
- Apache Tomcat J2EE servlet container http://tomcat.apache.org
- OpenBSD operativsystem med fokus på sikkerhed http://www.openbsd.org

# **BackTrack 5 og sniffer programmer**





Wireshark - http://www.wireshark.org avanceret netværkssniffer bruger vi til at sniffe, vi bruger Wireshark til primære demo, nævner Ettercap osv.

BackTrack http://www.backtrack-linux.org/ BackTrack er baseret på Linux og må kopieres frit :-)

### Stop - tid til check



Er alle kommet

Har alle en PC med

Har alle et kabel eller trådløst netkort som virker

Der findes et trådløst netværk ved navn kamenet

Mangler der strømkabler

Mangler noget af ovenstående, sæt nogen igang med at finde det :-)

### Status idag på internet



#### **IPv4 Address Report**

This report generated at 24-Jan-2012 07:59 UTC.

IANA Unallocated Address Pool Exhaustion:

03-Feb-2011

Projected RIR Address Pool Exhaustion Dates:

> **Projected Exhaustion** Remaining Addresses in RIR Pool RIR Date (/8s) APNIC: 19-Apr-2011 1.1990 RIPENCC: 27-Jul-2012 3.1711 ARIN: 19-Jul-2013 5.6671 LACNIC: 29-Jan-2014 3.8810 AFRINIC: 20-Oct-2014 4.3524

Kilde: http://www.potaroo.net/tools/ipv4/

# Why IPv6





# DDoS udviklingen, januar 2010 rapporten



#### Largest DDoS Attack - 49 Gigabits Per Second





Figure 1: Largest DDoS Attack – 49 Gigabits Per Second Source: Arbor Networks, Inc.

Kilde: http://www.arbornetworks.com/report 2009 rapporten

# DDoS udviklingen, februar 2011





Source: Arbor Networks, Inc.

Kilde: http://www.arbornetworks.com/report 2010 rapporten

# Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report, 2010 Report SOL



### Key finding:

# Application-Layer DDoS Attacks Are Increasing in Sophistication and Operational Impact

IDC and mobile/fixed wireless operators in particular are reporting significant outages, increased OPEX, customer churn and revenue loss due to application-layer DDoS attacks. These attacks are targeting both their customers and their own ancillary supporting services, such as DNS, Web portals, etc.

- - -

#### Conclusions

We further note that the fastest-growing category of ISPs-mobile and fixed wireless broadband operators-are also the least-prepared organizations in terms of network visibility, network control, and overall ability to successfully defend themselves and their customers against attack. These operators are balancing an overwhelming array of threats with conflicting budget pressures and business objectives.

Mere komplekse trusler, betyder det flere firewall?

# Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report 2010 Volume VIOLI



- Application-Layer DDoS Attacks Are Increasing in Sophistication and Operational Impact
- Mobile/Fixed Wireless Operators Are Facing Serious Challenges to Maintaining Availability in the Face of Attacks
- Firewalls and IPS Devices Are Falling Short on DDoS Protection
- DNS Has Broadly Emerged as an Attack Target and Enabler
- Lack of Visibility into and Control over IPv6 Traffic Is a Significant Challenge
- Chronic Underfunding of Operational Security Teams
- Operators Continue to Express Low Confidence in the Efficacy of Law Enforcement
- Operators Have Little Confidence in Government Efforts to Protect Critical Infrastructure

Kilde: http://www.arbornetworks.com/report

# Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report 2011 Volume VIOLI



- Ideologically-Motivated "Hactivism" and Vandalism Are the Most Readily-Identified DDoS Attack Motivations
- 10 Gbps and Larger Flood-Based DDoS Attacks Are the "New Normal"
- Increased Sophistication and Complexity of Application-Layer (Layer 7) DDoS Attacks and Multi-Vector DDoS Attacks Are Becoming More Common
- Visibility and Security of Mobile and Fixed Wireless Networks Are an Ongoing Concern
- First-Ever Reports of IPv6 DDoS Attacks "in the Wild" on Production Networks
- Rarity of IPv6-Enabled Attacks Indicates Low IPv6 Market Penetration and Lack of Critical Mass
- Stateful Firewalls, IPS and Load-Balancer Devices Continue to Fall Short on DDoS Protection Capabilities
- The Overwhelming Majority of Network Operators Do Not Engage Law Enforcement

Kilde: http://www.arbornetworks.com/report

### **IPv6** is coming





An important consideration is that IPv6 is quite likely to be already running on the enterprise network, whether that implementation was planned or not. Some important characteristics of IPv6 include:

- IPv6 has a mechanism to automatically assign addresses so that end systems can easily establish communications.
- IPv6 has several mechanisms available to ease the integration of the protocol into the network.
- Automatic tunneling mechanisms can take advantage of the underlying IPv4 network and connect it to the IPv6 Internet.

#### Kilde:

http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/iosswrel/ps6537/ps6553/white\_paper\_c11-629391.html

### **Implications**





For an IPv4 enterprise network, the existence of an IPv6 overlay network has several of implications:


- The IPv4 firewalls can be bypassed by the IPv6 traffic, and leave the security door wide open.
- Intrusion detection mechanisms not expecting IPv6 traffic may be confused and allow intrusion
- In some cases (for example, with the IPv6 transition technology known as 6to4), an internal PC can communicate directly with another internal PC and evade all intrusion protection and detection systems (IPS/IDS). Botnet command and control channels are known to use these kind of tunnels.

#### Kilde:

http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/iosswrel/ps6537/ps6553/white\_paper\_c11-629391.html

# **IPv6** in the Nordic region





http://v6asns.ripe.net/v/6?s=\_ALL;s=DK;s=SE;s=NO;s=NL

### **Metasploit IPv6**



#### Metasploit





#### Why Security Assessments Must Cover IPv6, Even In IPv4 Networks

Posted by Christian Kirsch in Metasploit on Mar 7, 2012 1:21:56 PM

What's your company doing to prepare for IPv6? Probably not an awful lot. While 10% of the world's top websites now offer IPv6 services, most companies haven't formulated an IPv6 strategy for the network. However, the issue is that most devices you have rolled out in the past 5 years have been IPv6-ready, if not IPv6-enabled. Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 actually use IPv6 link-local addresses by default. Also think about all the other clients, servers, appliances, routers, and mobile devices you've added to your network in recent years. If you're honest, how do you know that your network is not vulnerable to IPv6 attacks right now?

That's why even if you haven't set up an IPv6 network internally yet, you should test for IPv6 vulnerabilities. Here are some common security issues that you may find:

- Misconfiguration: Not actively planning for IPv6 can introduce dangerous
  misconfiguration, such as a firewall that has filters set up for IPv4 traffic but
  accepts all IPv6 traffic. One organization we audited left zone transfers on their
  DNS server open for IPv6, but blocked for IPv4
- Uneven features: Many systems vendors are having to retrofit IPv6 into their products. Because Rome wasn't built in a day, IPv6 features often lag behind for a while. This uneven feature support for IPv6 can lead to security issues.
- . No IPv6 defenses: Some defense mechanisms, such as older IPS systems, may simply be blind to IPv6 traffic, letting it pass through without scrutiny.

Metasploit can now conduct penetration tests on IPv6 networks to uncover these security issues, enabling you to find these issues:



#### Kilde:

https://community.rapid7.com/community/metasploit/blog/2012/03/07/

# New Loki - ikke alt er layer 7



At the beginning LOKI was made to combine some stand-alone **command line tools**, like the bgp\_cli, the ospf\_cli or the ldp\_cli and to give them a **user friendly, graphical interface**. In the meantime LOKI is more than just the combination of the single tools, it gave its modules the opportunity to base upon each other (like **combining ARP-spoofing from the ARP module with some man-in-the-middle actions, rewriting MPLS-labels for example)** and even inter operate with each other. (Fremhævning: HLK)

https://www.c0decafe.de/loki.html Loki

http://www.packetstan.com/2011/02/running-loki-on-backtrack-4-r2.html

"Yersinia is a network tool designed to take advantage of some weakeness in different network protocols. It pretends to be a solid framework for analyzing and testing the deployed networks and systems." http://www.yersinia.net/

### **NIST Special Publication 800 series**



National Institute of Standards and Technology U.S. Department of Commerce

**Special Publication 800-119** 

# Guidelines for the Secure Deployment of IPv6

SP 800-119 Dec. 2010 <u>Guidelines for the Secure Deployment of IPv6</u> God introduktion til IPv6 og sikkerhed i forbindelse med IPv6

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html





A complete tool set to attack the inherent protocol weaknesses of IPV6 and ICMP6, and includes an easy to use packet factory library.

Last update 2012-01-15 - opdateres løbende Current public version: v1.8 - CCC Camp release

http://thc.org/thc-ipv6/

# THC IPv6 [0x03] The Included Tools



- parasite6: icmp neighbor solitication/advertisement spoofer, puts you as man-in-the-middle, same as ARP mitm (and parasite)
- alive6: an effective alive scanng, which will detect all systems listening to this address
- dnsdict6: parallized dns ipv6 dictionary bruteforcer
- fake\_router6: announce yourself as a router on the network, with the highest priority
- redir6: redirect traffic to you intelligently (man-in-the-middle) with a clever icmp6 redirect spoofer
- toobig6: mtu decreaser with the same intelligence as redir6
- detect-new-ip6: detect new ip6 devices which join the network, you can run a script to automatically scan these systems etc.
- dos-new-ip6: detect new ip6 devices and tell them that their chosen IP collides on the network (DOS).
- trace6: very fast traceroute6 with supports ICMP6 echo request and TCP-SYN
- flood\_router6: flood a target with random router advertisements





- exploit6: known ipv6 vulnerabilities to test against a target
- denial6: a collection of denial-of-service tests againsts a target
- fuzz\_ip6: fuzzer for ipv6
- implementation6: performs various implementation checks on ipv6
- implementation6d: listen daemon for implementation6 to check behind a fw
- fake\_mld6: announce yourself in a multicast group of your choice on the net
- fake\_mld26: same but for MLDv2
- fake\_mldrouter6: fake MLD router messages
- fake\_mipv6: steal a mobile IP to yours if IPSEC is not needed for authentication
- fake\_advertiser6: announce yourself on the network
- smurf6: local smurfer
- rsmurf6: remote smurfer, known to work only against linux at the moment
- sendpees6: a tool by willdamn(ad)gmail.com, which generates a neighbor solicitation requests with a lot of CGAs (crypto stuff;-) to keep the CPU busy. nice.

thcping6: sends a hand crafted ping6 packet



and about 15 more tools for you to discover

### How to use IPv6



www.solidonetworks.com

hlk@solidonetworks.com

### Really how to use IPv6?



Get IPv6 address and routing

Add AAAA (quad A) records to your DNS

Done

### www.solidonetworks.com

www IN A

91.102.95.20

IN AAAA

2a02:9d0:10::9

### **IPv6 Status Denmark**



IT- og Telestyrelsen are becoming more active

Unofficial IPv6 task force at http://www.ipv6tf.dk/

Other initiatives http://world-ipv6-day.dk/

Major providers are ready on back bones

Internet Providers are increasingly becoming ready

### **Collect information about IPv6**



### Guidelines for the Secure Deployment of IPv6, SP800-119, NIST

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-119/sp800-119.pdf

The Second Internet: Reinventing Computer Networks with IPv6, Lawrence E. Hughes, October 2010,

http://www.secondinternet.org/

IPv6 Network Administration af David Malone og Niall Richard Murphy

http://www.ripe.net

This presentation ©

### Allocating IPv6 addresses



You have plenty!

Providers and LIRs will typically get /32


Providers will typically give organisations /48 or /56

Your /48 can be used for:

- 65536 subnets all host subnets are /64
- Each subnet has  $2^{64}$  addresses

# Preparing an IPv6 Addressing Plan





http://www.ripe.net/training/material/IPv6-for-LIRs-Training-Course/IPv6\_addr\_plan4.pdf


### **Example adress plan input**



#### 3.2 Direct Link Between IPv4 and IPv6 Addresses

If the existing IPv4 networks use only /24 subnets (for example, from 203.0.113.0 to 203.0.113.255), a direct link can be established between IPv4 addresses and the new IPv6 addresses. In this case, you can include the penultimate number of the IPv4 address (113 in 203.0.113.0/24, for example) in the IPv6 subnet. The IPv6 address will then be 2001:db8:1234:113::/64.

Such an IPv4-to-IPv6 transition could appear as follows:



Easy and coupled with VLAN IDs it will work ©

### **Run IPv6 in production**



Make sure you establish IPv6 in **production** 

Enabling service on IPv6 without production - bad experience for users

Start by enabling your DNS servers for IPv6 - and DNSSEC - and DNS over TCP Remember that your firewall might have problems with large DNS packets

Add a production IPv6 router - hardware device or generic server

Tunnels are OK, and SixXS consider their service production

#### IPv6 business case



- An almost unlimited scalability with a very large IPv6 address space ( $2^128$  addresses), enabling IP addresses to each and every device.
- Address self-configuration mechanisms, easing the deployment.
- Improved security and authentication features, such as mandatory IPSec capacities and the possibility to use of the address space to include encryption keys.
- Peer-to-peer connectivity, solving the NAT barrier with specific and permanent IP addresses for any device and/or user of the Internet.
- Mobility features, enabling a seamless connexion when moving from one access point to another access point on the Internet.
- Multi cast and any cast functionalities.
- IPv6 will provide an easier remote interaction with each and every device with a **direct integration to the Internet.** In other words, IPv6 will make possible to move from a network of servers, to a network of things.

#### Business case for IPv6 is **continuity**

Partial quote from http://www.smartipv6building.org/index.php/en/ipv6-potential

# IPv6: Internet redesigned? - no!



Preserve the good stuff

back to basics, internet as it used to be!

fate sharing - connection rely on end points, not intermediary NAT boxes

end-to-end transparency - you have an address and I have an address

Wants: bandwidth +10G, low latency/predictable latency, Quality of Service, Security

# IPv6 is evolution, not revolution

Note: IPv6 was not designed to solve all problems, so don't expect it to!

### Up and running with IPv6



Use ping/ping6 and traceroute to test connectivity

#### Try in your browser:

- http://www.kame.net Dancing turtle
- http://www.ripe.net RIPE, look for address up right corner
- http://loopsofzen.co.uk/ Play a game
- https://www.sixxs.net/Apply for IPv6 tunnel

#### Done ©

### Unix starthjælp



#### Da Unix indgår er her et lille cheat sheet til Unix

- DOS/Windows kommando tilsvarende Unix, og forklaring
- dir Is står for list files, viser filnavne
- del rm står for remove, sletter filer
- cd cd change directory, skifter katalog
- type cat concatenate, viser indholdet af tekstfiler
- more less viser tekstfiler en side af gangen
- attrib chmod change mode, ændrer rettighederne på filer

#### Prøv bare:

- Is list, eller long listing med Is -I
- cat /etc/hosts viser hosts filen
- chmod +x head.sh sæt execute bit på en fil så den kan udføres som et program med kommandoen ./head.sh

#### Aftale om test af netværk



Straffelovens paragraf 263 Stk. 2. Med bøde eller fængsel indtil 6 måneder straffes den, som uberettiget skaffer sig adgang til en andens oplysninger eller programmer, der er bestemt til at bruges i et anlæg til elektronisk databehandling.

#### Hacking kan betyde:

- At man skal betale erstatning til personer eller virksomheder
- At man får konfiskeret sit udstyr af politiet
- At man, hvis man er over 15 år og bliver dømt for hacking, kan få en bøde eller fængselsstraf i alvorlige tilfælde
- At man, hvis man er over 15 år og bliver dømt for hacking, får en plettet straffeattest. Det kan give problemer, hvis man skal finde et job eller hvis man skal rejse til visse lande, fx USA og Australien
- Frit efter: http://www.stophacking.dk lavet af Det Kriminalpræventive Råd
- Frygten for terror har forstærket ovenstående så lad være!

### Agenda Basale IPv6 begreber



Opstart - hvad er IP og TCP/IP repetition, TCP, UDP, Subnets og CIDR

Basale værktøjer traceroute, ping, dig, host


Wireshark sniffer

**VLAN 802.1q** 

THC IPv6 attack toolkit


### Netværk til routning





### **Internet today**





Clients and servers

Rooted in academic networks

Protocols which are more than 20 years old, moved to TCP/IP in 1981

#### Hvad er Internet



#### Kommunikation mellem mennesker!

#### Baseret på TCP/IP


- best effort
- packet switching (IPv6 kalder det packets, ikke datagram)
- forbindelsesorienteret, connection-oriented
- forbindelsesløs, connection-less

#### RFC-1958:

A good analogy for the development of the Internet is that of constantly renewing the individual streets and buildings of a city, rather than razing the city and rebuilding it. The architectural principles therefore aim to provide a framework for creating cooperation and standards, as a small "spanning set" of rules that generates a large, varied and evolving space of technology.

#### **BSD Unix**





På Berkeley Universitetet blev der udviklet en del på Unix og det har givet anledning til en hel gren kaldet BSD Unix, BSD står for Berkeley Software Distribution

BSD Unix har blandt andet resulteret i virtual memory management og en masse TCP/IP relaterede applikationer

Specielt har BSD TCP/IP kernefunktionalitet været genbrugt mange steder

Tilsvarende genbruges KAME IPv6 implementationen mange steder

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BSD

### KAME - en IPv6 reference implementation





http://www.kame.net

- Er idag at betragte som en reference implementation
  - i stil med BSD fra Berkeley var det
- KAME har været på forkant med implementation af draft dokumenter
- KAME er inkluderet i OpenBSD, NetBSD, FreeBSD og BSD/OS har været det siden version 2.7,
   1.5, 4.0 og 4.2
- Projektet er afsluttet, men nye projekter fortsætter i WIDE regi http://www.wide.ad.jp/
- Der er udkommet to bøger som i detaljer gennemgår IPv6 protokollerne i KAME

#### Hvad er Internet



80'erne IP/TCP starten af 80'erne

90'erne IP version 6 udarbejdes


- IPv6 ikke brugt i Europa og US
- IPv6 er ekstremt vigtigt i Asien
- historisk få adresser tildelt til 3.verdenslande
- Større Universiteter i USA har ofte større allokering end Kina!

1991 WWW "opfindes" af Tim Berners-Lee hos CERN

E-mail var hovedparten af traffik - siden overtog web/http førstepladsen

#### Fælles adresserum





Hvad kendetegner internet idag

Der er et fælles adresserum baseret på 32-bit adresser

En IP-adresse kunne være 10.0.0.1

### IPv4 addresser og skrivemåde



```
hlk@bigfoot:hlk$ ipconvert.pl 127.0.0.1
Adressen er: 127.0.0.1
Adressen er: 2130706433
hlk@bigfoot:hlk$ ping 2130706433
PING 2130706433 (127.0.0.1): 56 data bytes
64 bytes from 127.0.0.1: icmp_seq=0 ttl=64 time=0.135 ms
64 bytes from 127.0.0.1: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.144 ms
```

IP-adresser skrives typisk som decimaltal adskilt af punktum

Kaldes dot notation: 10.1.2.3

Kan også skrive som oktal eller heksadecimale tal

#### **IP-adresser som bits**



IP-adresse: 127.0.0.1

Heltal: 2130706433

IP-adresser kan også konverteres til bits

Computeren regner binært, vi bruger dot-notationen

#### **Internet ABC**



Tidligere benyttede man klasseinddelingen af IP-adresser: A, B, C, D og E

Desværre var denne opdeling ufleksibel:

- A-klasse kunne potentielt indeholde 16 millioner hosts
- B-klasse kunne potentielt indeholder omkring 65.000 hosts
- C-klasse kunne indeholde omkring 250 hosts

Derfor bad de fleste om adresser i B-klasser - så de var ved at løbe tør!

D-klasse benyttes til multicast

E-klasse er blot reserveret

Se evt. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classful\_network

### **CIDR Classless Inter-Domain Routing**



| Classfull routing  |                      |  | Classless routing (CIDR)     |                       |
|--------------------|----------------------|--|------------------------------|-----------------------|
| 4 Class C networks | Inherent subnet mask |  | Supernet                     | Subnet mask           |
| 192.0.08.0         | 255.255.255.0        |  | 192.0.08.0                   | 255.255.252.0         |
| 192.0.09.0         | 255.255.255.0        |  |                              | (252d=11111100b)      |
| 192.0.10.0         | 255.255.255.0        |  | Base networ                  | k/prefix 192.0.8.0/   |
| 192.0.11.0         | 255.255.255.0        |  | Bust her sim prenn 192101010 | in profile 192.0.0.07 |

Subnetmasker var oprindeligt indforstået

Dernæst var det noget man brugte til at opdele sit A, B eller C net med

Ved at tildele flere C-klasser kunne man spare de resterende B-klasser - men det betød en routing table explosion

Idag er subnetmaske en sammenhængende række 1-bit der angiver størrelse på nettet

10.0.0.0/24 betyder netværket 10.0.0.0 med subnetmaske 255.255.255.0

Nogle få steder kaldes det tillige supernet, supernetting

### Subnet calculator, CIDR calculator



| Network Class                   | First Octet Range |  |  |  |  |
|---------------------------------|-------------------|--|--|--|--|
| A O B O C O                     | 192 - 223         |  |  |  |  |
| IP Address                      | Hex IP Address    |  |  |  |  |
| 192 . 168 . 0 . 1               | C0.A8.00.01       |  |  |  |  |
| Subnet Mask                     | Wildcard Mask     |  |  |  |  |
| 255.255.255.0                   | 0.0.0.255         |  |  |  |  |
| Subnet Bits                     | Mask Bits         |  |  |  |  |
| 0                               | 24                |  |  |  |  |
| Maximum Subnets                 | Hosts per Subnet  |  |  |  |  |
| 1                               | 254               |  |  |  |  |
| Heat Address Banco              |                   |  |  |  |  |
| Host Address Range              |                   |  |  |  |  |
| 192.168.0.1 - 192.168.0.2       | 54                |  |  |  |  |
| Subnet ID                       | Broadcast Address |  |  |  |  |
| 192.168.0.0                     | 192.168.0.255     |  |  |  |  |
| Subnet Bitmap                   |                   |  |  |  |  |
| 110nnnnn.nnnnnnnnnnnnnnhhhhhhhh |                   |  |  |  |  |
|                                 |                   |  |  |  |  |

Der findes et væld af programmer som kan hjælpe med at udregne subnetmasker til IPv4

Screenshot fra http://www.subnet-calculator.com/

### RFC-1918 private netværk



Der findes et antal adresserum som alle må benytte frit:

- 10.0.0.0 10.255.255.255 (10/8 prefix)
- 172.16.0.0 172.31.255.255 (172.16/12 prefix)
- 192.168.0.0 192.168.255.255 (192.168/16 prefix)

Address Allocation for Private Internets RFC-1918 adresserne!

NB: man må ikke sende pakker ud på internet med disse som afsender, giver ikke mening

### IPv4 addresser opsummering



- Altid 32-bit adresser
- Skrives typisk med 4 decimaltal dot notation 10.1.2.3
- Netværk angives med CIDR Classless Inter-Domain Routing RFC-1519
- CIDR notation 10.0.0.0/8 fremfor 10.0.0.0 med subnet maske 255.0.0.0
- Specielle adresser
   127.0.0.1 localhost/loopback
   0.0.0.0 default route
- RFC-1918 angiver private adresser som alle kan bruge

### IPv6 addresser og skrivemåde



subnet prefix interface identifier

2001:16d8:ff00:012f:0000:0000:0000:0002

2001:16d8:ff00:12f::2

- 128-bit adresser, subnet prefix næsten altid 64-bit
- skrives i grupper af 4 hexcifre ad gangen adskilt af kolon :
- foranstillede 0 i en gruppe kan udelades, en række 0 kan erstattes med ::
- dvs 0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0 er det samme som 0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000
- Dvs min webservers IPv6 adresse kan skrives som: 2001:16d8:ff00:12f::2
- Specielle adresser: ::1 localhost/loopback og :: default route
- Læs mere i RFC-3513

#### IPv6 header - RFC-2460



```
|Version| Traffic Class
                     Flow Label
     Payload Length | Next Header | Hop Limit
Source Address
             Destination Address
```

### IPv6 - new and improved



#### IPv6 - extension headers RFC-2460

- Hop-by-Hop Options
- Routing (Type 0)
- Fragment fragmentation only at end-points!
- Destination Options
- Authentication
- Encapsulating Security Payload

Note: IPsec (AH and ESP) are mandatory for IPv6 hosts

Path MTU, PMTU implemented larger default MTU, at least 1280 bytes

Fragmentation only at the source host, no router fragmentation

### IPv6 addressing RFC-4291



Addresses are always 128-bit identifiers for interfaces and sets of interfaces

Unicast: An identifier for a **single interface**.

A packet sent to a unicast address is delivered to the interface identified by that address.

Anycast: An identifier for a **set of interfaces** (typically belonging to different nodes). A packet sent to an anycast address is **delivered to one** of the interfaces identified by that address (the "nearest" one, according to the routing protocols' measure of distance).

Multicast: An identifier for a **set of interfaces** (typically belonging to different nodes). A packet sent to a multicast address is **delivered to all interfaces identified by that address**.

# IPv6 addressing RFC-4291, cont.



subnet prefix interface identifier

2001:16d8:ff00:012f:0000:0000:0000:0002

2001:16d8:ff00:12f::2

8 times 4 hex-digits seperated by colon x:x:x:x:x:x:x:x

Written as ipv6-address/prefix-length CIDR notation

Leading zeros can be removed

One or more groups of 16 bits of zeros can be replaced by ::

### IPv6 address - special prefixes



- link-local unicast addresses
   fe80::/10 generated from the interface MAC address EUI-64
- FEC0::/10 site-local deprecated in RFC-3879
- FC00::/7 Unique Local IPv6 Unicast Addresses RFC-4193 http://www.simpledns.com/private-ipv6.aspx
- 2001:0DB8::/32 NON-ROUTABLE range to be used for documentation purpose RFC-3849.

# **OSI og Internet modellerne**



OSI Reference Model

Application

Presentation

Session

Transport

Network

Link

Physical

Internet protocol suite

| Applications              | NFS                   |  |  |
|---------------------------|-----------------------|--|--|
| HTTP, SMTP,<br>FTP, SNMP, | XDR                   |  |  |
|                           | RPC                   |  |  |
| TCP UDP                   |                       |  |  |
| IPv4 IPv6 I               | CMPv6 <sub>ICMP</sub> |  |  |
| ARP RARP<br>MAC           |                       |  |  |
| Ethernet token-ring ATM   |                       |  |  |

### Trådløse teknologier






Et typisk 802.11 Access-Point (AP) der har Wireless og Ethernet stik/switch Første dag bruger vi blot trådløse netværk, på dag 2 gennemgår vi 802.11

### **Broer og routere**





Fysisk er der en begrænsing for hvor lange ledningerne må være

### **Bridges**



Ethernet er broadcast teknologi, hvor data sendes ud på et delt medie - Æteren

Broadcast giver en grænse for udbredningen vs hastighed

Ved hjælp af en bro kan man forbinde to netværkssegmenter på layer-2

Broen kopierer data mellem de to segmenter

Virker som en forstærker på signalet, men mere intelligent

Den intelligente bro kender MAC adresserne på hver side


Broen kopierer kun hvis afsender og modtager er på hver sin side

Kilde: For mere information søg efter Aloha-net

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ALOHAnet

#### En switch






Ved at fortsætte udviklingen kunne man samle broer til en switch

En switch idag kan sende og modtage på flere porte samtidig, og med full-duplex

Bemærk performance begrænses af backplane i switchen

### **Topologier og Spanning Tree Protocol**






Se mere i bogen af Radia Perlman, <u>Interconnections: Bridges, Routers, Switches, and</u> Internetworking Protocols

# **Core, Distribution og Access net**






Det er ikke altid man har præcis denne opdeling, men den er ofte brugt Where are the NAT gateways?

#### Pakker i en datastrøm






Ser vi data som en datastrøm er pakkerne blot et mønster lagt henover data

Netværksteknologien definerer start og slut på en frame

Fra et lavere niveau modtager vi en pakke, eksempelvis 1500-bytes fra Ethernet driver

# **ARP in Ipv4**





### **ARP** request and reply



#### ping 10.0.0.2 from server

#### ARP Address Resolution Protocol request/reply:

- ARP request broadcasted on layer 2 Who has 10.0.0.2 Tell 10.0.0.1
- ARP reply (from 10.0.0.2) 10.0.0.2 is at 00:40:70:12:95:1c

#### IP ICMP request/reply:

- Echo (ping) request from 10.0.0.1 to 10.0.0.2
- Echo (ping) reply from 10.0.0.2 to 10.0.0.1
- ...

ARP is performed on Ethernet before IP can be transmitted

### **ARP** cache



```
hlk@bigfoot:hlk$ arp -an
? (10.0.42.1) at 0:0:24:c8:b2:4c on en1 [ethernet]
? (10.0.42.2) at 0:c0:b7:6c:19:b on en1 [ethernet]
```

ARP cache kan vises med kommandoen arp -an

-a viser alle

-n viser kun adresserne, prøver ikke at slå navne op - typisk hurtigere

ARP cache er dynamisk og adresser fjernes automatisk efter 5-20 minutter hvis de ikke bruges mere

Læs mere med man 4 arp


#### **ARP vs NDP**



```
hlk@bigfoot:basic-ipv6-new$ arp -an
? (10.0.42.1) at 0:0:24:c8:b2:4c on enl [ethernet]
? (10.0.42.2) at 0:c0:b7:6c:19:b on en1 [ethernet]
hlk@bigfoot:basic-ipv6-new$ ndp -an
Neighbor
                             Linklayer Address Netif Expire St Flgs Prbs
                             (incomplete)
                                                 100 permanent R
::1
2001:16d8:ffd2:cf0f:21c:b3ff:fec4:e1b6 0:1c:b3:c4:e1:b6 en1 permanent R
fe80::1%100
                             (incomplete)
                                                 100 permanent R
fe80::200:24ff:fec8:b24c%en1 0:0:24:c8:b2:4c en1 8h54m51s S R
fe80::21c:b3ff:fec4:e1b6%en1 0:1c:b3:c4:e1:b6
                                                 en1 permanent R
```

# **Fragmentering og PMTU**





Hidtil har vi antaget at der blev brugt Ethernet med pakkestørrelse på 1500 bytes Pakkestørrelsen kaldes MTU Maximum Transmission Unit Skal der sendes mere data opdeles i pakker af denne størrelse, fra afsender Men hvad hvis en router på vejen ikke bruger 1500 bytes, men kun 1000

# **ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol**



Kontrolprotokol og fejlmeldinger

Nogle af de mest almindelige beskedtyper

- echo
- netmask
- info

Bruges generelt til signalering

Defineret i RFC-792

NB: nogle firewall-administratorer blokerer alt ICMP - det er forkert!

# **ICMP** beskedtyper



### Type

- 0 = net unreachable;
- 1 = host unreachable;
- 2 = protocol unreachable;
- 3 = port unreachable;
- 4 = fragmentation needed and DF set;
- 5 = source route failed.

Ved at fjerne ALT ICMP fra et net fjerner man nødvendig funktionalitet!

#### Tillad ICMP types:

- 3 Destination Unreachable
- 4 Source Quench Message
- 11 Time Exceeded
- 12 Parameter Problem Message

#### ICMPv6 has more



Autoconfiguration - what is the network prefix

Duplicate Address Detection - can I use this address

Neighbor Discovery - which neighbors exist

Link layer addresses - "ARP" for IPv6

Neighbor Unreachability Detection, or NUD) - neighbors still alive

### IPv6 firewalls - you MUST allow SOME ICMPv6



```
# Simple stateful network firewall rules for IPv6
# using IPv4 file for input and inspiration from
# http://www.ipv6style.jp/en/building/20040526/2.shtml
# input from
        Sfwcmd6 -f flush
        $fwcmd6 add allow all from any to any via lo0
# Allow ICMPv6 destination unreach
        $fwcmd6 add pass ipv6-icmp from any to any icmptypes 1
# Allow NS/NA/toobig (don't filter it out)
        $fwcmd6 add pass ipv6-icmp from any to any icmptypes 2
# Allow timex Time exceeded
        $fwcmd6 add pass ipv6-icmp from any to any icmptypes 3
# Allow parameter problem
        $fwcmd6 add pass ipv6-icmp from any to any icmptypes 4
# IPv6 ICMP - echo request (128) and echo reply (129)
        $fwcmd6 add pass ipv6-icmp from any to any icmptypes 128,129
# IPv6 ICMP - router solicitation (133) and router advertisement (134)
        $fwcmd6 add pass ipv6-icmp from any to any icmptypes 133,134
# IPv6 ICMP - neighbour discovery solicitation (135) and advertisement (136)
        $fwcmd6 add pass ipv6-icmp from any to any icmptypes 135,136
```

# IPv6 firewalls, cont. allowing services



```
#
       Allow all established connections to persist (setup required
        for new connections).
        $fwcmd6 add allow tcp from any to any established
        $fwcmd6 add allow tcp from any to any out setup
# allow access to my webserver and ssh
        $fwcmd6 add allow tcp from any to any 80,443 setup
        $fwcmd6 add allow tcp from any to any $ssh setup
# allow access to X11 forwarding over ::1
        $fwcmd6 add allow tcp from any to ::1 6010
                                                   setup
#
        Politely rejects AUTH requests (e.g. email and ftp)
        $fwcmd6 add reset tcp from any to any 113
        Deny everything else ipv6
        $fwcmd6 add 65435 deny log ipv6 from any to any
```

# **Collect information about your network**



devices - what is a network device?

switches - Layer 2 does not matter much, management by RFC-1918 IPv4 is probably wise

routers - most important, connectivity MUST support IPv6. Check vendor home page - do NOT assume support is ready

Security devices: firewalls, IDS/IPS, VPN - critical and support in general poor. Some vendors such as Cisco ASA and Juniper SRX has good support

# **Ping**



ICMP - Internet Control Message Protocol

Benyttes til fejlbeskeder og til diagnosticering af forbindelser

ping programmet virker ved hjælp af ICMP ECHO request og forventer ICMP ECHO reply

#### \$ ping 192.168.1.1

```
PING 192.168.1.1 (192.168.1.1): 56 data bytes
64 bytes from 192.168.1.1: icmp_seq=0 ttl=150 time=8.849 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.1.1: icmp_seq=1 ttl=150 time=0.588 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.1.1: icmp_seq=2 ttl=150 time=0.553 ms
```

### Flere små forskelle



#### ping eller ping6

Nogle systemer vælger at ping kommandoen kan ping'e både IPv4 og Ipv6

Andre vælger at ping kun benyttes til IPv4, mens IPv6 ping kaldes for ping6

Læg også mærke til jargonen at pinge

# Unix - practical examples if config and ping



```
$ ifconfig en0
en0: flags=8863<UP, BROADCAST, SMART, RUNNING, SIMPLEX, MULTICAST> mtu 1500
inet6 fe80::216:cbff:feac:1d9f%en0 prefixlen 64 scopeid 0x4
inet 10.0.42.15 netmask 0xffffff00 broadcast 10.0.42.255
inet6 2001:16d8:dd0f:cf0f:216:cbff:feac:1d9f prefixlen 64 autoconf
ether 00:16:cb:ac:1d:9f
media: autoselect (1000baseT <full-duplex>) status: active
$ ping6 ::1
PING6(56=40+8+8 \text{ bytes}) ::1 --> ::1
16 bytes from ::1, icmp_seq=0 hlim=64 time=0.089 ms
16 bytes from ::1, icmp_seq=1 hlim=64 time=0.155 ms
$ traceroute6 2001:16d8:dd0f:cf0f::1
traceroute6 to 2001:16d8:dd0f:cf0f::1 (2001:16d8:dd0f:cf0f::1)
from 2001:16d8:dd0f:cf0f:216:cbff:feac:1d9f, 64 hops max, 12 byte packets
 1 2001:16d8:dd0f:cf0f::1 0.399 ms 0.371 ms 0.294 ms
```

### ping6 global unicast address



```
root# ping6 2001:1448:81:beef:20a:95ff:fef5:34df
PING6(56=40+8+8 bytes) 2001:1448:81:beef::1 --> 2001:1448:81:beef:20a:95ff:fef5:34df
16 bytes from 2001:1448:81:beef:20a:95ff:fef5:34df, icmp_seq=0 hlim=64 time=10.639 ms
16 bytes from 2001:1448:81:beef:20a:95ff:fef5:34df, icmp_seq=1 hlim=64 time=1.615 ms
16 bytes from 2001:1448:81:beef:20a:95ff:fef5:34df, icmp_seq=2 hlim=64 time=2.074 ms
^C
--- 2001:1448:81:beef:20a:95ff:fef5:34df ping6 statistics ---
3 packets transmitted, 3 packets received, 0% packet loss
round-trip min/avg/max = 1.615/4.776/10.639 ms
```

### ping6 link-local address



```
hlk@bigfoot:hlk$ ping6 -I en1 fe80::20d:93ff:fe4d:55fe
PING6(56=40+8+8 bytes) fe80::223:6cff:fe9a:f52c%en1 --> fe80::20d:93ff:fe4d:55fe
16 bytes from fe80::20d:93ff:fe4d:55fe%en1, icmp_seq=0 hlim=64 time=1.557 ms
16 bytes from fe80::20d:93ff:fe4d:55fe%en1, icmp_seq=1 hlim=64 time=1.725 ms

^C
--- fe80::20d:93ff:fe4d:55fe ping6 statistics ---
2 packets transmitted, 2 packets received, 0.0% packet loss
round-trip min/avg/max/std-dev = 1.557/1.641/1.725/0.084 ms
```

Note: -I en1 specifies that this interface is being used.

### ping6 til specielle adresser



```
root# ping6 -I en1 ff02::1
PING6(56=40+8+8 bytes) fe80::230:65ff:fe17:94d1 --> ff02::1
16 bytes from fe80::230:65ff:fe17:94d1, icmp seq=0 hlim=64 time=0.483 ms
16 bytes from fe80::20a:95ff:fef5:34df, icmp seq=0 hlim=64 time=982.932 ms
16 bytes from fe80::230:65ff:fe17:94d1, icmp seq=1 hlim=64 time=0.582 ms
16 bytes from fe80::20a:95ff:fef5:34df, icmp_seq=1 hlim=64 time=9.6 ms
16 bytes from fe80::230:65ff:fe17:94d1, icmp_seq=2 hlim=64 time=0.489 ms
16 bytes from fe80::20a:95ff:fef5:34df, icmp seq=2 hlim=64 time=7.636 ms
^C
--- ff02::1 ping6 statistics ---
4 packets transmitted, 4 packets received, +4 duplicates, 0% packet loss
round-trip min/avg/max = 0.483/126.236/982.932 ms
ff02::1 multicast address of all-hosts on the local link
ff02::2 multicast address of all-routers on the local link
```

### Hello neighbors



```
$ ping6 -w -I en1 ff02::1
PING6(72=40+8+24 bytes) fe80::223:6cff:fe9a:f52c%en1 --> ff02::1
30 bytes from fe80::223:6cff:fe9a:f52c%en1: bigfoot
36 bytes from fe80::216:cbff:feac:1d9f%en1: mike.kramse.dk.
38 bytes from fe80::200:aaff:feab:9f06%en1: xrx0000aaab9f06
34 bytes from fe80::20d:93ff:fe4d:55fe%en1: harry.local
36 bytes from fe80::200:24ff:fec8:b24c%en1: kris.kramse.dk.
31 bytes from fe80::21b:63ff:fef5:38df%en1: airport5
32 bytes from fe80::216:cbff:fec4:403a%en1: main-base
44 bytes from fe80::217:f2ff:fee4:2156%en1: Base Station Koekken
35 bytes from fe80::21e:c2ff:feac:cd17%en1: arnold.local
```

#### traceroute



traceroute programmet virker ved hjælp af TTL

levetiden for en pakke tælles ned i hver router på vejen og ved at sætte denne lavt opnår man at pakken timer ud - besked fra hver router på vejen

default er UDP pakker, men på Unix systemer er der ofte mulighed for at bruge ICMP

```
$ traceroute 217.157.20.129
```

```
traceroute to 217.157.20.129 (217.157.20.129),

30 hops max, 40 byte packets

1 safri (10.0.0.11) 3.577 ms 0.565 ms 0.323 ms

2 router (217.157.20.129) 1.481 ms 1.374 ms 1.261 ms
```

Husk at på Windows hedder kommandoen tracert

#### traceroute - med UDP



```
# tcpdump -i en0 host 217.157.20.129 or host 10.0.0.11
tcpdump: listening on en0
23:23:30.426342 10.0.0.200.33849 > router.33435: udp 12 [ttl 1]
23:23:30.426742 safri > 10.0.0.200: icmp: time exceeded in-transit
23:23:30.436069 10.0.0.200.33849 > router.33436: udp 12 [ttl 1]
23:23:30.436357 safri > 10.0.0.200: icmp: time exceeded in-transit
23:23:30.437117 10.0.0.200.33849 > router.33437: udp 12 [ttl 1]
23:23:30.437383 safri > 10.0.0.200: icmp: time exceeded in-transit
23:23:30.437574 10.0.0.200.33849 > router.33438: udp 12
23:23:30.438946 router > 10.0.0.200: icmp: router udp port 33438 unreachable
23:23:30.451319 10.0.0.200.33849 > router.33439: udp 12
23:23:30.452569 router > 10.0.0.200: icmp: router udp port 33439 unreachable
23:23:30.452813 10.0.0.200.33849 > router.33440: udp 12
23:23:30.454023 router > 10.0.0.200: icmp: router udp port 33440 unreachable
23:23:31.379102 10.0.0.200.49214 > safri.domain: 6646+ PTR?
200.0.0.10.in-addr.arpa. (41)
23:23:31.380410 safri.domain > 10.0.0.200.49214: 6646 NXDomain* 0/1/0 (93)
14 packets received by filter
O packets dropped by kernel
```

#### Værdien af traceroute



Diagnosticering af netværksproblemer - formålet med traceroute


Indblik i netværkets opbygning!

Svar fra hosts - en modtaget pakke fremfor et sort hul

Traceroute er ikke et angreb - det er også vigtigt at kunne genkende normal trafik!

### **Network mapping**





Ved brug af traceroute og tilsvarende programmer kan man ofte udlede topologien i det netværk man undersøger

# Kommandolinien på Unix



#### Shells kommandofortolkere:

- sh Bourne Shell
- bash Bourne Again Shell
- ksh Korn shell, lavet af David Korn
- csh C shell, syntaks der minder om C sproget
- flere andre, zsh, tcsh

Svarer til command.com og cmd.exe på Windows

Kan bruges som komplette programmeringssprog

### Kommandoprompten



```
[hlk@fischer hlk]$ id
uid=6000(hlk) gid=20(staff) groups=20(staff),
0(wheel), 80(admin), 160(cvs)
[hlk@fischer hlk]$

[root@fischer hlk]# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(wheel) groups=0(wheel), 1(daemon),
2(kmem), 3(sys), 4(tty), 5(operator), 20(staff),
31(guest), 80(admin)
[root@fischer hlk]#
```

typisk viser et dollartegn at man er logget ind som almindelig bruge mens en havelåge at man er root - superbruger

# Kommandoliniens opbygning



```
echo [-n] [string ...]
```

#### Kommandoerne der skrives på kommandolinien skrives sådan:

- Starter altid med kommandoen, man kan ikke skrive henrik echo
- Options skrives typisk med bindestreg foran, eksempelvis -n
- Flere options kan sættes sammen, tar -cvf eller tar cvf
- I manualsystemet kan man se valgfrie options i firkantede klammer []
- Argumenterne til kommandoen skrives typisk til sidst (eller der bruges redirection)







Vi laver nu øvelsen

??

som er øvelse ?? fra øvelseshæftet.







Vi laver nu øvelsen

??

som er øvelse ?? fra øvelseshæftet.

# TCP/IP basiskonfiguration



ifconfig en0 10.0.42.1 netmask 255.255.255.0 route add default gw 10.0.42.1

konfiguration af interfaces og netværk på Unix foregår med:

ifconfig, route **og** netstat


- ofte pakket ind i konfigurationsmenuer m.v.

fejlsøgning foregår typisk med ping og traceroute

På Microsoft Windows benyttes ikke ifconfig men kommandoerne ipconfig og ipv6


# GUI værktøjer - autoconfiguration





# GUI værktøjer - manuel konfiguration






### Windows - ipconfig



```
Command Prompt
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.1.7600]
Copyright (c) 2009 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
C:\Users\Henrik Kramshoej>ipconfig
Windows IP Configuration
Ethernet adapter Local Area Connection:
   Connection-specific DNS Suffix . : kramse.dk
   IPv6 Address. . . . . . . . : 2001:16d8:dd0f:cf0f:f049:94d0:75d8:683e
   Temporary IPv6 Address. . . . . : 2001:16d8:dd0f:cf0f:84bd:adea:fb61:8960
   Link-local IPv6 Address . . . . : fe80::f049:94d0:75d8:683e%11
   IPv4 Address. . . . . . . . . . : 10.0.42.107
   Subnet Mask . . . . . . . . . : 255.255.255.0
   : fe80::200:24ff:fec8:b24cx11
                                        10.0.42.1
Tunnel adapter isatap.kramse.dk:
   Media State . . . . . . . : Media disconnected Connection-specific DNS Suffix . : kramse.dk
Tunnel adapter Local Area Connection* 11:
   Connection-specific DNS Suffix .:
   IPv6 Address. . . . . . . . . : 2001:0:5ef5:73b8:1000:322b:f5ff:d594
Link-local IPv6 Address . . . . : fe80::1000:322b:f5ff:d594×13
   Default Gateway . . . . . . . :
C:\Users\Henrik Kramshoej>_
```

### Windows - control panel





### ifconfig output



```
hlk@biqfoot:hlk$ ifconfig -a
lo0: flags=8049<UP, LOOPBACK, RUNNING, MULTICAST> mtu 16384
        inet 127.0.0.1 netmask 0xff000000
        inet6 :: 1 prefixlen 128
        inet6 fe80::1%lo0 prefixlen 64 scopeid 0x1
gif0: flags=8010<POINTOPOINT, MULTICAST> mtu 1280
stf0: flags=0<> mtu 1280
en0: flags=8863<UP, BROADCAST, SMART, RUNNING, SIMPLEX, MULTICAST> mtu 1500
        ether 00:0a:95:db:c8:b0
        media: autoselect (none) status: inactive
        supported media: none autoselect 10baseT/UTP <half-duplex> 10baseT/UTP
en1: flags=8863<UP, BROADCAST, SMART, RUNNING, SIMPLEX, MULTICAST> mtu 1500
        ether 00:0d:93:86:7c:3f
        media: autoselect (<unknown type>) status: inactive
        supported media: autoselect
```

### ifconfig output er næsten ens på tværs af Unix

# Vigtigste protokoller



**ARP Address Resolution Protocol** 

IP og ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol

**UDP User Datagram Protocol** 

TCP Transmission Control Protocol


DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol

DNS Domain Name System

Ovenstående er omtrent minimumskrav for at komme på internet

# **UDP User Datagram Protocol**






Forbindelsesløs RFC-768, <u>connection-less</u> - der kan tabes pakker Kan benyttes til multicast/broadcast - flere modtagere

### **TCP Transmission Control Protocol**






Forbindelsesorienteret RFC-791 September 1981, connection-oriented Enten overføres data eller man får fejlmeddelelse

# **TCP** three way handshake





- TCP SYN half-open scans
- Tidligere loggede systemer kun når der var etableret en fuld TCP forbindelse dette kan/kunne udnyttes til stealth-scans
- Hvis en maskine modtager mange SYN pakker kan dette fylde tabellen over connections op og derved afholde nye forbindelser fra at blive oprette - SYN-flooding

### Well-known port numbers





IANA vedligeholder en liste over magiske konstanter i IP

De har lister med hvilke protokoller har hvilke protokol ID m.v.


En liste af interesse er port numre, hvor et par eksempler er:

- Port 25 SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
- Port 53 DNS Domain Name System
- Port 80 HTTP Hyper Text Transfer Protocol over TLS/SSL
- Port 443 HTTP over TLS/SSL

Se flere på http://www.iana.org

## **Hierarkisk routing**






Hvordan kommer pakkerne frem til modtageren

#### IP default gateway





IP routing er nemt


En host kender en default gateway i nærheden

En router har en eller flere upstream routere, få adresser den sender videre til

Core internet har default free zone, kender alle netværk

## **DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol**





Hvordan får man information om default gateway

Man sender et DHCP request og modtager et svar fra en DHCP server

Dynamisk konfiguration af klienter fra en centralt konfigureret server

Bruges til IP adresser og meget mere

#### IPv6 router advertisement daemon



Stateless autoconfiguration er en stor ting i IPv6

Kommandoen starter den i debug-mode og i forgrunden - normalt vil man starte den fra et script

Typisk skal forwarding aktiveres, som vist med BSD sysctl kommando

NB: de fleste clients vil idag implementere IPv6 privacy addresses

#### IPv6 autoconfiguration



Modified EUI-64 format-based interface identifiers

ifconfig en1

en1: flags=8863<UP,BROADCAST,SMART,RUNNING,SIMPLEX,MULTICAST> mtu 1500 ether 00:23:6c:9a:f5:2c

00-23-6c-ff-fe-9a-f5-2c 48-bit MAC stretched to become EUI-64

02-23-6c-ff-fe-9a-f5-2c inverting the "u" bit (universal/local bit)

fe80:: + 0223:6cff:fe9a:f52c add link-local prefix

inet6 fe80::223:6cff:fe9a:f52c%en1 prefixlen 64 scopeid 0x6


DHCPv6 is available, but stateless autoconfiguration is king

Routers announce subnet prefix via router advertisements

Individual nodes then combine this with their EUI64 identifier

#### Router advertisement daemon





#### Routing



routing table - tabel over netværkskort og tilhørende adresser

default gateway - den adresse hvortil man sender <u>non-local</u> pakker kaldes også default route, gateway of last resort

routing styres enten manuelt - opdatering af route tabellen, eller konfiguration af adresser og subnet maske på netkort

eller automatisk ved brug af routing protocols - interne og eksterne route protokoller

de lidt ældre routing protokoller har ingen sikkerhedsmekanismer

#### IP benytter longest match i routing tabeller!

Den mest specifikke route gælder for forward af en pakke!

## Routing forståelse



\$ netstat -rn
Routing tables

| _   |    |   |                            |     |    |                  |   |   |
|-----|----|---|----------------------------|-----|----|------------------|---|---|
|     |    | + | $\overline{}$              |     | -  | е.               | — | _ |
| - 1 | Γì |   | $\boldsymbol{\mathcal{L}}$ | r   | r١ | $\boldsymbol{-}$ | ı | • |
|     | 11 | _ | $\sim$                     | ㅗ . | ΙТ | $\sim$           | _ | • |

| Gateway         | Flags  | Refs  | Use   | Netif   |
|-----------------|--|---|---|---|
| 10.0.0.1        | UGSc   | 23  | 7   | en0   |
| link#4          | UCS  | 1   | 0   | en0   |
| 0:0:24:c1:58:ac | UHLW   | 24  | 18  | en0   |
| 127.0.0.1       | UHS  | 0   | 1   | 100   |
| 127.0.0.1       | UHS  | 0   | 0   | 100   |
| 127.0.0.1       | UCS  | 0   | 0   | 100   |
| 127.0.0.1       | UH   | 4   | 7581  | 100   |
| link#4          | UCS  | 0   | 0   | en0   |
|                 | 10.0.0.1<br>link#4<br>0:0:24:c1:58:ac<br>127.0.0.1<br>127.0.0.1<br>127.0.0.1 | 10.0.0.1 UGSc link#4 UCS 0:0:24:c1:58:ac UHLW 127.0.0.1 UHS 127.0.0.1 UHS 127.0.0.1 UCS 127.0.0.1 UCS | 10.0.0.1 UGSc 23 link#4 UCS 1 0:0:24:c1:58:ac UHLW 24 127.0.0.1 UHS 0 127.0.0.1 UHS 0 127.0.0.1 UCS 0 127.0.0.1 UCS 4 | 10.0.0.1 UGSc 23 7 link#4 UCS 1 0 0:0:24:c1:58:ac UHLW 24 18 127.0.0.1 UHS 0 1 127.0.0.1 UHS 0 0 127.0.0.1 UCS 0 0 127.0.0.1 UCS 7581 |

Start med kun at se på Destination, Gateway og Netinterface







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




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## Wireshark - grafisk pakkesniffer






http://www.wireshark.org

både til Windows og Unix, tidligere kendt som Ethereal

#### **Brug af Wireshark**






Man starter med Capture - Options

#### **Brug af Wireshark**





Læg mærke til filtermulighederne








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#### VLAN Virtual LAN



#### Portbased VLAN



Nogle switche tillader at man opdeler portene

Denne opdeling kaldes VLAN og portbaseret er det mest simple


Port 1-4 er et LAN

De resterende er et andet LAN

Data skal omkring en firewall eller en router for at krydse fra VLAN1 til VLAN2

#### **IEEE 802.1q**





Nogle switche tillader konfiguration med 802.1q VLAN tagging på Ethernet niveau Data skal omkring en firewall eller en router for at krydse fra VLAN1 til VLAN2 VLAN trunking giver mulighed for at dele VLANs ud på flere switches

Der findes administrationsværktøjer der letter dette arbejde: OpenNAC FreeNAC, Cisco VMPS








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#### **Domain Name System**





Gennem DHCP får man typisk også information om DNS servere En DNS server kan slå navne, domæner og adresser op Foregår via query og response med datatyper kaldet resource records DNS er en distribueret database, så opslag kan resultere i flere opslag

## Mere end navneopslag



#### består af resource records med en type:

- adresser A-records
- IPv6 adresser AAAA-records
- autoritative navneservere NS-records
- post, mail-exchanger MX-records
- flere andre: md, mf, cname, soa, mb, mg, mr, null, wks, ptr, hinfo, minfo, mx ....

| ns1 | IN | A    | 217.157  | .20.130              |
|-----|----|------|----------|----------------------|
|     | IN | AAAA | 2001:618 | 8:433::1             |
| WWW | IN | A    | 217.157  | .20.131              |
|     | IN | AAAA | 2001:618 | 8:433::14            |
|     | IN | MX   | 10       | mail.security6.net.  |
|     | IN | MX   | 20       | mail2.security6.net. |

## Basal DNS opsætning på klienter



/etc/resolv.conf

NB: denne fil kan hedde noget andet på Unix varianter!

eksempelvis /etc/netsvc.conf

typisk indhold er domænenavn og IP-adresser for navneservere

domain security6.net nameserver 212.242.40.3 nameserver 212.242.40.51

#### **BIND DNS server**



Berkeley Internet Name Daemon server

Mange bruger BIND fra Internet Systems Consortium - altså Open Source

konfigureres gennem named.conf

det anbefales at bruge BIND version 9

- DNS and BIND, Paul Albitz & Cricket Liu, O'Reilly, 4th edition Maj 2001
- DNS and BIND cookbook, Cricket Liu, O'Reilly, 4th edition Oktober 2002

Kilde: http://www.isc.org

## **BIND** konfiguration - et udgangspunkt



```
acl internals { 127.0.0.1; ::1; 10.0.0.0/24; };
options {
        // the random device depends on the OS !
        random-device "/dev/random"; directory "/namedb";
        listen-on-v6 any;;
        port 53; version "Dont know"; allow-query { any; };
};
view "internal" {
   match-clients { internals; }; recursion yes;
   zone "." {
       type hint; file "root.cache"; };
   // localhost forward lookup
   zone "localhost." {
        type master; file "internal/db.localhost";
   // localhost reverse lookup from IPv4 address
   zone "0.0.127.in-addr.arpa" {
        type master; file "internal/db.127.0.0"; notify no;
```

#### Other DNS software



Unbound DNS server http://www.nlnetlabs.nl/projects/unbound/

NSD http://www.nlnetlabs.nl/projects/nsd/

OpenDNSSEC http://www.opendnssec.org/







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## Små DNS tools bind-version - Shell script



```
#! /bin/sh
# Try to get version info from BIND server
PROGRAM= 'basename $0'
. 'dirname $0'/functions.sh
if [ $# -ne 1 ]; then
  echo "get name server version, need a target! "
  echo "Usage: $0 target"
  echo "example $0 10.1.2.3"
  exit. 0
fi
TARGET=$1
# using dig
start_time
dig @$1 version.bind chaos txt
echo Authors BIND er i versionerne 9.1 og 9.2 - måske ...
dig @$1 authors.bind chaos txt
stop_time
        http://www.kramse.dk/files/tools/dns/bind-version
```

## Små DNS tools dns-timecheck - Perl script



```
#!/usr/bin/perl
# modified from original by Henrik Kramshøj, hlk@kramse.dk
 2004-08-19
# Original from: http://www.rfc.se/fpdns/timecheck.html
use Net::DNS;
my $resolver = Net::DNS::Resolver->new;
$resolver->nameservers($ARGV[0]);
my $query = Net::DNS::Packet->new;
$query->sign tsig("n","test");
my $response = $resolver->send($query);
foreach my $rr ($response->additional)
  print "localtime vs nameserver $ARGV[0] time difference: ";
  print$rr->time signed - time() if $rr->type eq "TSIG";
        http://www.kramse.dk/files/tools/dns/dns-timecheck
```

#### IP netværkstuning





IP har eksisteret mange år

Vi har udskiftet langsommme forbindelser med hurtige forbindelser

Vi har udskiftet langsomme MHz maskiner med Quad-core GHz maskiner

IP var tidligere meget konservativt, for ikke at overbelaste modtageren

Billedet er en HP arbejdsstation med 19" skærm og en 60MHz HP PA-RISC processor

## Anbefalet netværkstuning - hvad skal tunes



Der er visse indstillinger som tidligere var standard, de bør idag slås fra

En del er allerede tunet i nyere versioner af IP-stakkene, men check lige

Ideer til ting som skal slås fra:

- broadcast ICMP, undgå smurfing
- Source routing, kan måske omgå firewalls og filtre

Ideer til ting som skal slås til/ændres:

- Bufferstørrelser hvorfor have en buffer på 65535 bytes på en maskine med 32GB ram?
- Nye funktioner som RFC-1323 TCP Extensions for High Performance

Det anbefales at finde leverandørens vejledning til hvad der kan tunes

## **Tuning**



Hvad er flaskehalsen for programmet?

I/O bundet - en enkelt disk eller flere

CPU bundet - regnekraften

Netværket - 10Mbit half-duplex adapter

Memory - begynder systemet at swappe eller thrashe

## Måling af througput



Når der skal tunes er det altid nødvendigt med en baseline

Man kan ikke begynde at tune ud fra subjektive målinger

Det kører langsomt, Svartiden er for høj

Målinger der giver præcise tal er nødvendige, før og efter målinger!

Der findes et antal værktøjer til, blandt andet Iperf

#### Målinger med Nping fra Nmap



```
hlk@fluffy:hlk$ nping www.solidonetworks.com
Starting Nping 0.5.61TEST5 (http://nmap.org/nping) at 2012-03-15 07:06 CET
SENT (0.2006s) Starting TCP Handshake > www.solidonetworks.com:80 (91.102.95.20:80)
RECV (0.2198s) Handshake with www.solidonetworks.com:80 (91.102.95.20:80) completed
SENT (1.2030s) Starting TCP Handshake > www.solidonetworks.com:80 (91.102.95.20:80)
RECV (1.2213s) Handshake with www.solidonetworks.com:80 (91.102.95.20:80) completed
SENT (2.2056s) Starting TCP Handshake > www.solidonetworks.com:80 (91.102.95.20:80)
RECV (2.2260s) Handshake with www.solidonetworks.com:80 (91.102.95.20:80) completed
SENT (3.2076s) Starting TCP Handshake > www.solidonetworks.com:80 (91.102.95.20:80)
RECV (3.2286s) Handshake with www.solidonetworks.com:80 (91.102.95.20:80) completed
SENT (4.2098s) Starting TCP Handshake > www.solidonetworks.com:80 (91.102.95.20:80)
RECV (4.2301s) Handshake with www.solidonetworks.com:80 (91.102.95.20:80) completed
Max rtt: 21.040ms | Min rtt: 18.324ms | Avg rtt: 19.819ms
TCP connection attempts: 5 | Successful connections: 5 | Failed: 0 (0.00%)
Tx time: 4.01046s | Tx bytes/s: 99.74 | Tx pkts/s: 1.25
Rx time: 4.03064s | Rx bytes/s: 49.62 | Rx pkts/s: 1.24
Nping done: 1 IP address pinged in 4.23 seconds
```

## Målinger med Iperf



Ovenstående er set fra server, client kaldes med iperf -c fluffy

## Antal pakker per sekund



Til tider er det ikke båndbredden som sådan man vil måle

Specielt for routere er det vigtigt at de kan behandle mange pakker per sekund, pps

Til dette kan man lege med det indbyggede Ping program i flooding mode

Når programmet kaldes (som systemadministrator) med ping -f server vil den sende ping pakker så hurtigt som netkortet tillader

Programmer der kan teste pakker per sekund kaldes generelt for blaster tools







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#### **Opsummering**



#### Husk følgende:

- Unix og Linux er blot eksempler navneservice eller HTTP server kører fint på Windows
- DNS er grundlaget for Internet
- Sikkerheden på internet er generelt dårlig, brug SSL!
- Procedurerne og vedligeholdelse er essentiel for alle operativsystemer!
- Man skal <u>hærde</u> operativsystemer <u>før</u> man sætter dem på Internet
- Husk: IT-sikkerhed er ikke kun netværkssikkerhed!
- God sikkerhed kommer fra langsigtede intiativer

Jeg håber I har lært en masse om netværk og kan bruge det i praksis :-)

## Spørgsmål?



# Henrik Lund Kramshøj, internet samurai hlk@solido.net

http://www.solidonetworks.com

I er altid velkomne til at sende spørgsmål på e-mail

## Danish resources - get involved






## Danish IPv6 Task Force

Danish IPv6 task force - unofficial http://www.ipv6tf.dk

## VikingScan.org - free portscanning





#### **PROSA CTF**





PROSA afholdt fredag 17. september - til lørdag 18. september Capture the Flag Distribueret CTF med 6 hold og arrangørerne i Aalborg Sjovt og lærerigt - gentages helt sikkert

Kilde: http://prosa-ctf.the-playground.dk/

#### Referencer: netværksbøger



- O'Reilly Network Warrior god allround bog, men også Cisco centrisk
- Stevens, Comer klassiske bøger om TCP/IP
- TCP/IP bogen på dansk måske
- O'Reilly IPv6 Network Administration
- KAME bøgerne om IPv6 protokollerne, meget detaljerede
- O'Reilly cookbooks: Cisco, BIND og Apache HTTPD m.fl.
- Cisco Press og website
- Juniper website
- Firewall bøger Cheswick
- Der findes mange gode bøger om netværk

## Bøger om IPv6



<u>IPv6 Network Administration</u> af David Malone og Niall Richard Murphy - god til real-life admins, typisk O'Reilly bog

IPv6 Essentials af Silvia Hagen, O'Reilly 2nd edition (May 17, 2006) god reference om emnet

IPv6 Core Protocols Implementation af Qing Li, Tatuya Jinmei og Keiichi Shima

IPv6 Advanced Protocols Implementation af Qing Li, Jinmei Tatuya og Keiichi Shima

- flere andre