

Velkommen til


Security Tools in Software Development

FOSS Aalborg

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
<http://www.security6.net>

Slides are available as PDF and are in Danish only, sorry



Lære om værktøjer der kan forbedre sikkerhed for produktionssystemer

Internet - Here be dragons



Matrix style hacking anno 2003



Trinity breaking in

```
80/tcp    open      http
81/tcp    open      hosts2.nc
10.0.0.0   [ nobile]
11 # nmap -u -sS -O 10.2.2.2
11
13 Starting nmap V. 2.540E1A25
13 Insufficient responses for TCP sequencing (3). OS detection i
13 accurate
14 Interesting ports on 10.2.2.2:
44 (The 1539 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: cl
51 Port      State      Service
51 22/tcp    open      ssh
58
68 No exact OS matches for host
68
24 Nmap run completed -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned
50 # sshnuke 10.2.2.2 -rootpw-"Z10N0101"
Connecting to 10.2.2.2:ssh ... successful.
Re Attempting to exploit SSHv1 CRC32 ... successful.
IP Resetting root password to "Z10N0101".
System open: Access Level (9)
Hm # ssh 10.2.2.2 -l root
root@10.2.2.2's password: █
```

<http://nmap.org/movies.html>

Meget realistisk http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zy5_gYu_isg

Et buffer overflow er det der sker når man skriver flere data end der er afsat plads til i en buffer, et dataområde. Typisk vil programmet gå ned, men i visse tilfælde kan en angriber overskrive returadresser for funktionskald og overtage kontrollen.

Stack protection er et udtryk for de systemer der ved hjælp af operativsystemer, programbiblioteker og lign. beskytter stakken med returadresser og andre variable mod overskrivning gennem buffer overflows. StackGuard og Propolice er nogle af de mest kendte.

Buffer og stacks

Variables

buf: buffer

Program

- 1) Read data
- 2) Process data
- 3) Continue

Stack




Function

```
strcpy ()  
{  
    copy data  
    return  
}
```

```
main(int argc, char **argv)  
{  
    char buf[200];  
    strcpy(buf, argv[1]);  
    printf("%s\n", buf);  
}
```

Overflow - segmentation fault



Bad function overwrites return value!

Control return address

Run shellcode from buffer, or from other place

Exploits

```
$buffer = "";  
$null = "\x00";
```

Exploits

```
$buffer = "";  
$null = "\\x00";  
$nop = "\\x90";  
$nopsiz = 1;
```

```
$buffer = "";  
$null = "\x00";  
$nop = "\x90";  
$nopsiz = 1;  
$len = 201; // what is needed to overflow, maybe 201, maybe more!  
$the_shell_pointer = 0xdeadbeef; // address where shellcode is  
# Fill buffer  
for ($i = 1; $i < $len; $i += $nopsiz) {  
    $buffer .= $nop;  
}
```

```
$buffer = "";
$null = "\x00";
$nop = "\x90";
$nopsize = 1;
$len = 201; // what is needed to overflow, maybe 201, maybe more!
$the_shell_pointer = 0xdeadbeef; // address where shellcode is
# Fill buffer
for ($i = 1; $i < $len; $i += $nopsize) {
    $buffer .= $nop;
}
$address = pack('l', $the_shell_pointer);
$buffer .= $address;
```

```
$buffer = "";  
$null = "\x00";  
$nop = "\x90";  
$nopsiz = 1;  
$len = 201; // what is needed to overflow, maybe 201, maybe more!  
$the_shell_pointer = 0xdeadbeef; // address where shellcode is  
# Fill buffer  
for ($i = 1; $i < $len; $i += $nopsiz) {  
    $buffer .= $nop;  
}  
$address = pack('l', $the_shell_pointer);  
$buffer .= $address;  
exec "$program", "$buffer";
```

Demo exploit in Perl

Hvordan finder man buffer overflow, og andre fejl

Black box testing

Closed source reverse engineering

White box testing

Open source betyder man kan læse og analysere koden

Source code review - automatisk eller manuelt

Fejl kan findes ved at prøve sig frem - fuzzing

Exploits virker typisk mod specifikke versioner af software

Bemærk: alle angreb har forudsætninger for at virke

Et angreb mod Telnet virker kun hvis du bruger Telnet

Et angreb mod Apache HTTPD virker ikke mod Microsoft IIS

Kan du bryde kæden af forudsætninger har du vundet!

Eksempler på forudsætninger

Computeren skal være tændt

Funktionen der misbruges skal være slået til

Executable stack

Executable heap

Fejl i programmet

Computeren skal være tændt

Funktionen der misbruges skal være slået til

Executable stack

Executable heap

Fejl i programmet

alle programmer har fejl

Software udvikling er nemt

Software udvikling er nemt

Software udvikling er nemt

Software udvikling er nemt

Du skal blot skrive perfekt kode første gang :-)

Software udvikling er nemt

Du skal blot skrive perfekt kode første gang :-)

Sikkerhed er svært

Det er svært at skrive perfekt kode, om ikke umuligt

Så nu vil vi snakke om værktøjer til at forbedre situationen

Part 1 Low hanging fruits - easy



Højere kvalitet er mere sikkert

This file specifies the preferred style for kernel source files in the OpenBSD source tree. It is also a guide for preferred user land code style. These guidelines should be followed for all new code. In general, code can be considered “new code” when it makes up about 50% more of the file(s) involved. ...

Use queue(3) macros rather than rolling your own lists, whenever possible. Thus, the previous example would be better written:

```
#include <sys/queue.h>
struct foo {
    LIST_ENTRY(foo) link; /* Queue macro glue for foo lists */
    struct mumble amumble; /* Comment for mumble */
    int bar;
};
LIST_HEAD(, foo) foohead; /* Head of global foo list */
```

OpenBSD style(9)

The following copies as many characters from input to buf as will fit and NUL terminates the result. Because strncpy() does not guarantee to NUL terminate the string itself, it must be done by hand.

```
char buf[BUFSIZ];  
  
(void) strncpy(buf, input, sizeof(buf) - 1);  
buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\\0';
```

Note that strlcpy(3) is a better choice for this kind of operation. The equivalent using strlcpy(3) is simply:

```
(void) strlcpy(buf, input, sizeof(buf));
```

OpenBSD strcpy(9)

Compiler warnings - gcc -Wall

```
$ gcc -o demo demo.c
demo.c: In function main:
demo.c:4: warning: incompatible implicit declaration of built-in
function strcpy
```

```
$ gcc -Wall -o demo demo.c
demo.c:2: warning: return type defaults to int
demo.c: In function main:
demo.c:4: warning: implicit declaration of function strcpy
demo.c:4: warning: incompatible implicit declaration of built-in
function strcpy
demo.c:5: warning: control reaches end of non-void function
```

Easy to do!

No warnings = no errors?

```
$ cat demo2.c
#include <strings.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    char buf[200];
    strcpy(buf, argv[1]);
    return 0;
}
$ gcc -Wall -o demo2 demo2.c
```

No warnings = no errors?

```
$ cat demo2.c
#include <strings.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    char buf[200];
    strcpy(buf, argv[1]);
    return 0;
}
$ gcc -Wall -o demo2 demo2.c
```

Der er stadig alvorlige fejl!

Versionsstyring og configuration management har mange fordele

Hvem ændrede, hvornår og hvad

Hvorfor blev der foretaget en ændring

Med versionsstyring kan pre-commit hooks implementeres

pre-commit - check

- case-insensitive.py
- check-mime-type.pl
- commit-access-control.pl
- commit-block-joke.py
- detect-merge-conflicts.sh
- enforcer
- log-police.py
- pre-commit-check.py
- svnperms.py
- verify-po.py

http://subversion.tigris.org/tools_contrib.html

<http://svn.collab.net/repos/svn/trunk/contrib/hook-scripts/>

In a Java project I work on, we use log4j extensively. Use of `System.out.println()` bypasses the control that we get from log4j, so we would like to discourage the addition of `println` calls in our code.

We want to deny any commits that add a `println` into the code. The world being full of exceptions, we do need a way to allow some uses of `println`, so we will allow it if the line of code that calls `println` ends in a comment that says it is ok:

```
System.out.println("No log4j here"); // (authorized)
```


<http://svn.collab.net/repos/svn/trunk/contrib/hook-scripts/enforcer/enforcer>

Eksempel verify-po.py

```
#!/usr/bin/env python
"""This is a pre-commit hook that checks whether the contents
of PO files committed to the repository are encoded in UTF-8.
"""
```

<http://svn.collab.net/repos/svn/trunk/tools/hook-scripts/verify-po.py>

Part 2 Design for security - more work



Sikkerhed er kun effektivt hvis det tænkes ind i design

Secure Coding begynder med design


Secure Coding: Principles and Practices af Mark G. Graff, Kenneth R. Van Wyk 2003

Architecture/design while you are thinking about the application

Implementation while you are writing the application

Operations After the application is in production

Ca. 200 sider, men tætpakket med information.




19 Deadly Sins of Software Security af Michael Howard, David Leblanc, John Viega 2005

Obligatorisk læsning for alle udviklere

Forfatterne har skrevet mange gode bøger både før og efter





Denne bog er præcis og giver overblik

Ca. 270 sider, let at læse.



Buffer Overruns, Format String Problems, Integer Overflows, SQL Injection, Command Injection, Failing to Handle Errors, Cross-Site Scripting, Failing to Protect Network Traffic, Magic URLs Hidden Form Fields, Improper Use of SSL and TLS, Weak Password-Based Systems, Failing to Store and Protect Data Securely, Information Leakage, Improper File Access, Trusting Network Name Resolution, Race Conditions, Unauthenticated Key Exchange, Cryptographically Strong Random Numbers, Poor Usability

Part 3 Testing - more work now, less work in the long run

| | |
|--|-------|
|  | Test1 |
|  | Test2 |
|  | Test3 |
|  | Test4 |

Højere kvalitet er mere sikkert

Finde fejl under udviklingen af software

Sikre at software overholder krav til kvalitet

Finde fejl senere!


Undgå at gamle fejl optræder igen!

Test ofte





```
public class TestAdder {  
    public void testSum() {  
        Adder adder = new AdderImpl();  
        assert (adder.add(1, 1) == 2);  
        assert (adder.add(1, 2) == 3);  
        assert (adder.add(2, 2) == 4);  
        assert (adder.add(0, 0) == 0);  
        assert (adder.add(-1, -2) == -3);  
        assert (adder.add(-1, 1) == 0);  
        assert (adder.add(1234, 988) == 2222);  
    }  
}
```

Kan bruges til at teste enkelte dele af en applikation

Eksempel fra http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unit_testing




The screenshot shows the Hudson web interface. The browser address bar displays `http://mike:8080/hudson/?auto_refresh=false`. The page title is "Hudson". On the left sidebar, there are links for "New Job", "Manage Hudson", "Build History", "Project Relationship", and "Check File Fingerprint". The main content area shows a status message "Building is fun now" with an "edit description" link. Below this is a table of jobs. The table has columns for "S" (Success), "W" (Warning), "Job", "Last Success", "Last Failure", and "Last Duration". Two jobs are listed: "FreeScanAdmin" and "MiniScan". Below the table, there is a "Build Queue" section stating "No builds in the queue." and a "Build Executor Status" table with two rows, both showing "Idle" status. At the bottom right, it says "Hudson ver. 1.282".

| S | W | Job ↓ | Last Success | Last Failure | Last Duration |
|---|---|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------------|---------------|
|  |  | FreeScanAdmin | 31 min (#13) | 1 hr 8 min (#7) | 1 min 7 sec |
|  |  | MiniScan | 38 min (#11) | 2 hr 22 min (#2) | 1 min 0 sec |

| No. | Status |
|-----|--------|
| 1 | Idle |
| 2 | Idle |

Continuous building and testing

Finder løbende fejl - hurtig feedback



```
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    char buf[200];
    strcpy(buf, argv[1]);
    printf("%s\n", buf);
}
```

Brug al den hjælp du kan til at finde fejl

statisk analyse

finder fejl uden at køre programmet

typisk findes konstruktioner som indeholder fejl, brug af forkerte funktioner m.v.

dynamisk analyse

findes ved at køre programmet, typisk i et specielt miljø

Flawfinder <http://www.dwheeler.com/flipfinder/>

RATS Rough Auditing Tool for Security, C, C++, Perl, PHP and Python

PMD static ruleset based Java

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_tools_for_static_code_analysis

A Fool with a Tool is still a Fool

1. Run tool
2. Fix problems
3. Rinse repeat

Fixing problems?

```
char tmp[256]; /* Flawfinder: ignore */  
strcpy(tmp, pScreenSize); /* Flawfinder: ignore */
```


Eksempel fra <http://www.dwheeler.com/flawfinder/>

PMD static ruleset based Java source code analyzer

PMD

PMD scans Java source code and looks for potential problems like:

- Possible bugs - empty try/catch/finally/switch statements
- Dead code - unused local variables, parameters and private methods
- Suboptimal code - wasteful String/StringBuffer usage
- Overcomplicated expressions - unnecessary if statements, for loops that could be while loops
- Duplicate code - copied/pasted code means copied/pasted bugs

You can [download everything from here](#) , and you can get an overview of all the rules at the [rulesets index](#) page.

PMD is [integrated](#) with JDeveloper, Eclipse, JEdit, JBuilder, BlueJ, CodeGuide, NetBeans/Sun Java Studio Enterprise/Creator, IntelliJ IDEA, TextPad, Maven, Ant, Gel, JCreator, and Emacs.

<http://pmd.sourceforge.net/>

Spøjs note: 2009-02-08 PMD 4.2.5: bug fixes, new rule, new Android ruleset

Hard to do - manual analysis

Hvorfor ikke bare programmere sikkert?

Der er mange ressourcer tilgængelige:

Websites: *Secure Programming for Linux and Unix HOWTO*

<http://www.dwheeler.com/secure-programs/>

Bøger: *19 Deadly Sins of Software Security: Programming Flaws and How to Fix Them*
Michael Howard, David LeBlanc, John Viega + deres andre bøger

Det er for svært, tager for lang tid!

Sørg for feedback i jeres processer

Måske når I kun til denne del, så sørg for at erfaringer opsamles for hvert projekt

Læs ressourcer og lav design så det bliver nemmere at sikre

Få antagelser = færre fejl

compile time vs. at run time nogle fejl kan ikke findes på compile-time

Er du doven så oversæt og kød programmet på OpenBSD ;-)



Use fuzzers, hackertools, improve security by breaking it

Simple fuzzer

```
$ for i in 10 20 30 40 50
>> do
>> ./demo `perl -e "print 'A'x$i"`
>> done
AAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
Memory fault
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
Memory fault
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
Memory fault
```

Memory fault/segmentation fault - juicy!

Fuzz Revisited: A Re-examination of the Reliability of UNIX Utilities and Services

We have tested the reliability of a large collection of basic UNIX utility programs, X-Window applications and servers, and networkservices. We used a simple testing method of subjecting these programs to a random inputstream.

...


The result of our testing is that we can crash (with coredump) or hang (infinitemloop) over 40% (in the worst case) of the basic programs and over 25% of the X-Window applications.

...

We also tested how utility programs checked their return codes from the memory allocation library routines by simulating the unavailability of virtual memory. We could crash almost half of the programs that we tested in this way.

october 1995

cat /dev/random



```
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    char buf[200];
    strcpy(buf, argv[1]);
    printf("%s\n", buf);
}
```

Et program der kan give forskelligt fejlbehæftet input som måske kan identificere fejl

Jeg anbefaler bogen *Fuzzing: Brute Force Vulnerability Discovery* Michael Sutton, Adam Greene, Pedram Amini og tilhørende website

Se: <http://www.fuzzing.org/fuzzing-software>

I 1993 skrev Dan Farmer og Wietse Venema artiklen
Improving the Security of Your Site by Breaking Into it


I 1995 udgav de softwarepakken SATAN
Security Administrator Tool for Analyzing Networks

We realize that SATAN is a two-edged sword - like many tools, it can be used for good and for evil purposes. We also realize that intruders (including wannabees) have much more capable (read intrusive) tools than offered with SATAN.

Traditionen med åbenhed er ført videre helt til idag

Se <http://sectools.org> og <http://www.packetstormsecurity.org/>

Part 6 Enhance and secure runtime environment



Sidste chance er på afviklingstidspunktet


Der findes mange typer *jails* på Unix

Ideer fra Unix chroot som ikke er en egentlig sikkerhedsfeature

- Unix chroot - bruges stadig, ofte i daemoner som OpenSSH
- FreeBSD Jails
- SELinux
- Solaris Containers og Zones - *jails på steroider*
- VMware virtuelle maskiner, er det et jail?

Hertil kommer et antal andre måder at adskille processer - sandkasser

Husk også de simple, database som `_postgresql`, Tomcat som `tomcat`, Postfix postsystem som `_postfix`, SSHD som `sshd` osv. - simple brugere, få rettigheder



Forsvar dig selv med flere lag af sikkerhed!

JVM security policies



Udviklet sammen med Java

Meget kendt

Både Silverlight og JavaFX låner fra denne type model

Apache 6.0.18 catalina.policy (uddrag)

```
// ===== WEB APPLICATION PERMISSIONS =====
// These permissions are granted by default to all web applications
// In addition, a web application will be given a read FilePermission
// and JndiPermission for all files and directories in its document root.
grant {
    // Required for JNDI lookup of named JDBC DataSource's and
    // javamail named MimePart DataSource used to send mail
    permission java.util.PropertyPermission "java.home", "read";
    permission java.util.PropertyPermission "java.naming.*", "read";
    permission java.util.PropertyPermission "javax.sql.*", "read";
    ...
};
// The permission granted to your JDBC driver
// grant codeBase "jar:file:$catalina.home/webapps/examples/WEB-INF/lib/driver.jar!/-" {
//     permission java.net.SocketPermission "dbhost.mycompany.com:5432", "connect";
// };
```

Eksempel fra `apache-tomcat-6.0.18/conf/catalina.policy`

Apple sandbox named generic rules

```
;; named - sandbox profile
;; Copyright (c) 2006-2007 Apple Inc. All Rights reserved.
;;
;; WARNING: The sandbox rules in this file currently constitute
;; Apple System Private Interface and are subject to change at any time and
;; without notice. The contents of this file are also auto-generated and not
;; user editable; it may be overwritten at any time.
;;
(version 1)
(debug deny)

(import "bsd.sb")

(deny default)
(allow process*)
(deny signal)
(allow sysctl-read)
(allow network*)
```


Apple sandbox named specific rules

```
;; Allow named-specific files
(allow file-write* file-read-data file-read-metadata
  (regex "^(/private)?/var/run/named\\.pid$"
    "^/Library/Logs/named\\.log$"))

(allow file-read-data file-read-metadata
  (regex "^(/private)?/etc/rndc\\.key$"
    "^(/private)?/etc/resolv\\.conf$"
    "^(/private)?/etc/named\\.conf$"
    "^(/private)?/var/named/"))
```

Eksempel fra `/usr/share/sandbox` på Mac OS X

Nyere versioner af Microsoft Windows, Mac OS X og Linux distributionerne inkluderer:

- Buffer overflow protection
- Stack protection, non-executable stack
- Heap protection, non-executable heap
- *Randomization of parameters* stack gap m.v.

OpenBSD er nok nået længst og et godt eksempel

<http://www.openbsd.org/papers/>

NB: meget af dette kræver relativt ny CPU og Memory Management Unit

NB: meget få embedded systemer eller operativsystemer til samme har beskyttelse!

Husk følgende:

Sikkerhed kommer fra langsigtede initiativer

Hvad er informationssikkerhed?

Data på elektronisk form

Data på fysisk form

Social engineering - *The Art of Deception: Controlling the Human Element of Security*
af Kevin D. Mitnick, William L. Simon, Steve Wozniak

Informationssikkerhed er en proces

Henrik Lund Kramshøj
hik@security6.net

<http://www.security6.net>

I er altid velkomne til at sende spørgsmål på e-mail

FreeScan.dk - free portscanning



Home


Miniscan List

On this page you can configure and start a portscan of your IP-address from this server.
Your IP-address is: **85.82.28.68**

[Configure and start a scan of the IP-adress](#)

Note that this service is currently software in development and you also need to make sure that you are allowed to scan the IP-address specified.

`http://www.freescan.dk`



Hvis man vil lære at lave buffer overflows og exploit programmer er følgende dokumenter et godt sted at starte

Smashing The Stack For Fun And Profit Aleph One

Writing Buffer Overflow Exploits with Perl - anno 2000

Følgende bog kan ligeledes anbefales: *The Shellcoder's Handbook : Discovering and Exploiting Security Holes* af Chris Anley, John Heasman, Felix Lindner, Gerardo Richarte 2nd Edition , John Wiley & Sons, august 2007

NB: bogen er avanceret og således IKKE for begyndere!

What is it?

The Metasploit Framework is a development platform for creating security tools and exploits. The framework is used by network security professionals to perform penetration tests, system administrators to verify patch installations, product vendors to perform regression testing, and security researchers world-wide. The framework is written in the Ruby programming language and includes components written in C and assembler.

Trinity brugte et exploit program ☺

Idag findes der samlinger af exploits som milw0rm

Udviklingsværktøjerne til exploits er idag meget raffinerede!

<http://www.metasploit.com/>

Følgende kurser afholdes med mig som underviser

- IPv6 workshop - 1 dag
Introduktion til Internetprotokollerne og forberedelse til implementering i egne netværk.
- Wireless teknologier og sikkerhed workshop - 2 dage
En dag med fokus på netværksdesign og fornuftig implementation af trådløse netværk, samt integration med hjemmepc og virksomhedsnetværk.
- Hacker workshop 2 dage
Workshop med detaljeret gennemgang af hackermetoderne angreb over netværk, exploitprogrammer, portscanning, Nessus m.fl.
- Forensics workshop 2 dage
Med fokus på tilgængelige open source værktøjer gennemgås metoder og praksis af undersøgelse af diskimages og spor på computer systemer
- Moderne Firewalls og Internetsikkerhed 2 dage
Informere om trusler og aktivitet på Internet, samt give et bud på hvorledes en avanceret moderne firewall idag kunne konfigureres.

Se mere på <http://www.security6.net/courses.html>