Application Layer: Overview

- Principles of network applications
- Web and HTTP
- E-mail, SMTP, IMAP
- **The Domain Name System DNS**
- P2P applications
- video streaming and content distribution networks
- socket programming with UDP and TCP

DNS: Domain Name System

people: many identifiers:

- SSN, name, passport #

Internet hosts, routers:

- IP address (32 bit) - used for addressing datagrams
- "name", e.g., cs.umass.edu - used by humans

Q: how to map between IP address and name, and vice versa ?

Domain Name System (DNS):

- *distributed database* implemented in hierarchy of many *name servers*
- *application-layer protocol:* hosts, DNS servers communicate to *resolve* names (address/name translation)
  - *note:* core Internet function, implemented as application-layer protocol
  - complexity at network's "edge"

DNS: services, structure

DNS services:

- hostname-to-IP-address translation
- host aliasing
  - canonical, alias names
- mail server aliasing
- load distribution
  - replicated Web servers: many IP addresses correspond to one name

Q: Why not centralize DNS?

- single point of failure
- traffic volume
- distant centralized database
- maintenance

A: doesn't scale!

- Comcast DNS servers alone: 600B DNS queries/day
- Akamai DNS servers alone: 2.2T DNS queries/day

Thinking about the DNS

humongous distributed database:

- ~ billion records, each simple

handles many *trillions* of queries/day:

- *many* more reads than writes
- *performance matters:* almost every Internet transaction interacts with DNS - msecs count!

organizationally, physically decentralized:

- millions of different organizations responsible for their records

"bulletproof": reliability, security

DNS: a distributed, hierarchical database



Root

Top Level Domain

Authoritative

Client wants IP address for www.amazon.com; 1st approximation:

- client queries root server to find .com DNS server
- client queries .com DNS server to get amazon.com DNS server
- client queries amazon.com DNS server to get IP address for www.amazon.com

DNS: root name servers

- official, contact-of-last-resort by name servers that can not resolve name



DNS: root name servers

- official, contact-of-last-resort by name servers that can not resolve name
- *incredibly important* Internet function
  - Internet couldn't function without it!
  - Remember Facebook outage a couple of days ago
  - DNSSEC – provides security (authentication, message integrity)
- ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) manages root DNS domain

13 logical root name "servers" worldwide each "server" replicated many times (~200 servers in US)



Top-Level Domain, and authoritative servers

Top-Level Domain (TLD) servers:

- responsible for .com, .org, .net, .edu, .aero, .jobs, .museums, and all top-level country domains, e.g.: .cn, .uk, .fr, .ca, .jp
- Network Solutions: authoritative registry for .com, .net TLD
- Educause: .edu TLD



authoritative DNS servers:

- organization's own DNS server(s), providing authoritative hostname to IP mappings for organization's named hosts
- can be maintained by organization or service provider

Local DNS name servers

- when host makes DNS query, it is sent to its *local* DNS server
  - Local DNS server returns reply, answering:
    - from its local cache of recent name-to-address translation pairs (possibly out of date!)
    - forwarding request into DNS hierarchy for resolution
  - each ISP has local DNS name server; to find yours:
    - MacOS: `% scutil --dns`
    - Windows: `>ipconfig /all`
- local DNS server doesn't strictly belong to hierarchy

DNS name resolution: iterated query

Example: host at engineering.nyu.edu wants IP address for gaia.cs.umass.edu

Iterated query:

- contacted server replies with name of server to contact
- "I don't know this name, but ask this server"



DNS name resolution: recursive query

Example: host at engineering.nyu.edu wants IP address for gaia.cs.umass.edu

Recursive query:

- puts burden of name resolution on contacted name server
- heavy load at upper levels of hierarchy?



DNS records

DNS: distributed database storing resource records **(RR)**

RR format: (`name, value, type, ttl`)

type=A

- `name` is hostname
- `value` is IP address

type=NS

- `name` is domain (e.g., foo.com)
- `value` is hostname of authoritative name server for this domain

type=CNAME

- `name` is alias name for some "canonical" (the real) name
- www.ibm.com is really servereast.backup2.ibm.com
- `value` is canonical name

type=MX

- `value` is name of SMTP mail server associated with `name`

DNS protocol messages

DNS *query* and *reply* messages, both have same *format:*

message header:

- identification: 16 bit # for query, reply to query uses same #
- flags:
  - query or reply
  - recursion desired
  - recursion available
  - reply is authoritative



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

Getting your info into the DNS

example: new startup “Network Utopia”

- register name networkuptopia.com at *DNS registrar* (e.g., Network Solutions)
  - provide names, IP addresses of authoritative name server (primary and secondary)
  - registrar inserts NS, A RRs into .com TLD server:

    `(networkutopia.com, dns1.networkutopia.com, NS)`

    `(dns1.networkutopia.com, 212.212.212.1, A)`
- create authoritative server locally with IP address `212.212.212.1`
  - type A record for www.networkuptopia.com
  - type MX record for networkutopia.com

Caching DNS Information

- once (any) name server learns mapping, it *caches* mapping, and i*mmediately* returns a cached mapping in response to a query
  - caching improves response time
  - cache entries timeout (disappear) after some time (TTL)
  - TLD servers typically cached in local name servers
- cached entries may be *out-of-date*
  - if named host changes IP address, may not be known Internet-wide until all TTLs expire!
  - *best-effort name-to-address translation!*

DNS security

DDoS attacks

- bombard root servers with traffic
  - not successful to date
  - traffic filtering
  - local DNS servers cache IPs of TLD servers, allowing root server bypass
- bombard TLD servers
  - potentially more dangerous

Spoofing attacks

- intercept DNS queries, returning bogus replies
  - DNS cache poisoning
  - RFC 4033: DNSSEC authentication services

DNS walkthrough

Suppose I want to go to the google web server.

DNS walkthrough

DNS walkthrough



My web browser will check two places first to see if there is any previous name resolution record of this google machine.

DNS walkthrough



One place is my computer's cache memory
(Windows Command Prompt: ipconfig/displaydns)

DNS walkthrough



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

The other place is a simple text file called: Hosts.
(Windows: the file path is C:/Windows/System32/drivers/etc/.)

DNS walkthrough



DNS walkthrough

This initial query from my computer, a DNS client, to my local DNS server is **recursive query**.

DNS walkthrough

DNS walkthrough

He would say: “I'm sorry. I don’t know (it from my memory). But I will find it for you. It is my job."

DNS walkthrough



Now **iterative query** starts:
During the iterative query, other DNS servers can simply provide a referral if they do not know the requested IP address.

When this local DNS server could not resolve a new name from its own database, it would make an **iterative query** to other DNS servers.

DNS walkthrough



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

At the same time my computer saves this IP address in its cache memory just in case it will use it again.

DNS walkthrough



So does my local DNS server. It saves this IP address in its memory. Next time when any other computer in the network asks the same question,

Questions