National University of Computer & Emerging Sciences

Fall 2024
BSCS
Lecture 04
Network Performance(Delay, Loss, Throughput) and Security

Chapter 1: roadmap

- What *is* the Internet?
- What *is* a protocol?
- Network edge: hosts, access network, physical media
- Network core: packet/circuit switching, internet structure
- Performance: loss, delay, throughput
- Security
- Protocol layers, service models
- History

How do packet delay and loss occur?

- packets *queue* in router buffers, waiting for turn for transmission
  - queue length grows when arrival rate to link (temporarily) exceeds output link capacity
- packet *loss* occurs when memory to hold queued packets fills up



Packet delay: four sources



$$d_{\text{nodal}} = d_{\text{proc}} + d_{\text{queue}} + d_{\text{trans}} + d_{\text{prop}}$$

d_{proc}: nodal processing

- check bit errors
- determine output link
- typically < microsecs

d_{queue}: queueing delay

- time waiting at output link for transmission
- depends on congestion level of router

Packet delay: four sources



$$d_{\text{nodal}} = d_{\text{proc}} + d_{\text{queue}} + d_{\text{trans}} + d_{\text{prop}}$$

d_{trans}: transmission delay:
- *L*: packet length (bits)
- *R*: link *transmission rate (bps)*
- $d_{trans} = L/R$

d_{prop}: propagation delay:
- *d*: length of physical link
- *s*: propagation speed (~2x10[8] m/sec)
- $d_{prop} = d/s$

d_{trans} and d_{prop} *very* different

Caravan analogy



- car ~ bit; caravan ~ packet; toll service ~ link transmission
- toll booth takes 12 sec to service car (bit transmission time)
- "propagate" at 100 km/hr
- *Q:* How long until caravan is lined up before 2nd toll booth?

- time to "push" entire caravan through toll booth onto highway = 12*10 = 120 sec
- time for last car to propagate from 1st to 2nd toll both: 100km/(100km/hr) = 1 hr
- *A:* 62 minutes

Caravan analogy



- suppose cars now "propagate" at 1000 km/hr
- and suppose toll booth now takes one min to service a car
- *Q: Will cars arrive to 2nd booth before all cars serviced at first booth?*

  A: Yes! after 7 min, first car arrives at second booth; three cars still at first booth

Packet queueing delay (revisited)

- *a:* average packet arrival rate
- *L:* packet length (bits)
- *R:* link bandwidth (bit transmission rate)

$$\frac{L \cdot a}{R} : \quad \frac{\text{arrival rate of bits}}{\text{service rate of bits}} \quad \textit{“traffic intensity”}$$



- *La/R* ~ 0: avg. queueing delay small
- *La/R* -> 1: avg. queueing delay large
- *La/R* > 1: more “work” arriving is more than can be serviced - average delay infinite!

La/R ~ 0

La/R -> 1

“Real” Internet delays and routes

- what do “real” Internet delay & loss look like?
- **traceroute** program: provides delay measurement from source to router along end-end Internet path towards destination. For all *i:*
  - sends three packets that will reach router *i* on path towards destination (with time-to-live field value of *i*)
  - router *i* will return packets to sender
  - sender measures time interval between transmission and reply



Real Internet delays and routes

traceroute: gaia.cs.umass.edu to www.eurecom.fr

3 delay measurements from
gaia.cs.umass.edu to cs-gw.cs.umass.edu

1 cs-gw (128.119.240.254) 1 ms 1 ms 2 ms
2 border1-rt-fa5-1-0.gw.umass.edu (128.119.3.145) 1 ms 1 ms 2 ms
3 cht-vbns.gw.umass.edu (128.119.3.130) 6 ms 5 ms 5 ms
4 jn1-at1-0-0-19.wor.vbns.net (204.147.132.129) 16 ms 11 ms 13 ms
5 jn1-so7-0-0-0.wae.vbns.net (204.147.136.136) 21 ms 18 ms 18 ms
6 abilene-vbns.abilene.ucaid.edu (198.32.11.9) 22 ms 18 ms 22 ms
7 nycm-wash.abilene.ucaid.edu (198.32.8.46) 22 ms 22 ms 22 ms
8 62.40.103.253 (62.40.103.253) 104 ms 109 ms 106 ms
9 de2-1.de1.de.geant.net (62.40.96.129) 109 ms 102 ms 104 ms
10 de.fr1.fr.geant.net (62.40.96.50) 113 ms 121 ms 114 ms
11 renater-gw.fr1.fr.geant.net (62.40.103.54) 112 ms 114 ms 112 ms
12 nio-n2.cssi.renater.fr (193.51.206.13) 111 ms 114 ms 116 ms
13 nice.cssi.renater.fr (195.220.98.102) 123 ms 125 ms 124 ms
14 r3t2-nice.cssi.renater.fr (195.220.98.110) 126 ms 126 ms 124 ms
15 eurecom-valbonne.r3t2.ft.net (193.48.50.54) 135 ms 128 ms 133 ms
16 194.214.211.25 (194.214.211.25) 126 ms 128 ms 126 ms
17 * * *
18 * * *
19 fantasia.eurecom.fr (193.55.113.142) 132 ms 128 ms 136 ms

3 delay measurements
to border1-rt-fa5-1-0.gw.umass.edu

trans-oceanic link

looks like delays
decrease! Why?

* means no response (probe lost, router not replying)

* Do some traceroutes from exotic countries at www.traceroute.org

Example

What are the propagation time and the transmission time for a 2.5-kbyte message (an e-mail) if the bandwidth of the network is 1 Gbps? Assume that the distance between the sender and the receiver is 12,000 km and that light travels at 2.4 × 108 m/s.

$$\text{Propagation time} = \frac{12{,}000 \times 1000}{2.4 \times 10^{8}} = 50 \text{ ms}$$

$$\text{Transmission time} = \frac{2500 \times 8}{10^{9}} = 0.020 \text{ ms}$$

Note that in this case, because the message is short and the bandwidth is high, the dominant factor is the propagation time, not the transmission time. The transmission time can be ignored.

Packet loss

- queue (aka buffer) preceding link in buffer has finite capacity
- packet arriving to full queue dropped (aka lost)
- lost packet may be retransmitted by previous node, by source end system, or not at all



* Check out the Java applet for an interactive animation (on publisher's website) of queuing and loss

Throughput

- *throughput:* rate (bits/time unit) at which bits are being sent from sender to receiver
  - *instantaneous:* rate at given point in time
  - *average:* rate over longer period of time



Throughput

$R_s < R_c$ What is average end-end throughput?



$R_s > R_c$ What is average end-end throughput?



bottleneck link

link on end-end path that constrains end-end throughput

Throughput: network scenario



10 connections (fairly) share backbone bottleneck link *R* bits/sec

- per-connection end-end throughput: $min(R_c, R_s, R/10)$
- in practice: R_c or R_s is often bottleneck

* Check out the online interactive exercises for more examples: http://gaia.cs.umass.edu/kurose_ross/

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- Performance: loss, delay, throughput
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- Protocol layers, service models
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Network security

- Internet not originally designed with (much) security in mind
  - *original vision:* "a group of mutually trusting users attached to a transparent network" ☺
  - Internet protocol designers playing "catch-up"
  - security considerations in all layers!
- We now need to think about:
  - how bad guys can attack computer networks
  - how we can defend networks against attacks
  - how to design architectures that are immune to attacks

Bad guys: packet interception

packet "sniffing":

- broadcast media (shared Ethernet, wireless)
- promiscuous network interface reads/records all packets (e.g., including passwords!) passing by



Wireshark software used for our end-of-chapter labs is a (free) packet-sniffer

Bad guys: fake identity

IP spoofing: injection of packet with false source address



Bad guys: denial of service

Denial of Service (DoS): attackers make resources (server, bandwidth) unavailable to legitimate traffic by overwhelming resource with bogus traffic

1. select target
2. break into hosts around the network (see botnet)
3. send packets to target from compromised hosts



Lines of defense:

- authentication: proving you are who you say you are
  - cellular networks provides hardware identity via SIM card; no such hardware assist in traditional Internet
- confidentiality: via encryption
- integrity checks: digital signatures prevent/detect tampering
- access restrictions: password-protected VPNs
- firewalls: specialized "middleboxes" in access and core networks:
  - off-by-default: filter incoming packets to restrict senders, receivers, applications
  - detecting/reacting to DOS attacks

… lots more on security (throughout, Chapter 8)

Computer Networking: A Top Down Approach
8th edition
Jim Kurose, Keith Ross
Addison-Wesley

A note on the origin of these ppt slides:

These slides are freely provided by the book authors and it represents a *lot* of work on their part.
We would like to thank J.F Kurose and K.W. Ross.

Network security

- field of network security:
  - how bad guys can attack computer networks
  - how we can defend networks against attacks
  - how to design architectures that are immune to attacks
- Internet not originally designed with (much) security in mind
  - *original vision:* "a group of mutually trusting users attached to a transparent network" ☺
  - Internet protocol designers playing "catch-up"
  - security considerations in all layers!

What is network security?

Confidentiality: only sender, intended receiver should "understand" message contents. Access must be restricted to those authorized to view the data in question.

- sender encrypts message
- receiver decrypts message

Authentication: sender, receiver want to confirm identity of each other

Message integrity: sender, receiver want to ensure message not altered (in transit, or afterwards) without detection

Access and Availability: services must be accessible and available to users

Friends and enemies: Alice, Bob, Trudy

- well-known in network security world
- Bob, Alice want to communicate "securely"
- Trudy (intruder) may intercept, delete, add messages



Who might Bob, Alice be?

- … well, *real-life* Bobs and Alices!
- Web browser/server for electronic transactions (e.g., on-line purchases)
- on-line banking client/server
- DNS servers
- routers exchanging routing table updates
- …

Roadmap

- What is network security?
- *Principles of cryptography*
- Authentication
- Message integrity

The language of cryptography



Symmetric key cryptography



symmetric key crypto: Bob and Alice share same (symmetric) key: K_S

Q: how do Bob and Alice agree on key value?

Symmetric key cryptography

Advantages:

- *Simple*
- *Fast*
- *Encrypt and decrypt your own files*
- *Uses less computer resources: Single-key encryption does not require a lot of computer resources when compared to public key encryption*

Disadvantages:

- Need for secure channel for secret key exchange
- Too many keys: A new shared key has to be generated for communication with every different party. This creates a problem with managing and ensuring the security of all these keys.
- Origin and authenticity of message cannot be guaranteed: Since both sender and receiver use the same key, messages cannot be verified to have come from a particular user. This may be a problem if there is a dispute.

Symmetric key crypto: DES

DES: Data Encryption Standard

- US encryption standard [NIST 1993]

- how secure is DES?
  - DES Challenge: 56-bit-key-encrypted phrase decrypted (brute force) in less than a day
- making DES more secure:
  - 3DES: encrypt 3 times with 3 different keys

AES: Advanced Encryption Standard

- New (Nov. 2001) symmetric-key NIST standard, replacing DES
- Processes data in 128 bit blocks
- 128, 192, or 256 bit keys
- Brute force decryption (try each key) takes 149 trillion years for AES

Roadmap

- What is network security?
- *Principles of cryptography*
- Authentication
- Message integrity

Authentication

Goal: Bob wants Alice to "prove" her identity to him

Protocol ap1.0: Alice says "I am Alice"

Failure scenario??

Authentication

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Protocol ap1.0: Alice says "I am Alice"



in a network,
Bob can not "see" Alice, so
Trudy simply declares
herself to be Alice

Authentication: another try

Protocol ap2.0: Alice says "I am Alice" in an IP packet containing her source IP address



Failure scenario??

Authentication: another try

Protocol ap2.0: Alice says "I am Alice" in an IP packet containing her source IP address



Trudy can create a packet "spoofing" Alice's address

Authentication: yet another try

Protocol ap3: Alice says "I am Alice" and sends her *encrypted* secret password to "prove" it.



Failure scenario??

Authentication: yet another try

Protocol ap3: Alice says "I am Alice" and sends her *encrypted* secret password to "prove" it.



record
and
playback
still works!

Authentication: yet another try

Goal: avoid playback attack

nonce: number (R) used only *once-in-a-lifetime*

ap4.0: to prove Alice "live", Bob sends Alice *nonce*, R. Alice must return R, encrypted with shared secret key



Alice is live, and only Alice knows key to encrypt nonce, so it must be Alice!

Roadmap

- What is network security?
- *Principles of cryptography*
- Authentication
- Message integrity

Message Integrity

Bob receives msg from Alice, wants to ensure:

- message originally came from Alice
- message not changed since sent by Alice

Digital signatures

cryptographic technique analogous to hand-written signatures:

- sender (Bob) digitally signs document, establishing he is document owner/creator.
- *verifiable, nonforgeable:* recipient (Alice) can prove to someone that Bob, and no one else (including Alice), must have signed document

Digital signatures (Asymmetric cryptography)

simple digital signature for message m:

- Bob signs m by encrypting with his private key K_B^-, creating "signed" message, $K_B^-(m)$



Digital signatures

- suppose Alice receives msg m, with signature: m, $K_B^-(m)$
- Alice verifies m signed by Bob by applying Bob's public key

Alice thus verifies that:

- ✓ Bob signed m
- ✓ no one else signed m

non-repudiation:

- ✓ Alice can take m, and signature $K_B(m)$ to court and prove that Bob signed m

-

Asymmetric (Public-key) cryptography

- When encrypting, you use **their public key** to write message and they use **their private key** to read it.





Digital signatures (Asymmetric cryptography) = Authentication

- When signing, you use **your private key** to write message's signature, and they use **your public key** to check if it's really yours.



Digital signatures (with Hashing) = Authentication + Message integrity