Likelihood and Bayes' Theorem

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- 1. Short problem from the end of last class (...ppt)
- 2. Homework #1: events, scope of inference, sample size & estimated probability
- 3. Exponents and logarithms (from previous notes)
- 4. Introduction Bayes' Theorem (as time permits)

So far three major conceptual points:

- 1. Using data to estimate parameters (in this case, the survival and flowering probabilities of plants)
- 2. Calculating the probability of collecting a particular data set if a particular model were true (P(data|model))
- 3. Calculating likelihood (relative support) for a model, given a data set

Now:

4. Calculating the probability a model is "true", given a data set

Bayes' theorem is an alternative method of assessing the **probability** of a model given a fixed set of data.

Rev. Thomas Bayes (1702-1761) showed that we can convert the probability of seeing a particular data set, given a model and parameters, into the probability of the model and parameters, given the data:

Bayes Theorem:

Recall the definition of conditional probability:

$$P(B|A) = \frac{P(A,B)}{P(A)}$$

because it's symmetric

$$P(A|B) = \frac{P(A,B)}{P(B)}$$

rearranging the 2nd equation:

$$P(A,B) = P(A|B) \times P(B)$$

substituting this into P(A,B) in the first equation:

$$P(B|A) = \frac{P(A|B) \times P(B)}{P(A)}$$

If B is the 'model' and A is the 'data', this is Bayes' Theorem.

$$P(model|data) = \frac{P(data|model)P(model)}{P(data)}$$

P(model|data) = probability of model and parameters, given the data P(data) = constant specific to the data set P(model) = sometimes controversial "prior probability"

Simple intuitive example: testing for Lyme Disease

- We have tests for Lyme disease, so why shouldn't everyone get tested regularly?
 - true positive rate = 87%
 - false positive rate = 1%
 - (these numbers actually vary depending on the type of test)
- But Lyme Disease is pretty rare in the US. According to the CDC, about 300,000 cases per year
- 300,000 / 300,000,000 = 0.001, or about 0.1% of population

$$P(Lyme|+) = \frac{P(+|Lyme) \times P(Lyme)}{P(+)}$$

Or in English:

The probability of having Lyme given a positive test equals the true positive rate of the test times the probability of getting Lyme divided by the probability of getting a positive test result.

You can also look at it like the probability of getting a true positive (this model) out of all the ways of getting a positive (both models) adjusted for the actual prevalence of Lyme (your prior belief of how likely it is that anyone would have Lyme).

Defining the terms:

- The "data" in this case, is a positive test result
- The "model" or "hypothesis" is "infected with Lyme disease". There are two possible, mutually exclusive models: has lyme disease, or doesn't have lyme disease.
- In this case, P(data|model) is given to us. But we've calculated this before (we'll come back to the orchid example).

Defining the terms:

- P(model) = P(Lyme) is our prior probability, or P(H) before considering the data. Since we know Lyme is rare, we can use this prior belief to inform the probability of having Lyme given a positive test result.
- P(data) = P(+) All possibilities that match the data. If the models are mutually exclusive, AND we have included all possible models in our analysis, then $P(data) = P(data|model) \times P(model)$ summed over all (mutually exclusive) models. ["OR" axiom of probability]
- In Bayesian analysis, we typically ASSUME all possible models are considered in the finite set of j models we are comparing, and therefore substitute
- In this case, there are only two models, so this calculation is simple.

Calculations

$$P(Lyme|+) = \frac{P(+|Lyme) \times P(Lyme)}{P(+|Lyme)P(Lyme) + P(+|uninfected)P(uninfected)}$$

P(+|Lyme) is the true positive rate and P(+|uninfected) is the false positive rate.

$$P(Lyme|+) = \frac{0.87 \times 0.001}{0.87 \times 0.001 + 0.01 \times 0.999}$$

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p_lyme_pos = (0.87 * 0.001) / ((0.87 * 0.001) + (0.01 * 0.999))
p_lyme_pos
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[1] 0.0801105

Only an 8% chance you have Lyme given a positive result!!

What would change if you knew the patient lived in Massachussetts? 87,000 cases / 6.5 million = 0.013

$$(0.87 * 0.013) / ((0.87 * 0.013) + (0.1 * 0.987))$$

[1] 0.1028088

What if they were bitten by a tick AND had a bulls-eye rash?

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(0.87 * 0.5) / ((0.87 * 0.5) + (0.1 * 0.5))
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[1] 0.8969072

More on P(model), the "prior probability"?

- The probability of each possible model prior to collection or analysis of the data being analyzed.
- Informative priors mean that all models are not equally likely, prior to collecting the data that will be explicitly incorporated into a statistical analysis. Developing informative prior probabilities is a large, active, controversial and mathematically and computationally dense field of research.
- In many cases, we want to base inference only on our data, in which case, if we compare j possible models, the prior probability of each is usually therefore = 1/j. This is called an **uninformative** prior.

More on P(data)

If the models are mutually exclusive, AND we have included all possible models in our analysis, then P(data) = P(data|model)P(model) . . . summed over all (mutually exclusive) models. ["OR" axiom of probability]

In Bayesian analysis, we typically ASSUME all possible models are considered in the finite set of j models we are comparing, and therefore substitute

$$P(data) = \sum_{j=1}^{n} P(data|model_j) \times P(model_j)$$

- This definition of P(data) means that the sum of the $P(model_i)$ over all j models must be 1.
- This definition also makes P(data) constant for a given data set, so, from a practical perspective, Bayes' P(model) begins to resemble Edwards' definition of **likelihood** when there are **uninformative** priors:

$$P(model|data) = \frac{P(data|model) \times (1/j)}{c}$$

- 1/j is the [uninformative prior] probability of the model - P(data) is a constant, c, that is the sum of the $P(data|model) \times (1/j)$ over "all" models - note that because P(data|model) is in the equation it is specific to the particular data set(!) - $L(parameters(\theta)|data) = P(data|model, parameters) \times k$ - These are identical if k = 1/jc

More on P(model|data)

• Also called "posterior probability". The probability of the model *after* seeing the evidence (as opposed to "prior probability")

In other words:

- In Bayesian analysis, we explicitly estimate the constant relating the probability of the model, given the data. This means we can obtain an **absolute** measure of support for a model **IF** we are willing to believe we have searched all possible models.
- In likelihood analysis, we simply use the fact that the likelihood of a model given the data is proportional to the likelihood of the data given a model, and restrict our analyses to comparing the **relative** support for two or more models.
- The symmetry of the two metrics of support falls apart if P(model|data) includes an *informative* prior probability distribution, rather than the constant 1/j.

Graphical / geometric representation

Good video here: https://youtu.be/HZGCoVF3YvM