AQ SPECIAL COLLECTION:
POST-FORDIST AFFECT

Ordinary Refugees: Social Precarity and Soul in 21st Century Japan

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ABSTRACT
In the aftermath of the bursting of the Bubble economy in 1991, a turn to more flexible labor since the late 1980s, and the recent disaster (of earthquake/tsunami/nuclear reactor accident) of March 11th, the socio-economic equilibrium in Japan has been shaken. In contrast to the post-war era of high economic growth when lifelong jobs and a middle-class lifestyle were the norm, today these staples of "good living" have become undermined or unobtainable for more and more Japanese. Not only are more workers irregularly employed (called the "precariat" or precarious proletariat by activist Amamiya Karin), but there are signs of a more pervasive precarity—experienced by more than just the precariat—at the level of an evisceration of social ties, connectedness with others, and a sense of security. Taking the example of "net café refugees"—young working poor who live in net cafés—as paradigmatic of what has been called the "refugeeization" of Japan as a place no longer materially or socially secure for many of its citizens, the essay studies the condition of "social precarity" in post post-war Japan. This is looked at through the lens of affect: not only the state of precarity as it is experienced affectively (as a pain and longing for what still gets assumed to be "ordinary"), but also the affects deployed in practices adopted by the socially disenfranchised and economically precariat to survive. Seeing in these extra-economic networks of survival

Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 85, No. 2, p. 345–370, ISSN 0003-5491.

a glimmer of social change—a recalibration of human life and relationality in a new direction—I consider them to be a biopolitics of life from below, constituting new zones of (post post-Fordist) social possibility for Japan/ese. [Keywords: Youth, Japan, precarity, home, sociality, hope, politics]

On a hot muggy night in June 2008, I went to a live house in Shinjuku, Tokyo. Although a hotbed of subcultural music in the 1980s, Loft+One is better-known today for its edgy events. In a series of "talks live house," that night's theme was suicide: a topic that has increasingly drawn public attention ever since a nationwide surge in 1998—to 32,000—that has stayed dramatically high ever since. The leading cause of death for youth between the ages of 18 and 24 and rising precipitously amongst the middle-aged,[1] suicide is linked to Japan's economic depression as 60 percent of all those who commit suicide are jobless. But suicide is also a marker of something deeper—a psychic sense of unease, uncertainty, and a darkness about the present in a state of not becoming a future—that has spread across the country. Hopelessness and futurelessness are buzzwords of the times. So is the phrase "relationless society" (*muenshakai*): a descriptor of a country where the stitching of connectedness between people is fraying at the seams. Being alone—literally, psychically, socially—is the new human condition for Japan/ese in the 21st century. In an age when people are expected to be "responsibly independent" (*jiko sekinin*), one-third of the population lives alone and 32,000 die "lonely deaths" (at home all alone)—the same number as those who commit suicide—every year.[2]

When I join the line waiting for the doors of Loft+One to open at seven, the sign outside reads "STOP *ryūka suiso jisastu!*" (stop hydrogen sulfide suicide). Referencing the latest suicide trend—so common at the time to be a daily occurrence—hydrogen sulfide suicide spread through an internet posting of instructions on how to assemble the ingredients from two readily available household detergents. Easy and quick to concoct, hydrogen sulfide also makes for a relatively quick and painless suicide. Just like everything in fad-conscious Japan, suicide goes through trends. It once was charcoal and still popular is the fad of suicide datelines: going online to meet partners in what Ozawa de Silva (2010) calls "shared death." Tonight's event is intended as an intervention into the spread of this latest trend—sharing not death but the talk of it as a means to keep people alive.

After paying the entrance fee, I took my seat along with about 70 others in a large but cozy space lined with sofas, a bar, and a lending *manga* library. Right on time, the moderator—a young man in his mid-30s—walked onto the stage and asked his five guests to join him. He began by asking each, all *tōjisha* (those with the experience of, in this case, attempting suicide), essentially the same four questions: Under what circumstances did you feel like dying? Have you ever felt like killing someone? What helped you get through these hard times? What message do you have for people who are having hardship?

The circumstances of each were different. Kacco—a male in his late 30s wearing a gingham dress—described how, because he had always wanted to be a girl, school was difficult and made him want to kill everyone. In middle school, he got pierced and had a "yankee" period (becoming part of *bōsōzoku*, motorcycle gang). For five years he was also a *hikikomori* (socially withdrawn, never leaving his room for a job or anything else). His message to the audience was, "It's okay to run away. Get out [of whatever/wherever] in order to survive." Aiko, a soft-looking woman in her early 20s, recounts a history of domestic violence and years spent dreading school because she had a hard time interacting with people. Eventually the men in her household left or died, so her life improved. Her message was: "You can always fix things (*yarinaosu*) so don't give up!" Shirai, a 46-year-old man, tells of living at home until age 33 with an alcoholic father. Fixated on sex but unable to connect to women, he was enraged every time he saw couples on the train. Still working on his alcohol and sex addictions, his message was to "disconnect from bad living environments and learn to care for yourself, and others." Dressed in goth, Amamiya Karin, a social activist and author in her mid-30s, described how she started getting bullied (*ijime*) as a middle school student. The bullying continued through high school and as a result she started wrist-cutting. Desperately lonely (*kodoku*) and deeply depressed, she became a *freeta* (irregular worker). This was the worst period of her life; treated as "disposable labor," she was repeatedly fired and never secure about her job, pay, or life itself. At age 21, she discovered that she wasn't alone in her hardship (*ikizurasa*) which was the single most important thing to happen to her. Her message to the audience: "You are not alone. You are not a freak. You're okay and we're here with you."

Tsukino Kōji, a man in his 40s, author of three books, host of an all-night radio show for hikikomori in Nīgata, and founder of the *Kowaremono*

(a performance group), relates a long life of being "*tōjisha:*" struggling in and dropping out of school, becoming an alcoholic, wrist-cutting, living as a hikikomori at home, over-dosing and almost dying (multiple times). After joining a support group during one detox stay at a hospital, he stuck with it and is still sober 20 years later. Tsukino, like all the guests except for Amamiya, also delivers a performance (a form of spoken word). And, it is here, in detailing the dynamics of a difficult relationship with a father who had just passed away—a highly successful businessman who, pushing his son to achieve, continually berated him for failing to do so—that Tsukino's message to the audience was the strongest. Indeed, he bellowed it out, shouting it over and over like a mantra: "*shinai, korosanai, ikitai!! SHINAI, KOROSONAI, IKITAI*!! (I won't die, I won't kill, I want to live!! I WON'T DIE, I WON'T KILL, I WANT TO LIVE!!). Cutting the air with soundwaves that strike—and keep striking—a nerve, the performance was stunning. Speaking at once to his father and to us—of wanting to die, to kill, but now to live—it is as if Tsukino gave voice to his soul.

The soul on strike that strikes through affect. The whole night—at three hours plus—is deeply affecting. And it continued to be when, after the interviews and performances, there is a question and answer period. One woman, now aged 25 who worked for one year at 19 but has been NEET (not in education, employment or training) ever since, asks how to go about finding a job. A number want to discuss the recent killings in Akihabara when a 25-year-old temporary worker drove a rented van into a crowded crossing and jumped out to stab more victims. The final question is asked by a woman who, standing up at the back, identifies herself as a hikikomori who constantly feels like killing herself. Until tonight, she hadn't left home for a year and, forcing herself to come here, says the evening's event has been helpful. But, breaking into tears, she wonders how she can keep going. At this, Amamiya thanks her for coming out tonight and praises the courage this took. Telling her how brave she is, Amamiya also reminds her that she is no longer alone. "You can email me, email us, anytime." Then she urges the woman to keep living. "Please, try to stay alive just a little longer. Stay alive. Stay alive—for us."

Social Precarity

The subject of this essay is what I call social precarity: a condition of being and feeling insecure in life that extends to one's (dis)connectedness

from a sense of social community. I take the word precarity from the word "precariat" as used by activist Amamiya Karin (2007) to reference the "precarious proletariat"—those consigned to irregular and unstable employment (in temporary, part time, day, or contract work) whose ranks have been growing in Japan, as elsewhere, with the rise of flexible labor and the deregulation of the market economy since the 1980's.[3] The prevalence of precarious employment is a global phenomenon triggering a spate of scholarly interest and political protest; and was certainly a major factor in the surge of uprisings in 2011 that spread from Tunisia and Yemen to Israel and the UK. As employed by Italian autonomists since the 1970s—from whom Amamiya adopted it—precarity is related to, but not necessarily interchangeable with, precarious labor. It spreads to the multiple ways in which unstable work destabilizes daily living. Indeed, as Noelle Molé (this issue) shows in the context of Italy and the rise of workplace mobbing, precarious labor can lead to a range of pathological symptoms that "haunt" one's very being. Precarity is insecurity in life: material, existential, social. But, as life itself becomes a central concern (Precarias a la Deriva 2006), precarity can also be the conditions for social change, new forms of collective coming-together, even political revolution.

> In its most ambitious formulation precarity would encompass not only the condition of precarious workers but a more general existential state, understood at once as a source of "political subjection, of economic exploitation, and of opportunities to be grasped." (Lazzarato 2004 as cited in Neilson and Rossiter 2008:52)

It is a precarity of "soul" that I am most interested in here. Following Bifo Berardi (2009), I understand soul to be rooted in both the material conditions of life-making, including work, and the social and existential conditions of living, including the ties we have with others and the ways we define (and find) meaning, energy, and worth. In terms of a well-being—of humanness and life—there is a crimping of the soul in Japan today that, if not universally shared, is widespread enough that some consider it a national disease. For example, in the weeks of devastation following the earthquake/tsunami/nuclear reactor accident of March 11, 2011, a front-page article in the *Asahi Shimbun* detailed the human/social crisis in which Japan was already deeply immersed. Seeing Japan/ese at a crossroads, it posed that this most recent disaster could either wake people up to the

importance of human connections or lead them even further into social deterioration and isolation as a "country of loneliness" (*kozoku no kuni*) (*Asahi Shimbun* 2011). In the aftermath of March 11, "*tsunagari*" (connected/connection) has emerged as a keyword; one survey found that the importance placed on having connections with others had soared just as the number of people seeking to get married did. It is in the same gap in such social ties or human support system that engenders the condition of life I examine in this essay under the term social precarity.

I explore social precarity in Japan today through the lens of affect: not only the affective state of precarity as it is psychically sensed, ordinarily experienced, and socially embodied (Berlant 2007, Mazzarella 2009), but also the affects deployed in what I take to be a politics of survival and social reconnection such as in the "Stop Suicide" event at Loft+One. I focus primarily on what Amamiya calls "pain (or hardship)-of-life" (*ikizurasa*) under conditions of shifting (and declining) socio-economic expectations: the uncertainty of not only income and job for those precariously un(der) employed, but also of social identity, belonging, and place. Under the post-war regime of the "enterprise society" and Fordist capitalism, people were affectively ensconced in a very particular orientation to life grounded in the triple institutions of home/work/school and the desires/disciplines of working hard, (re)producing home, and consuming brand name goods. What constituted belonging and well-being at the peak of Japan's bubble economy is becoming ever more remote for more and more Japanese today.

And yet—as a feeling, a mindset, an excitation turned to anxiety—this orientation towards a life not quite reachable for too many lingers on. Inciting a sensation of failure and loss, this rubric of well-being and being-normal needs to change if it is not to keep excluding so many. And this, too, is what I am interested in here: in changes being made in the horizons of expectation for what constitutes social citizenship, quality of life, and everyday security. Resistance to social precarity springs up in unpredictable places and forms—like "Stop Suicide" in a live house in Shinjuku.

The rest of the essay is divided into three parts. The first lays out the socio-economic landscape of post-war Fordism and the complex of being and belonging that gravitated around the heteronormative family and home and, from which, young precariat today are getting "refugeed." The second part delves deeper into how social precarity registers in disarticulations between the ordinary and social—the sensing of (dis)affiliation, (non)belonging, de-sociality in what I call a post-Fordist affect of ordinary

refugeeism. The third part takes up the work of the "soul on strike" (Berardi 2009): how people are coming together to figure out ways to better survive and to help one another in the process of doing so. In what could also be called a politics of survival and a biopolitcs for life from below are new zones of (post post-Fordist) social possibility.

Ordinary Refugeeism

Rebuilding itself after the defeat of World War II, post-war Japan became an economic superpower by the late 1970s. Its national lens radically changed: from the militarism of empire building to the productivity of Fordism. Citizens were now told to work hard not to win a war but to increase prosperity at home. The country prospered and with its "economic miracle," Japan gained the global prestige that had eluded it as a would-be imperial power. Meanwhile, the population enjoyed stable employment and the rise of consumer culture; by the late 1980s, 90 percent of Japanese identified as middle class.

Referred to as "*mai homu shūgi*"(my homeism), labor was geared towards owning a home stocked with the newest domestic electronics—washing machines, color TVs, automobiles (Kelly 1993). A site of consumption, the home/family was a productive unit as well: children worked hard at school, women managed childraising and the home, and men gave a lifelong commitment to jobs for which they were given a "family wage." Nestling the family within what Andrea Muehlebach and Nitzan Shosan (this issue) describe as fractal replication, Fordist capitalism was the grounding of the post-war nation-state, the "family corporate relationship" (*kazoku-kigyō aida kankei*) (Kimoto 2008:35).

Home-based, family-entwined, and productive of corporate capitalism, Fordist Japan embraced a principle of what Lee Edelman (2004) has called "reproductive futurism" as in seeing one's future in the image of the child. At the heart of modernist politics, reproductive futurism is a belief in the progressive betterment of life that, staking progress on the next generation, attaches—and delimits—sociality to the heteronormative family and home. Speaking from a queer perspective, Edelman is critical of a polity that, so invested in this calculus of worth and futurity, consigns to social exclusion and "no future" those unable or unwilling to reproduce.

Here, my interests are different: looking at what happens to a nation-state when, slipping in its ability to (re)produce, engenders a fear in the

people of their own consignment to (global) exclusion evacuated of any futurity. This is the case of post-bubble Japan where, due to a nagging recession brought on by the bursting of the bubble economy in 1991, the country has been seized by economic decline, labor restructuring (away from lifelong to flexible employment), and a loss of national confidence.[4] While the situation, though bad, seemed to be only temporary in the 1990s, economic decline has now become the new ordinary two decades later.[5] Further troubling things are Japan's low birth rate and aging (*shōshikōreika*) population. At both ends of the demographic spectrum, the population is getting stretched; stretched thin by a low birth rate (7.64 births for 1,000 population) and stretched tight by the care needs of its elderly, more and more of whom are living longer (with the highest life expectancy in the world).

If reproductive futurism and high economic growth once went together in the era of "Japan Inc.,"[6] today things seem to have stalled. The economy is stuck, jobs have been lost, and kids are no longer being born like they used to. It's difficult to still see a vibrant Japan with a progressively better future reflected in the image of a (productive) child. The "my-homeism" of Japan, Inc. has been replaced by a different affective constellation: a sense of displacement, ungroundedness, and loneliness that gets captured in what circulates as a slogan of the times—"without a place to call home" (*ibashō ga nai*). This vanishing and its accompanying nostalgic longing echo the fate, as Hylton White describes it (this issue), of the South African countryside home. This too, what I consider to be the affect of post-Fordist Japan, gets attached to images, and imagery, of the child and youth. There is the image of all those children not getting born—a source of endless national anxiety as can be seen by the massive media coverage of *shōshika* (low birthrate) and the aggressiveness with which the government tries to incentivize both getting married and having children. But another, equally pressing image, is of youth who, at the same age when their parents were gainfully employed and reproducing a family, are stuck in low-paid jobs or not working at all (the state of NEET, not-in-employment-education-or-training is said to number 2.5 million, and hikikomori are estimated to number 1 million) (Kaneko 2006).

Whether their condition draws sympathy or scorn, such un(der)employed youth are seen as unproductive in a society where, despite (or precisely because of) the economic downturn, productivity remains the calculus of (social/national) worth. Such is the case of the "lost generation,"

an entire generation of youth who came of working age during the "glacial job freeze" in the 1990s (followed by another "lost generation," if not two, a decade later). Unable to secure the regular employment that still marks status and security, such youth are crippled in their hopes for the future, including—for a large number of them—the ability to get married and have children (a prospect that a majority claim to desire) (Yamada 2003). Often stranded at home or even homeless, Japanese youth—an age bracket that is lingering longer or becoming endless—feel stuck. Mired in circumstances that show no signs of improving, more and more youth are succumbing to the "precariat," precarious proletariat or working poor. One-third of all workers, but half of those between the ages of 15 and 24, are irregularly employed (*hiseiki koyō*) which means no job security, no benefits, and wages that are static and low. 77 percent of those irregularly employed earn less than 2,000,000 yen ($26,000) a year, putting them in the ranks of the working poor. Calculating poverty as less than half of the mean average income, Japan has the second highest poverty rate of OECD countries, after the United States (Tachibanaki, 2008)—and this with the world's third strongest economy.

The reemergence of poverty in Japan—with its associations of the lean years following Japan's defeat in World War II—is a bleak sign of the turn of national fortunes. But equally bleak, if not more so, is the fact that what has been called the "new face of poverty" is that of youth.[7] Referring to a new form of homelessness in which people, mainly youth, take up temporary residence in net cafés, the term "net café refugees" has come to stand for the precariousness—of home, job, and life itself—for an increasing number of young Japanese.[8] The term was coined by the reporter, Mizushima XXX, who made a documentary on this new(est) demographic of poverty in Japan: young precariat dwelling in net cafés. Aired in January 2007, it was entitled *Netto kafuhe nanmin to hinkon Nippon* (Net Café Refugees and Poverty in Japan). As he learned about these "drifting poor," they are mainly flexible or irregular workers—which covers temporary, part time, contract, dispatch, or day labor—who, with unsteady paychecks and no job security, are unable to afford permanent housing. As viewers were shown in the documentary, many of those who reside temporarily at net cafés or *manga kissa* (comicbook coffeeshops) are also roaming the streets when they do not have work. More men than women, and most commonly in either their 20s or 50s, café dwellers are part of the floating population of flexible workers who have become deterritorialized in post-Fordist Japan. At the lower

end of flexible labor—usually relying on dispatch work (*haken*) or day labor (*hiyatoi*)—these workers earn an average of 6,000 to 8,000 yen ($70-80) for one day. And "home," when they find it in a net café, is decidely unhomey: a nighttime package for 6 to 8 hours (costing 1,200-2,000 yen, $15-$26) that provides a cubicle or reclining chair for one's "home." Compare this with the "scenes of utter domestic unavailabaility" (Muehlebach and Shoshan, this issue) that Lauren Berlant analyzes in the films *Rosetta* and *La Promesse* (Berlant 2007).

In the portraits of the three featured (ages 18, 24, 28) in Mizushima's documentary, there is no sense of a future, and no expectation that life will improve. This too—as a sign of a failed Japan—is how viewers reacted to the documentary which sent shockwaves throughout the country and spurred the government to do its own official investigation of net café dwellers/working poor later in the year. For, as Mizushima posited, the situation facing Japan is is akin to war, producing "refugees" (*nanmin*) out of ordinary youth—kids excluded from the very life they once were expected to (re)produce (Mizushima 2007). Picking up on the terminology, activists Amamiya Karin and Yuasa Makoto extended this concept further, arguing that the country itself is at risk of "refugeeization" (*nanminka*) (Amamiya 2007), a state of not being able to provide security—of job, life, home(land)—to its citizens. And, implicit, here is the sense of loss: of a Japan vanishing from the "Japan" it once was, should be, and may never be (again) (Ivy 1995).

Ordinary refugeeism—as in a longing for a "normative intimacy" (Berlant 2007:285) attached to a time and place that no longer exists—are affects that, widely shared, mark this moment of post-Fordist precarity in 21st century Japan. It is experienced in terms of (dis)belonging as in expressions of disaffiliation, unrootedness, social (if not literal) homelessness. And, as the flip side of this, the obsessive desire of "just being somewhere, of having a life": what, in her essay on post-Fordist affect, Lauren Berlant calls "normativity hangover" (2007:288). As Berardi (2009) puts it, this is the state of precarity when, speaking of post-Fordist production, life gets organized according to the market model which reduces humans to an algorithm of abstract, competitive—and for those who fail to measure up, failed—productivity. Feelings of ineptitude, isolation, and defeat are endemic, generating what Berardi sees as the two psychopathologies of post-Fordist times, panic and depression. Or, as Molé puts it (this issue) also speaking of Italy, the intensifying vulnerability of workers (at work and

from mobbing) can induce a zombie-like state of ghostliness, of feeling not precisely dead but hardly alive.

But even as these affects indicate a soul that is worn-down, they also can lead to refusal and resistance; the "soul on strike"(Smith in Berardi 2009:12)—demanding that something (in the way value gets produced and life is (not) getting lived) needs to change.

Withdrawal/Death/Violence/Hope

Young people today are basically withdrawn, sociologist Miyamoto Michiko told me in the summer of 2008 when I interviewed her about youth and labor in contemporary Japan. Referring to the phenomena much in the news of youth who literally take themselves out of school, work, or human circulation—NEET, *futōtō* (school-refusers), and hikikomori—Miyamoto also made a broader statement about the "de-sociality" of the younger generation.

> I don't think Japanese youth are as much anti-social as non-social (*hi-shakōtekil*). That is, they don't protest against society as simply don't participate in it. They're not active and not lively. Actually, they have no energy at all. Someone like Amamiya [Karin] is active; she's an activist. But this is the minority. Youth are generally withdrawn (*hikikomotteru*); they're in a state that is close to that of a hikikomori (*hikikomori chikai)*.

Citing a survey conducted in 2007 with youth ages 18 to 24 in Tokyo, she noted that, besides the 25,000 who identified as full-blown hikikomori, 70 percent said they had the "sentiment" (*shinjō*) of being a hikikomori. So, according to Miyamoto, social withdrawal has become something of a structure of feeling or ordinary affect (Stewart 2007) for Japanese youth today.

When I raised this issue with young people themselves, many acknowledged that they were socially disinterested, disinvested, depressed. But, as many told me, it is not the case that they willingly withdraw—from school, work, raising children. Rather, unlike their parent's generation for whom acquiring certain credentials would guarantee security, the socio-economic environment today is different. According to a 22-year-old university student who worked several part time jobs but was pessimistic

about her chances for regular employment in the *shūkatsu* season coming up (when young people undergo a rigorous "market" regime of finding jobs), life for young Japanese today is a "crapshoot." In her case, she went to university because her parents could afford it. But using this, or anything, to plan for tomorrow was an exercise in futility; many of her friends didn't bother, becoming *freeta* (irregular workers) right off the bat. Others she knew lacked whatever it was (energy, will, self-confidence—she wasn't sure) to even leave home and look for work in the first place, succumbing to withdrawal of various sorts (fullblown hikikomori, NEET, or those who lived off their parents). Japanese of her generation are nihilistic, she admitted. "Nothing really matters and we don't take anything, including ourselves, too seriously."

Born in 1975, Amamiya Karin came of age in Japan's "new economy" of flexibilization (*ryūdōka*). As children of baby-boomers who grew up under the Japan Inc. model of hard work at school geared towards the adult roles of stable middle class life, her cohort entered the job market when times were bleak (called the "lost decade" or the "glacial age of hiring"). Finding that companies gave job priority to their older, veteran workers rather than young workers just starting out, many in her generation had also befallen the trend of freeta: working freely, with no set duration or contract, in *arubeito* or part time jobs. But what started off as a lifestyle option by a Recruit Company campaign in 1989—urging youth to avoid a job-for-life in favor of come-and-go employment—freeta became more an economic fiat for young workers in post-bubble times (Slater 2009). When Amamiya entered the labor force in 1993, it was as a freeta, a job and status she says was numbing for multiple reasons; she could be fired anytime, the pay was minimal, rarely was she addressed by name, and the work could be done by anyone. As a worker, and human being, she was disposable (Amamiya 2007)—one of the ranks of the spreading "supernumeraries" in the global labor force today.

Certainly, the job status of a *freeta* (known more today by the blanket term *hisekishain* (irregular worker) which encapsulates contract, temporary, part time and, much in the news, *haken* or dispatch workers) is precarious. Pay tends to be low and benefits, non-existent. But Amamiya, now an activist who has emerged as something of a spokesperson for the irregularly employed, working poor, and lost generation of Japanese youth today, is careful to define the risk of precarity faced by young people in terms that are not just material. Employing the word, *ikizurasa* (hardship

of life), she defines it thus: "ikizurasa is connected to poverty and labor issues. But, first, it's a problem of *ningenkankei* (human relationships). And that's where I start—with an emotional sense of hardship" (Amamiya and Kayano 2008:x).

Honing in on human relationships, Amamiya describes the psychic turmoil of being a Japanese worker who lacks affiliation (*shozoku*). This is what companies once provided and still do for their *seishain* (regular workers): a steady salary, protection if there is a crisis, and—every bit as important—an identity. Irregular workers, by contrast, are on their own, struggling to make a living, and bereft of an *ibashō*—a whereabouts where one feels comfortable and at home. More than anything, according to Amamiya, it is the loss of a sense of belonging—recognition or acceptance by others (*shōnin*)—that troubles young precariat. Calling this *the* biggest issue facing young Japanese today, Amamiya portrays "hardship of life" as an insecurity that is not only material but also ontological: a sense of existential emptiness and social negation. And, in an idiom that has gained much currency these days, she sees this as adhering particularly, if not exclusively, to those in the underclass of what is becoming a two-class, bipolarized, society (*kakusa shakai*). According to Yamada Masahirō in his much cited book *Kibō Kakusa Shakai* (A Society of Differential Hope, 2003), Japan has moved from a society of an expansive middle class to one of class difference. What once was seen as within the grasp of most—steady employment, a family and home of one's own, material comfort—divides the nation now into "winners" and "losers." And this division exists not only in reality, but in the imagination as well.

As Yamada notes about post-bubble Japan, hope (*kibō*) has turned into hopelessness for those no longer able to access what he refers to as an "ordinary life" ("*hitonami no seikatsu*") (2003:27). But "ordinariness" here is a holdover from Fordist times, eluding ever more Japanese today (the "losers"). Reproductive futurism has thus become a privilege of the dwindling elite ("winners"). Men with regular jobs, for example, are twice as likely to marry and have children than those who are irregularly employed. Fewer people marry these days (70 percent of men and 54 percent of women ages 24 to 29 are unmarried) and those who do, marry later (the average age of marriage for women is 28.6 and for men, 30.4). And, for unmarried adults, a vast majority continue to live at home with their parents even into their 30s (as many as 60 percent of single adult males and 80 percent of females) (Yamada 2003).

Speaking from the position of an ordinary refugee—someone refugeed from precisely the kind of life laid out by Yamada as (once) constituting the norm(al)—Akagi Tomohirō (2007) has argued that the only hope of his generation is war. Laying out his position in a controversial article titled, "Hope is War" (*Kibōwa Sensō*), Akagi, a 31-year-old freeta at the time, was still working a nightshift and living with his parents ten years after entering the labor force. He described his conditions of life as "unbearably humiliating" (2007:54). With a monthly income of 100,000 yen (placing him well below the poverty line), Akagi couldn't move out, buy a car, or even think about marriage. Living as if he were "under house arrest," Akagi despaired of being forever stuck in the same dead-end job. Describing this existence as not "that of a human who can live having hope" (2007:54), he felt betrayed. Having done everything he was supposed to—study hard at school, enter and graduate from a good university, find and stick with a job—he had been denied what was promised him (and what he obviously longed for) as an adult. The corrective, he provocatively proposed, was for Japan to go to war to shake things up and spur social mobility as occurred after World War II. Despite the flexibilization of the economy, those (youth) on the bottom are in danger of getting stuck as a permanent underclass. If war occurred, it would be tragic, he agreed—but at least everyone would share the burden (Akagi 2007).

Strikingly, Akagi both identifies with, and feels disidentified by, the Japanese nation-state here—a condition of being given "no future" (Edelman 2004) which renders him socially dead. He feels excluded from a national project he believes still does, or should, exist—a middle-classness linked to the lifelong ties of the family corporate system. As Ghassan Hage (2003) has written, the nation-state has three mechanisms it can (and should, in his mind) use for distributing hope to its citizens: fostering a sense of belonging to the nation (national identification), cultivating investment in and expectations about a progressively better future (social mobility), and recognizing the importance of personal and collective dreams (social hope). When citizens feel plugged in to a sense of a collective beyond themselves and a future beyond the here and now, they are more likely to feel hopeful. When not, there is a tendency towards what Hage (2003) calls paranoid nationalism: clinging to a sense of nation or community which, when feeling excluded from, one attempts (sometimes violently) to exclude others from as well. This concept is akin to what Appadurai (2006), in his analysis of the rise of ethnic cleansing campaigns across the

globe since the 1990s, has called an "anxiety of incompleteness." Brought on in part by the free flow of finance capital and new inequities of global distribution, nation states, still grounded in some notion of national ethos, are finding their borders disturbed in ever more ways. Provoking a social uncertainty that is spreading globally, people lose clarity and confidence over who they are and where they fit in. As Appadurai notes, such an anxiety of identity is often accompanied by a surplus of rage and identitarian violence—as if killing a Tutsi will confirm, and complete, a Hutu's place in the nation-state.

Violence fueled by an anxiety of incompleteness could be said to characterize the Akihabara killings mentioned earlier: the rampage of a young precariat, Katō Tomohiro who—on June 8, 2007—drove a two-ton truck into a crowded intersection then jumped out and stabbed seven people to death. Occurring in the electronics and *otaku* (fan) district of Akihabara in Tokyo, the act spurred what was a wave of indiscriminate attacks in public spaces that lasted all summer. In this case, Katō was a 25-year-old haken (temporary) worker who, having gone from job to job, thought he had been fired from his current one. Deeply troubled as he admitted on the long trail of postings he left on a phone netsite, Katō wrote of his despair at being a haken worker with no firm attachments (to work, girlfriend, steady co-workers, or parents) that gave him a homebase (ibashō) anywhere. Devoid of the tokens of social status and connectedness, he had come to hate being alive and, as he posted the morning of the killing, "I came to Akihabara because I wanted to kill people. I've come to hate society and am tired of life. Anyone is OK." In the news reportage that followed, Katō was described as working poor, part of Japan's *suberidai shakai*—society where people slide ever downward with no safety net underneath—who, socially alienated, suffer from both loneliness (*kodoku*) and rejection (lack of *shōnin*).

Because of the nature of the violence—public, random, impersonal—the attack was considered to be a terrorist act, and came to be known as the "*Akibaken musabetsu terojiken*" (Akihabara indiscriminate terrorist act).[9] But, equally disturbing, was the profile of the so-called terrorist himself, someone not so dissimilar, in certain ways, from an increasing number of youth: irregularly employed, lonely and disconnected, socially estranged and existentially bereft. If the sociality of the new precariat was getting (dis)assembled like this, it was precarious not only for youth themselves but for the public at large. These were the terms around which

much of what was a voluminous debate over the incident took place. For example, in a 2008 roundtable published in the journal *Rosujiena* (Lost Generation) entitled "Who was the enemy in the Akiba terrorist incident?" participants discussed the role society played in creating a killer like Katō. As many noted (as they did the night of the "Stop Suicide" event I attended at Loft+One), youth of the lost generation feel socially displaced and humiliated, which is a sentiment that makes them uneasy (*fuan*) and dissatisfied (*fuman*). Blame here is often aimed at the state—for not supplying the younger generation with a sense of hope or social belonging (Hage 2003). As cultural critic Kayano Toshihiko put it, "if only we have hope and respect, we can live. But without a secure means of existence, many today have no place or sense of home at all (*ibashō*)" (*Rosujiene* 2008:34). Youth, as he noted, are not only driven to join right-wing associations by the promise of national belonging (something that happened to Amamiya earlier in her career when she joined a right-wing punk band), but are also driven to the kind of despair, and social nihilism, that spirals into violence—either towards themselves (as in wrist-cutting and suicide, both of which are on the rise) or towards others.[10]

Activating for Life: Affecting Social Soul

What can we say about a sociality that more and more people feel excluded from or find to be precarious itself? On this—the relationship between sociality and life under post-Fordist conditions of 21st century Japan/ese—I make three points.

The first is that there is a care deficit in Japan that stems, in part, from the fact that the corporation and family were the de facto welfare institutions under Fordist Japan, Inc. People were taken care of not so much by the state, which provided little welfare as is still true today, but by those groups they labored most intimately for, workplace and family. But with the dissolution of both, a care deficit is spreading across the country (seen in such phenomena as the rise of homelessness, suicide, and "lonely deaths"—what people remark upon as indicators of Japan's "relationless society") that the government—prompted by its neoliberalization and reliance on individual responsibility—defers to privatized care givers. Those unable to pay for such commodified care (or just basic health insurance), are left stranded: stuck alone in their homes—or on the streets—where one hears of more and more deaths due to economic deprivation.

The second point is that there is a contradiction, or disparity, in the way social citizenship is calculated today. On the one hand, flexible labor is increasing and promoted by the government itself. On the other hand, the falling rates of birth and marriage that accompany this are viewed as a national crisis. The government has taken a series of measures since the mid-1990s to aid childraising for married couples. It has also officially announced that the old gender pattern of male breadwinner/female caregiver is outdated, and that a new "life work balance" must be encouraged (Roberts 2005). The message sent here is that having a family of one's own still matters and still constitutes social adulthood (Takeda 2008). And yet the low wages and insecurity of precarious work is a major obstacle in starting, or maintaining, a family. On this, the government is offering very little assistance to its newly heralded flexible labor force. As a result, those who can actually have families/homes tend to be those who land permanent jobs, the numbers of whom are declining. If this is the measure of social citizenship today, then no wonder so many Japanese feel refugeed.

My third point concerns the template for sociality that, even now and for so many, is nostalgically attached to the past—to the kind of ties and identity that came from the family corporate system of Fordist Japan, Inc. Not only is this past over, and its familial model of sociality no longer in sync with current economic times, but the nestling of home within the capital relations of Japan Inc. bore its own problems. Complicit with the dominant power structures of producing a profit, the family-corporate system capitalized on—and insinuated itself within—the affective relations of (heteronormative) homelife. This meant the home became a breeding ground for hyper-productivity in the way of workaholic husbands, industrious students, and sacrificial mothers. Those who couldn't live up to the task often felt rejected in the eyes of not only society but their family as well. Further, so sutured to productivity, families have become ill-equipped in what one young Japanese woman described to me as "education of the heart": being willing and able to communicate affectively with one another. Many Japanese youth feel lonely, she told me, and withdraw into a state akin to that of a hikikomori. However, being at home may not ease their sense of social disbelonging. Indeed, for some at least, home is part of the problem.

A reconstitution or shoring up of the family then—of the "old" kind at least—is not necessarily the solution to precarity of life and what is widely perceived to be a disappearance of social humanity in Japan. Rather, there

needs to be something new that, as Ernst Bloch (1986) wrote about hope, comes from investing not in the past but in the future that, while not-yet-known, has the potential for new kinds of possibilities. Hope, in this sense, must not only capture the soul, but also drive the willingness to wage (socio-economic) reform. This is what José Muñoz (2009), borrowing Bloch's notion of hope (/utopia), advocates for as well. For queers, excluded from a heteronormative polity and assigned to "no future," there is always the need to "desire and imagine another time and place." But Muñoz also goes further. To participate in utopia or hope in the Blochian sense "is not to imagine an isolated future for the individual but instead to participate in a hermeneutic that wishes to describe a collective futurity, a notion of futurity that functions as a historical materialist critique" (2009:26).

Forward-dawning, anticipatory illuminations of a there and then that, while not-yet-known, comes from the refusal to settle for a dissatisfying here and now. This is the notion of hope that makes sense to me. Not as Yamada (2003) defines it: as those Japanese, dwindling in number, who can still manage to realize the Fordist dream of my-homeism. If only these so-called winners have hope today, then Japan, as a country, has truly become a land of refugees. But, if the rubric of futurity and belonging can change—away from privatized (heteronormative) families and corporate (capitalistic) affiliations to a notion of collectivity and life at once more flexible and inclusive—might not hope blossom in new possibilities for an emergent sociality and a queer(er) Japan?

While conducting fieldwork during the summers of 2008 through 2011 (mainly in Tokyo, but also in Nīgata and Osaka), I explored signs of radical hope, queer(ing) home, and reterritorialization of the social. What I sought was whether, in the insecuritization of the moment when something is gnawing at the soul, there is not only a pain of unease (fuan) but also a pulse of dissatisfaction (*fuman*) with the precarity of existence. Indeed, I found people who are suffering. And, fed up with suffering alone (which is part of the pain), there are some who are activating around collectivized forms of survival and care—the soul working out its pain to build new "social zones of human resistance" (Berardi 2009:220) and "extra-economic networks of survival" (2009:219) where the soul can be soulful again. Of course, when citizens assume more responsibility for their own welfare, it relieves the state from doing so. This is what Muehlebach (2011) has noted about a new "culture of voluntarism" emerging in Italy that the state advocates as socially useful, affectively

"moral" labor that goes unremunerated in the way of wages. Meanwhile, the neoliberal state—in Italy and in Japan—retreats ever further in its allocations for social provisions. But, in the "extra-economic networks of survival," I also saw glimmers of something more socially radical: a recalibration of human value, life, and collective belonging away from how these were constituted under the era of Fordist (re)productivity.

What I found ranged from Indie May Day parades (under the banner "freedom and survival"); NPOs like Moyai whose volunteer staff counsel drop-ins on how to find housing and jobs, and fill out welfare forms (even accompanying those who need assistance to the welfare office); and activism around labor unions for irregular workers as well as non-workers (including NEET and hikikomori)[11] to "night patrols" in neighborhoods where volunteers patrolled the streets looking out for stranded elderly to prevent them from dying alone; a community center that trains socially withdrawn youth to assist needy elderly living in an economically depressed neighborhood; and a "time savings" system (with over 30,000 members nationwide) where donors give care-labor and "bank" hours they can withdraw for their own care in the future.[12]

In some sense, all of these were inspired, at least in part, as arenas for the soul to work out its pain in a "social zone of human resistance" (Berardi 2009:220). Resistance here could be simply the resistance against dying; the will—enjoined with others—to keep living. This was certainly the case with the "Stop Suicide" event introduced at the beginning of the essay. But how—on the ground, as a deployment of affects—does this work?

Assembling participants who have attempted or considered suicide (the tōjisha both on stage and in the audience), "Stop Suicide" relied not only on talk but more on what the performers described to me as "*hakidasu*"—throwing up one's emotions. A number of the participants that night were members of a performance group called the *Kowaremono*. Started by Tsukino Kōji (the one enjoining himself/the audience to "not die, not kill, but to live!"), kowaremono literally means broken people and each member—ranging ranging in age from early 20s to mid-40s—identifies as having at least one physical or social disability: alcoholism, cerebral palsy, panic attacks, eating disorders, social withdrawal (hikikomori). Based in Nīgata, the group performs about six times a year, but its members also perform in clusters or individually. When I interviewed four of them in Nīgata later that summer, they introduced themselves to me as "all sick" (*byōki*) and described what they do on stage as a type of performance (*saiten*) that

doubles as public therapy: disgorging (*hakidasu*) the aches/wounds/panics they've suffered in life as a means of psychic and social survival.

> **Tsukino:** I'm an alcoholic and when I want to drink, I close up inside myself and this happens every single day. So, when I joined a no-drinking support group, I share this with them. We laugh, they listen to me, I listen to them. I receive sympathy and can breathe out. I'm alive today because of this. Doing this on stage is fundamentally the same—it's like therapy. Many in the audience have mental problems. So, it's the same thing: talking, listening, laughing, irony.
> **Kacco:** Saiten is performing this on stage. Rather than keeping *iki-zurasa* inside*;* it is a relief to be able to "vomit" (*hakidasu*) it up in front of everyone.
> **Tsukino:** [interjects] It's like being in a room of *chōbyōki* (where everyone is sick—a room of sickos)
> [everyone laughs]
> **Kacco:** Well, everyone talks and receives support from one another.

As they describe it to me, these performances of sharing hardships are personally effective in being socially affective; rather than withdrawing into oneself, they stage a scene of belonging (Berlant 2007, White this issue) by spewing pain in front of, and for, others. As Hannah Arendt (1998) has said, it is the "public realm" of what she calls the "common" that gives us our social flesh. "The presence of others who see what we see and hear what we hear assures us of the reality of the world and ourselves" (1998:50). With the Kowaremono, it is not simply the retching storytelling—that travels the room, picking at scabs—that is critical. Rather, it is the recognition one receives and gives in turn. Rather than succumbing to social exclusion (or death), one makes their very handicaps the very basis for being and belonging in the room.

The "Stop Suicide" events are one manifestation of what I am arguing to be a biopolitics of life from below that engages a sociality of the soul. But other examples come at this quite differently. "My Home" (*Uchi no jika*), for instance, is a drop-in center that labels what it is, and does, a "*fureai ibashō*" (a space to be in contact with others). Here, it is not the trauma of life "disgorged" on stage, but the everydayness of human companionship that gets produced in a space open to all. On its website it states, "In Japan, somehow there are a lot of people who are lonely. We've slipped

into a big darkness (*kurayami*) of loneliness. And, in just an instant, this darkness has transformed Japan." Offering a "light" out of this darkness, Uchi no jika is part of a nationwide movement of "regional living rooms" (*chiiki no chanoma*) with about 200 running today. Chiiki no chanoma borrows on the image (and affect) of the room where tea is served to guests (*chanoma*) in a traditional house in the countryside (*chiiki*). The aim is to refurbish but remake the referent as chiiki no chanoma are intended to be homey but not familial homes. The two I visited, in fact, had been empty homes that were reclaimed for a new kind of collective living (more hanging out to drink tea together than (re)producing the family). Quite pointedly, in fact, there are rules designed to purposely remap the kind of sociality these "living rooms" foster. In "My Space"—the one I visited in Nīgata—these rules were posted on the wall and written on the handout I received immediately upon entering. They included

- When people enter, don't stare or ask "hey, who's that?!"
- There's no clear distinction between those caring and those being cared for
- This is not a *nakama kurabu* (exclusive friendship clique)
- Don't talk about people in their absence
- There's no set program; spend time here as you like

"Uchi no jika"—literally "my home" using the term for natal home—is the name of the regional living room in Nīgata. It was started in 2003 by Kawada Keiko, a vibrant powerhouse who earlier founded a volunteer care-service in Nīgata (called *Magokokoro Herupa*, Heartfelt Helper) when faced with what was the overwhelming chore of tending to her husband's parents all alone.[13] "When nothing exists, start it yourself!" she cheerfully recalled about that venture. Realizing how lonely she found so many of those using "Heartfelt Helper" to be, Kawada then started her local "living room" out of an abandoned house. Essentially a hang-out center that, open every day from 9 am to 3 pm, welcomes any and everyone to just hang out, drink tea, play cards, talk to one another, eat lunch. Entrance is 300 yen ($3.90); lunch, 300 yen; and staying overnight, 2,000 yen ($26). In its 16-mat Japanese-style room, I found about 18 people the day I visited in June 2010—a mix of men and women, mostly middle-aged and elderly, but including a young woman with Down's Syndrome (who was being tended to by those at her table) and another woman in her 20s who

introduced herself as a Chinese migrant who had just settled in the area. The mood was upbeat and everyone seemed to be "lightly passing the time." One retired man in his 60s told me that he came here about three days a week, traveling 30 minutes by bus from his home. A woman in her late 50s related that, though she shared a nice home with her husband close-by, she preferred the atmosphere here and came almost daily.

Another man, possibly 70, recounted the accident that, years ago, had stopped him from working and had rendered him basically useless: a state that confounded his doctors, lawyers, and family alike. Distressed and feeling abandoned, he was told about "My Home" and Kawada who, in his words, brought him back to life again. Calling her his "*kokoro no sensei*" (heart teacher), the man told me how Kawada-san had rescued him by—as she stepped in to finish the story—finding something he could do that would be valued by others (bringing in fresh tofu everyday from his neighborhood). Recognition and acceptance (shōnin): the very hole in human (un)relatedness that agonized Amamiya more than anything as a freeta. And as this man introduced himself later that evening at the once-monthly festive night (where over 70 people crowded into the small space), he did so by pointing out with pride the blue happi coat he was wearing that identified him as the sake vendor he'd once been and wished to reclaim—somehow—again. This is yet another scene of staging belonging. And, in this case, the ghosts of Fordism (identity defined by work) play at the edges of this new format, and possibility, for sociality in post-Fordist Japan.

"My Home" is a constructed and flexible friendship zone. As Berardi notes, borrowing from Deleuze and Guattari, friendship is a way of overcoming depression because "friendship means sharing a sense, sharing a view and a common rhythm: a common refrain (*ritournelle*) in Guattari's parlance" (2009:215). Rather than a community per se (with some sense of fixity), "My Home" is a drop-in center whose potentiality for being and belonging is open, though not without rules. This is a far cry from the principles of hierarchy and differentiation that Nakane Chie (1970)—in her canonical text on Japanese society (*Tate Shakai*, Japanese Society) written at the height of postwar Fordism—outlined as at the core of all "human relations" in Japanese society, including the workplace and family. Hierarchical difference is critical in all relations (teacher/student, senior/junior colleagues), she wrote; indeed, without it, people don't know how to behave towards one another. At "My Home," by contrast, the operative term is not relationship but connectedness (*tsunagari*) which is

post-identitarian and premised on mutuality and care. This is a queer(ing) of homeism where everyone helps each other, shares a common (non) identity, and surges with an invigorating "human energy" (*hito no chikara ni yotte hito wa genki ni narerumono*).[14]

Conclusion

What I have aimed to do in this paper is to track an affective malaise—a sense that time has stopped, growth is stagnated, hope no longer exists, and homeism is degenerating to homelessness—in 21st century post-Fordist Japan/ese. This affect is rooted in real material conditions of shifts in the labor market and destabilization of the socio-economy. But affect is also a "domain of intensity, indeterminancy, and above all potentiality" that "preserves the traces of past actions and encounters and brings them into the present as potentials" (Mazzarella 2009:292). In the ordinary refugeeism of the present, traces of the reproductive futurism of the past are preserved, kindling a desire for an "ordinary life" that frustrates, and excludes, an increasing many. No longer is precarity, insecuritization, or even poverty the purview of the exceptional few; its spread to even college graduates and those who manage to get (then lose) decent jobs means that no one is totally "safe" today. As the number of net café refugees increases, they symptomize the refugeeization of the country itself.

But there is also a potential in this very discomfiture of life in the post-bubble, which is a demand for, or inkling of, change. Changing the terms by which life gets lived (besides the privatization of home and wealth), value gets assessed (outside of capitalism or even work-based productivity), and sociality gets stitched together (beyond family and corporation). The examples I have laid out from "My Home" and the "Stop Suicide" event contain the germs and promise of such a reterritorialization of the social. In my view, temporality and sociality are reconfigured here, away from "my-homeism" to a new "we" and a different kind of "collective futurity" "that functions as a historical materialist critique" (Muñoz 2009:26). It is important to not overly romanticize such initiatives, seeing in them what one wishes to see oneself of social resistance. But it is important as well not to abandon ourselves to (what could simply be) the hopelessness of our times. Where we find it, it behooves us to see—and nurture—the soul on strike. ■

Acknowledgments:

I thank Andrea Muehlebach and Nitzan Shoshan for their productive feedback throughout this process. I also appreciate the two rounds of thoughtful reviews by the two evaluators for *AQ* for this essay; one of whom I know to be David Slater and warmly thank.

Endnotes:

[1]The highest contingency today is men and women between the ages of 45 and 64.

[2]This was the subject of a special news program broadcast by NHK (the National Broadcasting Station) in February 2009.

[3]Actually, precarious employment as work that is informal, irregular, and casual is far more the norm than the exception for most workers in most countries for most of history (Neilson and Rossiter 2008). Today, half of all workers in the world are informally employed (Standing 2010). But "precarity" tends to reference workers in those countries (Japan, US, western Europe) that experience the rise of irregular employment today as a deviation from a period of post-war Fordist capitalism when stable, secure jobs were more standard (at least for core, male workers).

[4]For men, average life expectancy is 79 years and for women, 85.6.

[5]Though, for a counter-view that argues that reports of Japan's failure are far more mythic than real, see Fingleton 2012.

[6]Japan Inc. is the term used to refer to Japan's era of enterprise society, emphasizing the suturing between the nation-state and corporate capitalism, and the collusion between the government and industry.

[7]But impoverished elderly and, now, middle-aged are also on the rise.

[8]I use precariousness and precarity to reference both working poor—those with irregular employment who lack a living wage—and also the spread of insecuritization more generally in Japan today.

[9]For this account, and commentary, on what was called the "*Akihabaramusabetsuterojiken*" (Akihabara indiscriminate terrorist attack), I relied primarily on a special issue of the journal *Rosujiyene* (Lost Generation) (2008).

[10]Steinmetz (1994) has made a similar point about post-Fordist German youths and the appeal of the far right.

[11]Amamiya has written extensively about the Indie parades and activism for freeta, haken, and non-worker, unions that she has been instrumental in organizing (see, for example, *Amamiya Karin no "Seizon kakumei"nikki* (Amamiya Karin's Diary of the "Survival Revolution" 2009). Yuasa has also written extensively about his own activism, conditions of poverty and precarity in Japan, and his NPO Moyai (see, for example, Yuasa 2008).

[12]I participated in the night patrol in Honanchō, Tokyo. The community center pairing hikikomori with elderly is located in the old port neighborhood, Nuttari in Nīgata-shi. Called "*Nuttari yori tokoro*" (Nuttari Place), it is run by *Wakē* shora, a form of NPO called a banshōsha (literally, someone who runs alongside a bicyclist to give support). The "time savings" system (*jikan yotaku seidō*) is NALC (Nippon [Japan] Active Life Club) that was started in Osaka in 1993 and currently has 135 branches nationwide.

[13]A book has been written about Kawada Keiko and her various caregiving efforts. See Yokokawa 2004.

[14]Quotes are taken from handouts I received at Uchi no jika; this information is also repeated on its website (http://www.syakyo-niigatacity.or.jp/community-welfare/civicaction/regularmeeting-02.html).

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Foreign language translations:

Ordinary Refugees: Social Precarity and Soul in 21st Century Japan
Keywords: *Youth, Japan, precarity, home, sociality, hope, politics*

普通の難民： 二十一世紀の日本で社会的に不安定な存在とその精神
キーワード： 若者たち、日本、不安、不安定、居場所、絆、希望、核社会、社会運度

平民中的难民 : 二十一世纪日本的社会不稳定性与大和魂
关键词 : 青年 , 日本 , 不稳定性 , 家 , 社会性 , 希望 , 政治

Обыкновенные беженцы: Социальная необеспеченность и душа в Японии 21 века
Ключевые слова: молодежь, Япония, необеспечанность, дом, социальность, надежда, политика

Refugiados Normais: Precariedade Social e a Alma no Japão do Seculo XXI
Palavras chaves: Juventude, Japão, precariedade, casa, socialidade, esperança, politica

اللاجئون العاديون: التزعزع الاجتماعي والنسمة في يابان القرن الحادي والعشرين
الكلمات الجامعة: الشباب، اليابان، التزعزع، الوطن، الالتآم الاجتماعي، الأمل، السياسة