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**LINKING STATE AND SELF: HOW THE JAPANESE STATE
BUREAUCRATIZES SUBJECTIVITY THROUGH MORAL
EDUCATION**

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I investigate how a discourse (advocating hierarchy, sociopolitical categorization, and standardization) reproduces the rationalizing operations of Japan's politico-economic elite, serving the state by reproducing its ideology through "moral education" at local sites (schools). In Japan, state bureaucratic structures try to build a psychology that hierarchizes, categorizes, and formalizes the sociopolitical environment, thereby supporting an economic rationality demanded by economic nationalism. After describing the sociopolitical context of Japan's statist economic-nationalist ideology that drives a bureaucratizing discourse, I analyze a collection of teacher's guidebooks published by the Ministry of Education as my primary target of discourse analysis. I show how the state turns its objectives into subjective truths, or more specifically, how convictions in elite economic interests are reproduced through a discourse that is often explained as "traditional" or somehow "natural" to "being Japanese."

Keywords: moral education; state; Japan; national identity; ritualization

Introduction: Linking State and Subjectivity

A set of conceptual markers has provided intellectual direction for many Japanese and Japanologists alike. Taken together, these markers form a discourse that constructs national-identity. This discourse expresses (1) hierarchy: "vertical society" (tate shakai) and "senior/junior relations" (sempai/kôhai); (2) sociopolitical categorization: "groupism," (uchi/soto, inner/outer; ura/omote, back, hidden/front, exposed; and honne/tatemae, true opinion/stated policy); and (3) sociopolitical standardization: "cultural homogeneity," "consensus," and "harmony." (n1) These concepts, which define and reproduce class, age, gender, and nationality divisions, operate in families, schools, workplaces, and political institutions. Many Japanese regard these notions as comprising an essential Japanese identity that is part of a vague but immutable "tradition," or as rooted in the past: Tokugawa feudalism, Confucianism, an agricultural past, or Japan's history as an "island country." (n2) These culturalist mythologies and the aforementioned terms pervade accounts of Japanese society and are often employed by elites (and non-elites) to legitimate power arrangements, thereby ignoring existing political and socioeconomic structures that produce them. The result has been an Orientalist account of Japan by non-Japanese, and a self-Orientalizing project by some Japanese of their own society.

In this article I describe how the authorities try to reproduce these values (hierarchy, social categorization, and standardization) in schools through a state-sanctioned discourse and ritual practices. I will make my argument by viewing the aforementioned notions as the conceptual footmen of Japan's economic nationalism (and not as culturalist mythologies). To do this, I first provide the sociopolitical context by describing the statist economic-nationalist ideology that drives

a bureaucratizing discourse emanating from Japan's Ministry of Education (Monbushô). This discourse reflects the rationalizing operations of Japan's politico-economic elite, serving the state by reproducing ideology via socialization at local sites (schools).^(n3) Then, using a collection of teacher guidebooks published by the Monbushô as my primary target of analysis, I show how the state turns its objectives into subjective truths by rituals.^(n4) I show, that is, how convictions in elite economic interests are reproduced through a discourse that is often disguised as "traditional" or somehow "natural" to "being Japanese." In Japan, state bureaucratic structures try to build a psychology that hierarchizes, categorizes, and formalizes the sociopolitical environment, thereby supporting a belief in the rationality and efficiency demanded by economic nationalism. Bureaucratizing subjectivity for nation-statist goals is certainly not unique to Japan and is found in many places to varying degrees, but the point of this article is to describe how it is accomplished in Japan. I illustrate how schools in one society do what they do and avoid the danger of viewing "schools as black boxes simply reflecting or wholly determined by the economic forces outside of them" (Apple 1978: 496). Apple notes the problem of the "black box" approach:

One measures input before students enter schools and then measures output along the way or when "adults" enter the labor force. What actually goes on within the black box -- what is taught, the concrete experience of children and teachers -- is less important in this view than the more global and macro-economic considerations of rate of return on investment, or, more radically, the reproduction of the division of labor (1979: 26; see also Apple 1982b, 1982c, 1982d).

Moreover, my focus on moral education as a body of normative knowledge linking state interests and individual subjectivities allows an understanding (as limited as it may be in this short article) of the unspoken role of "invisible ideologies" (McVeigh 1998), that is, we must look not only at ideologies "about" education but also at ideologies "in" it (Finn et al. 1978: 3-4, cited in Apple 1982a: 249).

This article tries to connect the macro (state) and micro (individual subjectivity) levels, tracing the linkages between ideology and intention, institutions and individuals.^(n5) In the broadest theoretical sense, this article follows the work of Elias (1978; 1982; 1983), who recognized an indissoluble link between state-formation and individual socialization. Though Elias was concerned with state-formation through history, I am more concerned with "state-maintenance" on a daily basis. In this sense, the works of Bourdieu (1977; 1990) and Foucault (1979) also inform my approach, which views power structures (in this case, educational institutions) as encoding themselves on bodies through disciplinary practices. This article pursues a cultural psychological approach: how culture (that is, information about social structures, political relations, and economic interests) contours a psychology that in turn reproduces culture (though never perfectly).^(n6)

Anthropology is no stranger to the study of the state, but its analysis has been for the most part within a grand historical, evolutionary framework that loosely employs the concept of the "state." Though there are anthropological works that deal specifically with the state as a non-

archaeological object of study (for example, Fallers 1974), most anthropological works that do acknowledge the state regard it as a distant, almost transcendent entity whose actual structures and multifaceted connections to society are left indistinct. Anthropological works that deal with the state, though in a somewhat abstract manner, are far too numerous to be cited here.(n7)

Here, I define the state as a nonkin-based political system with centralized bureaucratic institutions that has power and authority over large populations living within clearly defined territorial boundaries. However, the state is not merely an external organization; it is also an internally organized type of subjectivity; that is, the state cannot exist unless its subject/citizens have been socialized to support it (more or less; there is always room for some resistance).

The very methods of anthropology, which are close, concrete, immediate, personal, local, even participatory -- might to seem to preclude an anthropology of the state, because the state is usually regarded as distant, abstract, diffuse, impersonal, translocal, and unapproachable. However, locales should not be considered as "self-sufficient isolates" that are disconnected from larger socioeconomic systems (cf. Fallers 1974:11). And, for purposes of this article, individual subjectivities should not be considered as "psychological shells" unaffected by larger socioeconomic systems. Locales and selves are not merely embedded in states; they are constructed and permeated by the sociopolitical agendas of states.

The argument in this article is inspired by my own teaching experiences in Japan's higher education system. I taught full-time at a women's junior college (1992-94) and at another women's junior college on a part-time basis (1989-91). Since 1994 I have worked full-time at a university and its affiliated women's junior college, and since 1995 I have concurrently worked part-time at another university. Other experiences in Japan's educational system include seven months teaching at a senior high school and as an assistant instructor at a university (1990-91). Though I do not specifically treat Japan's higher education system in this article, my experiences with the "finished product" (in a manner of speaking) of Japan's educational system have provided me with a familiarity about how a certain type of subjectivity is produced by state-sanctioned educational structures and practices.

The Japanese State and Its Education for Defense

Slogans such as "catching up and surpassing the West" and "rich nation, strong army" have reflected Japan's drive toward modernization. Such sentiments were motivated by a keen sense of patriotism and pride and insecurity triggered by Western imperialism of the late nineteenth century.(n8) Moreover, a general perception that Japan is a poor country surrounded by enemies has fueled this insecurity. General insecurity and cultural pride were the ingredients of what has become known as the "capitalist developmental state." Thus, to survive in a hostile world, Japanese have been taught that they must diligently develop, improve, and promote its industries, and advance its economic interests abroad. In order to accomplish its economic nationalist projects, Japan has carefully cultivated its human resources. Social cooperation, collaboration,

and coordination -- at least ideally -- have been and still are the order of the day. Indeed, the educational counterpart of "developmental orientation" -- Johnson's (1982) term to highlight Japan's politico-economic philosophy as opposed to the American model of "regulatory orientation" -- may be called an "education of cultivation." Developmental orientation assumes that the state is more involved in the market, concerning itself with plans, goals, and specific outcomes. But regulatory orientation assumes that the state's laissez-faire approach to the market is ideally impartial and concerned with procedural matters (Johnson 1982: 18-19). In the pedagogic sphere, developmental orientation drives the ideology-instilling educational institutions that are charged with reproducing the beliefs necessary to run Japan's economy. An education of cultivation is an academics of inducement, designed to motivate and exhort students to learn. The teacher's role is to bring about learning by supplying knowledge. The state's role is activist, and assumes that it has a stake in the "what" of learning. In other words, the state is granted the right and responsibility of furnishing the necessary knowledge, morals, and civility for a modern, highly rationalized, and successfully industrialized nation-state.(n9) Education is the foot soldier of an economics of defense.

The Ideology of Strategic Schooling

Monbushô officials are charged with the task of guiding, managing, and promoting education, moral development, cultural activities, scientific progress, and even religious matters. Like officials in the other ministries of Japan, theirs is an activist, goal-oriented mission. Attention to the bureaucratic language of Monbushô officials furnishes a sense of how they view their calling. The most common word encountered in official discourse is "guidance" (shidô) though it often denotes more of a sense of actively directing or strongly persuading others. Shidô is part of the term used by all ministries in the term "administrative guidance." Other favorite words of the Monbushô are: shinkô suru, to promote, encourage, and suishin suru, to drive forward, promote; kanri suru, to manage, control; kantoku suru, to direct; sôgô, comprehensive, all-round; tôteisu suru, standardize, make uniform; and ichigenteki, unified, centralized. The constant use of these terms suggests a state trying to be thoroughly involved in society.

The Japanese state's profound involvement in educational affairs is not just an institutional remnant from Japan's ultra-nationalistic and militaristic period. The bureaucratic elite's concern for guiding education has much deeper roots, and is part of a fundamental political philosophy about the role of the state in individual intellectual and moral development that is visible from the beginning of modern Japan's history as a nation-state until the present. Japan's approach to education may be viewed as one of "strategic schooling." This expression is inspired by Huber's (1994) "strategic economy," which views the state as in league with elite economic interests, integrating, building hierarchies, and in general ordering the relations between different governmental organs and commercial enterprises. Below I examine some key elements of this more or less implicit philosophy underpinning Japan's strategic schooling:

(1) In order to achieve its goals and maintain national defense through economic power, the state

regards a well educated, socialized, and trained citizenry as indispensable. For this reason, education is subsidiary to national defense.

(2) Thus, the state has the prerogative to set standards, control curriculum, and oversee the administration of educational matters. Furthermore, the state's interest in education, being basically a mobilization of minds, is comprehensive and subsumes morality, health, physical education, religion, culture, and other matters deemed ideological.

(3) Whether by prewar "imperial decree" or postwar "democratic processes," the state has ensured that some type of legitimacy has accompanied the development of its educational structures. The state, in order to legitimate its educational plans, practices, and procedures, has sanctioned its policies using imperial orders, cabinet orders, notifications, regulations, instructions, announcements, tentative plans, and laws enacted by the Diet. Advisory councils (shingikai), panels of policy experts that are attached to ministries or other governmental offices, are also used to furnish (or at least the semblance of) popular involvement and input.

(4) The educational experience has two focuses. First, it provides knowledge that meets the demands of economic rationalization (that is, math, natural sciences, and Japanese for reading and writing). Other subjects, such as history, foreign languages, and social studies, appear to be of secondary importance. Second, the educational experience instills the proper social values and attitudes necessary for an industrious and gendered (and according to its critics a relatively obedient and apolitical) work force. Socializing students to believe in Japan's cultural uniqueness (vertical society, groupism, and homogeneity) explains, excuses, and legitimates any distressing sociopolitical conditions (hierarchy, categorization, and standardization), and diverts critical attention away from the political decisions that produce these conditions (bureaucratically-guided rationalization). Of course, the state cannot effect perfect socialization, thus reproduction of its structures is always incomplete. But generally speaking, subject/citizens, regardless of their complaints and criticisms of excessive state involvement, do execute the daily and occupational practices deemed essential by the state.

The Institutions of Strategic Schooling

With Japan's state-centered educational philosophy as background, the institutional arrangements of this philosophy can now be delineated. I view the Monbushô as forming the apex of a nationwide organization with three levels corresponding to Huber's (1994) analysis of the economic bureaucracies as structured into three levels for maximum efficiency: (1) strategic; (2) mediating; and (3) tactical. Japan's educational system parallels its economic structures because it shares the basic goal of the latter: economic nationalism. In order to achieve this goal, the educational system is geared toward the most efficient production of workers for Japan's economic defense.

The first, or strategic, level, is composed of the Monbushô's Secretariat and advisory councils,

especially the Central Council of Education. The policies of these organs are, in the most general terms, shaped by economic nationalism, but more specifically, particular business interests and ideological pressures emanating from the Diet. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has played a significant role in shaping educational policy since 1955 when it was formed. Its "education clique," the unofficial group of LDP Diet members interested in educational policy, has pushed a nationalist agenda, arguing that some Occupation-era educational reforms need to be undone because they hinder the acquisition of "Japaneseness" by students. These Diet politicians have also ensured that economic interests have shaped educational policy. More official than the education clique are the LDP's two education committees: the Education System Research Council, which has examined education-related issues from a long-range perspective since 1955, and the Education Division, which has dealt with all legislation originating in the Monbushô and going to the Diet Education Committee. Leading business organizations -- such as the Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren), the Japanese Federation of Employers' Associations, the Japanese Committee for Economic Development, and the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry -- have also made certain that educational policy follows economic interests (cf. Kakinuma 1992). Members of these prestigious organizations sit on Monbushô advisory councils, as do individuals from other sectors of the *zaikai* (financial world) (cf. Schoppa 1991: 120-148).

The second, or the mediating, level of implementation, is composed of ministerial bureaus, their divisions, prefectural and municipal boards of education (3,471 prefectural and municipal boards), special juridical corporations, and authorized juridical persons. The mediating level of implementation is what makes the fairly uniform and nation-wide educating, socializing, and training of students possible. This level receives "guidance, advice, and assistance" from the Monbushô. These words appear in official discourse so constantly that they form a sort of bureaucratic litany and are the three most commonly encountered terms. What is notable about the way these words are used is that they inevitably describe administrative processes moving top-down (hierarchy), never from the bottom-up.

The strategic instructions passing through the second level are then transmitted to the third, or tactical level, which is composed of the thousands of schools, educational personnel, and students administered and monitored by the Monbushô. Under the direction of the boards of education are the thousands of ground-level units -- the individual schools. Superintendents of the prefectural boards of education stand over school principals. Though principals, ideally at least, should be leaders of the teachers and represent the school, in actuality they serve a personnel administrative function of the authorities. Within each of these units disciplinary practices, organizational structure, and administrative control vary to some degree in accordance with local conditions and pressures. The sheer administrative weight of the state educational apparatus, its several layers bearing down on each school, shapes an educational atmosphere that is orderly, efficient, spartan, and largely successful in its aims. Consequently, "Japanese schools teach a buttoned-down sense of time and space not unlike what one finds in the military" (Rohlen 1983: 316). Such an environment fosters ritualized hierarchies between teachers/students and

senior/junior students (sempai/kôhai relations). The school is considered primarily a moralizing and socializing organization, and secondarily a teaching institution. As in other societies, schools "seem to be less concerned with the distribution of skills than they are with the distribution of norms and dispositions which are suitable to one's place in a hierarchical society" (Apple 1979: 19).

Moral Education

The word *dôtoku* (moral) literally means the "way" (*dô*) to "virtue" (*toku*). The Monbushô mandates that all students in primary (grades 1-6) and junior high schools (grades 7-9) receive 35 class hours of moral education every year. Westerners often equate morality with a religiously inflected inner voice. But in Japan, *dôtoku* has a more secular flavor, with an accent on how best to interact with others in a group setting rather than on individual conscience. It is associated with etiquette, concrete and observable actions, and the actual methods that shape moral beings, expressed in the word *shitsuke* (training, breeding, discipline) (cf. Hendry 1986). That moral training is regarded as a central component of the good citizen is evident in the Fundamental Law of Education, in which the "completion of character" is enshrined. Indeed, the great significance attached to moral education is evident in how it is explained that it should be the cornerstone on which all educational activities rest. Thus, moral education, at least in primary schools, is one of the three main functions of a school, the other two being regular classes and special activities (SGTH: 5).

Moral education offers a discourse that the average Japanese finds understandable, acceptable, and desirable. Most Japanese accept that some form of instruction in moral matters is necessary, and there is no shortage of teaching materials, guidebooks, and academic works on this topic. However, the content, goals, and methods of moral instruction are disputed. Indeed, the postwar contention between the Monbushô and the Japan Teachers' Union over moral education reflects its highly contested nature. The former views moral education as a humanistic endeavor designed to foster good citizenship, while the latter has often associated it with a return to prewar nationalistic indoctrination.

Though teachers and local governments choose privately published texts for moral education classes, these must be authorized by the Monbushô. Teachers supplement their moral education classes with educational television programs, videos, students' essays, exemplary biographies, literary writings, classics, and class discussions. Officially, the government lacks the authority to advocate a particular morality. Materials used in moral education that concern political or religious matters should be impartial (SGDK: 68). The Monbushô, however, does publish a list of guidebooks on teaching methods that if carefully examined, does espouse an ethnomorality. It also recommends its own series of texts that consist of readings (DK 1, DK 2, DK3, DKS 1, DKS 2, DKS 3). These materials assert that moral education is necessary and its purpose is to teach students "how human relations should be," to "perfect human nature," or "the goodness of human nature," and "the formation of character," so that one becomes a *ningen-rashî ningen* (a humane person). Moral education, as "the formation of character," is a form of self-cultivation, and as such

it is a lifetime endeavor. In the next sections I provide examples of how the Japanese state's project of economic nationalism deploys a discourse of hierarchy, sociopolitical categorization, and sociopolitical standardization at schools.

The Discourse of Moral Education

Hierarchy

The effects of the state's pursuit of economic nationalism are visible in the classroom. Strategic education produces top-down, hierarchical organizational patterns that structure schools. Memorization and test-taking take precedence over critical discussion, asking questions, and analytic writing projects.

The dynamics of hierarchy are apparent in the word *sunao*, usually translated as "obedience," but this carries a heavier semantic load than the English word "obedient," since it is employed toward both children and adults and may mean submissive, gentle, meek, receptive, tractable, compliant, and cooperative. In a pedagogical context, White writes that this word is used to describe the "good child" and has connotations of open-mindedness, non-resistance, truthfulness, naïveté, naturalness, simplicity, mildness, and straightforwardness. It strongly implies active cooperation and engagement in group activities (1987: 28). It also strongly implies positive acceptance of what one is told. Being obedient points to and reinforces another important value: respecting those above one, or the idea of "occupying one's proper place" (Lebra 1976: 67-68; Fuller et al. 1986: 189). Consequently, obedience supports hierarchy, as in *sempai/kôhai* (senior/junior) and *sensei/seito* (master/student) relationships.

Notions of hierarchy are apparent in the uses of guidance (*shidô*), a term already introduced. *Shidô* may be translated as leadership, instruction, or coaching. In the moral education discourse, this is by far the most ubiquitous word, with many guidebooks having *shidô* in their titles. Indeed, guidance seems to capture the spirit of how the state's educational institutions should relate to their charges: as parental authorities at the apex of the political system, they should guide students along the correct path. LeTendre notes that "There was no debate over whether students should be guided to a set of beliefs, only which beliefs to inculcate and how much autonomy the teacher should have in determining these beliefs" (1994: 45, emphasis in original).

In order to ensure that the socializing goals are being met, vigilance over student behavior and appearance is an important theme in the guidebooks. Students should have their "actual condition" investigated through measuring their attitudes. Specifically, reports of daily life, description of impressions, questionnaires about school events, and journals kept by students in charge of school activities or chores, should all be monitored (SGD: 38). Rules about uniforms, hair length and style, posture, and positioning of the body should be carefully observed. In particular, sociolinguistic practices (*aisatsu*) receive a considerable amount of attention.

Like students, teachers themselves require "constant evaluation" by senior school authorities, as

a section called "What Should Be Done in Planning to Improve Guidance, Motivation, and Understanding of the Teacher's Role in Moral Education?" explains (CGD: 21). Another guidebook advises that in performing their duties, teachers should "steadily carry out the flow of planning, execution, and evaluation," with each stage of teaching carefully examined (SGD: 15).

Vis-à-vis students, teachers should have students "internalize" "the ability to make moral judgments," a "moral attitude," and a "moral consciousness." They should make efforts in training, recognize their position's responsibility, set themselves up as models, and respond to the citizens' expectations as public servants (CGD: 4). They have an active role to perform toward the students. The use of causative verb endings indicate this meaning: teachers should "cause [students] to acquire [morals]" (*mi ni tsukesaseru*); "cause to consider" (*kangesaseru*); "cause to understand" (*rikai saseru*); "cause to be aware of" (*kizukasaseru*); "cause to be conscious of" (*jikaku saseru*); and "cause [students] to evaluate themselves" (*jiko hyōka saseru*).

Sociopolitical Categorization

As for students, the homeroom is the key organizing unit. Each student is also a member of a grade (*gakunen*) and a class (*kumi*). In other words, students are organized so that in addition to being in a grade, a student belongs to a group that cuts vertically through different grades, further integrating a student into a school's group life. Student governments add to the well-organized, regulated atmosphere of school life. "Every aspect of the students' lives -- from the milk they drink to the clothes they wear -- is supervised and managed by some committee or section," and

For each teacher section, there is usually a corresponding student committee, and students are assigned specific tasks, such as delivering the kerosene to the art room in winter. Moreover, senior students are expected to instruct junior students in the correct way to carry out their tasks (LeTendre 1994: 53).

Students and teachers also spend a considerable amount of time on club activities, which are regarded as indispensable for socializing students. In these clubs students acquire an understanding of the significance of senior/junior relations.

Learning to privilege the group begins in school (whether it be family, workplace, or state) (cf. Hendry 1986; Peak 1991: 173-186; Fuller et al. 1986: 181; Lewis 1984, 1989, 1995). Students should acquire "love of one's school" and "local patriotism." Terms such as "group living," "mutual understanding" [among group members], and "cooperation" are used liberally throughout the guidebooks (cf. Lewis 1984, 1995; Fuller et al. 1986: 181). Students are admonished-to "respect the rules of the group" and to acquire an "awareness as a member of a group." Belongingness is emotionally reinforced through "feelings of belonging" and "feelings of unity," and teachers are advised to establish a "school tradition and spirit" (SGDK: 19). Belongingness strengthens the social boundaries between "inner" (*uchi*) and "outer" (*soto*) and the entailing concepts of "hidden" (*ura*) and "exposed" (*omote*). These boundaries are erected and maintained by *tatema*, which "refers to motives or intentions that are socially-tuned" and "shaped, encouraged, or suppressed

by majority norms" (Honma and Hoffer 1986: 94). Among their peers, students should learn "feelings of solidarity," thereby reinforcing belongingness. They should also develop "feelings of familiarity" [toward teachers]. Also, "it is important to make efforts to create a desirable atmosphere so that school and classes, as groups, come to have a sense of unity" (SGD: 81). After all, students are able to learn "unconsciously" from their surroundings (SGDK: 30). This is why "it is said that a good school atmosphere (kôfû) fosters good students. History and tradition, sweat and tears, joy and sorrow, and the desires and thoughts of people accumulate so that a school atmosphere is fomented, and students are influenced by all of these" (CG: 86).

Rohlen points out that in Japanese schools "[n]either ideology nor law is emphasized as the foundation of social order or meaning"; instead, "[m]orality is based on a consciousness of social relations, an awareness of being interdependent" (1983: 256). Indeed, the culture of Japanese schools encourages an array of small "societies" that students join voluntarily or are assigned. Examples of the former are clubs, special event committees, and cliques. Examples of the latter are grade level and "homerooms," in which students take the same classes together. Being a member of one of these small societies demands loyalty. One becomes a member in one club and does not ordinarily join other clubs. Belongingness comes about through active participation in groups, which "is assumed to be natural, healthy, and proper. Nonparticipation, it is assumed, is accompanied by loss of self-confidence and self-worth" (p. 203), and the whole point of participating in school events is to learn how to cooperate in large groups.

As for acquiring respect for more inclusive collectivities beyond family, students in the third grade should have their awareness of "being a member" of a local community fostered, and develop an attitude that regards their local community as important. In the fourth grade they should learn to hope for "the development of their local community" and consider the life of the local community from a broad view. In the fifth grade students should have an interest in the industrial development of Japan and encouraged to acquire "love for their nation." By the sixth grade students should have feelings that give importance to their nation's history and tradition and have a sense of responsibility and awareness as Japanese in the world cultivated (SGSH: 8).

Though the guidebooks do mention the importance of "patriotism" (aikokushin), public concerns about a return to prewar nationalism appear to mitigate too much attention to this topic. However, though postwar sentiments about Japanese nationality have been officially shorn of their prewar excesses, students are still socialized to possess a cultural nationality. Indeed, morality and nationality are all intimately linked. "Social ethics is grounded ultimately in something greater than the individual. It is not religion, but national tradition" (Rohlen 1983: 264). Several guidebooks mention, using the same phrases over and over again, the need for students to become "Japanese who have a sense of identity." It is explained that "Japanese who live in an international society" must have their understanding of "Japan's culture and tradition" strengthened. Specifically, students should learn about how their identity is rooted in the distant past. For example, students should study the "ancient Japanese imperial court" and how it unified the country, how the life of ancestors is related to their present life, and how they should value cultural

assets and heritage. Also, teachers are advised to have students "notice that our nation has a different culture" (SGSH: 74), and "it is necessary to have them consider the importance of making foreigners understand Japanese culture" (SGSH: 75). Another way in which cultural national identity may be constructed in the schools is through learning kokugo (national language; Japanese"), which is mandatory during primary (six years) and junior high (three years) school. For students who proceed to senior high school (three years), more advanced classes in Japanese are required.

Japan's national flag (Hinomaru) and anthem (Kimigayo) -- controversial symbols because of their militaristic associations -- have crept back into official guidance. In the most recent guidebooks they are discussed in a context of "international understanding" and "world peace." It is explained that in order to respect the flags and anthems of other nations, Japanese must "respect" their own flag and anthem and "understand their significance" (SGSH: 81-83). One guidebook, apparently to answer concerns that Japan's national flag and anthem lack a legal basis, points out that "[i]n our country the Hinomaru is the national flag and the Kimigayo is the national anthem. Being recognized by the people as customary for a long time, our country's national flag and anthem have widely taken root" (pp. 81-83). The anthem, after all, is a song "filled with the desire to see our country prosper." The flag and anthem are linked to the Emperor and the Constitution (SGSH: 81-3), and students should deepen their "understanding, respect, and affection" for the emperor (pp. 80-81).

As if to stress the theme of unity and togetherness, compound verbs -- composed of a main verb stem plus the verb *au* (bring together) -- appear throughout the guidebooks. These verbs include *kyôryoku shiau* (cooperate together), *fureau* (come in contact with), *shiau* (do together), *mitomeau* (see another's point of view); *wakariau* (understand together), *hanashiau* (consult with), *hagemashiau* (encourage one another), *manabiau* (learn together), *yomiau* (read together), *tasukeau* (help each other), *rikai shiau* (understand together), *renraku shiau* (contact each other), *toiau* (ask together), *dashiau* (contribute together), *mia* (exchange views), *kakawariau* (to be related with), *itawariau* (take care of each other), *hibikiau* (reverberate together), and *tsutaeau* (communicate to each other).

The guidebooks are filled with words such as "to endeavor," "to exert," and "to be diligent. Students should acquire the perseverance and mental stamina needed to prepare for the rigors of examinations. But persevering is also a value that connects one to others: one should exert oneself for the group (school grade, homeroom, club), and thereby strengthen belongingness. "To be patient" (*shimbô suru*), "persevere" (*gambaru*) (cf. Singleton 1993; Fuller et al. 1986: 181), and "endure" (*gaman suru*, *shinobu*), in fact, are cultural desirables in themselves. They are often heard outside of educational settings, such as when cheering somebody on (*gambatte*; usually glossed as "good luck" but literally meaning to "hang in there"). Also, displaying an engaging, enthusiastic attitude (Peak 1991: 86) --by being "cheerful" (*akarui*, *yôki*) and acting "positively" -- is highly desired because it signals one's heartfelt acceptance of the group or displays one's devotion to the task at hand. It is also a way of symbolizing obedience (*sunao*) to one's superiors

(hierarchy).

Sociopolitical Standardization

Standardization, as an aspect of rationalization, is visible in how morality should be taught as one part of a "total education." Thus, teachers are repeatedly advised to design and think in terms of "total plans" and how to "organically integrate" moral education into the curriculum. All teachers should keep their colleagues and superiors informed of their teaching plans, and there is a concern for "uniform" planning. CG and SGDK are replete with organizational diagrams, flow charts, calendars, sample schedules, and "guidance plan forms" that record if students are acquiring the targeted values. There seems to be a sense that moral instruction can somehow be mechanically engineered into students' heads. This concern for details and planning appears to be an attempt to organize and regulate every aspect of teacher-student interaction, so that methods themselves carry totalizing messages about the role of teachers. Not surprisingly, notions of "harmony," "consensus," "homogeneity," and a version of "equality" synonymous with "sameness" come to permeate educational practices among students.

The strategic tone that Japan's educational bureaucracy produces is illustrated by the earnest and urgent feel to the discourse about how educational practices should be executed. The guidebooks are replete with terms such as "planning" (*keikaku suru, hakaru*), "improvement" [of teaching methods], "how to move forward with training," and the need to "promote" and make moral instruction "effective." Moral education should be "deliberate" and "developmental."

The guidebooks repeatedly state that moral education should be taught not just in regular moral education classes, but should be present in other classes and permeate all school activities. Moral values, in a phrase that occurs throughout SGDK and CG, should "supplement, deepen, and be integrated" (*hojû, shinka, tōgō suru*) into all school activities. For example, teachers are advised to "clearly point out those instances when special activities possess moral education" (CGD: 29). Special activities, whose importance are clear in publications such as SGTH, may be grade activities, group activities, club activities, and school events, and are needed to foster desirable human relations, to form basic living habits, and an attitude that is careful about healthy and safety. They are also needed to deepen one's awareness as a member of a group, the significance of being Japanese, and to foster a spirit of public service (SGTH: 2).

Even simple events should be afforded great significance. For instance, one guidebook discusses in detail the role of cleaning activities for socializing students. Through "experiencing the guidance of cleaning activities" students learn how the most mundane practices carry moral messages (SGD: 84-85). Moreover, any guidance provided by teachers to students should be based on moral principles. Schools should be regarded as total institutions where morality is to be cultivated in all curricular and extracurricular activities. In math, Japanese language, physical education, and other classes, and in matters related to health, safety, the school cafeteria, use of the library, and periods before and after vacations, moral guidance should be given: "the role that moral education plays in school subjects is wide-ranging. It educates children rich in a humanism that possesses

a harmony of intellect, morals, and the body" (SGD: 6).

Another aspect of standardization concerns the habitualization of morality. To ensure that morality becomes a "way of living," it is necessary to "habitualize" (*shūkanka suru*) and have students constantly "repeat" morally-charged practices. As one guidebook explains it, "Until basic behavioral patterns reach the point of becoming unconscious and fixated, repetition is necessary" (SGD: 80). Peak, in fact, notes the ubiquity of the phrase "basic habits of daily life" in materials for preschoolers (1991: 65). Daily routines (eating habits, proper speech, personal hygiene, being punctual) are taught early and considered vital to character development because it is recognized that managing the body teaches a host of norms (for example, *uchi/soto* and *ura/omote* distinctions, proper sociolinguistic behavior [*aisatsu*]).

This focus on seemingly insignificant actions resonates with what Bourdieu calls *habitus*, "which designates a way of being, a habitual state (especially of the body) and, in particular, predisposition, tendency, propensity, or inclination" (1977: 214). Acquiring habits often constitutes accepting, or at least apprehending, an ideology:

The whole trick of pedagogic reason lies precisely in the way it extorts the essential while seeming to demand the insignificant: in obtaining the respect for form and forms of respect which constitute the most visible and at the same time the best-hidden (because most "natural") manifestation of submission to the established order (Bourdieu 1977: 94-95).

Conclusion

I conclude with four points. The first concerns how the sociopolitical processes of rationalization (hierarchization, categorization, and standardization) are clearly visible in the Japanese predilection to ritualize and segregate experience within education settings, and arguably, within other social spheres (cf. McVeigh 1994). Consider the importance given school functions. Japanese schools, as microcosms of Japanese society, reflect a concern for establishing a highly predictable rhythm of rites that clearly demarcates spatiotemporal boundaries, assigns everybody a role, and provides a general sense of order. Some major ceremonies include the Entrance Ceremony, Opening Ceremony, Club Guidance, Homeroom Home Visit, Student Committee Activities, Field Trips, School Trip, Cleaning, Closing Ceremony, Athletic Meet, School Culture Festival, Graduating Students Farewell Party, and Graduation. Besides the major ceremonies, there are a host of other events that are ritualized and pressed into sociopolitical service, such as Commencement of Work, Finishing of Work, Completion of Work, Rotation of Posts, Morning Meetings, and activities related to the commemoration of the school's establishment. The names of many of these are suffixed with *shiki* (ceremony) thereby indicating their ritualizing function. There are other more minor but more ubiquitous rituals and routines that carry moral messages, such as practices associated with lunch time, cleaning, and arriving at and leaving school, greetings (*aisatsu*), teacher-student interactions, and donning uniforms.

Japanese pedagogical thought possesses a theory of why ritual is so important (cf. "School Events" in SGTH, pp. 52-57). Ceremonies and school events "are moving group activities that possess educational value which cannot be easily obtained in regular classes." Such activities "provide order and change to school life" and can "develop healthy children's minds and bodies," Because "school life can become monotonous, during every year, semester, and month, plan events that segment and provide rhythm to children's life, making for a more lively life." Ceremonies are educational activities which "aim to develop and comprehensively demonstrate everyday learning and experiences that are found in grade activities, group activities, and club activities." They are important because they deepen a "sense of unity" and "belonging," foster responsibility, cooperation, discipline, and allow students to experience the joys and sorrows of the group together. Thus, it is necessary to have the students "participate in a positive manner in the events" (SGTH: 52-57). A "desire to participate" in ceremonies is made visible through Control of the body. Thus, students are told to keep their hands on their laps, to sit still, not to talk, not to turn their heads, and to make a serious face.

This great concern for predictability, control, and order is also evident in preparing for school functions. Such concerns teach rationality. Rohlen notes that planning and rehearsals are just as important as the events themselves, and that "remarkable to me was the degree of detailed preparations that teachers insisted on for events that Americans would see as largely casual and spontaneous" (1983: 165). This makes sense, because "[p]recision in school-wide events is another sign of a school's moral state" (p. 201). However, "[i]t is important to appreciate that orderliness in a Japanese school does not evoke some authoritarian image in the eyes of most, but rather is pleasant evidence of benevolence, high morale, and successful instruction" (p. 201).

Preparation, precision, and predictability are aspects of ritualization, which socializes students to perceive reality as composed of discrete units of experience and to break the social world down into well-bounded groups, clearly circumscribed scenes, and neatly defined situations. These express the norms of uchi/soto, ura/omote, and kejime (discrimination). What is significant about this ritualizing is that the form -- of school functions, events, and daily practices -- is just as significant as the content. Hidden messages of morality -- as a code that ritualizes, hierarchizes, organizes, and demarcates the social world -- are embedded in the method. The way and how, not just the what of events, impart knowledge about cultural desirables.

Rohlen writes that Japanese high schools

are best understood as shaping generations of disciplined workers for a technomeritocratic system that requires highly socialized individuals capable of performing reliably in a rigorous, hierarchical, and finely tuned organizational environment (p. 209).

This is true in other industrialized societies, though the designers of Japan's educational system seem particularly concerned with turning out students who acquire the skills necessary for a highly rationalized social environment. If students come to believe in the inherent goodness and

commonsensical nature of hierarchy, in-group/out-group distinctions, and the value of general orderliness, then daily routines become the training necessary for technocratic employment (cf. Apple 1979: 123-153). Through a discourse about morals, key links are formed between character and economic nationalism, individual subjectivity and State interests.

The second point concerns how bureaucratized subjectivity (or a certain cognitive style) is ultimately put to use. Bureaucratized subjectivity, of course, is not unique to Japanese society and may be found anywhere to varying degrees. But according to Rohlen,

The Japanese are producing an average adult citizen who is remarkably well suited to four requirements of modern industrial society: (1) hard, efficient work in organizations; (2) effective information processing; (3) orderly private behavior; (4) stable, devoted child rearing (1983: 305).

This cognitive style -- which constitutes a rationalized subjectivity (attention to hierarchies, social categories, and formalization) -- is transferred to the workplace. It is at these sites where ranking (for example, the seniority system of Japanese companies), grouping, and formalized relations (reproduced through sociolinguistic practices) are appropriated for the purposes of economic nationalist production.

The third point concerns the existence of a double discourse in Japan. Some (but not all) Japanese may find comfort in dressing up the state-ordained, economic-utilitarian demands of rationalization in an everyday discourse of the unique traits of Japanese tradition. However, working in Japan has convinced me that many Japanese are quite aware of the politico-economic forces that a more acceptable discourse disguises. Why then do so many prefer to discuss social life using an everyday discourse? As in any society, an idiom that clearly describes the hard and cold facts of a heavy-handed state, economic efficiency, and impersonal bureaucratic ethos is less appealing. But what is significant is that the demands of a highly industrialized socioeconomic order are closely linked to and legitimated by an essentialized Japanese national identity (that is, its unique vertical society and other social relations characterized as traditional).

One final point. In many political science studies, the state is regarded as a more or less autonomous actor, separate from society and individuals upon which it operates. Another view -- in line with notions such as Althusser's "ideological state apparatuses" (1971), Foucault's "discourse" (1979), and Gramsci's "hegemony" (1971) -- regards the state as ubiquitous and diffuse, pervading and permeating society and subjectivity. But these two views, the external autonomous actor versus the inherent omnipresent entity, are not necessarily contradictory. Indeed, the former may be an ideological support that encourages us to view the state as distant from our mundane lives when in actuality its projects shape our subjectivity (Mitchell 1990; 1991). If true, subjectivity is ultimately dependent on the sociopolitical environment, not independent of it. So much of what we label subjectivity is state-related that it is hard to imagine any form of modern consciousness that is not somehow contoured by state interests. However, "dependent on" is not synonymous with being "determined by." Cognitive and emotional patterning of an individual

originates in the sociopolitical environment, but this is not the same as claiming that the sociopolitical environment determines what a particular individual at any given time will do with a socially-provided psychology.(n10) Granted, state-initiated and ordained projects do not necessarily shape subjectivity directly or in an obvious manner, since they have their effect via layers of organization. But the distant, diffused, and unapproachable nature of the state should not discourage us from taking it seriously and factoring into social analysis. If anthropologists can study extended kinship systems, cosmologies, and informal networks, they can certainly apply these same tools of investigation to extensive government structures, mythologies of state, and official organizations.

NOTES

(n1) The literature that discusses and employs these terms, in English and Japanese, is too vast to cite here, but the reader is directed to Bachnik and Quinn (1994) for recent updated treatments.

(n2) Until recently, not a few researchers accepted these mythologies about Japanese society. See, for example, how Fuller et al. (1986: 166) contrast "Westernization" and "modernization" with "Eastern" and "traditional" values.

(n3) Other subjects besides moral education, of course, construct rationalized subjectivities (for example, math, sciences, and Japanese language), but I examine moral education since it clearly evidences the state's objectives.

(n4) To save space, all guidebooks have abbreviations that are given in the references.

(n5) Kiefer (1970) explores the "psychological interdependence" of family, school and bureaucracy in Japan, though her approach is considerably different from what is attempted here.

(n6) Three provisos and a word on methodology are in order. The first proviso: this essay does not investigate the problem of to what degree students internalize moral education as a comprehensive set of beliefs that is applied to all aspects of life. Indeed, most Japanese students I have asked described moral education classes as boring and useless. However, there are many different kinds of knowing, and knowing something is rarely a ease of either belief or its lack. There am degrees of acceptance, diversity of interpretations, and differences in knowledge utilization. The point is that, in spite of its largely negative evaluations, moral education does succeed in at least furnishing to some degree a repertoire of values that inform certain practices visible in society at large (cf. Lanham 1979). In any case, the state is not completely successful in socializing its citizens in a manner it deems appropriate.

The second proviso: there are numerous variables that shape any understanding of moral education and its sociopolitical implications, such as gendered versions, age differences, class distinctions, occupational variability, regional diversity, and individual interpretations. Because space precludes their treatment, these variables are not investigated. It should also be mentioned

that though the Monbashô does have considerable power vis-à-vis local school authorities, the latter often reinterpret, resist, modify, and occasionally disregard central bureaucratic orders.

The third proviso: in this article I am not arguing that the state is completely successful in its reproduction of an official ideology. Rather, I am more concerned with how the state tries to inculcate its ideology. Hence, my arguments are meant to delineate the contours of state projects in the realm of education-socialization.

Finally, since my focus is the state, this article is not about the numerous counter-practices that hinder the totalizing efforts of the state (a theme perhaps more familiar to political anthropologists).

(n7) To keep this article's argument focused, I have decided against a major assault on the definitional and methodological problems associated with the analysis of the state (see Abrams 1988; Britan and Cohen 1980; Cohen 1974; Gupta 1995; Herzfeld 1992; Mitchell 1990, 1991; Nader 1972, 1980; Nettl 1969; Nugent 1994; Taussig 1992).

(n8) Samuels begins his book about Japanese technonationalism by noting that when he was once asked to put in one word what makes Japan tick, he answered, "Insecurity": "This pervasive anxiety -- what the Japanese refer to as *fuan* -- helps to mobilize millions of people each day" (1994: ix).

(n9) Here mention should be made of Garon's work (1997), which examines how the Japanese state has implicated itself in the projects of modernity.

(n10) Indeed, we may question, resist, outwit, or negotiate with state power (cf. Skalnik 1989). But all these maneuvers -- as successful, heroic, or frustrated as they may be -- are recognitions of the state's inescapable embrace; they are counter-practices defined by an almighty and omnipresent system. Consequently, resistance to officialdom transpires within a dialectical relationship between state and non-state institutions.

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