

Matching





This Lecture


Graph matching is an important problem in graph theory.

It has many applications and is the basis of more advanced problems.

In this lecture we will cover two versions of graph matching problems.

- Stable matching
- Bipartite matching

Matching



Today's goal: to "match" the boys and the girls in a "good" way.

Matching

Today's goal: to "match" the boys and the girls in a "good" way.

What is a matching?

- Each boy is married to at most one girl.
- Each girl is married to at most one

boy.

What is a good matching?

Depending on the information we have.

- A stable matching: They have no incentive to break up...
- A maximum matching: To maximize the number of pairs married...

The Stable Marriage Problem:

- There are n boys and n girls.
- For each boy, there is a preference list of the girls.
- For each girl, there is a preference list of the boys.

1: CBEAD

A: 3521

2: ABECD

B: 5214

3: DCBAE

C: 4351



4: ACDBE

D: 1234




5: ABDEC

E: 2341

What is a **stable** matching?


Consider the following matching.

It is **unstable**, why?



- Boy 4 prefers girl C more than girl B (his current partner).
- Girl C prefers boy 4 more than boy 1 (her current partner).


So they have the incentive to leave their current partners, and switch to each other, we call such a pair an **unstable pair**.



What is a **stable** matching?

A stable matching is a matching with no unstable pair, and every one is married.


Can you find a stable matching in this case?



Does a stable matching always exists?

Not clear...

Can you find a stable matching in this case?



Stable Roommate

The Stable Roommate Problem:

- There are 2n people.
- There are n rooms, each can accommodate 2 people.
- Each person has a preference list of 2n-1 people.
- Find a stable matching (match everyone and no unstable pair).

Does a stable matching always exist? Not clear...

When is it difficult to find a stable matching?

Idea: triangle relationship!

Stable Roommate

Idea: triangle relationship!

	1	2	3
a	b	c	d
b	c	a	d
c	a	b	d
d	a	b	c

- a prefers b more than c
- b prefers c more than a
- c prefers a more than b
- no one likes d

So let's say a is matched to b, and c is matched to d.

Then b prefers c more than a, and c prefers b more than d.

No stable matching exists!

Can you now construct an example where there is no stable marriage Nope...

Gale, Shapley [1962]:

There is always a stable matching in the stable marriage problem.

This is more than a solution to a puzzle:


- College Admissions (original Gale & Shapley paper, 1962)
- Matching Hospitals & Residents.
- Matching Dancing Partners.

The proof is based on a marriage procedure...

Why stable marriage is easier than stable roommate?


Intuition: It is enough if we only satisfy one side!

This intuition leads us to a very natural approach.



The Marrying Procedure

Morning: boy propose to their favourite girl



The Marrying Procedure

Morning: boy propose to their favourite girl

Afternoon: girl rejects all but favourite







Brad


The Marrying Procedure

Morning: boy propose to their favourite girl

Afternoon: girl rejects all but favourite

Evening: rejected boy writes off girl

This procedure is then repeated until all boys propose to a different girl






Morning: boy propose to their favourite girl

Afternoon: girl rejects all but favourite


Evening: rejected boy writes off girl



Morning: boy propose to their favourite girl

Afternoon: girl rejects all but favourite


Evening: rejected boy writes off girl



Morning: boy propose to their favourite girl

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


Morning: boy propose to their favourite girl

Afternoon: girl rejects all but favourite

Evening: rejected boy writes off girl

OKAY, marriage day!



Proof of Gale-Shapley Theorem

Gale, Shapley [1962]:

This procedure always find a stable matching in the stable marriage problem.

What do we need to check?

- 1. The procedure will terminate.
- 2. Everyone is married.
- 3. No unstable pairs.

Step 1 of the Proof

Claim 1. The procedure will terminate in at most n² days.

- 1. If every girl is matched to exactly one boy, then the procedure will terminate.
- 2. Otherwise, since there are n boys and n girls, there must be a girl receiving more than one proposal.
- 3. She will reject at least one boy in this case, and those boys will write off that girl from their lists, and propose to their next favourite girl.
- 4. Since there are n boys and each list has at most n girls, the procedure will last for at most n² days.

Step 2 of the Proof

Claim 2. Every one is married when the procedure stops.

Proof: by contradiction.

- 1. If B is not married, his list is empty.
- 2. That is, B was rejected by all girls.
- 3. A girl only rejects a boy if she already has a more preferable partner.
- 4. Once a girl has a partner, she will be married at the end.
- 5. That is, all girls are married (to one boy) at the end, but *B* is not married.
- 6. This implies there are more boys than girls, a contradiction.

Step 3 of the Proof

Claim 3. There is no unstable pair.

Fact. If a girl G rejects a boy B, then G will be married to a boy (she likes) better than B.

Consider any pair (B,G).

- Case 1. If G is on B's list, then B is married to be the best one on his list.

 So B has no incentive to leave.
- Case 2. If G is not on B's list, then G is married to a boy she likes better.

 So G has no incentive to leave.

Proof of Gale-Shapley Theorem

Gale, Shapley [1962]:

There is always a stable matching in the stable marriage problem.

Claim 1. The procedure will terminate in at most n² days.

Claim 2. Every one is married when the procedure stops.

Claim 3. There is no unstable pair.

So the theorem follows.

More Questions (Optional)

Intuition: It is enough if we only satisfy one side!

Is this marrying procedure better for boys or for girls??

All boys get the best partner simultaneously!

Why?

All girls get the worst partner simultaneously!

That is, among all possible stable matching, boys get the best possible partners simultaneously.

Can a boy do better by lying? NO!

Can a girl do better by lying? YES!

This Lecture


- Stable matching
- Bipartite matching

Bipartite Matching

The Bipartite Marriage Problem:

- There are n boys and n girls.
- For each pair, it is either compatible or not.

Goal: to find the maximum number of compatible pairs.




Bipartite Matching

The Bipartite Marriage Problem:


- There are n boys and n girls.
- For each pair, it is either compatible or not.

Goal: to find the maximum number of compatible pairs.



Graph Problem

A graph is **bipartite** if its vertex set can be partitioned into two subsets A and B so that each edge has one endpoint in A and the other endpoint in B.




A **matching** is a subset of edges so that

every vertex has degree at most one.

Maximum Matching

The bipartite matching problem:

Find a matching with the maximum number of edges.




A perfect matching is a matching in which every vertex is matched.

The perfect matching problem: Is there a perfect matching?

Perfect Matching

Does a perfect matching always exist?

Of course not.




Suppose you work for the King, and your job is to find a perfect matching between 200 men and 200 women. If there is a perfect matching, then you can show it to the King. But suppose there is no perfect matching, how can you convince the King this fact?

Perfect Matching

Does a perfect matching always exist?

Of course not.

If there are more vertices on one side, then of course it is impossible.



Let N(S) be the neighbours of vertices in S.

If |N(S)| < |S|, then it is impossible to have a perfect matching.

A Necessary and Sufficient Condition


s it the only situation when a bipartite graph does not have a perfect matching?

Hall's Theorem: A bipartite graph G=(V,W;E) has a perfect matching if and only if |N(S)| >= |S| for every subset S of V and W.

This is a deep theorem.

It tells you exactly when a bipartite graph does not have a perfect matching.

(Now you can convince the king.)




Job Assignment Problem:

Each person is willing to do a subset of jobs.

Can you find an assignment so that all jobs are taken care of?

In fact, there is an efficient procedure to find such as assignment! (CSC 3160)




Add a vertex for each square in the board.

Add an edge for two squares if they are adjacent.

This is a bipartite graph with the black and white squares form the two sides.

A perfect matching in this graph corresponds to a perfect placement of dominos



With Hall's theorem, now you can determine exactly when a partial chessboard can be filled with dominos.

Latin Square: a nxn square, the goal is to fill the square with numbers from 1 to n so that:

- Each row contains every number from 1 to n.
- Each column contains every number from 1 to n.

1	2	3	4
3	4	2	1
2	1	4	3
4	3	1	2

uppose you are given a <mark>partial</mark> Latin Square when some rows are already filled in


2	4	5	3	1
4	1	3	2	5
3	2	1	5	4

Can you always extend it to a Latin Square?

With Hall's theorem, you can prove that the answer is yes.

Given a partial Latin square, we construct a bipartite graph to fill in the next row

2	4	5	3	1
4	1	3	2	5
3	2	1	5	4




We want to "match" the numbers to the columns.

Add one vertex for each column, and one vertex for each number.

Add an edge between column i and color j if color j can be put in column i.

Given a partial Latin square, we construct a bipartite graph to fill in the next row

2	4	5	3	1
4	1	3	2	5
3	2	1	5	4
1	5	2	4	3



A perfect matching corresponds to a valid assignment of the next row.


If we can always complete the next row, then by induction we are done.

The key is to prove that the bipartite graph always has a perfect matching.

Using Hall's Theorem

Hall's Theorem: A bipartite graph G=(V,W;E) has a perfect matching if and only if |N(S)| >= |S| for every subset S of V and W.

A graph is **k-regular** if every vertex is of degree k.




A 3-regular bipartite graph

Using Hall's Theorem

Hall's Theorem: A bipartite graph G=(V,W;E) has a perfect matching if and only if |N(S)| >= |S| for every subset S of V and W.

Claim: Every k-regular bipartite graph has a perfect matching.




A 3-regular bipartite graph

Using Hall's Theorem

Hall's Theorem: A bipartite graph G=(V,W;E) has a perfect matching if and only if |N(S)| >= |S| for every subset S of V and W.

Claim: Every k-regular bipartite graph has a perfect matching.

To prove this claim using Hall's theorem, we need to verify |N(S)| >= |S| for every subset S.




Proof by contradiction:

- 1. Suppose there is a subset S with |S| > |N(S)|.
- 2. All the edges from S go to N(S).
- 3. There are total k|S| edges from S to N(S).
- 4. There are at most k|N(S)| edges from N(S) to S.
- 5. A contradiction.

Completing Latin Square

Claim: Every k-regular bipartite graph has a perfect matching.

2	4	5	3	1
4	1	3	2	5
3	2	1	5	4



The bipartite graphs coming from Latin square are always regular because: Suppose there are k unfilled rows.

Then each column already has n-k numbers, and so connected to k numbers.

Each number appeared in n-k columns above, and so connected to k columns.

So, the bipartite graph is k-regular, and thus always has a perfect matching.