**Liu Jialiang**

— 老年人热致死亡显著上升，显示脆弱群体受害更深【9:44–10:20】（≥65岁热致死亡自1990年代以来+167%）。  
— 热暴露导致劳动与收入损失，低人类发展指数国家平均损失其GDP的7.6%，凸显贫困群体承压更重【12:19–16:33】。  
— 能源贫困与家庭空气污染导致过早死亡，强调“低收入/清洁能源缺乏”的健康不平等【25:57–29:55】。  
— 行动清单明确提出“以健康与公平为公正转型的核心”【42:01–44:22】。

气候政策应采取在面向全体人群降低风险的同时，对脆弱群体实施更强的定向保护。理由有三。第一，风险与损害分布并不均匀：空气污染、极端高温等在本地更集中地伤害低社会经济地位者与老年人，在全球尺度又更严重地落在发展中国家身上（“贡献最少、受害最多”）；第二，普惠减排与清洁空气政策能快速产生全体受益（例如更快去化石燃料可迅速避免约400万例过早死亡），但其边际健康收益在脆弱群体更大，因此应优先覆盖这些群体（如清洁能源获取、适应与医疗可及性）。 第三，韧性离不开减贫与基本服务提升：将最贫困的13亿人从极端贫困中解脱出来是减少全球不平等和提升健康福祉的前提；同时，在高收入与新兴经济体中必须紧急削减不可持续消费并推动“与环境脱钩”的制度与技术变革。

综上，最佳设计不是在“只保全体”与“只保弱势”之间二选一，而是以全民健康共益的减排/减污为底盘，叠加对儿童、老年人、低收入与高暴露人群的定向措施与资金（含“损失与损害”与卫生系统适应），把“健康与公平”置于公正转型的核心。

In designing climate policy— reducing risks for the whole population while applying stronger, targeted protection for vulnerable groups. First, risks and damages are unevenly distributed: air pollution and extreme heat disproportionately harm people with low socioeconomic status and older adults at the local level, and, globally, the most severe impacts fall on low-HDI countries that have contributed least to climate change. Second, universal mitigation and clean-air measures deliver rapid benefits for everyone — for example, accelerating the phase-out of fossil fuels could quickly avert around four million premature deaths — but the marginal health gains are greatest among vulnerable populations, making it imperative to prioritize their access to clean energy, adaptation infrastructure, and healthcare. Third, resilience requires both poverty reduction and basic service provision: lifting the poorest 1.3 billion people out of extreme poverty is foundational to reducing inequality and improving health, while high-income and emerging economies must urgently cut unsustainable consumption and pursue structural decoupling of economic activity from environmental degradation. As *People and the Planet* (Royal Society, 2012) stresses, ensuring that well-being and equity are central to this transition is not only ethically justified but also essential for long-term sustainability.

In sum, the choice is not between “protecting all” or “protecting only the vulnerable,” but to make universal health co-benefits from mitigation and pollution reduction the baseline, and layer on targeted measures and funding — including loss-and-damage support and health system adaptation — for children, the elderly, low-income, and high-exposure communities, keeping “health and equity” at the heart of a just transition.

**Xinqing**

— Diet & emissions: “2016→2021…农业生产排放 +2.9%，主要由红肉与奶制品驱动…若转向健康低碳饮食，每年可避免约 1120 万例死亡。”  
— Action checklist: “推动健康低碳饮食…以及安全的主动出行（active travel/public transport）。”

结论：多数人**并不容易**靠“自觉”长期坚持低碳饮食与更多公共/主动出行；但在**政策将低碳选项变为默认且省心**时，改变就会迅速发生。讲座给出饮食与出行的健康—减排共益（避免上千万例过早死亡、通过主动出行改善空气与健康），说明个体选择的潜力取决于环境支持。  
从结构层面看，Royal Society 的《People and the Planet》强调，要减少不可持续消费、实现与环境压力“脱钩”，**必须**配套制度与基础设施变革，而非只靠倡导与个人意愿（例如以长期目标为导向的定价、标准与公共投资）。 与此一致，Fioramonti 等（2022，《Ecological Economics》）主张通过**政策工具来“赋能可持续消费替代”**——涵盖营养与出行——并将税负从“劳动/增值”等“流”转向污染、废弃等“害”，从而让低碳饮食与公共/主动出行在价格与可及性上更具吸引力。  
因此，答案是：**不易，但可行**——当政策把“更便宜、更近、更方便”的默认选项与健康、低碳相一致时，行为改变会成为大多数人的理性选择，而不是少数人的自律挑战。

Bottom line: for most people, shifting to low-carbon diets and using public/active transport is **not easy by willpower alone**, but it becomes feasible—and fast—once policy makes these the **default, convenient choices**. The lecture shows large co-benefits from healthier diets and safe active travel (e.g., millions of premature deaths averted), underscoring that individual action scales when environments enable it.   
As the Royal Society’s *People and the Planet* argues, reducing unsustainable consumption and decoupling from environmental throughput **requires institutional change**—pricing, standards, and public investment aligned with long-term goals—rather than exhortation alone. Consistently, Fioramonti et al. (2022, *Ecological Economics*) recommend **policy instruments that actively enable sustainable alternatives** in nutrition and mobility, and tax shifts from “flows” (labour/value-added) to “harms” (pollution/waste). These levers make low-carbon choices cheaper, nearer, and easier, turning them from moral imperatives into everyday defaults.

**Yu-I**

— 饮食与健康共益：2016→2021农业生产排放+2.9%，主要由红肉与奶制品驱动；若转向健康低碳饮食，每年可避免约1120万例死亡。  
— 行动清单：明确“推动健康低碳饮食、……以及安全的主动出行（public/active transport）”。  
— 快速健康收益的例子：更快去化石/提高清洁能源可迅速避免约400万过早死亡。

结论：**个人选择能产生有意义的差异，但其效力取决于规模化与制度支持**。讲座提示，健康低碳饮食与主动/公共出行不仅降碳，还能显著减少过早死亡（饮食路径每年可避免约1120万例；能源清洁化可再避免约400万例），说明当大量个体行动被“可得、可负担、可持续”的环境放大时，会形成公共健康与减排的双赢。 但仅靠自觉往往受“价格—基础设施—社会规范”的锁定约束；因此，需要把“正确的选择”做成“最容易的选择”。正如 Fioramonti 等在《Ecological Economics》中主张，应通过**政策工具主动赋能可持续替代**（包含营养与出行），而不仅限于宣传：例如以税费/补贴、标准与公共投资降低低碳饮食与公共/主动出行的门槛。这样，个体减肉、回收、乘坐公共交通等日常行为才会被持续放大，转化为系统性的减排成效。

Bottom line: **individual choices can make a meaningful difference, but only when they scale and are institutionally enabled**. The lecture indicates that healthier, low-carbon diets and safe active/public transport deliver substantial co-benefits—diet shifts alone could avert ~11.2 million premature deaths each year, and faster fossil phase-out/clean energy could prevent ~4 million more—showing that everyday behavior can compound into population-level gains when the environment makes it easy and affordable. Yet willpower in isolation is constrained by prices, infrastructure, and social norms. As Fioramonti et al. argue in *Ecological Economics* (2022), policy must **actively enable sustainable alternatives** in nutrition and mobility—via instruments beyond simple exhortation—so that “the right choice becomes the easy choice.” Under such conditions, recycling, eating less meat, and taking public transport don’t remain niche moral acts; they aggregate into system-level emission cuts and measurable health benefits.

In 2023, the average person spent about 1,512 hours in conditions where exercising outdoors carried a moderate risk of heat stress. With temperatures rising, it's getting harder to keep everyday activities like walking and cycling safe. That means the push for “active travel” in healthier, low-carbon cities can actually clash with extreme heat — the times we most want people outside are often the most dangerous. So, do you think schools and workplaces should adjust class or work times during heatwaves? And if so, what kind of flexible schedule would you support?

— 热暴露对劳动/日常活动的冲击：2023 年因热暴露造成潜在劳动时数损失达 5120 亿小时，工人更频繁休息/无法户外作业，低 HDI 国家冲击尤甚。  
— 脆弱人群与致命风险：极端高温对 ≥65 岁、婴幼儿及慢病人群的风险更高。  
— “健康—公平”与主动出行：讲者主张把健康与公平置于公正转型核心，并鼓励“安全的主动出行”。

我认为学校和单位在热浪期间应调整作息，因为热暴露已显著影响户外通勤与劳动安全（2023 年全球因热暴露损失劳动时数达 5120 亿小时），低 HDI 国家冲击尤甚，而老年人、婴幼儿及慢病人群健康风险更高。正如 *People and the Planet*（Royal Society, 2012）指出的，政策应将健康与公平置于可持续转型的核心，并在应对环境压力时优先保护脆弱群体。在 *Ecological Economics*（Fioramonti 等, 2022）中也强调，制度设计必须主动降低可持续选择的门槛，使安全、低碳的行为在经济和可及性上成为“默认”。  
**可行方案（精简版）：**

* **错峰时间**：将高温时段（11:00–16:00）的户外课与体力任务前移或后移，减少暴露。
* **热警触发**：以官方热健康预警启动调整，确保标准统一、执行可行。
* **重点照顾**：为高风险群体提供空调室内“清凉空间”或临时远程选项。

Answer (English, medium length)  
I believe schools and workplaces should adjust schedules during heatwaves. Heat exposure has already caused substantial productivity losses—512 billion labour hours lost globally in 2023, with low-HDI countries worst affected —and poses greater risks to older adults, infants, and those with chronic illnesses . As *People and the Planet* (Royal Society, 2012) stresses, policy should place health and equity at the centre of sustainable transitions, prioritising protection for vulnerable groups . Likewise, *Ecological Economics* (Fioramonti et al., 2022) argues that institutional design must actively lower the barriers to sustainable choices, making safe, low-carbon behaviours the economic and practical default .  
A concise flexible approach I’d support:

* Time-shifting: move outdoor or physically demanding activities outside the hottest period (11:00–16:00).
* Heat alert trigger: base adjustments on official heat-health warnings for clear and consistent action.
* Protection for vulnerable groups: provide cooled indoor “safe spaces” or temporary remote options for high-risk individuals.

**Wang Xihao**

— 能源可及与健康风险：约 24 亿人仍依赖“脏燃料/低效设备”，全球约 30%家庭烧生物质；低 HDI 国家约 92%能源来自生物质；由固体燃料导致的室内 PM2.5在 2020 年致 230 万死亡，并严重阻碍冷链医疗、食品与教育服务获取。  
— 政策方向：建议在 2025 年 NDC中优先写入健康、重定向化石补贴、推动清洁能源采纳；2022 年 86 国中 84%补贴化石，规模 1.4 万亿美元，不少国家补贴额超过全年卫生预算。  
— 转型共益：清洁能源采用快速上升、低碳能源直接就业已超过化石，若更快去化石/提升清洁，可迅速避免约 400 万过早死亡（室内+室外）。

要在贫困发展中国家推进**健康型可再生能源**并让民众“用得上、用得起、用得稳”，国家与政府应把健康与公平嵌入能源规划、财政与监管之中。首先，**把化石补贴转向清洁能源与健康**：将现有的大额化石补贴（多国合计约 **1.4 万亿美元**、且部分国家补贴额高于全年卫生预算）用于清洁烹饪/清洁取暖与分布式可再生项目，并在 **NDC** 中明确健康目标与问责框架。 其次，**优先投资“最后一公里”的可及性**：以**微电网/离网光伏与储能**为公共服务节点（基层诊所、疫苗冷链、学校）供电，缓解能源贫困对冷链医疗、食品与教育获取的阻断效应。 第三，**降低清洁技术门槛、让“正确的选择变成最便捷的选择”**：结合**结果导向融资（RBF）**、定向代金券/微贷与**最低性能标准**淘汰固体燃料灶具；并按\*\*“危害税”原则**逐步把税负从劳动/增值转向污染与废弃物，同时推广**可获得的非专有技术\*\*，减少锁定效应与路径依赖（参见 *Ecological Economics* 对政策工具与税制转移的主张）。 最后，**公正转型与就业**：将**可再生能源岗位培训**并入社会保护与产业政策，顺势利用“低碳能源直接就业已超过化石”的趋势，确保转型中的生计安全。  
这些举措与 *People and the Planet* 提倡的**重塑制度、弱化对物质消费增长依赖**的方向一致，有助于把“健康—福祉—脱碳”的三重目标联动推进。

To accelerate a **health-centred clean energy transition** in low-income settings and ensure people can **access, afford, and reliably use** clean energy, national policies should hard-wire health and equity into energy planning, public finance, and regulation. **(1) Redirect fossil fuel subsidies to clean energy and health**: repurpose part of the ~**US$1.4 trillion** in fossil subsidies (with some countries spending more on subsidies than on their entire health budget) to clean cooking/heating and distributed renewables, and codify health targets and accountability in the **2025 NDCs**. **(2) Invest in last-mile access**: deploy **mini-grids/off-grid solar plus storage** at public-service nodes—clinics, vaccine cold chains, schools—to break energy-poverty bottlenecks that currently undermine cooling for medicines, food safety, sanitation and education. **(3) Lower adoption barriers and make the clean option the easy option**: combine **results-based financing, targeted vouchers/micro-loans, and minimum performance standards** to phase out solid fuels; **shift taxation from “flows” to “harms”** (pollution/waste) and enable **non-proprietary technologies** so sustainable options diffuse widely (per *Ecological Economics*). **(4) A just transition for livelihoods**: integrate **renewables workforce training** into social protection and industrial policy, leveraging the fact that **direct employment in low-carbon energy now exceeds fossil fuels**; rapid fossil phase-out paired with clean adoption can **avoid ~4 million premature deaths** by cutting indoor/outdoor air pollution.   
This package aligns with *People and the Planet*’s call to **build institutions less dependent on material consumption growth**, linking decarbonisation with improvements in health and well-being.

**Wu Yaxuan**

— **搁浅资产与转型准备度**：煤电在 **2025–2034** 年的搁浅资产估 **1640 亿美元**；许多国家对“健康、公正的转型”准备不足，**低 HDI 国家最不利**。  
— **政策抓手**：在 **2025 年 NDC** 中优先写入健康、并将约 **1.4 万亿美元**化石补贴重定向到“改善健康”的清洁行动。  
— **健康与就业共益**：低碳能源**直接就业已超过化石**；更快去化石/提高清洁可**迅速避免约 400 万过早死亡**。  
— **国际支持通道**：“损失与损害（L&D）”里**健康**的地位在上升，应进一步提升权重。

要缩小“低 HDI 国家转型能力不足”的鸿沟，建议把**国际融资**与**国内改革**捆绑推进、并以健康为约束：

1. **以健康为核心的“公正转型融资”**：把 **L&D** 与多边开发资金对齐，用**有条件减免/低息**支持“退煤—清洁替代—医疗与就业保障”成套方案，明确绩效指标指向**空气污染下降与过早死亡减少**（讲座估计更快去化石可避免约 400 万过早死亡），并将**劳动力培训**纳入项目设计以对接“低碳岗位已超过化石”的结构性机会。
2. **把存量化石补贴改造成“健康型清洁能源”支出，并在 NDC 中落地问责**：将补贴与税制从化石端转向**清洁烹饪/取暖、电气化与分布式可再生**，优先保障**基层诊所、冷链与学校**等公共服务节点；在 **2025 NDC** 明确健康目标与监测。为降低技术进入门槛，参照 *Ecological Economics*（Fioramonti 等，2022），配套**非专有技术**与\*\*（不限于税补的）政策工具\*\*，让清洁方案在**价格与可得性**上成为默认。

To bridge the readiness gap for **low-HDI countries**, pair **international finance** with **domestic reforms** under a health-centred lens:

1. **Health-centred just-transition finance.** Align **Loss & Damage** and multilateral development finance to back integrated packages—**coal retirement + clean replacements + health and jobs**—with outcome metrics tied to **air-pollution reductions and avoided premature deaths** (the lecture notes that faster fossil phase-out and clean adoption could avert ~**4 million** deaths). Include workforce training to leverage the fact that **direct jobs in low-carbon energy already exceed fossil employment**.
2. **Reallocate fossil subsidies into clean, health-improving energy—and lock this into NDCs.** Redirect part of the ~**US$1.4 trillion** in fossil subsidies toward **clean cooking/heating, electrification, and distributed renewables**, prioritising **clinics, vaccine cold chains, and schools**; embed measurable **health targets in 2025 NDCs**. To lower adoption barriers, following *Ecological Economics* (Fioramonti et al., 2022), deploy **non-proprietary technologies** and policy instruments **beyond taxation alone** so clean options become the **cheaper, nearer, default** choice.

These moves directly address the lecture’s warning about **~US$164 billion** in **coal-asset stranding (2025–2034)** and the **limited readiness of low-HDI countries**, by coupling de-risked finance with health-anchored, accessible clean-energy deployment.

**Yan Yu**

— 劳动损失与产业受冲击：2023 年热暴露致5120 亿潜在劳动小时损失（较 1990s +≈50%），多数发生在农业；户外劳动风险上升、必须更频繁休息与补水。  
— 收入与粮食安全：对应8350 亿美元潜在收入损失；低 HDI 国家因热致劳动能力下降，人均 GDP 平均损失 7.6%；热浪与干旱叠加，粮食不安全显著上升。

要在“保护劳动者健康”与“稳增长/保产出”之间取得平衡，社会层面的组合拳应同时覆盖**安全生产标准、收入保障与用工制度**：

1. **把“热健康”纳入劳动法定标准并刚性执行**：建立按**官方热健康预警**触发的**错峰工时与“工—休”循环**（如将体力/户外工序前移至清晨、正午转入低强度/室内），并强制配置**遮阴、饮水补盐、降温设施与急救训练**，优先覆盖农业与基建等高暴露行业。这直接对应讲座指出的**农业劳动受损最重**与**5120 亿小时损失**事实，是把“健康置于政策核心”的具体化。
2. **用财政与制度工具对冲“减时—减收—减产”链条**：设立**高温工时保险/工资补偿**与**冷链/灌溉与机具降温投资**，资金来源可部分来自**重定向化石补贴**与气候资金（讲座证据显示，许多国家对化石的补贴支出甚至**超过其全年卫生预算**）。同时推动**工作制度改革**（弹性工时、阶段性缩短工周、远程/在地混合），以提高在热浪期的单位小时产出与健康保障；这与 *Ecological Economics* 提出的“以福祉为导向的劳动改革（短工周、居家、工作—生活平衡）”一致。

To balance **worker health** with **growth and productivity** under escalating heat, society should act on both **safety standards** and **income/organization reforms**:

1. **Make heat-health a binding labour standard.** Trigger **shifted hours and work–rest cycles** by official heat-health alerts (front-load outdoor/physical tasks to cooler hours; switch to lower-intensity/indoor tasks at midday) and require **shade, hydration/electrolytes, cooling, and first-aid capacity**, prioritising agriculture and other high-exposure sectors. This operationalises the lecture’s evidence that **agriculture bears most of the losses** and that **512 billion work hours** were lost in 2023.
2. **Offset the ‘less hours → less income → less output’ chain with finance and labour reform.** Fund **heat-wage insurance/compensation** and **cooling/irrigation and equipment upgrades** using **reallocated fossil-fuel subsidies** and climate finance (the lecture notes that in ~30% of countries fossil subsidies **exceed total health budgets**). In parallel, adopt **wellbeing-oriented labour reforms** (flex-time, shorter work weeks during heatwaves, remote/hybrid options) to maintain productivity per hour while protecting health—consistent with *Ecological Economics* proposals on labour reform.

**Ma Guotong**

— 热暴露与生产率：2023 年因热暴露损失潜在劳动时数 5120 亿，潜在收入损失 8350 亿美元；低 HDI 国家人均 GDP 平均损失 7.6%。  
— 能源贫困：约 24 亿人仍依赖“脏燃料/低效设备”，\*\*约 30%\*\*家庭烧生物质；低 HDI 国家约 92% 能源来自生物质；家庭空气污染在 2020 年致 230 万死亡，并阻断冷链医疗、食品与教育。  
— 政策与能力缺口：低 HDI 国家对“健康、公正的转型”准备最不足；且 2022 年 86 国中 84%仍在补贴化石，规模 1.4 万亿美元，30% 国家补贴额高于全年卫生预算。

除你提到的生产率与能源结构劣势外，低收入国家还面临至少四类“结构性短板”：

1. **财政与政策空间受限**：大额、广泛的化石补贴挤占了卫生与转型资金，很多国家补贴规模甚至高于其全年卫生预算，难以为适应与清洁能源扩张“腾挪”资源。
2. **基础设施与城市化脆弱**：快速城市扩张若无良好规划易形成棚户区与基础设施短板，放大洪涝、极端降雨等风险对健康与经济的冲击。 同时极端干旱/洪涝并存与传染病地理扩张叠加，进一步加压卫生与供水系统。
3. **健康系统与知识/数据能力不足**：讲座指出适应与研究版图“不均衡”，低收入国家在脆弱性评估、监测与心理—社会支持等方面最薄弱，难以及时识别与应对健康风险。
4. **受限的“应对流动性”与社会保障**：*People and the Planet* 指出，资源匮乏使得**最脆弱者往往“最难迁移”**，难以通过搬迁规避风险；同时需要把最贫困人群从极端贫困中解脱，否则无法积累应对与恢复力。

这些劣势叠加，意味着低收入国家不仅**暴露更高、承压更重**，还**更缺工具**来将健康置于转型核心、把“正确选择”做成“最容易的选择”。因此，国际与国内政策都需围绕财政重定向、基础设施与卫生系统韧性、数据能力建设与社会保障来“补齐短板”，否则难以缩小与已开发经济体之间的气候应对鸿沟。

Beyond lower productivity and biomass-heavy energy use, poorer countries face at least four **structural disadvantages**:

1. **Constrained fiscal/policy space.** Large, widespread fossil-fuel subsidies crowd out health and transition finance; in about 30% of countries, subsidy outlays even exceed the entire health budget—leaving little room to fund adaptation or clean energy deployment.
2. **Infrastructure and urban vulnerability.** Rapid urban growth without adequate planning raises slum risks and weak infrastructure, amplifying the health and economic impacts of floods and extreme rainfall; concurrent drought/flood extremes and shifting infectious-disease geography further strain water and health systems. (people and planet)
3. **Weaker health systems and data capacity.** The lecture highlights an uneven research/adaptation landscape and fragile monitoring/psychosocial services in low-income settings, limiting timely risk detection and response.
4. **Limited adaptive mobility and social protection.** As *People and the Planet* notes, those most vulnerable often have **the fewest resources to migrate**, and lifting the poorest out of extreme poverty is essential to build resilience.

These disadvantages stack up: poorer nations are **more exposed and less equipped** to act. Closing the gap with rich countries requires redirecting fiscal resources, strengthening infrastructure and health-system resilience, investing in data/monitoring, and expanding social protection—so that health-centred, clean transitions become feasible defaults rather than unaffordable ideals.

**Enze**

— **“公正转型”与政策抓手**：讲者在“行动清单”中主张把**健康与公平置于公正转型的核心**、在 **2025 年 NDC** 中优先写入健康、并**将化石补贴重定向**到改善健康的行动。  
— **劳动力与就业结构变化**：**低碳能源的直接就业已超过化石**；不作为的经济成本以“数十万亿/年”计，继续扩张化石等于“**投资 Blockbuster**”（注定过时），必须进行**劳动力市场转型**。

要帮助高碳行业的劳动者顺利转入绿色经济，重点在于把**资金、技能与岗位**三件事做成“闭环”：

1. **设立以健康为指标的“公正转型基金”，用存量财政+气候资金托底**。将部分化石补贴与新气候资金（含 L&D、开发性金融）**重定向**到退煤/退油—清洁替代—**工人收入保障与再就业**一体化项目，并在 **NDC** 中纳入**可量化的健康与就业指标**（如空气污染下降、过早死亡减少、转岗留任率），使资金对准“人”的结果而非仅设备投资。 同时，借助“低碳就业已超过化石”的趋势，优先在受影响地区配置**电网与可再生制造/运维**岗位，降低异地迁移成本。
2. **以劳动改革+技能体系为抓手，把“绿岗”做成可达的体面工作**。参考 *Ecological Economics*（Fioramonti 等，2022）对**劳动改革**与**支持可持续替代**的主张：推行**短工周/弹性工时、体面薪酬、居家与工作—生活平衡**，并通过**绿领学徒制、职业资格互认、用工转岗协议**等手段，建立通往能效改造、分布式能源、储能与生态修复等岗位的“**可迁移技能**”通道；同步**从“流”(劳动/增值)转向“害”(污染/废弃)的税改与非专有技术**推广，以提高工人和中小企业采用绿色技术的性价比。  
   从治理取向看，*People and the Planet* 也强调**建设不依赖持续物质消费增长的制度**，把转型的风险从个人劳动者层面**转移**并**对冲**到更广的社会—财政安排中，减少政策阻力与不平等累积。

To move workers from high-carbon sectors into the green economy, policy has to close the loop between **finance, skills, and jobs**:

1. **Health-centred Just Transition funds with hard metrics.** **Redirect fossil-fuel subsidies and climate finance** (including L&D and MDBs) into integrated packages—**coal/oil phase-down + clean replacements + wage insurance/re-employment**—and **encode measurable health and job targets in the 2025 NDCs** (e.g., air-pollution drops, avoided premature deaths, placement/retention rates). This steers money to people-centred outcomes, while **placing clean-energy and grid jobs in affected regions** leverages the fact that **direct employment in low-carbon energy already exceeds fossil**.
2. **Labour reform plus skills pathways that make green jobs accessible and decent.** Following *Ecological Economics* (Fioramonti et al., 2022), adopt **labour reforms** (shorter work weeks, decent pay, autonomy, home-office/work-life balance) and build **green apprenticeships, portable certifications, and negotiated redeployment** into efficiency retrofits, distributed renewables, storage, and ecological restoration. Complement this with **tax shifts from “flows” (labour/value-added) to “harms” (pollution/waste)** and **non-proprietary technologies**, so workers and SMEs find green options cheaper and easier to adopt.   
   This aligns with the lecture’s call to **centre health and equity in the Just Transition** and to **redirect finance**, and with *People and the Planet*’s push for institutions **less dependent on continuous material-consumption growth**—reducing resistance, inequality, and the risk of

**Lv Ao**

— 低 HDI → 更高经济损失 & 农业工人最受影响：2023 年热暴露致全球5120 亿潜在劳动小时损失；低 HDI 国家因热致劳动能力下降，人均 GDP 平均损失 7.6%；多数损失发生在农业，且工人缺乏防暑保护  
— 研究鸿沟：气候—健康研究主要来自高收入国家/中国/印度，而南美、非洲、南亚/东南亚等受影响最深地区研究远少  
— 可动员的国际/国家抓手：2025 年 NDC更新在即，讲者强调应把健康置于承诺核心、并将约 1.2 万亿美元化石补贴重定向到“促进健康”的活动；损失与损害（L&D）及新的气候融资目标正在谈判中，健康议题的重要性上

在低 HDI 国家，热暴露造成的经济和健康损失更大，比如 2023 年人均 GDP 平均损失 7.6%，农业工人尤其缺乏防暑保护。但这些国家的气候—健康研究又远少于高收入国家，像非洲、南美等高风险地区的研究很不够。  
我认为国际组织和高收入国家可以做两件事：

1. **提供资金和设备帮助工人防暑降温**：比如用气候资金和部分化石补贴，给农业工人配备遮阳棚、冷饮水、降温设备，并在高温时段调整工作时间。这既能保护健康，又能减少因中暑或劳动力下降带来的经济损失。
2. **支持当地研究和培训**：设立专项资金，和当地大学、公共卫生部门一起做气候与健康研究，培训本地医生和技术人员，让他们能更好地应对热浪、改善工作环境。这能弥补目前“研究力量不足”的短板。

In lower-HDI countries, heat exposure causes bigger economic and health losses—on average **7.6% of GDP**, with agricultural workers often lacking heat protection . Yet climate–health research in high-risk regions like Africa and South America is far less developed than in high-income countries .  
I think international organisations and high-income countries could do two main things:

1. **Provide funding and equipment for worker heat protection**—using climate finance and part of fossil-fuel subsidies to supply shade, cool drinking water, and cooling devices for agricultural workers, and adjust working hours during extreme heat. This protects health and reduces productivity losses .
2. **Support local research and training**—like in people and planet, create special funds and partner with local universities and public-health agencies to conduct climate–health research and train local doctors and technicians. This can close the “research gap” and improve local capacity to handle heat risks .

**Li Yumeng**

— **补贴规模与反差**：2022 年 86 国中有 **84%** 在补贴化石燃料，规模约 **1.4 万亿美元**；约 **30%** 国家补贴额**高于全年卫生预算**，而讲者同时主张在 **2025 年 NDC** 中把健康写入、并**把补贴重定向到改善健康的行动**。  
— **结构性锁定与准备不足**：**114 家**大型油气公司仍在扩产；**2023 年化石能源吸走 37% 的全球能源投资**；许多国家对“健康、公正的转型”**准备不足**，**低 HDI** 国家尤甚；且**政治意愿在下降**（UNGA 将“气候—健康”挂钩的领导人比例 2022→2023：**50%→35%**）。

 **民生价格与政治风险**：取消或转移补贴，燃油/取暖/用电价格会先涨，短期“痛感”容易引发反弹；而总体政治意愿还在下滑，更加剧了政府的顾虑（见上面 UNGA 50%→35%）。*People and the Planet* 建议**重塑不依赖持续物质消费增长的制度**，强调必须配好**分配与公平**，否则公众支持度不足、改革难落地。

 **产业—财政锁定与执行能力门槛**：油气扩产与投入错配让补贴形成“既得利益 + 资产锁定”，转向容易被质疑“顶不住供给/影响就业”；同时不少国家对健康型转型**准备不足**。*Ecological Economics*（Fioramonti 等，2022）指出，仅靠税收难以奏效，需要**组合工具**（如从“流”税转向“害”税、结果导向融资、最低性能标准、代金券/小额信贷、**推广非专有技术**）把资金**有效**变成健康收益，这正是许多政府担心的“执行难点”。

 **Affordability & political risk.** Cutting or redirecting subsidies raises fuel, heating and power prices first, inviting backlash—made worse by **declining political will** (UNGA references to climate–health fell from **50% to 35%** in 2022→2023). *People and the Planet* argues we need institutions **not dependent on continual material-consumption growth**, with fairness safeguards; otherwise support evaporates.

 **Lock-in & delivery capacity.** Ongoing fossil **expansion** and **37%** of 2023 energy investment flowing to fossil fuels create **asset/employment lock-in**, while many countries are **unprepared** for a healthy just transition. *Ecological Economics* (Fioramonti et al., 2022) notes that redirection works only with a **tool-mix**—e.g., shifting taxes from “flows” to **“harms”**, results-based finance, minimum performance standards, vouchers/micro-loans, and **non-proprietary technologies**—which is exactly the delivery capacity many governments lack.

**Xinyue**

* **补贴→该转向：2022 年分析的 86 国里，\*\*84%\*\*在补贴化石，规模约 1.4 万亿美元；30%国家对化石的补贴还高于全年卫生预算。**
* **健康与就业好处：低碳能源的直接就业已超过化石；如果更快“去化石+上清洁”，可迅速避免约 400 万过早死亡；并且在 2025 年 NDC 里把“健康”写进去、把补贴重定向是明确主张。**

回答（中文，通俗·中等篇幅；两点策略）

1. 换个说法打动决策者：把可再生讲成“健康 + 就业 + 省钱”。 用讲座里的硬数据——“低碳就业已超化石、更快转型能少 400 万例过早死亡”——说明不是只为环保，而是能减医药负担、少缺工、保生产；再点出“1.4 万亿美元化石补贴其实能挪去干这些实事”，并写进 2025 年 NDC当成考核指标，这样从口号变成预算与任务。
2. 把“便宜好用”做到位：给清洁方案配一套可负担工具包。 参考 *Ecological Economics*（Fioramonti 等，2022）：不只讲税补，结合结果导向融资（RBF）+ 最低性能标准 + 定向代金券/小额信贷 + 把税从“流”（劳动/增值）转到“害”（污染/废弃）+ 推广非专有技术，让居民和中小企业上手清洁设备更容易、更便宜，政策就更好卖。

Reframe the pitch: renewables = health + jobs + savings. Lead with the lecture’s numbers—low-carbon jobs already exceed fossil jobs, and faster fossil phase-out with clean adoption could avoid ~4 million premature deaths. Then say: the ~US$1.4 trillion now spent on fossil subsidies can fund these health wins, hard-wired into 2025 NDCs so it’s a budgeted mandate, not a slogan.

Make clean energy the easy, affordable choice. Following Ecological Economics (Fioramonti et al., 2022): use a tool-mix—results-based finance, minimum performance standards, targeted vouchers/micro-loans, tax shifts from “flows” (labour/value-added) to “harms” (pollution/waste), and non-proprietary tech—so households and SMEs can adopt clean options cheaply and quickly. That’s how subsidy reallocation becomes politically sellable.

**Wu Yuanyi**

* 气候变暖→弧菌更活跃：沿海水体对弧菌（Vibrio）的“适宜性”提高，2023 年估 69.2 万例相关感染；且这类病原与极端降水/洪涝、热浪常在同一区域叠加，加压卫生系统。
* 把健康写入国家气候计划：讲者的“行动清单”主张在 2025 年 NDC 中优先写入健康，并用资金托底卫生与适应。

 **建立日常的气候—传染病预警系统。** 利用海水温度、盐度、降雨和病例数据，监测沿海弧菌等病原的风险，风险高时及时**发预警、关海滩或停采贝类**，并告诉公众怎么防护、哪里就医。基层医院要能快速检测、上报病例。这样可以直接应对**2023 年 69.2 万例感染**和极端天气叠加的威胁。*People and the Planet* 也强调，要通过**教育和科技**提升社会的适应能力。

 **投资健康基础设施，让应对手段可负担。** 在 **2025 年 NDC** 中明确传染病应对目标，把资金优先用在**安全饮水、污水处理、冷链和基层医疗**上。*People and the Planet* 指出，良好的供水和废物处理能显著保护公共健康。为让这些设施更普及，可参考 *Ecological Economics*（Fioramonti 等，2022）的方法：用**结果导向融资、最低性能标准、代金券/小额信贷、从“劳动”转向“污染”的税制、推广非专有技术**，让设备更便宜、更好用；同时正如 Kallis（2017）提醒的，还要有**制度和行为的改变**，才能长期降低病原传播风险

 **建立日常的气候—传染病预警系统。** 利用海水温度、盐度、降雨和病例数据，监测沿海弧菌等病原的风险，风险高时及时**发预警、关海滩或停采贝类**，并告诉公众怎么防护、哪里就医。基层医院要能快速检测、上报病例。这样可以直接应对**2023 年 69.2 万例感染**和极端天气叠加的威胁。*People and the Planet* 也强调，要通过**教育和科技**提升社会的适应能力。

 **投资健康基础设施，让应对手段可负担。** 在 **2025 年 NDC** 中明确传染病应对目标，把资金优先用在**安全饮水、污水处理、冷链和基层医疗**上。*People and the Planet* 指出，良好的供水和废物处理能显著保护公共健康。为让这些设施更普及，可参考 *Ecological Economics*（Fioramonti 等，2022）的方法：用**结果导向融资、最低性能标准、代金券/小额信贷、从“劳动”转向“污染”的税制、推广非专有技术**，让设备更便宜、更好用；同时正如 Kallis（2017）提醒的，还要有**制度和行为的改变**，才能长期降低病原传播风险

 **Build everyday climate–disease early warning.** Track sea temperature, salinity, rainfall and case data to spot Vibrio and other pathogen risks. When risk spikes, **issue alerts, close beaches or halt shellfish harvesting**, and tell the public how to stay safe and where to get treated. Clinics should be ready for fast testing and reporting. This tackles the **692,000 Vibrio cases in 2023** and the added strain from extreme weather. *People and the Planet* also stresses using **education and technology** to boost resilience.

 **Invest in health basics and make them affordable.** In the **2025 NDC**, set clear infectious-disease adaptation targets and direct funding to **safe water, sewage treatment, cold-chain, and primary care**. *People and the Planet* notes that well-planned water and waste systems protect public health. To make upgrades widespread, follow *Ecological Economics* (Fioramonti et al., 2022): use **results-based finance, performance standards, vouchers/micro-loans, tax shifts from labour to pollution, and non-proprietary tech**. And as Kallis (2017) reminds us, combine this with **institutional and behaviour changes** to keep disease risks down long term.

**我的看法（中文，精简版）**  
**最可能的单一原因：短期的能源与物价压力**压过了健康叙事。乌克兰战争后，政府优先“稳电价、稳油价”，继续加码化石补贴，政治注意力被“保增长、保稳定”占据，自然减少在国际场合强调“气候—健康”的空间。 这也印证了 Kallis（2017）的观点：在以增长为核心的体制下，**长期的健康/减材目标很容易被即时经济诉求挤掉**。

**结论（多说一点）**  
是的，这一下降会削弱“把健康放在气候行动中心”的主题；因为**健康叙事**能把抽象的减排变成“看得见的好处”（少生病、少医疗支出、生产力提高）。当领导人减少这样发声，跨国合作就失去一个**凝聚共识的抓手**，国内政策也少了**可被公众理解的理由**。要扭转趋势，一方面应按讲座建议把**健康指标写进 2025 年 NDC**，让预算与问责对齐；另一方面借鉴 *People and the Planet* 的建议，**建设不依赖持续物质消费增长的制度**，把公平与健康作为政策硬约束；并用 *Ecological Economics* 的工具，将政策目标从“单纯增长”转向**以福祉为导向的共同收益**（健康与就业），这样政治与公众支持才会回到“以健康为中心”的叙事上。

**Answer (English, concise with a longer wrap-up)**  
**Most plausible single reason:** **short-term energy/price pressures crowded out the health frame.** After the Ukraine war, governments prioritised affordability and stability, expanding fossil-fuel subsidies (≈**US$1.4T**) and leaving less political bandwidth to link climate and health at the UNGA. This aligns with Kallis (2017): in growth-centred systems, **long-term health/dematerialisation goals are easily displaced by immediate economic concerns**.

**Conclusion (expanded)**  
Yes—the drop from **50% to 35%** weakens the case for **health-centred climate action** because the health lens turns abstract carbon targets into **tangible benefits** (fewer illnesses, lower healthcare costs, higher productivity). When fewer leaders voice this link, cross-border cooperation loses a **unifying narrative**, and domestic policy loses a **publicly legible rationale**. To reverse it: hard-wire **health targets into 2025 NDCs** so budgets and accountability follow; adopt *People and the Planet*’s call for institutions **less dependent on continuous material-consumption growth**; and, per *Ecological Economics*, pivot policy toward **wellbeing co-benefits** (health and jobs) rather than growth alone. That’s how the health-at-the-centre theme regains momentum.

**① 观点：不会削弱把健康放在气候行动中心（中文）**  
虽然领导人在 UNGA 提及“气候—健康”的比例下降，但这未必意味着健康不再是核心。很多健康相关的措施可能已经融入到更广泛的气候与发展议程中，只是未在发言中明确标注。例如，*People and the Planet* 指出，健康与可持续发展目标、能源转型、减贫策略往往是交织推进的，即使不单独提“健康”，它依然在政策和投资中占据重要位置。此外，部分国家可能更倾向于用国内行动而非国际话语来体现健康优先。

**① View: Does *not* necessarily weaken health at the centre (English)**  
While fewer leaders mentioned “climate–health” at the UNGA, it doesn’t automatically mean health is losing its central place. Many health-focused measures may be embedded in broader climate or development agendas without being explicitly flagged in speeches. As *People and the Planet* notes, health often moves forward alongside SDGs, energy transition, and poverty reduction—so even if it’s not verbally highlighted, it can still be a core element in policy and investment. Some governments may also prefer to demonstrate health leadership through domestic action rather than international rhetoric.

**② 观点：会削弱一定的气候行动，但不完全（中文）**  
提及减少，可能削弱部分以健康为驱动的国际合作或资金争取，因为健康是公众易理解、易动员的切入点。但正如 *Ecological Economics* 提到的，气候行动还有经济、就业、安全等多重驱动力，这些动因依然能支撑相当部分的行动。换句话说，健康议题弱化会让部分政策缺少“健康红利”的宣传优势，但不会让整体气候行动停滞。

**② View: May weaken some climate action, but not entirely (English)**  
A drop in references may dampen some health-driven cooperation or financing, as health is an accessible entry point for public and political engagement. However, as *Ecological Economics* points out, climate action also has strong drivers in economics, jobs, and security—these can sustain much of the momentum. In other words, losing some of the “health dividend” narrative may reduce the appeal of certain policies, but it won’t halt overall climate action.