

Guidelines for Human Intelligence Collection Operations

by Harvey J. McGeorge

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PREFACE

This manual is intended to provide detailed assistance in establishing a comprehensive and effective approach to Human Intelligence Collection Operations. It provides guidelines for all areas of human source collection specifically designed to meet the needs of Intelligence Collection Officers, especially those Collection Officers who are not technically trained and who have no prior experience in the field of human source collection.

In order to establish an effective and efficient Human Intelligence Collection program, consistent guidelines must be developed and followed by all members of a Collection Agency. This manual will address requirements as they relate to the operation of an Agency and establish procedures for both recruiting and training techniques and for management of the Agent's activities. It will also cover a systematic approach to the recognition of potential sources, including investigating and evaluating those sources to determine individual placement and access, future benefits and counterintelligence risks.

Agent evaluation and termination will also be addressed and a comprehensive operations plan will be outlined. The operations plan will include cover, countersurveillance and contact procedures and reporting.

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CHAPTER

1

Introduction to Intelligence


**UPON COMPLETING THIS SECTION YOU
SHOULD BE ABLE TO:**

- 1. Define the term "Intelligence."**
 - 2. List and describe the elements of intelligence.**
 - 3. Define the term "Intelligence Cycle."**
 - 4. Name the varieties of intelligence and describe**
-

FUNDAMENTALS OF INTELLIGENCE^{1,2}

In the fifth century B.C. the Chinese sage Sun Tzu wrote that foreknowledge was "the reason the enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the enemy whenever they move." He believed that, "What is called foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits, nor from gods, nor by analogy with past events, nor from calculations. It must be obtained from men who know the enemy situation." Finally, he observed, "An army without secret agents is exactly like a man without eyes and ears." These statements emphasize the importance of advance information, and point directly to where this information must originate.

Informed policy and decision making requires adequate information and analysis. Being able to anticipate and predict an occurrence, before the fact, is an essential management tool in the expenditure and deployment of resources. Without sufficient information, a qualified judgment cannot be made. As a result, governments, law enforcement agencies and corporations engage in intelligence activities.



ELEMENTS OF INTELLIGENCE^{3,4}

Strictly speaking, intelligence can be defined as the **product** resulting from the collection, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all available information significant to an agency or entity. It is the principal legitimate function of an intelligence agency to provide this accurate, relevant product to its policy makers.

Collection

Collection is the purposeful acquisition of any information that might be necessary to achieve the intelligence goals of the Agency. Both human and technical methods may be employed to surmount the barriers that stand in the way of that sought-after knowledge.

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The resources of publicly available, openly accessible information must first be probed and exploited for potentially valuable information. Monitoring foreign radio broadcasts and publications such as newspapers, magazines, government reports, newsletters and the annual reports of corporations are all good means of open source collection. If the information is highly protected within a government or society, it may be obtainable only through specialized and often devious methods. In other instances, restricted information may be attainable through elicitation or even through direct solicitation. Thus, diplomats, military attaches, marketing agencies, consultants, and corporate representatives develop and exploit their contacts, both foreign and domestic, actively and often aggressively. Human sources provide major, frequently indispensable, insights that facilitate the understanding of a country, its leaders, its business and economic concerns, and the issues with which they may be grappling.

Obtaining valued information by special means consists of three elements: first, determining what specific information is being sought; second, ascertaining the nature of the target – the characteristics of the nation, group, business, or individual and the environment from which or about which the information is to be collected; and, third, marshaling and employing the resources and special means necessary to obtain the information. All of these elements in turn are affected by, and affect, the other components of intelligence.



Intelligence requirements are determined by top leadership, usually a nation's president and his staff, or some National Command Authority, or a corporation's president and/or top staff, or a law enforcement Command Officer. At a national level, it is typically the duty of the Director of the Foreign Intelligence Collection Agency and his staff members to determine how those intelligence requirements will be fulfilled. The actual collection of information is coordinated by Collection Officers who are responsible for the day-to-day implementation of the collection effort. Since Collection Officers seldom pursue targets without direction, the orientation and accuracy of these directions is vitally important. If the questions point away from the desired information, collection can hardly be expected to find its mark.

Collection efforts are also dependent on the protection afforded by counterintelligence. Especially when operating against opposing intelligence services which

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regard highly the use of secrecy, deception and disinformation, Collection Officers must be particularly wary of their sources and constantly calibrate the validity of their methods. Both human sources and technical methods can be manipulated by opposing intelligence forces. Counterintelligence is thus an essential shield for Collection Officers.


Within a corporation, intelligence collection may be the responsibility of the Strategic Planning Division, or Research and Development, or Marketing, or an inner working council which combines these different corporate divisions. An aggressive, competitive corporation, or one which feels actively threatened by outside forces, will generally set up an internal competitor intelligence agency. Economic espionage is now so pervasive that almost all major corporations maintain some form of competitor intelligence staffing.

Analysis and Estimates⁵

Raw intelligence must be collated, scrutinized and processed carefully. The aim of this analytical process is a finished product that is more intelligible and usable than the data and information drawn upon to prepare it. Exploiting all available material, analysis strives for clarity while screening out error, non-essentials and possible deception.

The types of analysis produced by an intelligence community vary from current reports on subjects of immediate interest, to periodic studies on questions of long-term concern. We can break down the products of analysis into three basic categories:

1. What happened yesterday and how will it affect today.
2. Daily or regular briefings on subjects of interest to the leadership staff. (At a national level, daily briefings for the President and national defense team are generally required, whereas within a corporation, briefings are usually less frequent.)



The ever-popular James Bond was a British MI-6 (SIS) agent. As the CIA is known as “The Company,” SIS is known internally as “The Firm” and to other agencies as “The Friends.”

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3. New topics that the agency feels needs top-level attention.

The first category of analysis products deals mainly with up-to-the-minute intelligence reports and includes components of the daily/regular briefings to ensure that the President or CEO is apprised of the most recent intelligence activity.

The second category would include daily briefs prepared specifically for the President. Short and descriptive, they are keyed to important issues of the day and use information from sensitive and open sources.

The third category of analysis products are typically produced by other departments that are specifically created to study and examine issues in greater depth. Their topics may be derived from the expressed interests of senior policy makers, or from a program of priorities generated within the Agency.

Analysis and estimates, put simply, is the integration of collected information from all sources into finished intelligence. The finished intelligence product might be a simple statement of fact, an estimate of the capabilities of an opposing organization, or the projection of the likely course of events of another Agency.

Intelligence activities comprise the collection and analysis of information and its transformation into intelligence; however, several other activities have come to be considered examples of intelligence activity, specifically, counterintelligence and covert action.

Counterintelligence^{6,7,8}

Stripped to its bare essentials, counterintelligence can be described as the identification, neutralization and manipulation of opposing intelligence forces. It aims first to safeguard information the government or corporation deems sensitive and does not wish to reach the hands of its adversaries. It aims further at protecting the government or corporation and its various components from penetration and manipulation by its opposing counterparts.

There are both active and passive aspects in these undertakings, although the lines of distinction between them are hazy. There is a **large distinction** between waiting passively for an opposing intelligence force to move – or taking forthright action to find its agents,

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thwart and, if feasible, gain control over them. If the latter can be accomplished, it may be possible to manipulate the other force to serve a variety of purposes. A classic example of aggressive counterintelligence is the British "double-cross" system of manipulated human intelligence during World War II.

Manipulation of an opposing intelligence service may be effected through deception in the form of information, passed via human or technical channels, designed to convey specific impressions, or misimpressions, to the recipient. Like other counterintelligence measures, it, too, is subject to defensive efforts by the target organization.

As an integral part of its function, counterintelligence deals with three aspects of security. First is personnel security, to determine that an individual is not now and is not likely to become a security risk, to insure that an individual is not granted access to information beyond his actual need-to-know, and to promptly identify and investigate instances of espionage, sedition, subversive activities or disaffection.



Officers from the Afghan National Army's Counterintelligence practice interview techniques during their training course.

The functions of a personnel security program are to prevent criminal activities by employees, espionage attempts by hostile intelligence forces and unintentional acts by employees that could lead to a compromise situation. A program of security clearances should be established and its application vigorously monitored. It will be necessary to ascertain the life history of potential employees to determine whether they are worthy of clearance, and, once an employee has been cleared, maintain consistent vigilance for signs and warnings that may indicate the possibility of him or her becoming a security risk. An aggressive

security awareness and counterespionage program should be initiated. Any and all valid suspicions of espionage should be investigated and acted upon.

Second, counterintelligence concerns itself with information security. All governments and intelligence agencies store information that, if disclosed, could significantly harm national or corporate security and therefore must be protected. The security of sensitive documents or material can be accomplished through the use of classification procedures, document

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marking, accountability records, and secure storage containers.

The third aspect of security that counterintelligence concerns itself with is physical security. The basic prerequisite of a physical security system is to impede, detect, assess, and neutralize all unauthorized external and internal activity. Levels of security range from a minimum of the simple door locks used in ordinary home security to on-site, armed response forces and sophisticated alarm/CCTV systems used at maximum security facilities.

Covert Action^{9,10}

This element of intelligence involves the clandestine effort to influence the internal, and often external, affairs of a sovereign state. The distinguishing feature of this type of attempt to influence events is that its actual sponsorship is concealed. Covert action refers to any operation or activity by a government or agency designed to influence persons or events, without revealing the involvement of the government or agency. (Covert action by corporations, and covert action by a government against foreign corporations, is generally considered to be an unethical action, and is referred to as industrial or economic espionage. There have been a number of documented covert actions by "friendly spies," using unethical means to obtain millions and possibly billions of dollars worth of proprietary information from American companies.) Many law enforcement agencies, particularly in major metropolitan areas, maintain active intelligence collection divisions and use undercover agents to infiltrate criminal groups and gangs.

There are several distinct types of covert action: black propaganda (propaganda that purports to emanate from a source other than the true one); gray propaganda (in which true sponsorship is not acknowledged); paramilitary or political actions designed to overthrow or support a regime; support (aid, arms, training) of individuals and organizations (newspapers, labor unions, political parties); economic operations; and disinformation.

Political, propaganda and paramilitary activity command the great bulk of covert action effort. Some of it may be applied discretely, as in the case of political guidance, advice, counsel, or financial assistance to individual leaders or political figures. Or, it may entail support on a larger scale to political parties and to a variety of private organizations which are politically important. Propaganda programs may be targeted at the country as a whole, with the intent to affect overall opinions and attitudes. They may also be conducted on a smaller scale, via selected media or other channels, aimed at influencing specific

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elements of the population. Paramilitary activity is perhaps the most difficult and controversial form of covert action. Military operations, obviously, do not lend themselves toward concealment.

The objectives of all categories of covert action must be consonant with overall policies and goals, and it is imperative that the action be coordinated effectively and on a sustained basis at senior echelons of the government or law enforcement agency. Without a consensus encompassing objectives and the main contours of operation modes, a given operation faces an almost certain prospect of exposure and failure.

Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all available, applicable and significant information.

THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE^{11,12}

It is important to put the collection and analysis activities conducted by various intelligence units into proper perspective, a perspective that relates these activities to the requirements and needs of the decision makers and the use made of the finished intelligence product. This is done through the concept of the ***Intelligence Cycle***.

The Intelligence Cycle is the process by which information is acquired, converted into intelligence, and made available to decision makers. Generally, it comprises four principal activities: directing, collecting, processing, and disseminating. The cycle should always be oriented to the Agency's mission and remain cognizant of the intelligence needs of the decision makers.

All activities in the intelligence cycle are continuous and concurrent. At the same time that new information is being collected, other information is being processed into intelligence and the resultant intelligence is being used. The production of an item of intelligence initiates new requirements and the activities of directing, collecting, processing, and disseminating

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occur again and again.

The Agency's mission is the center or hub around which the cycle revolves; therefore, the directing of the collection effort is considered to be the first step in the cycle. The intelligence required to achieve the specific objectives of the mission must be determined. Decision makers continually require up-to-date information and intelligence of what the target is doing, is capable of doing, and is planning for future operations. The requirements for intelligence are developed by the top leader and his staff during the preparation of strategic plans, during the execution of concurrent collection operations and during the processing of collected information.

The Collection Officer plans the collection operations in order to obtain the detailed information needed to satisfy the intelligence requirements that he has been assigned. The collection capabilities of any one station are rarely sufficient to satisfy all the intelligence requirements of the entire agency simultaneously. Therefore, the Collection Officer directs the collection resources of his area according to the priority assigned to each element of *his* particular collection task.

The collection of information requires the systematic exploitation of information sources by agents or other resources and the delivery of that information to the proper section for analysis and processing. Collection is the most difficult step in the cycle because the target individual or organization generally makes a practical effort to defeat attempts to gain information about their activities. In attempting to safeguard this information, the target conceals it, disseminates false information, enforces security measures, and adopts deception plans. To combat this, the Collection Officer must use whatever resources are available to corroborate and verify the collected information.

Processing information into intelligence is accomplished by the recording, evaluation and interpretation of the information. Recording reduces the item of information into a written or graphic form and groups it with related items so that it is easier to study and compare during the evaluation and interpretation processes. Recording may occur concurrently with evaluation and interpretation, but it must not hinder the dissemination of intelligence to those who need it. The Collection Officer must, if the need arises, subordinate the maintenance of records to the activities of evaluation and interpretation, and dissemination of intelligence.

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Evaluating information requires the examination of the information to determine its pertinence, accuracy and reliability. That information is then interpreted to determine its significance with respect to other items of information available. This is accomplished by the analysis of the information, integration of significant elements of information with other known intelligence, and, finally, forming a conclusion as to the probable meaning of the information. The conclusion answers the question, "What does this information mean in relation to the individual or target organization and the intelligence objectives?"

Evaluation and interpretation are the essentials in the processing step. It must be kept in mind that the decision makers want ***intelligence***, not just a compilation of information. As each new item of information is processed it affects, in some way, the current intelligence estimate of the situation. The conclusions already drawn in the current estimate are altered or confirmed. New capabilities are determined and old ones are discarded and, as a result, the probability of an opponent's course of action becomes clearer.

The next phase in the cycle is that of disseminating intelligence. As intelligence is the end result of the cycle, this intelligence must be disseminated to the leader or to the designated recipient, in a proper form and in time to serve the recipient's purpose.

The Intelligence Cycle does not stop with the dissemination of intelligence. New conditions and new missions require new intelligence. Intelligence estimates are a continual processes which keep the Intelligence Cycle rolling, with all four steps being concurrent and continuous.

THE UTILITY OF INTELLIGENCE^{13,14}

The utility of the intelligence activity, here narrowly construed to mean collection and analysis, depends on the extent to which it aids decision makers. Two questions arise in this regard:

- . In what ways does intelligence aid decision makers?
- . What attributes make intelligence useful?

Four distinct areas exist in which intelligence can be useful to decision makers: policy making, planning, conflict situations, and warning.

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In their policy making roles, national decision makers set the basic outlines for foreign, defense and economic policy. Corporate decision makers need accurate intelligence to assess economic conditions and make marketing decisions. Law enforcement decision makers need intelligence in order to determine where to place their resources to avoid and solve problems. The need for intelligence in order to make sound decisions can be summed up as follows:

Intelligence is information gathered for policy makers which illuminates the range of choices available to them and enables them to exercise judgment. Good intelligence will not necessarily lead to wise policy choices. But without sound intelligence, policy decisions and actions cannot effectively respond to actual conditions and reflect the best interests of the government or corporation, or adequately protect security.

In addition to its value in policy making, intelligence is vital to the specific decisions needed to implement policy, decisions that might be labeled planning decisions. Such decisions can involve the building and deployment of new weapons systems or the employment of trade restrictions. Here, intelligence might be able to tell the President the likely or expected effects of such actions, including the reactions of those individuals or organizations toward which a particular decision is directed. During international negotiations, intelligence can indicate how far the opposing negotiator can be pushed and the extent to which a position must be modified for it to be adopted.

Warning is also a prime benefit of intelligence. Warning might concern military or other action to be taken against the nation or its forces. On the basis of advance notice, defenses can be prepared, responses considered and implemented, and preemptive actions (diplomatic or military) taken to forestall or negate action. In the corporate environment, warning might concern a competitor's rush to market with a product that could affect the corporation's marketing and/or pricing strategies.

If intelligence can uncover a new military threat, steps can be taken to meet it. If intelligence can reveal an opponent's specific weakness, it can be exploited. With good intelligence, the wasting of vital resources by arming for the wrong danger at the wrong time can be avoided. Beyond this, in the broadest sense, intelligence underlies the estimates of enemy capability and thus helps to guide political strategy.

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The utility of intelligence, in addition to being dependent on its ability to address relevant subjects, is also dependent on its having the attributes of quality and timeliness. Unless all relevant information is assembled when assessing intelligence on a subject, the quality of the finished product may suffer. If the assessment of the information and the dissemination of the intelligence are not accomplished in a timely manner, its utility is negated.

In addition to being based on all relevant information, the assessment process must be objective. Anyone concerned with policy must have a profound interest in making sure that intelligence guides, and does not follow, policy.

VARIETIES OF INTELLIGENCE¹⁵

To understand how specific varieties of intelligence can be useful, one need only consider the components of those varieties. To begin, one might identify several general categories of intelligence: political, military, scientific/technical, and economic.

Political intelligence will include intelligence about both a nation's foreign policy and its domestic politics. Clearly, the foreign policies of other nations have an impact on national security, and the domestic politics of other nations, whether friendly, neutral, allied or hostile, are also of significant concern since the resolution of domestic political conflict can have a direct effect on foreign policy. The outcome of such conflict can affect the orientation of that nation in the world and the balance of power.

In recent years, political intelligence has become increasingly as important as military intelligence. For example, what are Iran's nuclear intentions – and what was behind Iran's ultra-conservative President's remarks regarding Israel? Intelligence must be gathered before the military can be committed.

Military intelligence is useful and required with respect to a wide variety of situations. Any country, in order to determine its own requirements for strategic forces, must know the nature of the strategic forces of neighboring and rival nations. The size and capabilities as well as the location of military forces must be continually monitored, either as a guide to planning requirements or as a means of warning against possible attack.

Scientific and technical intelligence includes both civilian- and military-related

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scientific and technical developments. In many cases, technological developments that occur in the civilian sector have military applications. Areas such as computer technology, ball bearing production, mirrors and optical systems, and lasers all have significant military applications. Hence, intelligence concerning a nation's progress in those areas or its ability to absorb foreign-produced technology in those areas is relevant to its potential military standing.

Economic intelligence is also of great importance. If the grain harvest in other countries is well below average, then the price of grain will naturally escalate. The economic impact of higher grain prices will affect the worldwide economy. Topics such as the activities of multi-national corporations, regional economic arrangements and the workings of international commodity markets are also of special interest.

CONCLUSIONS

Finding out the secrets of others while safeguarding your own is the essence of spying. Espionage involves a transaction in which the buyer wants something unobtainable at the expense of a third party, and a seller undertakes to supply that something in exchange for something else of equal or greater value to him. The seller is an agent who works for you and may do so for monetary gain, for ideological reasons or because he has compromised himself and agrees to do your bidding in order to keep his own secret. The agent is the supplier and what he does to fulfill the transaction is spying. Thus, the existence of secrets of value creates the labor market for spies.

As a government or agency places undue emphasis on secrecy, suspicion and spying proliferate. Modern espionage has taken on an extraordinary degree of sophistication which has resulted in an enormous amount of information; yet intelligence cannot be measured simply by volume. Many intelligence failures of modern times are due less to the fact that "nobody knew" than to the circumstance that "somebody knew, but nobody knew what it meant." The problem is most often one of inadequate analysis and is frequently due to the lack of a human factor. A reliable agent in the right place at the right time can provide what is relevant and bring meaning to other elements of information. The value and relevance of information ultimately rests on the human factor.³

Agents are only as good as the organizational process that created them and, moreover, are only as good as their Collection Officers. The process of manipulating agents

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demands a specialized individual (Collection Officer) for selection, training and management. It also requires patience. Good agents, and hence, good secrets, are not usually cheap.

CHAPTER

2

Fundamentals of Human Source Collection

UPON COMPLETING THIS SECTION YOU SHOULD BE ABLE TO:

1. Understand the meaning of "Human Intelligence" and why it is necessary to an intelligence collection effort.
 2. Describe the two types of clandestine agents.
 3. Understand the role of the Collection Officer in an intelligence collection effort.
 4. Describe the elements of the Agent Cycle.
-

HUMAN SOURCE COLLECTION

The age of rapidly evolving, constantly changing technology is upon us. The increasing capability to collect information via technical means has reduced the reliance on human sources. However, human source collection remains an integral part of any intelligence operation. Human sources can be used to fill gaps left by technical collection systems – in some cases important gaps – and to corroborate or verify technically collected information.

The fascination with spy satellites and other high-tech spying hardware has led to some massive intelligence failures. Intelligence agencies are now scrambling to play “catch-up” by recruiting human intelligence agents.

ABSTRACT^{16,17,18}

Historically, human source collection has played an important role in collecting information. In the following paragraphs we will take a brief look at some of the more notable successes in human source collection that have occurred in recent history. As you read these brief synopses, try to imagine the forethought and planning that must have occurred prior to their execution. Picture yourself as the Collection Officer responsible for these human source collection efforts.

Lambton-Jellicoe Affair

Two members of the British nobility were discovered to have been consorting with call girls. A security commission was formed to ascertain the extent to which British Government's security had been endangered. Members of the commission concentrated on the question of whether or not either of the nobles might have blurted out TOP SECRETS while engaged in "pillow talk." Or, whether they might have exposed themselves to potential blackmail.

Walker Family

Walker, his brother and his son are all behind bars after what was probably one of the most successful and longest running spy rings ever discovered. The task of

Fundamentals of Human Source Collection

assessing the damage that was done to National Security by this ring of spies over a seventeen-year period is enough to daunt the best minds and most intrepid spirits.

The greatest difficulty arose from a natural impulse to disbelieve the unbelievable. Despite unmistakable evidence that Walker's ring could have given the Soviets all they needed to break American ciphers for more than a decade, Washington officials initially could not accept that the worst had happened. The damage inflicted by the spy ring was officially declared as "very serious" but "not catastrophic."

Perhaps the future is of more concern than the past. At immense cost, machines, keys, frequencies, and methods had to be modified as a result of the information passed by Walker ring. And, the Soviets have had over seventeen years to amass comprehensive knowledge of American communications, cipher machines and systems. Officials must be doubtful about the security of any except totally new systems.



The psychological impact of such an immense crime has had detrimental effects on all American intelligence and security forces. Usually, an espionage case generates a brief flurry of headlines, then quickly shrinks from public sight and consciousness. But the Walker case will not go away for some time. Here was proof that espionage is not merely an inconsequential game played by inveterate cold warriors who refuse to grow up, but a deadly business that can affect the survival of a nation.

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE¹⁹ (FOREIGN)

A high priority for any nation's Foreign Intelligence Collection Agency is to understand the decision processes involved in the policy making of other nations. An understanding of both the processes and the people can lead to a more accurate estimation of the likely course of action in a given circumstance. Some of the necessary information may be gained

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by technical means, but the remainder can only be acquired from human sources.

Human Intelligence (HUMINT) collection pertains to the information obtained by clandestine agents and attaches as well as by the interviewing of defectors and immigrants. The most valuable human intelligence is generally obtained through the use of clandestine agents.

Note: The use of clandestine agents is not limited to government agencies. Modern law enforcement agencies rely heavily on the use of undercover agents in infiltrating criminal entities and street gangs. Police intelligence divisions are now an integral part of any major police agency.

Note: Human intelligence collection includes both overt and covert operations. "Open" sources may include information obtained from public and private libraries, magazines, newspapers, corporate annual reports, government reports, trade shows, professional and collegial seminars, radio and television, cocktail parties and other social events. These are all open sources which any good seeker of information will use to their advantage. They are considered as ethical and purely legal sources. Governments, corporations and, to some extent, law enforcement agencies use these open sources. However, as noted elsewhere, the use by corporations of clandestine agents to ferret out restricted information from competitors is considered unethical at best and illegal at worst.

Note: This particular manual was written largely for government Foreign Collection Officers, the "spies" who have peopled our Cold War spy novels and motion pictures. Make no mistake – just about every government in the world employs clandestine agents and Foreign Collection Officers to gain military, political and economic information. In this modern world, whereas much of the information collected is military and political in nature, a new emphasis has been placed on the acquisition of information used to gain economic advantages. "Economic espionage," considered unethical in the United States, is known to exist both with America's allies and enemies alike. Because of this situation, it behooves all corporate competitor agencies to thoroughly understand the covert human intelligence collection process so as to develop appropriate counterintelligence procedures. Knowing the enemy and the

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enemy's tactics is half (or more) of the battle.

Two types of clandestine agents exist, the controlled agent and the uncontrolled agent. The controlled agent is a witting individual who is fully aware that he is providing information that can be injurious to the agency or organization he is affiliated with. The uncontrolled agent is an unwitting individual who, due to a lack of concern for, or ignorance of, security unwittingly engages in conversations or otherwise provides information.

THE COLLECTION OFFICER²⁰

It is the role of the Collection Officer to coordinate the collection of information and implement the information requirements. He is designated the task of recruiting and managing agents, both controlled and uncontrolled. The successful execution of his responsibilities are crucial to an intelligence operation and his task must be approached with counsel and forethought.

Most Collection Officers have developed, either deliberately or unconsciously, their own individual procedures for the development and utilization of human sources. This systematic procedural approach can enhance the Collection Officer's ability to identify, recruit and efficiently use quality sources for high level penetration operations with better controls and better operational security. This approach, the Agent Cycle, is specifically designed for the controlled agent; however, the procedures and many of the techniques can be applied to uncontrolled agents as well.

THE AGENT CYCLE²¹

No two Collection Officers recruit, use and manage agents in the exact same way nor, throughout the intelligence world is there a uniformity among agencies on how it will be done. This is caused largely by the resources available and the intelligence objectives of differing intelligence agencies. However, many similarities do exist in the basic guidelines which we employ to spot, recruit, train, and manage an agent.

The following list represents the common elements used by successful intelligence Collection Officers.

Fundamentals of Human Source Collection

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| . Recognize potential agents. | (SPOTTING) |
| . Investigate and evaluate the agent's potential. | (ASSESSING) |
| . Persuade the individual to work for the organization. | (RECRUITING) |
| . Instruct him in what to do, how to do, etc. | (TRAINING) |
| . Control the agent and the operation. | (MANAGING) |
| . Discontinue the use of the agent. | (TERMINATION) |
| . Check on the agent. | (TESTING) |

SPOTTING, ASSESSING, RECRUITING, TRAINING, MANAGING, and **TERMINATION** are the basic elements of the Agent Cycle. **TESTING** is common to the entire process and takes place throughout the cycle. This is the framework of a systematic approach to the development and utilization of the controlled agent.

Spotting

To identify, locate and recognize an individual as a potential source or agent is the nucleus of spotting. The Collection Officer must be able to spot people who have placement and access and who may be receptive to recruitment. Placement refers to the potential agent's position in relation to the target, and access means that the potential agent has access to the desired information.

Assessing

Investigation, evaluation and "getting to know" the potential agent form the basis of assessing. Assessing begins in the spotting phase, becomes detailed and



U.S. Navy intelligence analyst Jonathan Pollard spied for Israel.

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comprehensive in the assessment phase, and carries over into succeeding phases of the agent cycle. Assessing may be the most critical part of the agent cycle. Critical time and manpower can be wasted if a Collection Officer cannot accurately assess a potential agent to determine if the agent has the necessary placement and access and if the agent would be receptive to recruitment. For example: ***Pollard's image of himself as James Bond doomed his long-term usefulness and should have been identified during the assessment phase.***

Recruiting

The enlistment of an individual to serve as a source for required information, material or other services is the goal of recruitment. Recruitment is generally accomplished through personal contact. Personal contacts made during the assessment phase are generally superficial and intended for information gathering; during the recruitment phase, relationships solidify with the aim of eliciting a commitment from the candidate.

Training

The basics of training consist of the preparation given to the agent to get the information you want, how you want him to get it, how he will get it to you, and how to do it all with security for himself and the operation. Principal training topics should include: clandestine communications, cover, security, and reporting. There are many factors that affect training and everything must be considered. Many questions must be answered before an adequate training plan can be developed. For example:

Managing

The controlled agent must be just that – ***controlled***. A successful intelligence operation is strictly dependent on the Collection Officer's ability to manage the agent's activities. The Collection Officer must act as supervisor to the agent. He is in a unique position with the agent because he is able to control the relationship in a way that few supervisors in non-clandestine situations can; there is no "open door" or "speak-up" policy in the world of espionage. The dissatisfied agent has no way of appealing to his Collection Officer's superiors. It is up to the Collection Officer to motivate the agent to work productively, by whatever means are necessary. For example: ***Walker recruited his***

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friends and his son despite KGB instructions to the contrary. The KGB failed to manage Walker properly – he was NOT under control.

Testing

Throughout the Agent Cycle, the agent must be continually tested. Test his training, test the validity of his information, test his adherence to operational rules, test him constantly to ensure that he understands his assignment and to ensure that he is fulfilling that assignment. A good Collection Officer leaves nothing to chance, he never assumes that the agent understands or takes the agent's word for it. The Collection Officer must prove that the agent does, in fact, understand.

Termination

When an agent has completed his assignment, served his purpose or is simply no longer useful, a decision must be made regarding termination. The impact of the agent's termination on the operation and on operational security must be measured. Numerous factors must be carefully considered and weighed before a decision to terminate can be reached.

Collection Officers who have the ability to successfully spot, recruit, train, and manage their agents are an integral part of any intelligence operation.

CONCLUSIONS

Those who engage in espionage on more than a casual basis must insist on control of the most rigorous kind. They must not only control the operation, but the very lives of those who undertake it. The requisite degree of control does not come easily or cheaply, nor

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can it be accomplished instantaneously. It comes only with forethought, planning and patience.

Agents capable of resolving the collection requirements of an intelligence operation are not made overnight. A lack of patience and attention to detail are perhaps the greatest obstacles to a successful operation. The making of an agent, even one having only a short-term utility and intended to be discarded, can be a lengthy and delicate undertaking. It must be remembered that every agent you make has the potential for harming you and your organization. The wise will bear this in mind, understanding that control of the agent is the only protection against this danger.

CHAPTER

3

Recognition of Potential Sources

**UPON COMPLETING THIS SECTION YOU SHOULD
BE ABLE TO:**

1. Define "Placement and Access" and understand its importance.
2. List the basic rules of specific spotting.
3. Determine where to look to find existing information about a potential recruit.
4. Understand the importance of developing a system for spotting.

SPOTTING^{22,23}

Spotting, the first phase of the Agent Cycle, is the identifying, locating and recognition of an individual who has placement and access and who may be receptive to recruitment as a potential source or agent. The potential agent's position in relation to the target defines his placement and access, this means simply that the potential agent **has access** to the desired information.

GENERAL AND SPECIFIC SPOTTING^{24,25}

Spotting is either general or specific in nature. General spotting is a continual process of being on the alert to identify persons who may have value as collectors of information for immediate or future requirements. General spotting does not require a specific target or operation. The deliberate and planned search of all available sources of information for a person who can satisfy the requirements of collecting information on a specific target is known as specific spotting.

In the case of spotting to fulfill specific requirements, the spotter requires knowledge of the target in order to be successful. Know your target, explore the potential human sources and remember to think in terms of placement and access. Identify people who come in contact with the target. Assess the placement and access of candidates and estimate the individual's possible receptiveness to recruitment.

SELECTING SPOTTERS^{26,27}

Although the Collection Officer will act as the primary spotter, it is only logical to use all available assistance to identify potential sources of information. Successful Collection Officers use a system for spotting. They begin by studying the target. Look for information on the target, if human, and the target's environment in other intelligence or surveillance reports, public records and bio data files. Analyze the placement and access of the people in the target environment and decide if a spotted individual can possibly be recruited. Remember, expert spotters are not just lucky – they have a system. As in all things done well, you must get started by building a solid foundation. Spotting done correctly lays the foundation for your complete operation. If possible, spotting should begin by researching known individuals who are employed by or associated with the target organization. This

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information is often obtained through personnel rosters. Even the most secretive organizations have been known to print up credit bureau reports and Christmas card lists containing names and home addresses. These lists sometimes include job positions.

If you do not have such lists your spotting may begin by surveillance of the known locations where the target individual or material may be found; office buildings, embassies, and residences. Start by recording vehicle tag numbers, take photographs of employees and determine who associates with whom. You will also learn of support elements that service the target's organization. Delivery companies, cleaning crews and food services may grant you access to needed information. These people are usually easily bribed or may give information unwittingly.

This initial spotting will direct you to where potential agents who have access to the target congregate to eat, drink and socialize. Since humans are for the most part creatures of habit and adhere to familiar surroundings, people will normally "hang out" in the same location. People also tend to be more relaxed in familiar surroundings and become easier to engage in conversation. Introduce alcoholic beverages into the picture and a few may become even easier to talk to, enabling you to spot flaws which may be exploitable. A person who has had a few drinks may begin outwardly criticizing his boss. Maybe he is just blowing off steam and means nothing by it; on the other hand, he may just be right for a possible recruitment.

Witting Spotters

Witting spotters are individuals who **knowingly** assist your collection effort by providing names of potential recruits. Intelligence officers and other individuals who are aware of your intelligence activity can be a valuable resource for spotting. As stated previously, some agencies even recruit spotters. Recruiting someone from the personnel department of a target organization who may have no placement and access of his own, but who may be in a position to influence the placement and access of others is a good example of a witting spotter.

Unwitting Spotters

Talking to friends, relatives and neighbors of potential recruits can also yield an abundance of information. These people often supply valuable information about the

Recognition of Potential Sources

potential recruit. Casual conversation with a person who knows the potential recruit can easily be turned to a topic relating to the potential recruit and, from there, information about the recruit can be obtained.

PLACEMENT AND ACCESS^{28,29}

Once individuals have been identified as potential recruits, the next consideration to the systematic spotter is Placement and Access. To what extent does the potential recruit have placement and access? The placement and access of an individual is particularly important to any planned utilization of the agent. As an example of a person having placement and access, consider the following:

Subject "A" is employed in the target organization and has a job as a file clerk within the section where the information you desire is kept. His job not only allows him regular access but his routine possession of such files would not cause undue alarm to peers or supervisors.

If the potential recruit seems cooperative but simply is not placed well within the target organization and does not have access, as demonstrated in the following example, that placement and access can sometimes be created for him.

Subject "B" is employed in the target organization. However, he does not work within the section from which you desire information. A vacancy is now available in that section. Subject "B" either applies for the job or assists in the hiring of another agent to fill the vacancy.

There are some obvious limitations to a Collection Officer's ability to create placement and access. Subject "B" may not be qualified for the job vacancy or he may not be in a position to assist in the hiring process. Recruitment of an individual in the Personnel Department will enhance your abilities to create placement and access.

HOW TO SPOT^{30,31}

Basic Rules

Recognition of Potential Sources

The rules for specific spotting are simple:

1. Know your target.
2. Think in terms of placement and access.
3. Explore all available information resources.

Where To Look

If the Collection Officer starts with a particular target figure or item in mind and thinks in terms of placement and (probable) access, he can begin the spotting process in his own office by looking through existing intelligence files.

Spotting information in the intelligence files:

- . Subject file cards can serve as a pointer.
- . Intelligence reports should (may) detail the nature and extent of an individual's associates.
- . Surveillance reports might detail the nature and extent of those associations.
- . Other agency intelligence files may contain more information than your own .

If the intelligence unit files do not adequately provide all of the information needed for spotting, then the search can be broadened.

Spotting information in non-intelligence files:

- . Operative files.
- . "General" police files.
- . Field interrogation cards.
- . Others (?).

Recognition of Potential Sources

Information in public records can often provide the first identification of an individual's association with or having access to the target. Criminal or civil court records, business licenses/permits, vital statistics, fictitious business name files, incorporation records and other public records can sometimes provide the identity of an individual who may have valuable potential as a controlled agent. Law enforcement and regulatory agency files, if accessible, may serve to identify associates of the target who were otherwise unknown.

If the operative knows his target, then he knows where to look to spot possible candidates for recruitment as controlled agents.

Developing a System

A spotting plan should first outline the placement and access of the individuals who are candidates for recruitment.

Unlimited access – An individual who can, at any time, come in contact with the target individual or item without question or suspicion. This would be the ideal individual to recruit.

Routine Access – A person who comes in contact with the target on a regular basis and would not be suspected should he/she be in possession of the desired information under most circumstances.

Limited Access – Individuals who have limited contact with the target. Their only contact is casual – passing in the hall, meeting at the water fountain, etc. – they do not work directly with the target but perhaps work in the same building.

Special Access – This person may come in contact with the target only once or on an extremely limited basis. Such a person may be a contract worker or a courier.

Area Access Only – A person who has access to the building or area, but is not

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permitted access to the target. A janitor or security guard would probably fall into this category. Surreptitious entry may be their only way to the target. Or this person could be a confidante or family member who can either gain access to the target or recruited to assist you.

Personal Contacts

If it is in keeping with the nature and scope of an operation, it is often advantageous to have a "chat" with an associate of a targeted individual. The same thing applies to the individuals who are close associates of the target's associates. A friendly conversation could uncover information which indicates that such persons could have a better degree of placement and access than previously perceived, and just might be susceptible to an eventual recruitment approach.

Recruiting a terrorist to spy for the U.S. today is much different from soliciting a Communist. During the Soviet era, the CIA targeted the party's youth, as the youth was gradually disillusioned by the corruption they saw within the Communist Party.

But the opposite occurs within Islamist terror groups. If the CIA targets the young, it gets someone who, as he burrows deeper into the group, he finds the al-Qaeda doctrine and leaders more appealing and the ideological lure stronger.

CONCLUSIONS

The Collection Officer who is repeatedly successful in spotting new human resources will use a systematic approach. He studies his target, analyzes the placement and access of those in the target environment, researches available information sources and arrives at a decision that a spotted individual could possibly be recruited. He is practicing the basics of the first step in the Agent Cycle – **SPOTTING**. He will also recognize that others can be either witting or unwitting spotters for him and use every resource at his disposal to gain information regarding a potential recruit.

The successful Collection Officer plans carefully and executes those plans with precision.

Chapter

4

Investigating and Evaluating Potential Sources

**UPON COMPLETING THIS SECTION YOU SHOULD
BE ABLE TO:**

1. Define the procedures for assessing a potential agent.
 2. Determine what type of information to collect about a potential agent.
 3. Understand why placement and access are vital qualities for a potential agent.
 4. Know how to develop an intelligence file system and understand its importance.
-

Investigating and Evaluating Potential Sources

ASSESSING^{32,33}

As applied to the Agent Cycle, assessing means evaluating an individual's potential as a controlled agent. Assessment begins, to a limited degree, in the spotting phase of the Agent Cycle, becomes detailed and comprehensive in the assessment phase, and carries over into succeeding phases of the Agent Cycle on a continuing basis. The assessment phase is the most critical part of the Agent Cycle.

During the final phase of the assessment process you will determine whether or not to recruit the potential agent. The decision should be based on all the information collected and the relative importance of any part of it. In other words, if placement and access are both very good, and a likely motivation has been identified, then recruitment is, thus far, probably desirable. Obviously less desirable are those potential agents without established placement and access. When the potential agent does not have good placement or access, a trivial bit of information, such as a common interest in an activity with the target, can become the cornerstone upon which the potential agent and the target can begin a relationship.

Once the decision is made to utilize the potential controlled agent, the recruitment phase of the Agent Cycle takes precedence over the assessment phase. However, assessing of the controlled agent **does** continue throughout his employment.

PROCESS OF ASSESSMENT

The assessment process includes those activities which Collection Officers must be trained to do. A comprehensive background investigation of the potential controlled agent must be conducted. It should include information from all conceivable sources and the information should be collected and recorded. Do not overlook collecting information from public and private sources and by means of surveillance. Include information about the potential agent's routine life style, his business associates and his social contacts.

GATHERING INFORMATION

All information, regardless of how trivial it may seem, should be collected and recorded. The more that is known about the potential agent the better the ultimate utilization.

Investigating and Evaluating Potential Sources

Activate a preliminary dossier which will become the repository for all information collected about the potential agent. Nothing must be left to memory or chance. The dossier is a management tool and will assist the Collection Officer currently using the information and can also be made available for future investigations. Recording information about the potential agent will eliminate the need for Collection Officers to "re-invent the wheel." Once recruited, a complete and organized dossier can be assembled.

What to Collect

Assessment of the potential controlled agent includes evaluation of the subject's potential, based upon the information gathered about the individual during the spotting phase. Additional information should be collected during the assessment phase. This information will be used in succeeding phases of the Agent Cycle. Pertinent additional information would include:

- . Strengths and weaknesses of character.
- . Idiosyncrasies.
- . Likes and dislikes.
- . Personal history.
- . Family background.
- . Relationships with other people.
- . Education.

Motivations

Probably the most important piece of information about the individual which should be identified in the assessment phase are possible motivations. Potential controlled agents may be motivated by:

- | | |
|--|--------------------------------|
| . Money. | . Adventure. |
| . Self aggrandizement. | . Gratitude. |
| . Loyalty to country, ethnic
group or individual. | . Friendship. |
| . Revenge. | . Religion. |
| . Idealism. | . Obligation to an individual. |
| | . Ideology. |

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- . Fear.
- . Sex.

The potential agent should be evaluated to determine if he is already motivated to cooperate, and, if not, if he can be motivated by the Collection Officer.

Observation

Observe the potential recruit. Probably the best person to make observations of the potential controlled agent is another type of agent called a "utility agent." A utility agent can ask questions, elicit responses and make personal observations within the potential agent's environment. If a utility agent is not available, it eventually becomes the responsibility of the Collection Officer to arrange a meeting with the potential agent.

INITIAL CONTACT^{34,35,36}

The initial contact with the potential agent is usually predicated by his lifestyle or situation. It can also be dictated by the individual's position, occupation or adverse circumstances. That is why it is important for the Collection Officer to have as much information as possible about the potential agent before he makes the initial contact. It is always possible that the wrong approach can "burn" the whole effort. On the other hand, the proper approach can mean a payoff in the shortest amount of time and effort expended.

Be careful with any approach; remember, the higher the placement of the potential agent, the greater the defensive effort required because the higher the placement, the more sensitive the target organizations are to penetration efforts and the more cautious they will be. A Collection Officer can consider several approaches for the initial contact with the potential controlled agent.

- . Utilize another person, the utility agent, or another Collection Officer to make the initial contact. Using another person to make the initial contact is not as secure as the Collection Officer making his own contact; therefore, the go-between must be absolutely trustworthy. The use of a go-between is less preferable for security reasons.
- . The Collection Officer can make the initial approach in one of two ways:

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- . Under an assumed identity, or
- . Openly as an Intelligence Officer.

The initial meeting can be arranged by the Collection Officer being at the same place and at the same time, "coincidentally." It can be a social meeting that the potential agent attends, a Friday afternoon end-of-the-week cocktail party, or any one of a number of places which should have been identified during the background investigation. The initial meeting should be used only to establish an introduction between the Collection Officer and the potential agent.

A follow-up "coincidental" meeting should be arranged. This meeting will provide an opportunity for lengthier conversations. Further "chance" meetings can probably lead to open conversations during which the Collection Officer may elicit specific information about the likes and dislikes, idiosyncrasies and motivations of the potential controlled agent. All information elicited should be included in the evaluation of the potential agent. As an example of this technique, ***Israeli Intelligence Officers regularly attended group meetings and seminars in an attempt to recruit American security consultants.***

RATING THE POTENTIAL AGENT³⁷

There have been several different schemes invented to numerically rate the potential of an agent. However, they can be sometimes misleading. Calling a person a "4" may hide the fact that he still has a great deal of potential but just needs more work. There are usually four categories for rating a person's potential according to his motives and the background checks made during the assessing phase.

Reliable	=	Excellent
Probably Reliable	=	Good
Probably Unreliable	=	Fair
Unreliable	=	Poor

While you are free to develop any rating scheme you choose, the table above should be used as a guideline for rating the potential agent. Also, keep in mind that a potential

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agent may score highly in the area of motivation and have a lesser score on the background check.

Placement and Access

Placement and access are vital qualities for any potential agent. No matter how willing a person is to act as your controlled agent, if he has no placement and access to the target, he will likely be of little value. Couple the "poor" to "excellent" ratings for motivation and background check with the potential agent's placement and access.

Unlimited Access	=	Excellent
Routine Access	=	Good
Limited Access	=	Fair
Area Access	=	Poor

The potential value of those with special access or who are associated with the target could range anywhere from poor to excellent; usually, they would be at least "Good." Therefore, the potential agent who has either excellent or good ratings for his motives and background and has excellent or good ratings in placement and access has the greatest potential to be a successful agent. This should not exclude the person who is in the fair or poor area, however. This just means that closer control has to be maintained on this individual if he/she is the only recruitment prospect.

Future Benefits

Not every potential agent will rate highly in all areas. Some may not even rate high enough in any area to be of any value in the particular operation for which you began assessing them. However, a successful Collection Officer always keeps the future in mind.

After the spotting and assessment processes are completed and you have identified an individual who is a perfect candidate for a controlled agent, except for the fact that he has

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no access to the target, be sure to maintain a file on this individual. He may be of no use to you on this particular operation, but he could prove to be invaluable on a future operation. Having already collected a great deal of information on this person will make the job that much simpler in the future.

The efforts of the spotting and assessment processes are rarely futile, even if you are certain that the potential recruit will **never** be a candidate for a controlled agent. At the very least, you have identified an individual who need not be investigated again. Maintain your file on this individual and when future operations arise pertaining to the same target, you will at least know whom **not** to consider.

**Diligent assessment of potential agents
will save your organization a lot of time
and money and may prevent damaging
compromise to your operation.**

Cost Effectiveness of the Potential Agent

Money is a factor in any endeavor including the recruitment of potential controlled agents. And, as with other undertakings, the cost must be weighed against the expected return. If the potential candidate for recruitment is going to cost you more than the value you would place on the information he might provide you with, then he will **not** be a cost effective agent. Conversely, if the potential agent will cost you little to recruit and manage, then it may not be necessary for him to produce a vast quantity of information in order to be a cost effective agent. Remember, cost is primarily associated with time and effort (manpower) and may involve only relatively small amounts of cash.

Counterintelligence Risk

There is another type of "motivation" which may inspire an individual to become an agent. That motivation is to infiltrate the intelligence organization to gain placement and

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access on behalf of a hostile intelligence service. Hostile intelligence services have demonstrated their ability to develop controlled agents at all levels and in all parts of the friendly intelligence service. Generally, this is accomplished by corrupting officials with money or support in their political endeavors. Occasionally, it is accomplished by blackmail. It is entirely likely that potential agents will be "dangled" for you to discover during spotting. Their specific mission in the hostile organization is to infiltrate **your** organization. As agents they would then have placement with your Intelligence Collection Officers and might achieve a type of access by evaluating the assignment and questions posed by the Collection Officers. An agent can also frustrate a collection effort by feeding the Collection Officer false information. **Never** underestimate the ability of a hostile intelligence service to penetrate your organization. Therefore, think counterintelligence. Think defensively. A good rule of thumb to follow is, if the potential agent is a volunteer and has exceptionally good placement and access, look beyond his given motives for some other reasons. Be especially careful if the guy looks too good to be true – he may be!

**NEVER underestimate the ability of a
hostile intelligence service to penetrate your
organization.**

INTELLIGENCE FILES³⁸

Intelligence is the end product of processed information relating to the actions or intentions of an individual and/or organization. The efforts of the Collection Officers to compile relevant information will not be effective unless proper records and files are maintained to facilitate the accurate and orderly dissemination of information for subsequent analysis and use. In the establishment of intelligence files, several questions and criteria have to be met.

File Mission

The first step in the development of intelligence file programs is the determination of the file mission. Decisions must be made as to what the files of the agency are to provide

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and what their reasons for existence are to be. For this purpose, we will join missions, goals, mandates, purposes, and objectives into the interchangeable term of "mission." The "mission" of the intelligence file is to provide a support system for easy and orderly storage, dissemination, evaluation, security, purging, and destruction of collected information.

File Content

The subject area of file content defines what can, and can not, be maintained in the file as sensitive materials. This is a particularly delicate area since it requires a great deal of judgment on the part of the Collection Officers and analysts as to what is useful and important and what is not. This is a subject that often has intelligence personnel in conflict with one another; what some see as useful may appear useless to others. Someone then has to have the ultimate authority to determine what will be part of the file's content and what will not. This authority should come from the Director or his designate.

It is important to remember that, to the Collection Officer, all information collected is important. Deeply buried within trivia, hearsay and gossip may be the key to a successful recruitment or the lead necessary to obtain operational objectives.

When planning a collection operation, objectives and priorities for information need to be established to avoid unnecessary collection. This is particularly important when dealing with agents. Losing control of an agent's collection efforts could bog you down in trivia and steer the operation away from the objectives and toward compromise.

File Types

The next consideration during the development of the intelligence support file system should be the type of files to be maintained. While the mission may cause us to develop different types of files, there are three categories that are most common:

- . Permanent.
- . Temporary.
- . Working.

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Permanent Files are those that contain individuals, subjects, events, and organizations that have been fully identified, verified and validated. The information in these files is as complete as possible. They should be reviewed every five years to be re-assessed for their value. Updating of intelligence is done as it is received.

Temporary Files are those which, while still related to intelligence objectives, do not quite meet file criteria for permanent file storage. Typically, the temporary file contains information concerning individuals and/or organizations of possible future interest, such as general spotting reports. The individuals are not yet fully identified or their placement and access is questionable and, as yet, the information has not been verified or validated. All intelligence materials held in temporary files will one day be routed out of the temporary category; they will be purged or transferred to the permanent file. No materials remain for long in temporary files. Most temporary files should not last for more than one year before they are transferred to permanent files or destroyed.

Working Files are designed to assist the Collection Officer as he develops the initial stages of the collection effort. Working files are short-term in nature for the convenience of the Collection Officer as he gathers material to develop into temporary or permanent files. Working files are an exception situation and need to be monitored closely. The security consideration must be as strenuously followed for working files as it would for permanent files. Within a week or two, information contained in a working file should be transferred to permanent or temporary files.

Intelligence Evaluations

Another important file activity is evaluation, since the bulk of newly arrived information consists of nothing more than allegations or bits and pieces of verified raw information. Evaluating the sources of the intelligence as well as its content at the time of its arrival indicates to the future users that the file systems can be relied upon. Disseminating intelligence which has not been evaluated is detrimental to mission objectives and security. To ensure uniformity in the evaluation system, a schedule should be incorporated.

Ideally, rating of intelligence should be the responsibility of persons who work daily with the intelligence materials so that the ratings will be both sound and consistent. The Collection Officer and the analysts are the best judges of the material since they often come

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in direct contact with or are near to the primary source. Supervisory monitoring will afford the necessary checks-and-balances to facilitate uniformity.

Quality Control

The handling of intelligence information is a very delicate operation. Therefore, controls need to be exercised in order to assure the proper collection, processing, evaluating, storage and dissemination.

In order to maintain consistency in these areas, a "Quality Control Officer(s)" should be assigned to review all intelligence files. He will double check that:

- . All material is submitted in the right format.
- . All material has been rated properly.
- . Data is maintained in correct files (permanent, temporary, working).
- . Data is classified correctly.
- . Procedures for dissemination are correctly followed.

The presence of a Quality Control Officer does not mean that other Collection Officers are free of the responsibility for the quality and use of this confidential material. His presence does mean that files are assured to be of a higher quality because of the operational attention he is assigned to give to them.

The value of a good file system is directly related to the quality of the information contained within the files. Incomplete files are of limited value whereas high quality files will predictably yield more and better information and understanding. The United States' Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) provides a good example of what a powerful intelligence tool file systems can be.

File Dissemination

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It is pointless to go through great lengths of covert maneuvers to collect intelligence and then to have the dissemination process handled loosely. Rigid and formal rules are followed in the external release of all intelligence. While there should be established strict distribution codes and routes, a few primary rules are:

- . Know who the person(s) are who will receive the intelligence.
- . Assure that they are aware of the classification and any special handling.
- . Deny any secondary dissemination. Unlawful copying of materials causes major control problems.
- . Confirm "need-to-know" authorization prior to dissemination. Professional intelligence personnel know and understand the need for this rule and should expect to be asked as a result of their request for confidential information.

Audit Trail

Maintain an audit trail. This is a most important activity and is the responsibility of all who handle the intelligence and the quality control responsibility to monitor.

A cover sheet should be attached to all intelligence to cover the following points:

- A. Document classification.
- B. Document number.
- C. Date of request.
- D. The name and agency requesting the material.
- E. Special handling instructions to include how and when it is to be delivered and returned.
- F. Name and signatures involved in the chain of custody.

File Security

Much of what has been discussed so far directly relates to file security. The very nature of intelligence collection relies on firm file security in order to maintain the value of the intelligence. These files should always be maintained in a highly guarded atmosphere.

There are three types of control which must be established in order to assure file security: administrative, technical and physical. Along with these controls, there are several questions that must be answered in the affirmative before the intelligence files can be considered sufficiently secure. If any of these questions are answered negatively, the file should **not** be considered secure and immediate steps should be taken to remedy the deficiency.

Administrative

- . Is file security a major part of the section, station and staff guidelines?
- . Are all handlers of intelligence trained in file security?
- . Is each station and section head responsible for supervising file security?

Technical

- . Are audit forms or cover sheets used to record file use?
- . Are all topics and subjects sensitive?
- . Has all material been properly classified?



Physical

- . Is storage facility or area kept under lock and key?
- . Does file room have solid walls, floor, ceiling and door?

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- . Is facility properly alarmed and monitored?
- . Have access lists been established?
- . Are all materials double secured in locked containers?
- . Have file evacuation plans been established in case of fire, flood, or impending hostile compromise?
- . Has strict destruction plans been established?
- . Has contingency plan been established in case of alarm and monitoring system failure?

File Purging

In intelligence collection, there comes a need to purge unnecessary information. This is for various reasons.

- . **Accuracy** – Verification has been made confirming that the details in file items are inaccurate.
- . **Relevance** – Proof exists that materials are not serviceable or productive in accomplishing the intelligence objectives.
- . **Timely** – Material no longer concerns the current objectives.

This does not mean that the information should be destroyed. When information meets one of these considerations, steps should be taken to upgrade or move it to the archives. The most important consideration, of course, is to improve accuracy through verification and validation.

Continual review must be a day-to-day process with review dates established for each document. If a file is purged and placed into archives, then a recording system for the archives should be established so it can still be easily retrieved.

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Conclusions

The assessment phase culminates in the decision to proceed with recruiting the potential controlled agent or to terminate the effort. This decision is based upon the agent's potential ability to provide information, his receptiveness to recruitment and the cost effectiveness of using him as a controlled agent.

REMEMBER! Intelligence is the end product of processed information relating to the actions or intentions of an individual and/or organization. A vast amount of time and effort has been invested in the acquisition of the information. The efforts of the Collection Officers to compile relevant information will not be effective unless proper records and files are maintained.

Continual review of intelligence information stored in the files must be a day-to-day process with review dates and procedures well established. A recording system to account for archived files should be maintained so information can still be easily retrieved when necessary.

Chapter

5

Recruiting

UPON COMPLETING THIS SECTION YOU SHOULD BE ABLE TO:

1. Define the goal of recruiting and how it is accomplished.
 2. Understand the six basic elements involved in the process of recruiting a controlled agent.
 3. Describe the two basic approaches to recruitment.
 4. Understand why control of the agent is important.
-

RECRUITING STEPS^{39,40,41,42}

Recruiting, as it relates to the agent cycle, follows the assessment phase and concerns itself with enlisting the assistance of an individual to serve as a controlled human resource in an attempt to either penetrate a target organization or to obtain information or material to which he already has some degree of access.

There are six basic elements involved in the process of recruiting a controlled agent:

- . Developing the relationship.
- . Planning the recruitment.
- . Making the pitch.
- . Using an alternative recruitment pitch.
- . Coping with an unsuccessful reaction.
- . Proceeding from a successful reaction.

Developing the Relationship

Personal contacts made with the potential agent during the assessment phase are generally superficial and are primarily for information gathering. In the recruitment phase, the personal contact develops into a more serious relationship and is designed to elicit a commitment from the potential agent. At some point during this relationship, when the Collection Officer believes the potential agent is ready for recruitment, a meeting should be arranged to recruit the candidate. When scheduling the time and place of the meeting, the Collection Officer should consider the following.

Time – The meeting should be scheduled at a time convenient to the person being recruited. Also, consider any conflict or unusual occurrence he may recently have experienced which will motivate him to be recruited. The potential agent is about to be asked for a commitment to perform under controlled conditions and every effort to minimize a real

Recruiting

or imagined danger to him should be made in order to ensure the securing of that commitment.

Place – Security for the operation, and for the person recruited, must be considered when selecting the place for the meeting. It would be illogical to arrange a meeting in a place where the candidate's identity and the Collection Officer's identity are known. A lengthy serious conversation between the two when observed by someone who knows both the candidate and the Collection Officer can neutralize the candidate's effectiveness before he has a chance to operate. Additionally, give consideration to convenience for the candidate when selecting a location. The place should be comfortable and free from distractions. Keep in mind the candidate has been primed during the assessment phase. It is possible that he is on the verge of volunteering assistance or just waiting to be asked to help. Therefore, it is important that the time, place and atmosphere of the meeting be conducive to inspiring a voluntary commitment with a minimum of coaxing.

Planning the Recruitment

After spotting the potential agent and investigating and evaluating his motives, placement and access, the Collection Officer makes his decision to attempt recruitment. The Collection Officer has developed a relationship with the potential candidate and has identified a time and place suitable for recruitment. There are two basic approaches to recruiting with variations on both:

Direct Approach – The direct or cold approach is simply asking a person if he will work for you, explicitly citing the motives you believe will cause the person to agree. The Israeli service has frequently exploited this approach.

The direct or cold approach is usually appropriate when the candidate need not be coerced to cooperate; for example, agents who can be motivated for recruitment by ideological reasons or by monetary gain.

Indirect Approach – The indirect approach uses suggestion as a technique to develop in the mind of the candidate the motivation that will cause him to make the decision to work with your agency without being asked directly to do so. The indirect approach takes more time but is usually more successful because the candidate commits himself to the

operation **before** he realizes the extent or true nature of his involvement.

The indirect approach to recruiting will usually follow a pattern from a normal relationship to a "conspiratorial" relationship between a recruiter and a candidate.

Making the Recruitment Pitch^{43,44}

At this time the Collection Officer will actually solicit assistance from the recruit. The recruitment pitch should be:

- . Well thought out.
- . Reduced to writing and critiqued.
- . Rehearsed.
- . Presented to someone familiar with the situation for a critical analysis.
- . Reworked for the best presentation.

This is the stage at which the candidate will or will not agree to engage in espionage. It is at this precise moment that the effort extended in the spotting and assessing phases should pay off. Therefore, it makes sense to use every bit of information, expertise and time to prepare your pitch to convince the candidate to work with your agency. Emphasis should always be placed on the motivating factors developed about the candidate.

Alternative Recruitment Pitch

The recruiter should be prepared with an alternative recruitment pitch in the event the primary pitch does not work on the candidate. A good Collection Officer always has a backup plan; i.e., exposure of compromising situations or other non-threatening involvement. If the proper assessment of the candidate has been made, the primary or secondary pitch should be sufficient to motivate him.

The Unsuccessful Reaction

There is always the possibility that the candidate will tell the recruiter to get lost. Since that is a possible alternative, it should be anticipated and planned for during the preparation of the recruitment pitch. Planning for an unsuccessful or negative reaction includes:

- . Not telling the candidate who or what the actual target is.
- . Not telling the candidate the specifics about his possible mission (i.e., information gathering, utility work or long-duration influence operation, etc.).
- . Not telling the candidate anything which, if gotten back to the target or hostile security services, would make them aware of the collection effort.

The candidate may speculate as to the identity of the target and the type of information the agency is seeking, but speculation is part of the intelligence environment which permeates the intelligence community. The Collection Officer should not lend credibility to speculation by unintentionally providing any information which would tend to verify it.

Since the prospective controlled agent has no need to know the true identity of the Collection Officer or the agency for which he works, emphasis should be given to maintaining anonymity and creating a cover story for the recruiter. In the event the potential agent rejects the recruitment attempt, neither the Collection Officer nor his agency should be identifiable.

If your recruitment effort fails, be patient; in time, the candidate may have reason to change his mind and will seek you out to volunteer his help. Even if he rejects you, leave him with the feeling that you have his best interest in mind and that a door is always open if his situation changes.

The Successful Reaction

Immediately following the potential agent's commitment to work for you, training and indoctrination should begin. Emphasis should be given to the control of the agent,

operational security, and assuring the newly recruited individual of his personal security.

Control of the Agent

Once committed, the agent should be given a last chance by the Collection Officer to back out, but only when the Collection Officer is certain that he will not back out. This tactic reinforces the recruited agent's commitment to the Collection Officer and also strengthens the Collection Officer's image as the decision-maker with control over the agent. It is imperative that the Collection Officer create an image of being the decision maker on all issues. The controlled agent, in particular, must be confident that the Collection Officer is authorized and able to make decisions.

It is also imperative that the controlled agent know and believe that the Collection Officer runs the operation and is responsible for, and concerned about, his personal safety. It must be made clear, however, that consistent with that responsibility, the agent must follow all directions and rules for the operation. If the agent brings the Collection Officer a problem or issue on which the Collection Officer has no authority to make a decision, he should sidestep the issue by telling the agent he "needs time to think about it." The Collection Officer should get direction from the appropriate authority at the earliest possible time, then present that decision to the agent as his own.

Remember, there must be an employer-employee relationship between the Collection Officer and the controlled agent at all times. The Collection Officer should immediately levy a requirement on the recruited agent. The requirement can be relatively insignificant, such as obtaining some information already in file. Again, this tactic reinforces the beginning of conditioned responses to the Collection Officer's directions. Do not let the controlled agent think the information is insignificant. Let him believe it is an important piece of information, even though it is easily obtainable by him.

Additional information about the agent should also be solicited subsequent to receiving his commitment, including photographs, handwriting samples and missing bio-data. If money is the prime motivator of the agent and he is being paid by the agency, signed contracts can be valuable for future use. ***CAUTION: Attempts at this early stage to secure further information about the agent can have a negative backlash. NEVER force the issue at this time if you sense a negative response.***

OPERATIONAL SECURITY

Consistent with operational security is the development of communication systems. Before a successful recruitment meeting is terminated, an initial communication system must be arranged. The system should be practical and simple, yet provide security for the agent and handler, and concealment for the operation. The initial system must afford "two-way" communication:

- . From the agent to the collection officer, and;
- . From the collection officer to the agent.



With agent development and operational progress, communication will likely become more sophisticated and should include primary, secondary, and emergency means. Examples of this could include:

- . Confidential phone numbers. **CAUTION** – Be sure that whoever answers these lines never identifies its operational purpose. This provides some security in case the phone numbers have been compromised. Frequent changing of these phone numbers helps maintain this security.
- . Dead letter drops.
- . Message services utilizing a cover identity.

Controlled Agent's Personal Security

From time to time, some agents may have to be reassured that their personal safety is provided for. They should be advised that security systems for their safety do exist. They should not be given the specifics of any such systems. The agent must, however, be given to understand that his safety hinges upon complete and absolute compliance with the rules and directions given him by his handler.

Subsequent Meetings with the Collection Officer

The Collection Officer must arrange for a subsequent meeting with the controlled agent to begin the training phase of the Agent Cycle. The Collection Officer must consider his own and his agent's availability for the next meeting. It would be good practice to utilize the initial communications system to get the message to the agent, setting the time and place for the next meeting.

CONCLUSIONS

Recruiting follows the assessment phase and concerns itself with actually making a pitch to an individual to serve as a controlled human resource. The six basic elements involved in the process of recruiting a controlled agent are essential to obtaining a successful reaction from the recruitee.

The Collection Officer must develop a relationship with the potential candidate and identify a time and place suitable for recruitment. Whether using a direct or indirect approach, the Collection Officer must always be prepared with an alternative pitch for recruitment and for the possibility of an unsuccessful reaction from the recruitee. The Collection Officer must develop his recruitment plan thoroughly to be prepared for all contingencies.

Chapter

6

Training the Controlled Agent

UPON COMPLETING THIS SECTION YOU SHOULD BE ABLE TO:

1. Understand why training a controlled agent is essential.
 2. Name the topics that should be covered when training a controlled agent.
 3. Develop an effective Training Plan Outline.
 4. Maximize the utility of the controlled agent through training.
-

NECESSITY OF TRAINING^{45,46}

The controlled agent has been successfully spotted, assessed and recruited. You now have reached one of the critical and most important crossroads in the development of the controlled agent – training for the specific mission for which he was chosen and recruited. You are now tasked with the what, where, when, how, and why of your mission.

Whatever the motivation, he has agreed to assist – to be a controlled agent. It is now up to you. While he may or may not know specifically what he will be expected to do, almost definitely he does not know how to do it (as you want it done). He is ready to work, but is certainly concerned about what the job will really entail and, most importantly, if he can do the job without getting caught.

When you recruited him, you made (or should have made) the commitment to properly train him for the given mission. You now must fulfill that commitment. You and your agency have invested time, effort and resources in this individual to reach this stage in the Agent Cycle and it is contingent upon you to properly finish your task. Your goal is to utilize the controlled agent to gather information or perform other services in the most efficient manner possible.

Historically, many intelligence agencies have been less than efficient in dealing with available human sources of information. In the case of the controlled agent with real placement and access, we cannot afford less than a **total** effort. The more sophisticated the target, the more difficult the mission. Therefore, if we are to be successful, we must appropriately train the controlled agent.

PURPOSE OF TRAINING⁴⁷

The dictionary defines training as "systematic instruction and drill." It further defines a training school as a "practical instruction and drill; specifically, a school in which students receive special vocational or technical instruction and practice." The dictionary has described for us the methodology we must employ. There are **no** short cuts in training. Assurance that the agent can complete the required tasks is likely to require sufficient training. Thus, successful collection operations are, in part, dependent on effective training.

Training the Controlled Agent

We have all experienced the satisfaction of recruiting a good source only to be followed by the pressure to "get him out there and learn everything you can – forget everything else, just get the job done." No consideration is given to a good cover. Improper and even dangerous measures are used to communicate with the source. Little concern is given as to whether the agent can do what is asked, and no consideration is given to security measures which will ensure his future usefulness. We have all seen Collection Officers place almost total reliance upon the judgment of agents. Or, they assume that he has the inbred capabilities to do the job without additional training, if training is even given a thought.

It has not been too long ago that intelligence agencies used similar practices in putting Collection Officers to work. They were hired, given a tape recorder, trench coat and camera, and told to go out and gather information. Fortunately, the training of Collection Officers has become structured and formalized and now stresses all types of education. In light of the increasing sophistication of our adversaries and targets, we must avoid archaic handling of recruited sources. We cannot afford to be derelict in the development of this valuable resource.

The purpose of training is to maximize the utility of a controlled agent.

The controlled agent has been selected because of his placement and access to the target. He has been carefully assessed and recruited and then we fail because we do not train him. The controlled agent is a resource which cannot be wasted; his potential may be unlimited if properly guided. We must take the time and effort to see that this potential is utilized to the fullest extent.

ESSENTIAL TRAINING TOPICS^{48,49}

In training the controlled agent, four specific areas will usually be dealt with:

- . Communication.
- . Security considerations.

Training the Controlled Agent

- . Cover.
- . Reporting procedures.

The newly recruited agent was chosen because of his placement and his ability to access the information needed. We have utilized a systematic approach in his selection, assessment and recruitment. Therefore, we cannot do less than utilize a systematic approach in his training. The systematic approach will ensure that nothing in the training phase is left to chance or overlooked. The training must necessarily take into consideration a number of factors:

- . The nature of the target.
- . The level of placement of the agent.
- . The information desired.
- . The depth of cover required.
- . The available time for training.
- . How the agent will communicate with you.
- . How you will communicate with the agent.
- . What security measures are necessary.
- . What equipment is necessary.
- . Where you will train the agent.
- . How much money will be necessary.
- . How you will evaluate the agent's performance.

Therefore, when we talk of a systematic training approach we must consider the

Training the Controlled Agent

necessity of a formal training plan. In each situation where a controlled agent will be utilized, a different training plan may be required; however, a good place to start is with a basic training plan outline.

Refer to Exhibit A entitled TRAINING PLAN OUTLINE located at the end of this chapter. This outline is a starting point and certainly is not presented as the universal answer. Each individual case will dictate an individual approach; therefore, Exhibit A TRAINING PLAN OUTLINE is submitted only for its conceptual application. However, it will assist you in organizing any training of a controlled agent and hopefully will prevent your overlooking important aspects of the training program.

Testing is continuous from the first contact through the termination of the controlled agent's work. However, in the training phase of the agent cycle we must never assume that he knows -- we must always verify his total grasp and understanding of everything. Review it with him and then test him again.

BENEFITS OF THE TRAINING PLAN OUTLINE

All of us must answer to someone for our actions. Someone will review our plan and will pass on whether or not we can implement it; therefore, a comment section is a necessity. This segment of the TRAINING PLAN OUTLINE enables you to clarify or add to your plan. Here you can give your sales pitch to convince those in authority that the whole plan is cost effective, necessary and beneficial. You can point out the wisdom of providing all the elements necessary to execute the whole program of training and the utilization of the controlled agent.

At this stage it is not unusual for someone to ask the question, "Why all this preparation -- why not just turn the agent loose and go do it?" A plan serves many purposes, but two very important reasons stand out. First, it provides the guidelines which preclude your forgetting something related to the training of the agent. The plan should set forth, in an orderly fashion, those things that must be considered if the agent is to be properly trained. Secondly, consider the plan through the eyes of the Station Chief or Desk Officer, or even the Director. Your plan sets forth in a detailed, organized fashion not only what you intend to do but also how you are going to do it. Whether the presentation is written or oral, you will present it in a systematic fashion that is readily understandable or, if necessary, defensible. If it is necessary to defend your plan, do not hesitate to use an enlarged version of the

guideline as a speaking aide or guide.

AREAS OF TRAINING

- . Communication.
- . Cover.
- . Security.
- . Reporting.



Continual Test and Review

Before we discuss the specific areas of training, I would submit to you one thought to retain throughout the agent's training – ***continual testing and review.***

Properly presented, testing and reviewing not only allows you to measure how effectively your training program is progressing but also enhances your rapport with the agent. It will add to your image as a professional and reinforce the agent's feeling of security in working for you (and your agency). It also keeps him on his toes because he realizes that you will not be satisfied with less than maximum effort. Additionally, testing and review adds to your ability to control and direct the agent. It is important to your control of the agent that you display a positive and professional, no-nonsense approach. Remember, ***he is working for you – he is not a member of the family.***

Communication

This area of training is listed first because this is what it is all about. You must communicate with the agent and he must communicate with you. You must direct his activities and he must report to you on what he has learned. The methodology of this communication should be predicated on the agent's placement in the organization, his proximity to the principals, his motivation for becoming an agent and, most importantly, his cover story.

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Three different methods of contact and communication should always be considered and planned for:

- . Primary – routine and scheduled.
- . Alternate – to be used if primary cannot be utilized.
- . Emergency – only to be utilized during a true emergency.

Regardless of the type of communication utilized you must impress upon the controlled agent the considerations of security. All of your efforts and the efforts of the agent can be totally wasted by carelessness or panic.

There are many methods of communication that can be used besides personal contact, the telephone and the mails. Some of these are listed here for your consideration and are discussed in subsequent chapters.

- . Dead drops.
- . Live drops.
- . Cut outs.
- . Newspaper ads.
- . Delivery services.
- . Special radio transmitters.
- . Placement of objects.

Methods of communication or the passing of information are only limited by your imagination. The type of target will usually be the main indicator of the type of communication that will be most effective and timely. Face-to-face communication with your agent will necessarily include elicitation of information. It is usually necessary for you to stimulate the agent's memory processes to retrieve possibly vital information he may not

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consider of interest to you. It is your job to elicit this type of data and additionally, it is your job to train the agent in elicitation of information from the target in a manner that will not arouse suspicion. The controlled agent must be drilled in this technique; do not assume that he will be good at this but, rather, continually test him.

Security

This is one of your primary responsibilities in the handling of the controlled agent. Protection and security must be considered at all times. The training must stress the "do's and don'ts" relating to his and the operation's security. Your concern with the agent's safety also will reinforce his confidence in you as a professional. The period of greatest danger of compromise is during a meeting with the agent; therefore, it is wise both to minimize these meetings and to plan for safety and danger signals during personal contact. Always plan for countersurveillance regardless of whether or not there are any indications that it is necessary.

Absolute secrecy is fundamental to espionage. The agent is to tell no one what he is doing nor for whom he is working. He must be constantly reminded that ***obscurity is basic to his security*** and that any unusual activity on his part will draw attention to him. ***Pollard, who spied for Israel, violated these rules and was caught because of it.***

Many additional things must be considered such as, what to do if arrested, and emergency communication if he feels he has been discovered or if something "big" is happening. All eventualities concerning the agent and the operations security must be planned for and included in the agent's training.

Cover

Cover of some sort may be necessary for a controlled agent. As the agent's handler, you will have to consider what type of cover will be necessary.

- . What is his reason for not maintaining his regular habits?
- . How necessary is a cover story (if he has been recruited because of his placement)?

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- . Will he need a cover to meet with you or others?
- . Will he need a cover for what he does or does not do?

If any type of cover is used, then the agent must be thoroughly drilled during the training period.

Reporting Procedures

Reporting procedures will vary with the individual agent and the target. However, we find that in the training of the agent, it is necessary to thoroughly school him in the basics of reporting; who, what, where, when, why, and how.

Whether written or verbal reports are utilized, it is necessary that all of the basics be considered. Again, you must impress upon the agent the necessity of reporting everything. He must be trained to understand that it is your function to put the pieces of the puzzle together and that it is his job to gather the pieces. If practical, you should debrief the agent after he has given his report.

When the agent is reporting, remember that you should be listening, not talking. Give him your full attention and do not be distracted. Listening will allow you to hear and understand what he has to say as well as showing him that you are interested in the job he is doing. This will reinforce his faith in you and will undoubtedly make him try harder.

Also, during the reporting procedure you will have the opportunity to test the agent by rewording questions and by using previously learned and confirmed facts to check his answers.

**Remember, testing and evaluation are
continual throughout the Agent Cycle.**

Observations and Descriptions

This is an important phase of the training cycle that should not be overlooked. Many operations require descriptions of what is observed; therefore, you must school the agent in how to describe persons, vehicles, documents, locations, etc. You may not want the agent to know what it is that he is tasked to observe. That lack of understanding can often lead the agent to believe that what he has seen is not important when, in fact, it may be a key element to the task. Therefore, it is essential that the agent is trained to report **EVERYTHING** he sees or hears, regardless of whether or not he views it as important. Accuracy in these observations and descriptions is extremely necessary and this phase should be emphasized and continually tested.

TEST MISSION/ASSIGNMENT^{51,52,53}

Before dispatching the agent to the actual target, give him his first operational test by assigning him a test mission. A test mission is a dry run, a "shake down cruise," but should always be designed so as to convince the agent that it is the real thing. Such a mission can be totally removed from the actual target or it can be aimed at the periphery of the actual target. There are three common variations on the test mission:

The known information mission – The agent is tasked to obtain information you **already** have. This type of test mission not only allows you to assess your agent's performance but, in addition, you have an opportunity to verify the agent's veracity by comparing the information the agent brings you with your existing information.

The phantom target mission – The target does not exist. You therefore have no need of any information pertaining to this target. This test mission, again, allows you to evaluate the agent's performance and his veracity.

Parallel agent mission – The agent is assigned a task identical to that of another agent. Parallel agent missions would typically pit the new agent against an established vetted agent. Comparing their respective performances and what they each produce gives insight to the ability and character of the new agent.

LIMITS TO TRAINING

During the training of the agent, it is well to remember that you selected and recruited him and he has yet to prove his mettle. Therefore, do not tell him more than he needs to know. This is particularly true with the unpaid individual; he has yet to be tried, so you must protect yourself, your operation and your agency.

Also, during the training cycle a good rule of thumb is to avoid the use of intelligence jargon. The agent may never have had any exposure to intelligence operatives except "spy movies" and it would be quite unwise to have a few "spy" phrases pop up in his speech. Another area to be considered is that of identification of the specific target and what specifically you want him to collect. He should be apprised of this only when his training is completed and you feel that he is ready. Sometimes, depending upon the agent or sensitivity of the operation, specific identification of the required information or material should not be revealed at all but hidden within a wide scope of desired material.

CONCLUSIONS

You now have your controlled agent trained. Now what is he going to do for you? You have selected him, assessed him, recruited him, and trained him. Along the way you have convinced your superiors that he is a valuable resource and that your agency needs him to accomplish his mission.

Although the controlled agent can be used for many unique applications, he is used principally to gather information on a target organization or to collect information or material related to a specific topic or event. He may also help you identify future candidates for recruitment. He is able to perform these tasks because of his placement and your training.

If we are going to have an impact on the national goals of our country or combat the espionage directed against us, we must be prepared to be innovative, as well as using tried-and-true methods. The systematic training of the controlled informant is one of the innovative tools we have at our disposal.

EXHIBIT A – TRAINING PLAN OUTLINE

1. PURPOSE AND GOALS

- . Identify the problem.
- . What type of training is necessary.
- . What will the training accomplish.
- . How will the training be delivered.

2. TIME FACTOR(S)

- . How much time is required for training.
- . When will it begin and terminate.

3. TRAINING SITE(S)

- . Where will you conduct the training.
- . Is a specific location required by the type of training.
- . How will security be preserved.

4. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

- . What measures will be taken to prevent compromise during training.

5. PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

- . Who will participate.
- . Can you perform training alone or are specialists required.

6. TRANSPORTATION

- . What kind of transportation is required.
- . Who requires it.
- . Where and when is it required.

7. COVER

- . Agent cover to account for his absence during training.
- . Cover story for use of training site.
- . Depth of cover required.
- . Backstopping measures.

8. AREAS OF TRAINING AND TRAINING AIDS

- . Training topics: drops, cover, security, etc.
- . What training aids are necessary: cameras, lock picks, etc.
- . Training aids should be: available, in working order, simple to operate.

9. FISCAL AND LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS

- . How much will be required.
- . What for.
- . Where from.

10. TESTING AND EVALUATION

- . How will you test understanding.
- . Evaluation criteria.

Chapter

7

Managing the Agent's Activities

UPON COMPLETING THIS SECTION YOU SHOULD BE ABLE TO:

1. Understand how to control an agent's activities.
 2. Appreciate the importance of discipline.
 3. Identify the elements that should be covered during a mission procedures briefing.
 4. Know why contact procedures are vital to managing an agent.
-

CONTROLLING THE AGENT^{54,55,56}

One of the Collection Officer's primary tasks is to create a proper sense of duty and discipline in the agent and to generate the atmosphere and machinery for impressing them. It is this which creates the **contract**, the sense of mutual rights and obligations under which the work is to be undertaken. The Collection Officer must create in the agent a commitment to the organization.

For all practical purposes there is no such thing as a **freelance agent**. There is in fact no room for independent operators, and to enter into espionage is to become entangled in the web. Every agent, in every transaction, is "owned" by someone. The agent is somebody's asset and someone in the organization (usually the Collection Officer or handler) is responsible for the agent's performance and productivity, and can be called to account by his superiors for any mismanagement.

Discipline is the Collection Officer's primary management tool. The agent must be controlled at all times. **NEVER** allow the agent to believe that he can make decisions independently. The agent should look to his handler to make decisions for him. ***Walker disobeyed the orders of his KGB handlers and recruited sub-agents on his own, including Whitworth, who attempted to turn him in.***

The agent will be taught many things – how to think, observe, report, etc., but first he must be taught to obey.

MISSION PREPARATION

Prior to dispatching the agent on any mission, important arrangements should be made to ensure the success and security of the collection assignment. Dispatching simply means activating the agent to do what you originally set out to accomplish; collect quality information about the target in a controlled and secure manner. The procedural steps of the Agent Cycle should have prepared the controlled agent and his handler to accomplish those operational goals. Considerable time, money and man-hours have been expended in the development of the agent and it would be illogical to revert to haphazard methods at this

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critical stage. To continue with a professional and systematic approach demands attention be given to details of the dispatch procedure. Any dispatch (except for test missions) should include the elements covered in the next few pages.

Target Debriefing

Debrief the agent regarding his knowledge of the target. What does he already know about the real target? Review the information he may already have given and elicit further details. Listen carefully and make no assumptions regarding what he **seems** to know about the target and what he **actually** knows. If you assume that the agent is more familiar with the target than he really is, you may tend to skim over vital points during the debriefing phase.


Mission Procedures

The agent's task should be precise and clear-cut. He should know **exactly** what he is supposed to do, when he is supposed to do it, and what he is expected to bring with him to the next meeting – whether the task is to collect a specific document, a piece of hardware, or information. The agent must be informed of his task and understand it clearly.

The Collection Officer must go step-by-step with the agent to explain every detail of the mission. Briefing the agent on the real target, as you wish him to perceive it, should be thorough but limited to only those things that he needs to know. This should be the first time the agent is informed as to specifically who or what is the target.

Special Equipment

If any special equipment is required for the agent to complete his mission, the Collection Officer should make that equipment available to him at this meeting. As the operation develops, and as new requirements are levied on the agent, more training in the use of special equipment may need to be added. Always make certain the agent knows and understands the things he has been trained in. **TEST HIM!**



Contact Procedures

Contact procedures should be kept simple whenever possible and there should always be at least one alternative contact method available to the agent. Emergency contact procedures should also be discussed.

The agent must be told where, when and how the next meeting or contact is scheduled during the mission preparation. His contact instructions should be clear and the Collection Officer must make certain there is no misunderstanding on the part of the agent. The agent must know what to do and how to do it.

Security

The agent should be given another warning about security matters. Assure him of his well-being provided he follows directions and does not decide to take independent action. Depending upon the character of the individual agent, words may have to be carefully chosen when talking about security measures. Be careful not to "spook" the agent. A good general rule is to emphasize security but in a matter-of-fact way.

Testing

Test him! - Test understanding of the briefing. Test any possible areas of weakness in training. Test security awareness. Test understanding of the collection requirements levied and, last but not least, make certain the agent understands the arrangements for the next contact.

Pep Talk

The pep talk is designed to offer encouragement, to build the ego, and to satisfy the motives that were first identified during the assessment of the agent. The pep talk should also be designed to minimize any thoughts the agent has about being some kind of "super spy." De-emphasize the adventure or the glamorous aspects of his role, if he is so inclined. Build his ego and satisfy his motives but minimize his role as a "super spy." The "super spy"

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syndrome may cause the agent to overlap his role.

Allow the agent a chance to ask questions. In response to his questions, be as direct and as positive as need-to-know and operational security will allow. Remember, in his eyes the handler must be the boss. **NEVER** say anything that makes him believe otherwise.

COLLECTION ASSIGNMENT(S)⁵⁷

Give the agent the initial specific collection requirements he will have to satisfy. Tell him what it is you want to learn. When giving him collection requirements, be specific but, for the first time, keep the requirements relatively simple. Take one, two or, at the very most, three relatively simple questions and use them as his initial assignment. Be specific, because he may be confused by anything less than specifics. To develop the agent into a truly productive collector of information, the handler must give him practical experience in his new role, and must avoid confusing him or scaring him off with complicated assignments before he becomes good at what he is doing. Fight the inclination to be impatient. **NEVER** try to collect everything in one day. One collection requirement is ideal; two questions to answer is reasonable; but never require the first time out that the agent obtain more than three pieces of information. The agent must be made to understand that he should not shut his eyes or close his ears to other things. At the next contact he should expect to respond to his specific collection requirements but also to report other things he has seen or heard.

DEBRIEFING^{58,59}

After the agent has completed the collection assignment and has dutifully appeared at the pre-arranged time for his next meeting, the Collection Officer must be ready to receive it and be fully prepared to debrief the agent.

Location

The location that is chosen for the debriefing is almost as important as the information that is to be transferred. Remember, you must tell the agent where and when to meet you again during the mission preparation; therefore, the meeting location must be planned well in advance. Choose a location and time that is convenient to the agent whenever possible, but do not sacrifice security for the sake of convenience.

Who Will Debrief?

Depending on the agent's collection assignment, it may be necessary for the Collection Officer to have assistance during the debriefing. If, for example, the agent has been assigned the task of collecting technical information on weaponry and the Collection Officer has limited knowledge and/or training in weapons the Collection Officer should seek an expert, from within the organization, to assist him during debriefing.

If the Collection Officer is not an expert in the area of weaponry, he may not be able to assess the value of the information the agent has obtained. Someone with more knowledge on the subject of weaponry will not only make the information transfer easier, it will also help to ensure accuracy.

Debriefing Aids

It may be necessary for the Collection Officer to make hardware or tools available for the debriefing. If, for example, the agent's assignment is to make copies of classified documents without the target's knowledge, the Collection Officer may need to have a photocopier available for the next meeting so that the documents can be duplicated immediately. Make sure you are prepared to provide any necessary equipment **before** you send the agent out on his assignment.

Security

Security is the most vital element of the information transfer. Neither the Collection Officer nor the agent can afford to have their purpose discovered. During the training phase this concept should be drilled into the agent until it is second nature.

When choosing a time and location for the meeting, consider security first, last and always. While not always possible to ensure 100% security, come as close as you can.

Payments

Assuming that payment at the meeting has been pre-arranged, the Collection Officer

Managing the Agent's Activities

should come to the meeting prepared to make the payment. However, payment should never be made until the Collection Officer has received the information from the agent and only when that information fulfills the collection assignment. The Collection Officer will have to use his own judgement when the agent comes "close" to the information he was assigned to retrieve. If it's close enough, the Collection Officer may determine that every effort was made on the part of the agent and make the payment as agreed. Or, the Collection Officer may choose to withhold all or part of the payment until the agent fulfills his mission. For this reason, payment is often withheld until the information can be analyzed.

Use discretion – if the agent genuinely feels he has made every effort to accomplish his task and he shows promise for future assignments, don't alienate him by refusing to make the payment.

CONCLUSIONS

Discipline is absolutely central to the practice of espionage. The agent must submit to the dictates of discipline because the agent is the mechanism for getting information and merely the trustee of the knowledge acquired. Agents who begin to believe otherwise are extremely dangerous to any organization. Acceptance of discipline is an essential requisite to making a good agent.

Discipline, however, is neither punishment nor the calculated use of terror. It is an essential adjunct to espionage and the agent must be taught if he is to do an effective job. The agent rarely sees or comprehends the big picture and he must understand the importance of conforming to the demands of his control – an unquestioning obedience to an unseen organization.

Agents must never be given the impression that they will be forgotten, or that they are on their own. The Collection Officer must nurture the feeling that he is there to help. The agent must be made to feel secure and must believe in the illusion of a safe way out if things go wrong. Therefore, the agent needs assurance that he will be able to contact you if he needs help.

With great patience and delicacy the Collection Officer can set up a series of transactions that move him and the agent closer and closer to the ultimate goal.

Chapter

8

Agent Evaluation

UPON COMPLETING THIS SECTION YOU SHOULD BE ABLE TO:

- 1. Determine the criteria necessary to perform an agent evaluation.**
 - 2. Understand how to evaluate the sources of information.**
 - 3. Understand how to evaluate the information itself.**
 - 4. Perform an accurate agent evaluation.**
-

THE PROCESS OF EVALUATION^{60,61}

An agent's value is usually measured by the volume and worth of the information that he produces. But a controlled agent, in particular, must also be judged by other criteria: his veracity, his overall value to the agency, and his specific operational value. In order to achieve an accurate evaluation of the agent, the following factors must be considered and weighed in an objective manner:

- . The **credibility and validity** of the information the agent provides.
- . The **veracity and loyalty** of the agent himself.
- . The **cost effectiveness** of the agent as a whole.
- . The agent's **operational value** to his specific assignment.

The factors should first be evaluated independently and then those independent evaluations should be merged to form the overall agent evaluation. Remember, objectivity is the key to an accurate evaluation. Don't let personal feelings or assumptions skew the results. Whether you like the agent or not should never be used as a criteria for judgement of his value.

Credibility and Validity^{62,63}

The Collection Officer and/or the analyst must have a system for the evaluation of the credibility and validity of information the agent reports. The source of the information must also be considered. ***Did the agent hear someone say it? Who? Did the agent retrieve copies of a report? Who is the author of the report? By what source did the agent come by the information?***

There are many methods for the evaluation of the credibility of a source of information and the validity of the information reported. The following pages explain one system which is in use by many agencies and is simple to apply.

In the application of this evaluation code, as with any other system of evaluation,

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objectivity remains the key ingredient. The words used in the code should be strictly interpreted. If you make the determination that the source is reliable and the information is confirmed and intend to pass that information on to your superiors; make certain that it is confirmed and reliable! The Director will **not** be sympathetic to you when you tell him you **thought** the information was confirmed. Be absolutely certain that your evaluation is accurate before you pass it on.

SOURCE

CONTENT

A - RELIABLE

1 - CONFIRMED

B - USUALLY RELIABLE

2 - PROBABLY TRUE

C - UNRELIABLE

3 - DOUBTFUL

D - UNKNOWN

4 - TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

In using the code, avoid the mistake of confusing the validity of information with the credibility of the source, and vice versa. A Usually Reliable Source (B) will not always give Confirmed (1) or Probably True (2) information. Likewise, Confirmed Information (1) does not necessarily originate with a Reliable (A) source. Make a distinction between the evaluation of sources and the evaluation of information.

A source can be elevated or lowered on the source evaluation scale, depending upon his track record. But he should remain in a given category long enough to establish solid justification for any change in his rating.

Sources given a rating of "A" have been found to be totally reliable. They have been tested in the past and have always been found to be truthful. An "A" rating should be dealt out extremely sparingly. If even only the slightest doubt exists, they should be given a rating of "B".

Sources given ratings of "B" are known to be usually reliable. These situations include sources that have been found, through experience, to be usually truthful and that what they report has been, to a great extent, factual and accurate.

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Sources given a "C" rating are considered to be unreliable. Largely because past experience has shown them to be sporadic in either their truthfulness or accuracy.

It is important to remember that just because a source has this low rating that does not mean that the information he has provided this time may not be totally truthful. It simply means that every attempt must be made to further verify the "C" rated material and to raise it to a more reliable rating before dissemination of the material is allowed.

Sources rated as "D" are frequently first time sources, an unrecruited "walk in" source who has yet to be vetted. The motivation and validity of unsolicited information should always be given close scrutiny, but never disregarded because the source is unknown.

The most reliable method of judging the value of information is by comparing it with similar information which may already be available in the intelligence files. When possible, the Collection Officer obtains confirming or refuting information through different sources.

Evaluation of information calls for judgment as well as objectivity. The evaluator, whether he is the Collection Officer, the analyst, or the person in charge, must ask himself such questions as, "Does it sound reasonable?," "Could it have really happened?," "How does it compare with other things I know?," or "Can I really evaluate the validity?" It cannot be overstated that the agent's performance must be evaluated and re-evaluated frequently. An agent who has been reliable for years may now have a subversive motivation to give you flawed information.

Content Validity

Content validity relates entirely to the content of the intelligence received. It can be in the form of an eyewitness account, another agency's report, photographs, maps, charts, or other written documentation. A rating of "1" is given when the content of the incoming material has been confirmed. This is the top rating and it tells the reader of the materials that the content has been corroborated by the rater and that the materials can be quoted with confidence.

Incoming intelligence materials consistent with past reports that were found to be valid are given a rating of "2" and are considered probable. A "2" intelligence rating has not yet been fully corroborated; however, when (or if) it is, the rating is changed upward to "1."

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Doubtful materials given the rating of "3" are still of interest to the collection officer and analyst. However, they are inconsistent with other accounts held in the files. The "3" rated materials are worth maintaining for possible further study but are of low value for dissemination. When they are disseminated, the recipient must be alerted to its questionable value. A validity rating of "4" are those materials that cannot be judged for one reason or another. These materials resist most normal evaluation tools. Often, this is caused by the non-availability of the author, anonymously written documents or phone messages. Such information needs a great deal of investigation and research in order to raise its validity rating by independent corroboration.

Veracity of the Agent⁶⁴

There is no such thing as an "agent whose loyalty is beyond question," because an agent involved in counterintelligence activities against you may continue to mix good information with false leads to help prevent detection. The agent should never be aware of when and how you test and evaluate him.

Deception by the controlled agent cannot be allowed to go undetected. To ferret out deception the following techniques are usually all employed on a continuous basis.

Debriefing by Skilled Interviewer/Interrogator – This provides you with a face-to-face opportunity to observe the agent's attitude, his demeanor and his body language.

Polygraph – While it is not always possible to detect all truths and lies all the time with a polygraph, it is a valuable aid in the determination of the veracity of an agent. Use of the polygraph will likely make the agent more prone to being honest.

Surveillance of the Agent – The agent should never be aware that he is being watched. Avoid revealing details about the agent that could have only been obtained through covert surveillance, as the agent will likely suspect that he is under scrutiny. Through occasional surveillance of the agent you may be able to uncover details that will either support or dispute his veracity.

False Information – Another technique used to test an agent's veracity is to give the agent false information. For example: You tell the agent that you have discovered that

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the target organization has just lost one of its key operatives. You have positive proof that the operative was recruited by another agency during an assignment out of the country. As part of the agent's assignment, ask him to confirm that information.

Remember, this is false information! If the agent confirms the story you told him, the agent is no longer reliable. Either he is no longer working for you, he is incredibly stupid, or he is not doing his job properly. Regardless of why he confirmed the story, he is no longer reliable and is probably a security threat to your organization.

COST EFFECTIVENESS

The amount of time and resources devoted to the training and management of an agent should be directly related to the projected length and productivity of the agent. The Collection Officer or analyst must, at some point, ask the question,

In answering that question, the analyst should consider how much money is being spent in relation to the value of the information the agent is producing. And, how much of the Collection Officer/handler's time is necessary to control and manage the agent. Agents who are intended to be one-time assets typically receive much less attention than agents recruited for long-term use.

For the most part, the evaluation of the cost effectiveness of an agent is a continuous task. When the Collection Officer feels that the agent is not producing in proportion to the investment the organization has made in him, the Collection Officer must, by whatever means, motivate the agent to be more productive. Occasionally, a "bargain" agent will come along who costs the organization almost nothing and produces at a high rate. These individuals are rare and are usually motivated by ideological reasons.

When the evaluation of the agent indicates that he is, in fact, cost effective, then there remains the evaluation of the agent's operational worth as a producer of information.

Operational Value

Now we must judge the value of the agent in regard to the specific operation or assignment he or she is involved in. While the agent may only be able to provide one piece

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of information that is insignificant to your organization as a whole, that bit of knowledge may be the key to this particular operation.

For example: the agency's goal is to infiltrate and undermine the target organization. Your specific task is to obtain data that is contained in their computer files. The agent you recruited and trained is an employee of the target organization but does not have access to the computer and is not technically capable of operating the computer even if he did. He does, however, have access to the computer passwords. Your agent provides you with the passwords, which you pass on to another agent, controlled by you or another handler, and that agent retrieves the information you need.

The agent in the example above may not be vital to the infiltration and undermining of the target organization as a whole, but without him you would not have been able to achieve your specific assignment. That agent was a vital cog in the wheel, providing you with the key to your operational objective. His overall value to your organization may be limited but his operational value to your specific assignment was critical.

Overall Value

An agent's overall value can be judged by weighing his productivity against various criteria.

- . How much actual money is being spent?
- . How much Collection Officer/handler time does the agent require?
- . Is he using his position to carry out subversive activities for others?
- . Is he acting in such a manner that compromises and subsequent embarrassment to our government is likely?
- . Is he using his position to gain more information than he provides?

These and other considerations of the agent's overall value should not pose serious problems if procedures and techniques for testing and controls have been applied. These questions should constantly be asked; however, if an agent's true value is to be objectively

measured, the key is objectivity.

CONCLUSIONS

One needs to remember that intelligence evaluations are not fixed and that often they have to be reviewed, re-evaluated and ratings changed as new intelligence is received. Every time new intelligence is collected, the handler must, as part of processing and filing, determine if this information has any impact on previously collected material.

Evaluation includes determining the pertinence of the information, the reliability of the source, the accuracy or credibility of the information, the cost effectiveness of the agent, the operational value of the agent and what he produces, and the overall value of the agent to your organization.

Chapter

9

Discontinuing the Agent's Services

UPON COMPLETING THIS SECTION YOU SHOULD BE ABLE TO:

- 1. Understand why termination is inevitable.**
 - 2. Determine when to terminate a controlled agent.**
 - 3. Understand why agents must be terminated.**
 - 4. Know how to terminate an agent.**
-

INEVITABLE TERMINATION⁶⁵

As with all of the steps in the Agent Cycle, termination considerations are ever present. Nothing lasts forever. Sooner or later the agent will either outlive his usefulness or become too great a security risk to be maintained. From the moment the agent is recruited, his handler must be ever mindful that a day will come when the agent must be terminated. The handler must be prepared for that day by continually acquiring evidence and documentation that is damaging to the agent. This will give the handler the upper hand when the time comes for termination.

The questions of when, why and how the ultimate termination of the controlled agent occurs must be given attention:

- . Starting with the operations plan,
- . Through the recruitment, development and operational phases, and
- . With the conclusion of the operation and/or the agent's employment.

With the decision to terminate, the value of all of the things learned about the agent and all of the control factors employed becomes evident. When the agent is terminated, the handler should have at his disposal a wealth of personal facts about the agent, a variety of documentation related to the agent/Collection Officer relationship and a definite psychological advantage.

WHEN AND WHY TO TERMINATE⁶⁶

The decision of when and why to terminate a controlled agent is usually based upon obvious factors. The agent:

- . Is compromised.
- . Physically and mentally unable to continue as an agent.
- . Is no longer productive.

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- . Change of attitude toward the operation.

A change in attitude toward the operation can result from several factors.

Security Awareness – A previously cooperative agent may become reluctant to continue the assignment because he has become more aware of the counterintelligence efforts directed at detecting his identity.

Loyalty – The agent may gradually begin to feel guilty about cooperating with you. This could be caused by a reawakened loyalty to the target organization.

Cultural, Social or Religious Background – The operation to which the agent is assigned may begin to touch on areas that the agent is more protective of, particularly if he feels intrusion into personal or family backgrounds.

Fear of Reprisal – The agent begins to develop a fear of reprisal that is greater than his motivation to work for the agency.

Agent Has Been Doubled by the Opposing Security Service – You believe through your testing, evaluation and agent surveillance operations that the agent is now being controlled by opposing security forces.

Agent is Not Manageable – Agent will not follow directions and has become dangerously unreliable.

Collection Officer Becomes Involved with Agent – Objectivity is lost when Collection Officers become too personally involved with their agent. This often occurs if some type of romantic involvement develops, but may occur in almost any other circumstance.

TERMINATION OPTIONS

The following types of termination are typical:

- . Redirection.

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- . Deactivation.
- . The relationship is severed.

Redirection

If the agent is to be redirected to another target(s), typically he will be turned over to another handler. The agent will still be working for your organization, but he will no longer be working for you. **All** of the information you have collected on the agent should be given to the new handler so that he may maintain the same level of control over the agent that you had. There is no point in re-inventing the wheel. You should cooperate with the new handler in every way possible to make the transition go as smoothly as it can.

Regardless of your personal relationship with the agent, whether you like him or not, you should attempt to make the transition as business-like as possible for the agent as well. The game of espionage is a tricky business. If the agent feels he is being slighted or punished by you, he may turn on both you and your organization. Attempt to get the agent to view the redirection as the normal course of events, an opportunity to work with a new and more senior handler. The agent doesn't necessarily have to like the redirection, but his ego needs to find some positive aspect to it.

Deactivation

When the agent is to be deactivated but maintained as an available resource, the handler must again endeavor to have the agent view this as a positive step. An agent with a bruised ego can be dangerous.

It is just as important to keep an agent in control when he has been deactivated as it was when he was active. How tight a leash that is kept on a deactivated agent will vary from person to person, but generally it is never wise for a formerly active agent to believe he has been forgotten. From the organizational point of view, the agent is deactivated only with the promise of continuing good behavior and should be periodically reminded of such. As assets, deactivated agents may become useful again and, thus, those agents who are deactivated must understand that they still work for you.

The Relationship is Severed

When the relationship is severed, all contact with the agent is stopped. However, periodic covert surveillance and monitoring are necessary to ensure that the former agent remains faithful. This is the most dangerous form of termination. The agent is no longer under the same level of control, and only your threat to expose him with the evidence you have collected on him or to do him some other sort of harm will keep him in check.

REMEMBER, the decision to terminate an agent must be based on the goals of the mission and the problems that may arise should you continue with his use.

HOW TO TERMINATE (Security Considerations)⁶⁷

The termination of an agent is often dictated by the original operation plan for termination, updated by experience with and knowledge of the agent, but always with all security elements given priority. Depending upon the nature of the operation, the role of the agent in the operation, and plans for his future use/non-use, the application of security measures will vary. Circumstances may dictate otherwise but **usually** the termination should be accomplished at a personal contact with the agent.

The termination contact will in many ways follow a parallel course with the procedures of other contacts. It should include the alerting of the agent, the specific notification, all of the preparations, and the applicable elements of any personal meeting.

Above all, the contact for termination should include these five basic elements:

1. **Information Debriefing** – The agent should be thoroughly debriefed for target-related information and knowledge that may have been overlooked.
2. **Operational Debriefing** – The agent should be queried about the techniques and procedures employed in the operation and how they affected him and his operational role. This "critique" by an agent can be enlightening and, when evaluated, can often serve to improve upon the Collection Officer's abilities as an agent handler.

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3. **Security Debriefing** – Everything the agent knows that relates to persons who may know, may think they know, or suspect, that the agent works for an intelligence agency, should be extracted. All of the security measures the agent has been (or should have been) taking should be reviewed to uncover possible weaknesses. Any questions about the agent's security awareness and application of security measures should be covered.
4. **Security Warning** – This element of the meeting for termination is the most critical. It is essential that you keep in mind: (a) the nature of the operation; (b) the agent's future role (if any); (c) his value to the operation and, above all; (d) the agent's motivations. The agent should be advised in no uncertain terms what he can and cannot do with the knowledge he has of the operation, and his relationship to the operation and his handler (and the handler's agency). The agent is told to "keep his mouth shut." Whatever is necessary to enforce that caveat should be applied. A simple admonition, with a subtle reminder of all of the information and documentation about the agent, and its possible use, may suffice. At the other end of the scale, an actual leak of this information may be necessary. The agent must understand the consequences of his violating the rules for security.
5. **Test Him** – Lastly, test the agent's understanding and solicit a statement from him as to that understanding.

Every agent you recruit has the potential for harming you and your organization. This is a universal principle.

CONCLUSIONS

Although warnings and not so subtle threats may not always be sufficient, when applied with a combination of knowledge about the agent, selected documentation, and accumulation of psychological control factors, these methods will have a decided impact. To terminate an agent with techniques which have a good chance of maintaining a desired level of security is certainly better than to terminate without effort in that direction.

Discontinuing the Agent's Services

A controlled agent who is to be terminated must still remain controlled. The level of control and the form the control takes will change, but the control must be there. Every agent you recruit has the potential to harm you and your organization. You, the Collection Officer/handler must maintain sufficient control over the agent to protect yourself and your organization.

Chapter

10

Operation Planning

UPON COMPLETING THIS SECTION YOU SHOULD BE ABLE TO:

1. Understand the purpose and benefits of an Operations Plan.
 2. Name the basic elements of an Operations Plan.
 3. Know why a clear-cut objective is essential.
 4. Develop your own Operations Plan.
-

INTRODUCTION

Being able to anticipate and predict an occurrence before the fact is an essential management tool in the expenditure and deployment of your resources. Thus, intelligence is a planning function which is closely related to the field of planning and research. It is also a function that must remain sufficiently flexible to adjust its recommendations and direction in response to new information and to develop an understanding of existing or developing problems so that they may be competently controlled with a minimum of waste. In effect, we are speaking of a logically planned, directed and controlled expenditure of resources based on cost effectiveness and an adequate understanding of the problem to be solved.

The basic elements of management should always be kept in mind. **Planning, organizing, staffing, directing, and controlling** are elementary concepts, but they are essential to success. Planning and control are considered the "management twins" since no plan can be expected to succeed without a controlled execution. The proper grouping of responsibilities and the proper selection of trained staff are as essential to the operation as the direction necessary to accomplish the desired goal. If followed, these management concepts accompanied with the six questions **who, what, when, where, why, and how** provide you with the necessary elements for a successful operation.

Strategic or long-range planning may be considered in the light of policy decisions or guidelines. Operational planning may be related to procedural guidelines or the "how to" phase in planning that satisfies the needs of strategic direction. It is the operational aspect that directly affects the collection plan and its cost. Simply stated, targeting the objective is based on management priorities, and the collection plan sets forth a proposed method to neutralize the selected target.

OBJECTIVES

The overall objective of the operation plan is to provide a strategy which will lead to either the acquisition of the desired information, material or the apparent intentions of some group. The plan is designed as a systematic approach to achieve the desired objective. The objective is the key to the plan, not the other way around. Without a clear-cut objective, operations plans will be haphazard and lacking in direction. With proper planning and coordination, everyone has a specific and unique task that will lead to the achievement of the

objective without duplication of effort and wasted resources.

A clear-cut objective will also help you to gain maximum cost effectiveness (results vs. expense) through proper selection of a collection system, constant evaluation of its results and proper adjustments in planning and execution. Additionally, the objective will aid your efforts to select targets based on priorities and to consider the "who and why" in relationship to the problem, its cause, its symptoms, and its effects.

TARGET SELECTION

Strategic intelligence is the long-term collection of information that reveals patterns and activities. This form of intelligence is used for policy decisions and may well be converted into operational use in the selection of your target. The product of analyzing the problem -- its size, scope, growth, influence, and its projected impact on your country and/or agency -- will weigh heavily on the target selection process. As a practical matter, each organization will establish priorities based on its individual needs and the resources available to it. Also, consideration must be given to whether the expected results are worth the necessary expenditures to achieve them.

Specific targeting reduces the problem of strategic information requirements down to a workable part of that problem. Instead of diffusing your resources to a point of ineffectiveness, it is obviously better to direct them at a few specific points which will have the greatest effect on the whole problem and which will have the best chance of success.

After the specific problems have been defined through the analysis of existing information and a hypothesis has been formed regarding possible action and effects, a priority decision may be made regarding the relative importance of various potential targets. The problem's cause, its demonstrated symptoms, and its effects on the country and/or your organization are all factors to consider as well as possible solutions. What political or economic impact will the problem reflect if it is allowed to continue? Is the time right or the opportunity present to take effective action? Will a delay now cost you more in the future? If you are unable to make a full commitment to the target, are there any intermediate steps which you may take to partially neutralize it? These are only a few of the questions that you may wish to consider during your selection of priorities.

Since priorities must be drawn from information, the selection is only as valid as the

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information supplied; hence, care should be taken not to over-assess or under-assess the information. Careful evaluation of the validity of the source and his information is required. If a target is selected in error but the collection plan is properly phased to test the hypothesis, the test effort should reflect the smallest necessary expenditure of resources at the point of termination or re-evaluation.

Essentially, target selection involves the questions of:

- 1. WHY you should spend a concerted effort on a target?**
 - 2. WHEN you should spend that effort.**
 - 3. HOW you came to that conclusion?**
-

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After determining who or what the target is and why, a plan must be constructed to determine what must be collected. Also, you must consider when, where and how the information should be collected and by whom. Since duplication should be avoided, you must decide who will collect the information, as economically as possible, and what information is needed to fill the gaps in the hypothesis. There is no need to prove the same fact twice with the exception of necessary corroboration.

Open vs. Clandestine Collection

All open (overt) means of collection should be exhausted before extensive covert or clandestine operations are initiated and, if covert operations are necessary, they should be kept at a minimum and closely coordinated with overt collection. Covert operations such as surveillance and controlled agents are expensive, time consuming and sometimes dangerous; therefore, the cost must be honestly weighed against the probable return on your investment. If the target warrants such a commitment and there is no other way to complete the collection effort, the importance of the target dictates the necessity of this commitment.

THE OPERATIONS PLAN

Every collection effort needs to be thoroughly thought out and planned. This is to assure that guidelines are followed, objectives are met and security is maintained. That is why each mission should begin with the drafting of an Operation Plan.

An Operation Plan consists of six basic parts:

- . **Heading.**
- . **Problem Statement.**
- . **Purpose and Objectives.**
- . **Execution.**
- . **Support and Communications.**
- . **Coordinating Instructions.**

Each one of these parts or paragraphs should provide, at a glance, the basic information for the mission. The Operation Plan is then supported by a series of annexes, tabs and appendices that explain in detail a particular concept or function. This method enables the Collection Officer in charge to write the base document of the Operation Plan and then delegate detailed technical planning to other Collection Officers or to a technician. The various components of the Operations Plan are explained below. Please compare these notations with the sample Operations Plan which has been provided in this chapter.

Heading

Classification – Each page of an Operation Plan and its annexes, tabs and appendices must begin with the security classification.

Operations Plan Number 88-131 – This indicates the agency case number, advising us that this is the one hundred and thirty-first operation begun by this agency in the year 1988. 030388 - indicates the date the plan was written. 01 - indicates that this the first

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operation plan written for this operation. B. Smith is the name or the code name of the author of the operation plan.

Activation Date – This is the date that the operation will officially commence.

Termination Date – This is the "anticipated" date of termination. It can be shown a number of ways.

- . Month, day, year and time: 061789 1200 hr.
- . Month, day and year: 061789
- . Month and year: 0689

The word "open" can also be used in lieu of a date, time group. "Open" means that it is anticipated that this will be a permanent collection operation or at least one of a great length of time.

The word "unknown" can also be used here. "Unknown" is used when an operation is anticipated to be of short duration, however, a specific termination date has not been set.

Station – The name or code name of the location where the mission will be based.

Collection Officer(s) Assigned – The names or code names of the Collection Officers permanently assigned to this case. It should not include support personnel such as technicians. The Senior Collection Officer should be listed first.

Agent(s) Employed – The names or code names of the agent(s) being used in this mission. Other entries: "TBN", to be named, used when an agent has not yet been recruited for the mission and the intent of the Collection Officer is to perform an agent recruitment.

Annexes - A list of annexes supporting this document.

Problem Statement – The problem statement should be a brief paragraph stating **why** it is necessary to initiate a collection effort against a particular target. At a minimum, it should cover:

Operation Planning

- . Name of the target individual and/or organization.
- . The goals or motivations of the target individual and/or organization that necessitates the collection effort.

Purpose and Objective – The purpose paragraph should be a brief statement of why the agency is undertaking this operation. The objectives paragraph lists the objectives that need to be met in order to accomplish the overall purpose.

Execution – The execution paragraph should be broken down into a step-by-step phasing of the operation. It should carry the mission from planning to termination. While the description of each phase should be kept brief, it can be expanded upon in the annexes. If you do not plan to supplement the statement with an annex, then the execution paragraph must be detailed.

Support and Communications – The support paragraph lists the internal units that will be needed to support the operation. At a minimum, the administrative section should provide information as to how the pay and allowances will be dealt with and how much of an operational fund has been budgeted. An operational fund annex would specify the breakdown of how the funds are to be utilized.

The communication paragraph should list all communications gear, frequencies and phone numbers to be utilized. It will also state the code word to be used to terminate the operation.

Annexes, Tabs and Appendices – Annexes, tabs and appendices are used to support and provide detail to the operation plan.

Annexes – Support the operation plan and are lettered.

Tabs – Support the annexes and are numbered.

Appendices – Support the tabs and are lettered.

All annexes, tabs and appendices have a heading followed by the information

provided by the author.

Such items as maps and overlays should be given a separate Annex, Tab or Appendix number and should never be listed collectively.

Why Write and Use Annexes, Tabs, and Appendices?

- . They allow the author of the Operation Plan to delegate some of the detailed planning to other Collection Officers and/or technicians.
- . Some technical assistance annexes remain the same for several operations. Therefore, by using an existing Annex, time can be saved in the preparation of the Operation Plan.
- . They provide security when there are "need-to-know" limitations on individuals who are privy to general concept of the operation but not "how-it-will-be-performed" details.
- . They limit repetitious explanation with the Operation Plan.

POST-OPERATION STATEMENT

Whether it be included in the original operation plan format, or as a separate document, a Post-Operation Statement is important to operational evaluation and future operation planning. Some of the subjects for such an operation critique are:

- . Actual duration of the operation.
- . Cost factors (time, money, equipment usage, etc.).
- . Problems encountered (solved and unsolved) and their effect on the operation and/or the department.
- . Summary of an objective evaluation of the success or failure of the operation.
- . Recommendations.

CONCLUSIONS

Intelligence collection operations concentrate on those essential elements of information concerning the target that are necessary to satisfy the intelligence requirements of your agency. In other words, a specific objective must be identified and an Operations Plan must be developed and followed. The achievement of the goal is accomplished through careful planning and direction of manpower and other resources. The Operations Plan acts as a guide to keep the entire mission on track and helps to avoid duplication of effort.

EXAMPLE OPERATIONS PLAN

Heading

(SECRET)

OPERATION PLAN#: 88-131-030388-01 B. Smith

ACTIVATION DATE: 03-15-88

TERMINATION DATE: 0689

STATION: Timbuctu

COLLECTION OFFICER(S) ASSIGNED: G. Jones, A. Daniel, E. Mohammed

AGENT(S) EMPLOYED: X39

ANNEX A, "Covert Documentation"

ANNEX B, "Communications"

Problem Statement (Example)

"An organization named the Native Socialist Defense League (NSDL) is an anti-government faction sworn to defeat the democratic growth of Aswanaland. NSDL has begun to receive outside funding from an unknown source and it is believed that the funding is being used to expand their operational base."

Purpose and Objective (Example)

Purpose: To identify foreign patrons and their intentions and identify the NSDL membership and any supporting conspirators within Aswanaland.

Objectives:

- A. Spot, assess and recruit an agent to provide information on the NSDL.
- B. To determine the source of funding for the NSDL.
- C. Identify the communications procedures (locations of caches, safe-houses and/or dead drops) used by the NSDL.

Execution

Phase I – Actions proposed to initiate the operation (planning, preliminary coordination and liaison, overt investigation, and development of covert resources.)

Phase II – Proposed plan for penetration by covert resources and methods for communication and control.

Phase III – Proposed activities of covert resources while "on-target" and the supporting and supplementing activities by overt personnel. (Include alternative courses of action)

Phase IV – Post-operation plans (procedures for terminating the operation; debriefing, reports, agent's role in prosecution (if any), press releases, etc.).

Support and Communications (Example)

Support

- A. Photo lab section.
- B. Locksmith section.
- C. Document printing section.
- D. Administrative section.
 - 1. Pay and allowances.
 - 2. Operational fund.
 - a. N22,000

Communications

- A. Radios and frequencies.
- B. Voice recording kits.
- C. Telephone systems.
- D. Termination signal.

Coordinating Instructions

This section will list:

- A. By type and number, agency personnel to be utilized and their function.
- B. With whom coordination and liaison must be maintained during all phases of the operation.
- C. "Need-to-know" limitations on individuals who are privy to the general concept of the operation but not the "how-it-will-be-performed" details.
- D. Operational limits.
- E. Available covert sources of information.
- F. Pertinent remarks or comments which will clarify the operational plan.
- G. Contingencies for possible problems that may be encountered.

Annexes, Tabs and Appendices (Examples)

Annex A – "Covert documentation" Operation Plan 88-131-030388-01

This heading tells us that it is the first annex of Operation Plan number 88-131-030388-01 and covers how covert documentation will be obtained and utilized.

Tab 1, Map 1, Annex C – "Surveillance Plan" Operation Plan 88-131-030388-01

This heading tells us that the tab is a map to be utilized with the Surveillance Plan (Annex C) of Operation Plan 88-131-030388-01.

Appendix A – "Telephone Overlay", Tab 1, Map 1, Annex C "Surveillance

Plan" Operation Plan 88-131-030388-01

This heading tells us that Appendix A is a map overlay showing the locations of public telephones located on Map 1, Tab 1, that will be utilized during the surveillance laid out in Annex C in support of Operation Plan 88-131-030388-01.

CHAPTER

11

Cover

UPON COMPLETING THIS SECTION YOU SHOULD BE ABLE TO:

- 1. Outline the steps toward implementation of the cover.**
 - 2. Describe effective records and documentation for the cover.**
 - 3. Coordinate support of the cover, if necessary.**
 - 4. Recognize cover limitations.**
-

PURPOSE OF COVER^{74,75,76,77}

**To Conceal - to Protect - to Lie
to Occupy the Surface - Screen or Pretense**

An intelligence operative who, in the course of his duties, finds it necessary to develop and use either a fictitious or assumed identity, must structure a "cover" to support the disguise. This can be as minor as having the proper explanation for your presence and activity to give in case of a passive inquiry by a talkative person who happens to sit next to you on a bus, or the total deep cover of establishing yourself in a target organization by infiltration into the heart and trust of its infrastructure.

In general, cover is defined as a role played by an intelligence officer to conceal his true identity and intent. The term "cover" refers to the apparently innocent activity or biographical characteristics designed to protect personnel and/or admit access to the target. Such activities or characteristics are generated in response to the operational objectives of security and the performance of the assigned mission. Cover is supported in varying degrees, according to necessity, by a wide range of methods involving manipulation of social structures and relationships, and documentary or other physical evidence. Deceptively simple in theory, in practice the building and maintenance of cover is a most complex art.

COVER'S PURPOSE

- . To give the agent a more or less fictitious, yet clearly defined and coherent identity and life story.
- . To account for the documents in the agent's possession.
- . To explain in a logical and plausible manner, the presence of the agent at the scene of his operations, the Target Area, or at one specific locality thereof.

- . To allow the agent the freedom of movement necessary for his mission.
- . To enable the agent to contact that strata of people in the target area with whom his mission is concerned.

The purpose of cover is to provide the Collection Officer a clearly defined and coherent personality and life story. The cover should be designed to provide a plausible reason for the presence of the Collection Officer and his agents in a particular area, and to account for any documents they may have in their possession. This allows the Collection Officer and the agent(s) the freedom of movement necessary to accomplish their mission and access to the type of people in the target area with whom the mission is concerned.

FOUNDATION OF COVER^{78,79}

If you are to operate covertly, it is imperative to develop cover stories that will stand up to rigorous inspection. When planning cover stories, considerations of realism, traceability, and flexibility should be made. When the plan is complete, it should be well rehearsed. Make certain that the cover story sounds realistic and fits the surroundings in which you are operating.

Traceability

Opposing intelligence operatives will check out cover stories. Therefore, cover stories cannot be skin-deep or made up at the spur of the moment. They must be well planned with established documentation and verification trails. In other words, cover stories must be traceable.

Flexibility

The cover story must allow the Collection Officer and/or agent the ability to maneuver should they be challenged on a given element of the cover story. Contingency planning gives your cover story flexibility.

Rehearsals

The best of cover stories are of little value if they are not thoroughly absorbed and rehearsed. Contingencies must be rehearsed along with primary cover stories. If time and operational security permits, a solid rehearsal should include:

- . In-depth discussion on who, what, when, where and how the operation is to take place and how the cover story is to be used. This discussion includes all contingencies.
- . Area study of the operational area to include maps, photographs, sketches, identification cards, etc., in order to support the cover story.
- . Testing is the last stage of the rehearsal to assure that enough of the information has been retained to prevent penetration of the cover story.

General cover is described as, ***the innocent life that a Collection Officer leads in order to conceal his subversive activities***. Specific cover is described as, ***the Collection Officer's innocent reason for doing a particular subversive act***.

The descriptions above provide us with a firm understanding of the ultimate goal. We know what we need to accomplish in terms of developing a good cover. All that remains for us to determine is the *how* of cover. How do we achieve good cover? How do we ascertain the steps necessary to create a competent cover that will be able to withstand scrutiny by an opposing intelligence service or the target organization?

We must start by developing a solid base or foundation for the role the Collection Officer/agent intends to play. Remember, each mission will likely require its own specific cover depending on its specific mission requirements. The strategy for a specific cover should be developed during the Mission Planning stage of the operation and include ***everything*** that is anticipated to accomplish the mission.

The next few paragraphs will describe the essential elements that should be considered and documented when developing a good cover.

HOW IS COVER SELECTED?^{80,81}

Area Study

The study of the area in which the operative is to function is imperative, even if the operative is supposed to be new to the area and unfamiliar with the day-to-day atmosphere. To attempt to accomplish the mission without studying the area first would severely limit flexibility and hamper the ability to successfully infiltrate the target.

Cover Story Area Study

This refers to the area from which the operative will claim to have come. The ideal scenario would naturally be to claim to be from somewhere that the operative is intimately familiar with. If this is not possible, the study of the cover story area is imperative.

We live in a world of nomads, people constantly moving from place to place. It is highly likely that in the sphere of the Collection Officer/agent's contacts, there is going to be someone who actually comes from the place the agent is now claiming as his previous home. A thorough study of the individuals the agent needs to fraternize with as part of his cover may help in the selection of this part of the cover story.

If time permits – a visit to study the location(s) in order to absorb not only the geography but the local flavor, is an excellent idea.

Target Accessibility

It is pointless to develop a cover that will protect the operatives from detection if, at the same time, it impedes access to the target. Certain ethnic, religious, social, or employment positions may preclude obtaining entry into an organization at the level that needs to be penetrated. Keep this in mind when selecting cover.

Adaptability of Intelligence Operative

Selection of the operative to the role he is to portray is a major consideration when

determining how effectively an individual will perform. Not all persons can adapt to any role. The selection of the cover should be one that the operative will feel comfortable with and/or have sufficient time to adjust to.

Capabilities of Counter Intelligence Units

Knowledge of the capabilities of the person responsible for screening and investigating individuals and their backgrounds varies a great deal. Computer access and information exchange agreements between countries will greatly govern the depth to which a cover needs to go. **NEVER** underestimate the capabilities of the opponent.

Time

The consideration of time will play a part in every aspect of the planning phase of a cover story. How soon does the operative need to be in place? How quickly does the targeted intelligence need to be collected? How long is the operative going to be in place? How much training time and area research time do you have and/or need?

Available Documentation

Obtaining the proper and "clean" documentation needed to protect and support a cover story can be difficult. If what is needed is not readily available, time will have to be allotted to obtain it.

BUILDING THE COVER^{82,83}

Once a cover has been selected, it needs to be structured in such a way as to give the necessary depth of protection, whether it be a cursory examination by a police officer or an in-depth investigation by an opposing intelligence force. If the agent is to assume the identity of a person no longer living, he must memorize every detail of that person's life that is contained within existing public files or records. If the agent is to assume a false identity, the necessary documentation must be created and positioned properly should someone choose to "check him out."

Family Background

Create a family background for the agent/Collection Officer. Who is he? Where did he come from? During a lifetime, a person inevitably establishes files on himself of every type. While most may appear to be insignificant, to a good investigator, the absence of these files may signal that a closer look needs to be taken. For purposes of documentation in the future it is usually easiest to create the family background based on a real person who is now dead. Birth and death records are public and can be easily accessed.

The agency should choose a person who was born in the proper time period. If you intend to pose as a person who is in his late thirties, a person should be chosen who was born thirty-five to forty years ago. Be careful that the person chosen has no close living relatives. We wouldn't want your "Uncle Charlie" to blow the cover. Status must also be considered when creating a family background. If the agent needs to pose as someone of substance, do not assume the identity of someone whose parents were migrant farm workers. The status of the person the agent plans to impersonate should be in line with the mission requirements.

If no suitable person who is no longer living can be found to use to establish the cover, the necessary records and files can be established through falsification, subterfuge and/or forgery. Recruitment or placement of an operative within the records storage facilities of different agencies and facilities will greatly enhance the ability to develop these record or file entries. Careful attention needs to be placed on sanitizing the records using methods such as backdating and matching physical profiles.

Education and Social Background

School records are very easy to investigate. Find out what school(s) the operative supposedly went to. Make a point of having the Collection Officer/agent go to the school and see it for themselves. Remember, many people have gone to that school over the years. It is highly possible that the agent may encounter someone who actually went to that school. Even if they did not attend at the same time the agent supposedly did, they will remember the layout and other points of interest that, if the agent actually went there too, he should know about.

Military Career (if any)

If, for purposes of the cover, a military background exists or is necessary, investigate it. Memorize the dates of service and places where the person was assigned. If the person had some specialized training, the agent should be familiar with it also.

Occupational Background

The agent's assumed occupational background must also be considered and he should be prepared with photos and details of prior co-workers. Photos of this type are easy to manufacture. As long as the pictures "look" like a group of co-workers having a beer together or going on a picnic, chances are no one will question them. Or, he can drive by the facility at quitting time and have someone else take his picture in front of the building while the employees are leaving.

The agent should also have some knowledge of the technology of the former work. If he was employed as a computer programmer, he should at least know the fundamentals of programming and be able to discuss it intelligently. If he was formerly employed as an electrician, he should know something about electronics, etc.

An individual agent must learn to "live" his cover both mentally and physically. An operative posing as a photographer should be familiar with as many aspects of photography as possible and attempt to use photographic terms and knowledge in conversation, when applicable. He should carry model releases or other photographic paraphernalia around in his pockets, just as a **real** photographer might unthinkingly put this type of "litter" in his pockets. Additionally, he might arrange photographic equipment and chemicals in his luggage or hotel room, in case of a surreptitious search.

It is usually a good idea, when developing your cover, to include your last one or two jobs as part of your foundation. Ideally, these will be real jobs that were obtained legitimately. Whatever employment history you intend to create should be realistic and believable. Checking references only takes a phone call and a simple phone call could blow your cover if it does not have a solid foundation.

CATEGORIES OF COVER⁸⁴

Cover *reaches into the mind of the opponent, thinks as he would think, and then creates a combination of fact and fiction, of actual arrangements and contrived impressions, which the opponent's mind is prepared to believe.* There are basically two categories of cover.

Natural

The term "natural" has specific meaning in intelligence work. Naturals are potential agents who are **already** in a position of access to a given target, and must conceal only their contacts with your organization or their interest outside the normal sphere of their life and work. They do not need to fabricate a history or background for themselves. They are known and probably trusted by their friends, coworkers and employers. They need only conceal the contact with the Collection Officer or handler outside their normal life and work.

Natural cover involves the use of true names in most cases and any documentation necessary is generally authentic. The agents continue their normal and legal occupation and simply work for your agency "on the side". Natural cover is, by far, the easiest to achieve.

Artificial Cover

Artificial cover, by contrast, involves fabrication of biographic details and documentation. Essentially, we must start from scratch, as discussed in the section on Foundation of Cover, by fabricating biographical data and false documentation to support the claim that you "are" who you say you are.

USE OF ORGANIZATIONS IN COVER⁸⁵

Cover applies to organizations as well as individuals, and can employ both in harmony. Organizational cover can be provided by legitimate corporations who are either working for you or with you, or created by using a "cover organization," (an organization created solely for purpose of cover to mask the involvement of your agency), or by a "front organization" created with a certain amount of truth in its purpose to provide a plausible reason for specific activities.

Organizational Cover

When organizational cover is used, the cover is provided by a legitimate organization. The participation, membership or employment of intelligence agents in such organizations may be with the witting or unwitting support of the organization's leadership or owners. Witting providers of organizational cover may be motivated by fear, ignorance, patriotism, or a host of other factors. Unwitting providers of organizational cover are unaware that clandestine activities occur within their ranks.

Whether your cover is provided for you or created by you, it is essential that all aspects of the cover are coordinated to provide a consistent flow of supporting information and documentation to anyone who chooses to look closely.

Cover Organizations

Cover organizations are created solely for the purpose of providing cover. They may be staffed by a number of legitimate personnel, to lend a degree of plausibility, and, of course, are created to seem as if they perform a legitimate function. Political movements, youth groups, religious groups, publishing firms, educational institutions, labor groups, professional societies, friendship societies, and foundations are all obvious examples. Organizations of this type do not require large amounts of overhead or equipment in order to appear legitimate. In actual execution, cover organizations (when properly done), are not obvious in any sense.

Front Organizations

While cover organizations exist primarily to mask involvement, front organizations mask not only involvement, but also purpose. For example, "The Society for Friendship With Russia" might, as a cover organization, mask the identity of your agents. As a front organization, it could provide the cover for a collection effort aimed at Russia's political intentions. A front organization not only provides a plausible explanation for your presence in the target area, it actually facilitates your collection efforts by providing you with a "legitimate" reason for acquiring and possessing the collected data. No one outside of your agency will know why you are collecting the data or what you intend to do with it.

DOCUMENTS⁸⁶

In order to establish your cover effectively, it is necessary to create or acquire various types of documents. In general, the documents must be consistent with the cover story, while the cover story, in turn, must explain the possession of the documents, the reasons why the agent has them, and from whom he got them. In the case of a team operation that involves more than one agent, documents should be checked to see that no contradiction arises between team members. The term "documents," as it is used here, encompasses ***everything required to sustain a cover***. Following are some examples of the types of documents that you should have.

Types of documents:

Official:	Birth certificate, driver's license, social security card.
Semi-official:	Graduation certificates, yearbook.
Personal & private:	Letters, photos, family mementos.

These documents can be obtained in various ways.

Sources of Documents:

1. Genuine.
2. Genuine but used by other than rightful owner.
3. Genuine but altered.
4. False.
 - a. Genuine blanks.
 - b. Reproductions of genuine blanks.
 - c. Fictitious forms.

DEPTH OF COVER⁸⁷

Depth of cover refers to the logic, its durability, its validity, and the degree of elaboration of the cover. It is a reflection of the degree of support afforded a given operation. Due to always elaborate and costly preparation, deep cover operations are generally applied against long-range objectives.

Depth of cover is also a reflection of the degree of operational security. Operational security is defined as ***the state of safety for intelligence installations, personnel and activities created by procedures designed to protect secret operations and their products against unintended disclosure and covert operations against scrutiny.*** Distinctions are often drawn between operational security, physical security and security of personnel. Yet these disciplines are so intermeshed that a failure in one always jeopardizes the other two.

Depth of cover can also be measured by the backstopping effort that is employed. Backstopping, as a general enterprise, refers to those means employed to lend credence to elements of cover should the Collection Officer fall under the scrutiny of the target or an opposing intelligence service. A Collection Officer may claim to be working for an insurance firm. Upon a search of his room or clothing, business cards are found listing the firm's address and telephone number and identifying the Collection Officer as a sales person. Upon calling the number, anyone investigating the Collection Officer will reach a secretary who will confirm that the "sales person" is indeed an employee of the insurance firm.

Flash alias such as non-useable copies of genuine articles (credit cards that "appear" genuine, false account numbers, etc.) are used when the backstopping effort is minimal. Full backstopping efforts require creation of an entire verifiable legend based on a real person.

CONCLUSIONS

Cover can be the key to your mission and should therefore be approached by building a solid foundation. Cover can either be natural – using an existing agent who is already in place – or artificial – creating an identity for an agent.

The key to good cover is coordination. More than one person or agency will likely be involved in establishing cover and it is essential that they work together to avoid duplication of effort and enhance continuous flow of the cover. Whatever type of cover is used, it must be solid and able to withstand scrutiny by the target or opposing intelligence services.

It must also be made clear that there is no such thing as a cover that cannot be discovered. No matter how much groundwork you lay, the possibility exists that someone or something could come along and destroy all your hard work. Keep this in mind and always be prepared for the possibility.

Chapter

12

Countersurveillance

UPON COMPLETING THIS SECTION YOU SHOULD BE ABLE TO:

- 1. Define the term countersurveillance and its importance to human intelligence collection operations.**
 - 2. Perform various methods of detection of visual surveillance.**
 - 3. Execute various methods of evasion of surveillance.**
 - 4. Understand the precautionary measures that are necessary during movement for clandestine purposes.**
-

FUNDAMENTALS OF COUNTERSURVEILLANCE⁸⁸

The anonymity of the Collection Officer and his recruited agents is essential to the overall success of the collection effort and the protection of all concerned. Counter-surveillance planning must be a basic planning element in any operation. The plan needs to include countersurveillance measures. Counter-surveillance measures are designed to **prevent, detect and evade** surveillance by opposing intelligence operatives.

PREVENTION⁸⁹

This is the most important aspect of countersurveillance training and planning. It must be a part of the operations plan and the daily routines of the Collection Officer and/or agents. Countersurveillance prevention plans are documented in the counter-surveillance annex of the Operations Plans and should include:

Cover Stories

As part of your continuing effort to thwart the efforts of opposing intelligence services, cover stories are critical. It is necessary to develop a cover story that will stand up to rigorous inspection. When planning cover stories, considerations of realism, traceability, and flexibility should be made. When the plan is complete, it should be well rehearsed. Assure that the cover story sounds realistic and fits the surroundings in which you are operating.

Routine Prevention

Far too often, security is compromised because of an unconscious act by a Collection Officer and/or agent that draws the attention of opposing intelligence operatives.

Discussing intelligence data in places where you can be overheard and/or recorded, or discussing classified information with persons who do not have a need-to-know, can lead to compromise and should be avoided. Making contacts or frequenting places that are traditional "hang-outs" for intelligence operatives are not good security practices. Those displaying excessive behavior towards sex, drugs or alcohol can be easily compromised by opposing intelligence operatives.

DETECTION⁹⁰

The next step in the countersurveillance objective is to be able to detect when an opposing intelligence force is conducting surveillance on you or your agent.

False Security

There is no such thing as a completely safe place or contact. Developing and maintaining routine awareness practices will help prevent false security and aids you in detection.

Set up your own surveillance on contact points and on agents to determine whether opposing intelligence forces have been deployed.

Subterfuge

Use subterfuge for cursory observation. Turn around and walk directly back down the street and observe the faces of people you see. Do this a few times and notice what faces you repeatedly observe. Or, if you think you're being followed, walk into a building and then observe who follows you into that building. This is referred to as "switchbacks."

False Drop

Use a false drop to detect surveillance. If you think you might be under surveillance, fold up a piece of paper and place it somewhere as if it were a "secret message" being left for your contact. Then move away from the false drop to a location where you, or someone else, can surreptitiously observe anyone trying to retrieve the piece of paper.

If you are, in fact, being followed by an enemy agent, he will more than likely attempt to retrieve the message. When he does, you will not only confirm your suspicion that you were being followed, but you may also be able to observe the enemy agent. All the enemy agent gets is a blank piece of paper. This is a risky technique. Since the adversary now knows that their surveillance is "blown" they may choose to move against you immediately.

Dead Ends

Lead suspected operatives into dead ends such as blind alleys, dead end roads or restrooms. In performing this maneuver, care should be exercised to avoid any undesired confrontations.

Identification

Identification of opposing intelligence operatives should be a major collection objective. During the planning and rehearsal phases, photographs and operational methods of these operatives should be studied and memorized.

While there are numerous ways to detect surveillance and methods of detection depend heavily on the particular circumstances of your mission, the following list will provide you with some examples of methods to detect surveillance.

- . Use of a convoy - One or more persons who follow at a distance to detect surveillance. This method can be most effective.
- . Retracing course - Frequent changes of direction in a short period of time.
- . Window reflections - Useful in business districts to see what or who is behind you without turning around.
- . Use of bait - Use a false drop, then use window reflections to observe pick-up attempts. If someone is watching you, they may go for the bait.
- . Change of pace - Vary your pace with sudden turns and stops. Anyone attempting to follow you will have to do the same and should be easily spotted.
- . Use public conveyances.
- . Board, pay fare, exit as it (bus, trolley, subway) begins to move, observe actions of others.
- . Leave conveyance in area with little pedestrian traffic and then loiter.

Countersurveillance

- . Board several successive conveyances along a single route within a short period of time.
- . Automobile tactics - Use traffic signals to force deliberate traffic violations.

EVASION⁹¹

Once you realize that you have been placed under surveillance, it will be necessary to evade the surveillance and immediately advise your higher command. Proper advance planning should enable you to do this with minimal endangerment to the operation and the agency.

- . Have a pre-arranged signal so that you can warn other team members and/or your agent that you have come under surveillance.
- . Don't go home or to a home station unless it is safe or unless directed by higher command.
- . Never meet with contacts unless it is safe and, when meeting agents or other Collection Officers, always be aware of surveillance activities.
- . Don't allow excessive paranoia to override good observation skills.

These are a few examples of methods to evade surveillance. The methods that are used are dictated by the environment that you are operating in and the type of surveillance that is being used against you.

You may suspect that you are under surveillance; however, you still need to move about. In this case you may choose to employ some of the following evasive techniques.

- . Vary routines to and from home and work. This would include any routine function you may attend like church, school or social clubs.
- . Avoid routine stops and vary the bars, stores and gas stations you utilize.
- . Vary times of exiting your home and workplaces.

Countersurveillance

- . Vary the exits and vehicles which you use.
- . Use decoys and disguises. One good method is to enter a building and then have a utility agent who appears similar to you and is wearing the same clothing, leave the building a short time later. Hopefully, he will lead the opposing operatives off your trail.
- . Use planned mass exits or wait until there are a number of people exiting and attempt to hide in the crowd.

Immediate evasion can be accomplished by several different methods. The ability to think quickly and act as you have been trained to do is extremely important. Evasion methods can be as simple as entering a building through the front entrance and then leaving through the side or back; or getting on a bus, train or subway and then immediately disembarking, hopefully trapping the surveillant aboard. Following are a few examples of methods of evading surveillance.

- . Entering and leaving crowded building – Hurry in and out of crowded buildings, taking advantage of multiple entrances and exits.
- . Concealment – Hide in apartment buildings, etc.
- . Decoy – Use another agent of similar description and dress when leaving residence or work.
- . Change of appearance — Change color or silhouette. Use disguises.
- . Dodging – Pursue erratic course through dense pedestrian or vehicular traffic.
- . Scatter – Multiple Collection Officers leave all at once during peak traffic.

CONCLUSIONS

Preventing, detecting and evading surveillance is a difficult objective. However, with professionalism, discipline, training, and imagination you can frustrate the best opposing surveillance.

Chapter

13

Contacts: Procedures and Reporting

UPON COMPLETING THIS SECTION YOU SHOULD BE ABLE TO:

1. Understand the importance, purpose and procedures for contact.
 2. Know what the Collection Officer/handler must do in order to be prepared for contact with controlled agents.
 3. List and describe the four elements of contact.
 4. Understand the utilization and benefits of contact reports.
-

INTRODUCTION^{92,93}

To this point, the manual has covered, among other things, the spotting, assessment, recruiting, training, and dispatch of the controlled agent. An integral part of the many things which comprise the details of the Agent Cycle is making contact with an agent. Contacts could well begin with the spotting phase, will usually become a part of the assessing phase, and will undoubtedly continue through the recruiting and training phases. Contacts with a controlled agent are obviously necessary after he has been dispatched and becomes operational. Because contacts between agents and Collection Officers are both necessary and risky, it is imperative that contact procedures and techniques be given special attention. Contacts with controlled agents have definite applications to all covert human resource operations.

CONTACTS ARE MADE TO:

- . **Establish relationships.**
 - . **Interrogate.**
 - . **Recruit.**
 - . **Train.**
 - . **Give assignments.**
 - . **Deliver information.**
 - . **Receive payments.**
 - . **Terminate.**
-

Contacts, regardless of what method is employed, are always made to accomplish something that is directly related to the objective of the collection operation. Because contacts are made for a purpose, it is advisable to list what those purposes are or might be. The many different reasons for making contact have one, or both, of two basic things in common.

- . Get information.
- . Do the things necessary to start, continue or terminate the collection of information.

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Contacts are only made when the contact has a direct relationship to the operational goal of collecting information.

KINDS OF CONTACT^{94,95}

Personal Meetings

Personal contacts with an agent are one of the more common, are usually the most productive, and, from an operational security point of view, are one of the more risky types of contact.

- . Potentially dangerous to the agent.
- . Potentially dangerous to the handler.
- . Potentially dangerous to the operation.
- . Should always be planned and conducted with detailed attention to security measures.

Telephone Contacts

Telephone contacts are probably as common as personal meetings, are usually less productive, and pose unique security problems.

- . Time and content limitations.
- . Usually prevent observation of the agent.
- . Telephones are not a secure means of communication.
- . Accidental eavesdropping.
- . Deliberate eavesdropping.

Written Contacts

Circumstances (Collection Officer is under surveillance by the local security service) may dictate that contact be made via the written word.

- . Mails.
- . Telegram.
- . Message delivery service.
- . Newspaper ads.
- . Dead drops, live drops.
- . Can be used as a device to stimulate or motivate some controlled agents.

Personal meetings and telephone contacts are normally the most productive because they allow for a dialogue, a conversation between the handler and the agent. Personal contacts stand alone, however, in providing the greatest all-round productivity and ability to apply controls to the operation and the agent. An agent's reactions can be measured, and what he says can be better evaluated when gestures, facial expressions and inflections are observable. Because the basics of personal meetings are applicable to other kinds of contacts, we will give detailed attention to the personal contact.

WHEN TO CONTACT

Because of the element of risk involved, personal meetings should be made as infrequently as possible, but often enough to keep the operation moving, the information flowing, and control of the agent maintained at a proper level. The decision to set up a personal contact should always be governed by the needs of the operation.

WHERE TO MEET

Safe-Houses

Safe-houses are secure locations used for meeting purposes, concealment, recuperation, and rest. They may be maintained by your agency, your station, or for purposes of your particular mission. Such locations include rudimentary shelters, private homes, apartments, temporary rooms, farms, business premises; or industrial plants. In each case, the safety and security of such locations are deemed to guarantee freedom from surveillance and arrest. An agent may, in these premises, speak freely of clandestine matters or engage in clandestine technical functions.

Types of Safe-Houses – Safe-houses are generally either:

Unmanned/Secret – This category of safe-house is a shelter, such as a shed, cave, cellar, or cabin, which is provisioned as necessary and left unattended until needed.

Unmanned/Assisted – This is typically a home or apartment maintained by a utility agent who does not reside on the premises. So-called vacation homes are ideal choices, as they provide plausible cover for transient use and enable the registered owner to deny any knowledge of clandestine use.

Manned/Secret – A manned/secret location is a "secret room" or concealment chamber in an ordinary dwelling or place of business.

Manned/Assisted – These safe-houses can be homes, apartments, or other dwellings with residents who actively assist the transient agent, provide security, lend technical expertise, and/or a wide range of other services.

Characteristics of the Safe-House – Management of safe-houses is governed by the usual requisites of clandestine behavior. In the case of assisted installations, owners or residents will usually have no overt ties to politically or socially sensitive groups, ideologies or activities. Such individuals should be conservative in all aspects of behavior and appear as normal members of the community in which they reside.

In some instances, safe-house personnel will be selected by virtue of their employment, with a job located in the right area that offers sufficient flexibility to allow them

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to go into action when the signal that a "visitor" is on his way is received.

Site Selection – Safe-house locations are invariably selected with due consideration to the natural cover they afford. Transient hotels or rooming houses that are not subject to controls are often used. Extensive modification of safe-house structures may be implemented to provide concealment chambers, escape routes or photographic darkrooms.

The physical location of the safe-house is a major consideration. It should not be too isolated. Isolation works for you and against you. While isolation offers the benefits of seclusion, it can present a danger by permitting a hostile intelligence service to surround it and take the safe-house by storm without drawing attention from close neighbors. In most cases, the hostile intelligence service has no more desire than you do to have their activities end up on the evening news.

In general, locations should be selected which do not encumber security unnecessarily and are consistent with the requirements of cover and expected volume of use.

Priming – Safe-houses are "primed" or made ready for use through the application of safety/danger signals. Either through drops or some other method of clandestine communication, the agent states his need to visit the safe-house or the handler directs him there. No matter who indicates the need for usage of the safe-house or how the signal is sent, once it has been received the safe-house is activated and prepared for the arrival of the agent.

Safe-House Keepers – When thinking in terms of long-term use of a safe-house, consider the possibility of recruiting the occupant, landlord or the manager as an on-site keeper of the premises. Such a person must be above suspicion and completely trustworthy, of course. But, if given the same attention as given to recruited controlled agents (application of the procedures and techniques of the Agent Cycle), they too could be recruited, to function as utility agents for the exclusive purpose of managing a safe-site. A clerical staff member might satisfy all these requirements and, for a small consideration, might be convinced that he should move to and occupy a safe-site selected by the intelligence unit. A keeper of a safe-house can provide site security, routine maintenance, telephone and mail coverage, and an appearance of normal use of the premises.

Safe-Sites

The place to conduct a meeting has several requirements if it is to be secure. A safe-site, to be safe, practical, and efficient, must satisfy certain criteria:

- . Use will not attract undue attention.
- . Arrival/departure by more than one route.
- . Observation of the site is limited.
- . Observation from the site is good.
- . Site is under handler's control.
- . Site is adequately equipped.
- . Ideally, is used for one operation and one agent.
- . Within the budget limits.

Safe-sites are not limited to "safe-houses." Houses, apartments, hotel/motel rooms, vehicles, an office space, any place or anything, provided it satisfies the needs of a contact and meets all or most of the criteria for a safe-site, can be used.

Apartments

Small apartments can satisfy most requirements for site selection. They should be located in areas where the counterintelligence potential is low, so as not to pose additional security risks.

Hotels/Motels

Of the two, hotels are often the better choice because they will allow the agent, and the handler, to disappear into a large structure which is frequented by many people, most of

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whom are of a transient nature. Hotels often have the additional advantage of having several public facilities, such as restaurants, which can afford plausible reasons for the agent's presence at the location. Motels, unless carefully selected, too often allow unrestricted observation of room doors and windows from several vantage points.

The major advantage offered by both hotels and motels is that one-time usage is in keeping with normal activity. In selecting either hotels or motels, consideration should be given to:

- . Ownership.
- . Management.
- . Clientele.
- . Structural features.

Gratuitous Rooms

Free rooms, offered because the ownership "has government contacts," or because the building is government-owned, should never be used when an operation is of any real significance. Even if the ownership and management is above suspicion, the likelihood of the arrangement being known by many others is too great a security risk to take. Such arrangements are convenient and save operational funds, but the risks involved could lead to compromises that would be much more expensive, in many ways, than would ever justify the small savings involved.

Residences

Residences belonging to members of the agency should never be used as a safe house unless it is of extreme necessity. Such utilization would provide extremely dangerous counterintelligence information. If a Collection Officer's home has to be used, certain rules must be followed:

- . The agent is not told the true identity of the owner of the house.

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- . Family members should not be present.
- . Personal effects such as mail, photographs and papers should be hidden.
- . If at all possible the agent should not be aware of the address or location. Bring the agent to the house late at night, blindfolded and have him leave the same way.

Vehicles as Meeting Sites

When considering using a vehicle as a meeting place, being selective and cautious about pick-up locations, routes of travel, parking locations, and where and how to disembark an agent, are all basic. But one practice, which is usually dictated by expediency or budgetary limitations, should be covered. That is the practice of using personal cars for contacts with agents. It is difficult to visualize an operation that is so urgent as to require that a Collection Officer use his own personal vehicle for operational purposes, when such use could identify to the agent the identity of the Collection Officer, his family, and his residence. Information of that kind need not and should not be available to any agent.

THE CONTACT^{96,97}

Notifying the Agent

As with most procedural rules, the question of when to notify the agent of an impending contact calls for flexibility and judgment. As a **general rule**, notification should be made at the latest possible and practical time. To give an agent days, or more than several hours notice, could be inviting possible compromise. On the other hand, to expect a well-placed and productive controlled agent to respond at a moment's notice, could also invite security problems or frustrate him because of ill-timed changes in his schedule. In the eyes of those in the target environment, the agent's actions must pass the test of plausibility and, in his mind, the demands made on him must be reasonable. To meet the agent's need to plan ahead, and to limit the information made available to him, a compromise is necessary. Any compromise must favor operational security.

Every contact with a controlled agent, with the exception of emergency meetings, should be given advance planning. Advance planning affords the ability to give the agent

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advance notice. However, advance notice should always be limited to nothing more than an alerting or "warning notice" that is sufficient for the agent to set aside the time for a meeting. The agent should only know that on a given day he will have to absent himself from his usual haunts. He should know nothing of the specifics of the meeting, such as the hour, the place, the purpose, or how the contact will be carried off. With training and experience in the operation, he will come to learn that if told to "keep next Thursday open," he must lay the groundwork to explain his whereabouts on Thursday. He will know that he will need a story to cover his disappearance from the target surroundings (cover for action) and he can cancel or reschedule plans that have already been made.

A question of priorities could arise which might demand that the handler adjust the scheduling of the meeting. If, for example, the agent has the sudden opportunity to access the target material, it would be unlikely that a meeting with the handler should be given priority. In the early stages of an operation, the agent's ability to carry off the requirements of a cover story, or even to plan ahead, will probably require that the handler give specific direction and assistance. With the agent's development, however, he will become more adept at these basics. The handler can then concern himself simply with the testing of the cover story and the agent's total understanding of everything involved.

Preparation

Once the controlled agent has been alerted, the handler must turn to his own preparations for the contact. Everything needed to accomplish the purpose of the meeting must be attended to.

PREPARATION CHECK LIST

- | | |
|---|------------------------------------|
| . Transportation. | . Routes of travel (recon). |
| . Training aids/equipment. | . Dossier review. |
| . Money/receipts. | . Notes. |
| . Safe-site arrangements (place and time). | |
-

There are literally hundreds of variations on how a contact can be arranged or

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conducted. The following considerations are important to ensure that a personal contact is productive and secure.

- . Specific notification/directions to the agent.
- . Initial Rendezvous.
- . Countersurveillance.
- . Safety and danger signals.
- . Picking up the agent.
- . Recontact procedures.

Meetings with controlled agents should normally be conducted as a four-part series of events. The following contact element sequence is recommended:

1. Adjustment.
2. Debriefing.
3. Operational matters.
4. Termination.

The Human Element

Although there are many things to plan for and consider in a truly professional agent contact, one thing stands out as needing recognition by all Collection Officers who are involved as agent handlers. It is important to remember that agents (and Collection Officers) are human beings. Because they are individuals, they must be handled as such. People are often difficult to predict. They have their own strengths and weaknesses, and all of the inner mysteries of every human being. After a controlled agent has been spotted, we assess for him his potential worth, his traits of character and his motivations. But when we assess, we can only assess the probable. Therefore, in all dealings with covert human resources, keep

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in mind that they must be given positive handling and control, but through delicate manipulation. And lastly, because they are unpredictable human beings, they must be given only enough information about the operation, about you, and about your agency, for them to effectively fulfill their role as an operational tool.

Be guided by your knowledge of the agent, his motivations, his personality, his likes and dislikes, his idiosyncrasies, and his character traits. Above all, use that knowledge to maintain control. **You** are the boss, not him. **You** direct his actions and **you** run the operation. Be demanding, but reasonable. Maintain a tight rein, but in a way that his ego will accept. Establish rapport, but never become his friend (or her lover). Maintain a business-like demeanor when in contact with him, but within a relaxed and congenial atmosphere. Be prepared to play the role of the father confessor, the psychologist, or the disciplinarian. But never lose sight of the real and only purpose of the agent, which is to collect information, under your control and your direction.

Intelligence Jargon

Television, movies and books have educated the general public with a rather extensive knowledge of "spy talk," the jargon that identifies the intelligence profession. Some of the language that we use is still distinctly ours and has not become part of the idiom of the public. This is especially true in the language of intelligence. Terms such as "target," "safe-house," "countersurveillance," "cover story," "dead drops," and a host of others, are unique to the intelligence business. Such words should not be introduced into the vocabulary of agents, and they should be purged from the language of Collection Officers. Consequently, in your contacts with an agent, avoid the use of intelligence jargon. Instead of telling an agent, "I'll pick you up at the 'rendezvous' and we'll go to the 'safe-house' for a 'contact' so that I can 'debrief' you," simply say, "Be at the corner of First and Main at 6:15 p.m. I've got to talk to you."

The rule is: ***Avoid the use of intelligence jargon when talking to an agent.*** To violate this rule is to invite possible compromise.

Control Devices Gimmicks

The use of tape recorders and various psychological stratagems as control devices

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has obvious advantages. We should add to those control factors the use of certain documentation that is invaluable for the control of any agent. There may be others, but three stand out as a must:

1. Handwriting samples directly connect the agent to the agency and can serve as a lever, if needed. They also serve to verify that any written message or report from the agent is in his writing.
2. Signed receipts serve as documents for the Collection Officer as to any financial or equipment transactions, and also directly connect the agent to the agency.
3. Photographs of the agent provide additional identifying data which is useful if he "turns over." Photos of the agent in the company of Collection Officers can also be used as a means of convincing some individuals that it is to their advantage to continue with the handler/agent arrangement.

The question often arises, "How in hell can I get a signed receipt?" Or, "You're crazy if you think that guy will hold still for a family portrait or give me a handwriting sample!" The answer to these questions is, simply, to do it anyway you can. In a handler's routine dealings with any agent, he will have to use a little "con," and, while often being truthful and straight forward, may occasionally have to employ surreptitious measures. Use the same techniques when collecting the documentation which should be a part of the agent's file.

CLANDESTINE MEETINGS^{98,99}

Face-to-face meetings, conducted secretly between a Collection Officer and his agent, are known as clandestine meetings. Such meetings are employed chiefly for agent management and operational administrative functions. In general, the advantages of clandestine meetings are:

- . They save time.
- . They are used as a countermeasure against some forms of eavesdropping.
- . They offer a measure of certainty.

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- . They provide a means of exercising control.

The stress and delicacy of intelligence collection work make human contact between an agent and his handler imperative if an operation or organization is to survive and function effectively. The disadvantages of clandestine meetings reflect concerns of security – your security, the agent's security, and the security of the operation. You or your agent may be under surveillance by hostile intelligence forces or by a target who has begun to suspect your agent's activities.

Accidental observation is also a consideration. Clandestine meetings involve a certain element of risk. You must know that and so must the agent. It is natural that one or both of you may be nervous and apprehensive about a face-to-face meeting. Apprehension is a very *readable* emotion in most people. Uninvolved passers-by may sense your nervousness and become acutely aware that ***something is going on***.

Types of Meetings

Clandestine meetings, for our purposes, can be divided into three categories:

1. Meetings between unacquainted operatives.
2. Meetings between acquainted operatives.
3. Silent meetings (brush contacts).

Meetings between unacquainted operatives require secure, prearranged identification signals and special briefings. The general description and distinguishing features of each operative must be established and, according to operational necessity, known by one or both. The security problems inherent in the meeting must be analyzed since there may be risks in permitting certain operatives the ability to extensively describe others they are to meet. The description must be specific enough to preclude the possibility of accidental recognition of legitimate parties who just happen to be at the meeting site.

The use of ***artificial descriptive points*** is one approach to the problem of providing descriptions. Artificial points can be given in lieu of physical descriptions such as height, weight and color of eyes. They must be obvious enough to spur recognition, yet common

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enough not to attract unwanted attention. Innocent enough in themselves, they offer agents a means of recognition. Examples include the time-worn flower in the button hole or uniquely folded newspapers. Unique objects such as two halves of a banknote should not be used due to obvious liability in case of search or arrest. The artificial descriptive points should not be confused with safety signals and handlers should be careful not to use them interchangeably with their agents. If a flower in a button hole is used as an artificial descriptive point then the flower in the button hole should **never** be used as a safety signal. This will avoid confusion.

Once initial recognition is achieved, the operatives must approach each other. At this juncture, identification is made and a method often employed is that of ***prearranged dialogue***. For example: Assume that the artificial descriptive point is a particular novel by Bronte. One operative offers, "I have never read Bronte." The other replies, "Do you mean Charlotte or Emily?" This is the first exchange. First exchanges are usually followed for safety's sake by a second exchange ***unrelated*** to the first. Again, by way of example: "I did not know there was a difference; as for me I am a gardener." The other operative replies, "It is difficult to keep a garden in this climate." Such harmless dialogue must be structured to prevent accidental conversations with the wrong person and leave no doubt that contact has been made with the correct individual.

Meetings between ***acquainted operatives*** obviously do not require prearranged identification signals. In every other respect they do not and should not materially differ from other types of meetings. Security must always be at the forefront in planning these meetings.

Silent meetings, sometimes called brush contacts, are arguably not meetings at all. Silent meetings are usually used to pass something physical such as a message or documents the agent has acquired as part of his assignment. Exchanging identical briefcases at a busy airport, or a folded newspaper during a momentary pause on a park bench are examples of silent meetings.

Frequency of Meetings

Clandestine meetings are further categorized in terms of their frequency. There are:

1. Regular meetings.

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2. Special meetings.
3. Control meetings.

Regular meetings take place according to a prearranged schedule and frequently involve the same site or sites. Such meetings should also be supported by "fallbacks," or alternative meeting times and sites, in case the regular meeting is missed for any reason.

Special meetings occur in response to special signals or requests, typically when the matter is of some importance or urgency. Such meetings may or may not be supported by fallbacks depending on the circumstances.

Control meetings are functionally a combination of both regular and special meetings and are used in instances where a communication link has been broken or lost. In such cases, the agent must come to a prearranged site at a prearranged time to re-establish contact.

Site Selection

Meetings are held in the open, in public places or conveyances, under safe circumstances (safe-houses), and at a variety of other sites. Meeting sites should be selected on the basis of the countersurveillance opportunity they present. Sites must be manageable. Deserted areas, for example, are ideal from a countersurveillance point of view, but assuming hostile surveillance, the appearance of two operatives at the same time in the same place will endanger (and probably ruin) your cover. With this in mind, more public places such as parks or museums are often selected. Such places, unless selected with considerable care, can be unmanageable due to the volume of foot traffic and surrounding vantage points. A worthwhile practice is the selection of pre-surveyed sites where ordinary traffic and activity have been observed over a long period of time.

Avoid meeting in the same place or locale used by others within your organization. Through a coordinated effort with other handlers in your area it should be simple to avoid duplicate use of the same sites.

Sites selected must actually exist and must be accessible to both parties at the time set for the meeting. If audio surveillance is a factor, the site should offer operatives a

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measure of safety. As an example, Soviet case officers working in the New York area were once known to favor rowing in a boat in Central Park for their meetings. Audio surveillance would be difficult from a stationary position on the shore when the boat was being rowed down river.

Cover for Meeting

Obviously, the site and the cover must be closely intertwined. An example of this is to use a doctor or dentist office, or a movie theatre. There must be plausible cover for every meeting and each attendee should be fully aware of the details of this cover. Of course, meetings that appear to be chance require little in the way of cover. It would, however, probably be viewed as suspicious for an agent to go to a park on the other side of town for a "stroll" when there is an even nicer park a block from his house.

Request for Meetings

In the case of special meetings, requests are necessary. The agent or handler must have some way of informing the other that a meeting is desired. Requests can be accomplished in any one of several ways. Distinctive arrangement of objects, chalk marks and classified advertisements can all be used to signal requests. A common method is the use of "wrong numbers" in telephone communication. The requester (either the agent or handler) calls the other operative, and when the line is answered, asks for "Joe," or someone else who is **not** at that number. This is the signal that a meeting is being requested. Upon being told that, "There is nobody by that name here," the requester asks, "Is this 555-1613?" The number is a code which gives the date, place and time of the requested meeting. In this example, 5 could refer to a place, 6 could refer to a day, and 13 could refer to 1300 hours. Following this, the requester is informed that he has reached a wrong number and rings off.

Safety Signals

If an agent discovers or suspects he is being followed to a meeting site, it is **essential** that he inform his contact of impending danger. To provide for this contingency safety signals have evolved. Used **in addition to** artificial descriptive points, safety signals silently advise meeting participants if: (1) it is safe to approach for the meeting; (2) if surveillance is suspected; and (3) if a fallback meeting is feasible.

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To again use our example of an agent with a book by Bronte, let us assume the meeting is to take place in a public library. The agent is seated, and apart from serving as a recognition point, his book also becomes a safety signal. If the book is placed on his right it is safe to approach; on his left, there is danger. If the book lies open and face down this signals that a fallback meeting will take place.

Arrival and Departure

Vigorous, often elaborate and time consuming countersurveillance should be practiced by both participants on their way to meeting sites. The following example should provide some insight:

A meeting was scheduled for Monday evening. After work on Saturday, the agent left town. Monday morning he returned to the city in his car. On the way, observing that he was not under surveillance, he decided to take advantage of this opportunity in order to be "clear" for the meeting that evening. He did not go to work but parked his car instead on a street (some distance from his place of business, and from the meeting site). He then boarded a subway and went to a different part of the city. He got off the subway at a little-used stop and confirmed the absence of surveillance. He then bought a newspaper and again boarded the subway. Later, the agent got off at another stop and went to a restaurant for breakfast. Again there was no surveillance. After breakfast, the agent made several more trips on the subway and confirmed that he was not under surveillance. To avoid being detected on the street by a counterintelligence agent, he went into a movie theatre. Twenty or thirty minutes before the scheduled meeting, he left the theatre and went to the meeting site, again checking along the way for signs of surveillance. The meeting took place as scheduled and without incident.

The above example illustrates the type of complex maneuvers that are often required for security. Once you are certain that you are not under surveillance, it is safe to approach the meeting site. Meetings should be kept short and similar tactics may be necessary when leaving the meeting site.

SUMMARY OF IMPORTANT POINTS

- . Contacts are always made to further the basic goals of an operation to collect information.
- . Of the many kinds of contacts, the personal contact is usually the most productive in information gained and in controls on the operation and the agent.
- . Personal contacts are risky and must be planned and executed with security measures given a maximum of attention.
- . Telephone contacts must include an awareness that the telephone is a very insecure means of communication.
- . Other kinds of contacts can be effectively employed if they are practical or would serve an operational need.
- . Meeting places should be selected with care and should satisfy all or most of the criteria for safe-sites.
- . Notifying an agent of an impending contact should be in two stages:
 1. Alerting.
 2. Detailed (as late as practical).
- . Contact Elements:
 1. Adjustment.
 2. Debriefing.
 3. Operational matters.
 4. Termination.
- . The human element in any contact demands that the handler know everything

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possible about the agent and acts in accordance with that knowledge.

- . Intelligence jargon should be avoided in all conversations with covert human resources.
- . Controls over an agent can be significantly strengthened by psychological manipulation and by documentation.

CONTACT REPORTS^{100,101}

One of the goals of this manual is to establish an appreciation of the value of management in human intelligence collection operations and to provide some of the tools that make for better management. This section will be devoted to one of the management tools which can serve many purposes – Contact Reports.

Why Another Report?

One of the more serious weaknesses in many collection operations is the informal recording of information which is necessary to insure the continuity of the operation. The Contact Report fills that void. It specifically records:

- . When and where the contact occurred.
- . How and why the contact was conducted.
- . What transpired and what was learned.
- . Who was involved.
- . Collection Officer's recommendations.

Such data, maintained in the agent's dossier, provides a ready reference to all of the important facts about the operation and the agent involved. It assists the Station Chief and/or the Section Leader in the decision making process, and it assists the Collection Officer in his role as the supervisor of the agent. Contact Reports provide an accurate

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chronology of agent development and operational progress. They are without equal as a tool for efficient and time-saving handling of a controlled agent.

Format

Any format which serves the intent of maintaining details of agent and operational progress will suffice. The following pages represent one format that has proven to be valuable in actual use. Exhibit A depicts a useful format. Exhibit B represents a hypothetical finalized Contact Report.

This example displays how a Contact Report can be complete yet concise. Each entry should be limited to the gist of the information that is pertinent to the particular paragraph.

Exhibits C through F display how a series of Contact Reports serve to record the development of a controlled agent and the progress of an operation. Taken singly or as a whole, these reports serve the Director and the agent handler in many ways. Each report took only minutes to complete, but may have saved hours or even days of valuable time.

NOTE: Although the examples are typewritten, Contact Reports can be handwritten. Unless typed by the Collection Officer, handwritten reports are recommended as a security measure. Only the involved Collection Officer(s) and the Section Chief/Director should have direct access to Contact Reports.

CONTACT REPORT SUMMARY

Contact Reports are one of the most valuable management tools available for productive and efficient operations involving controlled agents. They can also be utilized, with applicable modifications, in other types of human resource operations. Contact Reports:

- . Aid Collection Officers in the continuity of the operation.
- . Aid Collection Officers in agent control.
- . Aid the Collection Officer in agent development.

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- . Save valuable time.
- . Aid command/management in decision-making.
- . Help avoid setting dangerous patterns.
- . Eliminate duplication.
- . Are easy to complete.
- . Should be made part of the agent's dossier.
- . Should be directly accessed only on a "need to know" basis.
- . Are a means by which a Collection Officer can communicate his objective recommendations for the conduct of the operation.

EXHIBIT A
CONTACT REPORT

SOURCE: _____ DATE OF REPORT: _____

DATE OF CONTACT: _____ TIME: _____ LOCATION: _____

COLLECTION OFFICER(S): _____

SOURCE EVAL: _____ CONTENT EVAL: _____

References:

1. INFORMATION REPORTED
2. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CONTACT
3. OPERATIONAL MATTERS
4. LEADS
5. NEW PERSONAL DATA
6. FINANCES/LOGISTICS
7. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

EXHIBIT B

CONTACT REPORT

Page 1 of 2

SOURCE: X39-4

DATE OF REPORT: 3-7-90

DATE OF CONTACT: 3-6-90

TIME: 2015 LOCATION: Mainland Hotel

COLLECTION OFFICER(S): G. Jones

SOURCE EVAL:

CONTENT EVAL:

Ref. (a) Intelligence Report (file #_____)

(b) SOURCE #X39-4 & Intelligence Report (file #_____)

1. (Information) Anthony Smith's trip to Azuzu including dates, times, flight #, companions, and contacts made. Smith to bring money to anti-government organization.

2. (Circumstances of Contact) At 2015 I picked up X39 near the Keffi Bus Stop on Norman Williams St. Ikoyi, Azuzu. X39 used lit cigarette as safe signal and followed all previous instructions. We proceeded to

EXHIBIT B

CONTACT REPORT

Page 2 of 2

4. (Investigative Leads) X39 overheard Smith state that Michael will have the packages soon. No further information.

5. (New Personal Data) X39's new girlfriend is Sandra Jenkins, 123 Ivy St., Victoria Island, Azuzu. X39 states she knows nothing of his involvements. X39 met her at a party at the Astor Club on Amosu St. X39 appears to be drinking too much and complains of not sleeping well.

6. (Finances/Logistics)	Information payment:	N1000.00
	Motel & Refreshments:	<u>N53.00</u>
		N1053.00

Minox #10527 given to X39. All receipts attached.

7. (Comments/Recommendations) X39 is acting very nervous. I am unable to determine the reason. X39 assures me that everything is fine, except that he is having problems sleeping. X39 settled down during meeting but apparently needs to be monitored more closely for awhile. I believe that the increased frequency of personal contacts during the last year could be the reason for agent's nervous state. He remains productive and the information he produces has been good. X39's regular job, the demands of this operation and his new girlfriend are creating problems with his wife. X39 was counseled on the security risk resulting from his drinking and womanizing. He states he will improve.

EXHIBIT C

Page 1 of 2

SOURCE: X39-4

DATE OF REPORT: 6-6-90

DATE OF CONTACT: 6-6-90 TIME: 2000 LOCATION: Hyatt House #3

COLLECTION OFFICER(S): G. Jones, D. Morgan

SOURCE EVAL: Reliable

CONTENT EVAL: (can be 1-4)

- Ref. (a) Intell. Report (file #_____)
- (b) Source X39-2
- (c) Meeting with Station Chief 8-8-89

1. Anthony Smith associates, businesses owned, family and friends and identity of partner (ref. (a))

2. Called X39 at primary communication 45 min. before meet at Hyatt House. X39 arrived at 2000 and gave recognition signal in bar, per plan. X39 got on same elevator with Collection Officer without showing recognition. We went to room #3, meeting lasted 2-1/2 hr. Collection Officer departed 10 min. after X39. No problems.

3. Training reviewed (ref. (b)) and X39 dispatched to phantom target per operations plan. Secondary communication from X39 changed to dead drop for phantom target report only (ref. (c)). All tested OK.

EXHIBIT C

Page 2 of 2

5. X39's sister, Cecelia (same last name), approximately 39 years old, divorced, has two teenage sons. Lives at 1529 Vanguard Ave., Kiririri Canal, Apapa.

X39 has had previous contact with Daniel Aba (intelligence subject) when Aba operated Sunnyside Aluminum Recycling Plant. X39 likes Kronenbourg Lager and smokes St. Moritz cigarettes.

6. Hotel Room	N47.00
Bar	<u>5.70</u>
N52.70 Hotel receipt attached	

7. X39 tested on training 100% but I had to review communication procedures several times. X39 is having trouble remembering telephone numbers. He seems a bit too anxious but nothing serious.

EXHIBIT D

Page 1 of 1

SOURCE: X39-4

DATE OF REPORT: 11-9-89

DATE OF CONTACT: 11-9-89

TIME: 1330

LOCATION: Broad St., Azuzu

COLLECTION OFFICER(S): G. Jones

AGENT EVAL: Reliable

CONTENT EVAL: Reliable

Ref. (a) Intell Report (file #_____)

(b) Surveillance Report (in dossier)

1. Copies of Smith's accountant report. Smith is planning a trip to Jibutu (ref. (a)).

2. X39 was given telephone instructions for the meeting (used primary communication). At 1330, pickup was made in rental car at rear of Flobett Pharmacy and Supermarket, Norman Williams Street, Ikoyi, Azuzu. X39 was in rear seat out of view. I took a circuitous route to deserted park area in rear of St. Nicholas Hospital on Campbell St. There was no sign of surveillance to or from meeting site. We spent 30 min. at site, then I returned X39 to the bus stop near Flobett's.

3. No Training Report.

4. None.

5. X39's dentist - Dr. St. Mark Dennis, 21 B Daicar Road, Apapa. X39 has full lower plate (false teeth).

6. Refreshments N3.50 (six pack of Kronenbourg Lager)

Rental car 21.00

N24.50

EXHIBIT E

Page 1 of 2

SOURCE: X39-4

DATE OF REPORT: 1-1-90

DATE OF CONTACT: 1-1-90

TIME: 2015 LOCATION: Ikoyi

COLLECTION OFFICER(S): G. Jones

SOURCE EVAL: Reliable

CONTENT EVAL: Reliable

Ref (a) Intell. Report (file #_____)

(b) Source #X39-4 & intell report (file #_____)

1. Anthony Smith's trip to Jibutu including dates, times, flight#, companions and contacts made. Smith is expected to have an organizational meeting and deliver funds to faction there (ref. (a)).

2. At 2015, I picked up X39 in the rear of Tejuosho Market. X39 used lit cigarette as the safe signal and followed all instructions. We went to Tiger Hotel in the rental car. We were at the safe-site 2-1/2 hours without any problem. I returned X39 to pick-up point by a different route. No surveillance or problems noted.

3. I gave new primary communication procedure to X39 for contact with Collection Officer, (telephone number 843751). X39 memorized it and tested OK. I assigned X39 the collection of the identities of faction members that Smith met with.

4. X39 overheard Smith on phone saying that he needs more time before he can act. X39 believes that it was an overseas call.

5. None.

6. Information payment

N1,000.00 (ref. (b))

Motel & refreshments

125.00

EXHIBIT F

Page 1 of 1

SOURCE: X39-4

DATE OF REPORT: 4-5-90

DATE OF CONTACT: 4-5-88

TIME: 1430

LOCATION: Telephone

COLLECTION OFFICER(S): G. Jones

SOURCE EVAL: Reliable

CONTENT EVAL: Reliable

Ref. (a) Source #X39-4

1. (c/1) Smith's overseas call has been identified as going to a Brussels, Belgium based auto importer. Importer may or may not be connected with Smith's operation.
2. X39 contacted me via the primary communication procedure at 1430. X39 called from a phone booth on Kingsway Road, Ikoyi, Azuzu. Call lasted for 5-1/2 minutes.
3. I instructed X39 to use dead letter drop site #6 to deliver photo of report on anti-government faction and identities of personnel. I alerted him to keep all day of 6-5-90 open for personal contact.
4. None.
5. X39's wife has gotten a job at a nursery school on Festival Road, Victoria Island. X39 has joined the Azuzu Country Club, Ikeja.
6. Minox #10527 to be returned at next personal contact.
7. X39 seems more relaxed. I recommend the use of drops for future routine contacts.

Chapter

14

Clandestine Communications

UPON COMPLETING THIS SECTION YOU SHOULD BE ABLE TO:

1. Understand the necessity of and techniques used to accomplish clandestine communication with a high degree of security.
 2. Safely use and understand the function of drops.
 3. Understand and know how to use codes and ciphers.
 4. Perform clandestine communications safely in a variety of ways.
-

INTRODUCTION^{102,103,104}

Human source intelligence requires, by definition, a staff of human operatives and employees to achieve the intelligence objectives of your organization. These operatives (i.e., agents, Collection Officers or handlers, etc.) go out and get the information for you. In order for that information to be useful to your organization, some form of communication must occur between the person who has it (the agent) and the people who need it (your organization). Communication also provides a vehicle by which we are able to advise agents of emerging intelligence needs or newly discovered dangers.

Communication can take many forms and can be as simple as a telephone call, or as complex as using coded messages transmitted in a covert manner. Whatever form the communication takes, it must go undetected by opposing intelligence services and/or the target.

**Caution should always be exercised when
discussing or transmitting intelligence data,
regardless of the form the communication takes.**

Uncomplicated communication between individuals is something we already know how to do. Therefore, this chapter will concentrate on the more complex and surreptitious methods of communication.

DROPS^{105,106,107}

Drops are defined as ***a person, place or object used to transmit messages, money or equipment in secrecy between operational personnel.*** Drops are used in preference to clandestine meetings. In general, drops are advantageous because they provide greater secrecy for communication and greater security for personnel. Use of drops can reduce the number of clandestine meetings and offer considerable flexibility in time. There is no direct contact between parties and, assuming the drop remains undetected, only

one agent is exposed at any given moment.

The principal disadvantages of using drops is uncertainty. While "loaded", materials in drops are outside of the agent's immediate control. Drops are also liable to accidental or deliberate discovery with subsequent adverse effects to your operation, and the potential ravages of fire, flood, or wild animals. Extensive use of drops may also have a negative effect on the management of your agent and/or your operation. Fewer meetings decrease the opportunities to train and evaluate agents.

Using Drops

It is important to have several drops in case one is spotted by an opposing intelligence agent. When leaving a message, plan your route so that if one drop looks risky you can easily go on to others. Always walk slowly, stopping to look at the flowers or watch the birds, in case you are being followed. Then you will not look suspicious and it will give you an opportunity to observe the area for signs of surveillance.

Drops are of two principal types:

- . Dead drops.
- . Live drops.

A good agent and his Collection Officer need to know how to exchange messages secretly. They may need to pass information about the target's plans or they may need to arrange a meeting or pass on warnings of danger or emergency. Contact cannot and should not always be made openly. It is dangerous for the Collection Officer and the agent to meet often, or to be seen exchanging mysterious-looking papers.

Dead Drops

Dead drops are categorized by type and location and they can be either stationary or portable. Stationary dead drops are selected or prepared in lamp posts, fences, behind mirrors in washrooms, and a host of other places such as crevices in rocks or trees. They remain where they are until the agent retrieves them. Portable dead drops are specially

Clandestine Communications

constructed objects that are prepared in advance such as tin cans, boxes, tubes, or stones and then taken to the drop site. Portable dead drops should never be edible or burnable.

Signposts

The agent and his handler need to choose a location where a signal can be left to indicate that a drop has been used. This signal, or "signpost," is notification that a message or material has been left at a specific drop and is waiting to be picked up. After the message/material has been left at the drop, go to the signpost and leave the prearranged signal. These signals can be simple and should conform to the environment so as not to look suspicious. Signals should not, however, be anything that may happen by chance or be easily disturbed. Signals such as overturned stones or open shades should not be used if there is any possibility that someone or something else could unknowingly alter them.

The person retrieving the message/material must always remember to remove the signal at the signpost after it has been picked up. This way the person leaving the message/material need not make an extra, risky visit to the drop to determine if it has been recovered. A simple walk past the signpost to see if the signal has been removed will indicate whether or not the message was retrieved.

Live Drops

The agent may not need to come in physical contact with the Collection Officer if a live drop is used. Using a live drop requires more planning and the help of another agent or an unwitting accomplice. For example, the agent may often go to the public library. The Collection Officer uses this library also; however, the agent and the collection officer should never be seen at the library at the same time. The librarian is really another agent who acts as a live drop, someone who keeps messages for you. The librarian will pass the messages for you. You and your agent need not run the risk of a face-to-face meeting or deal with the complexities of using a dead drop.

CODES AND CIPHERS^{108,109,110}

Every government takes infinite pains to invent unbreakable systems of clandestine communications. Most often these systems take the form of codes or ciphers. **CODES** can

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be defined as, **a cryptographic system by which groups of letters (usually three to five) are substituted for syllables, words, phrases, or sentences.** In a code, some word, symbol or group of symbols is substituted for a whole word or even for a group of words or a complete thought. Thus, "XMLDP" or "74359," depending on whether a letter or number code is used, could stand for **"DANGER"** and every time they turn up in a message that is what they mean. **When the Japanese government set up the famous "East Winds" code for their diplomats in the United States in December, 1941, they were prepared to indicate through the simplest prearranged code words that an attack in the Pacific was forthcoming.**

In a cipher, a symbol, such as a letter or number, stands for a single letter in a word. Thus, "B" or "2" can mean "E" or some other letter. In simple ciphers the same symbol always stands for the same letter. In some of the complex ciphers used today, the same symbol can stand for a different letter each time it turns up depending on the **key** that is used for each message.

In terms of clandestine communications, codes and ciphers have proven to be easy, economical and a relatively safe means of transferring messages. Whether the messages are transmitted agent-to-agent, agent-to-Collection Officer, or Collection Officer-to-Director makes little difference. So long as both parties are using the same code or key for each message transmitted, the message can be easily deciphered.

Using Codes

In order to use codes, you must have the ability to both **encode** (transform the message into the coded format), and **decode** (return the message to its original undistorted format). This is typically accomplished through the use of a **Code Book**. A code book is, **a two-part manual containing an encoding section in which the plain-text words, phrases, etc. are arranged alphabetically with the unalphabetized code groups beside them; and a decoding section in which the code groups are arranged alphabetically but the meanings are not.**

A typical code book would be arranged as follows:

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ENCODING SECTION

<u>Code Group</u>	<u>Meaning</u>
BTMLF	Buying
GLTBW, WMIKB	C
XOLGM, BTPJH	Cache
PMVAVX	Cadillac
GQQNL	Caught
MNXMJ	Compromised
PVONA, BFMOH	I
NUURN	I am
DFPTS	I am not
AWZPW	I will

NOTE: Two code groups are provided for spelling a word that contains double letters. Do not use identical code groups side by side when spelling a word containing double letters. Often, multiple code groups are provided for frequently used words. These should be used interchangeably within messages.

DECODING SECTION

<u>Code Group</u>	<u>Meaning</u>
MAZSS	Period (.)
MCDUZ	Rifle, (s)
MJLCX	Water
MNXMJ	Compromised
NBOKV	T
NGDUR	Here
NSUDF	Convoy (s)
NUURN	I am

Encoding Procedure

1. Prepare the message to be encoded. Keep it brief.

Ex.: I AM COMPROMISED

2. Look in the encoding section for the words I, AM, or the phrase I AM.
3. The example encoding section shows the code groups "PVONA" or "BFMOH" as representing the letter "I" and the code group "NUURN" as representing the phrase "I AM." Since brevity is preferable, use code group "NUURN" to represent the first part of the message. Write "NUURN" beneath the words "I AM" on the message.

Ex.: I AM COMPROMISED

NUURN

4. The example encoding section shows the code group "MNXMJ" as representing the word "Compromised." Write "MNXMJ" beneath the word "Compromised."

Ex.: I AM COMPROMISED - Original message

NUURN MNXMJ - Code groups

5. The encoded message "NUURN MNXMJ" is ready to send when combined with routing identifiers and other format requirements.
6. Codes based on two-part code books as illustrated are secure as long as the code groups are totally random and never repeated during the life of the code book. Once code groups are used repeatedly, the security of the code is dramatically reduced. The use of code books facilitates rapid encoding, decoding and brevity in messages, but are a significant concession to security.

Decoding Procedure

1. Begin the decoding procedure by making certain that the message was enciphered using a code. Origin and format of the message should indicate the system used.
2. Identify and locate the code book used. Typical message formatting calls for the first code group to be preceded by a code book identifier.

Example:

6 9 8 2 7	T M J U Z	D F A Y L
Message	Routing	Code Book
Number	Identifier	Identifier

N U U R N	M N X M J	D F A Y L
--- Code Groups ---		
Code Book Identifier		
used to indicate		
end of message		

3. In this message the code groups are "NUURN" and "MNXMJ."
4. Using the decoding section of code book "DFAYL," find code group "NUURN" and write its meaning beneath the code group.

Example:

N U U R N	M N X M J	-	Code groups
I AM		-	Original message

5. Repeat this procedure for code group "MNXMJ."

Example:

N U U R N	M N X M J	-	Code groups
I AM	COMPROMISED	-	Original message

Using Ciphers

For our practice on using ciphers, let us address ONE-TIME-PAD-BASED SUBSTITUTION CIPHERS and DOUBLE TRANSPOSITION CIPHERS. Pay close attention to the differences between these two types of ciphers. Keep in mind that codes and ciphers differ and note the distinction between encoding and enciphering, and between decoding and deciphering.

One-Time-Pad-Based Substitution Ciphers

A One-Time Pad is ***a series of groups of five letters which do not repeat on a page, within a single pad or pages, nor within a series of pads.*** There will typically be 30-50 cipher key groups on a page. Lines of cipher key groups should be quadruple-spaced apart. Format of typical page from a one-time-pad follows.

Pad Identifier RYAMH		Security Classification SECRET		Page # 001
HRUWC	WLLXX	OPSEZ	FUBPP	RJCL0
YCDCZ	FHXBA	VBEXY	PSNLR	DCQMI
GFRJB	MIYNT	YCJRV	GWFIJN	BEMQC
MLFTB	WMILG	MKNQM	NXNUU	ONABF
MPTSS	TMJUZ	GQGCX	TKVOH	AWJRK
XOJBH	KBGHR	MJRJI	PVURN	DFAYL

Typical columns of 5-letter cipher key groups

One-time pads are used in conjunction with a trigraph. A trigraph is a multiple alphabet substitution system format used with letters from a one-time pad key group and the original clear text message to form a ciphered text that is unbreakable. The ***large letter*** in the left-hand corner of the box indicates the ***Key Letter*** for each box.

Example:

A	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ ZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA	N	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ MLKJIHGFEDCBAZYXWVUTSRQPON
B	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ YXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAZ	O	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ LKJIHGFEDCBAZYXWVUTSRQPONM
C	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ XWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAZY	P	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ KJIHGFEDCBAZYXWVUTSRQPONML
D	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ WVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAZYX	Q	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ JIHGFEDCBAZYXWVUTSRQPONMLK
E	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ VUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAZYXW	R	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ IHGFEDCBAZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJ
F	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ UTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAZYXWV	S	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ HGFEDCBAZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJI
G	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ TSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAZYXWVU	T	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ GFEDCBAZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIH
H	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ SRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAZYXWVUT	U	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ FEDCBAZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHG
I	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ RQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAZYXWVUTS	V	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ EDCBAZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGF
J	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ QPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAZYXWVUTSR	W	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ DCBAZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGF
K	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ PONMLKJIHGFEDCBAZYXWVUTSRQ	X	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ CBAZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGF
L	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ ONMLKJIHGFEDCBAZYXWVUTSRQP	Y	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ BAZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGF
M	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ NMLKJIHGFEDCBAZYXWVUTSRQPO	Z	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ AZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGF

The "A" in the left-hand corner of the box indicates that this is Key Letter box "A."

A	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ <-- Upper Row
	ZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA <-- Lower Row

Enciphering Procedure

1. Compose the message to be enciphered. Keep it brief.

Ex.: THE SOURCE IS JOHN PAUL SMITH A SOUTH AFRICAN AT THE
BRAZILIAN EMBASSY

2. Write the clear text message, letter by letter, above the cipher key groups on the one-time pad. Begin either one group in from the upper left-hand corner of a fresh page,

or

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at the second group following the end of the last message. If the original text does not fill the last group, add sufficient nulls.

The group below
identifies the starting
point. Leave it unused.

THE SO	UR CEI	SJOHN	PAULS	
HRUWC	WLLXX	OPSEZ	FUBPP	RJCLO
MITHA	SOUTH	AFRIC	ANATT	HEBRA
YCDCZ	FHXBA	VBEXY	PSNLR	DCQMI
ZILIA	NEMBA	SSYDL		
GFRJB	MIYNT	YCJRV	GWFJN	BEMQC

In the groups above, the top line of each group contains the original message while the bottom line contains the letters from the one-time pad.

Alternatively

Old Message

Leave Blank

Start Here

H I T E A S S N O W

N R N E B C E E R I

H U R W C

T H E S O U R C E I

W L L X X O P S E Z

Key groups

Key Group

Key Groups

3. Using the first letters of the original text and key group (the T and W)

T - H E S O

W - L L X X

create ciphered text by first locating the block beginning with key group letter "W" on the trigraph.

A	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ	N	MLKJIHGFEDCBAZYXWVUTSRQPON
B	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ	O	MLKJIHGFEDCBAZYXWVUTSRQPON
C	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ	P	MLKJIHGFEDCBAZYXWVUTSRQPON
D	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ	Q	MLKJIHGFEDCBAZYXWVUTSRQPON
E	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ	R	MLKJIHGFEDCBAZYXWVUTSRQPON
F	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ	S	MLKJIHGFEDCBAZYXWVUTSRQPON
G	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ	T	MLKJIHGFEDCBAZYXWVUTSRQPON
H	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ	U	MLKJIHGFEDCBAZYXWVUTSRQPON
I	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ	V	MLKJIHGFEDCBAZYXWVUTSRQPON
J	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ	W	MLKJIHGFEDCBAZYXWVUTSRQPON
K	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ	X	MLKJIHGFEDCBAZYXWVUTSRQPON
L	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ	Y	MLKJIHGFEDCBAZYXWVUTSRQPON
M	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ	Z	MLKJIHGFEDCBAZYXWVUTSRQPON

4. Looking along the upper row in block "W" (below), locate the letter "T." Directly below the "T" will be letter "K," which is the first letter in the ciphered text.

Top Row: From clear text

W	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
	DCBAZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDC

"W" First letter
from key group

Bottom Row: First letter of ciphered text

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5. Write "K" beneath the "W" on the one-time pad.

T H E S O	- Original text
W L L X X	- Key group on pad
K	- Enciphered text

6. The second letter is handled in the same manner. First locate block "L" on the trigraph. Looking along the top row of block "L," find letter "H." Directly beneath the "H" is letter "H." Write "H" beneath the "L" on the one-time pad.

L	A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
	O N M L K J I H G F E D C B A Z Y X W V U T S R Q P

7. Write "H" beneath the "L" on the one-time pad.

T H E S O	- Original text
W L L X X	- Key group on pad
K H	- Enciphered text

8. Repeat this process with each letter in the first group to yield:

T H E S O	- Original text
W L L X X	- Key group on pad
K H K K O	- Enciphered text

"K H K K O" is the first enciphered text group.

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9. Repeat the process with the remaining groups to yield:

	THE SO	URCEI	SJOHN	PAULS
HRUWC	WLLXX	OPSEZ	FUBPP	RJCLO
	KHKKO	RTFRS	CWKDX	TQDDT
MITHA	SOUTH	AFRIC	ANATT	HEBRA
YCDCZ	FHXBA	VBEXY	PSNLR	DCQMI
PPDQA	CEIFS	ETEUZ	KUMVP	PTIWR
ZILIA	NEMBA	SSYDL		
GFRJB	MIYNT	YCJRV	GWFJN	BEMQC
UMXIY	ANPLG	JFSFT		

10. The enciphered text of the message is:

KHKKO	RTFRS	CWKDX	TQDDT
PPDQA	CEIFS	ETEUZ	KUMVP
PTIWR	UMXIY	ANPLG	JFSFT

11. The message has been enciphered using a one-time-pad-based substitution system and is now unbreakable as long as the pads remain secure. Loss of the trigraph will not affect the security of the message. Only someone possessing the identical one-time pad can decipher the message. This system is appropriate for low-volume message traffic containing highly sensitive information that will remain sensitive for long periods – for example, agent identities.

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12. With the addition of routing identifiers and other message format requirements, the message is ready to send.

Deciphering Procedure

1. Begin the deciphering procedure by making certain that the message was enciphered using a one-time pad substitution cipher process. Origin and format of the message should indicate the enciphering system used.
2. Identify and locate the one-time pad used. Typical message formatting calls for the first cipher text group to be preceded by the pad identifier and the starting point in that pad. Example:

T M J U Z	R Y A M H	H R U W C	R O X E V	L H H K S
Routing Identifier	One Time Pad Ident.	Starting Pt. Ident.	1st Cipher Group	Cipher Group

3. In the example given above, you would locate pad "RYAMH" and find cipher key group "HRUWC." A message enciphered using pad "RYAMH" can only be deciphered using pad "RYAMH." Remember, it is **essential** that the same pad is used to both encipher and decipher the message. If the incorrect pad is used to decipher the message, the results will be gibberish

In the following example, note that the pad identifier in the upper left-hand corner of the pad is "RYAMH." This is the pad we will need to decipher our message.

RYAMH		SECRET		001
HRUWC	WLLXX	OPSEZ	FUBPP	RICLO
YCDCZ	FHXBA	VBEXY	PSNLR	DCQMI
GFRJB	MIYNT	YCJRV	GWFJN	BEMZC
MLFTB	WMILG	MKNQM	NXNUU	ONABF
MPTSS	TMJUZ	GQGCX	TKVOH	AWJRK
XOJBH	KBGHR	MJRJI	PVURN	DFAYL

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4. Key group "HRUWC" is used to identify the starting point and therefore must not be used in enciphering or deciphering.
5. Write the letters of the enciphered text above the letters of the cipher key groups on the one-time pad. Begin with the cipher key group "WLLXX."

K H K K O R T F R S C W K D X S Q D D T

Ex.: **H R U W C W L L X X O P S E Z F U B P P R J C L O**

P P D O A C E I F S E T E U Z K U M V P P T I W R

Y C D C Z F H X B A V B E X Y P S N L R D C Q M I

U M X I Y A N P L G J F S F T

G F R J B M I Y N T Y C J R V G W F J N B E M Q C

6. Locate block "W" on the trigraph. Looking along the upper line, find letter "K".

W	A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
	D C B A Z Y X W V U T S R Q P O N M L K J I H G F E

7. Beneath letter "K" is letter "T", which is the first letter of the original text. Write the "T" beneath the "W" of the key group "WLLXX".

Ex.: K H K K O - Enciphered text
 W L L X X - Key group on pad
 T - Original text

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8. Repeat this procedure for each of the remaining letters. When completed, the pad should look like this. Example:

	KHKKO	RTFRS	CWKDX	TQDDT
H RUWC	WLLXX	OPSEZ	FUBPP	RJCLO
PPDQA	CEIFS	ETEUZ	KUMVP	PTIWR
YCDCZ	FHXBA	VBEXY	PSNLR	DCQMI
MITHA	WOUTH	AFRIC	ANATT	HEBRA
UMXIY	ANPLG	JFSFT		
GFRJB	MIYNT	YCJRV	GW FJN	BEMQC
ZILIA	NEMBA	SSYDL		
MLFTB	WMILG	MKNQM	NXNUU	ONABF
MPTSS	TMJUZ	GQGCX	TKVOH	AWJRK
XOJBH	KBGHR	MJRJI	PVURN	DFAYL

9. Transcribing the message and breaking it into words, we get:

T H E - S O U R C E - I S - J O H N P A U L - S
M I T H - A S O U T H A F R I C A N - A T - T
H E - B R A Z I L I A N - E M B A S S Y - D L

**THE SOURCE IS JOHN PAUL SMITH A SOUTH AFRICAN AT THE
BRAZILIAN EMBASSY**

10. If the message is unreadable and you are certain you are using the correct one-time pad, check your starting point. If that fails, recheck the expected message format to be certain you have begun with the first enciphered group in the message.

DOUBLE TRANSPOSITION CIPHERS

Definitions:

Key: Agreed-upon word(s) (or phrases) that determine the sequence to be followed in enciphering and deciphering. The key should consist of 10 letters.

Nulls: Otherwise meaningless letters used to fill letter groups, mark the end of a sentence or the end of a message. Nulls should be chosen from the mid-range of frequency of use. (Ex.: C, W, M, F)

_____ **Transposition Cipher:** A cipher system in which the letters of the plain text are systematically disarranged by means of a key or pattern.

Enciphering Procedure

1. Compose the message to be enciphered. Keep it brief.

Example: HAVE SPOTTED POTENTIAL SOURCE FOR REQUESTED SOUTH
 AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC INFORMATION.

2. Identify the keys to be used.

Example 1: HOLIDAY FUN

Example 2: RIFLED SLUG

3. Write the first 10-letter key across the top line of a page. Space the letters of the key evenly and allow extra room between each letter.

Example: H O L I D A Y F U N

4. In alphabetical order, number each letter of the key. If a letter repeats within the key, number the repeating letters consecutively from the left.

Example 1:

4 8 6 5 2 1 10 3 9 7

H O L I D A Y F U N

Example 2 with repeating letters:

8 5 3 6 2 1 9 7 10 4

R I F L E D S L U G

5. Write the message beneath the key, taking care to ensure that the letters are printed in neat rows and columns to avoid confusion. Example:

4 8 6 5 2 1 10 3 9 7
H O L I D A Y F U N
H A V E S P O T T E
D P O T E N T I A L
S O U R C E F O R R
E Q U E S T E D S O
U T H A F R I C A N
D I P L O M A T I C
I N F O R M A T I O
N

6. Fill in the bottom row with nulls and draw vertical lines to separate the text into columns. See following example:

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4	8	6	5	2	1	10	3	9	7
H	O	L	I	D	A	Y	F	U	N
H	A	V	E	S	P	O	T	T	E
D	P	O	T	E	N	T	I	A	L
S	O	U	R	C	E	F	O	R	R
E	Q	U	E	S	T	E	D	S	O
U	T	H	A	F	R	I	C	A	N
D	I	P	L	O	M	A	T	I	C
I	N	F	O	R	M	A	T	I	O
N	D	B	L	P	C	G	W	F	M

7. To write the first encipherment, transcribe the letters in the column numbered 1 into groups of five letters.

Ex.: P N E T R M M C

When you reach the bottom of a column, proceed directly to the next-highest numbered column (1, 2, 3, etc.) and continue filling letter groups until all 10 columns are transcribed. Example:

```

P N E T R   M M C S E   C S F O R   P T I O D

C T T W H   D S E U D   I N E T R   E A L O L

V O U U H   P F B E L   R O N C O   M A P O Q

T I N D T   A R S A I   I F O T F   E I A A G

```

8. You have completed the first encipherment. Although the letters in the enciphered groups appear meaningless, a skilled cryptologist would have a fairly easy time reconstructing the original message. To make unauthorized decipherment significantly more difficult we will repeat the enciphering process using a second key.
9. Write the second key, "RIFLED SLUG," on the top of a piece of paper and number the letters as before.

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Example:

8 5 3 6 2 1 9 7 10 4

R I F L E D S L U G

10. Write the letter groups derived from the first encipherment (Step 7) below the key as you did with the original message in the first encipherment (Step 5).

Example:

8	5	3	6	2	1	9	7	10	4
R	I	F	L	E	D	S	L	U	G
P	N	E	T	R	M	M	C	S	E
C	S	F	O	R	P	T	I	O	D
C	T	T	W	H	D	S	E	U	D
I	N	E	T	R	E	A	L	O	L
V	O	U	U	H	P	F	B	E	L
R	O	N	C	O	M	A	P	O	Q
T	I	N	D	T	A	R	S	A	I
I	F	O	T	F	E	I	A	A	G

11. To write the second encipherment, transcribe the letters in columns 1 to 10 into groups of five letters. As before, when you reach the bottom of a column proceed directly to the next column and continue filling the letter groups until all 10 columns are transcribed (see Step 7). Example:

MPDEP MAERR HRHOT FEFTE

WNNOE DLLLQ IGNST NOOIF

TOWTU CDTCI ELBPS APCCI

VRTIM TSAFA RISOU OEOAA

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12. The message has now been enciphered using a double transposition cipher process and is now moderately secure. Information of a highly sensitive nature that will remain highly sensitive for more than a few days, for example agent identities, should not be enciphered with this system.
13. With the addition of routing identifiers and other message format requirements, the message is ready to send.

Deciphering Procedure

1. Begin the deciphering procedure by making certain that the message was enciphered using the double transposition cipher process. Origin and format of the message should indicate the enciphering system used.
2. Identify the keys that should have been used in the cipher and the order in which they should have been used. We will continue using the example keys

HOLIDAY FUN (1st encipherment)
RIFLED SLUG (2nd encipherment)

3. Begin decipherment by writing the second key, "RIFLED SLUG," on the top line of a piece of paper. Remember to evenly space the letters and to leave sufficient room between them. Then number the letters in alphabetical order. Example:

8 5 3 6 2 1 9 7 10 4
R I F L E D S L U G

4. Count the letters in the text portion of the message and divide that number by 10 to determine the number of letters in each column. Example:

M P D E P	MA E R R	H R H O T	F E F T E
U N N O E	D D L L Q	I G N S T	N O O I F
T O W T U	C D T C I	E L B P S	A P C C I
V R T I M	T S A F A	R I S O U	O E O A A

This message contains 80 letters which, when divided by 10, indicate that each

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column should contain 8 letters.

Note: The number of letters in the message should be evenly divisible by the number of letters in the key. If not, either the message is enciphered by some other system or you have incorrectly identified the text portion.

5. Insert the letters of the enciphered message in 8-letter vertical columns under the key beginning with column number 1. Drawing vertical and horizontal lines will help keep things neat and avoid mistakes. Example:

8	5	3	6	2	1	9	7	10	4
R	I	F	L	E	D	S	L	U	G
					M				
					P				
					D				
					E				
					P				
					M				
					A				
					E				

6. When you have entered a column of 8 letters, shift to column 2 and continue entering columns of 8 letters into your grid. In this manner, enter all of the letters in the message. Example:

8	5	3	6	2	1	9	7	10	4
R	I	F	L	E	D	S	L	U	G
P	N	E	T	R	M	M	C	S	E
C	S	F	O	R	P	T	I	O	D
C	T	T	W	H	D	S	E	U	D
I	N	E	T	R	E	A	L	O	L
V	O	U	U	H	P	F	B	E	L
R	O	N	C	O	M	A	P	O	Q
T	I	N	D	T	A	R	S	A	I
I	F	O	T	F	E	I	A	A	G

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7. View the results of the first decipherment by writing the letters on the first horizontal line in 5-letter groups.

Example: P N E T R M M C S E

8. Continue transcribing the rows of letters into 5-letter groups.

	Row 1		Row 2	
Example:	P N E T R	M M C S E	C S F O R	P T I O D
	Row 3		Row 4	
	C T T W H	D S E U D	I N E T R	E A L O L
	V O U U H	P F B E L	R O N C O	M A P O Q
	T I N D T	A R S A I	I F O T F	E I A A G

9. That completes the first encipherment.
10. To read the original text of the message we need to go through the decipherment process one more time. Begin by writing the first key, "HOLIDAY FUN," across the top line of a piece of paper in the same manner we did before (Section II, step 3). As before, number the letters of the key in alphabetical order and draw vertical lines to help keep the columns straight (Section II, step 5).

Example:

4	8	6	5	2	1	10	3	9	7
H	O	L	I	D	A	Y	F	U	N

11. Insert the 5-letter groups produced by the first decipherment under the key in vertical rows of 8 letters beginning with column 1.

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Example:

4	8	6	5	2	1	10	3	9	7
H	O	L	I	D	A	Y	F	U	N
					P		T		
					N				
					E				
					T				
					R				
					M				
					M				
					C				

12. When you have entered the first 8 letters, shift to column 2 and continue entering columns of 8 letters until all of the 5-letter groups are entered.

Example:

4	8	6	5	2	1	10	3	9	7
H	O	L	I	D	A	Y	F	U	N
H	A	V	E	S	P	O	T	T	E
D	P	O	T	E	N	T	I	A	L
S	O	U	R	C	E	F	O	R	R
E	Q	U	E	S	T	E	D	S	O
U	T	H	A	F	R	I	C	A	N
D	I	P	L	O	M	A	T	I	C
I	N	F	O	R	M	A	T	I	O
N	D	B	L	P	C	G	W	F	M

13. You have now completed the second decipherment. View the original message by transcribing the horizontal rows of letters into 5-letter groups. Start at the top. Divide the words with a hyphen (-) or slash (/) marks.

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Example:

HAVE-S	POTTE	D-POTE	NTIAL
SOURC	E-FOR-R	EQUES	TED-SO
UTH-AF	RICAN	DIPLO	MATIC
INFOR	MATIO	N-DBLP	CGWFM

**HAVE SPOTTED POTENTIAL SOURCE FOR REQUESTED
SOUTH AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC INFORMATION**

14. If the message is completely unreadable, verify that you are using the correct keys. Then, repeat the decipherment but reverse the order of the keys.

CONCLUSIONS

Clandestine communications are almost always a risk to the security of your agents, your operation and yourself. However, human source collection mandates that communication of some type must occur. Security must always be the prime consideration whenever communication is to take place.

CHAPTER

15

Establishing A Station

UPON COMPLETING THIS SECTION YOU SHOULD BE ABLE TO:

- 1. Describe and implement the process for selecting station team members.**
 - 2. Know the importance of establishing proper cover for the team and the station.**
 - 3. Understand the importance of a good physical security program for the station.**
 - 4. Establish a station and make it operative.**
-

INTRODUCTION

An intelligence agency operating abroad will need multiple bases of operation. Typically, one base of operation is located within a diplomatic facility and is called a "station." The station serves as the regional headquarters for the agency and manages the operational as well as the administrative aspects of the agency's activities.

As with most endeavors, the success of the station is closely linked with the degree of preparation that preceded its establishment. The preparation is logically divided into two phases.

1. Preliminary preparations.
2. Initial station activities.

Preliminary Preparations

Define the Station's Mission

Before any other meaningful steps can be taken, there must be a clear understanding of the station's mission. A station's mission is the sum of tasking statements or collection requirements that have been assigned to it. Based on that clear understanding of the mission, a judgment can then be made as to the number and type of personnel required to perform the mission.

Select the Station Team

Selection of the specific individuals who will be assigned to the station is the next order of business. The selection process should begin by defining the job skills that will be necessary to meet the station's mission requirements. Other relevant criteria might include language skills, educational background, appearance, health, and experience in the target country. Initiative is another, particularly important, selection criteria.

It is too early in the station-building process to allow more than the absolute minimum number of people to be aware of the plan to open a new station. Therefore, at this stage,

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confine the selection process to a review of personnel records to identify a pool of qualified candidates from which the final selection will be made.

Update Background Investigations


The personnel history of each of the candidates must be updated and verified by all available means. Typically, the candidates are told only that a routine security update is in progress and that they are required to cooperate by updating their written Personal History Statement. The accuracy and completeness on their statements is then verified with a polygraph examination in addition to independent investigation. This laborious process is undertaken to ensure, to the maximum possible extent, the integrity of the individuals who will perform much of the initial work that all subsequent station operations will depend upon. When the background investigations are complete, interview the successful candidates and select the initial station team. Reveal as little as possible regarding the specifics of the mission.

Visit the Embassy

The initial visit to the embassy is made to locate suitable space that can be made available, to identify security requirements, and to identify cover assignment options. Only the Ambassador should be aware of the purpose of this visit.

Typical security upgrades that will be required include the following:

- . Physical barriers (doors, locks, etc.).
- . Access control systems (ID cards, badges, etc.)
- . Intrusion detection system.
- . Security containers (safes, file cabinets, etc.).
- . Electronic surveillance countermeasures. (What exists now? To what extent



will destructive inspection be required?)

Devise Cover for Each Team Member

Cover assignments within the embassy should be relevant to the station's tasking and should facilitate freedom of movement. For a cover to be successful, the individual must appear comfortable and competent in the embassy assignment used as cover. The embassy staff will be the first to recognize an outsider in their midst and will no doubt air their speculations to all. To avoid having your staff's cover blown before they start, it is important that existing skills be matched to available cover job and missing skills developed through training – all before the Collection Officer arrives at the embassy. Do not assign a team member to a secretarial position if he cannot type. If there is no other suitable position available for him, teach him to type before sending him to the embassy.

External service personnel will frequently be asked about their previous assignments, particularly those at other foreign posts. If previous external service assignments are to be included as part of your cover story, then appropriate documentation in support of these assignments will have to be created. Pick cover jobs carefully with an eye to those that will require the minimum of support while still meeting the requirements regarding tasking and freedom of movement.

Collect Available Information and Intelligence

Begin collecting, within your own and allied agencies, all available information regarding your mission and the environment in which the station will operate. Important research topics include:

- . Tasking-related subjects.
- . Local counterintelligence organizations.
- . Locally based foreign intelligence services.
- . Possible local personnel assets.

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- . Local government organizations and political realities.

The material should be assembled into a nucleus upon which the station files will grow.

Initial Briefing for Station Team

It is appropriate at this stage to formally brief the individuals selected for assignment on the mission (tasks) and on their individual assignments within the station including their embassy cover assignments. Following this briefing, the station team members should devote their time to the following tasks:

- . Prepare to relocate their households.
- . Develop skills necessary for embassy assignment.
- . Develop skills necessary for station assignment.

Arrange Logistics for the New Station

A new station will require a certain amount of initial equipment that will have to be assembled and shipped. This shipment will include:

- . Household effects of the station team members.
- . Basic station equipment (see list at end of chapter).
- . Specialized equipment related to tasking.

Additionally, arrangements will have to be made for the secure two-way exchange of money, documents and additional equipment. A regularly scheduled secure courier is the typical means chosen. Finally, alternative communications channels will have to be established.

INITIAL STATION ACTIVITIES

Following the arrival of station team members at the embassy certain activities must be performed in order to ensure the success and security of the mission.

Learn and Work Embassy Cover Job

To be effective, you must learn how the embassy functions and how to move about the country without arousing undue suspicion regarding your actual assignment. The best and most effective way to do this is to focus on learning and performing your cover assignment. The absence of any intelligence-related activities on your part during your period as a "new person" will diminish speculation and enhance the deniability of future activities.

Establish an Initial Counterintelligence Program

The first order of station business is the establishment of the station's counterintelligence and security program. Procedures for intrastation communication and meetings must be established. Until the station has a secure home within the embassy, these communications and meetings should take place after normal embassy work hours and under varied pretexts.

Procedures for communicating with headquarters should have already been devised; if not, this must be done now. Additionally, since secure storage facilities do not yet exist, it is very important that the collection of compromising documents (notes, one-time pads, etc.) be kept to an absolute minimum.

PHYSICALLY ESTABLISH THE STATION WITHIN THE EMBASSY

As the Americans learned in Moscow, either do it right the first time or pay ten times as much to do it right later. The area within the embassy that is occupied by the station must be as absolutely secure as possible or the work that goes on there will be compromised by local and foreign intelligence services. This is a painstaking process best done in the following order.

Establish Cover for the Station

A station requires a secure area which, due to enhanced security, is obvious to all embassy personnel and at least some visitors. To avoid disclosing, to the visitors at least, the presence of the station, co-locate it with other embassy function that could justify enhanced security. The Political Analysis Section or the Financial Section are obvious examples. These cover activities would be located within the secure area but outside the actual station offices.

Initiate a Physical Security Program

Before any renovation work begins on what will become the station, a serious physical security program must be implemented. The area should be guarded on a 24-hour per day basis and all access controlled with passes, metal detectors and detailed inspections of any item entering the area. The purpose of these procedures is to prevent the introduction or removal of surveillance devices. The procedures begin before work on the station starts and continue on forever.

Destructive Inspection

A thorough inspection of the station offices is essential to security. Remove existing walls, ceiling and flooring from the entire secure area to make certain that no surveillance devices exist. This is a major undertaking that will be obvious to all and thus will require its own cover, such as repairs to a major structural defect in the building. Local labor obviously cannot be employed for this task and neither can the station team be seen spending too much time together in the area. One solution is to use your own military's engineer troops. They often have the necessary skills and can be fully vetted.

Initial Detailed ACM Inspection

Prior to the installation of the new floors, walls, etc., a detailed audio countermeasures (ACM) inspection should take place. The purpose of this inspection is to ensure that all surveillance devices have been removed by the destruction inspection and to chart all *harmless* ambient RF signals and telephone line anomalies. It will be very helpful

to see what that condition looked like on your test equipment in subsequent inspections.

Construction of Station Offices

The military engineers, if you use that option, should now construct the station using materials purchased at random throughout the city. This should be done under the constant supervision of headquarters ACM and counterintelligence (CI personnel who ensure that the materials are free from surveillance devices). Since this work will attract considerable attention, station team members should refrain from seeming to be overly involved.

Install Necessary Equipment

Although the personnel are in place and the station is in place and secure, you are not quite ready to venture, operationally, from the embassy just yet. Some of the following information will be necessary in virtually all operations and should be collected before the first operation is undertaken.

Update Files on Local Police and CI Agencies

Even if you are posted in a friendly country, you must assume that their security forces will attempt to monitor or penetrate and disrupt your operation. Building on the information collected at headquarters, you should collect as much detailed information as possible on the following types of local organizations.

- . National police or counterintelligence organizations such as New Scotland Yard or the FBI.
- . State or regional police.
- . Local police.
- . Military counterintelligence and signals intelligence units.
- . Facility security organizations including those that protect courts and government buildings.

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For each of these organizations a wide variety of information is required. Topics of importance include the following.

- . Mission of the organization.
- . Organizational chart.
- . Telephone directory.
- . CI-related mission.
- . Number of personnel assigned to CI tasks.
- . Location of each installation.
- . Total number of personnel at each installation.
- . Shift schedule and number per shift.
- . Uniforms or typical dress.
- . Communications capability including equipment and frequencies.
- . Armaments – type, caliber, type of ammo used.
- . Transportation including types of vehicles, descriptions and license plate numbers.
- . Relations with other CI agencies.
- . Organization morale.
- . Ability of leaders and troops.
- . Air patrol capabilities.
- . Typical procedures.

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It will no doubt be impossible to collect all of this information in a short period of time without being ridiculously obvious. Realistically, the goal should be to obtain all that can be obtained without compromising yourself, and then collect the remainder as you go along.

Collect Local Information

The station team will have to know where things are and how to get them. Thus, the following types of information should be collected.

- . Maps, sectionals and navigation charts of every variety.
- . Residential, business and government telephone directories.
- . Schedules for all forms of public transportation.
- . Organizational charts for all significant government agencies.
- . Lists of all possible open source information sources.

Identify Sources for Local Procurement of Supplies

Future operations may require unique support equipment on a "we need it right now" basis. Prepare for these future needs by identifying sources for the types of things you are most likely to need, including the following:

1. Transportation.
 - a. Automobiles and trucks of all types.
 - b. Aircraft - single engine, multi-engine and business-size jets.
 - c. Boats and ships of all sizes.
2. Communications equipment.

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- a. Amateur radio equipment.
 - b. SW radio receivers.
 - c. Telephone company equipment.
 - d. Military radio equipment.
3. Clothing of all types.
 4. Medical help (expert and discreet).
 - a. Doctors.
 - b. Clinics and hospitals.
 5. Document supplies.
 - a. Copiers.
 - b. Printing supplies.
 6. Concealment device materials.
 - a. Woodworking supplies.
 - b. Metalworking supplies.
 - c. Leathercraft supplies.

Clandestine Communication Sites

Sites for meetings, drops, letter boxes, etc. will be needed. Prepare for this by identifying the following.

- . Possible meeting sites that facilitate countersurveillance.

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- . Possible drop sites along with logical safe, load and clear signals.
- . Appropriate concealment devices.

Safesites

Identify potential manned and unmanned safehouse sites. Remember, these should facilitate countersurveillance and be prepared in advance with a safehouse kit.

Local Hostile Foreign Intelligence Services

Update and expand on the files begun at headquarters on the hostile foreign intelligence services believed to operate locally. Collect the same information as for local counterintelligence services.

Station Counterintelligence Manual

Prepare a station counterintelligence manual that outlines procedures to be used to avoid or deal with local CI or hostile intelligence services, while conducting station business. Emphasis on this manual should be placed on CI procedures for each phase of an operation. In the CI context, success is completing your operation with things no worse off than when you started.

Initiate Work on Tasking Requirements

The station is now ready to cautiously conduct operations.

FOREIGN STATION EQUIPMENT RECOMMENDATIONS

Quantity	Item
1	Photography and observation kit.
1	Darkroom kit.
2	Entry tool kits.
1	Voice recording kit.
2	Encryption devices for telephone/telex/computer.
1	IBM-XT computer or equivalent.
1	Counterintelligence kit.
1	Disguise kit.
3	Safehouse kits (2 persons for 3 days).
1	Base radio (if locally allowable).
4	Portable radios.
1	Station audio countermeasures kit.
2	Document shredders.
1	Specialized reference library.

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GLOSSARY OF TERMS

ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS: A location where an agent can receive mail, even though he does not reside there or have any visible connection with anyone who does. Examples: Small European shops, established corporations, private post offices.

AGENT: In current usage, a person who engages in spying or the support of those who do, or who seeks to detect them. Also, an officer who works for an intelligence agency.

AGENT-IN-PLACE: Perhaps the rarest and most valuable of intelligence persons – the agent who offers his services to a foreign power, but agrees to continue in his position so that the information he passes is current and valuable. Fatalism is presumed – KGB in furnace.

AGENT OF INFLUENCE: A person not directly under control of an intelligence agency, but willing to work on its behalf. Useful for low-level diplomatic objectives. Examples: Journalist, professors, labor leaders.

AGENT PROVOCATEUR: A person who insinuates himself into an organization with the aim of inciting it to acts that would make its members subject to punishment. Villain of labor.

AGIT-PROP: Agitation and propaganda, generally used in reference to communist and front group activities. Examples.: Marches, speeches, media events.

AUNT MINNIES: Photographs taken by professional photographers, journalists, amateurs, or tourists that show a place of interest to an intelligence topographer.

BABBLER OR BABBLE TAPE: An electronic device or tape recorder that emits what appears to be simultaneous gibberish, sometimes in multiple languages, used as a counter-bugging measure.

BACKSTOPPING: An array of bogus cover identifications issued to an operative that will stand up to fairly rigorous investigation. Examples.: Birth certificate, driver's license, credit cards. Flash alias – counterfeit.

BARGAINING COUNTER: An arrested agent who is stored in prison until the proper time arises to barter him for the release of a jailed operative from one's own side.

BAZAAR INTELLIGENCE: Marketplace rumors and gossip, generally with about as much credence as the source would imply. Do not, however, ignore it.

BIOGRAPHIC LEVERAGE: CIA euphemism for blackmail – literally, the use of known derogatory information from a person's past that is used to coerce him into doing the agency's bidding.

BLACK BAG OPERATION: An under-the-table operation such as passing funds to a foreign political party.

BLACK BOXES: Inanimate technical methods of spying, ranging from room bugs and telephone taps to satellite reconnaissance.

BLACK FORGERY: Material that is produced so that it appears to be of enemy origin.

BLACK PROPAGANDA: Operations in which the source of the disseminated propaganda is shielded or misrepresented so that it cannot be attributed to the source responsible for it. Examples.: E.H. Hunt and Mexican CP Party.

BLACKMAIL: The use of derogatory information to compel a person to work for an enemy intelligence service. Examples.: Frenzel in Czechoslovakia, West German parliament incident, false war record.

BLIND DATING: An agreement by an intelligence officer to meet another person at a place of that person's choice. Entails risk of kidnap.

BLOWN AGENT: An intelligence operative whose identity becomes known to the opposition, or who has had any aspect compromised.

BRAINWASHING: A term that came into wide use – or misuse – during the Korean War as descriptive of changes Chinese communist interrogators made in prisoners' minds through psychological manipulation, physical mistreatment and drugs. Overstatement – good sales technique in a favorable atmosphere.

BUG: The wiring of a room so that any sound made therein can be heard and recorded. Common in Soviet Bloc restaurants.

BURN: An intelligence agent who is deliberately sacrificed in order to protect a more valuable and productive spy.

CASE-DEATH: An intelligence operation that fails for no discernible reason. The immediate suspicion is a security breach.

CASE OFFICER: In CIA usage, the person in charge of agents who collect intelligence and perform other clandestine duties. Key person – only link with agent and agency.

CATTLE GUARDS: Euphemism for the paramilitary soldiers of fortune hired for anti-terrorist operations by the government of South Africa.

CAUTERIZATION: Removing compromised agents to safety. Terminate operations – cost millions.

CLANDESTINE OPERATION: An operation conducted in secrecy, but with no effort to disguise its nature. Secrecy by virtue of natural circumstances.

CLEAN: A piece of intelligence apparatus – an agent, a safe house, a letter-drop, or whatever – that has never been used operationally and hence is unknown to the other side. Soviet Bloc green.

COLD APPROACH: An attempt to recruit a foreign national as a source without any prior indication that he might be receptive to such an offer. Risk of rejection and compromise to local government.

COLLECTION OFFICER: Individual responsible for spotting, recruiting, managing and handling controlled agents. Also known as Handler.

COMPROMISE: The detection of an agent, a safe house or an intelligence technique by someone from the other side.

COMSEC: Acronym for "communications security," the method of protecting communications by providing the means of enciphering messages and by establishing the security of the equipment used to transmit them.

CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES: A broad range of persons who supply an intelligence agency with information that is available to them because of their position. Customs, immigration, bankers (WB & IMF), hotel, journalists.

CONTROL: Physical or psychological pressure exerted on an agent or group to insure that the agent or group responds to the direction of an intelligence agency or service.

CONTROL SIGN: A deliberate error of spelling or text used by an agent in communicating with superiors by radio or in writing when he (the agent) has come under hostile intelligence control. Garbled words.

COUNTERGUERRILLA WARFARE: Operations and activities conducted by the armed forces, paramilitary forces or non-military agencies of a government against guerrillas.

COUNTERINSURGENCY: Military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat subversive insurgency within a country.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE: Those actions by an intelligence agency intended to protect its own security and to undermine hostile intelligence operations.

COUNTERSURVEILLANCE: The process of insuring that an agent is not under surveillance when he sets out to keep an appointment with a contact. Minimum two hours to clean route/crowded streets, stores. Soviet scatter tactic.

COURIER: A messenger responsible for the secure physical transmission and delivery of documents and material. Unwitting couriers.

COVER: The role played by an intelligence officer to conceal his true purpose. Should be as factual as possible and contain a maximum of real information.

COVER FOR STATUS: An activity that explains by some believable story, other than the truth, why a spy sees the people he does, is surrounded by the accoutrements he possesses,

lives the way he does, and so forth. Book seller, travel agent, import/export.

COVER NAME: The pseudonym assigned an agent for security purposes.

COVER ORGANIZATIONS: Organizations created solely to provide cover for a covert agent (unlike "organizational cover," where an existing, legitimate organization is so used). Minimum required: phone, office, letterhead.

COVER STORY: A plausible explanation employed to explain an operation that goes awry. Example: U2/Weather. You must be sure of what the other side knows.

COVERT OPERATION: An operation using a cover story to conceal the real purpose of the agent's mission. Conducted in the open with secret intent.

CRYPTANALYSIS: The breaking of codes and ciphers into plain text without initial knowledge of the key used in the encryption.

CRYPTOGRAPHY: The enciphering of plain text so that it will be unintelligible to an unauthorized recipient.

CULTIVATION: The process of establishing rapport with a possible source of information or a potential defector. Dinner, tangible show of friendship.

CUSTOMERS: The various government departments that use information and analyses produced by intelligence agencies.

CUT-OUT: The go-between, or link, between separate components of an intelligence organization – for instance, the person who maintains contact with a clandestine agent on behalf of the handler controlling him.

DAMAGE CONTROL: The means by which an intelligence organization attempts to minimize the harmful results of an operation that aborts.

DANGLE: A person who approaches an intelligence agency in such a manner that he is asking to be recruited as an agent to spy against his own country. Vet – suspect of money,

liberal views.

DEAD DROP BOX, DEAD-LETTER DROP: A location where a message can be concealed by an agent for retrieval by another party. Load signal and clear signal needed.

DECEPTION: Luring your opponent into doing voluntarily and by choice what you want him to do. Example: The Man Who Never Was.

DECRYPT: To convert encrypted text into plain text by the use of a cryptosystem.

DEFECTOR: A person who, for political or other reasons, has repudiated his country and who may be in possession of information of interest to an enemy government.

DENIABILITY: The deliberate use of euphemisms that gives the high official grounds for denying knowledge of covert activities discussed at a meeting that he attended.

DENIED AREA: A country with such strict internal security that foreign intelligence agents dare not contact informants in person. Former Soviet Union, China.

DESTABILIZATION: The process of undermining, to the point of collapse, a foreign government through overt political and economic actions.

DETERRENT TAIL: Watchers who deliberately let their quarry know they are being followed to scare them out of achieving their purpose.

DEVELOPE: To cultivate a sympathizer into becoming an active espionage agent, generally on ideological grounds.

DISINFORMATION: (dezinformatsiya) A KGB term denoting a variety of techniques and activities to purvey false or misleading information, including rumors insinuation, and altered facts.

DISPATCHED AGENT: An operative who seeks out a rival intelligence agency and claims he wishes to defect, when in actuality he is attempting a penetration. Nosenko – 4.5 years. in solitary.

DISPOSAL: CIA term for the dismissal of a non-career agent, usually a non-American who has worked for American intelligence for diverse reasons. Direct, indirect, malicious.

DOUBLE AGENT: A person who goes to work for one secret service and then changes his allegiance to a rival; he purports to serve both his conflicting masters.

DOUBLED: A doubled agent is said to "work under control," or "in harness." He will "play back" bogus messages to his home controller – using texts provided by his captors.

DRY CLEANING: Various techniques a surveillance subject uses to shake off his pursuers or to establish whether he is being followed.

DUD: A person who makes contact with an intelligence agency with the declared intention of passing information, but who never appears again.

ELICITATION: Obtaining information from an individual or a group in a manner that conceals the true intent of the conversation.

ENCRYPT: To convert a plain text message into unintelligible form by means of a cryptosystem; this term also covers the meaning of "encipher" and "encode."

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION (EEIs): A military intelligence term for the most urgently required intelligence data. Will we be attacked? If so, when, where, how, in what strength?

EXFILTRATION: Smuggling an agent out of an unfriendly country.

EXPENSES: Opening gambit to entrap an intelligence target into working for an intelligence agency. Recruit exp. w/receipt.

EXPLOITATION: The process of obtaining information from any source and taking full advantage of it for strategic or tactical purposes. Khrushchev speech on Stalin.

FALSE CONFIRMATION: A delicate phase of a disinformation or deception operation intended to give credence to the item of information being passed to the other side.

FALSE FLAG: Recruiting an agent or an informer through the guise of telling him the actual work will be done for another country or interest. Unsuspecting; zealots.

FLAP POTENTIAL: The risk of embarrassment to an intelligence agency stemming from disclosure of an illegal or questionable activity, or of the defection of an agent. Don't embarrass the agency you work for.

FLOATER: A person used for a one-time or occasional intelligence job; low-level and, often as not, unwitting. Example: Call girls.

FRIEND: A person persuaded to influence a foreign government, or some segment thereof. Ideological motivation. Also, they can help with cars and errands.

FUMIGATE: To use electronic counter-devices to locate and neutralize listening devices concealed in a room. Example: Schwirkmann in Moscow.

GO-AWAY: A signal given by an agent that it would be unwise to make a prearranged contact in a public place. Two types: passive or active.

GO TO GROUND: To disappear, or to go into hiding.

GRAY PROPAGANDA: Statements or publications where the source is nonattributed or deliberately confusing. Example: Radio Free Europe.

GRINDER: A debriefing room used to interrogate defectors. Tactic used frequently: repetition of story.

HARD TARGETS: The closed and secret societies of the (former) Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and their satellites, as contrasted to the "soft" targets of neutral and allied nations.

HONEY TRAP: Sexual entrapment for intelligence purposes, usually to put a target into a compromising situation so that he can be blackmailed.

ILLEGAL: An intelligence agent who operates in a target country without the benefit of official status. Minimal or no contact with your overt representatives.

INFILTRATION: The placing of an agent in a target area within hostile territory or within a targeted organization.

INFORMANT: A person who wittingly or unwittingly gives information of intelligence value to an agent or the service for which he works. (1) Recruit and insert; (2) Turn in place.

INSPIRE: To deceive a detected enemy agent into accepting false information and reporting it as truth to his superiors.

INTELLIGENCE: The product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all available information that concerns one or more aspects of foreign nations or areas of operation that is immediately or potentially significant for planning.

INTELLIGENCE CYCLE: The steps by which information is assembled, converted into intelligence, and made available to consumers. Collection, collation, assessment, dissemination.

LEAK: The deliberate or accidental disclosure of classified information. Bragging can be encouraged by eros, ego, or alcohol.

LEGAL: An intelligence officer who works abroad with no attempt to conceal his nationality. Attached to embassy or other open activity of government.

LEGEND: The elaborate (if bogus) "biography" an intelligence agency prepares for an agent who is to be dispatched abroad with an assumed identity. More sensitive missions require more elaborate legends.

LETTER-DROP: A location where an agent can leave a secret communication to be retrieved by his control, or by another agent. Requires establishment of load signal and clear signal.

LITMUS TEST: A counterintelligence trick intended to put false information before a suspected informer or agent and to monitor the results.

LIVE LETTER BOXES: Sub-agents who wittingly or unwittingly pass messages to other persons. Drop a parcel; post a letter while traveling.

LIVE LETTER-DROPS (LLDs): A low-level operative recruited to receive letters and forward them to a case officer. Good LLD's travel seldom and get little mail. May be used only one or two times a year.

LIVE TAP: A telephone tap that is monitored by a listener, rather than being recorded for later study. Used sparingly – very expensive.

MAKE: When a person under intelligence surveillance identifies his followers, he "makes" them.

MAKING A PASS: The physical handing of a message to a courier or agent.

MAYDAY BOOK: A detailed book listing the exact procedures to be followed in the event an agent in the field suspects that he is about to be arrested. 24-hour availability to duty officer – agent has special phone number and code phrase.

MOLE: A high-level penetration agent who can give the innermost secrets of an intelligence service to its enemy. Example: Kim Philby.

MONEY: A principle of intelligence is that an agent must be paid, regardless of the depth of his ideological motivation. Pay for goods, pay for expenses – no pay allows feeling of independence.

MOONLIGHT EXTRADITION: The extralegal deportation of a person sought for intelligence or law enforcement purposes. One service gives person to friendly foreign service.

NKO: Need to know only, as in, "This report should be distributed on an NKO basis."

NOISE: A mass of information that hindsight analysis proves to be useless or irrelevant, but that cannot be readily sorted through by the contemporary analyst or decision maker.

NOT WITTING: A person not cognizant of the existence of a classified project, although he might be involved in it as a part of his normal course of business.

OBSERVATION POST (OP): An apartment or office that overlooks a target of intelligence interest, such as the rear of a Soviet embassy or the entrance to the Cuban Mission to the United Nations in New York. Occupied by "grannies" – service pays bulk of rent.

ONE-TIME PAD: A code system that relies upon the sender and the receiver having identical copies of "pads," usually some 50 pages, each covered with lines of letters or figures chosen at random. German idea from 1920's.

OPEN TEXT: Message sent in uncoded form.

OPERATIONAL CLIMATE: The gestalt of the political, economic, and cultural situation in a given country that is the target of intelligence efforts – a situation that, for better or worse, facilitates intelligence activity in the country of the opponent. Ability and equipment of CI, attitudes of citizens, patriotism of targets, amount of crime in country, police professionalism, level of education of citizens, and political outlook.

ORDER OF BATTLE (OB): Information regarding the identity, strength, command structure, and disposition of personnel, units, and equipment of any military force.

ORGANIZATIONAL COVER: The use of legitimate corporation offices abroad (as well as non-intelligence government agencies) as a cover for covert agents. Must perform organization's job, so time is limited for agency operations.

PACKED UP: Phrase describing an intelligence operation that is terminated, either because of failure or fear of exposure.

PENETRATION: The process by which an intelligence agent gains access to the organization and work of another intelligence service, unknown to the latter.

PERSONA NON GRATA (PNG): The diplomatic term for a person who is told to leave the host country because of unacceptable conduct.

PIGEON: The target of a surveillance.

PIGGYBACKING: Relying upon a friendly intelligence agency to supply the fruits of a covert investigatory technique, such as the result of a wiretap or a bug.

PITCH: An attempt by an intelligence agency to recruit a person from the opposition.

PLANT: A person put into proximity to an investigative subject with the intention of exploiting a known or perceived weakness. Commonly, women.

PLAY MATERIAL: Accurate information deliberately given to a rival intelligence agency as a means of establishing the credibility of an agent who is attempting an infiltration. Real secrets are used.

PLUMBING: The support structure that enables agents to operate in the field. Maps, train schedules, safe houses, drops, surveillance teams. People can be used unwittingly as plumbers.

POSITIVE VETTING: British security procedure wherein persons with access to classified material must be questioned and their background and previous associations and activities investigated and verified.

PRETEXT INTERVIEW: A conversation in which the agent arranges to talk about one subject when he is really interested in a totally different matter. Also used to gain access to a room.

PROCESSING THE TAKE: Transcribing, translating and analyzing the material gathered through telephone taps and room bugs.

PROVING IT OUT: Double-checking an agent's claimed veracity by attempting to verify easily provable portions of his reports. Ask what the original source was wearing if it can be checked.

RECOGNITION SIGNAL: A discreet but visible means of informing an unknown person – a control agent or cut-out – that you are the agent with whom he should make contact. Example: specified magazine.

ROLLING UP A NET: Arresting members of an intelligence apparatus (net) after the initial detection of its existence.

RUMOR: A false but plausible story put into circulation with the aim of causing harm to one's adversary.

SAFE HOUSE: A house or apartment rented by a person with no discernible connection to an intelligence agency and used for clandestine meetings with agents and other contacts. Small apartments hired out by out-of-town businessman who travels frequently and needs a place to overnight. Encourage junk mail.

SECURE TELEPHONE: A telephone connection equipped with scramblers or other devices so that overheard conversations cannot be understood.

SHAKING OFF THE DOGS: Losing a surveillance team.

SHOPWORN GOODS: A would-be defector's information, so dated or remote as to be worthless to the other side.

SIGNATURE: The individual touch used by a wireless radio operator which indicates his personal transmitting pattern.

SINGLETON: An individual agent operating alone, rather than as a member of a net or through a chain of intermediaries.

SLEEPER AGENT; SLEEPER: An agent put into a circumstance or situation where his sole job is to wait until it becomes possible for him to actively gather intelligence, regardless of the length of time required.

SNITCH JACKET: Neutralize a target by labeling him as a snitch, or informant, so that he would no longer be trusted.

SOLD: Adjective describing an agent who has been deliberately betrayed by his own side.

SOUND MAN: Wiretapping or bugging expert.

SOURCE PROTECT: A warning phrase at the start of a communication that directs that the contents be tightly guarded, even within the receiving office.

STAY-BEHIND NETS: Clandestine infrastructures of leaders trained and equipment ready to be called into action as sabotage and espionage forces, generally in areas subject to enemy occupation. Cache of weapons, explosives, radio transmitters.

STRINGER: A low-level agent who lives or works in proximity to an intelligence target and who passes along whatever information is acquired in the course of daily business. Minimal training – low pay with bonuses.

SUBMERGE: To disappear from sight once within the target country, usually to reappear later with new identification papers, cover story and physical appearance.

SURFACING: Publicizing a defector, either through a carefully sanitized article or through a public press conference.

SURVEILLANCE: Following a subject of intelligence interest, either by foot or by vehicle. Loose – no detection. Tight – do not lose.

SW (Secret Writing): Writing modified, usually by chemical means, to remain invisible.

TALENT-SPOTTER: A deep-cover agent responsible for spotting persons who are suitable recruits for intelligence work. Does recruiting, or just passes prospects along to others.

TARGET STUDY: A compilation of all available information on a person being considered for recruitment as an intelligence source. Existing file material, surveillance for up to two months, vulnerability to pitch – money, blackmail.

TASK: An assignment for intelligence personnel.

TECHNICAL COVERAGE: Euphemism for a wiretap or bug.

TELEGRAPH: A prearranged signal that tells an agent he should pick up material from a "dead drop." Example: Chalk mark on fence.

THIRD COUNTRY OPERATIONS: Using a base in one country as a means of gaining access to intelligence of other countries, and of conducting operations elsewhere in the geographical area.

TOSS: To enter and search, surreptitiously (and perhaps illegally), the living quarters or office of a person who is a suspect in an espionage or criminal case.

TRADECRAFT: The methods by which an intelligence agency conducts its business.

TURN: To persuade an enemy agent to go to work for one's own intelligence service, either through persuasion or coercion. An agent so persuaded is said to be "turned."

WALK-INS: Persons who volunteer their services to an espionage agency. Be very cautious of walk-ins – could be a plant.

WALK-PAST: The appearance by an illegal agent working abroad, at a set time and place, so that he can be observed by an officer of the illegals' support staff working in the area.

WATCH LIST: A compilation of names of persons considered of interest to the intelligence community. Border crossing points.

WET WORK: An operation involving the shedding of blood. KGB term.

WHITE CROW: KGB term for someone who stands out in a crowd, a situation to be avoided by a covert agent.

WHITE INTELLIGENCE: Information gleaned from such overt sources as foreign publications and broadcasts.

WITTING: A person who knowingly cooperates with an intelligence agency.