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# CookieLock Smart Contract Security Audit For Cookiesale



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## Summary

This report has been prepared for CookieSale and focuses on overall system architecture and codebase against issues, vulnerabilities, exploitations, hacks, and back-doors in the source code of CookieLock future as well as any contract dependencies that were not part of an officially recognized library. An advanced examination has been performed, utilizing Static Analysis and Manual Review techniques.

The audit result classified with categories as "Critical, Major, Medium, Minor and Informational". Each finding evaluated by our experts and corrective/preventive recommendations provided to catch up a high level of security standard.

## Auditing Approach and Applied Methodologies

The auditing process pays special attention to the following considerations:

- Code design patterns analysis in which smart contract architecture is reviewed to ensure it is structured according to industry standards and safe use of third-party smart contracts and libraries.
- Line-by-line inspection of the Smart Contract to find any potential vulnerability like race conditions, transaction-ordering dependence, timestamp dependence, and denial of service attacks.
- Unit testing Phase, we coded/conducted custom unit tests written for each function in the contract to verify that each function works as expected.
- Automated Test performed with our in-house developed tools to identify vulnerabilities and security flaws of the Smart Contract.

## Security

Identifying security related issues within each contract and the system of contract.

## Sound Architecture

Evaluation of the architecture of this system through the lens of established smart contract best practices and general software best practices.

## Code Correctness and Quality

A full review of the contract source code. The primary areas of focus include:

- Accuracy

- Readability

- Sections of code with high complexity

- Quantity and quality of test coverage

## Overview

### Project Summary

| | |
|---|---|
| Project Name | CookieSale |
| Audited Future | Cookielock |
| Platform | Multichain |
| Language | Solidity |
| Delivery Date | June 30, 2022 |
| Audit Methodology | Static Analysis, Manual Review |

## Audited Code Package



Locker.zip

## Vulnerability Summary

| Vulnerability Level | Total | Acknowledged | Partially Resolved | Resolved |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Major | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Medium | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Minor | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Informational | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0 |

## Findings

| Title | Severity | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Centralization Risk | Major | Resolved |
| Unrestricted Range of setFee | Medium | Resolved |
| Check Effect Interaction Pattern Violated | Informational | Acknowledged |
| Proper Usage of "public" and "external" type | Informational | Acknowledged |
| Lack of Zero Address Validation | Informational | Acknowledged |
| getTotalLockCount May Return Inaccurate Result | Informational | Acknowledged |

# Centralization Risk

| Severity | Location | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Major | CookieLock.sol:82 | Resolved |

## Description

In the contract CookieLock.sol , the role owner has the authority over the following function:

- setPoolManager() : the owner can modify the _poolManager to any arbitrary address.
- setFee() : the owner can modify the fee to any arbitrary amount.
- withdrawFee() : the owner can withdraw all the contract balance to the owner's address.

Any compromise to the owner account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this and modify the contract state.

## Recommendation

We advise the client to carefully manage the owner account's private key to avoid any potential risks of being hacked.

In general, we strongly recommend centralized privileges or roles in the protocol to be improved via a decentralized mechanism or smart-contract-based accounts with enhanced security practices, e.g., Multisignature wallets.

Indicatively, here is some feasible suggestions that would also mitigate the potential risk at the different level in term of short-term and long-term:

- Time-lock with reasonable latency, e.g., 48 hours, for awareness on privileged operations.
- Assignment of privileged roles to multi-signature wallets to prevent a single point of failure due to the private key.
- Introduction of a DAO/governance/voting module to increase transparency and user involvement.

## Mitigation

The development team renounced the ownership

# Unrestricted Range of setFee

| Severity | Location | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Medium | CookieLock:166-168 | Resolved |

## Description
In function setFee() , the value of fee can be updated by owner , yet without any explicit restriction on the upper and lower bounds of the fee. Therefore, the owner can set a very high fee on the operations in extreme cases. Thus, the user might suffer unexpected loss.

## Recommendation
We advise the client to set an explicit range restriction for the fee to ensure the fair distribution of the fees between the team operation and projects' community.

## Mitigation
The development team renounced the ownership

# Check Effect Interaction Pattern Violated

| Severity | Location | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Informational | CookieLock.sol:342-366 | Acknowledged |

## Description

The order of external call and state manipulation should follow the check-effect-interaction pattern.

## Recommendation

We recommend using the Checks-Effects-Interactions Pattern to avoid the risk of calling unknown contracts or applying OpenZeppelin ReentrancyGuard library - nonReentrant modifier for the aforementioned functions to prevent reentrancy attack.

# Proper Usage of "public" and "external" type

| Severity | Location | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Informational | CookieLock.sol: 382-386-390-394-398-402-410-418-436-454-458-471-480-484-497-506-510-514 | Acknowledged |

## Description

Public functions that are never called by the contract could be declared as external. When the inputs are arrays, external functions are more gas efficient than "public" functions. Below is a list of functions whose visibilities can be modified to "external":

- allLocks() ;
- getTotalLockCount() ;
- getLock() ;
- allLpTokenLockedCount() ;
- allNormalTokenLockedCount() ;
- getCumulativeLpTokenLockInfoAt() ;
- getCumulativeNormalTokenLockInfoAt() ;
- getCumulativeLpTokenLockInfo() ;
- getCumulativeNormalTokenLockInfo() ;
- totalTokenLockedCount() ;
- lpLockCountForUser() ;
- lpLocksForUser() ;
- lpLockForUserAtIndex() ;
- normalLockCountForUser() ;
- normalLocksForUser() ;
- normalLockForUserAtIndex() ;
- totalLockCountForUser() ;
- totalLockCountForToken() ;

## Recommendation

We advise the client to consider using the external attribute for functions never called within the contract.

# Lack of Zero Address Validation

| Severity | Location | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Informational | CookieLock.sol:174-180 | Acknowledged |

## Description
The variables _owner, _token should be verified as a non-zero value to prevent being mistakenly assigned as address (0)

## Recommendation
We advise the client to check that the aforementioned variables are not zero address.

## *getTotalLockCount* May Return Inaccurate Result

| Severity | Location | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Informational | CookieLock.sol:386-388 | Acknowledged |

### Description

getTotalLockCount() returns the number of total locked positions by querying the length of _locks array.

However, the _lock array never removes locked positions when unlock() is called. Therefore, getTotalLockCount() returns the number of locked positions that has ever pushed inside of the _locks array instead of the total number of the current locked positions.

### Recommendation

We advise the team to revisit the design and ensure this won't cause trouble to the project.

# SWC Attack Test

| SWC ID | Describtion | Test Result |
|--------|-------------|-------------|
| SWC-100 | Function Visibility | Passed |
| SWC-101 | Integer Overflow and Underflow | Passed |
| SWC-102 | Outdated Compiler Version | Passed |
| SWC-103 | Floating Pragma | Passed |
| SWC-104 | Unchecked Call Return Value | Passed |
| SWC-105 | Unprotected Ether Withdrawal | Passed |
| SWC-106 | Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction | Passed |
| SWC-107 | Re-entrancy | Passed |
| SWC-108 | State Variable Default Visibility | Passed |
| SWC-109 | Uninitialized Storage Pointer | Passed |
| SWC-110 | Assert Violation | Passed |
| SWC-111 | Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions | Passed |
| SWC-112 | Delegate Call to Untrusted Callee | Passed |
| SWC-113 | DoS with Failed Call | Passed |
| SWC-114 | Transaction Order Dependence | Passed |
| SWC-115 | Authorization through tx.origin | Passed |
| SWC-116 | A control flow decision is made based on The block.timestamp environment variable | Passed |
| SWC-117 | Signature Malleability | Passed |
| SWC-118 | Incorrect Constructor Name | Passed |
| SWC-119 | Shadowing State Variables | Passed |
| SWC-120 | Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes | Passed |
| SWC-121 | Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks | Passed |
| SWC-122 | Lack of Proper Signature Verification | Passed |
| SWC-123 | Requirement Violation | Passed |
| SWC-124 | Write to Arbitrary Storage Location | Passed |
| SWC-125 | Incorrect Inheritance Order | Passed |
| SWC-126 | Insufficient Gas Griefing | Passed |
| SWC-127 | Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable | Passed |
| SWC-128 | DoS With Block Gas Limit | Passed |
| SWC-129 | Typographical Error | Passed |
| SWC-130 | Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E) | Passed |
| SWC-131 | Presence of unused variables | Passed |
| SWC-132 | Unexpected Ether balance | Passed |
| SWC-133 | Hash Collisions with Multiple Variable Length Arguments | Passed |
| SWC-134 | Message call with hardcoded gas amount | Passed |
| SWC-135 | Code With No Effects (Irrelevant/Dead Code) | Passed |
| SWC-136 | Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain | Passed |

# Disclaimer

This is a limited report on our findings based on our analysis, in accordance with good industry practice as at the date of this report, in relation to cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in the framework and algorithms based on smart contracts, the details of which are set out in this report. To get a full view of our analysis, it is crucial for you to read the full report. While we have done our best in conducting our analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report and cannot claim against us based on what it says or doesn't say, or how we produced it, and it is important for you to conduct your own independent investigations before making any decisions. We go into more detail on this in the below disclaimer below – please make sure to read it in full.

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The analysis of the security is purely based on the smart contracts alone. No applications or operations were reviewed for security. No product code has been reviewed. If you have any doubt about the Genuity for this document, please check QR code: