

Ideology, Power, and the Persistence of Radical Islamism

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Disclaimer: This essay is a work of strategic analysis grounded in political realism and ideological critique. It does not claim normative neutrality or value-free description. Rather, it advances a reasoned analytical position based on historical precedent, publicly available information, media reporting, expert commentary, and observed patterns in international security and governance. The purpose of this essay is to examine radical Islamism as an ideological system with strategic implications for international order, not merely as a collection of discrete actors or isolated security incidents. The analysis reflects the author's judgment regarding the nature, persistence, and risks of ideologically driven movements that reject pluralism and coexistence. The views expressed are solely those of the author and do not represent any organization, government, or institution. This essay does not constitute legal, financial, or policy advice. While care has been taken to ensure analytical rigor and factual accuracy, the conclusions presented are interpretive and strategic in nature. Readers are encouraged to engage critically, consult diverse sources, and evaluate alternative analytical frameworks.

Modern international politics increasingly underestimates the role of ideology in shaping long-term conflict. While contemporary security discourse often emphasizes tactical counterterrorism, sanctions, or limited military engagement, these tools are insufficient when confronting movements rooted in totalizing belief systems. Radical Islamism—defined here as a political ideology that seeks to impose absolutist religious rule through coercion and violence—represents not a localized security challenge, but a systemic ideological threat. Like the revolutionary ideologies of the twentieth century, it operates across borders, adapts to pressure, and exploits institutional weakness. Treating it as a collection of isolated militant groups rather than as a coherent ideological system has repeatedly produced strategic failure.

The Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan illustrates this miscalculation. The U.S.–Taliban Doha Agreement succeeded in ending America's two-decade military involvement, a decision that required significant political resolve. Yet the conclusion of a military campaign did not resolve the underlying ideological conflict. Instead, it transferred governing authority to a movement whose worldview explicitly rejects pluralism, women's education, modern legal norms, and international accountability. The result was not moderation through responsibility, but ideological consolidation. The experience of the Doha Agreement further demonstrates the limits of negotiating with radical Islamist movements. Since returning to power, the Taliban have violated the core commitments of the agreement, including inclusive governance, prevention of terrorist activity, and engagement with the international community. Worse, Taliban officials have publicly stated that the Doha Agreement is no longer valid. This admission underscores a critical analytical point: agreements with radical Islamist movements are tactical instruments, not enduring political contracts. Once immediate objectives—such as the withdrawal of foreign forces—are achieved, the

movement discards obligations, reflecting an ideological framework in which compromise is a temporary expedient, not a principle.

A particularly concerning misconception among some policymakers is the belief that the Taliban can be “managed” or leveraged strategically to influence other actors, such as Iran. Those who advocate this approach fundamentally misunderstand the nature of radical Islamist ideology. Radical Islamism, like antisemitism, is a self-reinforcing worldview: it is absolute in its moral and political claims, deeply entrenched, and impervious to short-term incentives or tactical engagement. Appeasement, tolerance, or attempts at instrumental manipulation do not moderate its behavior; they facilitate its consolidation and expansion. The Taliban exemplify this dynamic. This organization has historically sponsored and harbored extremist groups within Afghanistan, both during its first regime and under its current rule. Its return to power demonstrates the cumulative danger of allowing ideologically driven movements to govern unchecked. Attempts to influence or co-opt the Taliban—whether by regional actors or external powers—ignore the ideological rigidity that underpins its governance. Radical Islamist movements do not behave like pragmatic state actors that can be incentivized through conditional engagement; they act in accordance with absolutist principles, viewing compromise as tactical rather than normative. Providing support or tolerating the Taliban under the assumption that they can be turned against Iran not only misunderstands the ideology but risks enabling the continued spread of extremist influence and governance. A recent and deeply concerning manifestation of radical Islamist ideology is its exploitation of antisemitism for strategic effect. Since October 7, there has been a notable rise in attacks on Jewish populations in various regions. Radical Islamist groups often deliberately frame or conduct violence in ways that lead observers to interpret it solely as antisemitism, obscuring the underlying ideological motivations rooted in radical Islam. This misinterpretation can lull policymakers and the public into treating the problem as a discrete hate phenomenon rather than as a component of a broader transnational ideological threat.

Radical Islamism is historically and conceptually derivative of antisemitism but far exceeds it in scope, ambition, and destructiveness. Where antisemitism is a prejudicial ideology targeting a specific community, radical Islamism constitutes a global, absolutist political-religious worldview aiming to restructure societies, governments, and international norms according to its principles. It is designed to dominate, coerce, and eradicate pluralism. Viewed in this light, radical Islamism represents perhaps the most destructive ideological system in human history, surpassing antisemitism in both scale and potential for violence. Attempts to interpret radical Islamist attacks merely through the lens of antisemitism are therefore misleading and dangerous. Understanding radical Islamism on its own terms—its absolutist aims, governance structures, and ideological endurance—is essential for formulating an effective response. This outcome underscores a central limitation of local counterterrorism and diplomatic measures. Tactical actions—targeted strikes, arrests, intelligence disruption, or negotiated agreements—can suppress violence temporarily, but they do not defeat ideologies capable of governing territory, shaping education, regulating social life, and defining moral authority. As long as radical Islamist movements retain the ability to function as political systems, they will regenerate networks and adapt to pressure. The continued presence of ISIS-K within Taliban-controlled Afghanistan demonstrates this dynamic. Fragmented extremism often thrives within the same structural conditions.

Ideological conflicts cannot be resolved solely through policing or episodic military engagement. Historical precedent is instructive. Fascism and Nazism were not defeated through enforcement alone, but through the dismantling of governing institutions, economic systems, propaganda structures, and ideological legitimacy. The Cold War provides an equally relevant example. The collapse of the Soviet Union was not inevitable, nor was it driven solely by internal economic inefficiency. It followed decades of sustained ideological, economic, political, and strategic pressure by Western societies that treated communism as a hostile ideology, not merely a competing state system. Containment, deterrence, sanctions, alliance-building, information competition, and technological rivalry gradually eroded the legitimacy and viability of Soviet communism. Had Western societies chosen accommodation over confrontation—treating communist expansion as a localized security issue rather than an ideological threat—the Soviet system might have endured far longer. The lesson is clear: ideologies that claim universal validity and reject coexistence do not dissolve through concessions alone. They recede when their capacity to govern, mobilize, and legitimize themselves is systematically dismantled.

China presents a contrasting case that highlights the importance of analytical precision. While the Chinese Communist Party remains politically communist, China's economic system has evolved into a hybrid model incorporating market mechanisms, global trade, and pragmatic adaptation. This transformation reflects strategic flexibility rather than ideological rigidity. Moreover, China's contemporary political reality cannot be understood without reference to its historical experience—particularly the "Century of Humiliation," which continues to shape national identity, sovereignty concerns, and sensitivity to external pressure. As a result, China's system, while authoritarian, does not function as a revolutionary transnational ideology seeking to export itself through religious absolutism or global insurgency. Its priorities center on state continuity, economic growth, and national cohesion rather than ideological evangelism. While China poses serious strategic and normative challenges to the international order, these challenges operate through state competition, not through the dismantling of pluralism via transnational ideological warfare. Conflating all non-liberal systems into a single category of ideological threat risks analytical dilution and strategic overreach.

Radical Islamism, by contrast, explicitly rejects coexistence. It frames compromise as betrayal, pluralism as corruption, and persistence as moral virtue. Allowing it to govern states provides the institutional infrastructure—schools, courts, borders, and security forces—through which it reproduces itself. A recurring pattern in global discourse further complicates efforts to confront radical Islamism: the deliberate propagation of the narrative that Western societies are responsible for its emergence. This argument is most frequently advanced by states that are strategic competitors of the West or former adversaries seeking to reposition themselves as alternative centers of moral and political authority. It is a narrative designed less to explain reality than to obscure responsibility. In practice, radical Islamist ideologies were not imposed on societies by Western states; they emerged within specific political, social, and institutional environments where governance collapsed, pluralism was suppressed, and absolutist interpretations of religion were allowed—or encouraged—to dominate public life. Western societies did not create radical Islamism; they fought it, often at significant cost. The historical record is unambiguous on this point.

Russia's contemporary posture toward Afghanistan illustrates this contradiction clearly. Moscow has moved toward recognizing the Taliban and engaging with them diplomatically, framing its approach as pragmatic realism while simultaneously advancing the claim that Western intervention gave rise to radical Islamist extremism. This framing ignores both history and agency. Russia has long demonstrated a capacity to exploit global mispricing situations—political, economic, and moral—to project soft power, particularly in regions where Western credibility has been weakened. Afghanistan and parts of the Middle East have become fertile ground for this strategy. Yet the same actors that blame Western societies for radical Islamism were conspicuously absent during the moments when confronting it mattered most. Where was Russia when Osama bin Laden operated freely in Afghanistan? Where was Russia when the Twin Towers were destroyed? Where was Russia when Ahmad Shah Massoud—the leader of the Northern Alliance and one of the most effective indigenous opponents of both the Taliban and al-Qaeda—was assassinated two days before September 11, 2001? These were decisive inflection points in the modern struggle against radical Islamist movements. The silence and inaction of many states during these events undermine later claims of moral clarity. Similar dynamics appear elsewhere. Recent statements suggesting that Russia would support Venezuela must be evaluated in light of Venezuela's role in transnational narcotics trafficking and its documented impact on U.S. domestic security. Just as the British Empire once weaponized the opium trade to weaken Chinese society, contemporary narcotics networks function as tools of strategic degradation. These phenomena deserve serious attention. Yet even amid these challenges, they should not distract from the existential nature of radical Islamist ideology itself.

The central danger lies not in any single state or criminal economy, but in the survival of an ideology that seeks permanent confrontation with pluralism, democracy, and coexistence. Radical Islamism thrives when responsibility is externalized, when its origins are misattributed, and when its governing expressions are treated as legitimate political actors rather than ideological systems incompatible with international order. To be clear, confronting radical Islamism does not mean collective punishment, cultural hostility, or religious repression. It means denying the ideology the ability to govern, institutionalize itself, and reproduce across generations. Ideologies, unlike populations, can and must be dismantled. Fascism, Nazism, and revolutionary communism were not defeated by denial or accommodation, but by sustained ideological, political, economic, and strategic pressure. Radical Islamism is no different.

Allowing narratives that absolve its internal origins while blaming those who resisted it only prolongs its lifespan. The persistence of radical Islamist governance is not an accident of Western policy; it is the result of repeated failures to confront ideology directly and consistently. If treated honestly—rather than reframed through geopolitical deflection—radical Islamism can be deprived of legitimacy, territory, and institutional power. Only then can it cease to function as a global threat.

Several broader lessons emerge from the study of radical Islamism and Taliban governance:

1. Ideologies that reject coexistence cannot be neutralized through tactical counterterrorism or local military measures alone.
2. Agreements with radical Islamist movements—such as the Doha Agreement—are often tactical, not enduring; ideological commitments outweigh legal obligations.
3. Attempting to leverage extremist movements, such as the Taliban, against other states (e.g., Iran) misunderstands the nature of radical Islamism and risks enabling its persistence.
4. Radical Islamism deliberately exploits antisemitism to mislead observers, obscure its true objectives, and consolidate ideological power.
5. States that were absent during key confrontations but now blame the West distort historical responsibility.
6. Power vacuums amplify risk; disengagement without durable governance frameworks enables extremist regeneration.
7. Structural capacity matters: less educated, economically marginalized societies under absolutist ideological rule produce transnational instability more readily than institutionally strong states.
8. Ideological threats require multi-dimensional pressure: sanctions, counter-ideological engagement, isolation of extremist regimes, and support for alternative governance structures.
9. Historical precedent demonstrates that confronting ideology—rather than merely actors—is essential for durable strategic success, as seen with Soviet communism.
10. Differentiation of threats is critical: authoritarian regimes like China operate strategically but do not replicate radical ideological expansionism; analytical precision avoids strategic overreach.
11. Legitimacy, governance capacity, and institutional control are central: eliminating these for extremist movements undermines their long-term ability to operate.
12. Engagement without ideological accountability risks empowering regimes to consolidate power while discarding external obligations.
13. Long-term stability depends on integrating ideological defeat with strategic partnerships, trust-building, and credible deterrence.

In conclusion, the challenge posed by radical Islamism is not a simple choice between engagement and force, but the integration of multiple strategic tools to systematically dismantle the capacity of extremist ideologies to govern, mobilize, and persist. Tactical agreements, temporary military actions, and local interventions are insufficient unless combined with sustained pressure, ideological countermeasures, and long-term institution-building. Recognizing the ideological dimension of conflict—rather than treating it as episodic security threats—is essential to preventing future instability and ensuring that disengagement does not empower radical movements to regenerate.