

Formal Verification with The Certora Prover



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Formal Verification with the Certora Prover

The Certora Prover is a tool for finding bugs in smart contracts


- ▶ Developers specify the intended behavior of the contract
 - ▶ Prover uses specs written in Certora Verification Language (CVL)
 - ▶ Specs are like unit tests ...but infinitely more powerful
- ▶ The Prover checks that the contracts obey those properties
 - ▶ in all circumstances! (every possible storage, every possible input)

The Prover relies on results of decades of research in formal verification


- ▶ Both academic and industrial

Formal Verification vs. Fuzzing

Fuzzing:



Formal verification (Certora Prover):



Certora Verification Language (CVL) Features:

- ▶ Solidity-like syntax
 - ▶ Specs can call methods, assign variables, define functions, ...
 - ▶ Use `require` to write preconditions, `assert` to describe behavior
- ▶ Reason about arbitrary values
 - ▶ Prover considers **every possible combination** of values for undefined variables.
 - ▶ Prover considers **every possible combination** of values of storage variables
- ▶ Syntax for calling an arbitrary method
 - ▶ e.g. if any method increases any user's allowance, the user was the sender
- ▶ Access internal contract state
 - ▶ e.g. everytime `_balances[a]` changes, update `sum_balances`
- ▶ Explicit syntax for writing state invariants
 - ▶

```
invariant totalSupplyBoundsBalances(address a)
    balanceOf(a) <= totalSupply()
```
- ▶ Reason about reverting paths
 - ▶ e.g. in emergency mode, `withdraw` never reverts unless ...
- ▶ Rewind storage to a previous state
 - ▶ e.g. Rerunning with more permissions doesn't cause revert

Example / demo

```
/// Transfer must move `amount` tokens from
/// the caller's account to `recipient`.
rule transferSpec {
  address sender; address recip; uint amount;

  env e;
  require e.msg.sender == sender;


  mathint balance_sender_before = balanceOf(sender);
  mathint balance_recip_before  = balanceOf(recip);

  transfer(e, recip, amount);

  mathint balance_sender_after = balanceOf(sender);
  mathint balance_recip_after  = balanceOf(recip);

  assert balance_sender_after == balance_sender_before - amount,
    "transfer must decrease sender's balance by amount";

  assert balance_recip_after  == balance_recip_before + amount,
    "transfer must increase recipient's balance by amount";
}
```

Results		Contract list
<input type="text" value="Type to filter"/>		All results ▾ 
▼	✖ transferSpec	0s
└─ ✖ 💬 "transfer must decrease sender's balance by amount"		0s

Example / demo

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  assert balance_sender_after == balance_sender_before - amount,
    "transfer must decrease sender's balance by amount";

  assert balance_recip_after  == balance_recip_before + amount,
    "transfer must increase recipient's balance by amount";
}
```

Variables

Call resolution

Local Variables

balance_sender_before	2
recip	0xffff
balance_recip_before	2
amount	2
sender	0xffff
balance_sender_after	2
e.msg.sender	0xffff
e.block.coinbase	0x401
e.msg.value	0
e.msg.address	3
balance_recip_after	2

Example / demo

```
/// Transfer must move `amount` tokens from
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rule transferSpec {
  address sender; address recip; uint amount;

  env e;
  require e.msg.sender == sender;

  mathint balance_sender_before = balanceOf(sender);
  mathint balance_recip_before  = balanceOf(recip);

  transfer(e, recip, amount);

  mathint balance_sender_after = balanceOf(sender);
  mathint balance_recip_after  = balanceOf(recip);

  require sender != recip;

  assert balance_sender_after == balance_sender_before - amount,
    "transfer must decrease sender's balance by amount";

  assert balance_recip_after  == balance_recip_before  + amount,
    "transfer must increase recipient's balance by amount";
}
```

Job ID

ccb265240dc4db801fad

Start 08/23/2022 08:40:29

Status

SUCCEEDED

Duration 00:00:24

Results

Contract list

🔍 Type to filter

All results ▼



✓ transferSpec

0s

Verification is only as good as the specification

We're currently developing tools to find bugs in specifications:

- ▶ Vacuity checking, tautology checking
 - ▶ Sanity checks to flag rules that couldn't possibly catch bugs
- ▶ Bug injection
 - ▶ Verifying versions with known bugs against the spec
 - ▶ Specs with good coverage should catch them!
- ▶ Mutation testing
 - ▶ Automatically change the code in ways that probably introduce bugs
 - ▶ e.g. remove method decorators, change `require` statements, ...
 - ▶ Specs with good coverage should catch them!

Thank you!

Questions?

<https://demo.certora.com>