D. Password-change phase

The proposed scheme allows a legitimated embedded device (SM_i) to change the password periodically, thereby ensuring security. To change the password, the smart meter (SM_i) first perform authentication and authorization and prove their genuineness (See Fig. 1). The details of the password change are as follows:

Step 1. $\boldsymbol{SM_i \rightarrow SP}$: $< I_i^*, P_{ke}^* >$. The authorized legitimated embedded device (SM_i) selects a new password Psw_i^* and then recomputes the hashed identity ($I_i^* = H(ID_i \,||Psw_i^*)$) and public key ($P_{ke}^* = Psw_i^*.G$). Subsequently, it sends the updated $<I_i^*, P_{ke}^*>$to SP through a trusted public channel by using the session key S_K.

Step 2. $\boldsymbol{SP \rightarrow SM_i}$: $< CID_i^*, CK'^* >$. Furthermore, SP receive updated parameters $<I_i^*, P_{ke}^* >$ and then SP selects a random number $R^*$and then recomputes all parameters ($CID_i{}^*$ =h(R$\|$ I_i^* $\|$s) $\oplus$ s, $CID_i{}'^* = CID_i{}^*$.G , $CK^* = h(R^*||s||E_t||CID_i{}^*)$, $CK^{*'} = CK^*$.G, $T = R^* \oplus h(R^* || I_i^* ||s\ )$, $A = T \oplus I_i^* \oplus CK^{*'}$, $t' = T \oplus CID_i{}^* \oplus$ s $\oplus ID_{TS}$, $a' = A \oplus CID_i{}^* \oplus$ s $\oplus ID_{TS}$, and $e_t' = E_t \oplus CID_i{}^* \oplus$ s $\oplus ID_{TS}$) which are mentioned in registration Subsection III.*B*. Subsequently, *TS* stores the parameters $<t', a', e_t'>$ in the server database and sends the updated $< CID_i{}^*, CK^{*'} >$ to the server *TS* through an open trusted channel by using the session key (S_K).



Fig.1. Password-change phase