With no explanation, label text_A→text_B with either "DON'T KNOW", "NO" or "YES".
text_A: Within three months of sending troops to Yemen in 1962, Nasser realized that the engagement would require a larger commitment than anticipated. By early 1963, he would begin a four-year campaign to extricate Egyptian forces from Yemen, using an unsuccessful face-saving mechanism, only to find himself committing more troops. A little less than 5,000 troops were sent in October 1962. Two months later, Egypt had 15,000 regular troops deployed. By late 1963, the number was increased to 36,000; and in late 1964, the number rose to 50,000 Egyptian troops in Yemen. Late 1965 represented the high-water mark of Egyptian troop commitment in Yemen at 55,000 troops, which were broken into 13 infantry regiments of one artillery division, one tank division from the Egyptian Armoured Corps and several Special Forces as well as airborne regiments. All the Egyptian field commanders complained of a total lack of understanding among the enlisted ranks of the topographical maps that had been distributed to them, which caused a real problem in the first months of the war.
text_B: Assuming that the terrain itself had not changed significantly, could the discovery of a cache of maps used by British and/or German troops in World War II have been of help to the Egyptian commanders at the onset of this war?
NO.