

# Digital Signatures

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## Group Theory Recap

# Groups

## Definition

A set  $G$  with a binary operation  $\star$  defined on it is called a group if

- the operation  $\star$  is associative,
- there exists an identity element  $e \in G$  such that for any  $a \in G$

$$a \star e = e \star a = a,$$

- for every  $a \in G$ , there exists an element  $b \in G$  such that

$$a \star b = b \star a = e.$$

## Example

- Modulo  $n$  addition on  $\mathbb{Z}_n = \{0, 1, 2, \dots, n-1\}$

# Cyclic Groups

## Definition

A finite group is a group with a finite number of elements. The order of a finite group  $G$  is its cardinality.

## Definition

A cyclic group is a finite group  $G$  such that each element in  $G$  appears in the sequence

$$\{g, g \star g, g \star g \star g, \dots\}$$

for some particular element  $g \in G$ , which is called a generator of  $G$ .

## Example

$\mathbb{Z}_6 = \{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}$  is a cyclic group with a generator 1

## $\mathbb{Z}_n$ and $\mathbb{Z}_n^*$

- For an integer  $n \geq 1$ ,  $\mathbb{Z}_n = \{0, 1, 2, \dots, n-1\}$ 
  - Operation is addition modulo  $n$
  - $\mathbb{Z}_n$  is cyclic with generator 1
- For an integer  $n \geq 2$ ,  $\mathbb{Z}_n^* = \{i \in \mathbb{Z}_n \setminus \{0\} \mid \gcd(i, n) = 1\}$ 
  - Operation is multiplication modulo  $n$
  - $|\mathbb{Z}_n^*| = n-1$  if  $n$  is a prime
  - $\mathbb{Z}_n^*$  is cyclic if  $n$  is a prime
- **Definition:** If  $G$  is a cyclic group of order  $q$  with generator  $g$ , then for  $h \in G$  the unique  $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q$  which satisfies  $g^x = h$  is called the discrete logarithm of  $h$  with respect to  $g$ .
- Finding DLs is easy in  $\mathbb{Z}_n$
- Finding DLs is hard in  $\mathbb{Z}_n^*$

# Cryptography based on the Discrete Logarithm Problem

# Diffie-Hellman Protocol

- Alice and Bob wish to generate a shared secret key using a public channel
  1. Alice runs a group generation algorithm to get  $(G, q, g)$  where  $G$  is a cyclic group of order  $q$  with generator  $g$ .
  2. Alice chooses a uniform  $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q$  and computes  $h_A = g^x$ .
  3. Alice sends  $(G, q, g, h_A)$  to Bob.
  4. Bob chooses a uniform  $y \in \mathbb{Z}_q$  and computes  $h_B = g^y$ . He sends  $h_B$  to Alice. He also computes  $k_B = h_A^y$ .
  5. Alice computes  $k_A = h_B^x$ .

By construction,  $k_A = k_B$ .

- An adversary capable of finding DLs in  $G$  can learn the key

# El Gamal Encryption

- Suppose Bob wants to send Alice an encrypted message
- Alice publishes her public key  $\langle G, q, g, h \rangle$ 
  - $G$  is a cyclic group of order  $q$  with generator  $g$
  - $h = g^x$  where  $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q$  is Alice's secret key
- **Encryption:** For message  $m \in G$ , Bob chooses a uniform  $y \in \mathbb{Z}_q$  and outputs ciphertext

$$\langle g^y, h^y \cdot m \rangle.$$

- **Decryption:** From ciphertext  $\langle c_1, c_2 \rangle$ , Alice recovers

$$\hat{m} := c_2 \cdot c_1^{-x}$$




# Schnorr Identification Scheme

- Let  $G$  be a cyclic group of order  $q$  with generator  $g$
- Identity corresponds to knowledge of private key  $x$  where  $h = g^x$
- A prover wants to prove that she knows  $x$  to a verifier without revealing it
  1. Prover picks  $k \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$  and sends initial message  $I = g^k$
  2. Verifier sends a challenge  $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$
  3. Prover sends  $s = rx + k \bmod q$
  4. Verifier checks  $g^s \cdot h^{-r} \stackrel{?}{=} I$
- Passive eavesdropping does not reveal  $x$ 
  - $(I, r)$  is uniform on  $G \times \mathbb{Z}_q$  and  $s = \log_g(I \cdot y^r)$
  - Transcripts with same distribution can be simulated without knowing  $x$
- If a cheating prover can generate two responses, he can implicitly compute discrete logarithm

# Digital Signatures

# Digital Signatures

- Digital signatures prove that the signer knows private key
- Interactive protocols are not feasible in practice



# References

- Section 10.3, 11.4, 12.5 of *Introduction to Modern Cryptography*, J. Katz, Y. Lindell, 2nd edition